Omission Neglect and the Bias Blind Spot: Effects of the Self-Other Asymmetry in Susceptibility to Bias and Responsiveness to Debiasing

Omission Neglect and the Bias Blind Spot: Effects of the Self-Other

Asymmetry in Susceptibility to Bias and Responsiveness to Debiasing

A dissertation submitted to the

Division of Research and Advanced Studies

of the University of Cincinnati

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PH.D.)

IN THE DEPARTMENT OF MARKETING

of the College of Business

2011

Xiaoqi Han

M.A., Marquette University

Committee Chair: Frank R. Kardes, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

Omission Neglect and the Bias Blind Spot: Effects of the Self-Other Asymmetry in

Susceptibility to Bias and Responsiveness to Debiasing

Xiaoqi Han

Chair: Dr. Frank R. Kardes

Research on the bias blind spot shows that people are less capable of identifying biases in their own judgment than in others. People generally believe that they are less susceptible to biases than their peers and average people. This dissertation investigates the self-other bias asymmetry with respect to omission neglect. Omission neglect refers to insensitivity to missing or unknown information. Results from bias blind spot research imply a potential relationship between the self-other asymmetry in bias belief and omission neglect. Research on bias correction suggests that people holding a higher degree of asymmetry in bias beliefs may be less likely to correct biases even when omissions are made noticeable. Ironically, consumers who believe that they are less vulnerable to omission neglect may be more susceptible to omission neglect. Consumers may be also less likely to correct their judgment even when omitted information is made noticeable. The goal of the dissertation is to develop debiasing techniques to debias omission neglect in order to improve consumer judgment and decision making.

Corrective procedures are designed to debias omission neglect by means of reducing the bias blind spot. Prior to debiasing, two studies are designed to substantiate the assumption about the relationship between the bias blind spot and omission neglect. Study 1 demonstrates that

ii people believe others are susceptible to omission neglect, but they themselves are not. Study 2 shows that higher self-other asymmetry predicts predict greater omission neglect and a decreased likelihood of judgment correction to a moderate position. Last, in study 3, we show that debiasing is most effective when the bias blind spot is most specifically related to omission neglect. However, only people in low need for cognitive closure are responsive to debiasing.

Taken together, the studies show that the bias blind spot contributes to omission neglect and reduces responsiveness to debiasing.

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Xiaoqi Han

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, my sister, my friend Dawn, and my late grandma.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor Dr. Frank R. Kardes. Without him, I would not have been able to complete this dissertation. He is kind, inspiring and tremendously knowledgeable. The inspirations on research I have received from him are beyond description. I am honored to have worked under his guidance.

I am also thankful to all the faculty members in the marketing department. I appreciate their kindness. Particularly, I thank Dr. James Kellaris for his humor; I thank Dr. David Curry for his warm and sincere advice; I also thank Dr. Karen Machleit for her generous support; and I thank Dr. Norman Bruvold for his fun and informative culture anecdotes.

I would like to thank my family who has supported my education all the way through.

Coming from a working class family, I would not have pursued higher education persistently without my family’s belief in me. Particularly, I would like to thank my parents, who worked really hard to support my education. I would like to thank my sister, who has been my emotional support and best friend. I would also like to thank my late grandma, who had faith in me regardless. Finally, I would like to thank my friend, Dawn, who stayed as my company in times of difficulty.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION ...... 1 CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 4 Omission Neglect...... 4 Debiasing Omission Neglect ...... 5 The Bias Blind Spot ...... 7 The Use of Introspective vs. Behavioral Information between Actors and Observers of Bias ...... 12 Bias Blind Spot and Omission Neglect ...... 14 Self-other Asymmetry and Bias correction ...... 16 Dual-processing Theories, Self-other Asymmetry and Omission Neglect ...... 16 The Shallowness Thoughts of the Self and System 1 Processing ...... 17 CHAPTER THREE HYPOTHESES ...... 21 Relationship between the Self-other Asymmetry and Omission Neglect ...... 21 Debiasing omission neglect ...... 22 The Need for Cognitive Closure and Debiasing effect ...... 23 CHAPTER FOUR STUDY 1 ...... 26 Overview ...... 26 Method ...... 26 Results ...... 27 Discussion ...... 29 CHAPTER FIVE STUDY 2 ...... 30 Overview ...... 30 Pretest ...... 31 Method ...... 32 Results ...... 35 Discussion ...... 39 CHAPTER SIX STUDY 3 ...... 41 Overview ...... 41 Method ...... 44 Results ...... 47 Discussion ...... 49 CHAPTER SEVEN GENERAL DISCUSSION ...... 51 REFERENCES ...... 55 APPENDIX A ...... 64 APPENDIX B ...... 67 APPENDIX C ...... 73

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TABLES AND FIGURES

FIGURE 1 THE PREDICTION ...... 14

FIGURE 2 STUDY 1 ...... 88

FIGURE 3 STUDY 1 ...... 89

FIGURE 4 STUDY 2 ...... 90

TABLE 1 STUDY 2 ...... 91

FIGURE 5 STUDY 2 ...... 92

FIGURE 6 STUDY 2 ...... 93

TABLE 2 STUDY 3 ...... 94

FIGURE 7 STUDY 3 ...... 95

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Consumers’ judgment and decisions are subject to a variety of biases. Biases refer to the systematic errors observed in judgments, decisions and behaviors (Gilovich, Griffin &

Kahneman, 2002). For example, consumers often experience purchase-related regret, wishing that they had or had not bought a product. The emergence of regret suggests that errors in judgment, recognized only after the fact, elicit intense emotional responses. One important factor contributing to these inconsistent judgments and decisions is that consumers usually hold incomplete information. However, the shortfall of information does not always promote cautiousness in judgment and decisions. Instead, research shows that consumers heavily rely on available information, disregarding information that is missing but yet important (for a review, see Kardes & Sanbonmatsu, 2003). In this dissertation, the focal bias under investigation is omission neglect, the tendency among consumers to ignore or underweigh missing information including missing cues, unknown information, attributes, alternatives, options, or issues (Kardes

& Sanbonmatsu, 2003).

The main purpose of the dissertation is to debias omission neglect among consumers. The effort corresponds to the recent call for research on debiasing (Milkman, Chugh & Bazerman,

2009). Specifically, researchers note that little is known about how decision making can be improved despite descriptive knowledge accumulated about biases. Because errors are costly for decision makers in all domains of society, developing debiasing strategies is urgent as well as necessary (Milkman et al., 2009).

Research on the bias blind spot (for a review, see Pronin, 2009) sheds light on a potentially profitable route to debiasing omission neglect. This stream of research shows that while people

1 are capable of identifying biases in other people, they are less apt to do so when they themselves commit biases. Consequently, people hold an asymmetric view of objectivity on the self and others. It has been found that the direction of the asymmetry largely favors ones’ own objectivity relative to others. That is, people believe that they are less susceptible than others to the influence of a variety of biases.

Multiple theories suggest a potential relationship between the self-other asymmetry of bias assessment induced by the bias blind spot and omission neglect. First, prior literature shows that a greater magnitude of asymmetry indicates a greater reliance on introspection (Pronin, Berger &

Molouski, 2007). Because omissions are not salient and usually escapes introspections, the magnitude of the asymmetry may be commensurate with the extent of omission neglect. Second, research suggests that judgment involving the self (vs. other people) elicits a higher degree of automatic (vs. controlled) processing (e.g., Balcetis & Dunning, 2005). Correspondingly, the judgment process entails a biased, selective sampling of information favoring the data regarding selves (vs. others) (Gilovich, Epley, & Hanko, 2005; Mussweiler, Epstude & Ruter, 2005). It is possible that the cursory processing of information activated by the self-other assessment is translated to subsequent judgment and decisions, aggravating omission neglect. Third, research on bias correction suggests that even when omissions are noticed, the erroneous belief of invulnerability may hinder the motivation to make sufficient judgment corrections (Wilson &

Brekke, 1994). Blind to their own biases, consumers may keep failing to learn from the environment even when it provides frequent, prompt, and unambiguous feedback (Hogarth, 2001;

Kardes, 2006). All of these potential consequences indicate that the bias blind spot, however ironically, perpetuates and exacerbates omission neglect.

Hence, we believe that corrective procedures designed to debias omission neglect comprise steps necessary to debias the bias blind spot. Prior to debiasing omission neglect, two studies

2 have been designed to substantiate the assumption about the relationship between the bias blind spot and omission neglect. Study 1 demonstrates the self-other asymmetry of belief about bias on omission neglect. Study 2 replicates this effect and further seeks to investigate the hypothesized predictive relationship between the self-other asymmetry and omission neglect. Last, in Study 3, corrective procedures are created to debias omission neglect derived from the self-other asymmetry.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Omission Neglect

Judgments made by consumers are often formed using limited information. Omission neglect refers to insensitivity to cues, attributes, alternatives, options or issues that go beyond presented information (Kardes & Sanbonmatsu, 2003).

Omission neglect induces biases in judgments and decisions because when germane information is missing, failure to account for the implications of missing information leads to extreme judgments that become unjustifiable when more other relevant information becomes available. In a representative study, half of the participants received favorable information regarding four attributes of a target camera, and the remaining half received favorable information regarding eight attributes (Sanbonmatsu et al., 1992). Consumers, who were either unknowledgeable or moderately knowledgeable about the product category, formed extremely favorable evaluations of the target camera across set-size conditions. Only consumers who were highly knowledgeable about the product category formed more favorable product evaluations when the product was described in terms of eight attributes than when the product was described in terms of only four attributes. Furthermore, the attributes were counterbalanced so that attribute favorableness was held constant across the two sets of four attributes used to create the eight attribute set.

Extreme judgments held with confidence when omissions are underappreciated may subsequently induce consumers’ post-purchase regret and dissatisfaction. For example, the consumer may regret and become dissatisfied when some attributes, overlooked when a purchase

4 decision is made, cannot be overlooked later when the product is actually used. In addition to suboptimal judgments and decisions, another consequence that omission neglect may evoke is the change of judgment criteria that markedly differ as a function of the judgment context.

According to Sanbonmatsu and colleagues (Sanbonmatsu et al., 1997, 2003), one important factor contributing to omission neglect is that presented attributes shift judgment criteria and the perceived sufficiency of given information. Without being adequately knowledgeable

(Sanbonmatsu et al., 1997), consumers often overweight the importance and relevancy of presented information while dismissing or underweighting the implication of missing information (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2003). Hence, inconsistent choices and decisions may result when presented attributes are not held constant. For example, preference reversal (Shafir, 1993), a well-known bias prevalent among consumers (e.g., Russo, Carlson & Meloy, 2006), attests to the facilitating role that omission neglect plays in the inconsistent use of information.

Despite the considerable increase in consumers’ knowledge about marketers’ persuasive intent (Campbell & Kirmani, 2000), prior research on omission neglect (Sanbonmatsu et al. 1992,

2003, 1997, 1991) shows that unawareness and inattention to missing information is pervasive and detecting omissions is surprisingly difficult.

Debiasing Omission Neglect

Wilson and Brekke’s (1994) seminal paper on mental contamination suggests that successful debiasing is difficult to achieve. To prevent the unwanted influence from tainting judgments or behaviors, several conditions have to be satisfied. First, debiasing starts with an awareness of bias that comes from either consulting one’s introspection or abstract theories.

After biases are noticed, one needs to be sufficiently motivated, and meanwhile equipped with

5 the knowledge of the direction and magnitude of the bias. Last but not the least, sufficient behavioral control is also necessary for one not to act on biases.

Because it is hard to bring omissions into awareness, debiasing omission neglect seems to be especially challenging. Further, omissions often elude introspection, providing little chance for people to learn from experiences (Dunning, 2005; Gilbert, 2006). The nature of omission neglect suggests that increasing awareness of omissions may be the primary component of an effective debiasing strategy. Prior research provides support for this possibility (Kardes et al.,

2006; Pfeiffer, 2008; Sanbonmatsu et al., 1997; 2003).

Several experimental manipulations have been employed to debias omission neglect. For example, Pfeiffer (2008) showed that increased salience of omissions, created by listing the omitted attribute in the description but marking it as “unknown”, increases the awareness of omissions, resulting in inferential adjustment to a moderate position.

In addition to increasing the salience of omissions, prior research finds that a comparative environment embedded with nonalignable attributes of two products increases sensitivity to omissions (Sanbonmatsu et al., 1997; 2003). For example, pairing a target product with a context product, described with relevant but different attribute dimensions, highlights the absence of the unique attributes in the target product. Further, increased awareness of omissions can be created in a context product category (i.e., soybeans) completely irrelevant to the target product category

(i.e., a camera) when a relatively large amount of information is provided for the context product.

Last, debiasing omission neglect can also be achieved by prompting people to consider judgment criteria prior to judgment (Kardes et al., 2006). In one experiment, before judgment on a car was assessed, half of the participants were prompted to think about the most important attributes in evaluating an automobile and the rest of the participants directly provided the evaluation. Results showed that moderate judgment of the target car was formed with lower

6 confidence among the participants who were urged to consider their judgment criteria. Further, in a similar vein, Kardes and his colleagues (Kardes et al., 2006) showed that having participants evaluate omitted attributes prior to (vs. after) providing their global evaluation of a digital camera increased the salience of judgment criteria, leading to moderate judgment of the product.

In summary, debiasing omission neglect has been mainly achieved by altering situational cues in the judgment context to bring omissions into awareness. Despite the findings, few studies have investigated the possibility of debiasing omission neglect by means of debiasing the judge.

The Bias Blind Spot

Ironically, although omission neglect is ubiquitous, most people may think that they themselves are not susceptible or at least less susceptible than others to its impact. This suspicion is supported by the findings from research on the bias blind spot (Pronin, 2009). The bias blind spot refers to the prevalent inefficacy of people to identify their own biases but not others’. This stream of research has discovered a consistent pattern that people hold a distinctive, polarized view regarding theirs and others’ susceptibility to bias. Specifically, people evaluate and predict themselves to be less prone to biases than their peers and average Americans. Pronin, Lin, and

Ross (2002) showed that people overwhelmingly believe that they are less susceptible than their classmates in a seminar, average Americans and average airport travelers to biases including the self-serving bias, the self-interest bias, reactive evaluation, the fundamental attribution error

(FAE), the halo effect, the hostile media effect, biased assimilation, and cognitive dissonance. In another series of studies conducted by Pronin, Berger and Molouski (2007), people were found to show a similar pattern of bias when assessing conformity as a consequence of social influence.

A typical experiment demonstrating the bias blind spot was executed as follows.

Participants received descriptions about a set of biases in short paragraphs. Then they were asked

7 about their own, their peers’ and average Americans’ tendency to show this effect. Consistent with the predictions based on the bias blind spot phenomenon, participants evaluated other people to be more prone to the biases, especially when the biases were regarded as being negative or when they left non-salient memory traces (Pronin et al., 2002).

In another experiment (Pronin et al., 2007), participants were told whether their peers supported various policy proposals on campus before they made their own vote. After the voting was completed, participants were provided with the voting record constructed on their own responses, but purported to belong to another participant. After reading both voting records, participants respectively assessed the extent to which their voting and the alleged other participant’s were influenced by the positions of their peers. Results showed that in the face of the two same voting records of theirs, participants felt that the one claimed to belong to “the other participant” was more influenced by peers’ opinion than their own voting.

More strikingly, Pronin et al (2002) showed that the bias blind spot remains robust even when people are equipped with the knowledge of bias. In one experiment, immediately after participants rated themselves relative to others on a series of bias tendencies, they were provided with the description of the “better-than-average” effect, explicating the fact that 70-80% people think they are above average when a quality is desirable. Participants then were asked to rate their previous ratings if objective measures were used. Most participant (60 out of 79) expressed objectivity to their initial judgment.

The Motivational Account. Why does one evaluate him/herself and others so differently and why does this asymmetry in belief about bias remain so robust and resilient across a variety of social judgments? Findings obtained from research on social comparison (for a review, see

Suls & Wheeler, 2000) shed some light. These findings suggest that the intrinsic motive of people to see themselves in a positive light gives rise to the blindness to biases in themselves.

For example, research on the “better-than average” effect (e.g., Alicke, 2000; Chambers &

Windschitl, 2004) has consistently recorded that people frequently show over optimism when assessing their own abilities and traits, and usually place themselves on a standing above the average. A large amount of evidence supports the proposition that this over optimism is driven by people’s motive to deny or at least understate negative things in themselves. (i.e., the self- enhancement motive; self-serving motives) (e.g., Baumeister, 1998; Steele, 1988; Taylor &

Brown, 1988). Hence, based on the motivational account, the asymmetric belief about bias between self and others is due to the fact that people more readily avoid negativity in themselves than in others.

However, provided that biases are negative and undesirable, this account does not adequately explain the reversed pattern of the asymmetry in some studies. These studies showed that people actually evaluate themselves to be more prone than others to some negative qualities including daydreaming, procrastination, and jealousy (Miller & McFalland, 1987; Savitsky &

Gilovich, 2003). For example, one study showed that when the task under evaluation is made to seem difficult (e.g., keeping a unicycle upright; owning an island), people thought that they were less capable than average people to execute the task (Kruger & Burrus, 2004). The motivational account is further shown to be insufficient in one study. The study showed that the bias blind spot emerged in both cases where a bias was described to be desirable and undesirable (Pronin et al., 2007, experiment2).

The Non-motivational Account. Although the “bias blind spot” is a unique case of the better-than-average effect (Pronin et al., 2002), colluding evidence suggests that one’s motivation alone, does not predict the self-other asymmetry. This further suggests that people may truly believe that the difference between them and others is a matter of fact rather than an inflated estimate indicating their hopes and desires. This is indeed the case. Williams and

Gilovich (2008) provided direct evidence pointing to the non-motivational, cognitive basis of the self-other asymmetry effect. The study showed that people were willing to bet on a random drawing whose probability of winning was matched to the percentile they assigned themselves on a self-rating scale. The authors found that participants’ willingness to bet on the random draw was not different from that on their self-ratings, indicating that people believe that their self- assessment, however inflated it is, reflects the perception of their true standing.

Several non-motivational accounts provide additional evidence. These accounts involve actors’ biased sampling of information, including selective accessibility (Mussweiler et al., 2005), egocentrism (Kruger, 1999) and focalism (e.g., Schkade & Kahneman, 1998; Wilson, Wheatley,

Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000). Consistent with William and Gilovich’s finding, these accounts suggest a cognitive, non-motivational bias underlying the evidence collection process involved in performing a social comparison task. Specifically, when the self is compared with others (vs. others are compared with the self) (Eiser, Pahl & Prins, 2001), the evidence recruited by the judge is unknowingly biased toward self-relevant data, whereas those relevant to the rest of the population are dismissed or underweighted. For example, Mussweiler and his colleagues

(e.g., Mussweiler et al., 2005) have shown that the self is automatically used as a standard of comparison for judging others. Based on a quick, holistic assessment of the similarity between the self (i.e., the standard) and others (i.e., the target), judgment of others is made after selectively navigating information stored in memory that affirms the conclusion of the initial assessment. For example, if the initial assessment indicates that a person is similar to the self, evidence supporting the similarity (vs. dissimilarity) between the self and the person is automatically rendered more accessible to assist judgment.

Naïve Realism. Pronin et al. (2004) proposed another important non-motivational theoretical account. According to the authors, naïve realism gives rise to the perception that

10 others rather than the self are more susceptible to the impact of bias. The core tenet of naïve realism locates in the fact that people view what they see as an objective reflection of reality untainted by their hopes, expectations, motives and sensory imprecisions. In everyday social interactions, it is not uncommon that discrepancy in perception and behavioral responses arises even in the face of an identical situation. The high objectivity one attaches to his or her own perception leads to the attribution of the discrepancy in two different ways. That is, one may attribute the divergence to dispositional factors associated with others or to their motivations, self-interests, political grounds that distort the reality. Alternatively, one may infer that despite the possibility of bias, he or she is not susceptible because bias is not observed on the self.

However, because people do not have access to the higher-order mental process (Nisbette and

Wilson, 1977), bias can only be inferred, especially when its influence occurs outside of awareness (Wilson and Brekke, 1994).

The former reaction is labeled the “fundamental attribution error” by social psychologists (Ross, 1977). The error component of the attribution process is derived from observers’ (vs. actors’) inadequate consideration of situational factors contributing to actors’ behavior. Researchers (Jones & Nisbett, 1972) contend that the different source of information available to actors and observers constitutes the variability in of the direction of the attribution. While the only source of information on which observers base their inference is actors’ behavior, one source of information, accessible only to actors and beyond the observation of the observers, is actors’ mental state. Hence, ignoring or underweighting actors’ thoughts, emotional states, and intentions leads to observers’ inclination to make more dispositional (vs. situational) attributions to actors’ behavior.

The latter way of reacting to divergence explains the basis in the self-other asymmetry reflected in the belief about bias susceptibility. Furthermore, research shows that what reinforces

11 this belief is the actor’s heavy reference to introspective information (Pronin, 2009), including thoughts, feelings and motives as the evidence attesting to the occurrence of bias. Failure to find bias in introspection leads to actor’s reassured conclusion that he/she is clear from bias.

Pronin and colleagues (Pronin, 2009) provide convincing evidence supporting the proposition that actor’s heavy use of introspective information underlies the self-other difference in bias assessment. Results from multiple studies (e.g., Pronin and Kugler, 2007) suggest that when it comes to bias assessment about selves and others, introspective information serves as a unique and particularly valuable source of reference for the self. While introspective information

(e.g., intention) is automatically and effortlessly assessed (Gilovich et al., 2005), it is consciously held with tremendous validity to the extent that it serves as the “gold standard” that people use to assess why they act in a certain way (Pronin et al., 2004 ).

In the following section I will elaborate on the psychological process contributing to the bias blind spot phenomenon and the evidence attesting to the process.

The Use of Introspective vs. Behavioral Information between Actors and Observers of Bias

The great conviction one gives to introspective information leads to different strategies in assessing self-other biases. Specifically, actors (i.e., selves) are more inclined to use introspective information, whereas when assessing biases that others commit, they are more likely to adopt behavioral information as the evidence. Pronin and colleagues (e.g.,Erhlinger et al., 2004; Pronin, 2009; Pronin et al., 2004, 2002) suggested that overweighting introspective information while dismissing behavioral evidence constitutes the main psychological process that drives the distinction between the self-other asymmetry.

Several studies provide the evidence indicating the distinct strategies that actors and observers use in bias assessment. Pronin and Kugler (2007) showed that actors (i.e., selves)

12 reported to “look inside their head” to look for the evidence of their own biases, but to consider human behaviors in general to access others’ biases (study 2). Another study demonstrated that when judging themselves, actors reported to attach a greater degree of usefulness to introspective information than to information regarding how people behave in general. The reversed pattern was found when it came to the assessment of biases of others (study 3).

More convincing evidence comes from another experiment showing that the different strategies employed by actors and observers of biases leads to the asymmetrical belief about bias

(experiment 3). This experiment also demonstrated that even when their own behaviors unmistakably indicate biases, actors tend to ignore this information and attribute biases to others rather than to themselves.

In the experiment, Pronin and Kugler investigated which information, introspective or behavioral, test takers and observers used when assessing test takers’ bias. All test takers’ test scores were manipulated to be poor. Test takers (i.e., the actors) were then asked to think aloud and later provide assessment on the validity of the test and the extent to which their assessment was tainted by their test scores. Meanwhile, observers received the same information as actors that included the verbalized thoughts of actors and their test scores. Results showed the predicted pattern that observers were more capable of identifying biases than the actors and that they imputed more biases to test takers whose test score were more negative relative to the average. In a similar study, observers prescribed more “better-than-average” biases to actors whose trait rating was further above average. However, in both studies, actors largely felt they were unbiased regardless of their test scores and trait ratings of selves.

Three additional implications can be drawn from the aforementioned two studies. First, committing biases or considering one’s tendency to commit biases makes people less open to the possibility that they themselves are biased (Pronin et al., 2004). Second, the severity of biased

13 behaviors apparent to the observers is positively correlated with the extent that the actors attribute biases to others but not to themselves. This pattern of results suggests that more biased behaviors may disable people to see their biases to a greater extent, driving a more polarized self-other asymmetry effect. Last, more relevant to the present research, an interesting question arises: will more polarized self-other asymmetry lead to greater biases, particularly greater omission neglect?

Bias Blind Spot and Omission Neglect

It is predicted that a greater extent of the self-other asymmetry may lead to a greater likelihood of committing omission neglect. This prediction is made based on the unique nature of omission neglect and the psychology process contributing to the asymmetric perception of bias susceptibility between the self and others. The prediction is illustrated in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1

PREDICTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SELF-OTHER ASYMMETRY AND OMISSION NEGLECT

Because the emergence of the asymmetry is attributed to the use of introspective information when it is invalid, the greater asymmetry between the self and others indicates the

14 bias actor’s greater tendency to collect and use introspective information at the expense of other relevant information. This psychological process leading to the conclusion about one’s bias tendency relative to others involves greater “errors,” suggesting that those who believe they are less susceptible to omission neglect as a result of biased information processing are actually more likely to show insensitivity to omissions.

Further, the unique nature of omission neglect should accentuate the likelihood that a greater magnitude of the self-other asymmetry increases the severity of omission neglect. Pronin

(2009) suggests that the bias blind spot is more severe among biases that are more cognitive (vs. social) in nature than other types of bias. That is, a more marked asymmetry should appear in biases that are directly reflected in judgments and behaviors not mediated by intentions, leaving minimal evidence available to introspection or after the fact. By contrast, biases that are more available to introspection (e.g., fear of public speech; procrastination) reduces, if not eliminate, the bias blind spot effect. Because omissions are not salient, they leave little trace in introspection. Hence, omission neglect may be a unique case of bias where introspection provides minimum evidence while it is the only source to which one refers in order to make bias assessment.

Last, due to the automatic nature of omission neglect, the greater tendency to refer to introspection should result in a greater likelihood of not finding any evidence supporting the occurrence of bias. The false confidence fueled by the absence of introspective evidence should decrease the motivation to control bias, leading to a greater likelihood of committing omission neglect.

Self-other Asymmetry and Bias correction

We believe that people who hold a greater asymmetric view between the self and others on the susceptibility to omission neglect are less likely make judgment corrections even when omissions become salient after initial judgment. Prior research on bias control and correction provides evidence for this possibility (Wilson and Brekke, 1994). It has been shown that after biases become accessible, successful bias correction is possible only when people are sufficiently motivated to do so (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Wilson & Brekke, 1994).

As previously mentioned, the great validity one attaches to the introspection resource should fuel misplaced confidence regarding the validity of whatever information introspection reveals. It thus follows that a greater degree of asymmetry suggests a higher probability of prematurely terminating the process of bias control and correction at the stage of bias awareness.

What’s worse, the minimal trace that biases leave on introspection turns up as the evidence that one acted as he/she did despite the potential influence of bias (Ehrlinger, Gilovich & Ross, 2005)

Hence, the false conviction strengthened by the illusory evidence that people use to support the belief about their invulnerability decreases the motivation to engage in sufficient bias correction and behavioral control. This suggests that a greater self-other asymmetry decreases the likelihood of judgment correction when omissions are made salient.

Dual-processing Theories, Self-other Asymmetry and Omission Neglect

Notably, implications drawn from dual-process theories provide consistent predictions on the relationship between the self-other asymmetry and omission neglect. We propose that the self-assessment of biases may elicit system 1(vs. system 2) processing that bases judgment on evidence that is more prominent and accessible. This impact is likely more pronounced among

16 people who think that they are less vulnerable than others to biases. Further, the operation of system 1 processing bearing on bias assessment suggests that greater automaticity is associated with people who hold a greater degree of asymmetrical belief. The increased automaticity in judgment should decrease the control people use to prevent omission neglect.

The Shallowness Thoughts of the Self and System 1 Processing

Dual-process theories (Chaiken & Trope, 1999) postulate that two modes of information processing bear on judgment and decision making, System 1 and System 2 (Stanovich, 1999;

Stanovich & West, 2000). System 1 processing involves unconscious, associative, rapid, automatic and effortless thinking. By contrast, the processing of system 2 is rule-based, conscious, slow, controlled and effortful (for a review, see Evans, 2008).

Among multiple dual-process theories (Evans, 2008), the dichotomy of the controlled vs. automatic processes (Atkinson & Shirffin, 1968) represents one major distinction between system 1 and system 2. Based on this theorization, an automatic process involves a sequence of nodes that always become active when receiving given internal and/or external inputs. This process is automatic because its activation requires minimal attention and active control. By contrast, a controlled process deals with the response to nodes that are temporarily, situationally activated. To initiate this process, a threshold of minimum attention needs to be met. The automatic process operates from the associative network stored in long-term memory and is anteceded by a well-learned procedure; the control process, on the other hand, operates under situational demand and does not require prior learning. The greater automaticity bearing on system 1 processing also suggests that suppressing this process becomes difficult once it is learned. In contrast, the controlled process can be suppressed and activated more flexibly.

In a follow-up paper following the theorization of dual-process processing, Shiffrin and

Schneider (1977) suggested that controlled and automatic components both contribute to the fulfillment of a task. This contention further suggests that the process of fulfilling some well- learned tasks activates the associative network existent in the long-term memory and essentially involves a greater automatic (vs. controlled) component. Consistently, minimal control is required to fulfill such tasks. By contrast, fulfilling novel tasks requires directed attention and the active employment of short-term memory (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), indicating that the process involves a greater controlled (vs. automatic) component.

Gilovich et al. (2005) proposed that thoughts about the self are shallow and indicative of system 1 processing. This proposition is based on the evidence found in a variety of research converging on the idea that in a social comparison context, thoughts about the self emerge rapidly and automatically (Boven & Lowewenstein, 2005; Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999) and that the evidence used in reaching judgment of selves hardly goes beyond available evidence (i.e., the omission bias) (Caputo & Dunning, 2005).

First, because self-information (vs. other-information) spontaneously springs up to one’s mind (Dunning, Meyerowitz & Holzberg, 1989), it would be hard for people not to use self- relevant information even when it is of low validity (i.e., the availability heuristic, Tversky and

Kahneman, 1974; Wilson, 2002). Hence, self-assessment often tilts toward collecting and employing information regarding selves with little attention paid to information relevant to others. If system 1 dominates information processing when the self is involved, judgment involving selves should be more likely to be reached in a thoughtless, top-down, theory-driven manner (vs. deliberated, bottom-up, data-driven-manner).This idea receives support from

Ehrlinger and Dunning (2003)’s study. The authors showed that people reach judgments about

18 their performance on multiple tasks by referring to their chronic self-views, suggesting that self- assessment is anchored on ones’ theory about the self.

Second, some evidence shows that intention serves as a proxy for evaluation and prediction of the action of the self (Koehler & Poon, 2005; Kruger & Gilovich, 2004). In a representative study (Kruger & Gilovich, 2004), participants were provided with some monetary reward for their chosen charity, the amount of which was positively correlated with the length of time their hands were able to be submerged in cold water. Another group of participants watched a videotape of an individual who underwent the same task. Results showed that participants’ self- ratings of altruism were highly correlated with their intentions but not with the length of time their hands were submerged in the cold water. The reversed pattern was found among observers who judged others’ extent of altruism. Furthermore, intention is frequently imputed as a valid input to judgment even when it is misleading (Wegner, 2002; Wilson, 2002). For example, people hold the illusory conviction that their consciousness will help them to resist the unwanted influence without knowing that many behaviors operate under an automatic process not mediated by intention (Wegner, 2002; Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). The evidence raised above reinforces the idea that the assessment of the self contains little deliberation beyond the evidence that is easily accessible.

Taken together, various theoretical accounts converge on the contention that the assessment involving the self bears on a more automatic process than judgment that excludes the self. Knowledge about the self is saved in one’s long-term memory and its employment becomes such a well-learned, routine procedure to the extent that its acquisition as an input in judgment bears on little consciousness and minimal control. In addition, assessment made when the self is involved hardly goes beyond available information (i.e., self-knowledge and intention) and therefore is highly influenced by the availability heuristic. Hence, we propose that the process

19 through which self-assessment is reached is suggestive of the activation of system 1 processing heavily relying on more accessible, prominent, and seemingly plausible evidence (i.e., data regarding the self and intention). Further, the use of such evidence is at the expense of the evidence that is less accessible, prominent and plausible at a superficial level (i.e., data regarding the population at large).

Similarly, we propose that performing the self-other assessment of bias may evoke a greater degree of automaticity in information processing and this effect is more pronounced on people who think that they are less susceptible to biases than others. Importantly, the extent of automaticity elicited in the self-other assessment should be commensurate with the extent that people believe they are better off than others. That is, the further above average that people think they are, the greater automaticity they may apply in judgment and decision making.

In evaluating bias tendencies between the self and others, a greater degree of automaticity suggests a greater tendency for collecting, employing and valuing self-relevant information including introspective information. Further, the more cursory processing of information associated greater automaticity may be indicative of a judgment and decision-making strategy that bases conclusions on more prominent, accessible evidence (i.e., presented information) at the expense of less prominent, less accessible evidence (i.e., omitted information).Hence, it is predicted that people who think that they are less vulnerable to omission neglect may be more likely to commit omission neglect. Furthermore, the more invulnerable people think they are to omission neglect, the more vulnerable they actually can be.

CHAPTER THREE

HYPOTHESES

Relationship between the Self-other Asymmetry and Omission Neglect

In summary, research on the bias blind spot, bias correction, and dual-process theories converge to the prediction of a relationship between the self-other asymmetry of belief about bias and omission neglect. It is predicted that the greater the asymmetry with regard to bias susceptibility people withhold between others and themselves, the greater omission neglect they may demonstrate. To substantiate this prediction, we first need to verify the existence of the bias blind spot on omission neglect. Further, omission neglect leaves minimal traces in introspective knowledge because omissions are not salient and one rarely receives feedbacks after missing information is disregarded. This further leads omission neglect to become a case of bias where the greatest reliance on introspective evidence is predicted when introspection is least relevant.

Therefore, we predict that the self-other asymmetry would be more pronounced on omission neglect than on biases that are more available to one’s introspection or knowledge about bias.

Based on the prediction, the following hypotheses are proposed:

H1: People will believe that they are less susceptible than others to omission neglect.

H2: The magnitude of the self-other asymmetry should be greater on omission neglect than biases that are more available to introspection or knowledge about bias.

H3: The less susceptible people believe that they are, (i.e., the higher the asymmetry), the more susceptible they will be to omission neglect.

H4: Higher self-other asymmetry will decrease motivation for sufficient correction even when omissions are made noticeable.

Debiasing omission neglect

Further, if the self-other asymmetry contributes to omission neglect, then diminishing the asymmetry should be a viable method of debiasing. However, in addition to diminishing the bias blind spot, another condition is necessary for debiasing to be effective. Prior literature suggests that to avoid the influence of a bias, people need to be aware of the presence of the bias especially when the bias is automatic (Wilson and Brekke, 1994) and when the naïve theory about the bias does not exist (Stapel, Martin & Schwartz, 1998; Wilson et al., 1992). Taken together, reducing the self-other asymmetry and increasing the awareness of the omission neglect should both be included in an effective debiasing strategy.

One viable way of debiasing is through education. In one study, Pronin and Kugler (2007) provided half of the participants an article, allegedly from Science, that provided information on the shortcomings of introspection because behavior could occur automatically. The other half of the participants received an irrelevant article. Next, all participants were asked to assess their susceptibly relative to their classmates’ on a set of biases. The result showed that participants receiving information on the illusory validity of introspection did not evaluate their susceptibility any differently from their peers while participants in the control demonstrated the typical bias blind spot.

To debias omission neglect, information on the bias blind spot and omission neglect is also provided. Further, we vary the specificity with which the bias blind spot was described with regard to omission neglect. We predict that the more specific the bias blind spot bears on

22 omission neglect, the more effective debiasing should be. Hence, the following hypothesis is proposed,

H5: The more specific the debiasing strategy regarding the bias blind spot and omission neglect is, the more effective it will be.

The Need for Cognitive Closure and Debiasing effect

To test the effectiveness of debiasingfor different groups of people, the need for cognitive closure is measured (Kruglanski and Webster, 1996).The need for cognitive closure is conceptualized as a preference for any definite opinion over confusion or ambiguity. As the need for cognitive closure increases, peoples’ desire to form (“seize”) and safeguard (“freeze upon”) an opinion increases. Consequently, people consider fewer alternatives and prefer easy-to-use (vs. difficult-to-use) information in reaching an opinion. Conversely, when the need for cognitive closure decreases, people’s desire to reach a definitive opinion decreases and this allows them to be open to more alternatives and inconsistent evidence.

The need for cognitive closure has been either measured as an individual difference variable (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) or manipulated as a situational variable. Situational variables including time pressure (Cronley, Posavac, Meyer, Kardes, and Kellaris, 2005,

Kruglanski and Freund, 1983; Kruglanski and Webster, 1996; Sanbonmatsu and Fazio, 1990;

Suri and Monroe, 2003) ambient noise (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), fatigue (Kruglanski, 1989,

Kruglanski, 1990; Webster, Richter, and Kruglanski,1996), or tedium (Kruglanski & Webster,

1996) increase the need for cognitive closure. By contrast, the need for closure decreases with accountability (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski and Freund,1983; Tetlock, 1985; Webster, Richter, and Kruglanski, 1996) and the pleasantness of the task (Webster, 1993).

Individual differences the need for cognitive are assessed by the Need for Cognitive

Closure Scale (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994). Correspondingly, individuals high (vs. low) in need for closure demonstrate similar preferences in judgments and behaviors as those who are put in situations that encourage (vs. discourage) closure.

Kruglanski and Webster (1996) suggest that the need for cognitive closure increases in the same direction as the tendency for selective information processing. People high in need for closure are more likely to focus on early cues and less likely to consider evidence inconsistent with the initial hypothesis in forming a judgment. Consistently, prior research on debiasing omission neglects shows that people high in need for closure are less responsive to the debiasing method through generating mental simulations (Hirt, Kardes, and Markman, 2004).

We propose that when the self-other asymmetry is primed by a bias assessment procedure, people high in need for closure are more likely use this accessible set of knowledge in the later task. They may be more susceptible to the priming effect (“seize”) and less likely to draw implications from information that is inconsistent with the primed knowledge (“freeze”). By contrast, people low in need for cognitive are more likely to consider the implications of information acquired later, even when it is inconsistent with their prior, accessible beliefs. Taken together, we predict that debiasing strategies should be more effective among individuals low in need for cognitive closure, regardless of their prior knowledge of the self-other asymmetry.

H6: Debiasing should be more effective among individuals low (vs. high) in need for closure.

Three experiments were conducted to investigate the aforementioned hypotheses. The first two experiments were designed to investigate the relationship between the bias blind spot and omission neglect. Study 1 tests whether the self-other asymmetry of bias belief pertaining to omission neglect (H1-H2). Study 2 seeks to investigate the hypothesized causal relationship

24 between the self-other asymmetry of belief about bias belief and omission neglect (H2-H4). In

Study 3, corrective procedures will be created to debias omission neglect derived from the self- other asymmetry (H5-H6).

CHAPTER FOUR

STUDY 1

Overview

Study 1 was designed to examine whether the bias blind spot would obtain on omission neglect (H1). We predicted that participants would report themselves to be less susceptible to omission neglect than their peers and average American college students.

We employed the standard procedure used in investigating the bias blind spot (Pronin et al.,

2002). Participants read information about three biases and assessed the tendency they, their peers, and the average American student would exhibit each bias. The three biases included omission neglect, the halo effect, and the planning fallacy.

Additionally, omissions are not salient and one rarely receives feedback after missing information is disregarded. Hence, omission neglect leaves minimal traces in introspective knowledge. This leads omission neglect to become a case of bias where the greatest reliance on introspective evidence is predicted when introspection is least relevant. Therefore, our second prediction is that the magnitude of the asymmetry on omission neglect should be greater than that obtained on the halo effect and the planning fallacy, a bias that is more available to knowledge about bias and introspection after these biases are committed (Pronin et al., 2002) ( H2)

Method

Participants and design. One hundred and thirty nine participants from a Californian university took part in the study for extra class credit. A one cell (self vs. other) within-subject design was used. Manipulations and measures for Study 1 can be found in Appendix A.

Procedure and material. Participants each received a questionnaire that contained descriptions of a set of bias including the halo effect, the planning fallacy and omission neglect, each described in a short paragraph. The order of presenting these biases was counterbalanced.

After reviewing the description about each bias, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they believe they (i.e., “To what extent do you believe that you show this effect or tendency?”), their peers (students in the same school) (i.e., “To which extent do you believe that average SJSU students show this effect or tendency?”), and average American college students

(“To which extent do you believe that average American students show this effect or tendency?) will show this tendency . All ratings were made on scales anchored from 1 (not at all) to 9

(strongly).

Similar to Pronin et al. (2002), supplementary data were obtained by asking participants to rate the extent of negativity of the bias ( i.e., “How negatively does this tendency reflect on someone showing it?”) and cognitive trace the bias leaves on one’s ( i.e., How aware are you when you yourself commit this tendency?”) and others’ awareness ( i.e., How aware are you when others commit this tendency?”

Results

Results of this study replicated prior findings in the bias blind spot studies. Composite score of biases were obtained by adding each participant’s’ rating of their own and others’ susceptibility on all three biases. The composite score demonstrated the typical bias blind spot effect. Participants rated themselves to be less susceptible to biases (M=17.05), t(138) =3.30, p<.005, than their peers (M=18.26) and average Americans (M=18.77), t(113) =4.82, p<.0001.

A mixed model (within-subject: self-vs. average American students) x (between subject: order of presentation) ANOVA was performed to compare participants’ rating of the bias

27 tendency among themselves and others. No order x self-other asymmetry effect was observed across the three biases. Hence, order of presentation was removed from the subsequent data analysis. As predicted, results showed that the difference between the self and others was statistically significant for each individual bias. Specifically, participants rated themselves

(M=5.10) less susceptible to omission neglect than the average American college students

(M=5.82), t (138) = 2.98, p<.005. A similar pattern was obtained on the planning fallacy, t (138)

=3.52, p<.005 and the halo effect, t(138)=2.04, p<.05. The results are presented in Table 1 and

Figure 2.

Further, consistent with our prediction, results of a series of paired t-tests performed on the ratings of the bias assessment on the self-assessment showed that participants believed that they were less susceptible to omission neglect than to the planning fallacy (MONself=5.12 vs.

Mplanningself=5.91, t(138)= 3.80, p< .0001). The effect should not be attributed to the self- enhancement factor because participant did not perceive either one of the biases more negatively than the other( t<1).This pattern of results suggests that compared with the planning fallacy, a bias more available to introspection and learned experience, omission neglect is non-salient and harder to detect.

Supplementary data on the awareness of bias when the self and other people commit these biases revealed that participants acknowledged that they were less aware of omission neglect than the planning fallacy on others (MONself=5.34 vs. Mplanningself=5.80, t(138)= 2.44, p< .01) as well as on themselves (MONother=5.32 vs. Mplanningother=6.10, t(138)= 4.10, p< .001) . This pattern of results confirms our assumption that omissions are less available to introspection than the planning fallacy.

Last, in order to assess the magnitude of self-other asymmetry effect on omission neglect, we inspected the effect size of the bias assessment between the self and others across the three biases. Results showed that the effect size was greater in direction for omission neglect (r=.32) than for the halo effect (r=.17) and the planning fallacy (r=.28). Further, comparisons made on the effect size between omission neglect and the other biases revealed that the effect size for omission neglect tends to be greater for the halo effect, Z=.1.58, p=.06. However, the effect size was not statistically different between omission neglect and the planning fallacy, Z=.56. This pattern of results indicates that the self-other asymmetry obtained on omission neglect tends to be of a greater magnitude than that on the halo effect.

Discussion

In Study 1, we obtained the bias blind spot effect for omission neglect. Participants thought they were less likely to neglect missing information than the average American college student.

Further, we provided the evidence that omission neglect for one self is harder to bring into awareness and detect than the planning fallacy. Last, the effect size of the self-other asymmetry on omission neglect was shown to be greater than that on the halo effect. This provides additional support for our contention that omission neglect is not salient in introspection and theories about bias. The results of the study support H1 and partially support H2.

CHAPTER FIVE

STUDY 2

Overview

Study 2 replicates the self-other asymmetry of bias perception on omission neglect (H1-H2).

Second, the experiment investigates the relationship between the asymmetry and omission neglect (H3). The last goal of this experiment is to investigate the impact of the asymmetry on the likelihood of judgment correction when omissions become salient (H4).

The experiment uses a response latency method originally developed to measure the strength of association between an object and an evaluation (Fazio, Herr, and Powell 1984; see also Kardes, Cronley, & Kim, 2006). Research shows that response latency decreases as the strength of association increases (Fazio, Chen, McDonel and Sherman 1982; Fazio, Lenn, Effrien,

1984). In the experiment, we recorded participants’ response latencies toward a series of brand and attribute pairs with the brand appearing above the attribute. The attribute was either associated with the brand (attribute-present) or dissociated with the brand (attribute-absent). We believe that response latency decreases as sensitivity to the relationship between the attribute and the brand increases. Accordingly, faster (vs. slower) response latencies to the attribute-absent pairs indicate higher (vs. lower) sensitivity to omissions.

Prior to the response latency task, participants were asked to assess bias susceptibility for themselves and others. The procedure was designed to assess the self-other asymmetry for omission neglect. Difference scores between participants’ assessments of their and others’ susceptibility to omission neglect was calculated (Biasaverage-Biasself) and used to analyze the impact of asymmetry on the response latency. Positive score between the two assessments

30 suggests that participants think others are more susceptible to omission neglect; negative scores indicate that the self is believed to be more susceptible than others; zero indicates that no self- other asymmetry exists on the perception of susceptibility to omission neglect.

Prior research shows that sensitivity to omissions increases as the salience of omissions increases (Sanbonmatsu et al., 1991; Kardes et al., 2006). Further, judgment correction is more likely as the salience of omissions increases (Pfeiffer, 2008). Taken together, to determine the relationship between the asymmetry and the likelihood of judgment correction, we varied the number of attribute-absent pairs included in the response latency task. Participants’ evaluation of the target brand was collected prior to and after the task.

We predicted that response latencies would be faster for attribute-present (vs. attribute- absent) pairs. Further, judgment correction to a moderate position should be more likely when four (vs. one) attribute-absent pairs were made salient to participants. We also predicted that response latencies would be slower for the attribute-absent pairs among participants who think that they are less (vs. more or equally) susceptible than others on omission neglect. Last, these participants would be less likely to moderate their initial judgment even after the exposure to four attribute-absent pairs.

Pretest

The purpose of the pretest is to rule out the possibility that the perceived importance of the attributes reduces the interpretation of the response latency data. The pretest also serves to rule out the possibility that the differential favorability of attributes in the attribute-absent pairs influences the result of judgment correction.

Forty-five students from an entry level marketing class participated in the pretest for extra course credit. The pretest involved a questionnaire investigating the perception of the importance

31 of sixteen attributes of a new laptop. Participants were requested to rate the importance of these attributes on scales anchored from 1 (Not important at all) to 7 (Extremely important).

Additionally, on a different page, a value followed each attribute dimension (e.g., Weight: 7 pounds). Participants rated the extent of favorability of these attribute values on scales anchored from 1 (Extremely unfavorable) to 7 (Extremely favorable).

Among the sixteen attributes, five attribute dimensions were selected because results of a series of paired t-tests indicated that these dimensions were perceived to be similarly important

(ts< 1). These attribute dimensions included operation system, return policy, weight, warranty policy, and memory. Further, return policy (30 days) , weight (7 pounds), warranty policy (90 days) and memory (2 GB) were selected as the attributes in the attribute-absent pairs because paired t-tests showed that the values of these attributes were rated equally favorable (ts<1).

Consequently, operations system and its value (Windows 7) served as the presented attribute of the laptop. In order to avoid the possibility that the length of the attribute content varies the response speed, we held the length of each attribute constant by using the first word of the attribute dimension in the response latency task.

Method

Participants and design. 130 participants in a Midwestern university took part in the experiment for class credit in groups of one to two. The participants were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions. A 2 (within-subject: target attribute-present pair vs. target attribute- absent pair) x 2 (between-subject: one target attribute-absent pair vs. four target attribute-absent pairs) mixed design was employed. Details of the manipulations and instructions of this experiment are contained in Appendix B.

Target brand-attribute pairs (target attribute-present pair and target attribute-absent pairs).The target brand was a laptop, Brand X Laptop, described with one attribute (Operation system: Windows 7). Participants were told that the laptop was recently launched by a well- known laptop manufacturer. In the response latency task, brand-attribute pairs appeared in the middle of the screen, with “Brand X Laptop” placed on the top of an attribute. Target attribute- present pair comprised “Brand X Laptop” and the attribute mentioned in the description about the laptop, Operation system: Windows 7. Target attribute-absent pairs included “Brand X

Laptop” and one of the attributes not mentioned in the description about the laptop ( i.e., Return:

30 days; Weight: 7 pounds; Warranty: 90 days; Memory: 2GB).

Filler brand-attribute pairs (filler attribute-present pair and filler attribute-absent pairs).To prevent participants from guessing the true purpose of the study, six filler brand- attribute pairs from the food category were included in the brand-attribute pairs, randomized with the target brand-attribute pairs. Three of the filler brand-attribute pairs included attributes associated with the brand (filler attribute-present pairs) and the remaining three pairs included attributes disassociated with the brand (filler attribute-absent pairs).

Procedure. Participants were told to complete two ostensibly unrelated tasks from different departments on campus. The first task was claimed to be a survey from the psychology department trying to understand the attitudes of undergraduate students enrolled in business programs. Similar to Study 1, participants were asked to make bias assessment on selves, peers in the same college, and average American college students on a set of biases. Counterbalanced in the presentation order, these biases included omission neglect, the truth effect, and the sunk cost fallacy.

Upon the completion of the first task, participants were directed to the second task operated on a 15” Dell laptop equipped with Direct RT and Media Lab software. Information about Brand

X Laptop was described on the computer screen before its evaluation was solicited. Next, participants’ response latencies were assessed on a series of filler and target brand-attribute pairs appearing in the middle of computer screen one pair at a time. To ensure that subjects understood the instructions and to eliminate short-term memory effects, a series of five practice trials involving brand-attribute pairs from familiar brands were used prior to the response latency task.

Last, participants were told to evaluate the laptop again. In the brand-attributes set provided to the participants, half of the participants received one attribute-absent pair and the remaining participants received four attribute-absent pairs about the target brand.

Response latencies. Response latencies were measured (in milliseconds) on the brand- attribute pairs. These pairs included the target brand attribute-present pair, target brand attribute- absent pairs, filler brand attribute-present pair, and filler brand attribute-absent pairs. Filler brand-attributes served as the baseline latency to control for individual differences in response time (Jonides and Mack 1984).

Participants were instructed to press “Z” (labeled “present”) on the keyboard if the attribute was present in the brand or “/” (labeled “absent”) if the attribute was absent from the brand.

Additionally, to increase the signal-to-noise ratio in the response latency data, they were instructed to press the keys as quickly and as accurately as possible, but accuracy was more important than speed (Fazio et al., 1984; Fazio 1990). To control for different response speed across individuals, participants were told to keep their index fingers on the “Z” and “/” keys throughout the task.

Error rate. Error of response was recorded. Responding to the target brand attribute- absent (vs. present) pair by pressing the button labeled “present” (vs. “absent”) indicates error.

Error of response should decrease as the sensitivity to brand-attribute relationship increases

(Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). This measurement serves as an additional indicator the extent of sensitivity to omitted and presented attributes

Judgment correction. Judgment correction was measured by comparing the evaluation made on Brand X Laptop prior to and after the response latency task. In both times, participants were asked to provide their evaluation of the product on a 7-point scale anchored from1

(Extremely unfavorable) to 9 (Extremely favorable). When omissions become salient, moderate judgment (vs. extreme judgment) is expected such that the correction should move toward the lower (vs. higher) end of the scale. No judgment correction is observed when the attitudes remain the same.

Results

Self-other asymmetry. A repeated-measure (within subject factor: self vs. average

American student) ANOVA was performed to compare participants’ rating of the bias tendency among themselves and average American college students (others). The order of presentation was included as a between-subject factor. No order x self-other asymmetry effect was observed across the three biases. Hence, order of presentation was removed from the subsequent data analysis.

As predicted, results yielded the blind spot effect on all three of the biases. Specifically, participants rated themselves (M=5.42) less susceptible to omission neglect than to the average

American college student (M=6.45), F (1, 124) = 96.27, p<.0001. A similar pattern was obtained on the sunk cost fallacy, F (1, 124) =40.81, p<.0001 and the truth effect, F (1,124) =55.63, p<.001.

Further, consistent with our prediction, results of a series of paired t-tests performed on the ratings of the bias assessment on self showed that participants tended to believe that they

35 were less susceptible to omission neglect than to the sunk cost fallacy (MONself=4.76 vs.

Msunkself=5.08, t(129)= 3.80, p=0.098) The same pattern of results was observed on the bias assessment on the truth effect (MONself=4.76 vs. Mtruthself=5.60 , t(129)= 4.79, p< .0001). Taken together, this pattern of the results suggests that omission neglect is harder to detect than the truth effect and the sunk cost fallacy.

Last, to determine the magnitude of the self-other asymmetry on omission neglect, the effect size of the asymmetry was examined. As expected, the effect size of omission neglect

(r=.66) was greater than the sunk cost fallacy (r=.49), Z=1.70, p<.05. However, the effect size for omission neglect was only directionally greater than the truth effect (r=.54), Z=1.2.The pattern of results suggests that the participants more consistently thought that they were less susceptible than others to omission neglect than to the sunk cost fallacy.

Response latencies of target attribute-present and target attribute-absent pair. Response latency data were analyzed to investigate sensitivity toward presented and omitted attributes. To control for the practice effect, response latencies of the first target attribute-absent and attribute- present pair were included in the data analysis. Further, only correct responses were studied

(Fazio, 1990; Kareev & Trope, 2011). Seventy (out of 128) response latencies were retained after screening out the incorrect responses.

A planned comparison between response latencies of target attribute-present pair and attribute-absent pair revealed that, as predicted, response latencies tended to be faster for the target attribute-present pair (M=2069.24) than for the target attribute-absent pair (M=2324.14), F

(1, 70) =3.51, p=.065. This pattern of results indicates that participants were less sensitive to omitted attributes than to presented attributes.

Error rate of target attribute-present and target attribute-absent pair. Additional evidence of low (vs. high) sensitivity to omitted (vs. presented) attributes was obtained by comparing the

36 error rate on the target attribute-present pair and the first-encountered target attribute-absent pair.

Results showed that, consistent with our prediction, error rates on the target attribute-absent pair

(57/128: 44.53%) were significantly higher than on the presented attribute (3/128:2.34%), providing additional evidence for participants’ insensitivity to omissions.

Self-other asymmetry and response latencies. In order to determine the influence of the self-other asymmetry on sensitivity to omissions, we blocked the participants into low or high self-other asymmetry groups. The high asymmetry group comprised participants whose bias assessment indicated that they thought others were more susceptible to omission neglect

(Biasaverage-Biasself>0);the low asymmetry group included participants who believed they themselves to be more susceptible than others and those believed themselves to be equally susceptible than others to omission neglect (Biasaverage-Biasself <=0) . We pooled the data of the latter two groups together. Although the asymmetry in an opposite direction can be a bias itself (Gilovich et al., 2005 ), people who think they are more susceptible than others are more likely to exert more control due to the salience of the benchmark set by other people (Berger,

2011).

A series of planned comparisons was conducted on the response latency data between participants of low and high self-other asymmetry. Response latencies to the filler brand attribute-absent pairs were averaged and were employed as baseline latencies to control for individual difference in response speed. A one-way (asymmetry: high vs. low) ANOVA performed on the response latencies of the filler brand attribute-absent pairs indicated that variances on the asymmetry did not influence this measurement. Further, latencies of the filler brand attributes were significantly related to latencies for the target attribute-absent pair, F(1,

67)=16.6 , p<.0001, suggesting that response latencies of the filler attribute-absent pair meets the requirement for being an appropriate covariate.

Table 2 shows response latencies (in milliseconds) to inquiries about target attribute- present and absent pairs as a function of the self-other asymmetry on omission neglect. Results of the planned comparison revealed that, as predicted, participants with a high self-other asymmetry responded to the attribute-absent pair slower (M=2504.037 vs. 1951.664), t(68)=

2.02, p<.05. Further, for people showing a high self-other asymmetry on omission neglect, response latencies on the target attribute-present pair (M=2131.871) were faster than attribute- absent pair (M=2504.037) ,t (68)=2.02, p=.05. However, the differential sensitivity to presented and omitted information was not found among people of a low asymmetry. Response latencies to target attribute-present pair (M=1967.915) and to the attribute-absent pair (M=1951.664) was not statistically different, t (68) <1.This pattern of the results indicates that the contrast of sensitivity between the attribute-present and attribute absent pair found in the overall analysis was mainly contributed by the participants showing a high self-other asymmetry on omission neglect.

Self-other asymmetry and judgment correction. To determine the likelihood of judgment adjustment as a function of the number of missing attributes and the self-other asymmetry, the difference of the evaluation of Brand X Laptop at time 1 and time 2 was obtained. Results of a

Chi-square test showed that judgment correction to a moderate position was more likely when the self-other asymmetry was low and when four (vs. one) target-brand-omitted-attribute pairs was shown, χ² (1) = 4.57, p < 0.05. However, as predicted, for participants of high a self-other asymmetry, the likelihood of judgment correction did not depend on the salience of omissions. χ²

(1) = 2.38, p<.12. Further, although 26 participants (out of 128) formed more extreme judgment at time 2, the distribution was independent from the self-other asymmetry and from the salience of omissions, χ² (1) <1. The pattern of result suggests that when omissions are sufficiently salient, judgment adjustment is more likely among people with a low (vs. high) self-other asymmetry.

Discussion

Study 2 replicated the self-other asymmetry of bias assessment on omission neglect when it was mixed with two other biases, the sunk cost fallacy and the truth effect. Consistent with our prediction and also with the results of Study 1, participants thought they were less susceptible than others to omission neglect. Participants also thought that omission neglect was less likely than the sunk cost fallacy and the truth effect. Further, results of the effect size of the asymmetry showed that the asymmetry on omission neglect was of a greater magnitude than that on the sunk cost fallacy. Taken together, the pattern of results suggests that omission neglect is hard to detect.

Because of the non-salience of omissions, the self-other asymmetry for omission neglect is of a greater magnitude than biases that are more available to introspection and experiences.

The experiment demonstrated the effects of the self-other asymmetry on sensitivity to omissions using the response latency task. As expected, participants who thought they were less susceptible to omission neglect than other people (the high self-other asymmetry group), responded to cues absent from (vs. present in) the target brand more slowly. By contrast, this pattern of data was not found among those who thought that they were more susceptible than or equally susceptible as other people to omission neglect (the low self-other asymmetry group).

This pattern of results provide support for our hypothesis that high self-other asymmetry leads to lower sensitivity to omissions (H3).

Further, results on the likelihood of making judgment correction when omissions were salient demonstrated a similar pattern. That is, when the salience of omissions was high, by embedding the response latency task with four (vs.one) target attribute-absent pairs, participants of low self-other asymmetry corrected the judgment to a more moderate end. However, salience of omissions did not lead to moderated judgment correction for people exhibiting a high self-

39 other asymmetry. The pattern of results supports our hypothesis that judgment correction is less likely among people exhibiting a high self-other asymmetry even when omissions become salient after initial judgment (H4).

CHAPTER SIX

STUDY 3

Overview

The forgoing studies provide evidence for our hypothesis that higher self-other asymmetry predicts lower sensitivity to omission neglect. Based on this finding, Study 3 was designed to debias omission neglect by reducing the illusory belief regarding one’s own invulnerability to biases relative to others. The experiment was also designed to test the effectiveness of different debiasing techniques varied on the specificity with which they pertained to the bias blind spot and omission neglect. We predicted that the more specific, the more effective the debiasing technique would be (H4).

In this experiment, the debiasing procedure involved having participants read an article from an alleged science journal that described the bias blind spot phenomenon and its consequence in terms of the self-other asymmetry on bias perception. The specificity of the bias blind spot pertaining to omission neglect was varied in the last paragraph of the article. The most specific version of the debiasing strategy (the debias-ON-self condition) explained omission neglect and used a sentence directly pointing to the relationship between the self-other asymmetry and omission neglect. The sentence read. “Although most people, including you, do not notice the insufficiency of information when judgments and decisions are made, you think that you are more capable than others of noticing missing information.”

Three more debiasing conditions were created. Less specific than the debias-ON-self condition was the debias-ON-other condition. This condition featured the last paragraph identical to that in the debias-ON-self condition except that the bias blind spot and omission neglect was

41 described in a third-person term (i.e., “Although most people … they think that they are more capable than others of noticing missing information…”). The second debiasing condition was created to debias omission neglect by debiasing opportunity cost (the debias-OC-other condition).

In this condition, the specificity between the blind spot and omission decreased even more. Prior research (Frederick et al., 2010) shows that having people consider the opportunity cost of making the current purchase (i.e., the options that one forgoes by current purchase) decreases the willingness to purchase and increases the preference for a cheaper option. Because failure to consider the options external to the current option contributes to omission neglect (Griffin, Ross and Dunning, 1990), debiasing the neglect for opportunity cost may also debias omission neglect.

Last, the least specific version (the debias-general condition) featured the absence of the last paragraph, not extending the implication of the bias blind spot phenomenon to omission neglect.

In the control condition (the no-debias-control condition), no debiasing treatment was included. To eliminate the possibility that the self-other bias assessment task itself would increase the baseline sensitivity to omissions, another control condition was included (the no- asymmetry-priming-control condition). In this condition, participants were directly instructed to perform a judgment task designed to test the effectiveness of debiasing.

Taken together, based on the specificity that the bias blind spot was experimentally manipulated to be related to omission neglect, we predicted that the effectiveness of debiasing should follow a descending order as follows: the debias-ON-self condition, the debias-ON-they condition, the debias-OC-neglect-they condition, the debias-general condition, and the two control conditions.

The effectiveness of different debiasing techniques was tested using methods similar to those used in fault-tree research (e.g, Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein, 1978). In these studies, people were asked to list the frequency of the mentioned causes and the unmentioned causes of

42 an outcome. The common findings among all the studies is that people tend to overestimate the frequency of the causes that have (vs. have not) been mentioned. Similar findings have been documented in the marketing domain (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2003). That is, consumers tend to overestimate the importance of presented attributes. Further, overweighting the importance of presented information contributes to overlooking missing information, leading to the formation of extreme judgments held with high confidence. In a representative experiment conducted by

Sanbonmatsu and his colleagues (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2003), half of the participants received one of the three pruned sets of information describing a model of a car (Model A) using three attributes. Half of the participants received the complete set describing Model A using nine attributes. Following this procedure, participants were asked to estimate the weights for all the attributes they received and all the other attributes that they did not, both parts should add up to

100%. The results showed that the weighting of presented attributes was significantly higher in the pruned than in the complete set, suggesting that participants were less sensitive to omitted information when limited information was offered.

Because overweighting presented attributes contributes to insensitivity to omissions, an effective debiasing strategy should reduce the perceived weight of the presented attributes.

Consequently, the weight assigned to omitted attributes should increase as sensitivity to omissions increases. Hence, the more effective the debiasing technique is, the more sensitive people should be to missing information, leading to higher weights they would assign to omitted attributes of a target product.

Further, different levels of need for cognitive closure may influence the effectiveness of the debiasing techniques. People low in need for cognitive closure should more likely assimilate the implication delivered in the debiasing article describing the bias blind spot phenomenon and omission neglect. Hence, they are more likely to be responsive to the debiasing treatment and

43 consequently weigh omitted information more heavily. By contrast, people high in need for cognitive closure are more likely to “seize” and “freeze” upon the accessible concept about the self-other asymmetry and less likely apply the information implicated by the debiasing message.

Hence, the debiasing techniques, however specific it bears on the bias blind spot and omission neglect, may not be effective on people high in need for cognitive closure ( H6).

Method

Participants and design. One hundred and seventy six participants participated in the experiment for extra course credit. After completing the self-other asymmetry priming task identical to Study 2, participants were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions including four debiasing conditions and two control conditions. Details of the manipulations used in Study 3 can be found in Appendix C.

Participants were provided with one of the three sets of pruned information describing a newly launched smart phone using three attributes. The primary dependent variable of interest was the estimated importance of attributes that were not included in the product description.

Manipulations and measures for Study 3 can be found in Appendix C.

Procedure. Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were told that they would be completing multiple studies from different departments on campus. They were told that the studies were combined into a research packet for convenience. The first study was purported to be from the psychology department intended to understand the attitudes of students from

Business College. Similar to Study 2, the study served to activate the self-other asymmetry concept through an asymmetry priming task where all participants reported their own, their peers’ and average American’s susceptibility to a set of biases. The set of biases included the truth effect, the sunk cost fallacy, and omission neglect.

The second study was purported to be from College of Arts and Sciences interested in knowing students’ viewpoints about two recent discoveries in science, one on marine science and the other on cognitive science. The article on cognitive science was where the debiasing treatment was embedded. After reading each article, participants were asked to provide their thoughts in a short paragraph. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four debiasing conditions. Half of the remaining participants did not receive the second study and directly proceeded to the third study (the-debias-control-condition). The other half of the remaining students only received the third study (the no-asymmetry-priming-control condition).

The last study, claimed to understand consumers’ perceptions, was designed to demonstrate the debiasing effect. All participants received one of the three sets of information regarding a smart phone. The descriptions of the smart phone in each set were varied. Three attributes were included in each set and each attribute was preceded by a label of the attribute dimension (e.g., "Battery life"). Participants were then instructed to assess the importance of each presented attribute and the attributes that were not mentioned in percentage. The instruction emphasized that the percentages should sum to 100. Last, participants were instructed to fill out the Need for Cognitive Closure Scale.

Article stimuli. The two articles participants read in the debiasing procedure were purported to be excerpts from journals in two scientific areas, marine biology and cognitive psychology. Participants were told that the articles represent the most recent, major discoveries in these two areas. The content of the first article was downloaded from the internet and pertained to the communications among dolphins

(http://www.physorg.com/news195295780.html). The second article in which the debiasing treatment was included, was adapted from one of Pronin’s articles published in Trends in

Cognitive Science (Pronin, 2007). Titled as “Anyone but Me- the Bias Blind Spot among

Individuals Unawareness, “the article described the bias blind spot phenomenon and explained its origin. . It read as follows: “People frequently perceive themselves as rational, consistent, and unbiased, but they perceive others as irrational, inconsistent, and biased. However, research shows that this perception of self-other difference is a bias itself. In fact, a large body of evidence demonstrates that people are similarly irrational, inconsistent and biased. The reason why the perception of self-other difference occurs and persists is that people recognize the existence, and the impact, of many of the biases that affect human judgment and inference. However, they seem to lack the recognition of the role that these same biases have in shaping their own judgments and inferences Recently, a series of experiments conducted by Emily Pronin, a social psychologist from Princeton University, showed that people tend to recognize (and even overestimate) the operation of bias in human judgment – except when that bias is their own. Indeed, marital partners overestimate the degree to which their spouses will self-servingly take credit for good outcomes (such as resolving relationship conflicts) and deny credit for bad outcomes (such as breaking household items). However, they do not anticipate that they themselves will do the same thing.”

Specificity of the debiasing technique was varied in last paragraph. In the condition where the bias blind spot was described most specifically related to omission neglect (i.e., the-ON-self condition), the paragraph read as follows, “Another good example involves the tendency among people to ignore missing information when limited or weak evidence is provided. Although most people, including you, do not notice the insufficiency of information when judgments and decisions are made, you think that you are more capable than others of noticing missing information.”

In the condition where the bias blind spot was least specific to omission neglect (i.e., the debias-general condition), the last paragraph was not included. Less specific than the debias- omission-neglect-self condition was the debias-ON-they condition, describing the bias blind spot and omission neglect in a third-person term; decreased specificity was found in the debias-OC-

46 they condition, introducing information on the bias blind spot and the opportunity cost neglect in a third-person term. It read as follows, “Another good example involves the tendency among people to neglect the opportunity cost that a salient, present option displaces. For example, when people are given the option to buy a $399, 32 Gigabyte iPodtouch, they rarely consider that buying a 16 Gigabyte one at $299 (which leaves them $100 in cash), is one of the options that they will have to forgo by purchasing the $399 iPod. Although most people do not pay attention to the opportunity cost, they think that they are more capable than others of taking that into account when judgment and decision is made.” “Although most people do not pay attention to the opportunity cost, they think that they are more capable than others of taking that into account when judgment and decision is made”).

Need for Cognitive Closure. Need for Cognitive Closure (NFCC) was measured using a

6-item scale (Kardes et al., 2007). After participants completed all the dependent measures and the 6-item Need for Cognitive Closure Scale, a need for cognitive closure index was created by summing the scores (Alpha=0.83).

Weights of omitted attributes. Weights of omitted attributes were obtained by having participants assign a percentage score representing the importance of each presented attribute as well as all other attributes that were not mentioned (i.e., omitted attributes). Participants were instructed that these percentage scores should total up to 100.

Results

Prior to examining the effectiveness of each debiasing technique, one experimental assumption was verified. We assumed that the asymmetry priming task would not increase the baseline sensitivity to omissions. To verify this assumption, we compared the results between the-debias-control-condition and the no-asymmetry-priming-control condition on the weights participants assigned to omitted attributes. As predicted, no difference was found between these

47 two conditions(t<1). This result indicates that priming the asymmetry did not increase sensitivity to omissions. Based on this result, in the subsequent data analysis, we pooled the data of the two control conditions and turned them into one control condition.

Next, a 5 (debiasing condition) x 2 (NFCC) x 3 (attribute set) analysis of variance performed on the weights of the omitted attributes revealed a main effect for debiasing condition,

F (4, 124) =3.3, p<.05 and a main effect for the need for closure F (1, 124)=4.63, p<.05. As expected, participants assigned higher weights to the omitted attributes in the debias-omission- neglect-self (M=24.28) than in the control condition (M=14.25), t (75) =2.03, p<.05. In addition, participants low (vs. high) in need for closure assigned higher (vs. lower) weights to the omitted attributes, (MhighNFCC=21.37 vs. MlowNFCC=16.35), t (152) =2.15, p<.05. Further, the variations among the attribute set did not have any impact on the dependent variable(p=.22). No other effects were found.

To investigate the predicted debiasing effect qualified by participants’ need for cognitive closure, we first did a median-split on participants’ self-reported need for closure and blocked the participants into high vs. low need for closure conditions. Subsequently, the design was turned into 2 (NFCC) x 5 (debiasing condition) design. Next, we subjected the dependent variable in each condition to a series of planned contrasts, with each debiasing /low NFCC condition assigned a weight of +3, debiasing /high NFCC condition, the control /high NFCC condition and the control/low NFCC condition each a weight of -1. We performed the contrast on the debias-omission-neglect-self condition first. The results revealed that, as predicted, omitted attributes in the debiasing-omission-neglect-self/low NFCC condition (M=29.36) received higher weights than debiasing-omission-neglect-self/high NFCC and the control condition, (M=15.01), t(82)=3.95, p<.01. This pattern of results indicates that debiasing was

48 effective in the condition where the blind spot was more specifically related to omission neglect for participants low in need for closure.

Last, the same contrasts were performed on the remaining debiasing conditions. Results showed that the weights participants assigned to the omitted attributes did not differ between the remaining debiasing conditions and the control condition even for participants of low need for closure(ts<1). This result indicates that debiasing was not effective in the remaining debiasing conditions even for participants with a low need for closure. Means for the dependent measure are shown in Tables 3.

Discussion

In Study 3, we successfully debiased omission neglect by reducing the self-other asymmetry. The reduction of the asymmetry was achieved by educating participants about the bias blind spot. In the debiasing material participants received, we varied the specificity of the bias blind spot information toomission neglect. Results we obtained in the experiment support our prediction that debiasing is more effective among people low in need for closure. Further, we provided evidence that debiasing was most effective when the information about the bias blind spot was specifically related to omission neglect. When debiasing was of high specificity, participants low in need for closure assigned higher weights to omitted attributes.

We found that debiasing was only effective in the condition where the blind spot was most specifically described in terms of omission neglect. This result may indicate that participants were not sensitive to the variations in debiasing as the specificity of the debiasing message was under a threshold. Nonetheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that the small sample size in some of the debiasing / low NFCC conditions may have reduced the statistical power to detect

49 the debiasing effect other than the debias-ON-self/low NFCC condition. Hence, H5 received partial support and H6 was supported.

CHAPTER SEVEN

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Results of three studies provide support the hypothesis that the bias blind spot concerning omission neglect contributes to insensitivity to missing information. To provide evidence for this this contention, we first developed two experiments to verify the relationship between the self- other asymmetry and omission neglect. In Study 1, we demonstrated the bias blind spot effect, as reflected in the self-other asymmetry in bias assessment, on omission neglect. Specifically, we showed that participants rated themselves to be less susceptible to omission neglect than peers in the same college and the average American student on a set of biases including omission neglect.

In Study 2, we replicated this effect, even when the information about omission neglect was mixed with two different biases. Further, using a response latency task, we showed that the relationship between the self-other asymmetry and omission neglect is opposite. The response latency data revealed that participants who thought that they were less (vs. more or equally) susceptible to omission neglect responded to the brand-attribute pair featured by the attribute absent from the target brand more slowly. Based on the findings of the first two studies, in Study

3, we showed that reducing the self-other asymmetry can debias omission neglect by increasing sensitivity to missing information. Further, when the debiasing strategy was varied on the specificity of the bias blind spot to omission neglect, differential levels of effectiveness of debiasing emerged. We found the most and only effective debiasing strategy was the one that most specifically described the relationship between the bias blind spot and omission neglect.

Participants who received this debiasing treatment considered the attributes not mentioned in the product description were more important than the remaining debiasing conditions and the control condition. Last, we qualified the debiasing effect on the individual preference for information

51 processing, need for cognitive closure. We found that participants who were in low need for cognitive closure were more (vs. less) responsive to debiasing

The research contributes to the scattered literature on debiasing by showing that debiasing a behavioral bias can be achieved by correcting the erroneous view about the self relative to others on bias susceptibility. Although debiasing has clear benefits for the society, it is highly difficult (Wilson and Brekke, 1994) and failures to debias are not uncommon (Milkman et al.,

2009). The difficulty underlying debiasing may contribute to the limited growth in the knowledge about debiasing. Findings of the present research suggest that debiasing is impossible when the actor’s awareness of bias is insulated by the bias blind spot, especially when the bias is automatic in nature. These findings are consistent with prior research that developed methods to improve resistance to persuasion (Sagarin, Caldini, Rice & Serna, 2002). Sagarin et al. (2002) found that dispelling the illusory invulnerability by experimentally inducing people to show the vulnerability (demonstrated vulnerability) can greatly enhance the ability to differentiate a legitimate source of persuasion from an illegitimate one. Because demonstrating one’s vulnerability may not be practical across all contexts (Sagarin et al., 2002), the present research shows that the perception of vulnerability can be created by shortening the perceived self-other difference.

The finding in the present research also echoes prior research that identifies the limitedness and inaccuracy of one’s self-knowledge (Wegner, 2002; Wilson, 2009; Wilson and Dunn, 2004).

Wilson (2002; 2009) contends that people are strangers to themselves and they are often led astray about why they behave in a certain way. Research shows that the inaccessibility to the mind’s non-conscious processing inhibits people from accurately explaining their behavior.

Despite the finding, people hold the illusory conviction that their conscious mind can help them to resist unwanted influences (Wegner, 2002). Ironically, the inaccuracy of the self-knowledge

52 stands in sharp contrast to people’s high confidence held about self-knowledge ( Dunning, 2005).

This suggests that overcoming the erroneous self-view is an important and resilient block in debiasing.

Wilson’s recent call of the calling for research on improving self-knowledge (Wilson, 2009) corroborates the importance of debiasing omission neglect. The bias is difficult to detect and avoid. This special nature of omission neglect turns the bias into a case where introspection is least informative when it is most likely employed to assess bias. Further, because omission neglect occurs under awareness, the susceptibility to fall prey to the bias is likely highly similar across individuals. Hence, the self-other asymmetry more likely reflects an error in information processing on omission neglect. It thus can be deduced that debiasing the self-other asymmetry and improving self-knowledge can more appreciably debias omission neglect than other biases that are more salient in one’s introspection or abstract theories.

The implication the present research provides to marketers is two-fold. First, as suggested by the results of Study 2, increasing the self-other asymmetry may decrease sensitivity to omissions about the product. Because the non-salience of omissions suggests that the bias may persist longer than other biases, marketers can efficiently enhance product evaluation, user experience, and customer satisfaction by means of increasing the magnitude of difference one has from others. Further, as the bias persists longer in people in higher need for closure, situational cues that encourage cognitive closure should accentuate the effect of increasing the self-other asymmetry.

In conclusion, the present paper responds to calls for academic endeavors in understanding debiasing. Although debising involves multiple processes, prior research on omission neglect suggests that by merely reminding people the possibility of missing information can improve consumer judgment and decisions making, even when no specific omission is known

(Sanbonmatsu et al., 1997). Therefore, increasing consumers’ awareness of their vulnerability to omission neglect by reducing the bias blind spot should achieve the goal of improving consumer judgment and decision making.

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APPENDIX A

Bias assessment of the self and others for Study 1

DESCRIPTION OF BIASES

(Order Counterbalanced)

Halo Effect

Researchers have claimed that some people show a Halo Effect tendency in many judgments. Halo Effect is a judgment bias whereby one’s overall judgment of another is an extension of a single factor rather than a mix of all relevant factors. That is to say, if an individual does well in one aspect, then this is likely to trigger favorable reports on other aspects. The Halo Effect can undermine an individual’s effort to be objective in making judgments.

Insensitivity toward Omissions

Researchers claim that some people are insensitive to missing information (Insensitivity toward Omissions). That is, when faced with limited information, these people rarely think that any important information is missing. What’s worse, when they are reminded of the possibility of missing information, they can’t tell which information is missing. Biases and regret occur when judgments are made based on limited information. This is especially the case when important information is missing.

Planning Fallacy

Planning Fallacy refers to the tendency among some people to underestimate the amount of time needed for completing a project. Researchers claim that Planning Fallacy is committed because when doing planning, people tend to focus only on the specifics required to fulfill the project while discounting other factors that influence the progression of the project.

SELF-OTHER BIAS ASSESSMENT SCALES

1. To which extent do you believe that you show this effect or tendency? 1……………2…..……….3………..….4………..….5………..….6………..….7………..….8………..….9 Not at all Somewhat Strongly

2. To which extent do you believe that average UC students show this effect or tendency? 1……………2…..……….3………..….4………..….5………..….6………..….7………..….8………..….9 Not at all Somewhat Strongly

3. To which extent do you believe that average American students show this effect or tendency? 1……………2…..……….3………..….4………..….5………..….6………..….7………..….8………..….9 Not at all Somewhat Strongly

4. To which extent do you believe this is a serious bias? 1……………2…..……….3………..….4………..….5………..….6………..….7………..….8………..….9 Not at all Somewhat Strongly

5. How negatively does this tendency reflect on someone showing it? 1……………2…..……….3………..….4………..….5………..….6………..….7………..….8………..….9 Not Negative at all Somewhat Extremely Negative

6. How aware you are when others commit this tendency? 1……………2…..……….3………..….4………..….5………..….6………..….7………..….8………..….9 Not Aware at all Somewhat Strongly Aware

7. How aware you are when you yourself commit this tendency? 1……………2…..……….3………..….4………..….5………..….6………..….7………..….8………..….9 Not Aware at all Somewhat Strongly Aware

APPENDIX B

Manipulations and measurement for Study 2

DESCRIPTION OF BIASES

Truth Effect

Researchers have found that repeating a statement increases people’s belief about the truthfulness of the statement. That is, given the same statement, people tend to consider the statement to be truer when they hear it multiple times (vs. just once). This so-called “truth effect” have been consistently found across different situations. The effect is robust even when the statement is entirely false.

Insensitivity to Omissions

Researchers claim that some people are insensitive to missing information (insensitivity to omissions). That is, when faced with limited information, these people rarely think that any important information is missing. What’s worse, when they are reminded of the possibility of missing information, they can’t tell which information is missing. Biases and regret occur when judgments are made based on limited information. This is especially the case when important information is missing.

Sunk Cost Fallacy

Research shows that people become less willing to abandon a project even when they would be better off doing so. However, decisions regarding whether a project or investment will be continued or not should be irrelevant to the cost that has occurred because whatever has been invested is a loss regardless. Committing the sunk cost fallacy can lead to poor financial investment decisions and poor personal decisions as well.

SELF-OTHER BIAS ASSESSMENT SCALES

5. How negatively does this tendancy reflect on someone showing it? 1……………2…..……….3………..….4………..….5………..….6………..….7………..….8………..….9 Not Negative at all Somewhat Extremely Negative

LAPTOP DESCRITIPON AND BRAND-ATTRIBUTE PAIRS

Laptop described with one attribute

Target brand attribute-present pair

Target brand attribute-absent pair

Filler brand attribute-present pair

Target attribute-present pair

Brand X Laptop---Operation system: Windows 7

Target attribute-absent pairs

Brand X Laptop---Memory: 2 GB

Brand X Laptop---Return: 30 days

Brand X Laptop---Warranty: 90 days

Brand X Laptop—Weight: 7 pounds

Filler attribute-present pair

Skyline chili---3-way chili

McDonald’s---Big mac

Pizza hut—Double topping pizza

Filler attribute-absent pair

Dunkin Donuts---Bottled Frappuccino

Starbucks---Chick-fil-A Nuggets

White Castle-Chicken tacos

APPENDIX C

Debiasing manipulations and measurement for debiasing effects in Study 3

DESCRIPTIONS OF BIASES

Descriptions of biases remain the same in this experiment as in Study 2

SELF-OTHER BIAS ASSESSMENT SCALES

The self-other bias assessment scales remain the same in this experiment as in Study 2

DEBIASING MANIPULATIONS

Cover Story

Next, College of Arts and Sciences is interested in knowing UC students’ viewpoints about two recent discoveries in science. The articles you read next are excerpts from top journals in two scientific areas, marine biology and cognitive psychology. The articles represent the most recent, major discoveries in these two areas. Please read carefully and then provide your thoughts in a short paragraph (50- 70 words). Please proceed to the next section when you fulfill this task.

DEBIASING MANIPULATIONS

Filler Article

Dolphins Use Diplomacy in Their Communication David Stephen Department of Marine Biology Yale University

Spanish researcher and a Paraguayan scientist have presented the most complete and detailed European study into the repertoire of sounds used by bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) to communicate. The study reveals the complexity and our lack of understanding about the communication of these marine mammals.

Until now, the scientific community had thought that whistles were the main sounds made by these mammals, and were unaware of the importance and use of burst-pulsed sounds. Researchers from the Bottlenose Dolphin Research Institute (BDRI), based in Sardinia (Italy) have now shown that these sounds are vital to the animals' social life and mirror their behavior.

"Burst-pulsed sounds are used in the life of bottlenose dolphins to socialize and maintain their position in the social hierarchy in order to prevent physical conflict, and this also represents a significant energy saving," Bruno Díaz, lead author of the study and a researcher at the BDRI, which he also manages, said.

The study, published by the publishing house Nova Science Publishers in the book Dolphins: Anatomy, Behaviour and Threats, presents the most complete repertoire ever of these burst-pulsed sounds and whistles, gathered using bioacoustics since 2005 in the waters off Sardinia (Italy).

According to the experts, the tonal whistle sounds (the most melodious ones) allow dolphins to stay in contact with each other (above all mothers and offspring), and to coordinate hunting strategies. The burst-pulsed sounds (which are more complex and varied than the whistles) are used "to avoid physical aggression in situations of high excitement, such as when they are competing for the same piece of food, for example," explains Díaz.

Sounds that mark out hierarchies

According to Díaz, bottlenose dolphins make longer burst-pulsed sounds when they are hunting and at times of high aggression: "These are what can be heard best and over the longest period of time," and make it possible for each individual to maintain its position in the hierarchy.

The dolphins emit these strident sounds when in the presence of other individuals moving towards the same prey. The "least dominant" one soon moves away in order to avoid confrontation. "The surprising thing about these sounds is that they have a high level of uni- directionality, unlike human sounds. One dolphin can send a sound to another that it sees as a competitor, and this one clearly knows it is being addressed," explains the Spanish scientist.

7878

DEBIASING MANIPULATION

Debiasing Articles Anyone but Me - the Bias Blind Spot among Individuals

William R. Cameron Psychology Department Iowa State University People frequently perceive themselves as rational, consistent, and unbiased, but they perceive others as irrational, inconsistent, and biased. However, research shows that this perception of self-other difference is a bias itself. In fact, a large body of evidence demonstrates that people are similarly irrational, inconsistent and biased. The reason why the perception of self-other difference occurs and persists is that people recognize the existence, and the impact, of many of the biases that affect human judgment and inference. However, they seem to lack recognition of the role that these same biases have in shaping their own judgments and inferences Recently, a series of experiments conducted by Emily Pronin, a social psychologist from Princeton University, showed that people tend to recognize (and even overestimate) the operation of bias in human judgment – except when that bias is their own. Indeed, marital partners overestimate the degree to which their spouses will self-servingly take credit for good outcomes (such as resolving relationship conflicts) and deny credit for bad outcomes (such as breaking household items). However, they do not anticipate that they themselves will do the same thing.

THE LAST PARAGRAPH

(Where the debiasing conditions was varied)

Debias-general condition: absence of the last paragraph

Debias-opportunity-cost-omission-neglect-they condition: Another good example involves the tendency among people to neglect the opportunity cost that a salient, present option displaces. For example, when people are given the option to buy a $399, 32 Gigabyte iPodtouch, they rarely consider that buying a 16 Gigabyte one at $299 (which leaves them $100 in cash), is one of the options that they will have to forgo by purchasing the $399 iPod. Although most people do not pay attention to the opportunity cost, they think that they are more capable than others of taking that into account when judgment and decision is made.

Debias-omission-neglect-they condition: Another good example involves the tendency among people to ignore missing information when limited or weak evidence is provided. Although most people do not notice the insufficiency of information when judgment and decision is made, they think that they are more capable than others of noticing missing information.

Debiasing-omission-neglect-self condition: Another good example involves the tendency among people to ignore missing information when limited or weak evidence is provided. Although most people, including you, do not notice the insufficiency of information when judgment and decision is made, you think that you are more capable than others of noticing missing information.

MEASUREMENT FOR SENSITIVITY TO OMISSIONS

Set One

Please Read Before Proceeding

Imagine that you are shopping for a smartphone. Information presented below about a smartphone from a major international company followed by questions about your opinions concerning this phone. We would like you to think about the questions and give the best answer that you can.

Please read the description provided below carefully. Because this is a new offer of this company, we are not allowed to reveal the brand name of the smartphone.

Therefore, we refer to it as Brand X. However, it is a smartphone from a well known and respected manufacturer.

Brand X Smartphone

Technology: CDMA ( 3G enabled)

Memory: 32 GB Battery Life: Up to 6 hours

Please read the following instructions carefully:

Features are weighted differently in the evaluation of a smartphone. Some

features are of greater importance, whereas others are of less importance.

Please assess the importance of each feature of Brand X Smartphone using a

percentage scale, where a high percentage indicates that a feature is important in your

overall evaluation and a low percentage indicates that the feature is not as important in

forming your overall evaluation. In addition, please assess the importance of features

that are not mentioned. Using the “all other attributes” category, please indicate the

extent to which attributes that are not listed are important to your overall assessment of

a smartphone. The sum of the all percentages must total 100%.

Please do not consider the price in your assessment of percentage importance.

Although price is very important for everyone, we are interested only in the evaluation of

the mentioned attributes whose importance might be different for each individual.

______100% All Other Technology Memory Battery Life Total Attributes

MEASUREMENT FOR SENSITIVITY TO OMISSIONS

Set Two Please Read Before Proceeding

Please read the description provided below carefully. Because this is a new offer of this company, we are not allowed to reveal the brand name of the smartphone. Therefore, we refer to it as Brand X. However, it is a smartphone from a well-known and respected manufacturer.

Brand X Smartphone

Operating System: Microsoft Windows Mobile 6.0 Professional Edition Built-in Camera: 5-megapixel camera Screen Size: 3.5-Inch

Please read the following instructions carefully:

Features are weighted differently in the evaluation of a smartphone. Some features are of

greater importance, whereas others are of less importance.

Please assess the importance of each feature of Brand X Smartphone using a percentage

scale, where a high percentage indicates that a feature is important in your overall evaluation and

a low percentage indicates that the feature is not as important in forming your overall evaluation.

In addition, please assess the importance of features that are not mentioned. Using the “all other

attributes” category, please indicate the extent to which attributes that are not listed are important

to your overall assessment of a smartphone. The sum of the all percentages must total 100%.

Please do not consider the price in your assessment of percentage importance. Although

price is very important for everyone, we are interested only in the evaluation of the mentioned

attributes whose importance might be different for each individual.

______100% Operating Built-in Screen All Other Total System Camera Size Attributes

MEASUREMENT FOR SENSITIVITY TO OMISSIONS

Set Three

Please Read Before Proceeding

Brand X Smartphone

Wireless Interface: Wi-FI IEEE 802.11 b/g Bluetooth 2.1 EDR

Provider: Unlocked GPS: Integrated GPS

Please read the following instructions carefully:

Features are weighted differently in the evaluation of a smartphone. Some features are of greater importance, whereas others are of less importance.

Please assess the importance of each feature of Brand X Smartphone using a percentage scale, where a high percentage indicates that a feature is important in your overall evaluation and a low percentage indicates that the feature is not as important in forming your overall evaluation.

In addition, please assess the importance of features that are not mentioned. Using the “all other attributes” category, please indicate the extent to which attributes that are not listed are important to your overall assessment of a smartphone. The sum of the all percentages must total 100%.

Please do not consider the price in your assessment of percentage importance. Although price is very important for everyone, we are interested only in the evaluation of the mentioned attributes whose importance might be different for each individual.

______100% Wireless All Other Provider GPS Total Interface Attributes

THE NEED FOR COGNITIVE CLOSURE SCALE

(6-item)

Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each according to your beliefs and experiences. Please respond according to the following scale.

____ 1. I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament.

____ 2. I don’t like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions.

____ 3. I find that establishing a consistent routing enables me to enjoy life more.

____ 4. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.

____ 5. I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place.

____ 6. I dislike unpredictable situations.

1 = Strongly Disagree 4 = Slightly Agree

2 = Moderately Disagree 5 = Moderately Agree

3 = Slightly Disagree 6 = Strongly Agree

FIGURE 2

STUDY 1

Bias Assessment between the Self and Others (9-point scale)

6.48 6.5

5.97 5.91 6 5.82 5.64

5.5

5.12 5

4.5

4 Onself Onothers Haloself Haloothers Planself Planothers

FIGURE 3

STUDY 1

Bias Assessment Composite Score (9-point scale)

18.5

17.5

17 18.25 17.96 16.5

16 16.67

15.5 Biasself Biaspeer Biasaverage

FIGURE 4

STUDY 2

Bias Assessment between the Self and Others (9-point scale)

6.5

5.5

4.5

4 Onself Onothers Truthself Truthothers Sunkself Sunkothers

TABLE 1

STUDY 2

MEAN RESPONSE LATANCIES (MSECS.) AS A FUNCTION OF SELF-OTHER AYMMMETRY, AND THE PRESENCE (VS. ABSENCE) OF AN ATTRIBUTE IN THE BRAND-ATTRIBUTE PAIRS

Attribute-present pair Attribute-absent pair Overall Mean Low Asymmetry 1967.915 1951.664 1959.79 (n=23) (n=23) (n=47)

High Asymmetry 2131.871 2504.037 2317.954 (n=47) (n=47) (n=47)

Overall Mean 2049.893 2227.85 2138.872 (n=70) (n=70) (n=70)

Covariates appearing in the analysis are evaluated at the following values: fillerabsent=1771.529

FIGURE 5

STUDY 2

MEAN RESPONSE LATANCIES (MSECS.) AS A FUNCTION OF SELF-OTHER AYMMMETRY, AND THE PRESENCE (VS. ABSENCE) OF AN ATTRIBUTE IN THE BRAND-ATTRIBUTE PAIRS

2600

2500 2504.037

2400

2300

2200 Low Asymmetry 2131.871 High Asymmetry 2100

2000 1951.664 1900 1967.915

1800 Attribute-present pair Attribute-absent pair

FIGURE 6

STUDY 2

THE LIKELIHOOD OF JUDGMENT CORRECTION TO A MODERATE END AS A FUNCTION OF THE SELF-OTHER ASYMMETRY AND THE NUMBER OF ATTTRIBUTE-ABSENT PAIRS

25 23 22

20 17

15 Judgment correction to a moderate position 10 8 No judgment correction 5

0 One attribute-absent Four attribute-absent pair pairs

High Self-other Asymmetry

14 12 12 10 10

8 Judgment correction to a 6 6 moderate position 4 No judgment correction 4 2 0 One attribute-absent pair Four attribute-absent pairs

Low Self-other Asymmetry

TABLE 2

STUDY 3

MEAN RATINGS FOR THE WEIGHTS OF THE MISSING ATTRIBUTES AS A FUNCTION OF DEBIASING CONDITIONS AND NEED FOR COGNITIVE CLOSURE

Debiasing Conditions NFCCHL Mean N SD

Debias-ON-self Low 29.36 14 19.82

High 17.33 15 11.93

Total 23.14 29 17.06

Debias-ON-they Low 20.71 7 8.86

High 18.77 13 14.57

Total 19.45 20 12.64

Debias-OC-they Low 21.2 15 14.93

High 14.5 10 7.98

Total 18.52 25 12.85

Debias-general Low 20.00 7 9.13

High 17.38 16 9.80

Total 18.17 23 9.48

Control Low 14.65 34 10.83

High 14.04 23 7.73

Total 14.40 57 9.62

Total Low 19.64 77 14.18

High 16.23 77 10.34

Total 17.94 154 12.49

FIGURE 7

STUDY 3

MEAN RATINGS FOR THE WEIGHTS OF THE MISSING ATTRIBUTES AS A FUNCTION OF DEBIASING CONDITIONS AND NEED FOR COGNITIVE CLOSURE

35.00

30.00

25.00

Low NFCC 20.00 High NFCC

15.00

10.00 Debias ON Debias ON Debias OC Debias Control (self) (other) (other) (general)