Republic of the Sudan
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Sudan OGN v 17.0 Issued June 2012 OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE NOTE Republic of the Sudan (aka e Republic of Sudan CONTENTS 1. Introduction 1.1 – 1.3 2. Country assessment 2.1 – 2.2 Actors of protection 2.3 Internal relocation 2.4 Country guidance caselaw 2.5 3. Main categories of claims 3.1 – 3.5 Civilians from South Sudan, 3.6 Members or associates of the SPLM/N 3.7 Civilians fleeing violence in the states of Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan 3.8 and Abyei Members or associates of Darfuri rebel groups 3.9 Members of non Arab ethnic groups from the Darfur states 3.10 Members of opposition groups and perceived government critics, 3.11 including students, journalists and human rights defenders Prison Conditions 3.12 4. Discretionary Leave 4.1 – 4.2 Minors claiming in their own right 4.3 Medical treatment 4.4 5. Returns 5.1 – 5.3 1. Introduction 1.1 This document provides UK Border Agency case owners with guidance on the nature and handling of the most common types of claims received from nationals/residents of Republic of the Sudan (aka North Sudan), including whether claims are or are not likely to justify the granting of asylum, Humanitarian Protection or Discretionary Leave. Case owners must refer to the relevant Asylum Instructions for further details of the policy on these areas. At present there is no justification for an OGN for the Republic of South Sudan. 1.2 Case owners must not base decisions on the country of origin information in this guidance; it is included to provide context only and does not purport to be comprehensive. The conclusions in this guidance are based on the totality of the available evidence, not just the brief extracts contained herein, and case owners must likewise take into account all available evidence. It is therefore essential that this guidance is read in conjunction with the relevant COI Service country of origin information and any other relevant information. COI Service information is published on Horizon and on the internet at: http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/guidance/coi/ 1.3 Claims should be considered on an individual basis, but taking full account of the guidance contained in this document. In considering claims where the main applicant has dependent family members who are a part of his/her claim, account must be taken of the situation of all the dependent family members included in the claim in accordance with the Asylum Instruction on Article 8 ECHR. If, following consideration, a claim is to be refused, case owners should consider whether it can be certified as clearly unfounded under the case by Page 1 of 27 Sudan OGN v 17.0 Issued June 2012 case certification power in section 94(2) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. A claim will be clearly unfounded if it is so clearly without substance that it is bound to fail. 2. Country assessment 2.1 Case owners should refer the relevant COI Service country of origin information material. An overview of the country situation including headline facts and figures about the population, capital city, currency as well as geography, recent history and current politics can also be found in the relevant FCO country profile at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/country-profile/ The situation in Sudan is evolving with ongoing security incidents reported in Darfur and violent conflict in the southern states of Sudan. Claims should be considered with the most up-to-date and relevant country of origin information. 2.2 An overview of the human rights situation in certain countries can also be found in the latest FCO Annual Report on Human Rights which examines developments in countries where human rights issues are of greatest concern: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/country-profile/ 2.3 Actors of protection 2.3.1 Case owners must refer to the Asylum Policy Instruction on ‗considering the protection (asylum) claim‘ and ‗assessing credibility‘. To qualify for asylum, an individual not only needs to have a fear of persecution for a Convention reason, they must also be able to demonstrate that their fear of persecution is well founded and that they are unable, or unwilling because of their fear, to avail themselves of the protection of their home country. Case owners should also take into account whether or not the applicant has sought the protection of the authorities or the organisation controlling all or a substantial part of the State, any outcome of doing so or the reason for not doing so. Effective protection is generally provided when the authorities (or other organisation controlling all or a substantial part of the State) take reasonable steps to prevent the persecution or suffering of serious harm by for example operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm, and the applicant has access to such protection. 2.3.2 Several government entities have responsibility for internal security, including the police, the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS), Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Defence. The NISS maintains security officers in major towns and cities. The Ministry of Interior controlled the Central Reserve Police (CRP). The Ministry of Defence‘s Border Intelligence Force (border guards), a loosely organized force composed largely of former Janjaweed Arab militia, operated in Darfur and elsewhere. The CRP also contains a number of former Janjaweed fighters. In November the CRP attacked the western section of the Zamzam internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in North Darfur, killing one IDP and injuring eight others. Security force impunity was a serious problem. The 2010 National Security Act provides NISS officials with legal protection for acts involving their official duties. Abuses by security forces generally were not investigated. Security force corruption was a problem, and security force members often supplemented their incomes by extorting 1 bribes. 2.3.3 A new National Security Act passed in December 2009 came into force in February [2011]. The Act maintained the NISS‘s extensive powers of arrest and detention without judicial oversight for up to four and a half months. The NISS continued to arrest and detain political activists and human rights defenders, hold them incommunicado, torture and ill-treat them, 1 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: Sudan, 24/05/2012, Section 1: Role of the Police and Security Apparatus Page 2 of 27 Sudan OGN v 17.0 Issued June 2012 and prosecute them for the peaceful exercise of their rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association. NISS agents remained immune from prosecution and disciplinary measures for human rights violations.2 2.3.4 In May 2012, the U.S. Department of State noted that ―government forces and government- aligned groups committed extrajudicial and other unlawful killings; security forces committed torture, beatings, rape, and other cruel and inhumane treatment or punishment; and prison and detention center conditions were harsh and life threatening. Other major abuses included arbitrary arrest and arbitrary, incommunicado, and prolonged pretrial detention; executive interference with the judiciary and denial of due process.‖3 Following the independence of South Sudan, Human Rights Watch reported that in Khartoum ―government authorities pursued familiar repressive tactics including harassing, arresting, detaining, and torturing perceived opponents of the government; censoring media; and banning political parties‖.4 The UK FCO report of April 2012 also highlighted the continued existence of ―widespread reports of torture in Sudan, particularly on the part of the security services, and directed at political opponents, activists, suspected rebels and ordinary citizens‖.5 2.3.5 In accordance with Sharia (Islamic law), the Criminal Act provides for physical punishments, including flogging, amputation, stoning, and crucifixion--the public display of a body after execution. In practice such physical punishment other than flogging was not frequently used. Traditional customary law commonly was applied to convicted defendants. Courts routinely imposed flogging, especially for production of alcohol.6 The public order police continue to arrest women, young girls and men, on grounds of ―indecent‖ or ―immoral‖ dress or behaviour, and courts carried out numerous flogging sentences during the year.7 2.3.6 Rebels in Darfur and the Three Areas [the three border areas of Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile] also committed abuses during the year.8 2.3.7 Although the Interim National Constitution and the law provide for an independent judiciary, the judiciary was largely subservient to the president or the security forces, particularly in cases of alleged crimes against the state. On occasion courts displayed a degree of independence; however, political interference with the courts was commonplace, and some high-ranking members of the judiciary also held positions in the Ministry of Interior or other ministries in the executive branch. In May 2012, Freedom House stated that ―the judiciary is not independent. Lower courts provide some due process safeguards, but the higher courts are subject to political control, and special security and military courts do not apply accepted legal standards‖.9 The U.S. Department of State highlighted that ―Except in rare cases, the government took no steps to prosecute or punish officials in the security services and elsewhere in the government who committed abuses. Security force impunity remained a serious problem‖.10 The judiciary was inefficient and subject to corruption. In Darfur judges were often absent from their posts.11 2 Amnesty International, Annual Report 2011: The State of the World‘s Human Rights, Sudan, May 2011, Arbitrary detentions, torture and other ill-treatment, 3 U.S.