Developments in the Middle East: Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State, South Africa

מרכז עזרי לחקר איראן ומדינות המפרץ This volume is a collection of the proceedings of the webinar “Developments in The Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States Research the Middle East” held on 14 October 2020. The event was the ﬁrst international webinar to mark the academic collaboration between the Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States Research, University of Haifa, Israel and the Department of Developments in the Middle East: Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State, South Africa. That academic collaboration being within the “Framework for Academic Proceedings of Colloquium 14/10/2020 Collaboration” that was agreed upon and signed between the two universities in April 2018. Speakers at the webinar were, Professor Philippe Burger, Professor Glen Segell (editor) Shaul Chorev, Dr. Thamar E. Gindin, Dr. Eben Coetzee, Ashkan Safaei Hakimi, Professor Amatzia Baram, Dr. Eran Segal, Dr. Soli Shahvar, Dr. Ido Zelkovitz, Dr. Glen Segell, Professor Theo Neethling, Professor Hussein Solomon and Dr. Moshe Terdiman.

Proceedings of the Webinar "Developments in the Middle East" First international Webinar to mark the Framework for Academic Collaboration between the Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States Research, University of Haifa, and the Department of Political Studies and Governance University of the Free State מרכז עזרי לחקר איראן ומדינות המפרץ The Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States Research

Developments in the Middle East: Proceedings of Colloquium 14/10/2020

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), save with written permission.

An academic collaboration of the University Israel of Haifa, Haifa, Israel The Department Political Studies and and the University of the Free State, Governance University of the Free State Bloemfontein, South Africa P.O. Box 339 The Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States Bloemfontein Research 9300 University of Haifa South Africa 199 Abba Hushi Ave Mount Carmel Haifa 3498838 PREFACE

This volume is a collection of the proceedings of the webinar “Developments in the Middle East” that was the first international webinar to mark the academic collaboration between the Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States Research, University of Haifa, Israel and the Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State, South Africa. That academic collaboration being within the “Framework for Academic Collaboration” that was agreed upon and signed between the two universities in April 2018. The webinar was held via ZOOM on 14 October 2020. The webinar took place to ensure that even due to the global pandemic of COVID-19, the academic interchange and discourse continues. It comes after an international workshop, that was due to be hosted by the University of Haifa on 12 March 2020 was canceled due to health & safety concerns brought on by COVID-19. During the webinar each of the 11 expert speakers presented for 10 minutes. The webinar was open to a global public audience, who watched via ZOOM and Facebook and who submitted written questions. There were 247 in this audience. The video recording of the webinar was made available immediately after the event and within an hour had 439 downloads. There has been a rigorous peer-review of the presentations published in this volume. I would like to thank all those involved, first and foremost the presenters, and authors in this volume, and not less those in the universities who value education.

Glen Segell Akko 24 October 2020 CONTENTS

Foreword 5 Professor Philippe Burger

Introduction: Recent developments in the eastern mediterranean 6 Professor Shaul Chorev

Panel 1: Iran 9 the threat of a nuclear iran: a dissident view 10 Dr. Eben Coetzee iran and hezbollah: same soul, two bodies 14 Ashkan Safaei Hakimi

Panel 2: The Persian Gulf 18

IRAQ’s new premier and his government: commitments and challenges 19 Professor Amatzia Baram saudi Arabia and kuwait – towards a new model for succession in the ruling family 24 Dr. Eran Segal

Panel 3: Israel and Palestinians 29 the palestinian question in iri’s foreign and anti-israel policy 30 Dr. Soli Shahvar israel, the gulf and the palestinian question 36 Dr. Ido Zelkovitz new diplomatic relations transforms geopolitics 39 Dr. Glen Segell

Panel 4: Middle East and North Africa 42

China’s military presence in djibouti: driving forces and some implications for the mena region 43 Professor Theo Neethling managing identity politics in the fractious mena region 47 Professor Hussein Solomon the renaissance dam in ethiopia 51 Dr. Moshe Terdiman

Webinar Program: 14 October 2020 54

About the Academic Partners and Contributors 55 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 5

FOREWORD Professor Philippe Burger The University of the Free State

For decades the Middle East has stood central to several complex geopolitical developments. As a result, scholars from around the world have studied these developments to gain a better understanding of the implications these developments hold for economies, politics and societies across the world. The Department of Political Studies and Governance at the University of the Free State comprises several scholars who do just that, i.e. study the broader Middle East and North Africa to gain a better understanding as scholars and academics. Through a Memorandum of Understanding that aims to facilitate scholarly debate and discussion, these scholars engage with scholars at the Ezri Center for Iran and Gulf States Research at Haifa University. For the scholars at the Department of Political Studies and Governance the choice of Haifa University was not accidental. Just as is the case with the University of the Free State, Haifa University is a very diverse community. In fact, with over 40% of its students being Arab Israeli, and with students from Israel’s Druze community, as well as several distinguished Arab Israel academics, Haifa University is by far the most diverse and inclusive university in Israel. Thus, through scholarly interaction with colleagues and students at Haifa University, scholars at the University of the Free State will be able to interact with members from all these communities in Israel. Scholarly conversations, rooted in academic freedom, and thus the free exchange of ideas, advance our knowledge and hold the promise of fostering a better understanding and appreciation among scholars for the diversity of the world in which we live. This is true even when, or especially when, scholars disagree.

Therefore, the collective hope of scholars from both the Ezri Center and the Department of Political Studies and Governance is that the exchange of ideas and academic debate between them will contribute to a better and inclusive understanding and appreciation of the complexities in the Middle East. 6 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

INTRODUCTION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN Professor Shaul Chorev The University of Haifa

Introduction I am very pleased that the first international Webinar to mark the cooperation agreement between the University of Haifa, Israel and University of the Free State, South Africa has been realized.

I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Glen Segell for his endless efforts despite the Covid 19 pandemic, to hold the workshop through the Webinar.

Although the workshop focused on the Middle East as a whole, this introduction article restricts itself to recent developments taking place in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Given its strategic location, the Eastern Mediterranean has historically been a point of conflict since antiquity. It was an important theater in World War II and of growing competition between American and Soviet naval forces during the Cold War. Turkey’s 1974 invasion of Northern Cyprus and subsequent de facto partition of the island added another layer of complexity.

What makes the Eastern Mediterranean so combustible today is the nexus of a number of complex and volatile issues, including: historic ambitions, conflicting assertions of sovereignty, competition over control of the newly discovered natural gas reserves, pipeline politics, civil wars and political chaos in the littoral states, US retrenchment, Russian naval base expansion in Syria, divisions among NATO allies, and waves of migration and refugees.

Turkey Turkey’s geo-political ambitions are manifest in the 2019 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) agreement between Turkey and the UN-endorsed Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA). While the Turkish-Libyan accord ostensibly establishes an EEZ from Libya’s northeast shore to Turkey’s southern Mediterranean coast. Under the agreement, Turkey considers itself legitimately expanding its territorial continental shelf, ignoring the Greek islands, many of which are off the coast of PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 7

Turkey. This accord raised concerns in Egypt, Greece, Cyprus and Israel, because— among other reasons—it may impact their ability to export natural gas and oil directly to Europe since any pipeline will have to pass through Turkey’s zone.

Indeed Turkey, has large energy requirements. Turkey is striving, moreover, to become a regional energy transit hub. But the presence of natural gas should not be considered the main driver for Turkey’s regional ambitions. Natural gas prices remain at historically low levels the past several years, and below a breakeven point needed for most major integrated oil companies to engage in any large exploration or drilling projects.

Arab countries have no desire to see Turkey re-create the Ottoman Empire’s former dominance of the region. Egypt, which has its own regional ambitions, is concerned with Turkey’s role in Libya, as well as the close relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and Erdoğan’s political party, AKP.

Turkey’s foreign policy adventures are occurring despite a deeply troubled Turkish economy—the Turkish lira recently hit an all-time low—and a deeply divided domestic political environment. Yet Turkey’s expansionist forays appear to reflect a genuine national policy, supported by many Turkish people, not merely an Erdoğan pretension.

Iran and Russia In addition to Turkey, both Iran and Russia gain from America’s diminished presence in the Eastern Mediterranean; all three were once great land empires that are now reasserting historical ambitions. The Russians continue to build their naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, but Russia’s involvement appears to be mainly opportunistic. Internally, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the accompanying economic and financial contraction, has increased opposition to Putin. As for Iran’s long-term strategic aim of extending its influence on the Mediterranean through Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut, this destination is reached by proxies only.

The European Union Apart from the tensions created by another potential war between NATO- member countries Greece and Turkey, some interesting dynamics are created by the divergent positions within the EU. Of all EU countries, France is the most aggressive in countering Turkey’s ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. While the French (and Egyptians) have sided with the opposition leader Khalifa Haftar, the Italians support Libya’s GNA. 8 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Most likely Germany, the strongest member of the EU and currently president of the Council of the European Union until December 31, 2020, will be left to sort out the conflicting EU interests. Yet Germany’s overriding objective most likely will be avoiding another refugee crisis.

Competing interests Neither Russia nor America is inclined to sort out the competing interests in the Eastern Mediterranean or capable of doing. Turkey’s revanchist initiatives have already prompted Egypt, Greece, Cyprus and Israel to cooperate informally, with Greece and Egypt concluding their own EEZ earlier this month.

However, the four-country coalition, even if formalized, would be inherently weak, held together only by antipathy towards Turkey. Despite the poor governmental relationship between Turkey and Israel, their annual two-way trade is valued at approximately $5 billion, which is far greater than Israeli trade with either Egypt or Greece.

With its political and economic problems, Egypt is unstable and not in a leadership position. And while the Egyptian government may support an alliance that included Israel, the Egyptian “street” would not.

Conclusion The conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean is indeed complex and mistrust runs rampant among regional actors. Most likely a permanent solution is unreachable in the short run, though implementation of immediate confidence building measures and de-escalation actions is imperative. Any small naval incident has the potential to start a war. Lengthy legal proceedings will not suffice for this region. A political solution must be found. While problematic, the most likely scenario would involve collective mediation by the US, Russia and Germany, acting in its capacity as president of the European Council. With this conflict, time is not a luxury. PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 9

Panel 1: Iran

Chair: Dr. Samuel Lebens University of Haifa

Dr. Eben Coetzee University of the Free State The threat of a nuclear Iran: A dissident view

Ashkan Safaei Hakimi University of Haifa Iran and Hezbollah: Same soul, Two bodies 10 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

THE THREAT OF A NUCLEAR IRAN: A DISSIDENT VIEW Dr. Eben Coetzee The University of the Free State

Introduction Will the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereafter: Iran) go nuclear and, if so, how dangerous will it be? Phrased differently, can we – i.e., the international community of states – live with a nuclear-armed Iran?

The Data Answers to these questions are, in the main, gloomy, with nuclear experts, the media, and government officials agreeing that a nuclear Iran poses unprecedented and insurmountable challenges. Iran, of course, is yet to become a member of the nuclear club, though it appears to be dangerously close to a breakout capability.

According to an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report during September 2020, Tehran’s current nuclear stockpile consists of about 3114.5 kg (in hexafluoride mass) of low-enriched uranium (LEU) or 2105.4 kg (uranium mass).

Although various models yield different estimates, analysts agree that the estimated breakout time for Iran is about 3.5 months; in some 5.5 months, Iran will have enough weapon-grade uranium to produce two nuclear weapons.

Besides the growing stockpile of LEU, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched its first military satellite (the Noor-1) during June 2020. The military satellite itself is, in fact, of little significance, with General Jay Raymond, the commander of United States (US) Space Command (SPACECOM), noting that the satellite amounts to nothing more than “a tumbling webcam in space”.

What does matter, however, is that the launch of the satellite made use of the new missile testing facility close to Shahrud rather than at the Khomeini Space Centre and, notably, employed a new satellite launch vehicle (SLV) – the Qased (or Ghased). The latter used a new solid-propellant motor designed with longer-range ballistic missiles in mind. That motor can serve two ends: it can point towards the initial design of a new intermediate-range ballistic missile or, more disconcertingly, a nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 11

While Iran has always contended that its nuclear program is aimed at peaceful nuclear energy – per the provision of Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – various developments cast doubt on this. The point, at any rate, that this presentation wishes to labor, is that a nuclear-armed Iran can be deterred and is likely to be far less dangerous than widely assumed. Why should this be the case?

Primary drivers of Iran’s nuclear program Let us first consider some primary drivers of Iran’s nuclear program. Although the Iranian nuclear program dates to the Shah, much of the impetus for Iran’s nuclear program came from US actions in the Middle East in the wake of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (9/11). Immediately after 9/11, Tehran reached out to Washington, offering to aid its counterterrorism efforts.

However, in his January 2002 State of the Union address to Congress, US President George W. Bush identified Iran as one of three ‘rogue states’ constituting an ‘Axis of Evil’, with the US subsequently invading and occupying one of these states (Iraq). Regime change in the Middle East was widely touted as a primary goal of US foreign policy, with the democratization of Iraq constituting the first piece of a broader democratization puzzle.

After the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the message to Iran became clear: protect yourself. When a senior Bush administration official was asked about the lesson to be learned by Iran following the US invasion of Iraq, the official replied: “take a number” – in short, Iran is next in line. Against such a backdrop, and with a nuclear Israel as its neighbor, the critical question to ask is why would Iran not want nuclear weapons?

As Kenneth Waltz has noted, it is surprising that Iran has waited as long as it has to balance Israel. Unsurprisingly, no other region, notes Waltz, is marked by “a lone, unchecked nuclear power”. With the US intruding in its backyard, and with a nuclear Israel as neighbor, Iran’s seeking for nuclear weapons conform to the pattern generally witnessed with all nuclear states: to deter aggression and, ultimately, to survive.

In this respect, as in others, Iran’s behavior conforms to the way states generally behave in international politics, namely, to provide for their own security, to survive, to take care of themselves with the means that they can produce. Iran thus constitutes a security-seeking state with very little grand designs or ambitions to reconfigure the boundaries of the Middle East. 12 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Three widely held concerns

The fear of a nuclear-armed Iran usually stems from three widely held concerns: one, Iran would use its nuclear shield to wage proxy wars or terrorism; two, Iran would transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists or would be unable to control its arsenal; and three, the possibility of a nuclear strike on Israel.

The concerns are either grossly exaggerated or baseless. That Iran would use its nuclear shield to wage proxy wars or support terrorism is at odds with the historical record of nuclear states.

When states become part of the nuclear club, they become acutely aware of their vulnerability- i.e., that the major powers are closely watching them and that they have become a potential target in the eyes of these powers. As against bold and aggressive action, nuclear possession brings moderation, as the history of India and Pakistan, Maoist China and North Korea attests.

Although observers fret about the stability-instability paradox (i.e., nuclear weapons breed strategic stability yet tactical instability), the presence of a nuclear Israel should be enough to allay such fears. Any such bold and aggressive behavior would hardly serve Iran’s security seeking goals.

The second fear – to wit, nuclear transfer and the loss of control – is one that is often invoked, especially given the fact that Iran is widely considered as the pre-eminent state-sponsor of terrorism. The threat of nuclear terrorism, and the possibility of state-transfer of nuclear weapons, have been widely exaggerated. States transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists would be easily identified. This is especially true in the Iranian case, where ties between Iran and various terrorist organizations are widely known. Research indicates that where more than 100 individuals die in a terrorist attack, the perpetrators can without much difficulty be identified.

Moreover, nuclear states are unlikely to transfer their costly investment in nuclear weapons to parties that they cannot trust or control. If nuclear weapons are transferred and used, attribution will not be difficult, with the development of nuclear forensics allowing for the identification of the source of nuclear material after a denotation has taken place (this provides a very strong incentive not to transfer in the first place!). PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 13

If nuclear transfer is unlikely, what about the loss of weapons, especially given that Iran has multiple leaders (i.e., the president and Ayatollah, as well as various military factions)? States have every incentive to take care of their weapons.

If a single (military) faction controls nuclear weapons (such as the IRGC, the likely custodians of Iran’s nuclear weapons), what can it do with the weapons and what can it not do? The history of the nuclear age powerfully illustrates that the only conceivable purpose of nuclear weapons is deterrence. As likely custodians of Iran’s nuclear weapons, the IRGC is likely to learn that lesson very quickly.

Finally, how likely is an Iranian nuclear strike on Israel? Of all the possible scenarios that nuclear experts fret about, this is the most unlikely one. Although the Iranians are often portrayed as irrational (or mad Ayatollahs), they – as with other nuclear states – prize survival. Launching a nuclear strike against Israel would be suicidal.

One can easily say that the Iranians are unlikely to follow Western rationality and worldviews. However, nuclear deterrence is not premised on rationality, but fear. It is often suggested that the deterrent relationship between Israel and Iran is likely to be markedly different from that of, say, the US and the Soviet Union. The latter relationship was marked by the safety of continents and oceans between the two parties.

The Israeli Iranian one will be marked by proximity, which (most experts fear) will generate vulnerability and increase the likelihood of miscalculation. There is, however, no reason to believe that deterrence would not work. Both states would know that the use of even a few nuclear weapons would be suicidal.

Conclusion In conclusion, the emergence of a nuclear Iran is likely to bring stability to the Middle East. Can we live with a nuclear-armed Iran? We certainly can. Not only is deterrence likely to work remarkably well between the two states, but fears about nuclear transfer, loss of control of weapons and proxy wars are overblown. 14 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

IRAN AND HEZBOLLAH: SAME SOUL, TWO BODIES Ashkan Safaei Hakimi The University of Haifa

Introduction The first round of Israeli Lebanese negotiation to mark their maritime borders were recently held at a UNIFIL tent near the Lebanese town of Naqoura. Hours before the opening of negotiations, Hezbollah issued a statement of opposition to the composition of the Lebanese delegation calling it “a severe blow to the resistance.”

The Big Question But what is Hezbollah? And how did it become the most successful proxy group of the Islamic Republic of Iran? To answer this question, we should first look at the history of Lebanon – Its demography – and the history of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and its ideology. In 2004, in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s fall in Iraq, King Abdullah the second of Jordan warned that a new “Shia Crescent” was being formed from Iran to Lebanon.(1) The same warning has been repeated many times in the last sixteen years. Ever since its establishment, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has tried to set up networks in the region in its effort to “export the revolution.”

Exporting the revolution was so important for the Iranian revolutionaries that they dedicated several articles of the constitution of the new regime to it.(2) Most of these efforts have been put into bringing the region’s Shiites under the IRI umbrella. Some of the networks that the IRI currently controls, loosely or firmly, are based on the centuries-old Shia networks in the Middle East. Furthermore, the friendships formed between Iranian revolutionaries and some Shia and Sunni elements, mainly in PLO camps in Lebanon, before the 1979 revolution, played an important role when those individuals became high-ranking officials in the new regime.

While there are currently dozens of groups throughout the Middle East that allegedly operate under the auspices of the Iranian regime, not all the efforts of the IRI in forming new networks or bringing the existing networks under its control PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 15 have been successful. And it could be claimed that the creation of Hezbollah has been the most successful project of the Islamic Republic in this area. Many scholars have studied Hezbollah: from Clinton Bailey who wrote the first academic article about this group in 1984, to Magnus Ranstorp who wrote extensively about Hezbollah. There are also many primary sources available to us: from the memoirs of Hezbollah leaders and Iranians who lived in Lebanon, to archival material.

Lebanon So, let’s go to Lebanon and have a look at its contemporary history and demography. The Lebanon we know today was established in 1945 as a largely Christian Maronite state, after the French mandate ended. Although some efforts were made to bring all religious groups to the government, still the Shiites stayed marginalized as they had been during the Ottoman Empire and French rule. Lebanon is one of the most religiously diverse countries in the middle east. Even probably more diverse than Israel. Since the last official census in Lebanon was held in 1932, we do not really know the exact ratio of religious groups in the country. in 1932, Christians made up more than half of the population. However, different studies show that the balance has changed since then and now Christians form around 40 percent of the population.

Shiites Shiites, according to most estimations, form slightly more than a fourth of Lebanon’s population. Shiites have lived in Lebanon for centuries. We have proofs of Shiite communities living in southern Lebanon as far back as the nineth century. (3) However, they lacked any effective organization until mid-1960s. This situation changed when Imam Musa al-Sadr founded The Highest Islamic Shi’i Council in 1967, The Movement of the Dispossessed in 1973, and finally the AMAL movement in 1975.

With the disappearance of al-Sadr (1978), which was followed by two other important developments for the Lebanese Shiites – namely, the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979 and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 – the seeds for a new Shi’i organization in Lebanon were planted.

The disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr during a trip to Libya in 1978 and the disagreement between various factions in AMAL regarding their response to the Israeli invasion resulted in its split.(4) At the same time, other Shi’i groups, which were much closer to the new Iranian rulers, began to show up. 16 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

One of these groups was formed by “some young Shi’i zealots who introduced themselves as ‘the fellows of Khomeini’ in Khaldeh, in south Lebanon.”(5) Later in 1982, some of these groups and individuals that had been influenced and supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran, gathered in Ba’albek in south Lebanon and formed a ‘secret organization.’ What cemented these groups and individuals together was their belief in Vilayat al-Faqih, the importance of fighting Israel and using the Islamic Revolution in Iran as an example for their future activities.

Hezbollah

The new organization was named Hezbollah in 1984 and went public a year later by publishing an open letter titled “Who are we and what is our identity?” In this letter, Hezbollah pledged full submission to the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as Vali-yi Faqih.(6) This pledge of submission was later extended to Ali Khamenei, when Hezbollah held its first congress in Tehran in 1989.

The Iranian Connection

It should be noted that the relationship between Khamenei and Hezbollah goes back to the group’s establishment. Khamenei, as the Deputy Defense Minister, was instructed by Ayatollah Khomeini to take full responsibility for Hezbollah, thus, as Joseph Alagha puts it, “Khamenei has been Hezbollah’s godfather.”(7) Unlike some of the decisions in the Islamic Republic, on which, different group inside the regime have different ideas, the support for Hezbollah has always been universal.

According to Mohsen Rafiqdust, the first minister of Islamic Republic’s Revolutionary Guards, “Hezbollah was established, bred and refined” by Ayatollah Khomeini.(8) In other words, the decision to help establish and support Hezbollah was made by the ‘central institutions’ and has enjoyed the full support of all factions. the relations between Iranian revolutionaries and Lebanese Shiites did not begin after the establishment of the Islamic republic. Many of the future leaders of Iran had been training in Palestinian camps in southern Lebanon since the early 1970s.

These early contacts between the revolutionaries and the Lebanese Shiites played a vital role during the first years after the establishment of Hezbollah. It gave the future Iranian leaders a good perspective of the situation of the Lebanese Shiites and helped spreading Islamic revolutionary ideas among the latter. Hezbollah, for its part, has emulated the Islamic Revolution of Iran not only in words, but also in practice. PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 17

In similar manner to the Iranian Islamic revolutionaries a few months after the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran, the Hezbollah, right after its formation in 1982, established the Foundation of Martyrs. This was followed by other foundations which were similar to their Iranian counterparts not only in purpose, but, in some cases, even in name; foundations such as Jihad of Construction (established 1985) and Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation (registered as Imdad Committee for Islamic Charity in 1987).

Three elements Along these lines, it can be said that there have been at least three elements resulting in the successful relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah. 1) The leadership vacuum in the Lebanese Shiite community, which was partly the result of their historical marginality in Lebanon and partly the result of the sudden disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr, was the first element. 2) The second factor was the aftermath of the Israeli invasion and the split in the largest Shi’i organization in Lebanon, AMAL 3) The fact that establishing and supporting Hezbollah has been a decision made by the highest IRI authorities and gained a pivotal role in Iran’s foreign policy is the third reason for this continuity. Pre-revolution contacts between the future Iranian leaders and Lebanese Shiites, Hezbollah’s almost full subordination to the Islamic Republic’s supreme leader and the organizational resemblance do contribute to the strong relationship between Hezbollah and Iran too.

Sources 1 Robin Wright and Peter Baker, “Iraq, Jordan see threat to election from Iran,” Washington Post, 8 Dec 2004, p. A01, retrieved form http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43980- 2004Dec7.html (retrieved on 10 October 2020.) 2 Chapter 1, Section 3, article 16; Chapter 1, Section 11; Chapter 10, Section 154. 3 Josef Olmert, “The Shi’is and the Lebanese State,” in Martin Kramer (ed.), Shi’ism, Resistance, and Revolution, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1987, P. 189. 4 Ali Khosrow-shiri, Inqilab-i Islami-i Iran va Shi’ayan-i Lobnan, Tehran: Markaz-i Asnad-i Inqilab-i Islami, shamsi year 1389/2010, P. 84. 5 Ibid, P. 84; Na‘im Qasim, Hizbullah, translated by Dalia Khalil, London: SAQI, 2005, P. 88. 6 Ibid, P. 90-92. 7 Joseph Alagha, “Hezbollah’s conception of the Islamic state,” in Sabrina Mervin (ed.), The Shi‘a worlds and Iran, London, Minnesota and Beirut: SAQI, 2010, P. 94. 8 Mohsen Rafiqdust, “Baray-i Tarikh Miguyam,” Tehran: Sureh Mehr, 1393/2014, P. 19. 18 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Panel 2: The Persian Gulf

Chair: Professor Hussein Solomon University of the Free State

Professor Amatzia Baram University of Haifa Iraq’s New Premier and His Government: Commitments and Challenges

Dr. Eran Segal University of Haifa Saudi Arabia and Kuwait - toward a new model for the order of succession in the ruling family PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 19

IRAQ’S NEW PREMIER AND HIS GOVERNMENT: COMMITMENTS AND CHALLENGES Professor Amatzia Baram The University of Haifa

Iraq’s Malaise Until the 2003 occupation of Iraq by the US and Coalition of allies the main conflicts in the country were between the Sunni-hegemonic regime on the one hand and its Shi’i and Kurdish majority on the other. In 2003 the Kurds won an autonomy. An armed conflict was replaced with diplomatic disputes over stretches of territory, oil rights and share in the national revenue. The Sunni-Shi’i conflict exploded in a new way. Now the democratically elected government was dominated by the Shi’a, and it was challenged by Sunni tribes and armed Islamist groups. In June 2014 Mosul and over a third of Iraq’s territory were conquered by ISIS. In July 2017 these territories were liberated by the Iraqi military and Shi’i militias with the crucial support of a US-led international coalition. Ever since the Shi’i- Sunni conflict, too, receded. The year 2018 ushered in a new phenomenon in Iraq’s history: a severe conflict within the Shi’i community, with the Sunni population staying carefully on the sideline.

In July 2018 Iran, who had been supplying almost all the electricity of the Iraqi south, abruptly cut off their supply. The result was not only discomfort when air conditioning was shut down in a summer of 45 degrees in the shade but, more importantly, most water supply stopped, and the little left was dangerously polluted. In Basra 4000 people had to be treated for water poisoning every day, and the neglected health system broke down. Massive anti-government and anti-Iranian demonstrations broke out. The prime minister resigned, and parliament elected a new one but to no avail. In October 2019 mass-demonstrations broke out again. This time they began in Baghdad but spread quickly to the south again. Some 600 demonstrators were murdered, scores were kidnapped and 20,000 wounded, mainly by the pro-Iranian militias.

The new PM too resigned and for eight months the political system froze. Then al- Kadhimi was approved. He found a devastated infra-structure and a dying economy, choked by the stranglehold of a formidable parasite, Iran. The Iraqi authorities were, and still are unable to impose import taxes on Iranian merchandise, mainly 20 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST fruits and vegetables, medicines and other light industry products. The Iraqi agriculture and light industries cannot compete. Due to incompetent planning and management, most of Iraq’s energy (both electricity and gas) is coming from Iran.

The rise of Al-Kadhimi On May 6, Mustafa Abd al-Latif Al-Kadhimi was elected by the Iraqi parliament as prime minister following months without a government and two failing candidates. The depth of the political fatigue was demonstrated when soon all his 22 chosen cabinet ministers were confirmed.

Al-Kadhimi was born in Baghdad in 1967. After law school in Baghdad, he left the country in the late 1980s and eventually settled in London. He returned after the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 and worked at a human rights organization, then as a journalist. In June 2016, when ISIS controlled Mosul as well as large parts of Iraq al-Kadhimi was appointed as director of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service. During his tenure he had good relations with most Iraqi politicians. He was sympathetic towards the demonstrators. He also developed good relations with the U.S.-led international coalition against ISIS. He had good relations with the Saudi government. At the same time he also carefully avoided any confrontations with the Iranians and their supporting Iraqi militias. Iran consented to his candidacy very reluctantly. It was motivated by its own temporary weakness and fear of political chaos in Iraq, which is both Iran’s milking cow and body armor.

Kadhimi’s Appointments The core of the Al-Kadhimi government are professionals. This is one way to curb corruption and increase efficiency. Other important appointments are in the security field. He has retained his own position as chief of intelligence and appointed as minister of the interior—the man in charge of police and security in large towns—the former Chief of the General Staff. As minister of defense he appointed a Sunni General. The most important nomination outside government was the reinstatement of the anti-Iranian General Abd al-Wahhab al-Saadi as commander of the Special Anti-Terrorist Force. Al-Saadi had been dismissed by the former PM upon an Iranian demand. This unit is a division-size force. It is the main force that liberated Mosul from ISIS occupation and is the only military division in the Iraqi army capable of real fighting. General Saadi is popular with Sunnis and Shi’is alike. All three generals are close associates of the new PM.

Through his security appointments, the prime minister guaranteed his control over the state’s official armed forces, including the police. By retaining the intelligence PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 21 service under his command, he made it difficult (though not impossible) for the Iranians and their agents to assassinate him. Indeed, a couple of months after his confirmation his security officials reported that they foiled an attempt on his life. By keeping the state military tightly under his control, he created an option to fight the militias if worse comes to worst.

Security Commitments and Challenges Al-Kadhimi defined a few political guidelines, all of them very difficult to achieve. The most important one was not to allow interference in Iraqi affairs by foreign powers. This meant preventing militia attacks against Western embassies and targets including the U.S. soldiers who help Iraq with the war against ISIS. This also means, apparently, denying Iran the positioning of missiles against American, Gulf Arab or Israeli targets on Iraqi soil. The second most important commitment was a call for the militias to become a full-fledged part of the state military. Presently, the militias are answerable to Iran’s Quds Force. Constitutionally speaking, the Iraqi prime minister is the commander in chief of all armed forces, and Mr. Al-Kadhimi is clearly bent on turning this principle into a reality.

However, militia attacks continued and compelled the American forces to re- deploy to safer locations. Following a US threat to close their Baghdad embassy, al-Kadhimi told diplomats from 25 countries that his government would protect their facilities and Coalition forces from militia attacks. A militia rockets attack on October 1st against a US base in Kurdistan came a day later. So far Al-Kadhimi has been trying the diplomatic approach, but if it fails, he will have to decide whether to go to battle. Bearing in mind that the militias number no less than 150,000 well- equipped men, a military confrontation is very risky.

Supporting the Demonstrators To demonstrate his support for the anti-Corruption and anti-Iranian demonstrators and his opposition to the militias that killed and kidnapped so many of them, al- Kadhimi forbade all security forces to use lethal weapons against demonstrators. He also made a few arrests and confiscated a few militia headquarters. He was later forced to release everyone. He provided financial compensation for families of murdered demonstrators, and he retired a few army and police officers who had ordered to open fire. He is working with parliament to reform the electoral law and appointed a committee to prepare for new elections in June 2021. These are two of the main demands of the demonstrators, designed to eliminate the official corruption. He also promised to prosecute corrupt politicians. 22 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Economic Commitments First, al-Kadhimi reduced the salaries of his government ministers by 15%. This was a symbolic step, but it showed his identification with the plight of so many Iraqis. He promised to boost employment for the young generation and improve the infrastructure, mainly electricity and the medical services. This was his way of indicating to the young protesters that he is taking their interests to heart: youth unemployment was very acute already before the Coronavirus pandemic. However, due to the decline in oil prices al-Kadhimi will find it very difficult to carry out these plans. On the international level, the new PM is making great efforts to engage the Gulf Arabs. For example, he is trying to replace the Iranian with Saudi electricity, but Iran is not pleased. It forced Iraq to sign a new agreement for Iranian electricity supply. This is a major concession that complicates Iraq’s relations with the US.

Conclusion: Challenges and Chances of Success To uproot most of the corruption in the Iraqi political system it will be necessary to change the nature of the state officialdom by increasing the share of professionals at the expense of political appointees. Al-Kadhimi will also need to eliminate the Muhasasa, the practice of sharing top jobs from cabinet ministries on down according to a rigid key of sect and party. The economic sluggishness is largely the result of a corrupt officialdom appointed due to political rather than professional criteria. The military, too, has been afflicted with corrupt promotions. This explains their swift rout at the hands of ISIS in 2014. Al-Kadhimi must also keep his promise to the Kurds to settle the disputes regarding the mutual financial commitments between Baghdad and Irbil. To bring the Sunnis back into the fold and drive a wedge between them and ISIS, the new prime minister will need to substantially upgrade the reconstruction of the Sunni center-north.

Likewise, to end the demonstrations that paralyzed Baghdad and the southern cities he will need to find an early solution to the four immediate problems in the south: electricity, potable water, health services, and unemployment. Ending the Iranian stranglehold over the Iraqi economy will help substantially. However, the new prime minister has strong opponents: Iran will try to assassinate or at least unseat him. In the meantime, it will use the pro-Iranian militias to foil his plans or at least exact a very high price for any policy step they do not like. The PM will have to walk a dangerous tightrope between the US and Iran and its militia satellites.

Al-Kadhimi is not without political support. In the parliament, he is supported by most parties, but Iranian pressure can change that. He has no party of his own, PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 23 and on balance parliamentary support for his premiership is brittle. Still, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the marja’iyyah (collective religious leadership) of the holy cities are staunch supporters. They see him as a guarantee against Iranian domination. Al-Sistani is widely admired. He emphatically demanded of the militias to obey only the PM. This moral support is very meaningful, but Iran and its supporting militias are rejecting this demand.

President Barham Salih is another ally. His authority is very limited, but he used it wisely to anoint al-Kadhimi. Finally, the demonstrators are giving him a chance, but they are desperate and angry and may change their minds if they do not see early results. Furthermore, even six months into al-Kadhimi’s premiership, the demonstrators are still terrorized, and they are fatigued. It is not clear how long they can persist in the face of the militias’ assaults. The relative calm in the Sunni arena is not guaranteed either. In mid-October near the town of Balad north of Bahdad, twelve young Sunni men had been kidnapped. Eight of them were brutally murdered, the rest are missing.

The governor of Salah al-Din Province implied that the murderers came from the locally positioned radical pro-Iranian Shi’i militia of Asaib Ahl al-Haqq. The murder seems to be the result of local tension between a Sunni village and the Shi’i militia, but Sunni citizens threatened that there would be a reaction. Al-Kadhimi took the incident very seriously. He rushed to the Sunni village and promised to find the murderers and bring them to justice. This, however, is in doubt. The Iraqi security forces failed to find and arrest the militiamen who murdered hundreds of Shi’i demonstrators, and failed to identify the group that last July assassinated the Shi’i pro-al-Kadhimi counterterrorism expert Hisham al-Hashimi. This means that, in addition to the Shi’i-on-Shi’i confrontation, the new Iraqi PM must be very effective to prevent a renewed wave of Sunni insurgency.

Abroad, the U.S. is in complete support, as are most of the Gulf Arabs. However, in October 2020 the US threatened that if militia attacks continue, they would evacuate their Baghdad embassy and revoke the license given to Iraq to import Iranian electricity and gas. This sent a message that US support is not guaranteed.

Al-Kadhimi must show some success soon and then quickly build on it. It now seems that his intention is to buy enough time to be able to go to the June general elections. Now his odds are about even or slightly less than even. He has a fighting chance, but the obstacles on his road are formidable. If he fails, there will be nothing to prevent Iran from turning Iraq into its docile strategic and economic colony. 24 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT – TOWARDS A NEW MODEL FOR SUCCESSION IN THE RULING FAMILY Dr. Eran Segal The University of Haifa

Introduction The stability and survival of Persian Gulf state monarchies in the 20th century has been a key mystery. Middle Eastern monarchies have gradually become republics, yet the Gulf monarchies haven’t. Further a strength during the upheavals commonly called the “Arab Spring” since 2011 has been not only to survive but also to have an impact, and even transform other republics.

My thesis to explain this phenomenon is the importance of the ruling family. This has been widely overlooked by observers not familiar with these monarchies. Yet it is the main and maybe the only legitimacy to rule in the Gulf socio-political sphere.

Many outside observers, as well as the mass media, usually emphasize the ruler, the head of state, or the next line – the Crown Prince (CP) as the sole rulers. They thus neglect the informal mechanisms of the royal families. In states such as Kuwait or Bahrain the formal institutions, for example parliaments and courts, are over emphasized in their effects on the ruling family or the country politics in general.

The Thesis I put forward that the most important of the informal mechanisms and the crucial one for the stability and survival of the royal family is the mechanism of succession. The decision is always a royal family decision, even if there are constitutions or parliament that plays a role in daily life. It is very unlikely that any ruler will decide on who will succeed him, or a contestant waiting in the wings when a ruler is ill, without a considerable support inside the royal family. This notion is widely understood by many scholars of the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless I would like to state that despite this the emphasis is on how the next King, Emir or CP will be decided, and ignore the larger picture of the order of succession.

Let me explain. The royal families are generally large, usually thousands. These depend on the vision of succession. If large sections in the family accept the mechanism of succession, then any potential in-fights can be contained. It should be remembered that every candidate for the position of inheritor to the rule will PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 25 create a coalition inside the family. In doing so they will also be in line to receive an important position and resources if he succeeds in becoming the King, Emir or CP.

Therefore, the main problem and indeed a major challenge to the ruling family is when one mechanism of rule is about to end. The new ruler is not just a new ruler. It may be an entirely new mechanism of rule, that is to say, branch of the royal family. This is especially so when there is no clear candidate to inherit. Many potential inheritors could create multiple coalitions that could also evolve. In doing so not only endanger the royal family stability, but also the system of rule, and the state.

Example: Saudi Arabia Let me turn to history to show examples. The most famous example of what I am saying was in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. To be sure Saud is the name of the royal family, that rules in the Arabian Peninsula. To put case to thesis is the struggle between King Saud and Faisal in the early 1960s that resulted in King Saud’s abdication. There were many aspects to that struggle yet the most important was accepting or disputing the order of succession. Saud promoted his sons while Faisal relied on his brothers. Faisal was able to enroll the powerful Sudairis thus winning the struggle. From that point five Sons of Ibn Saud, took power switching between the Sudairis and the rest.

How did this come about and what transpired? Well, it started with Ibn Saud who created the 3rd Saudi state and who ruled for 50 years. During this he obliterated any credibility of rivals within the family. He had 37 sons from different wives. His goal was to enable and ensure the creation of a sole legitimacy only to his descendants.

Faisal challenged his brother Saud and the legitimacy of what he was doing. In succeeding he moved the royal family to looking at the state’s founder’s brothers and their coalitions as potential rules, as alternate mechanisms, and not solely one branch. The subsequent elevation of the seven Sudairis as a powerful group moved and enabled Faisal to create a unique position. This was the 2nd CP [wali liwali al- ahd]. In doing so a balance was created between the Sudairis and the rest of the sons.

What does that mean in practice? Well, every new king since Faisal has received one CP from his predecessor and after assuming power, he has also selected from his own coalition the 2nd CP. This has widened and broadened the mechanism potentially from one branch to two, and so also has reduced the potential for in- 26 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST fighting. This mechanism has survived 40 the years from Faisal's murder in 1975 until the latest King Salman’s ascendant in 2015.

Next in question of the significance of the royal family, and not just the change of ruler at the top is the 3rd generation, that being of Ibn Saud's grandsons. What has happened to them? Surely over the last century the extended royal family may well number in the thousands, and so they would be too far from the throne to be significant. Not so. They have importance because Saud tried to elevate his sons in the 1950s. Yet these sons also aged. That meant that grandsons were given more and more significance and in doing so eyed the throne as theirs. Despite growing anticipation over a major power struggle in the royal family, since the 1990s, the mechanism has survived all the struggles.

Since 2015, the issue has resurfaced. One of the main concerns is once again the growing number of the 3rd generation who now number in the few by now. That wouldn’t in its own right be an issue but, on the horizon, may be a new means and order of succession. For example in 2015 emerged Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (MbS) the son of the new king who was relatively unknown until then. He assumed unprecedented power in a couple of years, and in 2017 was appointed to as the sole CP. The position of 2nd CP position was abolished.

There are several speculations regarding what is transpiring and the next stage. One prominent one suggested is that MbS would like to force his father the king to abdicate as soon as possible and then rule. Yet, I claim differently and have done so since 2017. My understanding of the situation is that the question of appointing a new CP is not a straightforward one. It is an extremely problematic and difficult process. It is about the whole royal family. And since 2017 there is are indicates of MbS paving the way to creating a new order of succession.

Let me elaborate. It seems to me that MbS would like to appoint his younger brother Khalid bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (KbS) to a major role. In practice he already functions as if he were a 2nd CP. But MbS is cautious. He understands and appreciates that such a unilateral move could anger the whole royal family. Why? Because it would mean that only the sons of Salman could be heirs from this point. It would abolish the mechanism, that survived 40 the years from Faisal's murder in 1975 until the latest King Salman’s ascendant in 2015. It could threaten the stability of the state.

Therefore in my view, while no one questions the fact that MbS should be a king and maybe the next king, it is not the only issue. What is important, and maybe PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 27 the most important issue, is the entire mechanism of the order of succession that is critical. Mbs will need to balance and placate the entire royal family for his rule to be stable. As in the period of King Saud any lack of understanding in the family when combined with an economic crisis, and other problems especially in the foreign relations, could lead to his forced abdication. If MbS fails to create an agreed upon mechanism to the order of succession in the royal family, after his rule, it could impede his rule.

Example: Kuwait Saudi Arabia is not the only case to my thesis. Another case is Kuwait. Once again history has shown the importance of the royal family and not just the few people at the top. In Kuwait since the beginning of the 20th century a mechanism has existed to balance the order of succession not from one but from two branches of the royal family. These are known as Jabiriyya and Salimiyya who emerged from the 2 sons of Mubarak, the founder of modern Kuwait. He had murdered his brother to enable only his sons to rule, and later a two-branch mechanism was created.

This two-branch mechanism has survived almost a century. The only exception was in the 1960s when Sabah al-Salim inherited rule from his own brother but to ensure stability immediately nominated the young Jabir al-Ahmad from the rival branch as CP. Further, after the creation of the state in the 1960s, having received independence from Great Britain, the CP has also been the Prime Minister. This duality of power, Emir and Prime Minister, from different branches has created a more solid balance between the branches.

In the beginning of the 21st century the Emir and the CP have both aged and were ailing. Things happened. Sabah al-Ahmad moved to replace his brother in 2006 despite the claims by the other branch (Salimiyya) for the role. Almost immediately he nominated his brother Nawaf as CP and his nephew Nassir al-Muhammad as PM. In doing so he ostracized the whole Salimiyya branch from the order of succession. This resulted in growing infighting among the royal family. This was evident in 2006-2009 especially from the Salimiyya and their supporters. Then also gradually inside the Jabirriya as there was no understanding over the order of succession.

The change enabled the popular Sabah al-Ahmad, who died recently, to be succeeded by his brother Nawaf. He has inherited quietly. It also enabled him to nominate his younger brother Mishal to CP. However as the young CP is 80 28 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST years old, it means that there is no wide understanding of the order of any further succession. In practice his decision will only postpone for short period the creation of a new mechanism.

Conclusion In conclusion, I have provided examples of the importance of the entire ruling family and the various informal mechanisms as a reason to the stability of the Gulf monarchies. In doing so I have emphasized that the most overlooked reason for this is the order of succession that creates balance between the main coalitions inside the families. It is the history of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that can shed light on these mechanisms. As they are ending in the current years the families are looking for a new balance. On the horizon if they don’t would be instability. To be sure crisis and lack of broad understanding can be a danger to the stability of the family and the regime. The al-Saud and al-Sabah will need to find their family solutions to guarantee their own stability in rule and prevent intra-family feuds. Or else in danger is their own rule, their families, and maybe the political system of their states. PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 29

Panel 3: Israel and Palestinians

Chair: Dr. Eben Coetzee University of the Free State

Dr. Soli Shahvar University of Haifa The Palestinian Question in IRI's Foreign and anti-Israel Policy

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz Yezreel Valley College and the University of Haifa Israel, the Gulf, and the Palestinian Question: A new Area?

Dr. Glen Segell University of Haifa and University of the Free State New diplomatic relations transforms geopolitics 30 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION IN IRI’S FOREIGN AND ANTI-ISRAEL POLICY Dr. Soli Shahvar The University of Haifa

Introduction: The Importance of Palestine in the Muslim World One of the main ends of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) is to unite the Islamic world (Vahdat-e Jahan-e Islam) under its leadership as "the mother of all Islamic lands" (umm al-qura-ye Islam). In order to achieve that, the IRI needed a cause around which the Muslim world (or at least the majority) could unite.

Apart from its religious position as the third holy place of Islam, Palestine has been by far the widest common ground among Muslims and a unifying cause for Muslims. Furthermore, The Quran (Surat al-Nisaa: Aya 141) preaches against the rule of heretics (kuffar) over Muslims: "never will Allah give the disbelievers over the believers". When the Christian world wanted to conquer Palestine, a series of wars under the name of Crusader Wars developed between the Christian and Muslim worlds. Those lasted over two hundred years (1096 – 1291), which ended with Muslim victory.

In modern times, Palestine became, once again, a clash arena between the Christian and Islamic worlds, this time embodied in the struggle between Christian Britain and Muslim Ottoman Empire during WWI. It was during this war that the Balfour Declaration (1917) provided for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

Iranian Shi'i Ulema and the Question of Palestine Following this declaration and after WWI, which ended with Allied victory, a process of Jewish immigration to Palestine began. In turn, this increased tension between Arab and Jews, leading first to a series of Arab-Jewish clashes in the 1920s and 1930s.

The rising numbers of Jewish immigrants to Palestine alarmed Palestinian leadership, calling for Islamic support and solidarity. Such calls were also heard in Iran, where leading Shi'i ulema – such as ‘Abd al-Karim Ha’iri and Sayyed Hossein 'Ali Tabataba'i Borujerdi from Qum and Aqa Mirza Sayyid Muhammad Bihbahani form Tehran – issued statements in support of Palestine and against PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 31 the Jews. However, it was Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim Kashani, the most vocal and the most politically active among the leading Shi'i ulema at the time, who championed the cause of Palestine. For him, and for a number of Iranian Shi'i radical fundamentalist groupings – mainly the Jam'iyat-e Fada'iyan-e Eslam (League of those who scarify themselves for Islam) and the Ettehad-e Moslemin (Unity of Muslims) which emerged in the mid-1940s – supporting Palestine expressed their pan-Islamic worldview, and an expression of Islamic unity. There were other problems facing the Islamic world, such as French involvement in North Africa or the problems between the Muslims and Hindus in Kashmir; but none of those attracted Muslim attention as Palestine. Following the period of intense processes of secularization, modernization, Iranian nationalization (in its pre-Islamic sense) and anti-clericalization of the Reza Shah period (1925-1941), Kashani and his allies also aimed for strengthening Islamic teachings and for implementation of Islamic law in Iran.

The Palestinian Question – from Religious to Religious-Political Issue The establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, namely the State of Israel in 1948, gave the existing religious-based Islamic attitude towards the Jews a new dimension, political. Thus, the Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine became also an Israeli/Zionist-Arab one, putting Kashani's (and later Khomeini's) pro-Palestinian policy on contrary and opposite footing to his anti-Israeli/Zionist policy.

Kashani and his allies and followers propagated the cause of Palestine, issued statements, organized large public gatherings, raised donations and even organized thousands of Iranian Shi'i volunteers to be sent to the 1948-1949 war in support of the Palestinian Arabs against the Jews/Israelis/Zionists. But, while allowing the statements to be made and gatherings to take place, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (r. 1941-1979) blocked any attempt for Iranian participation in the 1948-1949 War.

In the 1940s Ruhollah Khomeini was still a young Shi'i cleric, but he was very much influenced by Kashani's worldview, tactics and methods – especially the primacy of Palestine as a unifying force. Before his exile from Iran to Iraq (1964) Khomeini created the Jam'iyat-e Mo'talafeh-ye Eslami (League of Islamic Coalition), which in cooperation with a number of his trusted politically active Shi'i clerics, laid the foundation for a growing network of branches throughout Iran. It was Khomeini (in exile) and his network in Iran, aided by the PLO (in training Iranian guerilla fighters against the Shah) and other political organizations – mainly from the left and the center of the Iranian political spectrum – that finally (1978-1979) 32 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST managed to bring about the revolution, topple the Pahlavi regime and replace it with an Islamic Republic, ruled by Shi'i clerics and Islamic law.

The IRI and the Adoption of a Pro-Palestinian and Anti-Israeli Foreign Policy

Foreign policy reflects a given regime's identity. IRI's identity could be best described as an "identity square", composing of 4 sides: Islamic, Iranian, revolutionary and non-aligned. The Islamic element is paramount as it incorporates the other 3 elements, and thus it dictates the interests and ends of IRI's foreign policy.

Due to this "identity square", the IRI's sees its role, among others, as: defender of Islam (and Shi'ism) and protector of the weak and the oppressed. Therefore, from IRI's point of view – namely, as a holy place of Islam, and also as the weak against the Israeli oppressor – Palestine needs to be protected and Israel – to be opposed.

Opposing Israel stands in direct contrast to Mohammad Reza Shah's de facto recognition of Israel (1950) and the close relation which Iran and Israel developed from the late 1950s to late 1970s. This contrast in foreign policy could be explained in both the Pahlavi's and the IRI's identity. While the identity of the Pahlavi regime was an Iranian (in its pre-Islamic context), making the Shah to give precedence to Iranian national interests, the Islamic identity of Khomeini and the IRI's leadership make Islamic interests (as far as those promote Iranian Shi'i leadership of the Islamic world) paramount to national interests. This caused Pahlavi Iran to establish close relations and strategic cooperation with Israel, while it made the IRI to adopt an anti-Israeli policy.

Generally speaking, as long as the PLO continued its struggle against Israel, the IRI supported it in spite of PLO's generally secular and nationalist posture. PLO's evacuation of Lebanon following the first Lebanese War (1982), removed a major non-Lebanese strong para-military force from Lebanon. The IRI succeeded in filling the vacuum with a Shi'i proxy in Lebanon, i.e. Hezbollah.

In turn, following the Oslo agreement between Israel and the PLO, the IRI moved to support the more radical Palestinian groups, such as the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine and Hamas.

Thus, the IRI has been successful in placing its own proxies and allies on Israel's northern and Southern borders, being careful not to move into direct armed conflict with Israel. PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 33

Through its financial, logistic and military support and guidance, the IRI has managed to place itself as the main harbinger of the Palestinian cause, hoping to win wide Islamic solidarity as the most steadfast against Israel and for Palestine, and thus – to win position of leadership of the Muslim world.

The "Arab Spring" and the Radicalization of IRI's Regional Behavior This pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli strategy has generally proved itself until the "Arab Spring" events, especially in Iraq and Syria, which rolled the Islamic World back into heightened Shi'i-Sunni conflict. This has placed Palestinian organizations, who are Sunnis, in a difficult position vis-a-vis their relations with Shi'i IRI, and provided an opening – first for Turkey (especially following the Marmara affair) and later for Qatar – who both promote Sunni political Islam through the Muslim Brotherhood, including its branches in Gaza (i.e. Hamas) and Israel itself (the Islamic Movement, mainly its northern branch).

These developments among the radical Palestinians, whether in Gaza or in Israel, have brought a number of Arab countries in the Persian Gulf, who oppose Muslim Brotherhood (and thus oppose the policies of Turkey and Qatar) and Shi'i IRI, to distance themselves from the Palestinians, and to develop secret ties with Israel (like Saudi Arabia) and even sign a peace agreement (UAE) or normalize with it (Bahrein), probably opening up the way for other Arab and Islamic states to break the wall of enmity with Israel.

Although still being committed to the Palestinian question, these countries have removed the historical pre-condition for establishing relations with Israel. This development places the radical groups in Palestine with two major rival regimes struggling over hegemony over the Middle East: Erdogan's Turkey and the Ayatollah's in Iran, whose rivalry is both ethnic (Turks vs Iranians) and religious (Sunni vs Shi'i). Both are under harsh economic circumstances and heavily involved in a multi-conflict zones and wish to come up with the upper hand in the struggle over the leadership of the Muslim World.

In this struggle, the IRI seems to be in a more fragile situation: it is under severe economic sanctions, dire health crisis (especially, due to Covid-19), deteriorating environmental crisis, and widespread popular opposition. Its domestic policies have caused rising protests throughout Iran, by both the majority Persian and the minority non-Persian ethnic groups, by majority Shi'i and minority Sunni Muslims, by rising religious conversion (mainly to Christianity), and by alternative political ideologies, such as secular constitutionalism, liberal democracy and socialism. 34 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Under such circumstances, the IRI would probably be further sidelined as far as the Palestinian question is concerned, thus giving more room to Turkey and Qatar. Also, with the local criticism building up in Iran as well as for its proxies in the region (Hezbollah in Lebanon, Assad regime in Syria, and its proxies in Iraq and Yemen), the IRI would have to concentrate more on its own survival at home and those of its Shi'ite proxies.

IRI's Pro-Palestinian Policy – Does It Serve Palestinian Interests?

It is important to note that the IRI has been very selective where it applies its foreign policy principles or wishes to keep its "Islamic identity". For example, despite its claim to support the weak and the oppressed, the IRI is not among the countries that assist the 13,000 Muslim refugees currently on the Greek Island of Lesbos. Nor is it among the countries who participate in assisting the 1.5 million fleeing Muslims from Mayanmar, or among those countries who have listed to assist in reconstruction of Lebanon. On the contrary, by supporting the Assad regime in Syria, the IRI plays an important role in the killing of Muslim people in Syria and didn't invite even one out of the 8 million Syrian refugees to Iran. Furthermore, the IRI fails to criticize Chinese treatment of Muslims (such as employing 2 million Uygur, Tatar, Kazak, Qarabagh and Soghdian Muslim captives in the forced labor camps in China) or that by Russia (such as Russia's "swallowing" of Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia – two Muslim populated regions in Georgia). Moreover, although Muslim Kosovo has been recognized by more than hundred countries, the IRI is not among them, and that's because Putin refused to do so, supporting Serbia and its Christian Orthodox majority. Due to similar reasons, the IRI is not assisting Shi'i Azerbaijan against Christian Armenia, which is supported by Russia.

Such examples clearly show that IRI's principles are applicable only where its interests rest, exactly in the same manner as the cases where they are not applied. Through its proxies it has already managed to gain much control in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, creating the Shi'ite Arc, and through its proxies in Gaza, Yemen, and Bahrein it wishes to expand those further. Behind the slogan of "Freedom of Jerusalem", the "Jerusalem Day" parades, organizations such as "Conference in Support of the Intifada and Revolution of the Palestinian People", and opposition to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, lie IRI aspirations for control of Palestine, not its freedom. PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 35

Conclusions The message for the Palestinians, as for many other nations, groups and organizations supported by the IRI, should be that IRI's assistance to them is not dedicated to improve their standard of living or provide humanitarian assistance, but to prolong conflicts (and thus misery, poverty and despair) – in Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Nigeria, Venezuela and many other places. Isma'il Haniyeh, for example, had admitted that the IRI invested in Gaza for building tunnels for smuggling weapons into Gaza, but it is well known that it has never invested in building a school or a clinic.

By using the Palestinian card the IRI aims not to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but to expand the Arab-Israeli conflict into an Islamic-Zionist struggle, led by the IRI and for its own ends. This policy, however, has backfired. IRI's domestic, regional and international policies and radical behavior have not only diminished its local popular support to new low (due to serving regime's rather than national Iranian interests), but also brought about further isolation for itself and fragmented the Arab and Islamic worlds. More Muslims countries and nations are distancing themselves from the IRI, some of whom have recently even established relations with Israel, with others have either secret contacts or planning to join the peace circle with Israel. It is with Israel that the Palestinians need to coexist as neighbors, and it is through a true peace agreement with Israel that they would embark on the path of prosperity and security. 36 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

ISRAEL, THE GULF AND THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION Dr. Ido Zelkovitz The University of Haifa

Introduction From the onset of the political process between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, the Palestinians have worked to create a broad Arab front to support their position and have asked the Arab world not to normalize relations with Israel until a permanent agreement is reached between the parties to establish a Palestinian state.

The entry of Arab states from the Gulf into a process of accelerated normalization with Israel has led to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority’s concept of negotiations. The Palestinian failure of move forward in the peace process led to the current round of reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas that started with direct talk under Turkish hospitality in 19th September 2020. This reconciliation attempt can be understood against the background of the regional changes that have resulted from Israel’s agreements with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.

The Background For more than a decade there has been a mostly unsuccessful dialogue among the various Palestinian factions to unify their political system, which has been divided since June 2006, and Fatah and Hamas presently face a significant crisis of confidence. The current attempts at reconciliation, however, have different characteristics than past attempts. This time, the contacts between Fatah and Hamas are taking place when the Palestinian national movement is at one of its low points, as countries in the Arab world are turning their backs on it, and when it needs to rethink its overall strategy moving forward.

This political crisis occurs while Fatah and Hamas leadership are in a transition phase. Power struggles over the succession of Mahmoud Abbas embroil Fatah, while Hamas is undergoing an election process intended to determine the leader of the movement for the next four years. As part of this process, there are power struggles between Hamas leadership in Gaza and its leaders abroad. PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 37

The reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas that have been taking place in Turkey, considered a member of the regional axis opposing Israel and a Hamas sponsor, reveal the extent of the crisis facing the Palestinian Authority, which suspects its traditional friends in the Middle East of turning their backs on it. The death of Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah in September, Kuwait’s leader since 2006 who oversaw Kuwait’s foreign relations for some fifty years, is a symbolic illustration of the sense of loneliness felt by Palestinians due to Gulf abandonment. Al-Sabah famously repaired the relations between Kuwait and the PLO following the crisis of the first Gulf War in which Yasser Arafat sided with Saddam Hussein.

Looking Foreword The younger generation that is taking over the reins of leadership in the Gulf states does not share the commitment of its parents’ generation to the Palestinian issue. The younger generation chose to abandon the Arab League’s “Three No’s” of the Khartoum Conference of 1967 (no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel) in favor of establishing civil and economic peace with the State of Israel. This peace also includes political and security elements, which create ample space for the Gulf states to maneuver regionally, particularly against Iranian threats of regional destabilization.

However, despite forging closer ties with Israel, the Gulf states have not entirely abandoned the Palestinian issue. The UAE stipulated the cancellation of Israeli annexation plans as a condition for signing the Abraham Accords. Saudi Arabia, the largest and most important of the Gulf states, which spearheaded the Arab Peace Initiative in 2002 on the basis of a two-state solution, is gradually increasing its engagement with Israel, but continues to insist upon a resolution to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict before full normalization can proceed.

As these dramatic changes take place in the region, the Palestinian leadership has dropped its guard. Had it not been for the normalization measures between Israel and the Gulf states, we would not have seen the renewed efforts at reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. Considering regional developments, the factions feel obligated to show Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that they are trying to provide a national and political solution to the many domestic and foreign problems facing Palestinian society.

The rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas, which is being sponsored by Turkey-Qatar-Iran axis, does not come naturally to the Palestinian Authority’s 38 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST leadership. Mahmoud Abbas is hoping that a change of administration in the United States on 3 November 2020 will allow him to break free from the dialogue with Hamas in order to rekindle the peace process. This would be done under the auspices of a new American leadership, based on a new peace plan crafted in the mold of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative.

Conclusion Against the background of the changes that have already taken place in the region, the leadership of the Palestinian Authority understands that the Arab world is no longer waiting for its approval to forge peace agreements with Israel. This is a moment of truth for the old guard of the PLO. They must decide whether to return to the negotiating table with Israel and work to realize the two-state vision, or whether to allow for the continuation of the status quo that brought to the Palestinian National movement nothing but a dead-end. Choosing to preserve the status quo could end in the complete erosion of the scant legitimacy that the Palestinian Authority possesses and lead to the rise of Hamas as the dominant faction in the Palestinian national movement at the expense of Fatah. This is not in Israel’s interest. Instead, the Israeli government would be well served to foster a new diplomatic horizon for the Palestinians and to advance the two-state solution. In so doing, it would help strengthen the moderates in the Palestinian arena and not the extremists. PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 39

NEW DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS TRANSFORMS GEOPOLITICS

Dr. Glen Segell The University of Haifa and The University of the Free State

Introduction Good Afternoon. Thank you for all having made this exceptional academic webinar a reality. Let me start my presentation noting that the Abraham Accords and the COVID-19 pandemic shed an important light on the criticality of futures- based thinking to move us beyond conventional assumptions and positions.

In today’s chaotic cycle of rapid change, growing complexity, and radical uncertainty, the national security establishment and indeed academia must develop the skills and flexibility to adapt to the unexpected. To be sure, the fallout from COVID-19 has revealed overlooked vulnerabilities for our supply chains, our society, our economy, and, most pertinent, our national security strategy, which relies on all three. Education too has not escaped the lockdowns and quarantines.

Thesis As the Abraham Accords show there are always winners and losers. Looking to move forward may I request permission from my learned and distinguished colleagues with us today to offer as a framework for thinking a hypothesis.

I propose “Four Geopolitical Futures” - images if you like, of the future that recur throughout history, public debates, and popular culture; but they also stretch the limits of what we think of as logically possible. We do not “invent” the future. Disruption happens. We cannot solve for future uncertainty – we over-predict or under-predict. And there are no good sources on the future so that limits our research capabilities. Hence, the greatest value of the four is that they create a strategic culture for where and when you ask a research question, so that any answer is contextual.

The four provide the best possible audit of present capacity, that challenge core assumptions about present trends. These are:

1) Transformation – that addresses fundamental shifts in rules of an established order. The powers and the survivors are those states that have achieved levels of resiliency visa-vis their peer competitors. 40 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

2) Collapse - that shows the possibility of a sudden loss of order. That includes a legitimacy crisis around the “truth narrative.” Indicative are tools for societal manipulation. There is a need to adapt to a radical change in our expectations or to the rules of change.

3) Discipline – that shows that collapses are not always complete or trans- formational. Strains on social order drive both liberal and authoritarian regimes alike towards highly centralized and restrictive measures for example surveillance and health checks.

4) Continued growth – that shows how different things could be. There needs to be a capability to maintain, to see what the future might look like if we do not adapt, collapse, or transform. Indeed calculate the costs of inaction rather than await surprise on the unexpected.

From these we can develop a framework of strategic geopolitics that is the foresight to craft "alternative futures." And not to coalesce around one vision of the future, which can result in major vulnerabilities in strategic planning. We can apply trend analysis to see what to expect if the present continues; AND intelligence assessments, to give us likely adversary courses of action based on established patterns of behavior.

To be sure. foresight requires imaginative approaches to designs that are often at odds with organizational or national cultures - experimentation can appear imprudent. But it is the capacity to develop and maintain intellectual capital for new thinking that enables survivors to take the high ground when the environment is turned upside down either by The Abraham Accords and the COVID-19. The goal is to envision a believable yet unanticipated world and confront the limits/creative possibilities of existing capabilities.

Examples

Let me give a few examples on the current Middle East Geopolitics and possible futures.

Firstly Iran, Turkey and Qatar portray a pan-Islamist alliance – all have commissioned mercenary jihadists in Syria, Libya, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region of West Africa to topple governments and replace them with Islamist supporters. Both Sunni and Shia. There are proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and North Africa. There are expansionist schemes. PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 41

What would happen if there were to be regime collapse in Iran and Turkey – maybe revived more secular states?

Secondly Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain portray a statist- militarized secularizing pact (also known as the Arab Quartet). They have boycotted Qatar, accusing it of funding regional terrorism. They are anti Iran and Turkey. There are increasingly shared interests with Israel, as well as other southern Mediterranean, southern European states such as Greece, Cyprus, Italy, and France. There are also similarities in issues. For example foreign workers in the Gulf; and economic migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean into Europe. And the current COVID-19 pandemic.

Conclusion Now I will conclude with The Abraham Accords – That is Israel, UAE and Bahrain. It offers a geopolitical future scenario that the Middle East regional order begins to look like post-WWII Europe.

Longstanding disputes are resolved and there is respect for each other’s borders. While economic integration and a shared currency eludes the region, the renouncement of expansionism brings a greater focus on domestic issues. Transcending previous ideological impasses allows for greater investment in education and healthcare. There is a resurgence in national entrepreneurship, technological innovations, and scientific discoveries.

In such a vision a fundamental shift for Israel is that Gaza becomes the primary basis for a new, Palestinian State. There has been a regime change in Iran. Its cultural identity stems from being a coastal Mediterranean city instead of an Islamist identity. So, a post-Hamas Gaza is modeled after Singapore.

And the Judea / Samaria (West Bank)? Either become citizens of the new Palestinian State (in Gaza) and/or remain in their towns as permanent residents, but not citizens, of Israel’s increasingly annexed regions, based on Jewish religious rationale.

That leaves the foreign intervention as a question. The only legitimate is the EU in MENA, as this is its southern and eastern border. But what of the the USA and indeed China and Russia that are also increasing their own presence and are there, here, for the long haul. Thank you. 42 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Panel 4: Middle East and North Africa

Chair: Dr. Glen Segell University of Haifa and University of the Free State

Professor Theo Neethling University of the Free State China’s military presence in Djibouti: Driving forces and some implications for the MENA region

Professor Hussein Solomon University of the Free State Managing identity politics in the fractious MENA region

Dr. Moshe Terdiman University of Haifa The Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 43

CHINA’S MILITARY PRESENCE IN DJIBOUTI: DRIVING FORCES AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MENA REGION Professor Theo Neethling The University of the Free State

Introduction

Ever since the establishment in Camp Lemonnier, the US expeditionary base in Djibouti, which was established in 2003 alongside bases belonging to the French, Italian, Spanish, Japanese and German militaries, Djibouti has increasingly become a country of considerable international importance.(1) Today, both China and the United States, the world’s two economic powerhouses, as well as several other major powers, have military forces in Djibouti in a region where more or less 10 per cent of the world’s oil exports and approximately 20 per cent of commercial exports annually are transported through the busy shipping lanes.(2)

China’s geo-strategic interests in Djibouti and beyond

The establishment of a Chinese military base in Djibouti marked a notable step in the ambition of People's Liberation Army to turn its naval warfare branch (navy) into a so-called blue-water navy as the Djibouti base was the establishment of China’s first overseas military base. Like several other observers and analysts in the Western world, the former U.S. Army Gen. and AFRICOM commander, David Rodrigues, interpreted this as “another sign of its [China’s] growing reach beyond the Asia-Pacific”.(3)

The Chinese government has justified its military base in Djibouti as a facility to contribute to humanitarian relief and peace and stability in Africa. At the same time, it was stated that the base would also be used as a facility to undertake maritime counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden to which China has been a regular multinational contributor since 2008. What is striking of Beijing’s public diplomacy is that China always downplayed the military aspect of the Djibouti base, but instead called the base a “support facility” for replenishing the Chinese navy and meeting international obligations in relation to peace and stability in Africa.(4) 44 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

In short, China’s military base in Djibouti is intended to be instrumental in supporting five “mission areas”: (5) • Counterpiracy in the Gulf of Aden, which was the primary catalyst for Chinese engagement in Djibouti. • Intelligence collection on other countries and their activities in the region. • Non-combat evacuation operations in East Africa in relation to an increasing number of Chinese citizens and expatriates in the region. • Peacekeeping operations, especially in relation to the increasing numbers of Chinese troops serving in South Sudan, as well as Mali. • Counterterrorism operations pertaining to significant terrorist threats faced by Chinese populations in the region.

In view of the above, the following should also be highlighted: The Djibouti base can protect Beijing’s economic interests on the continent, and render assistance in maintaining a more secure environment, both in terms of open seas anti-piracy protection and supporting the ideal of a maritime silk road through the Indian Ocean onto the African continent through naval operations. It can also support or protect Beijing’s interests in specific African states or regions through peacekeeping endeavours.(6) Further to this, the base puts China in a position where Beijing now has airfield facilities that could significantly strengthen its surveillance or intelligence-gathering capabilities over a significant portion of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, specifically the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Libya, as well as Central Africa.(7)

China’s geo-economic interests in Djibouti and beyond It is commonly known that Djibouti is located at the crossroads of one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. Not only is Djibouti key to shipping access to both the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, it also links Europe, the Far East, the Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf. Djibouti is also located at the mouth of the Red Sea and that makes the country an ideal transhipment hub for cargo in and out of the MENA region. In this regard, it should be noted that a significant percentage of Beijing’s trade with the EU passes through the Gulf of Aden, valued at over US$1 billion a day. In addition, over 40% of China’s total oil imports pass through the Indian Ocean.(8)

A most important Chinese project that is strongly linked to Chinese commercial interests in the MENA region is President Xi Jingping’s development framework, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as the ‘One Belt, One Road’ PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 45 initiative. This strategic project was launched in 2013 and is aimed at developing an economic belt and a maritime road to promote cooperation and interconnectivity of major markets in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe.

The BRI is often regarded as a lofty Chinese ambition to revive China’s ancient Silk Road trading routes between Asia and Europe. At the center of the plan are two envisaged economic routes. The first is the Silk Road Economic Belt, stretching from Asia to Europe, and the second is the Maritime Silk Road. The latter is of importance as it will begin in China and pass along the Indian Ocean littoral to East Asia and then connect Europe through the Suez Canal. Djibouti happens to be located along the Maritime Silk Road.

The BRI is widely viewed as a uniquely ambitious infrastructure project that is aimed at strengthening China’s business interests in several regions, including MENA countries, and as an important framework for exercising China’s soft power. The BRI has gained increasing prominence in Chinese policymaking and economic planning and involved several state and business actors from a wide range of countries in this ‘21st-Century Maritime Silk Road’. The BRI underpins and explains China’s investment of billions of dollars in new rail, shipping and airport infrastructure in dozens of countries, such as Kenya, Djibouti and Egypt on the African continent(9) and the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East.(10) This then explains references to Djibouti as China’s gateway to Africa and the Middle East.

Concluding remarks Investments in Djibouti boost the ability of PLA to project its power in the MENA region, and even beyond. In fact, China’s base in Djibouti boosts this emerging superpower’s global naval potential well beyond its immediate neighbourhood. China has been investing in the creating of a blue water navy for several decades and the establishment of a naval base in Djibouti and additional regional bases can now facilitate the development of the Chinese navy as a navy with global reach. With a permanent base in Djibouti, the PLA have a formidable maritime and potentially aerial springboard that enables it to reach deep into the northern, eastern and central parts of Africa, as well as the northwest parts of the Indian Ocean.(11)

Whatever the future holds, is a matter of speculation, but there is good reason to argue that China’s Djibouti base matters greatly to its energy strategy in the MENA region, but increasingly also its global expansion. As far as the latter is concerned, it 46 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST is of great importance to the MENA region, specifically the development of the BRI as Chinese President Xi Jingping’s flagship foreign and economic policy project. Against this background, Rózsa and Tamás(12) correctly observe that Beijing has a “strategic need to ensure a stable MENA in order to realise its economic interest in the region”. In the final analysis, there is much food for thought in Chaziza’s observation that, “the Djibouti naval base may just be the beginning of China’s military expression of power in the MENA region”.(13)

Sources 1 Braude, Joseph, and Jiang, Tyler. 2016. “Why China and Saudi Arabia are building bases in Djibouti”. HuffPost, 26 September. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-braude/why- china-and-saudi-arabi_b_12194702.html; accessed 5 October 2018. Pieper, Dietmar. 2018. “How Djibouti became China’s gateway to Africa.” Spiegel Online, 8 February. http://www. spiegel.de/international/world/djibouti-is-becoming-gateway-to-africa-for-china-a-1191441. html, accessed 12 October 2018. 2 Bearak, Max. 2019. “In strategic Djibouti, a microcosm of China’s growing foothold in Africa”. The Washington Post, 30 December. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in- strategic-djibouti-a-microcosm-of-chinas-growing-foothold-in-africa/2019/12/29/a6e664ea- beab-11e9-a8b0-7ed8a0d5dc5d_story.html, accessed 10 January 2020. 3 GlobalSecurity.org. 2018. “Djibouti-China Naval Base.” https://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/world/djibouti/forrel-prc-base.htm, accessed 6 September 2018. 4 Wang, Monica. 2018. “China’s strategy in Djibouti: Mixing commercial and military interests.” ForeignAffairs.com, 13 April. ht t p s ://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-strategy-djibouti-mixing- commercial-and-military-interests, accessed 5 September 2018. 5 Downs, Erica, Becker, Jeffrey, and de Gategno, Patrick. 2017. “China’s military support facility in Djibouti: The economic and security dimensions of China’s first overseas base.” CNA Corporation, Analysis Solutions, July. ht t p ://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038215.pdf, accessed 3 August 2018. 6 Wang, op. cit. 7 GlobalSecurity.org, op. cit. 8 Chaziza, Mordechai. 2018. “China’s military base in Djibouti.” Mideast Security and Policy Studies, no. 53: 1-27. 9 Wu, Yu-Shan, Alden, Chris, and Sidiropoulos, Elizabeth. 2017. “China’s One Belt One Road initiative will need Africa’s support to work.” Quarts Africa, 2 May. https://qz.com/ africa/993861/obor-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative-needs-africas-support/; accessed 14 September 2018. Olander, Eric, and Van Staden, Cobus. 2017. “Inside Africa’s role in China’s ambitious ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative.” HuffPost, 16 March. https://www.huffingtonpost. com/eric-olander/africa-china-one-belt-one-road-initiative-_b_9471982.html, accessed 12 August 2018. 10 Siddiqa, Arhama. 2020. “The rise of the Middle Kingdom in the Middle East: China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” Middle East Monitor, 7 August. https://www.middleeastmonitor. com/20200807-the-rise-of-the-middle-kingdom-in-the-middle-east-chinas-belt-and-road- initiative/, accessed 9 August 2020. 11 Chaziza, op. cit. 12 Rózsa, Erzsébet and Tamás, Peragovics. 2019. China’s political, military and cultural engagement in the MENA region. In Sidlo, K.W., The Role of China in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Beyond economic interests? European Institute of the Mediterranean Joint Policy Study, July. 13 Chaziza, op. cit. PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 47

MANAGING IDENTITY POLITICS IN THE FRACTIOUS MENA REGION Professor Hussein Solomon The University of the Free State

Introduction

I want to discuss four alternatives - secession, federalism, power-sharing and nation-building – which MENA countries have utilized in an effort to manage fractious identity politics in their respective countries.

Secession: The Case of Libya

Whilst secessionism is often regarded as a last resort to escape sectarian strife since it is the most politically unpalatable option. It entails allowing a group to secede and thereby govern themselves - retaining the territory which they inhabit which was once part of a sovereign state.

Whilst this is an extreme method of escaping negative identity politics, it should be considered as a viable option when civil war has become so ruinous that the costs of secession may be more bearable than maintaining the current borders of an existing sovereign state.

Commenting on this fraught issue, Gal Luft opines, “Sometimes a divided country is better than a broken and hopeless one”. Libya confronts such a stark reality. Despite international mediation attempts, the primary fault line between forces of Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) and the Government of National Accord (GNA) has grown ever deeper.

Beyond this primary fault line, lay a constellation of other armed actors. Indeed, there are a staggering 1700 militias operating in this strife torn country. These militias are formed along lines of clan, criminal and Islamist lines.

Should secession be considered in Libya? What form would it take? If one accepts the partition of the country along the lines of the balance of forces between those of the LAAF and the GNA, what prevent these rather fragile political entities from disintegrating further as clan militias and Islamist forces carve out their own niche within the divided country? 48 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Federalism: The Case of Morocco A less extreme form of separation is federalism. This allows for the sharing of power between different groups, especially where a group is contiguous with a geographic region. At its core, federalism, devolves power from the centre to regional units where the powers of each are clearly demarcated and constitutionally enshrined.

Such autonomy may well provide aggrieved groups with a stake in the sovereign states and may well appease demands for secession. On the other hand, autonomy may result in greater fragmentation as groups use autonomy as a half-way towards outright secession. Moreover, federalism comes with greater financial burdens, think of the replication of state capitals and the additional layers of bureaucracy.

Despite the challenges of federalism, there is space to consider it within the context of some MENA states. The case of Morocco and the Western Sahara does come to mind here. Given the political realities on the ground, the most viable option may well be Morocco’s Autonomy Plan.

This seeks to reconcile Morocco’s claims of sovereignty over the territory with the desire for self-determination on the part of the Saharawis. Genuine, cooperative federalism with supporting sub-regional conflict resolution mechanisms and the equitable distribution of economic benefits might well prove to put an end to this long-running conflict.

Power-sharing or consociationalism: The Case of Lebanon Far from dragooning people into one identity, power-sharing does two things. First, it actively acknowledges different identities. Second, it views these multiple identities as legitimate. Power-sharing arrangements are characterized by four elements. These include: the involvement of major groups in power-sharing at executive level; the possibility of a minority veto on certain crucial issues; the internal autonomy of groups where it is desired most; and proportional representation and proportional allocation of public funds and posts in the civil service.

Lebanon’s power-sharing system has been unravelling in recent years and it is instructive to examine the reasons for this. Despite its initial resistance to Lebanese sectarian politics, Hezbollah drew benefit from it and mastered the art of deploying identity for political objectives. Hezbollah has made use of the confessional governance system to create a state within a state. As such, it has resisted calls from the Lebanese street to reform or radically alter the current power-sharing agreement in Lebanon. PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 49

Hezbollah resisted the call from ordinary Lebanese in 2011, as part of the Arab Spring, to rid the country of such sectarian identity politics. In 2015, more animated calls for an end to the confessional system of governance arose with demonstrators again taking to the streets. Once more, Hezbollah resisted an end to the politics of division. Its’ Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah whilst publicly arguing that his organization adopted a neutral position, worked with other sectarian political elites, despite ideological and political differences, to thwart popular forces calling for an end to the confessional system.

Nasrallah also labeled those calling for an end to the current system ‘Takfiris’ and Zionist agents. Whilst making common cause with other political elites, Hezbollah was slowly controlling the Lebanese state from within. Its armed forces, some analysts, note are more powerful than that of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Its insidious control of the Lebanese state, meanwhile, continued apace and by February 2020 Lebanese President Michael Aoun felt compelled to publicly deny that Hezbollah is leading the new government.

Hezbollah’s support for the sect-based party system, however, is going against popular opinion on the Lebanese street and makes little financial or governance sense. One of the key characteristics of effective power-sharing systems is that not only leaders, but their constituency must also materially benefit from confessional governance.

This is clearly not happening in Lebanon where the same families have been in power since the end of the civil war. Patronage networks and nepotism as opposed to the requisite technical skills has resulted in not only ineffective governance but also entrenched corruption.

Lebanon has one of the planet’s largest debt loads. Government debt is more than 150 percent of gross domestic output and prospects of a sovereign default is highly likely. The central bank and local lenders were compelled to restrict the transfer of monies abroad as a result of a severe shortage of foreign exchange. This economic crisis has resulted in Lebanese to take to the streets since October 2019.

The Lebanese power-sharing experiment demonstrates the danger of allowing one group to amass power at the expense of other groups (for instance, allowing Hezbollah to retain its armed militias), to create a state within a state and allowing it to take over as well as excluding the majority of the population from materially benefiting from the system. The latter takes on added significance when an economy is imploding. 50 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Nation-Building: The Case of Oman Finally, there are nation-building approaches to overcome sectarian divides. Whilst the cleavages of state and society across the MENA region exists, it does not mean that it should be accepted as a norm. Inclusive nation-building, as opposed to elite co-option strategies pursued by MENA leaders, would entail promoting the idea of a common shared nationhood and creating a collective sense of belonging stressing the territory we share, a shared history and future goals all can buy into.

Oman under Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said provides important lessons in successful nation-building. Sultan Qaboos reigned from 1970-2020 and moved his country from conflict to relative peace and prosperity

If there is one criticism to be leveled against Oman’s otherwise successful nation- building approach is the fact that it was too closely associated with the person of Sultan Qaboos. It was he who reached out a conciliatory hand to the rebellious south, he who cajoled recalcitrant tribal sheikhs to partake in inclusive politics, he who created a capable state and had the political acumen to ensure that the benefits of state largesse was to be shared by all.

Oman’s successful nation-building attempt was therefore inextricably linked with the person of Sultan Qaboos. With his passing away on the 10th January 2020, it is unclear if his successor, Haithim bin Tariq, has the necessary political acumen or legitimacy of his predecessor.

Indeed, Haithim bin Tariq is a relatively unknown. He served as Secretary-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 2002 and that constitutes his public role. If there is one lesson, we can draw from Omani nation-building is that the long- term sustainability of these processes needs to be better institutionalized and less personalized.

Conclusion In conclusion, as we look at the future, fractious identity politics will continue to mar the MENA region’ political landscape if inclusive politics and inclusive national identities are not embraced. PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 51

THE RENAISSANCE DAM IN ETHIOPIA Dr. Moshe Terdiman The University of Haifa

Introduction

Throughout the last decade, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has been a constant source of tension between Ethiopia on the one side and Egypt and Sudan on the other side.

The GERD is situated on the Blue Nile, 15 km from the Sudanese border, and once completed, it will be the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa and the seventh largest in the world. It will have the capacity to generate 6,000 MW/h and an expected power generation of 16,000 GW per year. Its aim is to generate energy that will go to Ethiopia's national grid and be used to develop the rural and urban areas and relieve Ethiopia's acute energy shortage.

It should be mentioned in this context that as of today, only 27% of the Ethiopian population has access to the electricity grid. Therefore, this dam is a real necessity for the ever-growing Ethiopian population. As for the surplus energy generated from the dam, it will be sold and exported to neighboring countries including Sudan and possibly Egypt and Djibouti.

A view of Egypt

The late Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, laid the foundation stone of the GERD on April 2, 2011. At the time, Egypt experienced a chaotic situation after its late president, Husni Mubarak, resigned from power in February 2011 following the Arab Spring events. At first, Egypt tried to stop the construction of the dam or to inspect the works since it was afraid that the dam's construction would mean less water flowing in the Nile to Egypt. The reason for that is that the Blue Nile is the source of most the Nile's water, containing 80% water and silt.

When Egypt made peace with the fact that the dam's construction is a fait accompli, in recent year, Egypt has moved on and has been negotiating with Ethiopia and Sudan on the filling period of the dam, while saying that Ethiopia must not start generating electricity from the dam without reaching an agreement with Egypt on this issue. 52 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Ethiopia would like to fill it as fast as possible while Egypt would like it to be filled as slow as possible since it is afraid that during the filling period there will be 10% less water flowing in the Nile and, thus, its agriculture and ability to supply its ever- growing population with water will be hampered. And, worse still, all this may happen while Egypt has already been experiencing a severe water crisis.

Contemporary Developments

Nowadays, the negotiations are stuck between the three parties. In February 2020, Ethiopia did not sign an agreement reached between the parties in Washington D.C. in the framework of negotiations mediated by U.S. Treasury Secretary, Steven Mnuchin on the dam's filling period. Ethiopia claimed that the U.S. is not a fair mediator and is supporting Egypt's stand. In the beginning of June 2020, the negotiations between the parties resumed in the level of Ministers of Irrigation and ended without an agreement being reached. Then, on June 19, the Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gedu Andargachew, said that Ethiopia intends to start filling the dam at the beginning of the rainy season in July whether an agreement would be reached or not. As a result, Egypt and Sudan requested the UN Security Council to intervene and the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sameh Shukri warned that Egypt may conduct a military activity against Ethiopia in case the UN would not be able to bring Ethiopia to the negotiation table. However, the UN Security Council did not reach a decision.

The AU took the initiative and on June 26 conducted an online emergency summit meeting in which the leaders of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia agreed to resume negotiations and to form a committee of legal and technical experts that will enable the parties to reach an agreement during the coming weeks. At the end of the day, due to heavy rains in Ethiopia, the dam was filled with 4.9 billion cubic meters of water. Later, the negotiations that took place under the auspices of the AU on August 28 also failed.

At that period, Sudan also experienced heavy rains which caused a devastating flood with the Blue Nile reaching a record water level not seen for nearly a century. These floods are ranked as the most severe floods recorded in the region. The flood affected more than 3 million people, destroyed more than 100,000 homes and caused the death of more than 100 people. Ethiopia said concerning those floods that without the Renaissance Dam, the floods would have been even more disastrous. PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 53

As a result of the lack of progress in the negotiations and as a means of punishment or pressuring Ethiopia to make a compromise with Egypt, in August 2020, U.S. President, Donald Trump, directed Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, to halt part of the foreign aid to Ethiopia amounting to approximately 130 million USD. This move proved that Ethiopia was right in its conviction that the U.S. is not a fair mediator.

And now, in October 2020, senior Ethiopian officials made remarks that yet again escalated the tension between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan. On October 2, the Commander of the Ethiopian Air Force, Brigadier General Yilma Merdasa, said that Ethiopia is fully prepared to protect the dam against any attack. On October 5, the President of Ethiopia, Sahle-Work Zewde, said that in this coming year the dam would start to generate electricity and the second filling of the dam would be completed.

The General Manager of the Ethiopian Civil Aviation, Wesenyeleh Hunegnaw, banned commercial flights to fly above the dam in order to protect it. Egypt, in response, asked the President of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, for help. Beforehand, Egypt asked South Sudan and Somaliland to build military bases in their areas, but Ethiopia thwarted these attempts and even threatened South Sudan that it would strike it if it allows Egypt to do so.

At the end of the day, the GERD is a fait accompli and the question now is whether Ethiopia will reach an agreement with Sudan and Egypt on the timeframe of the filling period or it will fill the GERD in a year as the Ethiopian President said.

Conclusion It is important to say that this is not only a struggle between Egypt and Ethiopia but also between two national symbols. The Nile is the gift of life that without it Egypt cannot survive. The GERD is the symbol of the new federalist Ethiopia. It is also a struggle between Egypt, which claims that it has historical rights in using the Nile's water, and the other Nile riparian countries, whose population is increasing very rapidly, that claim to have a right to use the water for development purposes. At least for now it seems like Ethiopia has the upper hand. 54 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Webinar Program: 14 October 2020

Facebook live broadcast link and recorded video: https://www.facebook.com/HaifaMaritime/

In April 2018 a “Framework for Academic Collaboration” was signed between the University of Haifa, Israel and the University of the Free State, South Africa. An international workshop was due to be hosted by the University of Haifa on 12 March 2020 to mark this agreement and to further it. The COVID-19 prevented this event from taking place. On 14 October 2020 an Online Webinar will take place to ensure that even due to this Global Pandemic, the academic interchange and discourse continues. Each expert speaker will have 10 minutes to present. The Online Webinar is also open to a Global Public Audience who may submit written questions. Webinar Commences: 14:30 South Africa Standard Time / 15:30 Israel Summer Time.

Welcome Remarks The Palestinian Question in IRI's Foreign and anti- Israel Policy Professor Philippe Burger, Pro Vice- Chancellor: Poverty, Inequality and Dr. Ido Zelkovitz, Yezreel Valley College and the Economic Development, and Vice Dean University of Haifa (Strategic Projects): Faculty of Economic and Israel, the Gulf, and the Palestinian Question: a new Management Sciences, University of the Free State, South Africa Area? Dr. Glen Segell, University of Haifa and Panel 1: Iran University of the Free State Chair: Dr. Samuel Lebens, University of Haifa New diplomatic relations transforms geopolitics

Dr. Thamar E. Gindin, University of Haifa Panel 4: Middle East and North Africa The people's voice: What can we and what can't we learn from social media Chair: Dr. Glen Segell, University of Haifa and Dr. Eben Coetzee, University of the Free State University of the Free State The threat of a nuclear Iran: a dissident view Professor Theo Neethling, University of the Free Ashkan Safaei Hakimi, University of Haifa State Iran and Hezbullah: Same soul, Two bodies China’s military presence in Djibouti: Driving forces and some implications for the MENA region Panel 2: The Persian Gulf Professor Hussein Solomon, University of the Chair: Professor Hussein Solomon, University of Free State Free State Managing identity politics in the fractious MENA Professor Amatzia Baram, University of Haifa region The new government in Iraq and the Iraqi scene Dr. Moshe Terdiman, University of Haifa Dr. Eran Segal, University of Haifa The Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – toward a new model for the order of succession in the ruling family Q&A Session to all Expert Presenters

Panel 3: Israel and Palestinians Concluding Comments Chair: Dr. Eben Coetzee, University of the Free Professor Shaul Chorev, Director, The Ezri State Center for Iran & Gulf States Research, Dr. Soli Shahvar, University of Haifa University of Haifa, Israel

MoU Facilitator and Webinar Convener: Glen Segell (DPhil, FRGS), The Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States Research, University of Haifa, Israel Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State, South Africa PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 55

ABOUT THE ACADEMIC PARTNERS AND CONTRIBUTORS The Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States University of Haifa The main mission of the Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States, University of Haifa, is to promote research, achieve a better and deeper understanding, and provide crucial insights into the society, economy, politics, religion and culture of Iran and other countries of the Gulf, through the expertise of a sterling team of specialists and the employment of interdisciplinary tools and methods, covering the region's past, present and future. The Ezri Center also aims at becoming a hub of advanced research on the relations between Israel and Iran as well as one on the Jewish communities of the Gulf, and particularly Iran. Through its various activities - which include innovative research, policy analysis, local and international conferences, workshops, symposia, colloquia, occasional lectures, book launches, film presentations, exhibitions, and cultural activities - the Ezri Center wishes to provide a better and deeper understanding of the complexity and the undercurrent processes of Iran and other countries of the Gulf as well as the region as a whole. The Center also draws on the vibrant local Iranian and Arab communities, as well as the cooperation and collaboration of other Institutes and Centers, for events aimed at the dissemination of and familiarity with the Iranian and Arab arts and culture.

The Department of Political Studies and Governance The University of the Free State The Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State, consists of two components: Governance and Political Transformation and Political Science. These two components or divisions have their own distinct institutional roles and functions, but they find common ground in their relation to the study of the state, government, relevant non-governmental institutions, and politics in general. As such, much of the common scholarly focus, interest, and research relate to the science and art of government; the science dealing with the form, policies, organization, and administration of the state or a part of one; and with the regulation of its relations with other states and non-governmental organizations. The Department provides an ideal setting for students at all levels of undergraduate and postgraduate study to engage with novel ideas through learning, practicing scholarship, and creative research in various sub-fields of politics and governance, as well as in an array of interdisciplinary areas of inquiry. Its aim is to encourage its students to think broadly, critically, and internationally about the core features of democratic and global citizenship. The mission of the department is to pursue excellence through quality teaching, research, institutional and community engagement. This it seeks to achieve through offering innovative and relevant programs on national, regional, African, and global issues and the creation of opportunities to develop competent staff in teaching and research. It does this with a staff on all three campuses of the University of the Free State. 56 PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Philippe Burger is a Professor of Economics and Pro Vice-chancellor: Poverty, Inequality and Economic Development at the University of the Free State.

Professor Shaul Chorev, is the Director of the Ezri Centre for Iran & Gulf States Research, University of Haifa. He is also the Director of the Haifa Research Centre for Maritime Policy & Strategy and the Reuven Chaikin Chair in Geostrategy. He has held several key national defence positions.

Eben Coetzee lectures in the Department of Political Studies and Governance at the University of the Free State, South Africa. He has delivered several international and national papers, dealing specifically with nuclear weapons, the democratic peace proposition, structural realism and the idea of theory in international relations. His research interests include nuclear proliferation, nuclear deterrence and structural realist theory

Ashkan Safaei Hakimi is an MA student of Middle Easter and Islamic studies at the university of Haifa and a junior researcher at the Ezri Center for Iran and Persian Gulf Studies. His areas of interest include Iranian Jews, Iranian immigrants in Israel, Iranian cinema and Shiism. He is also a journalist currently working as Israel correspondent for a London-based, Persian-speaking TV, Iran International.

Dr. Amatzia Baram is professor Emeritus of Middle East studies at the University of Haifa, Israel. He received his Ph.D. in 1986 from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He taught at the Hebrew University, the University of Haifa and Georgetown University in Washington, DC. He was an Associate Member at Saint Antony's College, Oxford and resident fellow at several research institutes in the US and Europe, including the Woodrow Wilson Center and the US Institute of Peace in Washington, DC, and the Rockefeller Foundation in Bellagio. At the University of Haifa he served as Head of the Department of Middle East History and Director of the Jewish Arab Center and Middle East Institute. His main areas of study are the history of Iraq, Islamic Political and pan-Arab movements, and Arab intellectual history.

Dr. Eran Segal is a research fellow at the Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States Research, the University of Haifa, Israel, and he teaches at the University of Haifa, the Levinsky College of Education and the Yezreel Valley College. He has published several articles on the history, politics and society of the Arabian States of the Gulf.

Dr. Soli Shahvar is a senior faculty at the Dept. of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies and the Founding Director of the Ezri Center for Iran & Persian Gulf Studies, both at the University of Haifa. He holds a BA and MA (cum laude) from Tel Aviv University and a PhD from the School of Oriental & African Studies (SOAS), University of London. Shahvar's publications focus mainly on modern Iran and the neighboring region. He has authored and edited 11 books and has published many articles in peer-reviewed journals. He also PROCEEDINGS OF COLLOQUIUM: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 57

has contributed several entries to Encyclopedia Iranica – the leading encyclopedia in Iranian studies.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is the Head of the Middle East Studies Program at the Yeezrel Valley College, a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a research fellow at the Ezri Center for Iran and Gulf Studies at the University of Haifa.

Glen Segell (DPhil, FRGS) is Research Fellow at the Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States Research, University of Haifa and in the Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State. He is Editor of the “Middle East tracker” and the “London Security Policy Study.” He has published a substantial number of peer reviewed articles and books. ORCID 0000-0002-4186-276

Professor Theo Neethling holds a DLitt et Phil in International Politics through the University of South Africa. His research interests concern Africa's international relations, South Africa's foreign policy, Africa's peace and security architecture and African futures.

Professor Hussein Solomon is Academic Head of Department of Political Studies and Governance at the University of the Free State. He is also a Visiting Professor at Osaka University in Japan and a Senior Research Associate of the Jerusalem-based think tank Research on Islam and Muslims in Africa (RIMA).

Dr. Moshe Terdiman is research fellow at the Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States Research, University of Haifa as well as at the Forum for Regional Thinking. He is also the Founder and Director of Research of Islam and Muslims in Africa and a Co-Founder and Director of the Institute for Environmental Security and Well-being Studies מרכז עזרי לחקר איראן ומדינות המפרץ This volume is a collection of the proceedings of the webinar “Developments in The Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States Research the Middle East” held on 14 October 2020. The event was the ﬁrst international webinar to mark the academic collaboration between the Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States Research, University of Haifa, Israel and the Department of Developments in the Middle East: Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State, South Africa. That academic collaboration being within the “Framework for Academic Proceedings of Colloquium 14/10/2020 Collaboration” that was agreed upon and signed between the two universities in April 2018. Speakers at the webinar were, Professor Philippe Burger, Professor Glen Segell (editor) Shaul Chorev, Dr. Thamar E. Gindin, Dr. Eben Coetzee, Ashkan Safaei Hakimi, Professor Amatzia Baram, Dr. Eran Segal, Dr. Soli Shahvar, Dr. Ido Zelkovitz, Dr. Glen Segell, Professor Theo Neethling, Professor Hussein Solomon and Dr. Moshe Terdiman.