First As Tragedy, Then As Farce
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FIRST AS TRAGEDY, THEN AS FARCE SLAVOJ ZrZEK VERSO London • New York First published by Verso 2009 © Slavoj Zizek 2009 All rights reserved The moral rights of the author have been asserted I 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2 Verso UK: 6 Meard Street, London WIF oEG US: 20 Jay Street, Suite 1010, Brooklyn, NY 11201 ww.versobooks.com Verso is the imprint of New LeftBooks ISBN-13: 978-1-84467-428 2 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress Typeset by Hewer Text UK Ltd, Edinburgh Printed in the US by Maple Vail Contents Introduction: TheLessons of the First Decade 1 1 It's Ideology, Stupid! 9 Capitalist Socialism?-CrisisAs Shock Therapy-The Structure of Enemy Propaganda-Human, All Too Human ...-The "New Spirit" of Capitalism-Between the Two Fetishisms Communism,Again! 2 The Communist Hypothesis 86 The New Enclosure of the Commons-Socialism or Communism?-The"Pu blic Use of Reason"- ...in Haiti The Capitalist Exception--":'Capitalismwith Asian Values ...in Europe-From Profit to Rent-"We Are the Ones We Have Been Waiting For" Introduction: The Lessons of the First Decade The title of this book is intended as an elementary IQ test fo r the reader: if the first association it generates is the vulgaranti-communist cliche-"You are right-today, after the tragedy of twentieth-century totalitarianism, all the talk about a return to communism can only be farcical!"-then I sincerely advise you to stop here. Indeed, the book should be fo rcibly confiscated from you, since it deals with an entirely different tragedy and farce, namely, the two events which mark the beginning and the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century: the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the financial meltdown of 2008. We should note the similarity of President Bush's language in his addresses to the American p�ople after 9/11 and after the financial collapse: they sounded very much like two versions of the same speech. Both times Bush evoked the threat to the American way of life and the need to take fast and decisive action to cope with the danger. Both times he called for the partial suspension of American values (guaran tees of individual freedom, market capitalism) in order to save these very same values. From whence comes this similarity? Marx began his Eighteenth Brumaire with a correction of Hegel's idea that history necessarily repeats itself: "Hegel remarks somewhere that al great events and characters of world history occur, so to speak, twice. He fo rgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.'" This 1 Karl Marx, "TheEighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte:' in Surveys From Exile, edited and introduced by David Pernbach, Harmondsworth: Penguin 1973, p. 146. 2 FIRST AS TRAGEDY, THEN AS FARCE supplement to Hegel's notion of historical repetition was a rhetorical figure which had already haunted Marx years earlier: we find it in his "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right;' where he diagnoses the decay of the German ancien regime in the 1830S and 1840S as a fa rcical repetition of the tragic fall of the French ancien regime: It is instructive for [the modern nations 1 to see the ancien regime, which in their countries has experienced its tragedy, play its comic role as a German phantom. Its history was tragic as long as it was the pre-existing power in the world and fr eedom a personal whim-in a word, as long as it believed, and had to believe, in its own privileges. As long as the ancien regime, as an established world order, was struggling against a world that was only just emerging, there was a world-historical error on its side but not a personal one. Its downfall was therefore tragic. The present German regime, on the other hand-an anachronism, a flagrant contradiction of universally accepted axioms, the futility of the ancien regime displayed for all the world to see-only imagines that it still believes in itself and asks the world to share in its fantasy. If it believed in its own nature, would it try to hide that nature under the appearance of an alien nature and seek its salvation in hypocrisy and sophism? The modern ancien regime is rather merely the clown of a world order whose real heroes are dead. History is thorough and passes through many stages while bearing an ancient fo rm to its grave. The last phase of a world-historical fo rm is its comedy. TheGreek gods, who already died once of their wounds in Aeschylus's tragedy Prometheus Bound, were fo rced to die a second death-this time a comic one-in Lucian's Dialogues. Why does history take this course? So that mankind may part happily with its past. We lay claim to this happy historical destiny for the political powers of Germany.' 2 Karl Marx. ''A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right:' in Early Writings, introduced by Lucio Colletti. Harmondsworth: Penguin 1975. pp. 247 8. INTRODUCTION 3 Note the precise characterization of the German ancien regime as the one which "only imagines that it still believes in itself" -one can even speculate about the meaning of the fact that, during the same period, Kierkegaard deployed his idea that we humans cannot ever be sure that we believe: ultimately, we only "believe that we believe:' Thefo rmula of a regime which "only imagines that it believes in itself" nicely captures the cancellation of the performative power ("symbolic efficiency") of the ruling ideology: it no longer effectively functions as the fundamental structure of the social bond. And, we may ask, are we not today in the same situation? Do today's preachers and practitioners of liberal democracy not also "only imagine that they believe in them selves:' in their pronunciations? In fact, it would be more appropriate to describe contemporary cynicism as representing an exact inversion of Marx's formula: today, we only imagine that we do not "really believe" in our ideology-in spite of this imaginary distance, we continue to practise it. We believe not less but much more than we imagine we believe. Benjamin was thus indeed prescient in his remark that "every thing depends on how one believes in one's belief:'3 Twelve years prior to 9/11, on November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. This event seemed to announce the beginning of the "happy' 90S:' Francis Fukuyama's utopia of the "end of history," the belief that liberal democracy had, in principle, won out, that the advent of a global liberal community was hovering just around the corner, and that the obsta cles to this Hollywood-style ending were merely empirical and contingent (local pockets of resistance whose leaders had not yet grasped that their time was up). September 11, in contrast, symbolized the end of the Clintonite period, and heralded an era in which new walls were seen emerging everywhere: between Israel and the West Bank, around the European Union, along the US-Mexico border, but also within nation states themselves. 3 Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Briefe, Vol. I, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag 1995, p. 182. 4 FIRST AS TRAGEDY, THEN AS FARCE In an article for Newsweek, Emily Flynn Vencat and Ginanne Brownell report how today, the members-only phenomenon is exploding into a whole way of life, encompassing everything from private banking conditions to invitation- only health clinics , , . those with money are increasingly locking their entire lives behind closed doors. Rather than attend media-heavy events, they arrange private concerts, fashion shows and art exhibitions in their own homes. They shop after-hours, and have their neighbors (and potential friends) vetted for class and cash. A new global class is thus emerging "with, say, an Indian passport, a castle in Scotland, a pied-a-terre in Manhattan and a private Caribbean island" the paradox is that the members of this global class "dine privately, shop privately, view art privately, everything is private, private, private:' Theyare thus creating a life-world of their own to solve their anguishing herme neutic problem; as To dd Milay puts it: "wealthy familiescan't ju st 'invite people over and expect them to understand what it's like to have $300 million:" So what are their contacts with the world at large? Theycome in two fo rms: business and humanitarianism (protecting the environment, fighting against diseases, supporting the arts, etc.). Theseglobal citizens live their lives mostly in pristine nature-whether trekking in Patagonia or swimming in the translucent waters of their private islands. One cannot help but note that one fe ature basic to the attitude of these gated superrich is fe ar: fear of external social life itself The highest priorities of the "ultrahigh-net-worth individuals" are thus how to minimizesecurity risks-diseases, exposureto threats of violent crime, andso fo rth.4 In contemporary China, the new rich have built secluded commu nities modeled upon idealized "typical" Western towns; there is, for example, near Shanghai a "real" replica of a small English town, 4 Emily Flynn Vencat and Ginanne Brownell, "A h, the secluded life;' Newsweek, December 10, 2007. INTRODUCTION including a main street with pubs, an Anglican church, a Sainsbury supermarket, etc.-the whole area is isolated from its surroundings by an invisible, but no less real, cupola.