NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

TAX COMPETITION AND TRADE PROTECTION

Eckhard Janeba John D. Wilson

Working Paper 7402 http://www.nber.org/papers/w7402

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 October 1999

We like to thank the participants of the Norwegian-German Seminar on Public Economics, and in particular our discussant Guttorm Schjelderup, for their comments. Errors are ours. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

© 1999 by Eckhard Janeba and John D. Wilson. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Tax Competition and Trade Protection Eckhard Janeba and John D. Wilson NBER Working Paper No. 7402 October 1999 JEL No. F13, F21, H73

ABSTRACT

This paper reconsiders the question of whether tax competition for mobile capital leads to tax rates on capital that are too low or too high from the combined viewpoint of the competing regions (or countries in an economic union). In contrast to standard models of tax competition, both commodity trade and capital mobility is allowed to occur between the competing regions and the rest of the world. A key result of the analysis is that whether the capital taxes are too low or high depends on the degree of external trade protection. When the country’s central government is free to set the tariff, tax competition leads to inefficiently low tax rates. But in the absence of a tariff, tax rates can be too high. In particular, regions may choose to subsidize capital in equilibrium as a means of inducing favorable terms-of-trade effects, but the subsidy (i.e., a negative tax) will then be too low because an increase in a single region’s subsidy benefits other regions by reducing their relative quantities of subsidized capital. These results are discussed in the context of the European Union’s Single Market, where non-EU firms have responded to the ‘Fortress of Europe’ by increasing foreign direct investment.

Eckhard Janeba John D. Wilson Department of Economics Department of Economics University of Colorado at Boulder Michigan State University Campus Box 256 East Lansing, MI 48824 Boulder, CO 80309-0256 [email protected] and NBER [email protected]

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