Reality Monitoring and Autobiographical Memory: Negotiating the Self Carlos Montemayor

Montemayor C. Archives of Psychology, vol. 2, issue 10, October 2018 Page 1 of 19

REVIEW ARTICLE

Author’s affiliation: San Francisco State University

* Corresponding address: E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract The contemporary study of memory has greatly benefited from recent findings in neuroscience and psychology showing that memory is a highly flexible, contextualized and yet, reliable enough system, composed of different types of functions that contribute to the formation of a personal perspective that balances accuracy and personal relevance. How exactly is this balance achieved and what is the contribution of society, language and culture in its development? Although this paper discusses some of the recent findings on memory, its main focus is on evaluating them within a larger perspective. Memory has been a central issue in the humanities, literature, and the history of psychology. The dynamics of inner speech and narrative, analyzed from a theoretical and historical point of view, provide key insights for the interpretation of contemporary findings in the light of previous theories of memory, consciousness, and the influence of language on both. Collective memory, different forms of memory-monitoring, and the interaction between episodic and autobiographical memory are discussed. The main proposal of the paper is that episodic memory plays an intermediary role between collective and autobiographical memory. Previous views on memory suppression and intrusion are analyzed in the context of such intermediation.

Keywords: Collective Memory, Depersonalization, Autobiographical Memory, Inner Speech, Narrative

Introduction tiplicity of narratives and groups. Some of the collective controls on memory are now There is a conflict, intensified in modern automated, global, industrialized, and large- societies, between individual or private ly dependent on commercial interests. Oth- memory evaluation, and collective or public ers are ancient, dependent on religious tra- forms of memory control. There is, ob- dition, resistant to change, and powerfully viously, a lot in between. The individual is engrained in the still diverse forms of life of not ―by herself‖ and the collective is not millions of people. This conflict between monolithic—they are both nested in a mul- traditional forms of collective memory con-

Copyright © 2018, Archives of Psychology. All rights reserved. http://www.archivesofpsychology.org Montemayor C. Archives of Psychology, vol. 2, issue 10, October 2018 Page 2 of 19 trol and new forms of corporatized memory How to resolve the tension between the will become more exacerbated with our private and the public in memory? This increased reliance on technology and artifi- question has two answers. Empirically, the cial intelligence. answer will depend on what exactly is the mechanism for memory re-consolidation Other areas of conflict regarding memory and re-contextualization in the brain, and control concern the clash between govern- how this mechanism explains the negotia- mental forms of memory regulation and the tion between reality monitoring and person- resistance or memory activism of civil so- al meaning (see for instance Nadel, et al., ciety (e.g., the promotion of certain national 2000; Lane, et al., 2015). A variety of tra- narratives that are incompatible with histor- deoffs must be satisfied in order to achieve ical facts; the imposition of certain memo- a stable balance between reliability and ries at the cost of other memories, which personal value (Montemayor, 2015, 2016, are more important to unprivileged groups; 2018a). Theoretically, the answer depends the control over memory-evaluation and on how this conflict is resolved in a human generational legacy). Here the conflict is being’s conscious awareness. It is to this between the State’s bureaucratic power and latter question that I devote my attention. civil society groups that have alternative ways to recount and explain the past. In The question of how this tension is resolved between, here as well, there is a lot of in conscious awareness must be addressed nuance, including the valuable contribution with a careful examination of two topics, of memory activists between States and which are rarely investigated in relation to individual groups (see Wüstenberg, 2017). one another. One of them is the difference between autobiographical memory and epi- These are important issues that bear on our sodic memory. A proposal that helps solve current political realities, and they present the tension between the collective and the unprecedented challenges for the study of personal aspects of memory is that autobio- collective memory and its influence on the graphical memory is necessarily conscious psychology of individuals. I shall focus on and that it constantly solves the problem of an issue that is more germane to psycholo- which memories are personally valuable; by gy and neuroscience, and which is going to contrast, episodic memory, with its tempo- be crucial for future debates on these topics, rally framed introspective function, verifies namely, the way in which the re- the collective and reliable aspects of memo- contextualization of episodic and autobio- ry (Montemayor, 2017, 2018a). This dis- graphical memories balances two types of tinction is explained in the following sec- memory-monitoring: collective and private. tions, with a special emphasis on the role of The proposal defended here is that we mon- narrative and inner speech.1 itor ―what is real‖ in our memories through episodic memory, in highly complex ways, The other topic is depersonalization. For the described below, and that besides this, we present purposes this term can be defined monitor ―what is valuable for us‖, through quite generally, as a feeling of personal autobiographical memory. It is because of alienation or unreality (Radovic and Radov- the impact of autobiographical memories on ic, 2002). The advantage of this general the process of re-contextualizing memory that the overall monitoring of what is real in 1 For the importance of inner speech in cogni- memory becomes intertwined with the per- tive development see Vygotsky (2012); for a sonal significance of memory—we always recent theoretical assessment of the extent reminisce in a place that is somewhere in and nature of inner speech see Hurlburt between the personal and the collective. (2006).

Copyright © 2018, Archives of Psychology. All rights reserved. http://www.archivesofpsychology.org Montemayor C. Archives of Psychology, vol. 2, issue 10, October 2018 Page 3 of 19 definition is that it allows for different of time (e.g., duration, time order and si- forms of depersonalization, regardless of multaneity) are integrated into an empathi- whether they are considered normal or pa- cally and viscerally relevant unity of con- thological. Some forms of depersonaliza- scious awareness, rather than a merely me- tion may actually play an active and posi- trically structured sequence of events (Mon- tive role in the balance between individual temayor, 2017). and collective memory. Depersonalization in this sense, means that the process Although it is not entirely uncontroversial, through which we ―internalize‖ a memory a similar distinction is justified with respect might depend partly on changes concerning to the memory system. According to this feelings underlying how a memory turns account, conscious memory is narratively from a ―neutral‖ event that simply occurred structured, and corresponds to autobio- to one that acquires enormous personal sig- graphical memory. Episodic and semantic nificance, and vice versa. memory give us conscious access to information, and they are components of the I first address the difference between epi- memory system with specific epistemic sodic and autobiographical memory, em- functions. In particular, the trace integration phasizing the narrative and evaluative role in those systems, based on the structure of of autobiographical memory reconsolida- external events and propositional contents, tion in achieving a balance between two differs from autobiographical memory sources of control for memory-monitoring (Montemayor and Haladjian, 2015; Mon- (personal and collective). I then examine temayor, 2018a). the topic of depersonalization in memory, and explore the relation between these two More important for the present purposes, topics, namely autobiographical memory the memory system needs to satisfy tra- and depersonalization, in the context of deoffs concerning accuracy, detail and flex- more general difficulties concerning con- ibility, but for autobiographical memory, sciousness, collective memory, and the me- the most important tradeoff is between per- chanisms of suppression and intrusion. sonal value and strict accuracy. The memory system must be reliable enough for the purposes of communication and testimony, Autobiographical and Collective Memo- but also insightful enough for an individual ries and her personal context, in order for her to value these memories as something that We share with many other species the basic really matters to her. This tradeoff involves mechanisms for recollection. For instance, the function of memory-monitoring at the the circadian clock system for time-keeping personal level. The capacity to justify be- is fundamental for most forms of life, and it liefs about the past, however, does not con- constrains the way in which we perceive cern monitoring the personal value of time, remember the past, and plan for the memories. The fundamental constraint on future. The interval clock system is used by episodic memory is that the control for its a wide variety of species, including hu- accuracy is publically determined, and it is mans. These are mechanisms that play a the basis for collective coordination and significant role in episodic memory, deci- testimony (Mahr and Csibra, 2017). sion-making, motor control, and mental representation (Montemayor, 2010, 2013). Reality monitoring (the reliable process We keep track of time in many automatic through which the veridicality of a memory and unconscious ways, but our awareness is determined) is a critical function of epi- of time differs because the metric features sodic memory. Episodic memory is ―auto-

Copyright © 2018, Archives of Psychology. All rights reserved. http://www.archivesofpsychology.org Montemayor C. Archives of Psychology, vol. 2, issue 10, October 2018 Page 4 of 19 noetic‖ because it informs us about events personal value. But it does so in personal that occurred to us in the past, but it cannot and collective ways, which involve types of fully inform us about which memories are memory depersonalization, as described in ranked as the most important for us, in the subsequent sections. terms of personal value. Mahr and Csibra (2017) have explained and documented Suppose the distinction between episodic extensively how the episodic memory sys- and autobiographical memory is accepted, tem affords a specific type of epistemic and that its role in memory formation and attitude towards the simulation of an event, reconsolidation is verified. What is the role which provides knowledge of such an event of collective memory in the interaction be- and an indexed representation that such an tween episodic and autobiographical memo- event occurred to us. On this account, epi- ry? Collective memory, as Maurice Halb- sodic memory is a source of epistemic justi- wachs (1992) explained, is multiply layered fication, which serves to justify beliefs; it (e.g., it involves memories of our family, also plays the essential role of providing a religious group, culture, and social class). personal type of reality monitoring, which Our membership to groups, which has be- is based on information that we collectively come more complex with the advancement share with others. Autobiographical memo- of intricately connected modern societies as ry, on a different account in which it is not well as rapid means of communication, has reducible to the functions of the episodic a powerful impact on our memories, includ- memory system (Montemayor, 2018a), ing our personal narratives. Here, collective must strike a balance between strict reality narratives frame what we value and in turn, monitoring and the internal monitoring of our personal narratives become adjusted to what we value about our memories, in the values of the groups we are members of. terms of a personal narrative. This is a per- However, the most basic role of collective sonal tradeoff that might best be understood memory cannot be merely one in which we in terms of the dissociation between con- learn how to value certain events as parts of sciousness and attention (Montemayor and our personal narrative (this ultimately de- Haladjian, 2015). pends on the personal and private autobio- These aspects of memory-monitoring, con- graphical function of memory, which is not strained by veridicality and personal value, dependent on collective forms of memory present the possibility that episodic memory control). Rather, as Halbwachs emphasized serves as the ―intermediary‖ between indi- in his important book, the central role of vidual and collective memory functions. collective memory is to monitor the veraci- Accordingly, the most truly private aspect ty of events that constitute the collective of our memories can only be determined by past. From families to entire nations, collec- the narrative function of autobiographical tive memories are systematically and even memory. The personal value of memories bureaucratically consolidated, repeated does not entirely depend on accuracy (for through rituals and public events, and con- instance, we value dreams because of their firmed through this ritualization and official personal insightfulness, even though the repetition. They are also interpreted, ac- events in a dream are not real, and are iden- cording to historical, sociological and anth- tified as such by the reality-monitoring ropological principles. This collaborative function—the work of Freud on this topic is effort concerning the collective reliability discussed below). Thus, the risks of confa- of memory involves a transactive memory bulation, if the narrative function is ―left processes, a term introduced by Daniel alone,‖ are significant. Human memory Wegner (1987). The collective memory of strikes a fine balance between accuracy and groups and organizations is characterized

Copyright © 2018, Archives of Psychology. All rights reserved. http://www.archivesofpsychology.org Montemayor C. Archives of Psychology, vol. 2, issue 10, October 2018 Page 5 of 19 by this transactive and collective type of accuracy and narrative value (Montemayor, reality monitoring, from the small scale of 2015, 2016; Montemayor and Haladjian, families to the large scale of institutions and 2015). This analysis must include the func- States. tions of collective and personal memory- monitoring. In particular, reality monitoring Because of its essentially epistemic func- of a collective kind may be experienced by tions, the episodic memory system is ideal- the subject as an alien authority on the per- ly poised to function as the intermediary sonal monitoring function of memory, between autobiographical memory and var- which can suppress memories or intrude in ious forms of collective memory. By serv- the processing of a personal and private ing as a source of justification for beliefs memory, as explained in more detail below. about the past, and as the basis for epistem- Suppression or intrusion of this kind may ic authority concerning what happened to us have a powerful and potentially damaging in relation to verifiable events we share effect on the autobiographical function of with others, episodic memory is a funda- memory and yet, they are indispensable for mental ingredient in collective testimony, collectively keeping track of accurate in- and it is crucial to create the fabric of trust formation about the past. that institutions and groups depend on. At large scales, it is this kind of trust that The psychologist Julian Jaynes (1976/2000) enables successful and reliable communica- proposed a controversial view of con- tion. sciousness, which I do not endorse, and which is understandably unpopular in con- Collective memory constitutes a historical sciousness studies. It is unfortunate, how- type of reality monitoring about events that ever, that Jaynes is narrowly interpreted as are important because of the groups we a scholar of consciousness (particularly, belong to. This is genuine ―reality monitor- what philosophers call ―phenomenal con- ing,‖ as defined by Johnson and Raye sciousness‖ or the subjective character of (1981) and Johnson (1991): the vigilance experience that gives it its unique phenom- and maintenance of reliable information enology) because Jaynes provided very concerning the causal origin of the content important insights concerning the unique- of memories. Two types of monitoring are ness of human memory.2 He was especially at work in the mediation of episodic memo- interested in the experience of alienation ry between collective and autobiographical memory. On the one hand, we value collective memories because of reliable communication, and also because of how we share 2 There are many other problems with Jaynes’ them with the groups we belong to, which theory, besides its implausible account of partially determine our place in these consciousness. Perhaps the biggest scientific groups and how we are perceived in socie- difficulty with his theory is its incompatibility ty. On the other hand, we most fundamen- with what we know about the evolution of the tally cherish memories that we find perso- human brain and what he says about bicame- nally valuable, because of their autobio- ralism. I shall not delve into these difficulties graphical individuality—they define who here, which would just distract from the me- we are at a personal level. rits of Jaynes’ view with respect to the issue of memory. To be completely clear: I do not These unique aspects of human memory endorse Jaynes’ account of phenomenal con- pull in opposite directions and this constant sciousness; however, I believe Jaynes made tension justifies an analysis of human important contributions to the topic of collec- memory in terms of tradeoffs concerning tive memory, particularly with respect to the issue of depersonalization in memory.

Copyright © 2018, Archives of Psychology. All rights reserved. http://www.archivesofpsychology.org Montemayor C. Archives of Psychology, vol. 2, issue 10, October 2018 Page 6 of 19 that comes with collective forms of memo- the uniquely personal and the vastly collec- ry-monitoring, suppression, and intrusion. tive. In particular, Jaynes emphasized how once Jaynes described the lack of conscious memories became less depersonalized in memory capacities as follows: ―Ancient the evolution of human psychology, they man did not live in a frame of past happen- opened possibilities that transformed the ings and future possibilities as we do. He way we think about the world and our- had no notion of a lifetime stretching be- selves. According to him, for most of our tween birth and death as we do […] man- evolution, we probably had no genuinely kind learned on the basis of linguistic meta- personal or autobiographical recollections, phor a new kind of mentality, conscious- and operated in a largely depersonalized ness.‖ (Jaynes, 2012, 199-120). The new fashion, in the sense that even though recol- human mentality, according to Jaynes ―con- lections were framed by collective narra- sciousness,‖ is described here as the result tives and accurate information, they were of new memory capacities, which involve not framed in terms of a meaningful per- our personal lifetimes and the openness of sonal narrative—we simply responded to the collective past and future. recollections. Interestingly, Jaynes (2000) proposed that we experienced collective It is interesting that this new type of con- and historically determined memories in scious memory is also described in terms of terms of a paradoxical kind of inner speech the capacities for language and metaphor. that was, in spite of being internally pro- This is, as I shall now argue, Jaynes’ deep- duced, experienced as alien or external to est insight. On the one hand, language al- us. He gives examples of divinities talking lows for reliable communication, assertion, to people, with abundant sources from lite- and epistemic authority based on know- rature, as illustrations of this phenomenon. ledge of the past, in relation to the future. The accuracy or inaccuracy of what was These are the reality monitoring functions simply given to us in our minds was not the of episodic memory. On the other hand, result of collective reality monitoring. We metaphor and language, in the form of ge- were merely following these messages al- nuine inner speech, provided the possibility most automatically, tagging events in terms of generating a meaningful narrative in of a succession that was commanded by which a person lives through vivid and im- external sources. Jaynes associates this de- portant memories that are richly relevant to personalized type of memory with uncons- her alone. This is the narrative function of ciousness. autobiographical memory. The transaction between collective forms of memory and Jaynes thought that once we overcame this this personal function of autobiographical situation, a complex combination of much memory depends on the mediation of epi- more personal memories—now genuinely sodic memory, as an epistemic control for personal memories associated with authen- the accuracy of the narrative function. tic inner speech—and genuinely collective ones that we reliably shared with others, radically modified all of our cognitive func- Language, Memory and Depersonaliza- tions, putting some of them under tremend- tion ous stress and at the same time, optimizing As mentioned, formats for temporally new ways of planning and thinking. This is, representing time in episodic memory ex- according to Jaynes, a staple of human con- ploit old systems, such as the circadian and scious memory, namely the tension between interval clocks, which have non-linguistic

Copyright © 2018, Archives of Psychology. All rights reserved. http://www.archivesofpsychology.org Montemayor C. Archives of Psychology, vol. 2, issue 10, October 2018 Page 7 of 19 and metrically based formats of representa- changed dramatically (Jaynes, 2012, tion (Montemayor and Balci, 2007; Mon- 120). temayor, 2010 and 2013). With language, humans acquired an enormously powerful Jaynes is right about the importance of lan- format of representation, with syntactic- guage and metaphor, but he did not distin- recursive functions that map onto a vast guish between phenomenal consciousness number of contents, and immense possibili- (the subjective character of experience) and ties for communicative nuance. The influ- other forms of cognition, such as accessing ence of language does not affect the early information for control, thought and action forms of time perception, concerned with (Block, 1995, 1997). The dissociation be- sensorial duration and simultaneity, but tween consciousness and attention helps language has a powerful effect on our elucidate how these new capacities evolved memories—incidentally, this might be the and interact in the human species (Halad- right way to interpret the scope of the jian and Montemayor, 2015). However, the Whorfian hypothesis, namely the claim that most important point Jaynes is making is language determines thought (Montemayor, quite valid, namely, that the influence of 2018b; see also Montemayor and Haladjian, language on memory is extremely impor- 2017). tant for both the reality monitoring function of memory and the personal value we as- Jaynes emphasized the importance of these sign to autobiographical memory. This is an new, linguistic formats of representation, as extremely important issue that needs to be well as their interaction with previous and studied in more detail. more ancient forms of memory. He was particularly interested in how language The episodic memory system has its ancient (with its public accuracy functions, for in- foundations in the capacities of animals to stance through testimony and the speech act represent the past and predict events in the of assertion) and narratives (with their im- future (Gallistel, 1990). So how exactly was pact on personal autobiography) created an language—arguably a uniquely human ca- entirely new type of conscious mentality—a pacity (see Berwick and Chomsky, 2016)— vastly new ―space‖ for action. Jaynes such a major factor in the development of wrote: new forms of reality monitoring that transformed episodic memory? One possibility For the first time, a man could ―know is that episodic memory became a collec- himself,‖ could remember, not simply tively shared form of evidence-updating by know that or know how. For the first means of the propositionally-framed format time, he could ―see‖ what he had of representation that language provided. done and grope for what he should do This new format offered access to a vast in a mind-space generated out of me- amount of cognitive contents that can be taphor. […] But with this new ability publically verified to be true, through testi- to reexperience the past in a spatia- mony and assertion, and which can be chal- lized time, to remember and plan and lenged, updated, and confirmed by others narratize, comes a troop of new com- through joint attention (Bruner, 1983, plications, some of which are still 2015). Thus, access consciousness, or erupting into the difficulties of mod- access to information, is epistemically nor- ern conscious life. Our innate geneti- mative: one should believe the reliable in- cally determined emotions that we formation of adequate perceptual and mem- share with most mammals are ory processes (Fairweather and Monte- mayor, 2017). This function is properly

Copyright © 2018, Archives of Psychology. All rights reserved. http://www.archivesofpsychology.org Montemayor C. Archives of Psychology, vol. 2, issue 10, October 2018 Page 8 of 19 executed by episodic memory, which does thority, aspects of memory became deper- not necessitate phenomenal consciousness, sonalized in the sense that by monitoring and must go beyond subjectivity and auto- them as external, inner speech became ―Ja- biography. nus-faced‖: outwardly determined-inner speech is there to remind us of something Autobiographical memory, however, was we need to do, and it is public in nature, the most dramatic result of the impact of while inwardly produced-inner speech is language on human memory, and cognition there to ―comment‖ or ―resist,‖ along with in general. Jaynes is not exaggerating when many other cognitive activities that deter- he says that this transformation set humani- mine character and personality, all of which ty apart from the rest of other species, and are private and shielded from the collective created a gulf between our hominid ances- vigilance of testimony and assertion. tors and ourselves. But it was not by generating an epistemic framework for shared This type of depersonalization in memory testimony and assertion that this cognitive created stress in our cognitive system, and it revolution occurred. It was by means of an is patently present in disorders that involve opposite process: an “inward turn of memory intrusion and suppression. It also narrative” to use Erich Kahler’s (1973) could be related to cognitive disorders brilliant expression—the title of his re- which might have to be reevaluated as per- markable book on the subject of introspec- haps side effects of our evolution toward tive thought in the development of litera- inward narrative, although this is a complex ture. Humans managed, through this inward and controversial issue that I shall not dis- process based on language, to create an cuss here. It suffices to say that authors like inner realm vast enough to spin the yarn of Jaynes, and Kahler in particular, have iden- autobiographical narrative. tified this development in the history of literature, and that certainly similar histori- Incidentally, Jaynes was not alone when he cal patterns may be identified in other cul- thought that this process was deeply asso- tural and artistic domains. ciated with human awareness. As Joseph Frank says in the foreword to Kahler’s Much of our mental lives hinges on the bal- book: ―…Kahler views the internalization ance between inward and outward subvoca- of narrative—the movement from external lized speech—inner speech that is expe- action and epic adventure to the ever-deeper rienced as authentically private, as opposed and more intense exploration of character to inner speech that is experienced as exter- and personality—as part of the general evo- nal in origin or as publically imposed on us. lution of human consciousness as a whole.‖ Our very notion of autonomy, as Jaynes (Frank, 1973, xiii). also emphasized, depends fundamentally on this balance. The ancients, according to An effect that this inward turn of narrative Jaynes, simply followed the voices they produced is that human cognition had to heard, as an external and unconditioned compensate for other crucial ways of expe- dictum. We normally appeal to memory riencing the linguistic aspects of memory. routines in which we do something very The voice of the other’s testimony; the similar: we repeat things to ourselves in voice of the universal ―commanding rea- inner speech in order to guide our actions son;‖ or even the voice of God or of various and not forget something important that has deities (the way Jaynes saw it)—they all been determined collectively, but we do not had now to be balanced with the inexorable necessarily experience this as an outward inner voice of autonomy and privacy. As command. However, the dividing line be- this inner voice gained complexity and au- tween inward and outward is thin. Kant

Copyright © 2018, Archives of Psychology. All rights reserved. http://www.archivesofpsychology.org Montemayor C. Archives of Psychology, vol. 2, issue 10, October 2018 Page 9 of 19 famously defined the categorical imperative main source of personal value in the memo- in terms of the obedience to a maxim or ry system. command that qualifies as universal and which is given by the subject to herself, so that the most private and unconstrained The Inner Realm autonomy of the self, and the universal The inner realm of conscious autobiograph- force of moral obligation, are one and the ical memory and its narrative structure is same—universally valid and deeply private. not uniform. More precisely, the perspec- There is no space here to examine the tive of the first person is not uniform be- enormous importance of inner speech and cause of the complexity of narration and it memory in spiritual and philosophical tradi- is, in fact, constantly in the turmoil of the tions. It suffices to point out that this is a present. Memories experienced as un- very rich topic, concerning the practices of wanted, or as if from an alien perspective, confessing, praying, and repeating texts are important ingredients of how our per- (both for remembrance and for ritualiza- sonal narrative becomes articulated and tion). It is also deeply related to the reli- entrenched with collective memories and gious interpretation of texts and to the me- with events we might value or reject. There taphor of listening to the voice of the is a fair degree of intrusion and suppression prophets or of God, which is written in or- in this negotiation, of daydreaming, plan- der to be heard and obeyed. In a different, ning and reinterpreting. We remember although not entirely unrelated context, dreams in connection with our most che- judicial interpretation is frequently thought rished memories. But we keep the inner of as an exercise in understanding the inten- realm in good epistemic balance by the rou- tions of the legislator, and of interpreting tines of reality monitoring, the mediating the text of the law as accurately and reason- role of episodic memory and the regulation ably as possible—a process of ―listening‖ of adequate levels of intrusion and suppres- as carefully as possible to the voice of the sion. law and to the intentions behind it. Some memories feel less personal than oth- Episodic memory was expanded beyond its ers, in the sense that we either do not place temporally framed structure towards the any value in them or feel like they are not epistemic needs of our linguistically orga- genuine parts of our narrative. The term nized community. Here episodic memory ―depersonalization‖ is defined in a specific became part of our epistemic practices of way here: to refer to aspects of memory that justifying claims about the past and imagin- are important for our daily lives but which ing how these facts may affect the present we do not experience as part of our personal and future. This is the outward aspect of narrative. The more depersonalized our episodic memory. Its inward aspect is that it memories become, the more alienated our mediates collective memories and narra- perspective becomes, leaning exclusively tives with the deeply personal narrative towards public evaluation. In the spectrum structure of autobiographical memory. Al- from full selfish-autonomy to complete lack though autobiographical memory is inde- of a personal narrative we find the struggles pendent in its function from episodic mem- and negotiations of autobiographical memo- ory, it depends on episodic memory to ac- ry. The risks of confabulating our narrative curately perform the functions of reality are significant, so different forms of reality monitoring. But only autobiographical monitoring must be in place. At the same memory remains essentially private; it is the time, a significant degree of flexibility must

Copyright © 2018, Archives of Psychology. All rights reserved. http://www.archivesofpsychology.org Montemayor C. Archives of Psychology, vol. 2, issue 10, October 2018 Page 10 of 19 be given to the narrative functions of auto- provide a narrative we value, in large part biographical memory. because it is what gives us moral standing: it is what makes us morally significant and The way in which Jaynes understood these unique. issues of balance and flexibility was through the varieties of inner voices that Ultimately, Jaynes concluded that we must guide, and ultimately determine, our perso- confront these memories in the vast theater nality. Inner speech that was originally per- of recollection in order to find who we are. ceived as external is turned inwards, and The manner in which this is done allows for eventually becomes the source of our auto- enormous flexibility and transformative nomous and engaged first person perspec- power. One can say, in confronting the past: tive. Our attention became capable of being ―I was a different person back then, how oriented towards ―outer‖ and ―inner‖ could I have done that‖? What was perfect- speech, through the functions of reality ly familiar at some point becomes foreign, monitoring and narration. This divided self, alien, and depersonalized later. These are half trapped in privacy, half exposed to the the personal encounters we have not only public (or some other combination within with our past selves, through recollection, the spectrum just mentioned) generates a but also with what we value about ourselves situation of cognitive stress. But this disso- in general, from a moral point of view. But nant chorus of voices generated a vast land- in this vast inner realm, one can also find scape, a large theater of life, which Jaynes the dramatic and surprising origin of the described in spatial terms as follows: aesthetic value of recollection. The inner realm finds its finest expression. It is not …With time metaphored as space, so waste and filler; it is recollection in the to- like the space of our actual lives, a tality of time, hypostasized, turned into part of us solemnly keeps loitering moral and aesthetic contemplation. Vladi- behind, trying to visit past times as if mir Nabokov (1951/1989), in his autobio- they were actual spaces. Oh, what a graphical book Speak, Memory, wrote: temptation is there! The warm, sullen longing to return to scenes long va- I confess I do not believe in time. I nished, to relive some past security or like to fold my magic carpet, after love, to redress some ancient wrong use, in such a way as to superimpose or redecide a past regret, or alter some one part of the pattern upon the other. ill-considered actions toward some- Let visitors trip. And the highest en- one lost to our present lives, or to fill joyment of timelessness—in a land- out past omissions—these are arti- scape selected at random—is when I facts of our new remembering con- stand among rare butterflies and their sciousness. Side effects. And they are food plants. This is ecstasy, and be- waste and filler unless we use them to hind the ecstasy is something else, learn about ourselves. (Jaynes, 2012, which is hard to explain. It is like a 121) momentary vacuum into which rushes all that I love. A sense of oneness The inner realm is spacious enough to ac- with sun and stone. A thrill of grati- commodate many voices, scenarios and tude to whom it may concern—to the perspectives. The demand to learn about contrapuntal genius of human fate or ourselves instead of accumulating the waste to the tender ghosts humoring a lucky of recollection is a moral one: the proper mortal. (Nabokov, 1989, 139). function of autobiographical memory is to

The inner realm can also be the source of ing effects for short and long-term personal endless joy. Our memories can become evaluations. For example, there is an tender internal ghosts instead of rabid ex- asymmetry between judgments concerning ternal monsters. The inward can turn sub- regret, which shows that our inner voice lime. The lesson from Jaynes about morali- concerning remorse changes with time. ty, therefore, holds for the aesthetic realm Short-term regrets are about actions; long- as well. Our inner lives are nothing but a term regrets are about omissions (Kahne- ―dumpster of memories‖ if we don’t seek to man and Tversky, 1982). This ―fading af- encounter the good in us, as well as the fect bias‖ focuses our attention on external beautiful. If we are trapped in the public consequences and frames autobiographical struggles of collective episodic memory, we memory accordingly. Interestingly, this lose track of what is morally good in our- regret-effect varies if it is experienced pri- selves and also of what is beautiful in our vately or in interpersonal contexts, and it lives. seems to vary culturally as well (Komiya, A. et al., 2011). The psychological findings analyzed below show that the general structure of autobio- Regarding accuracy, Loftus (1975, 2005) graphical memory indeed involves complex showed that people report false information tradeoffs, forms of intrusion, suppression if they receive misleading cues during re- and emotional biases. These findings show call. We seem to be biased toward meaning- how regret, narrative effects, and personally completion, many times at the cost of reali- meaningful memories are balanced with ty monitoring, but clearly within safe reality monitoring. This balance determines enough bounds. Findings confirming this a ranking of memories that constitute who effect show that recollection depends on we are in terms of what we value the most. overall plausibility and narrative coherence (Brainerd and Reyna, 2005; Goff and Roe- diger, 1998; Hyman et al., 1995; Lindsay et The Accuracy and Personal Value of al., 2004). Memory There are two possible interpretations of Reality monitoring in episodic memory these findings. One of them is that human provides accurate information about the memory is unreliable. An alternative inter- past, from our perspective, so that we can pretation is that this kind of ―unreliability‖ plan for the future by, for instance, simulat- is actually the result of a vital function of ing those events. These are crucial aspects human memory: the narrative function of of episodic memory that allow it to serve as autobiographical memory described above. the interface between collective memory, Healthy patients systematically distort including collective forms of reality moni- memories—significantly more than im- toring and autobiographical memory, the paired patients with amnesia and other im- deeply personal type of memory that pro- pairments (Schacter, Verfaille and Pradere, vides moral and aesthetic value to memo- 1996). It is plausible, therefore, that memories we cherish, fear and consider essential ry distortions based on narrative effects are aspects of who we are. beneficial (Schacter, Guerin and Jacques, The event-ordering and agent-involving 2011), even if they lead to forms of confa- functions of episodic memory interface bulation that are tolerable if reality monitor- with language through explicit judgment, ing works adequately in general. One can and with autobiographical memory through go further, following Jaynes. It is in virtue subjective experiences, producing interest- of these effects that one can find moral and aesthetic value in memory.

It seems perplexing to postulate that memo- much intrusion into the formation of a per- ry would have the function to confabulate sonal narrative, even if it guarantees strong in beneficial ways. Confabulation is, after forms of reality monitoring and accuracy. all, a cognitive deficiency. But this is not so Group cohesion is important for human perplexing if there is a tradeoff between flourishing, but too much of it corrodes the accuracy and personal value that human narrative function that leads towards per- memory is designed to balance. Human sonal flourishing. This is ultimately a bal- memories need to be accurate enough to ance between heteronomy and autonomy. provide reliable guidance, but they also need to be insightful and vivid enough to Public forms of reality monitoring are very provide meaning to our lives. The tradeoff important contributors to the reality moni- is between entirely accurate memories toring function of episodic memory. Groups without value and very insightful memories generate the expectation that personal that are fully confabulated. Two different narratives of group members will be com- types of value are at stake here, as Jaynes patible, and add complexity, to the collec- noticed. On the one hand, we can have very tive. These expectations are heteronomous accurate memories, satisfying an epistemic and publically available. But there are in- type of value, but such a repertoire of ward forces (the truly ―inner voice‖), which memories may amount to nothing but must ultimately counterbalance such expec- ―waste and filler.‖ On the other hand, we tations. Good things come from group- can find meaning and moral value in our influence, such as collective reality moni- lives, but without reality monitoring, we do toring; but it also has bad effects, such as so at the risk of living a confabulated life. collective narcissism (see Putnam, et al., Episodic memory can play, as mentioned 2018). Collective memory opens our minds above, the very useful role of intermediary but it can also narrow the scope of what between, on the one hand, the purely epis- matters to us, depending on the type of bi- temic functions of memory and the value- ases and quality of reality monitoring of the making properties of conscious autobio- memory-culture of a group. Some members graphical memory. are privileged, and have group-supported license to exercise their relatively unre- Collective memory influences personal strained autonomy, while others are ex- narratives at different stages and, as the pected to restrain their autonomy in favor of findings have shown, certainly interacts the group narrative. This type of group bias with the fading affect bias. Salient action is makes regret and dignity depend frailly on what we tend to regret the most in the short- the balance between heteronomy and au- term, but what we avoid to do is what we tonomy. tend to regret the most as our personal narratives are evaluated more thoroughly. The Literature captures this tension in various pressure of collective memories on autobi- ways, and it illustrates lucidly the develop- ographical narrative depends on the extent ment of group biases in relation to the inte- and depth of the interpersonal context. If we gration of personal narratives. A powerful are part of a group that constantly consoli- example is given by Kahler, in his excellent dates memories through rituals and cultural discussion of Madame de La Fayette’s La practices, the pressure to shape our narra- Princesse de Clèves. In his analysis of a tive according to these collective memories scene in which the Madame de Clèves is will be more significant than the pressure reacting to a comment by her lover, which from a group without a strong sense of ―pleased and offended her almost to the memory and ritualization. Too much pres- same degree,‖ Kahler writes: sure from collective memory signifies too

The paradoxicalness of the situation the information contained in such memo- leads even further, and the actual tra- ries. Dreams have a powerful impact on our gedy of these three persons arises out personal self-evaluation. In dreams we are of it. For it becomes evident that in also confronted with a vast realm of expe- such a predicament preserving one’s rience in which we not only relieve the past, dignity outwardly is not compatible but in which we seem to profoundly en- with preserving it inwardly. Outward counter it anew. Memories about dreams do dignity demands dissimulation, but not satisfy the basic epistemic constraints of inner dignity the truth. (Kahler, 1973, episodic memory, but we still value them. 27) Halbwachs (1952) proposed that it is im- Inward dignity collides with outward digni- possible to remember anything in dreams, ty, in one of the first appearances in litera- but this claim needs clarification. Accord- ture of the torn nature of regret, the de- ing to Halbwachs, memory in dreams is so mands of autobiographical integrity, and ―inert and drowsy‖ that the dreamer cannot self-edification. Inner voices give depth and remember that a person they see vividly in context to polarized reactions, inwards and the dream died a long time ago. This type of outwards. The pleasure of a lover’s atten- dream, in which one ―interacts‖ with the tion is experienced with equal intensity as person long gone is one that we value personally, especially if the person was close. the disgust and offensiveness of the situation the Madame de Clèves finds herself in. Sometimes we spend time interpreting what This polarized regret cannot happily coa- those ―appearances‖ could mean; why are lesce into action or omission. they so powerful and why do they ―keep coming to us‖? The failure here is not one It is not very common to find oneself in of personal or autobiographical evaluation, such an unfortunate dilemma, but the struc- but of accuracy. We cannot remember any- ture of the conundrum is quite familiar. As thing in dreams because the reality monitor- the findings described above show, regrets ing function of memory is not operational are biased towards action, only to later be and without it, there is no way to guarantee biased towards important things we didn’t that it is not all mere confabulation. do in life. Some regrets are experienced more intensely when our culture places But previous cultures placed great signific- constant requirements on our self- ance on dream recollection for collective edification. These are the difficulties of spiritual reasons. The emphasis in these autobiography. Biases and contextual cues archaic practices has, obviously, never been frame the negotiation between the inner on the accuracy of dreams with respect to voices, some of which request privacy, the past. In ancient cultures, dreams were while others demand publicity. The psycho- considered accurate omens about the future, logical findings confirm that this autobio- as well as important messages from a tran- graphical negotiation is indeed a compli- scendental realm. Dreams, for a very large cated process in which memories organize part of our history, were considered a crucial place of communion with the transcen- themselves around potent emotions and considerable social pressure. dental realm of spiritual meaning—the keystone of what truly matters, or of ulti- Relief and regret, personally structuring mate reality. Sigmund Freud (1899/1997), episodic memories and converting them who dedicated one of his major scientific into autobiographical narrative with the works to the interpretation of dreams, forge of emotional vividness, can be expe- commenting on the deep connection be- rienced independently of the accuracy of tween the conception of the dream in pre-

Copyright © 2018, Archives of Psychology. All rights reserved. http://www.archivesofpsychology.org Montemayor C. Archives of Psychology, vol. 2, issue 10, October 2018 Page 14 of 19 historic history and the supernatural, ex- vividness, it is fundamental to understand plained: the inner workings of vividness in relation to memory orchestration. Two fundamental, A reminiscence of the concept of the and also polar opposite mechanisms, are the dream that was held in primitive processes of suppression and intrusion. times seems to underlie the evaluation Dreams, for Freud, had great psychological of the dream which was current importance precisely because of their intri- among the peoples of classical antiq- cate connection with these mechanisms. uity. They took it for granted that dreams were related to the world of the supernatural beings in whom they Suppression, Intrusion and Depersonali- believed, and that they brought inspi- zation rations from the gods and demons. The personal tradeoff between accuracy and Moreover, it appeared to them that personal value requires a fine balance be- dreams must serve a special purpose tween suppression and intrusion. If, for in- in respect of the dreamer; that, as a stance, a memory from a dream keeps ir- rule, they predicted the future. (Freud, rupting into our waking life and dominating 1997, 6) our attention, our psychology would start leaning towards confabulation. Waking The personal significance of the dream is in memory must suppress this type of memo- interpreting what may or will happen to the ry. In general, reality monitoring depends dreamer (at least in ancient cultures, al- on balancing intrusion and suppression, though some of this mysticism still sur- with critical consequences for the stability rounds dreams). This ―interpretation‖ is the of our personal narratives. Dream memo- kind of analysis Jaynes encouraged—it is a ries, as Freud indicates, provide a constant kind of moral edification by recollection. dosage of autobiographical alienation, even About dream memory, Freud said that the though they have a substantial impact on pre-scientific conception of dreams ―ac- our personal narratives by revealing surpris- counted for the main impression made upon ing information about ourselves, both posi- the waking life by the morning memory of tive and negative. the dream; for in this memory the dream, as compared with the rest of psychic content, Intrusion occurs when an unwanted memo- seems to be something alien, coming, as it ry recurs involuntarily, but what counts as were, from another world.‖ (Freud, 1997, voluntary and involuntary in memory, as 7). The views of Halbwachs and Freud are the previous discussion on regret shows, is compatible if we distinguish ―remember- an intricate problem. Spontaneity can be ing‖ as a success term (one remembers only beneficial, by confronting us with new con- if the memory is accurate) and ―remember- texts in which memories need to be reas- ing‖ as autobiographical personal narration sessed, helping us relive, reevaluate and (which can occur, and very powerfully, in reframe our personal perspective. This type dream memory). The first is guaranteed by of spontaneous, involuntary intrusion, if it reality monitoring, the second by autobio- occurs within the proper bounds that allow graphical memory. for the integrity of a personal narrative, is very important for consolidating and recon- Dreams are a central part of the inner realm solidating memories. even though they can be experienced as ―alien‖ or depersonalized. But if memory Intrusion, however, can have the opposite value is shaped by personal narrative and effect—instead of helping consolidate a

Copyright © 2018, Archives of Psychology. All rights reserved. http://www.archivesofpsychology.org Montemayor C. Archives of Psychology, vol. 2, issue 10, October 2018 Page 15 of 19 memory with narratively beneficial purpos- suppression. Induced intrusion through vo- es, it can either prevent such a narrative luntary attention, for example when one from integrating or become so disruptive repeats constantly a phrase in inner speech, that it can be a sign of cognitive disorder. is a typical strategy for learning. The selec- Intrusion, typically, at least as it is con- tive inhibition of attention to certain memo- ceived of in contemporary psychology, is of ries through dominant narratives, is a form this negative kind, producing intrusive of suppression that is deeply rooted in memories that might be quite vivid and feel group dynamics and society at large. For present (this phenomenon should be distin- instance, certain cultures may favor memo- guished from so-called ―memory intrusion,‖ ries related to initiation rituals and constant- the process in which partial information ly cast a bright light on events that the indi- leads to an error of memory, without pro- vidual may not have found joyful at the ducing intrusive memories). Intrusive time, and might still inwardly resent today. memories, even if they are not of the fully Outwardly, however, the pressure is to re- vivid and traumatic kind, disrupt the bal- member this event with pleasure and pride. ance required for proper memory function. Like the example above by Kahler demon- Depression, for instance, has been asso- strates, outwards dignity and inwards digni- ciated with intrusion, but not specifically ty may collide. Other cultures may avoid with suppression (Schmidt et al. 2009). The such practices of consolidating memories, influence of culture, collective memory, leaving the individual to ―her own‖ at the and the type of outward pressure discussed risk of becoming too indifferent about the in the previous section, associated with re- relationship between collective memory gret, certainly play a role in intrusion. formation and autobiographical narrative— something that the individual in that group Suppression is the opposite of intrusion. It may resent. Thus, like so many aspects of occurs when even voluntary effort fails at memory, intrusion and suppression can be retrieving a memory. It is also, like intru- good or bad. In pathological cases, they sion, a critical requirement of the transac- both are extremely disruptive. tions concerning autobiographical narrative. The way in which suppression interacts These are important themes in the work of with intrusion is not only antagonistic (one Freud and Halbwachs (as well as Jaynes). of them retrieving what is unwanted, the Suppression features centrally in Freud’s other one preventing us from obtaining theory of memory (and dreams). Repressed what we need), but it is also related to vo- memories generate conflicts concerning luntary attention, in self-defeating ways. layers of personality, which the individual, For instance, findings have shown that con- in her role of autobiographer, has to over- scious effort to intentionally suppress a come by revisiting constantly her own narr- thought (e.g., ―don’t think of a white bear‖) ative. Suppressed memories associated with exacerbates intrusiveness (Wegner 1994). the behaviorally-dominant deep uncons- The term ironic processing was proposed cious, must come to the surface for the in- by Wegner to explain this phenomenon. dividual to arrive at a therapy-induced un- The proposed mechanism behind ironic derstanding of herself. processing is that resources for suppression highlight the suppressed thought for tar- Dream memory-suppression is an important geted recurrent-attention processes, result- form of reality monitoring. But the inwards ing in intrusion. and outwards aspects of this process are also complicated. Myth and narratives share This interesting process provides a window a lot with the dream world. Although myths into the larger battle between intrusion and and collective narratives may originate in

Copyright © 2018, Archives of Psychology. All rights reserved. http://www.archivesofpsychology.org Montemayor C. Archives of Psychology, vol. 2, issue 10, October 2018 Page 16 of 19 dreams and confabulation, Halbwachs dis- episodic efficiency turns into personally tances himself from dreams. For Freud, valuable meaning. Future research should dreams play an important therapeutic role explain in more detail the vast scope of lin- that reveals forms of suppression that are guistic mediation in all these processes. An imposed by society. For Halbwachs society important insight of the traditional ap- plays a constructive role by consolidating proaches to memory, analyzed in this paper, memories through collective accuracy; for is that the emergence of linguistically for- Freud, it plays an oppressive role by imped- matted cognition altered decisively the ing natural tendencies to form personal ways in which we narrate the past, inwardly narratives. As the previous discussion and outwardly. shows, these are not necessarily antagonistic views: the very mechanisms behind autobiographical memory and the mediation References of episodic memory are themselves antagonistic. Berwick, R. C. and Chomsky, N. (2016). Why Only Us: Language and Evolu- tion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Conclusion Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a The contemporary study of memory in psy- function of consciousness. chology and neuroscience, which has con- Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 firmed the flexibility, context-dependence, (2):227-47. and integrative nature of memory, can ben- efit from previous views on memory. I have Block, N. (1997). On a confusion about a argued that the flexibility and context- function of consciousness. In The dependence of integrative processes, such Nature of Consciousness: as memory reconsolidation, depends on the Philosophical Debates, edited by Ned fragile balance of polarized tendencies to- Block, Owen J. Flanagan and Güven wards accuracy and narrative. An interpre- Güzeldere, 375-415. Cambridge, MA: tation of some of the recent findings, in the MIT Press. light of the historical analysis presented here, reveals that previous views on memo- Brainerd, C. J., and Reyna, V. F. (2005). ry can help explain these findings and help The science of false memory. New us identify deeper connections with tradi- York: Oxford University Press. tional themes that have interested psychologist, sociologists, philosophers, and lite- Bruner, J. (1983). Child’s talk: Learning to rary critics. use language. New York: Norton. A central conclusion from this historical and theoretical analysis is that episodic Bruner, J. (2015). From Joint Attention to memory plays a very intricate and critical the Meeting of the Minds: An Intro- role, mediating between the private, highly duction. In C. Moore and P. J. Dun- personal evaluations of narrative and the ham (eds.) Joint Attention: Its Origins public, socially enforced forms of memory and Role in Development. Routledge integration. Reality monitoring is part of the (pp. 1-13). main functions of episodic memory, but although episodic memory guides the for- Fairweather, A., and Montemayor, C. mation of personal narratives, it cannot suf- (2017). Knowledge, Dexterity, and At- ficiently capture the process through which tention: A Theory of Epistemic Agen-

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