Two Principles of Evidence and Their Implications for the Philosophy of Scientific Method
TWO PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD by Gregory Stephen Gandenberger BA, Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, 2009 MA, Statistics, University of Pittsburgh, 2014 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Kenneth P. Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2015 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH KENNETH P. DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Gregory Stephen Gandenberger It was defended on April 14, 2015 and approved by Edouard Machery, Pittsburgh, Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences Satish Iyengar, Pittsburgh, Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences John Norton, Pittsburgh, Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences Teddy Seidenfeld, Carnegie Mellon University, Dietrich College of Humanities & Social Sciences James Woodward, Pittsburgh, Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences Dissertation Director: Edouard Machery, Pittsburgh, Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences ii Copyright © by Gregory Stephen Gandenberger 2015 iii TWO PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD Gregory Stephen Gandenberger, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2015 The notion of evidence is of great importance, but there are substantial disagreements about how it should be understood. One major locus of disagreement is the Likelihood Principle, which says roughly that an observation supports a hypothesis to the extent that the hy- pothesis predicts it. The Likelihood Principle is supported by axiomatic arguments, but the frequentist methods that are most commonly used in science violate it. This dissertation advances debates about the Likelihood Principle, its near-corollary the Law of Likelihood, and related questions about statistical practice.
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