The Role of Deal‐Level Compensation in Leveraged Buyout Performance Sven Fürth1 | Christian Rauch2| Marc Umber3 September 2013 Abstract This paper analyzes the influence of deal‐level compensation structures for buyout fund managers on the performance of Leveraged Buyouts. We use a unique and hand‐collected data set of 93 LBO deals in the United States over the period 1999‐2008 for which we can distinguish between different fund‐ and deal‐level compensation components that fund managers receive. Our results show that higher deal‐level compensation is negatively related to deal‐level performance. A one percent increase in the fees‐to‐proceeds ratio lowers the return to LPs by 127 percentage points. We also document that the occurrence of deal‐level fees does not depend on the structure of the fund‐level compensation structures, but instead on the profitability of the LBO target company and the historic performance of the buyout firm. These results are robust to changing market environments, characteristics of the LBO and restructuring activities in the target company, terms of the partnership agreements between investors and fund managers, fund structure and –profitability and different performance measures. JEL classification: G23, G24, G34, G12, G15 Keywords: Private Equity, IPO, Insider Trading, Buyout 1 Goethe University Frankfurt, Finance Department, House of Finance, Grueneburgplatz 1, 60323 Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Phone: +49‐(0)69‐798‐33727. E‐mail:
[email protected]‐frankfurt.de. 2 (Corresponding Author) Goethe University Frankfurt, Finance Department, House of Finance, Grueneburgplatz 1, 60323 Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Phone: +49‐(0)69‐798‐33731. E‐mail
[email protected].