Argentina's Quarter Century Experiment with Neoliberalism
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Inflation and the Business Cycle
Inflation and the business cycle Michael McMahon Money and Banking (5): Inflation & Bus. Cycle 1 / 68 To Cover • Discuss the costs of inflation; • Investigate the relationship between money and inflation; • Introduce the Romer framework; • Discuss hyperinflations. • Shocks and the business cycle; • Monetary policy responses to business cycles. • Explain what the monetary transmission mechanism is; • Examine the link between inflation and GDP. Money and Banking (5): Inflation & Bus. Cycle 2 / 68 The Next Few Lectures Term structure, asset prices Exchange and capital rate market conditions Import prices Bank rate Net external demand CPI inflation Bank lending Monetary rates and credit Policy Asset purchase/ Corporate DGI conditions Framework sales demand loans Macro prudential Household policy demand deposits Inflation expectations Money and Banking (5): Inflation & Bus. Cycle 3 / 68 Inflation Definition Inflation is a sustained general rise in the price level in the economy. In reality we measure it using concepts such as: • Consumer Price Indices (CPI); • Producer Price Indices (PPI); • Deflators (GDP deflator, Consumption Expenditure Deflator) Money and Banking (5): Inflation & Bus. Cycle 4 / 68 Inflation: The Costs If all prices are rising at same rate, including wages and asset prices, what is the problem? • Information: Makes it harder to detect relative price changes and so hinders efficient operation of market; • Uncertainty: High inflation countries have very volatile inflation; • High inflation undermines role of money and encourages barter; • Growth - if inflation increases by 10%, reduce long term growth by 0.2% but only for countries with inflation higher than 15% (Barro); • Shoe leather costs/menu costs; • Interaction with tax system; • Because of fixed nominal contracts arbitrarily redistributes wealth; • Nominal contracts break down and long-term contracts avoided. -
Uncertainty and Hyperinflation: European Inflation Dynamics After World War I
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO WORKING PAPER SERIES Uncertainty and Hyperinflation: European Inflation Dynamics after World War I Jose A. Lopez Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Kris James Mitchener Santa Clara University CAGE, CEPR, CES-ifo & NBER June 2018 Working Paper 2018-06 https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/working-papers/2018/06/ Suggested citation: Lopez, Jose A., Kris James Mitchener. 2018. “Uncertainty and Hyperinflation: European Inflation Dynamics after World War I,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2018-06. https://doi.org/10.24148/wp2018-06 The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Uncertainty and Hyperinflation: European Inflation Dynamics after World War I Jose A. Lopez Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Kris James Mitchener Santa Clara University CAGE, CEPR, CES-ifo & NBER* May 9, 2018 ABSTRACT. Fiscal deficits, elevated debt-to-GDP ratios, and high inflation rates suggest hyperinflation could have potentially emerged in many European countries after World War I. We demonstrate that economic policy uncertainty was instrumental in pushing a subset of European countries into hyperinflation shortly after the end of the war. Germany, Austria, Poland, and Hungary (GAPH) suffered from frequent uncertainty shocks – and correspondingly high levels of uncertainty – caused by protracted political negotiations over reparations payments, the apportionment of the Austro-Hungarian debt, and border disputes. In contrast, other European countries exhibited lower levels of measured uncertainty between 1919 and 1925, allowing them more capacity with which to implement credible commitments to their fiscal and monetary policies. -
1 Introduction
Theroleofincomeinmoneydemandduringhyper-inflation: the case of Yugoslavia 1 ZORICA MLADENOVIC´ 2 Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade BENT NIELSEN 3 Department of Economics, University of Oxford 27 March 2009 Abstract: During extreme hyper-inflations productivity tends to fall dramatically. Yet, in models of money demand in hyper-inflation variables such as real income has been given a somewhat passive role, either assuming it exogenous or to have a negligible role. In this paper we use an empirical methodology based on cointegrated vector autoregressions to analyse data from the extreme Yugoslavian episode to investigate the role of income. The analysis suggests that even in extreme hyper-inflation the monetary variables and real income are simultaneously determined. The methodology enables a description of the short term adjustment of the variables considered. Keywords: Cointegration, hyper-inflation, income, money-demand 1Introduction During extreme hyper-inflations productivity tends to fall dramatically. A 50% fall was observed for the German episode of the 1920s and a 70% fall was observed for the Yugosla- vian episode of the 1990s. Yet, in models of money demand in hyper-inflation variables such as real income has been given a somewhat passive role. This has come about in various ways. One strand of the literature has followed the work of Cagan (1956), who assumed a money demand relation involving real money and inflation only, while the effect of real income is negligible. Another strand of literature lead by Calvo and Leiderman (1992) work with a utility maximising model in which the budget constraint involves in- come as an exogenous variable. In that kind of the model a money demand is derived from micro assumptions. -
Hyperinflation in Venezuela
POLICY BRIEF recovery can be possible without first stabilizing the explo- 19-13 Hyperinflation sive price level. Doing so will require changing the country’s fiscal and monetary regimes. in Venezuela: A Since late 2018, authorities have been trying to control the price spiral by cutting back on fiscal expenditures, contracting Stabilization domestic credit, and implementing new exchange rate poli- cies. As a result, inflation initially receded from its extreme Handbook levels, albeit to a very high and potentially unstable 30 percent a month. But independent estimates suggest that prices went Gonzalo Huertas out of control again in mid-July 2019, reaching weekly rates September 2019 of 10 percent, placing the economy back in hyperinflation territory. Instability was also reflected in the premium on Gonzalo Huertas was research analyst at the Peterson Institute foreign currency in the black market, which also increased for International Economics. He worked with C. Fred Bergsten in July after a period of relative calm in previous months. Senior Fellow Olivier Blanchard on macroeconomic theory This Policy Brief describes a feasible stabilization plan and policy. Before joining the Institute, Huertas worked as a researcher at Harvard University for President Emeritus and for Venezuela’s extreme inflation. It places the country’s Charles W. Eliot Professor Lawrence H. Summers, producing problems in context by outlining the economics behind work on fiscal policy, and for Minos A. Zombanakis Professor Carmen Reinhart, focusing on exchange rate interventions. hyperinflations: how they develop, how they disrupt the normal functioning of economies, and how other countries Author’s Note: I am grateful to Adam Posen, Olivier Blanchard, across history have designed policies to overcome them. -
Chapter 1 the Demand for Economic Statistics
Chapter 1 The Demand for Economic Statistics The media publish economic data on a daily basis. But who decides which statistics are useful and which are not? Why is housework not included in the national income, and why are financial data available in real time, while to know the number of people in employment analysts have to wait for weeks? Contrary to popular belief, both the availability and the nature of economic statistics are closely linked to developments in economic theory, the requirements of political decision-makers, and each country’s way of looking at itself. In practice, statistics are based on theoretical and interpretative reference models, and if these change, so does the picture the statistics paint of the economic system. Thus, the data we have today represent the supply and demand sides of statistical information constantly attempting to catch up with each other, with both sides being strongly influenced by the changes taking place in society and political life. This chapter offers a descriptive summary of how the demand for economic statistics has evolved from the end of the Second World War to the present, characterised by the new challenges brought about by globalisation and the rise of the services sector. 1 THE DEMAND FOR ECONOMIC STATISTICS One of the major functions of economic statistics is to develop concepts, definitions, classifications and methods that can be used to produce statistical information that describes the state of and movements in economic phenomena, both in time and space. This information is then used to analyse the behaviour of economic operators, forecast likely movements of the economy as a whole, make economic policy and business decisions, weigh the pros and cons of alternative investments, etc. -
The Argentine Financial Crisis: a Chronology of Events
Order Code RS21130 January 31, 2002 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web The Argentine Financial Crisis: A Chronology of Events J. F. Hornbeck Specialist in International Trade and Finance Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Summary Argentina’s current crisis resulted from a confluence of events, some external to Argentina’s policy process, others directly related to its political and economic choices. Although it is not easy to discern at what specific point in time Argentina’s economic situation turned into a crisis, it is clear that by early 2001, political, economic and social events had taken a significant turn for the worse. The following is a summary of these events from before Argentina’s adoption of the currency board in 1991 to developments in early 2002. This report will be updated periodically. Chronology of Events1 1980s Argentina suffers through an extended period of economic instability including the Latin American debt crisis and hyperinflation. 1989 Peronist candidate Carlos Menem is elected President of Argentina and appoints Domingo Cavallo as Minister of Economy. Together they enact a major structural adjustment program including tax reform, privatization, trade liberalization, deregulation, and adoption of a currency board. April 1, 1991 Argentina’s Congress enacts the Convertibility Law, which legally adopts the currency board guaranteeing the convertibility of peso currency to dollars at a one-to-one fixed rate and limiting the printing of pesos only to an amount necessary to purchase dollars in the foreign exchange market. Effectively, each peso in circulation is backed by a U.S. dollar and monetary policy is forcibly constrained to uphold that promise. -
The Ends of Four Big Inflations
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Inflation: Causes and Effects Volume Author/Editor: Robert E. Hall Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press Volume ISBN: 0-226-31323-9 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/hall82-1 Publication Date: 1982 Chapter Title: The Ends of Four Big Inflations Chapter Author: Thomas J. Sargent Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11452 Chapter pages in book: (p. 41 - 98) The Ends of Four Big Inflations Thomas J. Sargent 2.1 Introduction Since the middle 1960s, many Western economies have experienced persistent and growing rates of inflation. Some prominent economists and statesmen have become convinced that this inflation has a stubborn, self-sustaining momentum and that either it simply is not susceptible to cure by conventional measures of monetary and fiscal restraint or, in terms of the consequent widespread and sustained unemployment, the cost of eradicating inflation by monetary and fiscal measures would be prohibitively high. It is often claimed that there is an underlying rate of inflation which responds slowly, if at all, to restrictive monetary and fiscal measures.1 Evidently, this underlying rate of inflation is the rate of inflation that firms and workers have come to expect will prevail in the future. There is momentum in this process because firms and workers supposedly form their expectations by extrapolating past rates of inflation into the future. If this is true, the years from the middle 1960s to the early 1980s have left firms and workers with a legacy of high expected rates of inflation which promise to respond only slowly, if at all, to restrictive monetary and fiscal policy actions. -
Private Investment Response to Neoliberal Reforms: Implications of the Argentine Case, 1989-1996
Private Investment Response to Neoliberal Reforms: Implications of the Argentine Case, 1989-1996 March 1997 Juan J. López Assistant Professor Department of Political Science The University of Illinois at Chicago 1007 West Harrison Street (M/C 276) Chicago, IL 60607-7137 Phone: (312) 413-3783 Fax: (312) 413-0440 E-mail: [email protected] Draft: comments welcome Prepared for delivery at the 1997 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Continental Plaza Hotel, Guadalajara, Mexico, April 17-19, 1997. 1 Introduction Warren Christopher, then the U.S. Secretary of State, in visit to Buenos Aires in February 1996 declared that Menem and Cavallo "had done in Argentina one of the great economic successes of the century."1 This is the official line in Argentina, echoed by fervent supporters of neoliberal economic reforms abroad. If one only looked at some official statistics on economic growth and investment, one might conclude that economically Argentina is doing wonderfully. Budget deficits have been significantly reduced.2 Since April 1991, after the Convertibility Plan, inflation has been kept at low levels. For the period 1990 to 1995, the annual average rate of GDP growth was 5 percent.3 Gross domestic investment grew at an average annual rate of 12 percent between 1990 and 1995.4 Yet a sober look at the data on the economic situation in Argentina raises serious doubts as to whether a solid foundation is being build in the country for sustainable economic growth. The economic growth since 1991 is to a large extent due to the influx of dollars from abroad and to the utilization of idle productive capacity that firms had.5 Unemployment and 1 Clarín, Edición Internacional, February 27 to March 14, 1996, p. -
Inflation, Deflation, Stagflation and Disinflation: What’S the Difference, Why Does It Matter and What’S the Best Case?
Volume XLI personal • traditional • independent May 2015 Investment letter Inflation, deflation, stagflation and disinflation: What’s the difference, why does it matter and what’s the best case? lot of press coverage recently has been dedicated to central Performance of Stocks, Treasury Bonds and Corporate Bonds: banks and their effort to combat deflation—the outright Total Return Relative To Cash Under Various Price Level Environments A fall of prices. We are dedicating this investment letter to (Q1/1926 – Q4/2014) different types of overall price movements. We’ll discuss what STOCKS TREAS CORP %TIME they mean and which is preferable for investors. Let’s start with a Price Inflation 0.10 3.00 1.97 43.1 brief definition of each. Price Stability 12.50 1.35 1.89 48.2 Price Deflation 5.52 0.66 4.02 8.7 Inflation simply means rising prices of goods and services across Chart copyright 2014 Ned Davis Research, Inc. Further distribution prohibited without prior permission. All Rights Reserved. See NDR Disclaimer at www.ndr.com/copyright.html. the economy along with the resulting loss of purchasing power. For data vendor disclaimers refer to www.ndr.com/vendorinfo/. We can see this loss when a steady dollar amount buys less of an item over time. A severe bout of inflation, where purchasing Are you surprised with the result? We weren’t. However, we were power drops drastically in a very short period of time, is known as surprised at the margin by which stocks trounced the other asset hyperinflation and has occurred historically in various countries. -
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eOtifr' I DEN'l? IAL CONFIDENT/At 7663 THE WH ITE HOUSE WASHI NGTON MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION SUBJECT: Meeting with President Carlos Menem of Argentina PARTICIPANTS: The President Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs David C. Mulford, Under Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs Terence Todman, Ambassador to Argentina Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Everett Ellis Briggs, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Latin America and the Caribbean Carlos Menem, President of Argentina Domingo Cavallo, Foreign Minister of Argentina Guido Di Tella, Argentine Ambassador to the United States Nestor Rapanelli, Minister of Economy of Argentina Alberto Kohan, Chief of Staff to President Menem Humberto Toledo, Spokesman for President Menem DATE, TIME September 27, 1989, 11:50 a.m.-12:40 p.m. EST AND PLACE: The Cabinet Room The President received President Menem at 11:40 a.m. in the Oval Office, after which the two stopped briefly at the edge of the Rose Garden for a friendly exchange with the media pool before going to the Residence to meet Mrs. Bush. They returned to the Cabinet Room at noon for the formal meeting. The President: I wanted to show President Menem the White House and introduce Mrs. Bush to him. And I wanted our press to see for themselves the affection we feel for this president and friend. -
Argentina Postpones Plan to Create National Security Ministry LADB Staff
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of New Mexico University of New Mexico UNM Digital Repository NotiSur Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) 5-27-1994 Argentina Postpones Plan to Create National Security Ministry LADB Staff Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur Recommended Citation LADB Staff. "Argentina Postpones Plan to Create National Security Ministry." (1994). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur/ 11499 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in NotiSur by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LADB Article Id: 56755 ISSN: 1060-4189 Argentina Postpones Plan to Create National Security Ministry by LADB Staff Category/Department: Argentina Published: 1994-05-27 In mid-May, President Carlos Menem announced plans to create a new National Security Ministry to "combat delinquency, drug trafficking and terrorism." The nature of the new ministry, and the timing of the announcement, however, led to charges that the move was essentially a maneuver executed by Menem's powerful Economy Minister, Domingo Cavallo. Critics assailed the proposal, suggesting that creation of the new ministry was actually aimed at controlling social unrest leading up to the 1995 presidential elections. The ensuing cabinet crisis was the worst Menem has faced in the last three years. The crisis unfolded in the days just prior to inauguration of a new Constituent Assembly, which will consider, among other things, a change in the Constitution to allow Menem to run for reelection in 1995. -
Neoliberal Policies Vs. Democracy Diferent Disciplinary Assumptions
Judith A. Teichman. The Politics of Freeing Markets in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and Mexico. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. xv + 273 pp. $55.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8078-4959-0. Reviewed by Marc Becker Published on H-LatAm (January, 2002) Neoliberal Policies vs. Democracy different disciplinary assumptions. Teichman, Based on the case studies of Chile, Argentina, professor of political science at the University of and Mexico, Judith Teichman argues that electoral Toronto, blames the failure of reform in Latin democracy allows for broader societal input into America on an "Iberian legacy of clientelism, cor‐ the nature of neoliberal reforms in Latin America poratism, and patrimonialism" (p. 10). My gradu‐ (p. 9). The recent collapse of Fernando de la Rua's ate school training in history was deeply ground‐ government in Argentina on December 20, 2001, ed in a dependency theory approach that found in the face of a "social explosion," however, se‐ such a critique to be antiquated and perhaps even verely challenges this argument. Although carried racist, preferring instead to place blame for out under a functioning electoral democracy, poverty in Latin America at the feet of an indus‐ Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo's austerity trial core that held the region at the periphery of measures which were intended to win support economic development. Teichman fails to critique from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the assumptions of corporatism and never failed to take into account the needs of the vast presents alternative perspectives to this hypothe‐ majority of people in Argentina.