News Report

Winter, 1980/1981

The Black American Lobby for Africa and The Caribbean THE U.S. AND AFRICA: 1981-1984 As the Reagan administration puts its ad­ According to Robinson, "The new cast of an increased U.S. military deployment visors on U.S. Africa policy in place, Trans­ foreign policy actors holds little hope for throughout the world to act as " deterrent Africa ' s Washington staff is receiving constructive future relations between the forces" to "illegal intervention " on the part numerous calls from members and others U.S. and Africa. Almost across the board of the Soviets, particularly in the Third concerned about the likely outlook of the they are Globalists in their perspective and World. new advisors toward Africa . Commenting on biased toward the white minority regime in On the question of U.S./South Africa rela­ Secretary of State Alexander Haig's first South Africa ." tions Haig has suggested that South Africa press conference, TransAfrica's Executive Secretary of State, General Alexander Haig, should be included in a western military Director, Randall Robinson , said "It is has wasted no time in establishing a tone of alliance against the Soviet Union thus mak­ already clear that the administration 's preoc­ confrontation with the Soviet Union as a ing South Africa an unofficial member of cupation with U.S./Soviet competition for basic tenent of future U.S. foreign policy. NATO. He believes that possible Soviet ac­ control of resources and political influence Haig's limited knowledge of African affairs is tivities in mineral rich Southern Africa could will shape the course of U.S. foreign policy one reason TransAfrica fears he will be quick trigger a "resource war" which could result toward Africa, leaving little room for serious to assign the continent the role of bat­ in the loss of " 90 percent of several key consideration of African objectives." Tran­ tleground for U.S. / Soviet rivalry. Haig served minerals" to the Western world. According sAfrica and other black groups, including the Nixon / Ford administrations as white to one legislative assistant for TransAfrica , the Congressional Black Caucus, have main­ house chief of staff after having been a "It is perhaps this concern over access to tained that American fortunes in Africa will deputy to national security advisor Henry strategic minerals that allows Haig to elevate not suffer from Cuban or Soviet involvement Kissinger. During his tenure at the national the importance of the white minority regime so much as from a lack of a U.S. policy security council Haig was a persuasive ad­ in South Africa well above the world com­ responsive to Africa's priorities of political vocate of the 1972 Christmas bombings of munity's concern over political and freedom in southern Africa and economic Hanoi. While in the position of NATO Com­ economic freedom for black South Africans. developm·ent throughout Africa. mander from 1975 to 1979, Haig called for (continued on page 6)

Alexander Haig Chester Crocker Richard Allen AFRICA ASKS OF AMERICA: ''ARE YOU WITH US OR AGAINST US?'' Excerpts from a speech by Randall Robinson, given at the Department of State, February 3, 1980, on the occasion of Black History Month.

I strongly believe that American relations the U.S. military occupation of Haiti in Yet given its doubtless importance, Africa with Africa will badly deteriorate in the com­ March 1920. Nor were the foreign policy has traditionally been seen by United States ing years to the mutual detriment of the contributions of the Pan-African Congress policy makers through the fogged lens of United States, Africa and the World . I am Movement founder, W.E.B. DuBois, well Soviet designs on penetration. On issues not yet certain that this course is irreversi­ received in the land of his birth . ranging from South Africa's racial policies ble. A considerable body of evidence in­ Then as now , the general attitude was that to the war in Eritrea, never has the United dicates, however, that it may well be. For blacks should steer clear of foreign policy States focused primarily on understanding similar reasons, I believe that race relations and concentrate on domestic affairs. In the often single-minded course of African within the United States have already begun 1914 blacks were denied passports to attend political, economic and social development to deteriorate. By some curious time tested the Pan African and Versailles Conference in and framed its responses accordingly. As a law of socio-political behavior, in periods of Paris to express their views on the disposi­ consequence of this , opportunities have too economic and strategic trial , those in power, tion of the German colonies in Africa, yet often been lost, policy reverses too frequent­ the advantaged, do not listen to outsiders - Armenian Americans were permitted to ly suffered , and potential friends African outsiders, African-American out­ testify at the Peace Conference on the treat­ squandered because of an American inabili­ siders, the disadvantaged generally. Out­ ment of Armenians after the dismantling of ty to appreciate legitimate African central siders with their grievances left to fester un­ the Ottoman Empire. The full weight of the objectives and the intensity with which ob­ treated are to be swept from public sight, Cointelpro Operation fell on the Late Martin jectives are embraced by broad African con­ unseen and unheard, their problems, to the Luther King following his Riverside Church stituencies. extent that they are described at all, to be speech in 1965 which strongly criticized No issue galvanizes African opinion as described by those in power, to those in U.S. involvement in Vietnam . Today there are does the fundamental affront of South Africa power, in terms that comfort those in power. indefensibly few blacks working inside this to the entire continent of Africa , indeed to Such is the stuff of blindness, a formula for building at serious policy levels and those of the entire African World. South Africa is the sad and costly awakenings. us from the outside who express our con­ only country in the world where the right to Already at home, the term racism has cerns from time to time I dare say are more vote is exclusively reserved to one race. become unfashionable though the awful tolerated than closely listened to. Black South Africans may not own land , social and economic consequences of racism This is tragic indeed , not only for those not move within their own country without clearly have not. Even blacks speak of it less. listened to, but more for a nation proceeding passes or enjoy other social and political The advantaged are tired of it, irritated by in a troubled world without benefit of rights ordinarily associated with citizenship . the stridency. We have gotten the message. counsel from a sign if ica nt segment of its Indeed, South Africa's program of " Separate But this per"nicious disease continues to er­ population . Development" or Ba ntusta nization deprives rode our cities and rip apart the social fabric In the last twenty years the significance of blacks of their fundamental right to citizen­ of our society. How do the suffering at home Africa has increased enormously in the ship . and abroad win the constructive attention of economic and strategic calculus of the There are no peaceful avenues to change those at whose hands in part they suffer? American foreign policy making apparatus. within South Africa; political opposition by Listen to the voices of America . They seek to Thirty-eight percent of the United States im­ whites and blacks alike is met with arbitrary salvage us all. ported petroleum comes from Africa. Much arrest, prolonged detention without charge, I am often asked if blacks are really in­ of the balance of the oil we import from the banning orders, torture and often death . terested in foreign policy, "Isn't this a new Middle East travels sea lanes that Africa Under the Internal Security Act of 1976, the notion7", they ask. I am always deeply of­ rests astride. Growth in United States/Africa Terrorism Act, the Riotous Assemblies Act fended by such questions. They demonstrate trade and investment continues impressively and the Unlawful Organization Act, the the extent to which our society has gone to with badly needed benefits for a sagging South African Police State has unlimited ignore its black holders of a different view. United States economy. From 1970 to 1976 capacity to control and destroy dissent by Indeed, this is hardly a new phenomenon . United States exports to Africa tripled in blacks and whites alike. This nation 's leaders sought to ignore the value. It is projected that exports to Africa Secretary of State Alexander Haig has black abolitionist Frederick Douglass when will increase ten percent annually by 1987 remarked recently that the United States will he pressed for U.S recognition of the two creating in the process some 780 ,000 addi­ stand firm against terrorism. African leaders black independent nations of his time: Haiti tional jobs in the United States. Added to will watch American closely to see how firm and Liberia. American did not heed the urg­ this is an increasing United States the new administration will stand against ings of the NAACP Field Secretary, James dependency on Africa for supplies of the state terrorism of South Africa. Last Weldon Johnson who spared no effort to end minerals vital to our economy and defenses. (continued on page 7)

Page 2 ANGOLA: THE BELEAGUERED NATION "Has the U.S. any moral or legal justification for her objection to Cuban military intervention in Africa? . ... In a situation where the soldiers of South Africa keep on attacking Angola, President Neto felt free to seek foreign assistance to cope with the aggression. After all, it is because the West sustains the racist regimes in Southern Africa that the frontline states are threatened and therefore required to strengthen their military power. " Lagos International Service, Nigeria, January 4, 1978

The United States does not recognize the African territories (Angola , Mozambique, went to the FNLA by way of Zaire in the Angolan Government and has no official Guinea Bissau , Cape Verde and Sao Tome north, South Africa was responsible for presence in Angola. The CIA's intervention in and Principe). In January 1975, the Por­ strengthening UNITA forces in southern Angola in 1975 was very costly for U.S. tuguese worked out a complicated agree­ Angola , a move also related to South African policy throughout Africa . It severely tarnish­ ment (the Alvor Accord) with the three attempts to thwart and monitor SWAPO ed the U.S. Image throughout the continent movements in Angola for a transitional movements in the southern Angola region. and allied the U.S. on the side of the white government and elections to lead to in­ This U.S./South African strategy was intend­ minority regime in South Africa . The dependence. This tripartite government col­ ed to force the MPLA to fight on two fronts American insistance on the removal of lapsed in the summer of 1975. simultaneously causing it to relinquish con­ Cuban troops from Angola as a prerequisite Contrary to the Ford administration's trol over areas in the central and southern of recognition further eliminated the public statements, (which claimed that the regions of the country. possibility of a constructive U.S. role in American intervention in Angola came after, Soviet aid to the MPLA increased in March Angola and thus decreased its influence in and in response to, a Soviet initiative) U.S. 1975 which was one reason for the the region as a whole. The new administra­ U.S. / South African expansion of activities tion of Ronald Reagan has hinted at the that summer. However, it was the South possiblity of renewing CIA activities in African invasion (beginning in August 1975 Angola. According to most Angola analysts and becoming a massive intervention by Oc­ such a policy would only be a repeat of past tober 1975) carried out in cooperation with mistakes resulting in an increase in the CIA and UNITA, which precipitated the Soviet/Cuban influence in southern Africa, introduction of large numbers of Cuban the exact opposite of U.S. objectives in that troops and Soviet arms into Angola. And it region. A review of the situation in Angola was this "unholy" alliance with South Africa might help illuminate a more constructive that discredited UNITA and helped the U.S . policy option toward that country. MPLA achieve legitimacy as the sole govern­ At the time of independence from Par- ing body in Angola . Nothing has more • tugal , in November 1975, foreign internve­ legitimized the Cuban presence in Angola tion in Angola was already well established than this South African aggression in 1975 and had done a great deal to further exacer­ and the continuing attacks that South Africa bate existing internal political and military covert operations in Angola began in January has systematically launched against Angola conflicts between the three rival nationalist 1975 when Portugal announced a target with little respite since their supposed movements. date for Angolan independence. The Na­ withdrawal in March 1976. Armed struggle for the liberation of Angola tional Security Council's "Forty Committee" The secret war being waged by the U.S. in began in earnest in 1961 with the on covert intelligence operations decided in Angola was not revealed to the Congress un­ emergence of the MPLA (Popular Movement January 1975 to provide money and equip­ til the fall of 1975, whereupon Senator for the Liberation of Angola) and the FNLA ment to the FNLA and UNITA. $300 ,000 in Richard Clark and Congressman Charles (National Front for the Liberation of Angola). covert funding was provided to the FNLA Diggs, chairpersons of the respective Con­ A third movement UNITA (National Union for that January, although the first reported U.S. gressional Africa subcommittees in the the Total Independence of Angola) began a assistance for the FNLA was as early as Senate and House of Representatives, held third guerrilla war against the Portuguese in 1962. By mid-summer the U.S. had increas­ hearings on Angola , publicly airing the the late l 960's. Open dissenion among ed its assistance to the FNLA by $30 million . details. By January 1976 both chambers of these groups was a factor in reducing the ef­ The U.S. decision to increase CIA involve­ Congress had voted to adopt the Clark fectiveness of Angolan nationalists and ment in Angola significantly coincided with Amendment which cut off funding for CIA created an inviting arena for foreign in­ a South African plan to intervene militarily. operations in Angola, and prohibited any CIA tervention. Both the U.S. and South Africa hoped to sus­ activity there without explicit Congressional The overthrow of the Salazar regime in Por­ tain the FNLA and UNITA and to thwart the approval. tugal in Apri I 197 4 led to the Portuguese growing influence and military strength of By March 1976 the MPLA had defeated decision to grant independence to all their the MPLA. While the bulk of_ U.S. assistance (continued on page 8)

Page 3 U.S. AID TO AFRICA THREATENED By Mark Wenner David Stockman, the Director of OMB , achieved momentous results yet some pro­ African programs for the Peace Corps and plans to reduce the Carter FY 82 aid budget gress has been made in improving educa­ A.l.D. which in recent years have increased of $8 billion to $5.47 billion , advocating tional institutions, infrastructure, health the percentage of funds and personnel among many things: care , and agricultural practices despite allocated to the region and focused on basic • a greater emphasis on direct economic historically low appropriations. Although the human needs, especially agricultural and security assistance to friendly U.S. is the richest country in the world , it development, will be dealt a great setback. govern men ts. ranks thirteenth on a list of seventeen donor Furthermore, of the three major regional countries, devoting .27% of GNP in 1978 to development banks, Stockman takes special • revocation of $3.24 billion pledge to the foreign assistance inspite of a pledge to con­ aim at the African one. His initiative if sus­ International Development Association tribute 1% of GNP. In the same year tained could jeopardize the future of the (I DA), a multilateral organization that Americans spent more money on alcoholic bank. The other two, the Asian and the Inter­ provides low-interest loans to the beverages, tobacco products, sports, travel, American, would be slated for sharp reduc­ poorest countries of the world . jewelry, and beauty care than on foreign aid. tions two or three years hence. Lastly, the • revocation of a three year pledge to the Moreover, how muct fat can be trimmed in P.L. 480 program despite its spotty history African Development Bank, an organiza­ programs accounting for less than 1% of the of corruption and discouragement of local tion strapped for loanable funds. Federal budget? Lastly, while the Carter in­ production , does provide short term • cutting the Peace Corp budget by 25%. creases would have largely offset inflation , budgetary relief for governments facing grain • eliminating P.L. 480 Title I, a program this budget proposal would entail real shortages. that sells surplus grain. decreases. To informed sources Stockman appears to More specifically , these proposals view Africa as having little importance. • refusal to support real increases in con­ grievously affect sub-Saharan Africa , an area However, the facts do not support him . tributions and eliminate voluntary con­ with 27 of the 38 poorest countries. In Africa has significant economic and tributions to a host of U.N. and other regard to the IDA , unless Stockman relents, diplomatic power. In the U.N ., the 45 sub­ multi latera I organizations concerned it may either collapse since the European Saharan countries in concert with other with health , educational, technological donors would in all likelihood renege as well , Third World nations constitute an over­ and agricultural issues in the Third or if the rumored compromise is struck (one whelming majority on the floor of the World. calling for extending the payment period General Assembly. On the economic front, By stressing short-term political and from 3 to 6 years) the other donor countries sub-Saharan Africa is a treasure trove of strategic interests, Stockman is charged with will probably follow suit, reducing the paid­ natural resources - oil , copper, bauxite, displaying alarming naivete. He has i n monies 50 % be low the origi na I pledge. diamond s, cobalt, uranium , gold, zinc, calculated the cost of these reductions and Presuming the latter course of action , lend­ phosphates, chrome, and columbrium. reallocation of funds as the "loss in in­ ing activities will be sharply curtailed at a Africa supplies the U.S. with 40% of its oil im­ fluence in countries of lesser importance." most critical time. At present Africa faces ports , accounting in large for the running As for the probable impact on recipient growing food deficits, soaring oil import U.S.-Africa trade deficits dating back to countries, he has deemed it negligible since bills, refugee problems, droughts, epidemic 1972. In 1977 this deficit amounted to $6.7 much previous aid was " ineffective", diseases, inadequate transportation net­ billion and in 1978 to $9.9 billion . Also from unresponsive to " U.S. political priorities" , works, unsafe water supplies, and a dearth 1970 to 1976 U.S. exports to Africa have supportive of "state planning efforts" and of technical expertise. With the exception of tripled in value. At present, exports to the " income redistribution " , instead of market­ Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Senegal all the continent are increasing at a rate of 10% per oriented development. Contrary to other sub-Saharan countries are heavy IDA annum and by 1987 some 780 ,000 addi­ Stockman 's reasoning the U.S. cannot borrowers. The alternatives for the " least tional U.S. jobs will be generated in the pro­ withdraw and safely pursue selfish goals. His developed " countries of Asia and Africa are cess. In addition , Stockman overlooks the proposals would effectively scuttle aid as a stark. First, they are poor credit risks for sizeable dollar infusions into the U.S. foreign policy tool , consign the poorest coun­ private commercial banks, Second, The economy from foreign assistance whether tries to a grim future , heighten the possibili­ World Bank, customarily a lender to middle­ through multilateral or bilateral channel s. ty of armed conflict in several regions , and income countries, will al so be forced to For example , A.l.D . in its Congressional destroy U.S. credibility as a responsible reduce concessional outlays if U.S. breaches Presentation for FY 81 estimated that 70 % world leader. If these proposals are sanc­ its commitment to double its capital of its expenditures went for the purchase of tioned, a prominent World Bank official feels subscription . Denied sources of long-term American goods and services. Multilateral in­ the prospects for a stable and propserous financial assistance , these countries' plan­ stitutions likewise procure large amounts of world order are indeed dimmed. ning cycles will be disrupted and be ever U.S . capital goods. When these figures are With scrutiny, Stockman ' s arguments more prone to the caprices of external actors taken into account the real transfers of seem specious. U.S . aid programs have not and events. (continued on page 8)

Page 4 RECENT EVENTS BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS TAKE STAND • On Saturday May 30, 1981 at 7:00 PM, TransAfrica will host its ON SOUTH AFRICA Fourth Annual Benefit Dinner at the Washington Hilton Hotel. In response to a recent TransAfrica request, 70 black mayors and Bishop Desmond Tutu, General Secretary of the South African state legislators in twenty-five states have agreed to introduce legisla­ Council of Churches, will be the guest speaker. Bishop Tutu, whose tion calling for the divestment of public monies from financial institu­ organization represents over 15 million South Africans, has been tions and companies doing business with the Republic of South for years one of South Africa's leading black advocates for freedom. Africa. This swift and broad response encouragingly exceeds the lobby As a consequence, nearly a year ago, the South African government organization's initial expectations. forbade him to travel abroad . Only recently has his passport been TransAfrica officials hope that this national legislation campaign returned to him. Over 2000 guests are expected for this year's combined with the END U.S. SUPPORT FOR SOUTH AFRICA sign cam­ dinner at $75 per plate. paign (see TransAfrica News Report, Fall 1980) will demonstrate clear­ • The memberships of the Congressional Subcommittees on Africa ly to the Reagan administration and to the nation the depth of Afro­ for the 97th Congress are as follows: American commitment to the cause of freedom in South Africa. Senate: Nancy Kassebaum (Chairperson/Rep-KS); Jesse Helms (Rep-NC); S.I. Hayakawa (Rep-CA); Charles Mathias (Rep-MD); Paul Tsongas (Dem-MA); John Glenn (Dem-OH); Chris Dodd (Dem-CT); House of Representatives: Howard Wolpe (Chairperson/Dem-MI); To the Editor: George Crockett (Dem-MI); Steve Solarz (Dem-NY); Gerry Studds Recent news of South African attacks on Mozambique and Angola (Dem-MA); Dennis Eckart (Dem-OH); William Goodling (Rep-PA); appall me especially in light of Secretary of State Haig's avowal to Arlen Erdahl (Rep-MN); Olympia Snowe (Rep-ME); Robert Dornan make the combat of "international terrorism" a foreign policy priority. (Rep-CA). So far, I have neither seen nor heard any vehement condemnations of • From January 8-12, TransAfrica Executive Director Randall Robin­ South Africa's brazen terrorist actions by the State Department. son, attended the African American Institute Conference in Sierra The word terrorist only seems to conjure up images of motley, Leonne. Mr. Robinson chaired the closed plenary session on extremest, underground bands victimizing innocent people. For in­ Namibia at the conference. stance, this label has been given to the PLO and SWAPO . However, • Mark Wenner has joined the staff of TransAfrica as a legislative when Israel or South Africa attack refugee camps, slaughter women assistant for economic affairs. Mr. Wenner is a recent graduate of and children, torture suspects, or invade recognized countries such as the University of Notre Dame where he completed his masters in Lebanon and Angola the Western press and government officials seem economics. strangely timorous and reluctant to criticize. • In mid-February 25 black churches in major cities across the coun­ When will this hypocrisy cease? try received and posted Anti-Apartheid signs in their church yards as part of a national campaign to end U.S. support of South Africa. Carolyn Lane The cities are: Atlanta, Washington, Gary, St. Louis, Brooklyn, Chicago, IL Phialdelphia, New Orleans, Chicago, Cleveland, Birmingham, Newark, Boston, Norfolk, Nashville, Pittsburgh, Jacksonville, Bridgeport, Detroit, Indianapolis, Dallas, Los Angeles, San Fran­ TransAfrica welcomes letters from readers. We would like to hear your cisco, Baltimore and Richmond. If you would like to order a sign views on. U.S.-Africa/Caribbean issues. Letters to the Editor for for your organization or institution please call Dolores Clemons of publication must include the writer's name, address and telephone our staff at 2021223-9666. number.

ACTION ALERTS TRANSAFRICA NEWS REPORT Write, call or send telegrams to President Ronald Reagan and tell him that: Vol. 1, No. 8 Winter 1980/ 1981 • The United States must use every measure to pressure South Africa to accept a speedy implementation of the United Nations Security Council plan for the in­ 1325 18th Street, N.W. dependence of Namibia through democratic elections. At the January all parties Suite 202 Geneva conference in Namibia, South Africa refused SWAPO's offer for a ceasefire Washington, D.C. 20036 preceding elections and has continued its illegal military occupation of Namibia.

NOTE: Please respond immediately. Your involvement may mean the difference be­ Editor: Salih Abdul-Rahim tween a protracted war and independence for Namibia.

Page 5 U.S./AFRICA: 1981-1984 (cont'd. from page 1)

Or perhaps it is the racial attitude of General Overseas Companies of Portugal , represen­ ment. Haig that brings him to this ill-fated conclu­ ting Portuguese interests in Angola and It is interesting to note that Marion sion." On this point Roger Morris, a former Mozambique. In this capacity Allen pro­ Smoak, a registered Washington foreign NSC staffer, provides some insight to Haig's moted U.S. investment in these two Por­ agent for the existing South African character in his book on Henry Kissinger en­ tuguese colonies. Following the Wiriyamu designated government in Namibia, served titled Uncertain Greatness, when he reveals massacre in Mozambique during this period on Reagan's State Department transition that, "To the amusement of Kissinger and Allen claimed that it "never did occur" and team. As a lobbyist for the South African his colleagues, Colonel Haig would quietly that it was a "Czech disinformation report". cause, Smoak has been trying to convince pretend to beat drums on the table as The massacre was fully reported by the members of Congress that SWAPO is a African affairs were brought up at NSC staff British Sunday Times and further confimred "Marxist terrorist organization ". Whether or meetings." by a five-member United Nations team. not Smoak has any influence with Reagan on Working under Haig as the assistant Allen 's demonstrated sympathy to white rule this matter is unknown. secretary for Africa at the State Department in Southern Africa and his posture as a Reagan will have to take a stand on will be Chester Crocker, the former African seasoned Cold Warrior further indicates that Namibia in the very near future . The United Studies Director at Georgetown's Center for the theme of East-West confrontation will be States' western allies have already indicated Strategic International Studies (CSIS). the major, if not exclusive, context in which that if South Africa remains intransigent Crocker was the author of the State Depart­ African issues are evaluated. they may be willing to impose a time limit ment transition team's paper on Africa The first African item on the new ad­ on South Africa and should that deadline ex­ which severely criticized the Carter ad­ ministration's agenda is the question of pire they would not block a resolution in the ministration's Africa Bureau for developing Namibia. (See TransAfrica News Report, Fall U.N . imposing sanctions against South policies based on "dubious premises" and 1980) A recent all-parties conference held in Africa . for being unwilling to compete with the Geneva in mid-January failed to get a South The new administration 's approach to Soviet Union for influence on the continent. African agreement to a cease-fire in this 14 Angola has thus far been to hold to the well Haig and Crocker are old acquaintances. year old war between the occupying forces of established position that "We won't Crocker was an NSC staff assistant during South Africa and the South West African recognize the Angolan Government so long Haig's tenure as deputy national security ad­ People's Organization (SWAPO) . The Geneva as there are 20,000 or 18,000 Cuban visor and both men had offices at CSIS dur­ conference , which was convened at the re­ mercenaries within their borders." Many of ing the summer of 1979 when Haig was con­ quest of South Africa , was intended to allay Reagan's advisors as well as the President sidering running for the presidency. South African suspicions about the impar­ himself have stated publicly that they sup­ Georgetown 's CSIS was the source of most of tiality of the U.N. allowing for a cease-fire port Jonas Savimbi 's anti-government UNITA President Reagan's foreign and defense ad­ after which supervised elections could take forces and would like to see the Clark visors during the campaign and transition place bringing about a peaceful transition to Amendment repealed which prohibits U.S . period. The CSIS is well known for its con­ majority rule in Namibia. Both South Africa covert activities in that country. But it is servative academics who share the Globalist and SWAPO accepted an international agree­ clear that U.S. support for UNITA would be • view of the new administration. ment (of which the U.S. and four other another source of friction with America's Crocker has written a great deal about western nations were sponsors) to end the allies. It would also probably disrupt Southern Africa and Soviet and Cuban in­ conflict in 1978, but South Africa has been U.S./Nigerian relations and play into Soviet volvement in Africa. His favorite themes are; stalling on the implementation of that plan and Cuban hands increasing their involve­ Securing southern Africa from further Soviet ever since. With the collapse of the Geneva ment there. (For fuller discussion of the penetration; supporting the South Africa conference there is some doubt as to the situation in Angola , see article on page 3). backed UNITA movement in Angola; expand­ future of the western settlement plan and Informed sources on the Hill indicate that ing South African economic preponderance most observers view the Reagan administra­ U.S. policy toward South Africa is likely to be throughout the entire Southern African tion's response as being a determining fac­ very similar to that pursued by Richard Nix­ region and increasing western investment in tor. Knowledgeable observers see Reagan 's on as outlined by Henry Kissinger: Closer ties and contact with South Africa ostensibly to choices to be clear. "Continue to support the to South Africa combined with aid policies "promote attitudinal changes and the open­ Western pla·n which would give a clear signal to the rest of Africa intended to lessen their ing up of social and economic relations" to South Africa that they have nothing to criticism. In fact, former President Jimmy between white and black South Africans. gain from the west by continuing to stall, or Carter cannot be said to have ventured far Another key person in the development of reverse direction and abandon the western from this course either, despite his human U.S. Africa policy will be the new head of plan in favor of a South African designed rights rhetoric and condemnation of Apar­ the NSC, Richard Allen . Allen helped to internal settlement which would undermine theid. In a campaign interview with the establish Georgetown's CSIS in the early all current positive U.S./ Africa relations and editors of Jet magazine Reagan also con­ l 960's. He was also a top Nixon advisor dur­ might invoke a Nigerian oil embargo against demned Apartheid as "repugnant" but add­ ing former President Nixon's first term . In the U.S ., as well as alienate our western ed that he would maintain relations with 1973 and 1974 Allen was a lobbyist for the allies who are still seeking an early settle- South Africa "to be of help there." Reagan (cont'd. on page 7)

Page 6 "WITH US OR AGAINST US? (con t' d from page 2l

week South Africa military forces invaded asks of us: "Are you with us or against us7 South Africa and that this objective will be Mozambique marauding to within sight of No dissembling please. " I challenge our achieved within 30 years with or without the capitol Maputo killing a still undeter­ government today to answer the question. American support. mined number of South African refugees. Will the United States commit itself to stand I urge our new national leadership, for the Has our nation stood firm against this7 Last publicly and unequivocally behind essential­ good of America , Africa and the world to year as African Heads of State met in ly what is its own plan for the independence listen closely to African voices that tell us Freetown, Sierra Leone, South African forces of Namibia7 where Africa must and will go. Those who massively invaded Southern Angola . Hun­ The United States does not recognize counsel that Angola will fall are wrong. dreds of Namibians and Angolans had died Angola . Virtually every African government Angola will neither fall nor be compromised . at the hands of South Africa before this inva­ has diplomatic relations with Angola. Most Those who counsel that South Africa can sion; many more during it and more still of them have encouraged our government to hold out in Namibia and at home are wrong. since. South African bombers fly over follow suit. Great Britain , France, West Ger­ Namibia will achieve an unqualified in­ Southern Angola day and night. In Mungo, many - all have established embassies in dependence in the near future and South every building has been bombed , from the Luanda. Though American businesses are Africia will be transformed in my lifetime. hospital to two schools and a church. The there and thriving, our nation remains alone Listen to African voices that tell us where roads of southern Angola are lined with the in the west in the withholding of recogni­ Africa must and will go. They ask: " Are you burned out carcasses of trucks that once car­ tion . Last May, Candidate Ronald Reagan with us or against us7" I urge our new ried food to starving people in the South. told the Wall Street Journal that he would leadership to answer rightly. It is the only How firm has our nation stood against this provide Jonas Savimbi with " weapons" to basis for any future American friendship terrorism? assist UNITA in its attempt to overthrow the with Africa. Though it may never be broadly Angolan government. UNITA is allied with Randall Robinson is the Executive Director of understood across this land, the African South Africa. American support for UNITA TransAfrica. question to America is sim pie. They ask: means American support for South Africa . REAGAN (cont'd. from page 6) "Will America stand with Africa for We are told that the United States does not equitable democracy and simple justice in recognize Angola because Cuban troops are further commented that he felt the current South Africa and Namibia or will America there. The reasoning here is tortured. Indeed problems there "are not so much racial as stand with white South Africa in a futile at­ Soviet troops are in the Soviet Union and we they are tribal." tempt to slam shut the gates to Freedom7" recognize the Soviet Union. He can we The more knowledgeable Crocker is likely Let us not delude ourselves. It would be recognize the sovereign blight of South to be the chief architect of U.S./South foolish to eclipse it with preoccupations Africa and withhold it from an Angola being Africa policy. Crocker describes himself as about Soviet penetration , Cuban troops and occupied by South Africa? In September an 'objective moderate' on the issue of the like. Africa wants to know whether we testimony before the House Subcommittee South Africa and will probably lable U.S. are with them or against them . Worry less on Africa , Gerald Bender asked , "Can any policy toward South Africa as " communica­ about our susceptibility to communism they member of our government guarantee this tions for change.". Under such a policy the . tell us, worry more about our request for Sub-committee or the Angolans for that mat­ U.S. will continue and in fact increase those universal benefits of freedom so many ter that if the Cubans were to be withdrawn, economic and strategic collaboration with through history have fought and died for. South Attica would not greatly increase its the white minority regime. Crocker believes The Reagan Administration will have op­ attacks against Angola in an attempt to bring that reforms such as those initiated by portunities soon to begin to answer Africa's down the MPLA govern ment7" Africa asks its Prime Minister P.W. Botha should be question. These responses no doubt will go question again to us: " On this burning issue rewarded by the U.S. and that official anti­ far to shape the future of U.S ./ Africa rela­ of South Africa, are you with us or against apartheid rhetoric should be curtailed . He tions. The Namibia diplomacy has failed us7" also feels that domestic groups in the U.S. because South Africa fears that democratic There is growing support in America for that are calling for comprehensive sanctions elections conducted under United Nations those in South Africa who've struggled so against South Africa should not be allowed observation would bring the Southwest long for freedom. A national poll conducted to impact upon U.S. policy. Crocker views Africa Peoples Organization to power. Over by the Carnegie Endowment for I nterna­ South Africa as an integral part of the the last four years SWAPO, has made every tional Peace on March 16, 1979, found western world and the most important U.S . conceivable concession in an attempt to end Americans to believe the United States market in Africa . He is dissatisfied with talk a long and bloody war and get on with the should "Do Something" to get South Africa of "full political participation " for blacks in implementation of the United Nations to change its system , with a plurality favor­ South Africa and also questions the value of Security Council 's plan for the in­ ing a range of activities including trade the arms embargo against South Africa . dependence of Namibia. No one disputes restrictions. Surely change is inevitable. The Some possible consequences of the ex­ that South Africa alone has stalled this very logic and sweep of African history pected U.S. tilt toward South Africa are: the carefully crafted process. No one disputes places certain matters beyond dispute: That ending of U.S. participation in the arms em­ either that South Africa expects the United Black South Africans will settle for nothing bargo against South Africa ; resumption of States to sustain their intransigence. Africa less than one person-one vote in a unitary (cont'd. on page 8)

Page 7 AID TO AFRICA (cont'd. from page 4) resources to the Third World are a pittance. have established embassies in Luanda and southern Africa decreased or ended, he Many may ask what gravity shou Id be at­ are happily expanding their economic ties should make every attempt to ensure an ear­ tached to these proposals given this is the with the government there . ly settlement is reached on Namibian in­ first step in a long process with many actors. Last fall the sub-committee on Africa of dependence." The report further argues Many Washington bureaucrats and political the House of Representatives held a series of that, "If (Reagan) would like to see Angola pundits interpret Stockman 's extreme pro­ hearings to examine "the current political move further from Soviet influence he would posals as a clever maneuver designed to gain and economic situation in Angola and its im­ be wise to normalize relations with Luanda superior bargaining strength. So fa !' his plications for American foreign policy." The and help Angolans decrease their stratagem seems to have worked . Stockman hearings included testimony from a broad dependence on the eastern bloc . is dead serious on reducing government range of businesses, government agencies In conclusion the Angola study recom­ spending and the best the liberal voices can and private individuals concerned with U.S . mends that, "The administration 's develop­ hope for is to restore last years funding policy toward Angola. The business com­ ment of a coherent and realistic southern levels. To TransAfrica , Stockman 's proposals munity as well as academic specialists on Africa policy should try to avoid a blinding seem to be the first manifestations of an Angola supported normalization of relations preoccupation with what the Soviets are do­ "America First" foreign policy, one animated with Luanda on the grounds of lucrative in­ ing in the area and respond more forthright­ by Cold War perceptions and blatant vestment opportunities with a government ly to clear African priorities. Though the U.S . strategic and corporate short run interests. that "has generally been responsive and sup­ has publicly condemned apartheid for a long portive as a business partner" , and because time, it has more steadfastly refused to take REAGAN (cont'd. from page 7) normalization would enhance the U.S. posi­ any meaningful steps either to compel U.S. exports of nuclear fuel to South Africa; tion as an " honest broker" in negotiations change or to disengage itself from profitable closer U.S ./South Africa intelligence col­ on the question of Namibia as well as any trading relations in South Africa and possible negotiations on the current civil Namibia, thereby strengthening the op­ laboration and the recognition of Bantustans strife in Angola itself. (the so-called independent homelands for pressive capacity of the South African ethnic groupings of black South Africans There is good reason to believe that the regime. President Reagan must choose the made up of 13% of the least productive Carter administration wou Id have recognized side of South Africa or the side of the land). the MPLA government had it not feared the Africans. Recognition of the established government in Angola and expansion of Such a tilt toward South Africa would be domestic political repercussions of being trade relations with Angola as well as con­ an open repudiation of concerns expressed seen to accommodate a Soviet/Cuban fait accompli . Thus the Cuban presence is.sue repeatedly by Africans, Afro-Americans and tinued and increased economic assistance to Zimbabwe and Mozambique would be the others about the rightward direction of U.S. was emphasized and continues to be em­ policy. phasized by the Reagan admin istrtion as the positive way to ensure U.S. Influence in the real obstacle to normalization. region. It would further enable America to Angola has hardly any trade with the secure its economic and strategic interests, ANGOLA (cont'd . from page 3) Eastern bloc countries and has refused to maintain good relations throughout the con­ the FNLA and UNITA/ South African armies join the trade group of the Soviet Union and tinent and gain some legitimacy in the in conventional combat and established con­ its satellites, Comecon. It is clear that the region on the issue of change within South trol over most of Angola. Angolan government wants increased trade Africa. These actions, coupled with a suc­ Several African countries had recognized with the west as well as improved political cessful resolution of the Namibia conflict, the MPLA government in Angola as early as relations. The Angolan government has sup­ would help assure the U.S. of good relations November and December of 1975 , and by ported the " Western Five's" efforts to with the black majority in South Africa that - ~ . the end of February 1976 the majority of the achieve a internationally acceptable solution will inevitably come to power. " OAU 's member-states, the EEC countries, in Namibia , and has publicly stated that The Angolans, in any case , have continued Portugal and some 50 other countries had such a solution would facilitate the depar­ to send signals to the U.S. indicating their recog nized the MPLA government. In ture of Cuban troops from Angola . It is willingness to normalize relations and to November 1976 Angola was admitted to the Angola 's support of Namibian nationali sts continue to support the western plan fo r a United Nations after the U.S. finally backed that continues to make them the victim of settlement in Namibia despite South African down from its threat to veto Angola 's ap­ massive South African assaults, severly obsti na nee. plication for membership. damaging the infrastructu re in southern Over the past four years, since the confir­ Angola and tying up resources badly needed EDITOR'S NOTE: South African aggres­ mation of the MPLA government in Angola , for Angola 's economic reconstruction , an sion against Angola in the last three years the United States has pursued an opposite undertaking delayed largely because of the has left 3,000 dead, 3,000 injured and 7,000 course toward Angola than that of its Euro­ near wa r footing into which South Africa has million dollars worth of damage. Between pean allies. The U.S. still speaks of "the forced the Luanda Government. 1978 and 1980 South Africa had carried out removal of all Cuban troops" as a precondi­ According to a recent TransAfrica study on 1,400 reconnaissance flights over Angolan territory, 290 bombardments, and 50 troop tion for diplomatic recognition , while Bri­ U.S./ Angola relations, " If President Reagan landings. tain, France, West Germany, Italy and others wishes to see the Cuban military presence in

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