Entanglements of Western and Chinese Oil Zones in Niger

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Entanglements of Western and Chinese Oil Zones in Niger Z. Wirtsch. 2016; 60(1–2): 40–56 Jannik Schritt* The petro-political configuration: entanglements of Western and Chinese oil zones in Niger DOI 10.1515/zfw-2015-0583 1 Introduction Abstract: The article examines the spatial, economic, political and socio-cultural transformations induced Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, and with the rise in the process of Niger becoming a new oil producer in of new emergent powers in the world, Africa has become 2011. It does so by analyzing entanglements of Western increasingly important in the competition for oil, espe- and Chinese ‘oil zones’ in Niger, which are understood cially between Western and Chinese oil companies. This as trans-territorial spaces of assemblage. I argue that the competition was fueled by high oil prices on the world specific properties of these two oil zones have triggered market (between 2004 and 2014), and political instability the emergence of a particular ‘petro-political configura- in the Middle East that shifted the attention to hitherto un- tion’ in Niger. The argument proceeds through four stages. derexplored regions in Africa. Pointing to the similarities Firstly, looking at economic entanglements, I argue that and continuities of colonial exploitation in Africa, many the Chinese oil zone enabled the Nigerien economy to de- academics and journalists have coined this competition velop so-called upstream and downstream oil industries, a ‘new scramble for African oil’ (Ghazvinian 2007; Klare/ something the Western oil zone had not allowed. Second- Volman 2006; Yates 2012). In doing so, however, these ly, analyzing political and socio-cultural entanglements, I critics neglect the new agency of African states after in- argue that, by being co-opted into former Nigerien presi- dependence and the end of the Cold War (Frynas/Paulo dent Mamadou Tandja’s political project for constitutional 2007). It is through this agency and the increasing compe- amendment, China’s oil diplomacy has become a kind of tition for African oil that many African countries became ‘soft power’ in Niger, something Western political rheto- new oil producing states (Hicks 2015).1 One of these new ric has failed to achieve. Thirdly, focusing on geopolitical oil producers is the landlocked West-African country, Ni- and military entanglements, I argue that the militarization ger. In 2008, the China National Petroleum Corporation of global space should ensure capitalist accumulation, (CNPC) signed a Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) especially in situations in which the translation of trans- with the Nigerien government. The agreement included a national governmentality has failed. Finally, I use these condition to construct an oil refinery with a capacity of entanglements to identify the heterogeneous elements of 20,000 barrels per day (bpd) within the national territo- Western and Chinese ‘oil zones’, and the specific capitalist ry. ExxonMobil and Petronas had rejected this condition, properties these assemblages generate. and in 2006, abandoned oil exploration in Niger, judging the country’s estimated oil reserves not to be economical- Keywords: assemblage, China, infrastructure, oil, politics, ly profitable. Finally, in 2011, the CNPC and Nigerien gov- Niger. ernment inaugurated the joint-venture oil refinery near Niger’s second largest city, Zinder, in the country’s east. The historical conjuncture of Niger becoming a new oil producer offers a unique opportunity to analyze the economic, political and socio-cultural transformation Articel note: Parts of this paper were taken from my Nigerien exam- processes induced by entanglements of ‘Western’ and ple in a book chapter I co-authored with Andrea Behrends: Schritt, J./Behrends, A. (forthcoming): ‘Western’ and ‘Chinese’ Oil Zones. ‘Chinese’ oil zones. I understand these zones as trans-ter- Petro-Infrastructures and the emergence of new trans-territorial ritorial spaces of order which have varying properties. I spaces of order in Niger and Chad. In: Engel, U./Müller-Mahn, D./ will argue that the different characteristics of these two Böckler, M. (Hrsg.): Spaces of Order: Adaptation and Creativity in oil zones, in their entanglement with the Nigerien con- Africa. text, have triggered different spatial, economic, political and cultural transformation processes. First, by looking *Corresponding author: Jannik Schritt, Institute for Social and Cultural Anthropology, Georg August University of Göttingen, Theaterplatz 15, 37073 Göttingen, Germany, e-mail: 1 With the recent fall in oil prices, some countries (including Ugan- [email protected] da, Kenya, and Tanzania) are still waiting to start producing oil. J. Schritt: The petro-political configuration 41 at the economic entanglements of ‘Western’ and ‘Chinese’ In broad terms, these theories forecast that the production oil zones in Niger, I will show that the Western oil zone’s of oil leads to economic decline, enclave industrialization, neoliberal properties – which could be characterized as the emergence of authoritarian regimes, violent conflicts, ‘points of profit’ or the ‘enclave approach’ – divide Niger corruption, a rent-seeking mentality and environmental according to the old (French) colonial classifications of pollution (Gelb 1988; Auty 1993; Yates 1996; Karl 1997; Afrique utile, the economically useful, and Afrique inutile, Ross 2012). Literally thousands of studies on oil produc- the economically worthless (Ferguson 2005). In contrast ing nations across the globe have investigated these con- to the ‘Western’ oil zone, I will show that the Chinese oil cepts (especially the resource curse thesis). Some social zone’s state capitalist properties have enabled the Nigerien sciences approaches have made use of the resource curse economy to develop so-called upstream and downstream and rentier state models, but have also argued for plac- oil industries – not only for extraction of the oil, but also ing oil production in the context of pre-existing social and for the refinement, use, and sale of it within Africa. The political structures (Behrends/Reyna/Schlee 2011; Watts Chinese oil zone engages in large-scale industrialization 2004). In recent years, social scientists have been increas- and infrastructure modernization projects, promoting the ingly dissatisfied with the models’ dominant focus on oil build-up of network-style spatial connections and linkag- as money (Watts 2004; Mitchell 2011). From the beginning, es in Afrique inutile itself. Second, analyzing the political anthropological approaches have pointed to the impor- and socio-cultural entanglements of these two oil zones, tance of the production of meanings or significations of I will show that by articulating China’s oil diplomacy of oil (Behrends/Schareika 2010) that are essential in con- ‘equal partnership’, ‘win-win relationships’ and ‘non-in- structing a new oil reality, be it in state-building processes terference’ with the former Nigerien president Mamadou (Coronil 1997), cultural production (Apter 2005), conflicts Tandja’s political project for constitutional amendment in (Behrends 2008) or political disputes (Schritt 2014). In 2010, China’s political rhetoric became a kind of ‘soft pow- addition to significations approaches, science and tech- er’ in Niger. In contrast to China’s oil diplomacy, I argue nology studies (STS) and the ‘material turn’ have gained that the translation of Western transnational governmen- high currency in the social sciences, especially in geogra- tality in Niger has largely failed because Western politics phy, sociology, history and anthropology. In thinking oil are portrayed as neo-colonial and ineffective in promoting beyond the ‘resource curse’, these approaches seek to ac- national development (Schritt 2013). Third, by focusing on count for forms of agency and control contained in the ma- the geopolitical and military entanglements of these two teriality of the resource (oil), and the technological as well zones in Niger, I will show that the military approaches of as socio-political infrastructures surrounding oil produc- China and the West (the USA and France) abroad differ in tion (Mitchell 2011; Rogers 2012; Barry 2006, 2013; Appel such a way that we might speak of a ‘soft’ (Chinese) and a 2012a, 2012b; Watts 2012; Richardson/Weszkalnys 2014). ‘hard’ military strategy (American and French) (Sun 2015). Instead of analyzing the different dimensions of oil Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Chinese mil- production separately – money, significations, material- itary presence is constantly growing in Africa, and these ity, infrastructure – scholars have tried to combine these two approaches appear to be converging. Finally, I sum- different ‘sensitizing concepts’ (Blumer 1954) into new an- marize the diverse entanglements of the Western and the alytical ones. Dominic Boyer, for example, proposed the Chinese zones with the Nigerien state, sketching out how concepts ‘energopolitics’ (2011) or ‘energopower’ (in the the heterogeneous elements of these two zones – which style of Foucault’s ‘biopower’) in order to ask how ‘ener- emerge in relational, overlapping, conflicting, competing gic forces and infrastructures interrelate with institutions and cooperative forms – reveal particular varieties of cap- and ideations of political power’ (2014:309). Other schol- italism. In connecting these arguments to contemporary ars have made use of the concept of ‘oil assemblage’ in academic literature, I contextualize the Niger case study order to point to the multiplicity and heterogeneity
Recommended publications
  • COUNTRY ANALYSES and PLANS Niger NIGER
    COUNTRY ANALYSES AND PLANS Niger NIGER $104M of CapEx funding and $96M of annual OpEx funding will enable Niger to connect over 19,000 schools This investment will bring 3.5 million students and teachers online and bring connectivity to 7.2 million community members who live locally, potentially enabling over 525 million USD of GDP growth, a 1.8% increase. Source: Dalberg Analysis based on Giga mapping and modelling data, 2020 NIGER “The Giga initiative is a great project for us because it comes to complement the already existing efforts we had of last mile connectivity to different essential services like schools.” IBRAHIMA GUIMBA-SAÏDOU Director, ANSI & Minister | Special Advisor NIGER Mobile coverage has steadily increased over the last 5 years, further connectivity is required to achieve rural development plans In the last 5 years mobile broadband coverage has grown The Government of Niger is aiming to drive economic growth through but internet use has lagged behind digitization with universal access to connectivity Broadband coverage and internet penetration, % of Niger hopes to achieve this target through the following internet population. (ITU, 2020) connectivity and education policies: 100 • Renaissance Act II Program: The President’s 2016 reform program envisages 3G Coverage an improvement in the quality of public services by improving digital Internet users1 communication within society. This led to the creation of National Agency for 80 Information Systems (ANSI) and the strategic vision "NIGER 2.0“ Airtel became the first 4G
    [Show full text]
  • Niger Country Brief: Property Rights and Land Markets
    NIGER COUNTRY BRIEF: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND MARKETS Yazon Gnoumou Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin–Madison with Peter C. Bloch Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin–Madison Under Subcontract to Development Alternatives, Inc. Financed by U.S. Agency for International Development, BASIS IQC LAG-I-00-98-0026-0 March 2003 Niger i Brief Contents Page 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Purpose of the country brief 1 1.2 Contents of the document 1 2. PROFILE OF NIGER AND ITS AGRICULTURE SECTOR AND AGRARIAN STRUCTURE 2 2.1 General background of the country 2 2.2 General background of the economy and agriculture 2 2.3 Land tenure background 3 2.4 Land conflicts and resolution mechanisms 3 3. EVIDENCE OF LAND MARKETS IN NIGER 5 4. INTERVENTIONS ON PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND MARKETS 7 4.1 The colonial regime 7 4.2 The Hamani Diori regime 7 4.3 The Kountché regime 8 4.4 The Rural Code 9 4.5 Problems facing the Rural Code 10 4.6 The Land Commissions 10 5. ASSESSMENT OF INTERVENTIONS ON PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND MARKET DEVELOPMENT 11 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 BIBLIOGRAPHY 15 APPENDIX I. SELECTED INDICATORS 25 Niger ii Brief NIGER COUNTRY BRIEF: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND MARKETS Yazon Gnoumou with Peter C. Bloch 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE OF THE COUNTRY BRIEF The purpose of the country brief is to determine to which extent USAID’s programs to improve land markets and property rights have contributed to secure tenure and lower transactions costs in developing countries and countries in transition, thereby helping to achieve economic growth and sustainable development.
    [Show full text]
  • Niger: Frequently Asked Questions About the October 2017 Attack on U.S
    Niger: Frequently Asked Questions About the October 2017 Attack on U.S. Soldiers Alexis Arieff, Coordinator Specialist in African Affairs Lauren Ploch Blanchard Specialist in African Affairs Andrew Feickert Specialist in Military Ground Forces Kathleen J. McInnis Analyst in International Security John W. Rollins Specialist in Terrorism and National Security Matthew C. Weed Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation October 27, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R44995 Niger: Frequently Asked Questions About the October 2017 Attack on U.S. Soldiers Summary A deadly attack on U.S. soldiers in Niger and their local counterparts on October 4, 2017, has prompted many questions from Members of Congress about the incident. It has also highlighted a range of broader issues for Congress pertaining to oversight and authorization of U.S. military deployments, evolving U.S. global counterterrorism activities and strategy, interagency security assistance and cooperation efforts, and U.S. engagement with countries historically considered peripheral to core U.S. national security interests. This report provides background information in response to the following frequently asked questions: What is the security situation in Niger? How big is the U.S. military presence in Niger? For what purposes are U.S. military personnel in Niger, and what role has Congress played in the U.S. military presence there? Is the U.S. military presence in Niger related to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)? What is the state of U.S.-Niger relations and aid? Where else in Africa are U.S. military personnel deployed? Medical evacuation: What is the “golden hour” and does it apply to troop deployments in Africa? What are the broader implications of building partner capacity in Niger for DOD? Who were the four U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Natiolnal DEMOCRATIC INS'l'l'l'u'l'e '
    NATIOlNAL DEMOCRATIC INS'l'l'l'U'l'E' - FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FA.. (202) 939-3 166 Fihh Fhr. I-1- Yrruchtwttr lrmw. Y.W. Washington. D.C. 2W.W (202) .W?-llZb H E-Mail 5Ym0~9@htCIMAILCOht AREAF Project Find Report DEMOCRATIC CONSOILIDATION IN NIGER, MALI AND BENIN THE ROLE OF AN EFFECTIVE LEGISLATURE Grant No. AOT-0486-A-00-2134-00 Modification #I0 January 1 to September 30, 1994 AREAF Project Final Report DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN NIGER, MALI AND BENIN THE ROLE OF AN EFFECTIVE LEGISLATURE Grant No. AOT-0486-A-00-2134-00 Modification #10 January 1 to September 30, 1994 I. INTRODUCTION The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) organized a legislative rogram program in Niamey, Niger, for deputies from the national assemblies of Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The primary objective of the seminar was to increase the effectiveness of these nascent assemblies and to assist the process of consolidating democratic governance in these countries. The program was planned in direct response to requests for assistance from newly elected representatives of three of the national assemblies. The program was designed in three parts: an advance visit by a small team of NDI staff and a parliamentary expert to plan for the seminar and develop a specific agenda; the seminar itself and a follow-up presence by an NDI field representative to assess the project and assist in initiatives that may have flown from the seminar. The seminar provided an opportunity for the West African participants to address problems common to their fledgling legislstures.
    [Show full text]
  • NIGER State Report 1
    INITIAL AND PERIODIC REPORT OF THE REPUBLIC OF NIGER TO THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (A.C.H.P.R) ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 1988-2002 INTRODUCTION On 15th July, 1986 the Republic of Niger ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted in Nairobi (KENYA) in June 1981. In compliance with article 62 of the Charter, Niger should have presented its initial report on measures taken with a view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms set out in the Charter. Also, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th periodic reports should have been presented respectively in 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000. The 7th report is scheduled to be presented this year. However difficulties of all sorts; military coup d’Etats, political instability and armed rebellions, as well as the socio-economic constraints that the country had to bear throughout the decade of the 1990s have not allowed the authorities of Niger to fulfil this obligation. By reason of the foregoing, the government of Niger fervently wishes that the present report be considered as a basic report, replacing all the other seven that Niger should have presented at the dates indicated above. The structure of the report, which is in line with the general guidelines drafted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, is as follows: Chapter I: Profile of the Republic of Niger. Chapter II: Legal system, system of government and relations between institutions. Chapter III: Main texts of domestic law relating to the promotion and protection of Human and Peoples’ Rights.
    [Show full text]
  • Niger Democracy, Human Rights and Governance Fact Sheet
    DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & GOVERNANCE NIGER FACT SHEET PHOTO: USAID NIGER Following Niger’s return to democratic rule in 2011, the Government of Niger committed to fighting corruption, increasing transparency and ensuring that proper management of the country’s natural resources benefits all Nigeriens. Niger’s National Assembly plays a key role in advancing reforms needed to strengthen governance and consolidate recent democratic gains vital to furthering the country’s development. The potential revenue from extractive industries in Niger is of great importance to the economic growth of the country, and as a result, the efficient and transparent management of these industries plays a key role in Niger’s future. At the local level, the decentralization process is still evolving and there is a need for citizens to become more involved in municipal councils and school governance structures. Finally, the 2016 elections provided an excellent opportunity for the country to reaffirm its support for a peaceful electoral process and subsequent democratic transition. OUR WORK USAID partners with the Government of Niger to improve its ability to respond directly to citizen concerns for inclusion and improved services. USAID works in coordination with civil society, USAID.GOV USAID FACT SHEET: DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & GOVERNANCE 1 | communities and local governments to increase the local government’s visibility and effectiveness as a service provider to its citizens. In addition, USAID programming is strengthening the National Assembly’s ability to draft, review and oversee the implementation of laws and regulations governing public policy focused on extractive industries. These programs train members in improved practices, increase communication and collaboration between the National Assembly and civil society organizations, and ensure that representation of women and protection of women’s rights become the norm.
    [Show full text]
  • Niger 2020 OSAC Crime & Safety Report
    Niger 2020 OSAC Crime & Safety Report This is an annual report produced in conjunction with the Regional Security Office at the U.S. Embassy in Niamey. OSAC encourages travelers to use this report to gain baseline knowledge of security conditions in Niger. For more in-depth information, review OSAC’s Niger country page for original OSAC reporting, consular messages, and contact information, some of which may be available only to private-sector representatives with an OSAC password. Travel Advisory The current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory at the date of this report’s publication assesses Niger at Level 3, indicating travelers should reconsider travel to Niger due to crime, terrorism, and kidnapping. Avoid travel to Niger’s border regions, particularly the Malian border area, Diffa region, and the Lake Chad region due to terrorism. Review OSAC’s report, Understanding the Consular Travel Advisory System. Overall Crime and Safety Situation Crime Threats The U.S. Department of State has assessed Niamey as being a HIGH-threat location for crime directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests. Crime occurs at all hours in Niger. Non-violent crimes (e.g. pickpocketing, purse snatching, backpack/cell phone theft) are present in major cities, notably in/around places where Westerners gather. Within Niamey, avoid the Night Market; criminals loiter in the area, which is notorious for pickpocketing, purse snatching, mugging, and assaults. Other markets, the area around the Gaweye and Grand Hotels, the National Museum, and Kennedy Bridge are also high-risk areas. Review OSAC’s reports, All That You Should Leave Behind.
    [Show full text]
  • Rethinking the Response to Jihadist Groups Across the Sahel
    Research Rethinking the response Paper to jihadist groups across Africa Programme the Sahel March 2021 Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is a world-leading policy institute based in London. Our mission is to help governments and societies build a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world. Contents Summary 2 01 Introduction 3 02 Governments and armies in the Sahel: structural failures 6 03 The case of northern Mali 10 04 Niger: a counterexample 14 05 The role of local militia groups 18 06 The limitations of proxy warfare 20 07 Conclusion: the end of military cooperation? 24 About the author 27 Acknowledgments 27 1 Chatham House Summary — Rather than the ideology of global jihad, the driving force behind the emergence and resilience of non-state armed groups in the Sahel is a combination of weak states, corruption and the brutal repression of dissent, embodied in dysfunctional military forces. — The dominant narrative of a global jihadi threat has overshadowed the reality of the key role played by military nepotism, prevarication and indiscipline in generating and continuing conflict in the Sahel – problems that long predated the ‘war on terror’. Moreover, it has pushed the international community to intervene to regulate local conflicts that have little to do with global terrorism or religious indoctrination. — Mali offers a clear example of this. The widespread use of poorly controlled militias, the collapse of its army, two coups – in 2012 and 2020 – and a weak state presence in rural areas, on top of a history of repression and abuse suffered by its northern population, has done much more to drive the growth of insurgent groups than did the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, Salafist indoctrination, or alleged support from Arab countries.
    [Show full text]
  • Niger High Authority for Atomic Energy (HANEA)
    MISSION REPORT ON THE INTEGRATED NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE REVIEW (INIR) PHASE 1 MISSION Counterpart: Niger High Authority for Atomic Energy (HANEA) 16–23 April 2018 Niamey, Niger This page is intentionally left blank for editorial purposes. Report of the INIR Phase 1 Mission to Niger 16-23 April 2018 Page 2 CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 5 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 8 2. OBJECTIVES OF THE MISSION ................................................................................... 8 3. SCOPE OF THE MISSION .............................................................................................. 9 4. WORK DONE .................................................................................................................. 9 5. MAIN CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................... 9 6. EVALUATION RESULTS FOR PHASE 1 ................................................................... 13 APPENDIX 1: REVIEW OBSERVATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS ............................................................................................................. 20 APPENDIX 2: LISTS OF THE INIR TEAM MEMBERS AND COUNTERPARTS ........... 76 APPENDIX 3: REFERENCES ................................................................................................ 80 APPENDIX 4: ABBREVIATIONS
    [Show full text]
  • USAID Niger Country Profile
    NIGER COUNTRY PROFILE Niger, an emerging democracy landlocked in the increasingly unstable Sahel region, consistently ranks at or near the bottom of the United Nations Human PHOTO: SCOTT DOBBERSTEIN, USAID SENEGAL Development Index. Despite increased economic growth, poor infrastructure, extremely low education levels and multiple concurrent natural disasters have hampered broad-based development. Economic progress is further challenged by the highest fertility rate in the world, which essentially doubles the population every twenty years. These hurdles, coupled with an increasing presence of violence, crime and violent extremism, particularly along the border regions with neighboring Mali, Libya and Nigeria, put Niger at risk of a reversal in positive development gains that have been made throughout the country in recent years. OUR WORK ENHANCING RESILIENCE: AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY The vast majority of Nigeriens rely on subsistence agriculture to meet their daily needs. The region’s increasingly frequent climatic shocks, such as droughts and floods, lead to poor harvests and regular food shortages. Even during plentiful times, 50 percent of Nigerien children under-5 years old are chronically undernourished. USAID provides food and other assistance to the most vulnerable communities, including pregnant and nursing mothers and young children, while working to address the root causes of malnutrition and to promote positive health practices. In order to make communities more resilient to food insecurity, USAID works to improve agricultural, livestock and resource management practices and to ensure inclusive economic growth for all Nigeriens. USAID.GOV USAID NIGER COUNTRY PROFILE 1 | DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE Since Niger’s return to democratic rule in 2011, the Government of Niger has taken steps to fight corruption and improve governance.
    [Show full text]
  • Decentralisation and Local Power in Niger
    Issue paper no. 150 Decentralisation and local power in Niger Abdoulaye Mohamadou June 2009 Decentralisation and local power in Niger Abdoulaye Mohamadou IIED gratefully acknowledges the support of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), who are funding this phase of the Making Decentralisation Work (MDW) programme, for co-financing this publication. IIED would also like to thank the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation for their continued financial support. Translated from the French by Lou Leask. About the author In addition to teaching in the Faculty of Agriculture at the Université Abdou Moumouni in Niamey (Niger), social anthropologist Abdoulaye Mohamadou runs LASDEL, an independent research organisation that conducts empirical research programmes on governance, studying how public and goods and services are managed and delivered in communities across the sub- region. For more information on the work done by LASDEL, visit its website on www.lasdel.net Printed by: Russell Press, Nottingham, UK. Printed on: Recycled paper – Challenger Offset 90g, and Challenger Tint (Gold) 160g for the cover. Contents Acronyms and abbreviations 1. Introduction 1 2. Building a political arena 3 2.1 Creating administrative authorities 2.2 Emergence of a local intellectual elite 3. Setting up the municipalities 7 3.1 Key issues in the canton of Birnin Lallé prior to decentralisation 3.2 Dividing up the canton of Birkin Lallé and the pastoral zone 4. Conclusion 14 Bibliography 16
    [Show full text]
  • Yahaya Ibrahim Stakesniger
    Niger in the face of the Sahelo-Saharan Islamic Insurgency Precarious Stability in a Troubled Neighborhood Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim Working Paper No. 004 Sahel Research Group Working Paper No. 004 Paper Series: The Stakes of the Malian Crisis in the Sahel Niger in the face of the Sahelo-Saharan Islamic Insurgency Precarious Stability in a Troubled Neighborhood Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim August 2014 The Sahel Research Group, of the University of Florida’s Center for African Studies, is a collaborative effort to understand the political, social, economic, and cultural dynamics of the countries which comprise the West African Sahel. It focuses primarily on the six Francophone countries of the region—Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad—but also on in developments in neighboring countries, to the north and south, whose dy- namics frequently intersect with those of the Sahel. The Sahel Research Group brings together faculty and gradu- ate students from various disciplines at the University of Florida, in collaboration with colleagues from the region. More information is available here: http://sahelresearch.africa.ufl.edu/ Paper Series: The Stakes of the Malian Crisis in the Sahel In January 2012, Tuareg separatists launched a rebellion against the government of Mali in a bid to gain independence for the northern regions of the country. They were quickly joined by groups of Islamist militants seeking to establish control of the region, and dealing significant setbacks to the Malian military in a series of engagements. Following these de- feats, on 22 March 2012 frustrated junior officers in the Malian military led a coup d’état which ousted President Amadou Toumani Touré from power.
    [Show full text]