U N I VE R S IT Y reuiew JA N U A R Y -F E B R U A R Y 1977 The Professional Journal of the United States Ai from the editor's aerie

It is with no little astonishment that we receive frequent queries from Air Force personnel asking how they might regularly receive Air University Review. Of course, the cognoscenti know that the Basis of Issue, which we reprint annually, establishes distribution to assure reasonable access for all Air Force personnel. Colonels and above as well as civil service grades GS-16-18 are authorized personal copies. All organizations down to detachment level are authorized distribution on the basis of one copy for each 20 officers. In case of organizations having fewer than 20 officers, any lesser number would qualify, including detachments with as few as one officer. The essential point to remember is that distribution is not automatically accomplished solely on the basis of your eligibility. If you are not already receiving the Review, you must establish your requirement with your servicing Publications Distribution Officer. Our published contributors are, of course, aware that they receive a complimentary subscription for one year, in addition to a cash award that is somewhat more munificent than in past years. And certainly no one is discouraged from subscribing directly to the Government Printing Office, as outlined on the inside back cover. We are presently revising the Basis of Issue with the object of increasing its availability, particularly for individuals engaged in scholarly pursuits and for noncommissioned officers. If we are successful in this revision, we promise to make it known promptly.

Our cover suggests the keystone position of our prime resource and the complex considerations involved in attracting and retaining what used to be called "manpower,” an outmoded term in our changing society. Dr. Curtis Tarr, in the lead article, discusses present problems and future trends in the management of this most important resource.

Occasionally, we receive the suggestion that we offer a "Letters to the Editor" department. Our present practice is to act as a clearinghouse between correspondents offering comment and the authors involved. However, we reiterate the offer made in a recent issue to publish separately any letter that is of general interest. As stated in a recent letter from one of our regular contributors, Jerome Peppers, "Somehow it doesn't seem right that the content of a professional journal must generally reflect that all is right with the world and that all the 'professionals' are pleased and happy with events and things." If the volume of letters and their relevance to significant issues justify a separate forum, we will be more than willing to make room for it in future issues.

From the Editor s Aerie...... Facing Page Managing the Human Resources of the Total Force...... 2 Dr. Curtis W. Tarr The Unknown Professional Soldier...... 12 Maj. Pember W. Rocap, USAF Nuclear Proliferation and U.S. Security...... 19 Maj. Wayne L. Morawitz, USAF MBO: Experiences in a Nonprofit Government Agency...... 29 Maj. Joseph M. Syslo, USAF Seenotdienst: Early Development of Air-Sea Rescue...... 36 Capt. Earl Tilford, Jr., USAF Terrorism as a Military Weapon ...... 54 Jay Mallin Air Force Review Air-to-Air Training under the DOC System...... 65 Col. Robert D. Russ, USAF In My Opinion National Military Space Doctrine...... 75 Col. Morgan W. Sanborn, USAF Deterrence: Reckless Prudence...... 80 Dr. James A. Stegenga Never Awake a Sleeping Giant...... 84 Capt. James O. Younts III, USA Books And Ideas Zumwalt, An Intellectual Admiral...... 88 Dr. Paolo E. Coletta Potpourri...... 91 (The Contributors...... 95

ATTENTION The Air University Review is the professional journal of the United States Air Force and serves as an open forum for exploratory discussion. Its purpose is to present innovative thinking and stimulate dialogue concerning Air Force doctrine, strategy, tactics, and related national defense matters. The Review should not be construed as representing policies of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, or Air Uni­ versity. Rather, the contents reflect the authors' ideas and do not necessarily bear official sanction. Thoughtful and informed contributions are always welcomed. MANAGING TH HUMAN RESOURCES OF THE TOTAL FORCE D r . C urtis W. Tarr uman resources now cost established on 19 April 1974 with the considerably more than all other broadest charter ever devised for such defense expenditures combined. an undertaking: to consider all of the hu­ HWill this growing share of the budget man problems in the Department of De­ eventually cripple the nation’s ability to fense and the armed forces, including acquire new weapon systems and carry­ the entire fife cycle of manpower and out the research and development to personnel matters, for active and Re­ help the United States maintain a com­ serve forces, civilians in DOD, and pri­ petitive edge? If so, how can we hope to vate contractor personnel. gain an advantage over the forces of oth­ Two years later, after studying these er nations or alliances, or match the ad­ subjects in cooperation with a profession­ vancing sophistication of the weaponry al staff of about twenty, holding hearings they employ? At the same time, what and meetings in Washington and else­ will be our defense capability in the All where in the nation, and making numer­ Volunteer Force (AVF) environment? ous trips to visit the armed forces, the These questions worried members of commissioners submitted their compre­ the United States Senate as they debated hensive report. Although it is difficult to the Department of Defense (DOD) au­ condense over four hundred pages of ar­ thorizations for fiscal year 1974. Senators gument and recommendations into a Lloyd Bentsen and Howard H. Baker, Jr., short article, readers of the Air Universi­ thereupon suggested that an indepen­ ty Review may wish to know some of the dent commission be formed to consider key recommendations of the report, par­ the problems related to defense man­ ticularly as they relate to the United power. As the Senate weighed this possi­ States Air Force. bility, other members suggested Commissioners reached the general additional concerns worthy of investiga­ conclusion that manpower can be stud­ tion: What are the socioeconomic effects ied rationally only as one system, not as of volunteerism? How many people will a series of systems. The parts of the man­ we require within the next decade? How power system relate so closely that it is well do we utilize people? Do we pay seldom possible to make a change to one them adequately and fairly? Can our without affecting the others, sometimes present forces carry out their missions? adversely. When someone alters one seg­ Convinced that a study could prove ment, he may improve it, but he also helpful, the Senate wrote into the au­ may cause burdens elsewhere that ex­ thorization bill the language to create an ceed the gain he has effected. The Com­ investigative group; House members mission attempted to study manpower as concurred in conference. Thus the De­ a whole, although to do so requires a dis­ fense Manpower Commission, consisting cipline that vastly complicates the ap­ of seven members (four appointed by the proach to specific problems. Let us look Congress, three by the President), was at the major inquiries of the report. 3 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW projected manpower needs sion staff has estimated that a National Although it has become a vital element Guard infantry battalion (with a low in our defense planning, the total force readiness rating) costs 12 to 15 percent of still is far from a reality. Many Army Na­ an active one while an Air National tional Guard and Reserve units cannot Guard A-7 unit (with a high readiness be ready for deployment overseas within rating) costs 65 percent of an active one. ninety days; twice that time would be Obviously, both readiness and capital in­ more realistic. Air National Guard and vestment influence substantially the to­ Reserve units, with high levels of sup­ tal cost of the unit. port, usually have excellent readiness Looking at the combatant force struc­ ratings. But ground units too often have ture of the Air Force, the Commission been plagued by inadequate equipment concurred in the expansion of the tacti­ and training time, the latter particularly cal forces from 22 to 26 wings. To accom­ in the larger units that require more modate these units within the existing time for readiness than possibly can be force structure, the Air Force must available to them. Despite gratifying economize in the use of military person­ progress recently, the Navy does not yet nel. It is possible to do so in a number of adequately utilize its surface Reserve. ways. Probably these four new wings can The logic of a total force policy implies be accommodated on existing bases to a mix of active, Reserve, and civilian reduce support costs. In addition, some manpower to accomplish the missions of facilities could be closed if it becomes each service. That mix cannot be as cost politically feasible to do so. Commission­ effective as we might wish, however, un­ ers believe that more civilians could be less a manager knows the actual costs of utilized in support organizations, only a manpower types, including the entire portion of which are ever deployed. life-cycle costs from recruitment to Many of the Air Force industrial facilities retirement. Such cost data do not now could make more extensive use of labor- exist, and many estimates are grossly saving equipment if the constraints on misleading. The tendency is to calculate acquisition were eased. The Air Force only the immediate out-of-pocket ex­ should use contract personnel more fre­ penses of a person’s salary, disregarding quently; the test at Vance Air Force the supporting benefits provided, the in­ Base, Oklahoma, may provide insight vestment in training and professional de­ that can be useful at other installations. velopment, and ultimately, also, the Furthermore, in using contractors, the retirement benefits that will be supplied. Air Force should determine the job to be With adequate cost data, each service done, not how to do it, in order to en­ probably could develop a better man­ courage an imaginative approach by the power mix than the one presently used, firm making the bid. Commissioners be­ particularly if the manager had more lieve that contracting can be expanded flexibility in the choice of manpower to substantially without hindering the de­ accomplish the mission. ployment of fighting units. When assess­ A case in point is the cost of Reserve ing contractor costs, the services must forces. Although too often we deal with compare them with life-cycle military or rules of thumb for guidance, such as “a civilian costs, not merely those immedi­ Reserve component costs only one-fifth ately out of pocket. as much as an active one,” the Commis­ The Reserve Associate Program, MANAGING HUMAN RESOURCES 5 which has brought so much credit to the These are bold assumptions that prob­ Air Force for imaginative use of Reserve ably will not prevail for a decade. But if personnel, should be expanded to in­ they do, then the Commission believes clude other missions, particularly where that our active military forces should be it is desirable to improve the wartime maintained at approximately their surge capability. Commissioners specu­ present strength of 2.1 million person­ lated particularly upon the use of associ­ nel. Civilian personnel could be reduced ate personnel with active-duty tactical somewhat, perhaps by seventy or eighty fighter and reconnaissance squadrons. thousand to a level of one million, assum­ Where possible, support functions ing base closures, the use of more labor- should be consolidated so that one facil­ saving equipment, and the employment ity could accommodate several Reserve of more contract personnel. The Select­ units. As with the active units, deploy­ ed Reserve should continue at about ment should determine the numbers of 890,000, provided the Navy finds a use military personnel required in a unit, for its surface reserve. Private contract thereby opening possibilities for both personnel could increase. civilian employment and contracting. When a Reserve unit has a rating of C-3 or better, then only one active force ad­ recruiting recommendations visor is needed, a change that would Although the Air Force can be proud of reduce the number of advisors without its success in attracting volunteers curbing effectiveness. throughout the period of conscription, Certainly an important and probably the All Volunteer Force has imposed an indispensable element in Reserve some strains on recruiting efforts. But force readiness has been the use of tech­ largely these have fallen on the other nicians. But this program is more costly services, particularly the Army and the than need be, owing to the dual role of Marines, which must attract men into the technician. The Commission recom­ ground combat jobs where the technical mended the use of National Guard and training opens few employment oppor­ Reserve personnel on active duty, re­ tunities in civilian life. For the most part, placing the technician who is both a civil the services all have made an excellent servant and a military reservist. This transition to the AVF. change, one that certainly would have to Commission staff members, on the ba­ be phased into operation to protect the sis of data collected, conclude that the rights of those presently employed, quality of the active forces, both in edu­ would preserve the concept of the citi­ cational level and mental category, has zen-soldier, improve command relation­ improved over the draft years. But the ships, and eliminate dual pay and opposite is true of the Reserve forces. retirement. The number of blacks has grown, with­ To determine the numbers of person­ out any indication that this has affected nel required by 1985, the Commission the ability of units to carry out their mis­ made several assumptions: that the Unit­ sions as some had suspected. The partici­ ed States would avoid hostilities, that we pation of women has increased, but the would maintain our relative defense Commission detected a continuing lack capabilities, and that the present inter­ of acceptance of them. There is little evi­ national situation would not change. dence that volunteerism has changed 6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the geographic or economic composition cy of varying rather than rigid incentive of the forces; the services still draw their all the more attractive. numbers from the middle class. Flexibility in the use of quotas would The Commission considered carefully make it possible for recruiting managers whether the services should adopt a rep­ to weigh the propensity of young people resentational policy. To write such a in one area to enlist or to assess local eco­ statement that would encourage rather nomic conditions. Likewise, recruiters than inhibit improvement would require should be measured on the success or the skills of a poet laureate, the experi­ failure of those they recruit, based upon ence of a statesman, and the wisdom of job performance. A single mental test Solomon. The Commission concluded should be employed by all of the services that the armed forces should recruit and and administered by joint teams inde­ assign personnel without regard to rep­ pendent of the recruiting forces. The resentation, except for women where tests should be changed frequently to the case is special and requires excep­ avoid compromising them. tional handling. To make certain that in­ Selection tests should measure the stitutional discrimination does not likelihood that a recruit will complete his continue in career patterns and assign­ enlistment satisfactorily rather than pre­ ments, the leadership from the Secretary dict his success in training. By using a of Defense downward must take a per­ least-cost analysis, the Air Force prob­ sonal interest in equal opportunities for ably could improve its assignment of per­ women and members of racial minority sonnel to augment the success of its groups. In particular more women and recruits. Study of this section of the re­ minority officers must be attracted and port could provoke a healthy discussion then encouraged to advance through the of Air Force assignment methods. ranks. A most important charge to the Com­ The Commission made many specific mission was to explore the future of the recommendations on recruiting opera­ All Volunteer Force. To do so, one must tions that merit the consideration of look at the supply of men during the next those actively engaged in the responsi­ decade, the period of study assigned to bility. Of general interest was the sugges­ the Commission, and the alternatives for tion that the services be given flexibility employment that will be available to in the use of incentives and options so young people during that time. The sup­ that the amount offered is commensu­ ply will diminish between now and 1985 rate with the need at a particular time. (and more sharply after that). Employ­ For instance, in those months where ment will depend upon the vigor of the larger numbers of people must be at­ economy. Members of the Commission tracted to fill training programs or to staff calculated the success of recruit­ make up for retirements, perhaps incen­ ment, assuming the continuing competi­ tives should be increased, with corre­ tiveness of financial incentives, for an sponding reductions during months economy that grows rapidly, moderate­ when fewer people are required. Like­ ly, or slowly. wise, the state of the economy and the The study concluded that the active time of year will determine to some de­ forces will not encounter difficulty at­ gree the recruiting competitiveness of tracting volunteers during the next the armed forces, thereby making a poli­ decade if the economy grows slowly or MANA GINC HUMAN RESOURCES 7 moderately. But in a time of rapid eco­ nomic growth, the armed forces must development and use of manpower change their methods to attract youth; In the area of development and use, the the staff suggested revising physical and Commission determined how the serv­ mental standards, utilizing more wom­ ices select the person with appropriate en, offering more tempting bonuses, or education and motivation to do a job, providing more competitive salaries. train him, and make certain that he is Some combination of these alternatives available at an appropriate time. Obvi­ should attract sufficient numbers of qual­ ously no organization does this perfectly; ified people to make the AVF viable usually the services perform well. during periods of rapid growth until The Commission recommended that 1985. For the Reserve forces, present the Air Force not place undue emphasis methods probably will attract the neces­ on postgraduate work, illustrating that sary' volunteers during slow or moderate point by saying that except for scientific periods, but they will not avert signifi­ and technical assignments the bac­ cant shortfalls during rapid economic calaureate degree should be a sufficient growth. Major revisions and possibly a level of formal education to attain four- change in the locations of units might be star rank. The services should not estab­ necessary in a spirited economy. lish education and training facilities Commissioners were disturbed by cur­ where civilian institutions already are rent mobilization planning. In the event doing this work satisfactorily. Better uni­ of major hostilities, the armed forces, formity in classifying civilian and mili­ particularly those in ground combat, will tary jobs would make possible the depend upon the Individual Ready Re­ utilization of civilian training by the serve and the Standby Reserve to re­ armed forces, thus reducing military place casualty losses, until new men are training costs. provided by enlistment or conscription Instead of requiring advanced degrees and trained by the services. The Com­ by those assigned to certain positions, mission staff concluded that DOD esti­ the Air Force should determine the per­ mates of the size of this replacement centage of people holding similar posi­ pool were too optimistic. The staff also tions who need the degree. For example, judged that plans for reinstating con­ the Air Force might want 40 percent of scription from a small Selective Service those filling certain management posi­ headquarters—making necessary the es­ tions in the Logistics Command to hold tablishment of boards to carry out regis­ a master’s degree in business administra­ tration, appeals, and induction, and the tion, rather than designating particular delivery of men to the armed forces— positions, amounting to 40 percent of the would require a substantially longer time total, to be occupied by officers holding period than present mobilization esti­ the M.B.A. The former system would mates. Accordingly the Commission probably provide equally effective man­ recommended that the Selective Service agement with far fewer assignment System be reconstituted to conduct an­ problems. nual registration and classification of The services should encourage officers young men to make possible inductions to improve themselves through volun­ within thirty days of the declaration of an tary education programs related to their emergency. occupational assignments but not at the 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW expense of professional education. Ei­ professional. Promotion would be based ther professional education is vital to the upon years of service, time in grade, and military person’s preparation for ad­ performance. Normal retirement would vancement, and thus professional educa­ not come before thirty years, except for tion should be linked to promotion, or those engaged in combat jobs where the nation should avoid the expense of retirement could be earned at a faster professional education. The Commission rate. The elimination of the failure-ori­ affirms the former. ented “up or out” system should im­ prove both morale and performance. The retirement system would rein­ the future career force force this concept. Present annuities One of the boldest recommendations of payable after twenty years of service the Defense Manpower Commission re­ would be phased out, replaced by annui­ lates to the military career force of the ties payable when normal retirement future. Considering the increasing liabil­ under the new program was reached. In­ ity of the nation to pay retirement be­ creasing the length of service would nefits, one may conclude that this reduce the numbers actually retired and pattern cannot continue without serious­ thus those trained and educated. It prob­ ly affecting the ability of the nation to ably would make possible somewhat maintain adequate defense activities in longer tours as well. If a member of the the future. career force departed voluntarily, he The military career force may be sized would be offered an annuity payable at to provide the leadership for the armed age 65. Involuntary separatees would re­ services, or it may be sized to provide ceive the annuity at age 65 plus a separa­ opportunities for advancement under an tion readjustment, or they could elect to “up or out” system. The Commission receive a double readjustment payment. recommends the former, tempered by The Commission staff tested this re- personnel management considerations, quirements-based concept on a USAF rather than the latter which is now em­ officer force of 97,841 people, the objec­ ployed. Under this recommendation, the tive of the Defense Officer Personnel career force would include all officers Management Act (DOPMA). It is pos­ and NCOs who had served ten years or sible that in a requirements-based sys­ longer. Coming to the ten-year point, a tem a smaller career force would person would be chosen for the career provide appropriate leadership, but no force or separated. Only those who are attempt was made to determine these needed to manage the total professional possible savings. Comparing the costs of force would be selected. Once chosen, a the DOPMA force against a require­ person would not be required to advance ments-based one, calculating personnel in rank to remain in the force; a person flows by computer simulation, the staff would be separated only for failure to calculated that the DOPMA force, in­ meet professional standards of perfor­ cluding retirement, would cost $3.3 bil­ mance or for a reduction in service lion annually, compared to the strength. requirements-based force of less than Career force personnel would be $3.1 billion, or a saving each year of more grouped into broad categories, such as than $200 million. A similar study of the combat, technical, administrative, and Army enlisted force indicated savings of MAN A GINC HUMAN RESOURCES 9 more than twice that amount, indicating ing the Commission was to determine the magnitude of cost reductions pos­ how the level of military and civilian sible (provided that Commission staff as­ salaries should be set. Presently, military sumptions are valid) if this approach compensation is geared to civil service were taken throughout DOD. The mat­ salary levels through the linkage estab­ ter obviously merits thoughtful consider­ lished by the Rivers Amendment. Intro­ ation. duced as a temporary expedient many years ago, that legislation continues to do imperfectly what various Administra­ pay and benefits tions and the Congress have not other­ Commission recommendations on com­ wise determined: how to compensate pensation were as varied as the elements military people in a manner that is both of this baffling, complicated subject. The competitive and equitable. staff looked carefully at the various com­ The imperfection of the present sys­ ponents of compensation, making in the tem has at least two major causes. Civil process a detailed study of the military service salaries now are set by determin­ estate program. The Commission recom­ ing comparability between government mended that the services be given flexi­ jobs and those in private enterprise. Al­ bility in the management of bonuses and though appearing straightforward, the special payments to military personnel actual process of finding comparable jobs so that these could be employed only is difficult and in many cases not possible; when they are required to encourage the process of soliciting information nec­ that for which they were intended: en­ essarily involves flaws; and the applica­ listment, re-enlistment, acceptance of tion of this information usually favors the hazardous or unwelcome duty, or a vari­ civil servant. The Commission accord­ ety of situations that may or may not ex­ ingly accepted the concept of compara­ ist throughout the services. In order to bility as a guide to judgment, but not in eliminate differences in compensation the way it currently is being used. between married and single persons, the The second cause for doubt is that mili­ Commission recommended that the tary jobs often have little connection items of regular military compensation with those in civil service. The assump­ be converted into a fully taxable military tion that the relationship between ranks salary. It is understood that doing so and grades for military purposes will be would only eliminate the monetary nearly the same as for civilian purposes disadvantage single persons now have; it has serious limitations. would not save money because the salary But finding an alternative to this would be augmented to compensate for procedure is likewise perplexing. To the increased taxes. The Commission re­ abandon the Rivers Amendment could ported that institutional benefits, par­ threaten the orderly advance of military ticularly commissary and post exchange compensation during periods of infla­ privileges and medical care, are consid­ tion, whereas linking military and civil­ ered by military personnel to be much ian compensation brings together an more important than their cost to the impressive variety of interests in the government and thus should be main­ Congress. Thus any approach should be tained. one that continues to view the total prob­ One of the most difficult problems fac­ lem of Federal compensation rather 10 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW than military salaries alone. sonally. It is difficult to maintain pride in Accordingly, the Commission recom­ a force that is pilloried as wasteful, lazy, mended the establishment of a perma­ corrupt, gluttonous, or lawless. Although nent and independent Federal most of us realize that the balance of Compensation Board, composed of full­ judgment in the nation lauds our mili­ time members charged with the respon­ tary forces, a few comments by candi­ sibility of studying and recommending dates, Congressmen, or other national levels of compensation for those in all leaders can disillusion some of our most major Federal pay systems. The Board patriotic military people. should be authorized to employ a staff Who represents us, they question? The large enough to study the circumstances Commission answered that the Chief of related to recruitment and retention of Staff should do so, and that to serve this personnel in each of these systems, es­ function he must have the freedom to tablishing equity between various occu­ speak. No one questions the necessity for pations and conditions of service. The military personnel, including the Chief Board would report both to the Presi­ of Staff, to take orders. But until the or­ dent and to the Congress under appro­ der is given, the Chief of Staff should be priate procedures for publication and permitted to express concern. This has implementation, providing an opportu­ been possible less frequently as the roles nity to either the President or the Con­ of the National Security Advisor, the gress to set aside recommendations Secretary of State, the Secretary of De­ within a specified time before they fense, and the Director of the Office of would take effect. Establishing such a Management and Budget have grown board would be a major departure from more prominent in the determination of present methods. But the Commission national policy. concluded that the immediate system for Without an effective spokesman, determining military compensation young people in the ranks will think needs major revision, and this means of more about the apparent advantages of doing so should be assessed. inviting unions to represent them. If this occurs, then command authority and human considerations union membership will vie for the pri­ mary allegiance of the military person, The leadership of the Air Force im­ all to the confusion of operations and the pressed the Commission. Commanders ultimate detriment of the nation’s de­ usually are responsible, imaginative, and fense. This issue presently demands the competent. Morale of the people of the attention of the President, the Secretary Air Force seems good; it appears that of Defense, and the Congress. units can carry out their missions, as they In the AVF, human considerations did with such skill in Southeast Asia. eventually will help to determine what But that is not to say that there are no weapons we can employ and where we problems. Many young people, and can employ them. As options increase for sometimes career personnel, believe young people in a growing economy, that the nation has failed to keep its im­ military personnel will have less interest plied promises to them. When they hear in unaccompanied tours, isolated posts, national leaders speak against the mili­ demanding hours, and harsh conditions tary, they often take that criticism per­ of life and service. By this I do not imply MAN A CING HUMAN RESOURCES 11 that the youth of America will not accept they always have in all human enter­ the challenge of the difficult, the unusual, prise. Agamemnon’s warriors before the dangerous: a glance at what they face Troy or Alexander’s forces at Arbela in athletics dismisses that fear. But the have their modern counterparts. We re­ services cannot assume dedication to a member how the Luftwaffe collapsed in professional life that involves too much World War II after the best German pi­ drudgery or misery, or too many lonely lots had been lost, and those who re­ hours plagued by concern for loved ones. placed them were not trained well Thus human considerations must be as­ enough to match Allied airmen. Today sessed in the determination of what the the individual in the cockpit remains, al­ nation should undertake and how it though with a much different assignment should do so. than in former days. But behind him are The real test of Air Force is perform­ other heroes, crucial to success and in ance when the nation needs air power. greater numbers: those who design, pro­ This may be during an emergency or a cure, and maintain complicated weapon demonstration of force or a war. We systems. maintain costly forces to prevent their Thus the management of human re­ use as well as to employ them if need be. sources will be an important determi­ In either case, flawless performance is nant of Air Force success in America’s the means to success. future. To affirm that, for the Air Force Too often we think in terms of superi­ and the other services as well, the Com­ or design, or better manufacturing, or mission concluded that Defense Man­ larger numbers, or more skillful deploy­ power management truly is the keystone ments. But behind all of these concepts, of national security. people will determine success, just as Moline, Illinois

Manpower costs are high, but the trend in constant dollars over the past 13 years is about steady. In fact, manpower costs as a percentage of the federal budget and the Gross National Product (GNP) have been declining since fiscal 1973. . . . Lt Gen H ar o l d G. M oor e US. Army SOLDIER M ajor Pember W. Rocap SK any military leader to give an 1) Reputable outside observers of mili­ after-dinner speech to or about tary affairs have not considered the NCO AkNCOs,and everyone worth the salt a member of the military profession. on the meal preceding his remarks will, like Kipling, refer at least once to the 2) The Air Force NCO has perceived NCO as “the backbone of the Army,” or and reacted to this exclusion in several the Air Force, or whatever the appropri­ ways. ate service. Such predictable conduct at 3) Recent Air Force efforts to improve the speaker’s podium, like behavior un­ the NCO corps, though extensive, der fire or in any other stressful situation, needed, and effective, will not be com­ is primarily a matter of past experience plete until the NCO’s status in the profes­ and conditioning. Those with a full mili­ sion is adequately examined. tary career have had enough personal 4) Continued disregard of the issue experience confirm the importance of could have potentially serious conse­ the NCO to the success of any military quences. organization that making the “back­ 5) An adequate examination of this is­ bone” analogy is almost instinctive. sue is not possible until at least three in­ The Air Force considers its NCO corps hibiting attitudes within the military are so valuable that it has recently made and recognized and removed. is still making an extensive effort to im­ These five points indicate both the es­ prove the NCO’s status. Despite these sence and the broad outline of the discus­ recent efforts and the long-recognized sion that follows. The underlying theme importance of the NCO to the military, is that some of the most serious person­ one key question has not been satisfac­ nel problems facing the Air Force and torily answered: Is the NCO a member of the military cannot be fully understood, the military “profession” or simply a gov­ much less solved, outside the context of ernment worker in uniform in contrast this issue. Although the specifics of the to certain commissioned officers who are discussion are primarily Air Force ori­ professional military men? ented, the issue is probably not restricted The purpose of the article is to address to the Air Force. In fact, it may be a this question. Whether or not it provides source of even greater aggravation to ca­ an acceptable answer is another matter. reer Army and Marine Corps NCOs re­ Finding such an answer depends on un­ sponsible for leading troops in combat. derstanding that: The most commonly accepted view of 13 14 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the NCO’s “professional” status has as well. In the process, however, they come from outside the military. This is debar the NCO from the profession at not surprising, considering the relatively large: Huntington by direct statement, restricted professional autonomy of the Janowitz more by assumption. Even American military profession (especially those studies that have concentrated ex­ when compared to the military in other clusively on the enlisted man, such as countries and other professions in this American Enlisted Man: The Rank & country). Civilian theoreticians deter­ File in Today’s Military by Charles C. mine much of the American military’s Moskos, Jr., and the earlier The Ameri­ guiding strategy; politicians select its se­ can Soldier by Samuel A. Stouffer et al., nior leaders and can specify its member­ viewed the enlisted man and NCOs as ship qualifications and composition; and sociological phenomena in uniform rath­ men in mufti have written the most com­ er than members of the military profes­ prehensive descriptions of the nature of sion. The latter possibility is not even the profession and its relation to the seriously considered. state. This theoretical exclusion of the NCO The major authorities in the latter from the military profession by the aca­ group, of course, are Samuel P. Hunting- demics has been experienced and acted ton and Morris Janowitz. Differing in upon in actuality by the Air Force NCO their disciplinary approaches to the in several ways. The establishment and, study of the military and in their conclu­ in recent years, the phenomenal growth sions about the degree of basic conserva­ of the Air Force Sergeants Association tism within the military, both place the (AFSA) have occurred not least because NCO outside the “real” military profes­ of a perceived lack of adequate attention sion. The expertise-responsibility-corpo- to enlisted concerns by the longer estab­ rateness conceptualization of the lished and much larger Air Force Asso­ military profession in Huntington’s The ciation (AFA). Although the AFA opens Soldier and the State explicitly excludes its membership to all ranks, spells “air the NCO. Right from the beginning, power” as one word (with power insepa­ Huntington addresses the sloppy and rable from air), and speaks with une­ confusing use of “professional,” which qualed eloquence on its behalf to anyone has “obscured the difference between who will listen, AFSA membership (en­ the career enlisted man who is profes­ listed and former enlisted only) has sional in the sense of one who works for grown from about 8000 in 1971 to more monetary gain and the career officer who than 51,000 today. Within the Air Force, is professional in the very different sense the exclusion of the subject of the NCO of one who pursues a ‘higher calling’ in from the deliberations of the profession­ the service of society.” The difference is al mainstream has also been noticed and so obvious to Janowitz in The Profession­ commented on by NCOs. In a 1973 study al Soldier that it is not even discussed. for the Air Force Senior NCO Academy, The professional soldier is an officer. Pe­ “The Air Force NCO, Motivation or riod. Complacency,” Senior Master Sergeant In fairness to both scholars, it should Michael L. Farino and Chief Master Ser­ be noted that their interest is focused on geant Carroll E. Vaughn wrote that professional military elites, a group ex­ “professional military publications such cluding not only NCOs but most officers as the Air University Review and the Air UNKNO WN PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER 15 Force Magazine have largely ignored positive suggestions for improvement the NCO.” They also indicated that their that had existed in and about the NCO attempts to collect authoritative back­ corps for at least the previous fifteen ground for their study were “fruitless.” years crystallized at the highest levels of The growth of the AFSA and the ob­ Air Force thinking during the summer of servations of Sergeants Farino and 1975. At that time, the Air Force Man­ Vaughn are specific reactions directly at­ agement Improvement Group, as part of tributable to the “professional” exclusion its primary goal of enhancing the quality of the NCO. In a more general sense, the of Air Force life, concentrated on pos­ exclusion has also been partly respon­ sible measures to improve the status and sible for the long-term dissatisfaction abilities of Air Force NCOs. A cross sec­ within the Air Force NCO corps about its tion of ranks, specialties, and commands status and prestige. Unfortunately, this participated, including several represen­ source of that dissatisfaction has never tatives from the areas most concerned been openly identified. As a result, re­ with personnel perceptions and policies: cent and ongoing efforts by the Air Force information and personnel. Meanwhile, to improve NCO status are still incom­ many major commands and nonperson­ plete. In no way should this detract from nel specialties were already finding ways either the laudable motives behind or to provide NCOs, especially senior the effectiveness of many of these efforts. NCOs, more challenging and responsible In fact, they may be the most important duties. internally generated Air Force person­ As a result of these efforts, existing nel actions of the past five years. In a NCO grade structure and titles have un­ military institution already deserving its dergone a thorough examination and reputation for progressive personnel transformation to a three-tier force for policies, this would be no small accom­ management purposes; skill descriptions plishment. and codes have been reworked and com­ Yet, when one considers the debatable bined, with a trend toward the emer­ status of the NCO in the profession, the gence of the so-called generalist total impact of the efforts becomes some­ supervisor/manager over the technician what paradoxical. Some unintentionally in the upper NCO ranks; senior NCOs reflect a move toward, and thus support are being systematically assigned to posi­ for, inclusion of the NCO in the corpo­ tions previously filled by commissioned rate profession. Others reveal a serious officers; and the leadership and disregard of the NCO’s professional ex­ managerial abilities of the entire NCO clusion as an important, if not central, corps are being extensively developed in factor in the status and prestige problem. resident NCO academies, at specific A brief review of recent activity in this bases selected to test a realignment of area will make these conflicting aspects education responsibilities in this area un­ more apparent. der a single local manager, and across the Air Force by traveling teams from the USAF Leadership and Management De­ velopment Center. On the one hand, some of these M any of the frustrations, changes effectively erase many former problems, gripes, misconceptions, and distinctions between officers and NCOs 16 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW in terms of responsibility and position. As of whatever other duty differences exist such, they inadvertently provide support among various ranks, there is one all-in­ for the incorporation of the NCO in the clusive role description that not only all military’s professional concept. On the NCOs but all NCOs and officers share as other hand, not only has there been no military professionals. Professional re­ mention of this possibility, the primary sponsibility varies only in degree, never reasons given for instituting many of the in kind, within the profession. changes indicate that all of us in the Air Overall, one of the most important re­ Force, officers and NCOs, may have been sults of recent Air Force efforts to im­ Homerically nodding on this particular prove NCO status may be the clear issue. According to a recent Air Force indication given of what else needs to be News Service editorial, “NCO Prestige done. Identifying the missing piece in a and the Three-Tier Enlisted Force”: 1000-piece puzzle is much easier after For the past several years, noncommis­ the other 999 pieces have been assem­ sioned officers (NCOs) have expressed the bled. The missing piece in this case indi­ feeling of losing their rank and job pres­ cates what basis, if any, exists for tige. One reason is a perceived confusion including the NCO in the military over roles and responsibilities and a feel­ ing that NCO talent is being underutil­ profession proper. When completed, this ized. A contributing factor is that AFR puzzle should portray a satisfactory 39-6, “Duties and Responsibilities of the working concept of the profession. Noncommissioned Officer,” specifies just By far the greatest pressure for finding one all-inclusive role description for that piece and re-examining the milita­ grades E-4 through E-9. ry’s entire professional concept current­ Also, questions have continually arisen ly comes from outside the military. It is over whether the E-4 is an NCO. The feel­ generated by the spectre of military un­ ing exists that “everyone is a sergeant,” ionization. As in other issues examined therefore lessening the prestige of holding earlier, most of the debate over unioni­ NCO status. zation has not even acknowledged much Along with this, similar questions exist less seriously considered perhaps the as to whether the E-7 is considered a sen­ most important factor involved, that is, ior NCO. The end result was a clear indi­ the NCO-military profession question. cation that the Air Force needed to face Military unionization, above all else, de­ the NCO issues if they were going to in­ pends on equating the officer-enlisted re­ sure a quality, productive force for the fu­ lation to a management versus labor ture. basis, with all the divergent interests in­ Obviously, the possibility that the herent to that view. Such a distinction more fundamental issue may be the within the military is false. The previous NCO in relation to the basic corporate brief description of changing NCO roles concept of the military profession pro­ should have made this apparent. The vides a different perspective on the only meaningful distinction in the mili­ above reasons. From this- perspective, tary is between the professional and the NCO prestige depends not on whether nonprofessional. It is to the everlasting an E-4 is an NCO or an E-7 a senior NCO credit of the professionalism of many but on whether an NCO of any rank can NCOs that they have recognized the be a corporate member of the military disaster unionization would be for the profession. If he can be, then regardless military. If any doubt exists about the UNKNO WN PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER 17 ability of NCOs, as a group, to accept and order to avoid appearance of elitism. In place the essence of the military profes­ the interest of thorough consideration on sion above self, the unequivocal state­ all sides, such emotionalism must be ex­ ment of the AFSA against unionization cluded from the outset. The major inhib- should help dispel it. All of which seems iter of all is probably the notion that the to indicate that the exclusion of the NCO entire exercise is improper because it from the corporate concept of the does violate the traditional concept of profession may actually be more the profession as best articulated by theoretical than real. It certainly is not Huntington. Anyone arguing from this very practical. position should consider the following. First of all, as one respected military leader pointed out in these pages only last year, even the term “military profes­ To recommend, at this point, sionalism” has only recently become that as of 0800 tomorrow the profession­ widely known and used. In fact, anyone al concept of the American military who has served in the military long should incorporate eligible NCOs would enough to be eligible for twenty-year be easy, irresponsible, presumptuous, retirement benefits signed up before and quite possibly wrong. No single most people were aware there was a member of the military has the authori­ military profession—a military, yes; a ca­ ty, the wisdom, or even the right to make reer force, yes; but a profession, no. The such a recommendation. Clearly, how­ parameters, characteristics, and essential ever, it is necessary now for that profes­ nature of the American military profes­ sional concept to be re-examined with sion are still being determined. More­ the prospect of including the NCO. over, those best able to define any There are valid points to be made on profession are the members of that both sides of the issue. To ensure that an profession, including the military. While objective and thorough examination of certain attributes, such as a long-term the NCO-military profession issue can commitment to the higher ideals and occur, the existence of at least three atti­ ethos of the military, may be agreed on tudes that could inhibit such an examina­ as basic to the definition of a professional, tion must be recognized. Once other distinctions, such as that made be­ recognized, these inhibiters can be dis­ tween “managers of violence” and other carded and a truly “professional” debate specially skilled military members, are can occur. not necessarily the final or only basis for Conceivably, any debate on this issue identifying the military professional. could be inhibited on both the pro and Finally, in the absence of conscription, the con side and by doubts that there the all-voluntary membership of the should even be a debate. Some NCOs American armed forces can be placed in who could contribute valid support for four concentric groups: at the outer edge professional incorporation might hesi­ and leaving as soon as possible are the tate to do so to avoid appearing self-serv­ noncareerists whose commitment goes ing. In a similar way, those with equally no further than the end of their current valid reasons for maintaining the older, enlistment; one ring in are those who more theoretically tidy concept of the plan to stay long enough to qualify for profession might not put them forth in retirement benefits but who see their 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW service as a job, nothing more; next are boundaries of the profession are ill- those other careerists whose sense of ser­ defined. vice and dedication remains with them on and off duty, in and out of uniform; finally, at the nucleus, are the careerists, C learly, this issue must be confronted relatively few in number, who are the and thoroughly examined. If it is not, innovators, pacesetters, and leaders. The many recent advances by and for NCOs, members of this last group are a part of including the three-tier approach to the military profession just as clearly as managing the force, could degenerate the members of the first are not. It is into a bureaucratic shell game. within the middle two groups that the Air Force Logistics Management Center

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If your organization is not presently receiving its authorized copies of the Review, consult your Publications Distribution Officer. THE EDITOR NDIA’S DETONATION of her “peaceful nuclear explosive” in May I1974 was held by some to be a non- event, while others saw it as epoch-mak­ ing. For the first time a country other than one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council had demonstrated a nuclear explosives capability.1 While no additional mem­ bers have publicly joined the nuclear weapons club since that initial jumping of the firebreak, world events give little encouragement to hopes that member­ ship will be held to six. Informed sources have charged that Israel has already con­ structed six to ten atomic weapons;2 an Argentine legislator recently called for the construction of a nuclear weapon as a means of gaining prestige for Argen­ tina;3 and the world’s energy crisis will make it progressively easier for countries to indulge in nuclear weaponry as nu­ clear power stations produce more and more reactor by-products that can be processed into weapons-grade fuel. Nations might wish to construct nu­ clear weapons for any number of specific reasons, but these reasons can be gener­ alized into a few broad categories: to in­ crease military power to counter an immediate military threat; as an extra measure of insurance against the capri­ ciousness of an unpredictable future, NUCLEAR such as situations in which a more power­ ful nation would attempt coercion; or to PROLIFERATION display the capability to the world solely for its prestige value in order to increase AND U.S. the country’s status in subjects not neces­ sarily related to military matters. SECURITY Lincoln Bloomfield has estimated that the construction of new nuclear power Major Wayne L. Morawitz stations will give present nonnuclear weapons countries a potential by the early 1980s to make 50 atomic bombs per week.4 The prospects of such a wide­ spread proliferation of nuclear weapons 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW have resulted in an extensive body of lit­ ment. Fortunately for the country that erature concerned with general disrup­ wants to build an atomic device, how­ tion in the world order and dangers to ever, there are very few secrets standing world peace resulting from such prolifer­ in the way. In fact a newspaper article ation.5 Herman Kahn has estimated that has told of a young college student who 50 small nations could have impressive designed an atomic bomb, using techni­ nuclear arsenals by the year 2000 and cal data widely available in unclassified predicts that under such conditions the sources.7 international system would be in a virtu­ The theory is simple: bring together al state of anarchy.6 enough of any one of several fissionable Although such dire predictions may materials to form a critical mass. If this eventually prove true, they also may material is brought together quickly have obscured the need to give more at­ enough, the energy released by the spon­ tention to what can be expected in the taneous chain-reaction splitting of the immediate future: the future toward atoms of the substance will result in an which we must develop plans, against explosion. For instance, a mass of which we must allocate resources, and in plutonium can be constructed just below which we must deploy weapon systems. its critical mass, which is from four to While it may be theoretically possible for seven kilograms,8 depending on the 50 more nations to have constructed purity of the material, and an additional atomic bombs within the next 25 years, amount of plutonium can then be fired, our immediate concern must be what like a bullet, into the first. If the total can be expected to take place over the mass is greater than the critical mass, and next few years. Only in a more restricted if the “bullet” is fast enough, an explo­ time frame can useful predictions be sion will result from the sudden release made and practical measures taken to of energy involved in the chain-reaction counter perceived threats. Therefore, fission. While this particular technique ten years into the future will be the far has not proved very efficient, it illustrates horizon of this study. Any attempt to the basic requirements for producing a forecast beyond that is too speculative to nuclear explosion. be useful when examining specific coun­ Whereas the theory is well known, in tries’ capabilities. The discussion will be practice several problems arise. The first further restricted by limiting it to the is getting the fissionable material. Since direct military threat of nuclear prolifer­ two of the materials that can be used are ation to the security and vital interests of isotopes of uranium, U233 and U235, it is the United States during that period. possible to make atomic bombs out of uranium. Naturally occurring uranium, however, has very little of the fissionable T he nuclear powers have isotopes.* For instance, only 0.71 per­ shown an understandable reluctance to cent of natural uranium is U235.9 Natural share control or give away their atomic uranium can be enriched; through physi­ weapons. With the exceptions of the cal separation techniques, the percent­ United States toward Britain and Russia age of fissionable isotopes can be toward China prior to 1961, the nuclear •Isotopes of a given element have the same number of nuclear protons but differing numbers of neutrons. Naturally occurring chemical elements are powers have shown a similar reserve in usually mixtures of isotopes so that observed atomic weights are average sharing the secrets of weapons develop­ values for the mixture. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 21 increased. It is possible to enrich urani­ lion research and development (R&D) um until it is of weapons-grade quality, effort to develop the first one. He es­ but this is, at present, a very expensive timated $5 million per year to adapt and undertaking. maintain a rudimentary, nonspecialized Another fissionable isotope is the delivery system.10 His estimate for a plutonium isotope Pu239- This isotope is a modest program of more sophisticated by-product of virtually every nuclear smaller bombs and a specialized delivery reactor now in operation. Thus, while system was between $230 and $310 mil­ reactors may be designated in a variety lion per year over a ten-year period. Fi­ of ways, such as “military” or “power” nally, Beaton also analyzed the well reactors, even the peaceful electrical documented British and French pro­ power station reactors produce plutoni­ grams to establish the cost of a small um that can be extracted from other force of superpower quality. He found waste products and transformed into that the British program cost $300 mil­ bombs. This method is not inexpensive lion per year and the French $336 mil­ either; but it is less expensive than en­ lion per year over a twenty-year riching uranium to a weapons-grade period.11 These estimates are for pro­ quality, and the growing number of nu­ grams starting from scratch. Further, the clear power reactors in the world is in­ annual costs are averages for the respec­ creasing the available supply of tive ten- and twenty-year totals, but a plutonium from which nuclear weapons few of the yearly figures are very much can be made. higher than the average while others are If a country embarks on a program to lower. deploy a nuclear weapon system, the first Nearly a decade later, in 1974, Van obstacle to be overcome is the research Cleave noted that “non-electrical gene­ that would be required to develop the rating reactors capable of producing final configuration as well as a delivery enough plutonium for a half dozen to a system for the weapons. Another signifi­ couple of dozen bombs per year are cant factor, of course, is cost. available on the open market for prices William Van Cleave and Leonard Bea­ ranging from about $15 million to $75 ton have attempted to place a cost on million, perhaps including the initial fuel programs necessary to develop a nuclear loading.”12 He estimated the cost of a weapons capability. Beaton estimated in fuel fabrication plant at $3 million and 1966 that a $450 million investment over pointed out that India’s plutonium sepa­ a ten-year period could support a mini­ ration plant cost $7 million. He put the mal nuclear force of five bombs a year. cost of a weapons laboratory at $3 mil­ This sum included the costs of modifying lion.13 its existing commercial or military air­ Many countries have decided to build craft, for delivering nuclear bombs. His nuclear reactors for power production. If estimates included $100 million for refin­ they later decide to use the plutonium ing uranium to fuel grade, a reactor, and waste products for weapons, additional a plutonium separation plant. He allot­ funding will be required only for separa­ ted another $75 million for constructing tion plants, weapons laboratories, initial and instrumenting a test range. Twenty r & d costs, and delivery systems. A rudi­ million dollars per year went for produc­ mentary system, assuming the reactor is tion costs for the bombs after a $25 mil­ already available, should be on the order 22 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW of $350 to $400 million over a ten-year large amount of its gross national prod­ period. The percentage of the costs as­ uct (GNP) on developing nuclear weapons; sociated with offshoots of peaceful nu­ another country with the same economic clear technology can be expected to capability and gnp might opt for a very account for less of the total costs as the small conventional military force. military programs get more ambitious. The Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (npt) Thus, even discounting the costs of nu­ is a useful analytic tool that gives a rough clear power reactors, the total costs of a indication of which countries do not wish modest or a superpower-quality force to pursue a nuclear weapons program would be approximately $3 billion or $6 and those that might wish to do so. The billion respectively, over ten- and very act of signing and ratifying the npt twenty-year periods. is strong indication of an intent not to As Beaton pointed out, both Britain build a nuclear force. While signing and and France spent approximately $6 bil­ ratifying the npt could be a subterfuge, lion over a twenty-year period to reach the difficulty of keeping such a program the level of sophistication that he termed secret would make such deviousness im­ “superpower quality.” Since there are no practical. It is also possible that a nation nations other than the existing five major may have signed the npt with every in­ powers presently committed to a goal of tention of abiding by it, yet a future building a superpower-quality force, it is change of government, widespread pro­ highly unlikely, and probably impossible, liferation, or some other unforeseen that any present nonnuclear weapons event could cause that country to renege country could, under any set of circum­ on the agreement. Nevertheless, since stances, develop a force of that quality there is no logical way to take such ran­ within the next decade. The possibility dom events into consideration, it will be that even one could do it is so remote assumed that a signature on the treaty that the question will be pursued no fur­ plus its ratification removes that country ther; therefore, only the possibilities of from contention for nuclear weapons minimal rudimentary or modest nuclear status in the near future. Even so, this programs will be considered. still leaves the rather large number of 61 nations that have not signed the docu­ ment or ratified it.14 THE PROBABILITY of a specific Walter Hahn has identified 26 of these country’s embarking on a nuclear weap­ as countries that he considers potential ons program is dependent on several fac­ nuclear weapons candidates. The 25—in tors, the most important being whether addition to India, which has already it can afford such a program. The sac­ demonstrated the capability—are listed rifices that a country will undergo to sup­ in Table l.15 These are the countries that port a program are, in turn, dependent either have significant natural uranium upon its motivation for desiring nuclear deposits or own, or soon will own, opera­ weapons. A very poor country may tional nuclear reactors that could pro­ desire nuclear weapons but not be able vide adequate amounts of fissionable to afford them, while a country that uranium or plutonium for bombs if could easily afford them may have no enough money and national commit­ need. Political and geographic factors ment were to be applied. could drive one country to expend a Of the several general reasons for a defense budget % o f GNP % increase for %increase for $ million for defense minimum program modest program

Algeria 285 3.2 12.3 105.3 Argentina 1,031 1.2 3.4 29.1 Bangladesh 65 1.2 53.8 461.5 Belgium 1,821 3.4 1.9 16.5 Brazil 1,283 1.4 2.7 23.4 Chile 213 1.2 16.4 140.8 Colombia 102 0.8 34.3 294.1 Egypt 6,103 34.1 0.57 4.9 India 2,660 3.1 1.3 11.3 Indonesia 1,108 7.4 3.2 27.1 Israel 3,503 29.9 1.0 8.6 Italy 3,891 2.6 0.90 7.7 Japan 4,484 0.93 0.78 6.7 Libya 203 3.4 17.2 147.8 Netherlands 2,936 4.2 1.2 10.2 North Korea 770 22.0 4.5 39.0 Pakistan 722 9.5 4.8 41.6 Portugal 701 5.7 5.0 42.8 Saudi Arabia 6,343 52.9 0.55 4.7 South Africa 1,332 4.1 2.6 22.5 South Korea 719 4.1 4.9 41.7 Spain 1,372 2.1 2.6 21.9 Switzerland 1,041 2.2 3.4 28.8 Turkey 2,174 6.8 1.6 13.8 Venezuela 494 2.6 7.1 60.7 West Germany 12,669 3.6 0.28 2.4 Table 1. Defense Budgets and Nuclear Force programs'6 country to initiate a nuclear weapons Turkey are countries that seem to have program, the need to counter an im­ the prerequisite motivation for pursuing mediate threat may be identifiably re­ a nuclear weapons program. Another lated to existing defense programs. If a nine nations (Algeria, Belgium, India, country feels immediately threatened or Libya, Netherlands, Portugal, South extremely vulnerable, a significant per­ Africa, South Korea, and West Germany) centage of that country’s gnp should al­ are in a lower category, which may imply ready be going toward conventional a definite concern with military security forces. Such a country should then be but to a lesser degree than the top seven. considered a prime candidate for a nu­ Of the nine, India’s 3.1 percent appears clear weapons program in the next few low when compared to the adversary Pa­ years. The large percentage of the gnp’s kistan because her gnp is so much larger. devoted to defense (Table 1) do appear South Korea’s 4.1 percent would prob­ to the author to reflect an approximate ably be much larger except for the mili­ relationship to known trouble spots in tary aid being provided by the United the world. Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, States. Bangladesh’s percentage would North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and probably be much larger also if not for 23 24 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW her unfortunate economic situation. percent increase in their defense budg­ Another reason for a country to go nu­ ets to develop a minimum nuclear force. clear could be to gain prestige and serve On the other hand, only Egypt, Israel, as a status symbol. Any country acting on Italy, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and West Ger­ such an ambiguous impulse would prob­ many could develop modest programs ably not be willing to spend as much on for less than a ten percent increase. a nuclear program as it would to counter Thus, for only a five percent increase in an immediate threat, but if it could their annual defense budgets, most of become a nuclear power at a relatively these countries could develop a mini­ insignificant cost, the temptation would mum program, and a few could develop be very great. As already indicated, a a modest program for less than ten per­ country would be facing an average an­ cent. Even a ten percent increase might nual increase to its defense budget of $35 come at great sacrifice, however, where million for a minimum nuclear force, or the defense budget already constitutes a $300 million for a modest nuclear force large percentage of the gnp (e.g., Egypt, in order to achieve its objective within Israel, and Saudi Arabia); Israel is a spe­ ten years. The last two columns of Table cial case since it may already have devel­ 1 are the percentages by which the an­ oped nuclear weapons and included the nual defense budgets must be increased cost in its present and several previous to accommodate additional $35 million budgets. and $300 million programs respectively. One of the requirements for develop­ It must be noted that these cost figures ing a delivery system for a minimum pro­ are only estimates. World inflation would gram is an existing conventional delivery almost surely have increased the ex­ system that can be modified for nuclear penses delineated by Van Cleave and warheads or bombs. “The Military Bal­ Beaton. On the other hand, new tech­ ance,” compiled by the International In­ nology may have reduced others or may stitute for Strategic Studies, London, and do so in the next few years. The estimates published by Air Force Magazine, was are probably as reasonable as any. used to determine which countries have Argentina was mentioned as one coun­ operational weapon systems that could try that is at least discussing the possibil­ conceivably be used as a nucleus for de­ ity of developing a rudimentary nuclear veloping a nuclear capable delivery sys­ weapons program for prestige purposes. tem. At this point, those countries that If Argentina can contemplate such a pro­ could deploy a tactical delivery system gram, other countries with comparable will be discriminated from those that or bigger defense budgets should also be conceivably could deploy a delivery sys­ considered potential status seekers; spe­ tem capable of placing nuclear weapons cifically, those countries which could de­ on American targets. velop a program with the same, or a Although an atomic bomb delivered lesser, percentage increase in their de­ by an F-4 might be quite spectacular, it fense budgets as Argentina’s 3.4 percent is of little military significance within the must be considered candidates, from an context of this discussion. To engage a economic standpoint, for small status­ nuclear power in nuclear warfare with­ seeking programs. Only Algeria, Bangla­ out the capability even to threaten the desh, Chile, Colombia, and Libya would enemy’s homeland would be foolish to require more than a rather modest five say the least. Such a scenario may not be NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 25 completely beyond the realm of possibil­ tries do have oceangoing naval vessels, ity, but common sense seems to dictate a however, which could be used to carry capability to reach American sovereign surface-to-surface missiles, cruise mis­ territory in order for another nuclear siles, or, in two cases, jet aircraft. The power to be considered a direct military Argentine and Indian navies both have a threat to the U.S. None of these countries single aircraft carrier. possess missiles with intercontinental ca­ Table 2 is a summary of these military pability. None of them possess long- capabilities as well as a summary of the range bombers, and only Israel owns air naval capabilities of each country. An X refueling tankers, so the threat to the in the first column indicates the country U.S. from long-range air or space attack may feel a need for more than a mini­ is nonexistent at this time and into the mum military establishment because of foreseeable future, unless Japan should critical regional hostilities or some other embark on a program to develop mili­ undefined fear about security reflected tary ic b m 's and, at the same time, turn in substantial military budgets. An X in hostile toward us. Many of these coun- the second column indicates the country could develop a nuclear force with less than a five percent increase in the de­ fense budget. An XX indicates the coun­ try could develop a modest force with Table 2. Nuclear needs and less than a ten percent increase. An X in capabilities 17 the third column indicates the country Naval possesses at least three oceangoing naval Threat Status Capability ships such as cruisers, destroyers, frig­ Algeria X ates, or submarines. A conventional Argentina XXforce of such ships implies the existence Bangladesh of the critical infrastructure of harbors, Belgium X X dry docks, refueling ships or friendly Brazil XX Chile X ports, and fuel supplies, as well as trained Colombia X personnel and training facilities. Egypt X XX X Table 2 shows that some of the coun­ India X X X tries do not have the military weapon Indonesia X X Israel X XX systems available for reconfiguration into Italy XX X nuclear-capable delivery systems. While Japan XX X this does not completely rule out the pos­ Libya X sibility of a country building a navy or air Netherlands X X X North Korea XX force with intercontinental capabilities, Pakistan X X X to do so would be both costly and time Portugal X X X consuming. This means that out of the Saudi Arabia X XX twenty-two countries which might be South Africa X X X tempted to build nuclear weapons for ei­ South Korea X X X Spain X X ther military security or prestige, only Switzerland X fourteen—Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Turkey X X X India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Pakis­ Venezuela X tan, Portugal, South Africa, South Korea, West Germany X XX X Spain, Turkey, and West Germany— 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW do so at the price of its very existence as Missile-carrying submarines obviously a sovereign nation. Any attempt at a present the greatest challenge, and sub­ clandestine or anonymous action would marine detection r &d must receive more be to risk everything if discovered. and more emphasis if additional nations Second, military intelligence-gather­ achieve a capability for submerged mis­ ing activities must include the capability sile-launching platforms. to detect newly acquired nuclear capabilities and to identify anonymous In summar y, any nation wishing to join delivery systems such as unmarked sub­ the ranks of the nuclear powers must be marines, ships, or aircraft anywhere in forced to observe the same ground rules the world. The technique and equip­ that have ostensibly governed the strate­ ment needed to perform this type of sur­ gic relations between the U.S. and the veillance for everything except the U.S.S.R. for the past 25 years. Each ad­ submarines are probably available but versary must be made to believe that a would require additional funds for ex­ nuclear attack on another will result in a pansion of existing programs. Positive retaliatory blow. Each nation must real­ identification and constant tracking of all ize that a decision to use a nuclear weap­ nuclear-weapons-carrying vessels com­ on must be taken with the bined with our present 474N submarine- understanding that it has done so in the launched ballistic missile (SLB.vi) detection face of the very gravest danger to itself. and warning net and our satellite-based If this holds true for future nuclear pow­ early warning system should give cre­ ers, the chances for nuclear attacks dence to a policy of assured retaliation. against the U.S. will be minimized, Lack of an extremely reliable and accu­ which may be the best that can be ex­ rate method of tracking all nuclear- pected in a world of nuclear prolifera­ weapons-carrying vessels could even in­ tion. vite catalytic and anonymous attacks. March Air Force Base, California

Notes 1. Lincoln P. Bloomfield. "Nuclear Spread and World Order,” Foreign Proliferation Phase II. edited by Robert M. Lawrence and Joel Larus (Law­ Affairs. July 1975. p. 751. rence: University Press of Kansas. 1974), p. 35. 2. Los Angeles Times. October 19. 1975, Part 1-A, p. 1. 10. Beaton, p. 32. 3. Bloomfield, p. 747. 11. Ibid., pp. 33-36. 4. Ibid., p. 750. 12. Van Cleave, p. 57. 5. For instance, see A World of Nuclear Powrs? edited by Alastair Bu­ 13. Ibid. chan (Englewood Cliffs. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966); and The Future 14. Walter F. Hahn, "Nuclear Proliferation,” Strategic Review. Winter of the International Strategic System edited by Richard Rosecrance (San 1975, pp. 17-18. Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company. 1972). 15. Ibid. 6. Herman Kahn. Thinking about the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon 16. The CNP’s and defense budgets are given for each country in the Press. 1962). pp. 210, 212. December 1975 issue of Air Force Magazine, which presents "The Military 7. Los Angeles Herald-Examiner. November 18, 1975. Balance" compiled by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Lon­ 8. Leonard Beaton, "Capabilities of Non-nuclear Powers,” .4 World of don, pp. 43-104. The percentages were calculated from these figures. Nucleim Powers? edited by Alastair Buchan, p. 17. 17. Ibid. 9. William Van Cleave. "Nuclear Technology and Weapons," Nuclear 18. ibid. MBO Experiences in a Nonprofit Government Agency Major Joseph M. Syslo

ILLIONS of words have been written about manage­ ment concepts. After twenty years or so one concept still remains controversial. It appears periodically in the management world, with successful results in some cases and Mdisaster in others. The unique feature of this one theory is that it resurrects and starts over in another location despite its spectacular failure elsewhere. The name of this management concept changes with each rebirth. It has been called “man­ agement by objectives,” “managing for results,” “manage­ ment by commitment,” “goals management,” and other variations. In spite of the name changes, it is still basically the same management concept that Peter Drucker wrote of in the early sixties. It was actually Dr. Kurt Lewin who coined the name “management by objectives” in the forties.1 The chang­ ing of names is not arbitrary, nor is an attempt to disguise the 29 30 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW system for a new try. The title change is There are other methods of measuring usually indicative of a change in the the success of management. The success­ overall system for that particular in­ ful, timely accomplishment of routine stance. That, perhaps, is the reason for tasks, the successful implementation of the overall success of management by an innovative system, the successful objectives (MBO). In order to succeed, completion, or, better yet, the start of a each program must be fitted to the orga­ developmental program brought out of nization it is to serve. the conceptual phase because of the im­ The purpose of this article is not to petus of a goal oriented management explain the inner workings of these system—all are indicators of manage­ many programs, their individual differ­ ment’s success. This is not to say that ences, or the general managerial tech­ profit is not an important and effective nique itself. Explanations and measurement. The comparison of last interpretations of the mechanisms will year’s profits to this year’s is a necessary, be inevitable. The main purpose is to valuable indication of growth and health. share some observations made while tak­ However, in addition to the comparison ing part in the implementation of such a of yearly profits, or the comparison of system in a government agency and pos­ costs incurred to benefits derived, the sibly demonstrate some of the pitfalls overall results of the organization’s ac­ that might lie in the path of a newly im­ tivities should also be measured, mbo is a plemented program. system that can do just that. In fact, mbo mbo programs are relatively new to might be better suited to a nonprofit or­ the general public. Originally, it was ganization because it can concentrate on thought that mbo would not fare well be­ actual results. cause of the lack of a proper measure­ Management by objectives started as a ment system, namely profit.2 It seems government-wide effort in 1973 by the that mbo was initially predicated on the Office of Management and Budget, in profit-loss statement as the best measure­ reaction to a presidential memoran­ ment of success or failure. In some cases dum.4 Some twenty-five or more govern­ this was the best measurement; in others ment agencies have instituted mbo in it was inconsequential. Drucker conclud­ one form or another, and they have had ed very early in his writings that a busi­ tentative success in some of the systems. ness should not be inbeing entirely for In the published literature on the sub­ the profit motive. A business concern ject, there are numerous ways listed of was also in operation to make a contribu­ “how not to” achieve program success. tion to the society.3 If his thought on the Dale McConkey lists twenty ways to kill matter has merit, then the profit-loss mbo. John Humble, the leading British statement does not have to be the sole management expert and a staunch indicator of success or failure of the en­ proponent of mbo, has also outlined a terprise or of the management system number of ways that mbo can fail.5 The that guides it. In keeping with this line of list inevitably grows—things to do, reasoning, the absence of profit-loss things not to do—as more and more or­ measurement, or even some form of ganizations try mbo. This is good! Critical cost-benefit measurement, would be in­ analysis provides for a healthy attitude consequential to assessing the progress and a way to further perfect the concept. of an mbo system. Judging from experience gained in the MHO 31 involvement of the field implementation subordinates to negotiate objectives and of the Management by Objectives/Re­ the plans to achieve them—all take time. sults (MBO/Ri program by the Air Force There is also a requirement to meet peri­ Contract Management Division (AFCMD) odically during the mbo cycle to deter­ of the Air Force Systems Command, one mine the status of these plans. This realizes that the list can be amplified. process consumes a large amount of the The mbo R program evolved as a result of key man’s time. Once the program is off the development and test by the head­ and running, the temptation is to back quarters staff of a system fitting the orga­ away and reduce time commitments be­ nization’s environments and needs.6 The cause of the evidence of initial program program has now completed two years, success. Time constraints should not be and an overall promise of good things is used as the rationale for lessening top indicated, if care is taken to avoid certain management involvement. The factors obvious pitfalls. of geographical remoteness, travel time, expense, and key personnel availability top level support should not dictate any lessening of top Of the many woes that can beset an mbo management involvement. An mbo pro­ program, lack of top management sup­ gram will place hardship on key person­ port is by far the leading killer. Top man­ nel and will place heavy demands on the agement support is the first requirement time of managers. The point that mbo levied by most mbo proponents. This re­ was chosen to be the main method of quirement was also stated to be one of management can easily be overlooked. The purpose of mbo is to change the the primary concerns with the im­ organization from an activity-oriented to plementation of the afcmd program: a results-oriented operation.8 Implemen­ The first step in implementing mbo is the at­ tation of such a system indicates that tainment of top level support. If there is one management wants to: significant element that can cause mbo pro­ grams to fail, it is lack of full commitment by 1 . identify the command’s direction, 2 . prioritize resource allocation, and the head of the organization.7 3. measure effectiveness. This is not a new or profound analysis. These improvements cannot be made Then why reiterate it? Because allowing unless management support is indicated this support to falter under any circum­ and perceived by subordinates. stance or guise will result in the rapid Management has made the commit­ demise of the program. It is very true ment to this program for the long run, that in the implementation phase of mbo, but management in military and govern­ much time must be devoted by key per­ ment organizations changes frequently. sonnel to ensure the proper beginnings. mbo can tie this transience together. Top It is also true that top level management management must support the continu­ has limited time, and the key man’s time ing program, not only the initial phases. is extremely valuable. There are many The mbo system does provide a vehicle facets of the mbo system that are entirely for continuing management support, the new to an organization and therefore review cycle. time-consuming. Training each partici­ Most experts agree with the idea of pant takes time. Writing objectives, total management involvement, includ­ defining key result areas, meeting with ing frequent review. John Lasagna 32 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW makes the proposal that “an ideal review to measure dollars spent per value date seems to fall between two and six gained in the realm of public service is a months, preferably closer to the former nebulous concept. What then can a period the first year or two in an mbo manager or commander do to ascertain effort.”9 Humble writes, “Review is not whether or not the newly instituted mbo an isolated event once a year, but rather program is achieving success? an additional occasion for taking a total Actually, this measurement is contin­ view of results and resetting objectives. gent on the objectives that are originally This total review supports an ongoing written and agreed upon by the subordi­ day to day, week to week management nate and his boss. The more specific and review.”10 Any lessening of the review understandable an objective, the easier sessions, which allow face-to-face contact it is to evaluate its progress. An objective between superior and subordinate, is that pinpoints a singularly responsible debilitating. Using another medium for manager to a measurable result, within determining the status of objectives available resources, will allow for would have the same effect. It would be unbiased evaluation.11 Remember, the perceived by the subordinates that top subordinate manager and his superior management is no longer concerned have to agree on all of the objectives with the program. They will perceive a written. program started and left to run on its The training manual used for the own momentum. afc md mbo/r program lists five levels of The inherent quality of an mbo pro­ quantifiable objectives. In descending gram is to give management more time order of abstraction, they are hard num­ to concentrate on the future because bers, ratios, scales, verbal descriptors, through this mbo tool the short term is and condition descriptors. An example of more efficiently managed at the proper the concreteness of hard numbers would lower echelon. This is not to say that mbo be an objective that stated, “to recruit will eliminate all the fires needing to be five people within ninety days.” This fought, but it will eliminate those that demonstration of hard numbers leaves are fought unnecessarily due to misguid­ no room for confusion as to what the out­ ed planning. come should be. The more vague verbal descriptor might read, “to write a report problems of measurement during the next fiscal quarter.” An exam­ ple of a condition descriptor might be, Perhaps the most difficult problem of a “to improve the morale of the organiza­ new mbo program is that of measure­ tion.” ment. Even in the private sector (which Keeping the objectives in the higher has an obvious return on investment- levels of abstraction eases the problem of measurement capability) some objec­ measurement but does not solve it en­ tives can only be subjectively measured. tirely. Continuous review of the objec­ The majority of goals in the public sector tives and the progress made along the are beyond quantification because there plans to achieve them assist in the solu­ is no product involved. Cost-benefit anal­ tion of the measurement problem. ysis, another method of objective meas­ Progress can be analyzed, plans altered, urement, is also very difficult, if not and objectives can be further refined impossible, in the public sector. Trying (moving up on the abstraction ladder). MBO 33 These actions further ease the problems time constraints. This also may be the of measurement and also prov ide a yet first time the supervisor is mutually set­ stronger case for frequent review. ting the course of his organization, mbo will be, for many, the first experience in participative management. Many tradi­ performance appraisal tionally set ways have to be rethought. Another problem not quite so easy to Only after the supervisor and subordi­ contend with is the difficulty of measur­ nate are comfortable with the relation­ ing personal success and performance ship can an mbo system flourish and an appraisal. George Strauss, in a critical honest objective appraisal be made. This view of mbo, stated, “mbo is not very real­ can come about only after an adequate istic if looked upon entirely or primarily period of implementation. Even after as a method of performance appraisal or this honeymoon period, linking the mbo subordinate goal setting . . . goals mesh program directly to performance ap­ with those of the organization!’12 The sys­ praisal can seriously affect the overall tem must be able to succeed first, leaving outcome. appraisal to a later date if not ignoring it totally. There is a superficially easy link between the accomplishment of goals line and staff and the performance appraisal. It would In a well functioning management sys­ appear that a manager’s success or fail­ tem, there is the temptation to integrate ure in achieving mutually acceptable line and staff mbo programs. On the sur­ goals should be reflected in his perfor­ face it appears to be a reasonable, ex­ mance rating. Perhaps so, but then the peditious choice to streamline the question comes to mind, “If these are program. This choice, however, could re­ mutually acceptable goals, shouldn’t the sult in an overintegration of functions. performance appraisal be mutually mbo can work for a staff function. It has ‘shared’ between the subordinate and his worked successfully for line organiza­ boss?” tions. Yet it cannot work successfully as a A more pertinent consideration is the totally integrated system in which the fact that for the first three to five years of staff participates between command and program implementation, a too-close re­ line—especially where the line organiza­ lationship with the performance apprais­ tions are separate entities with com­ al can lead to the establishing of mand and staff functions of their own. An mediocre objectives. It can ultimately example would be a corporate body lead to the failure of the entire program made up of several divisions or separate because of the fear of poor appraisal, or companies. because of the bias and overobjectivity of Traditionally, staff departments do not the appraiser. Implementing a new work in the mainstream of activity. Line management system, especially mbo, departments do mainstream work. Even necessitates a wholesale change in atti­ in the public sector there is the distinc­ tudes and perceptions. For the first time tion where activities usually are not as­ in the careers of many involved, the sociated with generating a product. Staff subordinate is displaying to his boss ex­ serves, advises, and solves problems for actly how much he thinks he can per­ the commander, afcmdsmbo/r program form, in what manner, and within what started with staff implementation in Feb­ 34 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ruary 1974. The staff was the test bed for eration is very important, keeping in the program. Line implementation fol­ mind the limited availability of funds lowed a year later and has just completed and the extremely ambitious, innovative the first cycle.13 The program was prob­ program. It was done at af c md through ably divided this way for ease of im­ a thorough training scheme that utilized plementation because of the mbo advisors from within the organiza­ geographical dispersion of the operating tion. The usual criteria of competence locations of the command. The mission (e.g., motivation, confidence, etc.) were statement and command objectives sought, but the most important qualifica­ were transmitted to both line and staff tion was that the candidate be not pres­ organizations at the start of the cycle to ently serving in a management provide direction.14 Each function de­ position.16 Thus a nonmanager was cho­ termined objectives from its perception sen to educate and advise higher levels of the mission statement and negotiated of management. It was a very innovative its objectives with the command section. way to go, to provide an outside consul­ One of the policies stated in the field im­ tant. There was no chance for inter­ plementation was, “the command sec­ departmental conflict because one tion will only review objectives of field manager was being chosen over another. organizations.”15 The results were good. Advisors, Whether it was done to facilitate im­ trained by the command section, passed plementation or in recognition of pos­ on the ground rules of the program to sible conflict of command lines, separate their organizations. Clear air, unbiased, line and staff program implementation mutual-objective setting sessions among was the proper choice. Line-staff coordi­ the supervisor, subordinate, and advisor nation of objectives is of no value if the resulted because of the expertise and the mutual objective negotiations between “special” status of the advisor. Original the subordinate and his boss are done implementation plans were to educate properly. Objectives of both line and one advisor in the mbo / r process.17 Con­ staff functions are presented to and tinuing education was to take place on a analyzed by command. Any actual or po­ periodic basis, providing the advisor tential conflict between line and staff ob­ with up-to-date direction in new mbo sys­ jectives should be identified and resolved tems and ideal situations to be used in by the command section. Likewise, any the advisory process. This procedure potential windfalls found in the mutual would serve to build a better framework negotiations or review sessions should be of managerial knowledge throughout transmitted by the command section to the organization. Of course, feedback both line and staff functions. There is no was a very important by-product. The need for direct line-staff coordination command section would get some gener­ which could result in the disastrous al idea (more specific as the number of short-circuiting of command communi­ continuing education sessions increased) cations. as to the overall status of the new system. Continuing education is a basic neces­ continuing education sity in an mbo program. Any neglect in this area could rapidly stagnate the pro­ An mbo program can be put into effect gram and cause it to fail. This education without outside consultants. This consid­ process must not be limited to mbo but MBO 35 should include management skill en­ There are other alternatives. The hancement as well, particularly in the point to be made, however, is that man­ public sector where job and skill rotation agement development, a recurring mbo are not as easily achieved as in a private educational process, and a medium for corporation. Any organization needs a allowing command collection of feed­ sound management development pro­ back are necessities of a successful pro­ gram to go hand-in-hand with the rather gram. different mbo approach- The mbo/r program at afcmd is a little As stated previously, there are many over two years old and appears to have set ways to overcome. The best way to do had a very successful start. There is possi­ it is through a thorough educational pro­ bility for improvement, but to their cred­ cess. The matter of resources comes to it, the responsible managers have made mind when considering this. Funds as an interim assessment and suggested al­ well as productive personnel time are ternative directions. Some of the ap­ limited. proaches are in concert with this article; There are, however, alternatives to others are not. Yet the purpose of this costly formal resident education pro­ article is not to judge. Rather it is to share grams. On-the-job training may well be a viewpoint generated while taking part the primary method. One of the best ex­ in the field implementation of the mbo/r amples is the education of the afcmd program. At the working level, where mbo R advisor. The education this non­ the inertia is strongest and disagreement manager is getting, just viewing the can be insidious and terminal, the poten­ mutual negotiations, is invaluable to his tial pitfalls seem to be more apparent. understanding of the management pro­ The program is good, and it could very cess. Conferences of managers to ex­ well serve as an mbo model for any other change ideas rather than to discuss daily government agency. But remember that problem areas could also be extremely any spinoff program will have to be fitted effective. Using the experience on hand to the specific organization. Probably to teach and train each other not only some of the points brought out here will improves the skill of managers but also assist in that tailoring. increases rapport as a side benefit. Armed Forces Staff College

Note* 7. Letter. Director of Research, AFCMD to staff and field organizations. Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. 23 October 1973. 1. Clenn H. Varney. "Management by Objectives: Making It Work." 8. Management by Objectives /Results Training Manual, Air Force Con­ Supervisory Management. January 1972. p. 24. tract Management Division, n.d. 2. For an excellent discussion of the profit, cost-benefit measurements in 9. John B. Lasagna. "Make Your MBO Pragmatic." Harvard Business MBO. see Rodney H. Brady. “MBO Coes to Work in the Public Sector," Review, reprinted November-December 1971, p. 63. Harvard Business Review. March-April 1973. pp. 65-66. 10. Humble, p. 23. 3. Peter F. Drucker. Managing for Results (New York: Harper and Row. 11. Management by Objectives/Results Training Manual. Air Force Con­ 1964). p. 11. tract Management Division, n.d. 4. Frederick V. Malek. "Managing for Results in the Federal Govern­ 12. Ceorge Strauss, "Management by Objectives: A Critical View," ment." Business Horizons. April 1974. p 25; Mildred F. Bailey. “MBO 3, Training and Development Journal. April 1972. Action 4: An Effort toward Reporting Efficiency," Defense Management 13. Hq AFCMD MBO/R Status Report. AFCMD. 21 August 1974, p. 5. Journal. January 1975. p. 50. 14. Ibid., pp. 2-3. 5. Dale D McConkey. "20 Ways to Kill Management by Objectives," 15. Management by Objectives/Results Training Manual. Air Force Con­ Management Review. October 1972, pp. 4-13: and John Humble. How To tract Management Division, n.d. Manage by Objectives (New York; AMACOM. 1973). p. 39. 16. Management by Objectives/Results Field Implementation Plan. 6. Management by Objectives /Results Status Report. Air Force Contract AFCMD. n.d. Management Division. Kirtland AFB. New Mexico. 21 August 1974, p. 2. 17. Ibid.

HE sky over the northwestern Sovi­ friendly lines after avoiding Soviet pa­ et Union between Murmansk and trols for four days.1 TPetsamo was clear and cold on a winter day in 1942. For the German war correspondent in the back of the twin- I t was during the Franco- engine Messerschmitt 110 (Bf 110), an Prussian War of 1870-71 that the first actual combat patrol flight was exciting aerial rescue occurred. While the Prus­ and unusual. Neither he, the gunner, nor sians besieged the city of Paris, the the pilot saw the Soviet Yakovlev fighter French used observation balloons to air­ until the bullets slammed into the fuse­ lift 164 wounded soldiers and some im­ lage, ruptured hydraulic lines, and sev­ portant bags of mail from the ered control cables. The German fighter beleaguered city.2 rolled out of control and plummeted to­ During World War I there were sev­ ward the arctic tundra. eral attempts to use airplanes as ambu­ The correspondent and gunner para­ lances. The French Air Service chuted from the falling aircraft. They evacuated sick soldiers from Serbia by air became separated in the descent, and, to as early as 1915.3 Two years later, as the further complicate the situation, the United States proceeded with an all-out newspaperman lost his eyeglasses. He mobilization for war, thousands of new soon found himself alone and half-blind pilots were trained at temporary fields all on the snow-covered tundra, well behind over America. Many inexperienced pi­ enemy lines. lots suffered accidents and injuries. Since Shortly after landing, however, a Ger­ most training fields were isolated, over­ man airplane spotted him and circled land transportation by ambulance took overhead. The correspondent managed hours. Early in 1918 Captain William C. to make his myopic condition known to Ocker, a training officer at a remote field the flyers, and soon another plane in Louisiana, converted a standard JN-4 dropped him a new pair of spectacles “Jenny” to accommodate a patient in a along with precise instructions on how to semirecumbent litter in the rear cockpit, reach a nearby lake, where he would be thus initiating the world’s first military picked up. On reaching it the reporter aerial ambulance service.4 found the gunner, and together they Britain, France, and Germany made anxiously awaited their rescue. An Arado advances in the use of the airplane for 199 (At 199) rescue plane fitted out with humanitarian purposes during the inter­ skis, landed on the frozen lake, and soon war period. In April 1923 an epidemic of the two weary men were strapped in and dysentery afflicted British soldiers on ready for takeoff. The Arado was almost garrison duty at isolated posts in Kurdis­ airborne when Soviet fighters attacked tan. The Royal Air Force (RAF) units sta­ and sent it sliding into a snowbank. The tioned in Iraq had a few Vickers-Vernon pilot and his two passengers climbed troop carrier aircraft which were quickly from the disabled craft and scrambled dispatched from Baghdad to Kirkuk and for cover. Fearing further losses, the See- then on to a forward landing field near notdienst (Air-Sea Rescue Service) com­ Serkhuma in the Adghir Dagh Moun­ mander at Kirkenes in northern Norway tains. Two hundred stricken troops were suspended further recovery efforts. then quickly evacuated to hospitals in However, the three Germans reached Baghdad.5 Three years later, during the 37 American ingenuity was responsible for the Srst airborne ambulance, JM-4 “Jenny, "modified by Captain William C. Ocker to carry a litter patient semirecumbent in the rear cockpit. A JN-4 H type “hospital ship " (below, left) was on display at Love Field, Dallas, Texas, late in Flying Ambulances 1918. ... A later model, the DH-4 airplane ambulance, (below right), is seen preparing to take off from Langley Field, Virginia. ... By World War II air-evacuation capability was rather more sophisticated, as seen (bottom) in the practice run at Bowman Field, Kentucky, in March 1943. SEENOTDIENST 39 Riffian War in Morocco, the French im­ sighted guidance of Generaloberst provised ambulance planes and evacuat­ (Colonel General) Hans von Seeckt, ed a number of wounded.6 Chief of the Reichswehr, the diplomats obtained a provision whereby a number of German pilots and engineers were The Death and Resurrection placed at the disposal of the fledgling of German Air Power Red Air Force. In 1924 the Germans and The Treaty of Versailles, 28 June 1919, the Soviets established a flying school at limited the size of the German military Lipetsk, about 300 miles southeast of to a defensive force of 115,000 men and Moscow, and Junkers Flugzeugwerke prohibited an air force and armored obtained a concession from the Soviet units.7 Article 202 specified that Germa­ government to build aircraft in an old ny must surrender, “ ... all her land and factory at Fili, near the capital.12 Lipetsk water aircraft, including any which may proved to be not only a flying school but be in the process of manufacture, devel­ also a testing ground for prototype Hein- opment, or construction.” Neither was kel and Fokker airplanes, built in Ger­ Germany permitted to retain ” ... air­ many and Holland to comply carefully craft engines, ballonets, and wings, ar­ with Allied restrictions, then shipped to maments, ammunition, airborne instru­ Russia and made combat-ready at Li­ ments... and photographic equipment.”8 petsk.13 The Allied Control Commission over­ Reichsprasident (Reichs President) saw the dismantling of the German Air Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg ap­ Force. Although arbitrary deadlines and pointed National Socialist Party Fiihrer force cuts hampered its efficiency, the Adolf Hitler to the post of Reichskanzler Control Commission effectively clipped (Reichs Chancellor) on 30 January 1933. the wings of German air power by Janu­ Hitler arranged for his friend Hermann ary 1922.9 However, interest in aviation Goring to succeed GeneralJeutnant continued in both civilian and military (Major-General) Helmut Wilberg as Der sectors of German society. Glider clubs Reichsminister der Luftfahrt (Reichs Air and gliding became popular around Ger­ Commissioner). (Wilberg, a Jew, became man universities. A sport flying club Chief of the Air War College.)14 The re­ (Sportflug G.m.b.H.) was funded by the building of German air power began im­ Reichswehrministerium (Ministry of De­ mediately, and two years later, on 10 fense); it operated ten flying schools March 1935, Goring revealed the exis­ where former military pilots could use tence of the new Luftwaffe which then their flying experience and civilians had a force of five reconnaissance and were trained as aviators.10 eleven fighter and bomber squadrons.15 While publicly abiding by the terms of The Luftwaffe developed as a tactical the Versailles Treaty, the German gov­ air arm for use in supporting the Wehr- ernment moved secretly to circumvent macht, and in its early years operations its provisions. Germany and the U.S.S.R. were oriented to combat over land mass signed the Treaty of Rapallo on 17 April areas. As the Luftwaffe expanded quick­ 1922. In addition to the political and eco­ ly, it could ill afford the unnecessary loss nomic provisions, the Treaty included a of a single trained aircrew member. If a number of mutually beneficial secret plane encountered problems over land, military agreements.11 Under the far­ the crewmen could ultimately parachute German air-sea rescue Air-sea rescue had its beginnings in Germany early in World War II. A Seenotdienst olScer (right, reading clockwise) briefs a rescue crew for rescuing the survivors of a sinking ship. . . Air-sea rescue personnel demon­ strate the uses and kinds of rescue equipment for lighter and bomber crews. . . . An air-sea - rescue aircraft is ready to undertake a mission. The German air-sea rescue in­ ventory included the Heinkel He 59 (left) as well as the French Breguet-Bizerte (below, left to right), the Dornier Do 24 Hying boat, and the Do 18. Some o f these res­ cue planes were quite sophis­ ticated: the He 59 was fitted with Grst aid kits, artifi­ cial respiration machines, and electrically heated sleeping bags in addition to the ex­ pected Boats and life rafts.

to safety. However, if a seaplane was Initially Goltz had very little equip­ forced down, the crewmen had to be ment with which to accomplish his mis­ picked up by boat. In the spring of 1935 sion. The pride of his Luftwaffe seagoing Luftkreis-Kommundo VI (See) (Air Re­ fleet was an old Air Traffic Control Boat, gional Command VI, Naval), headquar­ the Krischen. He rigged the leaky old tered at Kiel, assumed the responsibility vessel with a boom and tackle sufficient of developing a system for recovering for hoisting smaller types of seaplanes on downed seaplanes and their crews. Lieu­ board. Additionally, he commanded a tenant Colonel Konrad Goltz, a supply small number of barely seaworthy boats officer, was given, as an added duty, the of various sizes and descriptions, none administrative responsibility for some over 50 feet in length.16 boats to be used in picking up downed Goltz issued regulations that provided airmen. for six rescue zones—two in the North 41 Sea and four in the Baltic. Each zone was and large numbers of airplanes incapa­ assigned a rescue boat for retrieval pur­ ble of landing on water began operating poses, and each zone commander was over the North Sea and along the Baltic given the authority to request the use of coast. Until this time there had been only Kriegsmarine (Navy) aircraft for search a few instances of airmen in distress at purposes. Support from naval units could sea. In such cases rescue units involved be obtained through German Naval used any available naval seaplanes to as­ Headquarters at Kiel and Wilhelmshav- sist in recovery efforts. Only after the en. German lifeboat societies also ren­ Luftwaffe commenced operations over dered aid whenever possible.17 water on a regular basis was the decision In response to the increased danger of made to acquire a seaplane specifically war with Great Britain following the Mu­ modified for air-sea rescue operations.18 nich Crisis of 1938, the Luftwaffe con­ Colonel Goltz selected the Heinkel 59 ducted exercises early in 1939 that (He 59), a large, twin-engine biplane included its first large-scale, over-water fitted with floats, as the first Luftwaffe operations. The bombers then available aircraft dedicated for air-sea rescue du­ to the Luftwaffe proved grossly inade­ ties. The Rescue Service acquired 14 of quate in range. As a result numerous air­ these planes and awarded the firm of fields were established along the coast, Walter, Bachman, and Ribnitz of Meck- 42 The German Sea-Rescue Boat 501 (opposite) races against time to save a downed aircrew. . . . A rescue ship (above, left) makes for port with a salvaged aircraft aboard. . . . A German sea-rescue crew (right) scram­ bles to start a mission in a confiscated French boat, in harbor at Cherbourg.

lenburg, a contract for refitting the ma­ Political as well as military considera­ chines to the specifications outlined by tions motivated these changes. First, the the Luftwaffen-inspektion des Sani- Office of Secretary of State for Air, under tatswesens (Medical Inspectorate of the Field Marshal Erhard Milch, absorbed Luftwaffe). Accordingly, first aid equip­ the title and functions of the Office of ment, electrically heated sleeping bags, Inspectorate-General of the Luftwaffe. and artificial respiration machines were Second, to better prepare for war against installed. The rescue experts ordered the potential enemies in the West as well as planes refitted with a floor hatch, a col­ in the East, flying units were subordinat­ lapsible ladder long enough to reach ed to four operational commands, known through the hatch to the surface of the as LuftBotten (Air-Fleets), headquar­ water, a hoist, and lockers to hold life tered in Berlin, Brunswick, Munich, and belts, signaling devices, as well as other Vienna.20 This reorganization placed the survival paraphernalia.19 rescue function under the Office of Gen­ By February 1939, the growth of the eral of the Luftwaffe with the Command- Luftwaffe, its reorientation resulting er-in-Chief of the Navy and Commander from the exercises, and its increased area of Naval Units.21* •Name of one office under Der Reichsminister der Luftfahrt und Ober- of activity prompted a large-scale reor­ befehlshaber der Luftwaffe (Reichminister of Aviation and Commander in ganization of its command structure. Chief of the Luftwaffe). 43 44 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Air-Sea Rescue at the off for Heligoland in their tight forma­ Beginning of the War tion. A low ceiling prevented the bomb­ On 1 September 1939, German forces ers from releasing on their targets at crossed the Polish frontier. The Luft­ Wilhelmshaven, so still holding forma­ waffe proved to be a potent attack force tion, the pilots turned for home. Bf 109s as it first demolished the Polish Air Force and Bf 110s picked up the bombers soon then demoralized the Polish Army with after they departed the German coast. seemingly endless strafing attacks. Brit­ The fighters attacked the formation from ain and France declared war on Germa­ the top, firing diagonally across the wing ny on 3 September. However, since and upper portions of the fuselage. With combat operations in the first months of no upper fuselage gun turrets, the Well­ the war were limited primarily to the ingtons were defenseless against this Polish theater and therefore took place new tactic. Over half the formation went almost entirely over land areas, rescue down while the Germans lost only one was not much involved. A different Messerschmitt.24 phase of humanitarian endeavor played Seenotdienst (Air-Sea Rescue Service) a part in the fighting in Poland. Drawing boats and newly acquired He 59 rescue on their aeromedical evacuation experi­ planes responded from their base at Hor- ence gained in the civil war in Spain, the num. They saved a score of British air­ Luftwaffe used Ju 52s to evacuate over men in this first wartime air-sea rescue 2500 wounded from Poland during the operation of any appreciable size.25 four weeks of fighting.22 Conversely, the British could hardly Late in September 1939, Luftwaffe have responded to save their own fighters shot down five Royal Air Force downed airmen. The RAF had only a few Hampden bombers of a group that was crash boats and no rescue planes in 1939. attacking two German destroyers near Back in 1935, the Air Ministry approved Heligoland Bight, an arm of the North the building of an experimental high­ Sea off the port of Wilhelmshaven. These speed rescue launch. Coastal Command early losses made Bomber Command subsequently ordered 15 of these boats hesitant to send planes too close to Ger­ following successful testing in 1936. An many during daylight hours. As German order for 13 additional boats was placed U-boats and mines claimed ever more in 1939, about the time that the entire British shipping, the War Cabinet put in­ force was called in from Aden, Sin­ creasing pressure for action on Bomber gapore, Malta, and Malaysia and sta­ Command. In early December twin-en­ tioned in home waters. These actions gine Vickers Wellingtons, flying in tight marked the extent of British prepara­ formations, resumed armed reconnais­ tions for search and rescue (SAR). Locat­ sance flights over the North Sea.23 Their ing a downed pilot remained the task was to seek out and attack German primary responsibility of the parent unit naval vessels operating in the Heligoland throughout the first two years of the Bight and off Wilhelmshaven. During war.26 the first two missions, on 3 and 14 December, the bombers held their tight formations and successfully repelled The Seenotdienst Moves North German fighter attacks. After smashing Poland, Hitler turned On 18 December, 24 Wellingtons took his attention to the West. On 9 April SEENOTDIENST 45 1940, 2 hours and 29 minutes after the and to perform aircrew recoveries first German paratrooper landed outside throughout Luftflotte V (Air-Fleet V).30 Copenhagen, the King of Denmark sur­ As the fighting in Norway drew to a rendered. At a cost of twenty dead and close, the General Staff assessed the Luft­ wounded the territory of the Reich grew waffe’s performance. Colonel Goltz was by 16,000 square miles.27 ordered to Berlin where he presented a On that same day Germany began air detailed list of complaints and recom­ and sea operations against Norway. The mendations to Jeschonnek, who as a re­ Norwegians, aided by the British and sult, ordered the establishment of Der French, offered stiffer resistance. Their Inspektion des Seenotdienstes (Inspec­ small air force, elements of the Royal Air torate of Air-Sea Rescue Services). Goltz Force, and the Royal Navy combined was appointed Chief of the Inspectorate with the unpredictable northern weath­ and promoted to the rank of Generalma- er to exact a price for the Luftwaffe’s vic­ jor (brigadier general).31 tory in the North.28 GeneraJoberst Hans Jeschonnek, Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, re­ Early Summer, 1940 vealed the details of Hitler’s plan to at­ On 10 May 1940 Hitler’s forces tack in the North to only a handful of staff opened their attack in the West. Three officers. The Seenotdienst was, there­ days later the panzers of General Heinz fore, unaware of the details of Hitler’s Guderian crossed the Meuse at Sedan. Directive Number 1, and consequently Within a week German forces reached made no preparations for large-scale res­ the English Channel, cutting off and cue operations. On the first day of opera­ trapping the Allied armies in Belgium.32 tions, when a number of Junkers In spite of the lessons learned in Nor­ transports crashed into the Norwegian way, the General Staff again failed to pre­ Sea, no rescue forces were available to position search and rescue forces prior to save their drowning crews. Luftwaffe operations in Holland, Bel­ Upon learning of the invasion, Goltz gium, and France. Though the greater ordered several He 59 seaplanes trans­ weight of air operations was concentrat­ ferred from the Isle of Sylt to Aalborg in ed in eliminating the French Air Force, northern Denmark, and within two days the Luftwaffe had a secondary mission of rescue planes and boats began operating keeping the Channel under observation in support of the Norwegian campaign.29 and attacking British ships bringing rein­ Rescue operations responded to meet forcements to the continent.33 the requirements as fighting in Norway During May, rescue operations were expanded and intensified. Heinkels and conducted on a shoestring as the Seenot­ rescue boats moved from Listafjord to dienst depended on interim solutions Stavanger, Bergen, and Trondheim. Fol­ while trying to expand to meet the needs lowing the fall of Norway, rescue units of the approaching confrontation over deployed to Tromso and Kirkenes in the the Channel. General Goltz prevailed on far north. Units of the German Air-Sea Generalmajor Hans-George von Seidel, Rescue Service remained in Norway Generaiguartiermeister der Luftwaffe throughout the war to provide valuable (Quartermaster General of the Luft­ rescue service along the bitterly contest­ waffe), to transfer 12 Heinkel He 59s ed Arctic sea lanes into the Soviet Union from his resources to the rescue invento- A downed German dyer climbs out of his rub­ An unconscious airman is ber lifeboat into a Dornier 24 rescue plane. hoisted aboard a German air-sea rescue aircraft.

A rescued airman is returned to safety and medical care.

46 The German Air-Sea Fescue Service delivers the crew of a downed FAF bomber to safety in Holland, 1942.

ry. The Heinkels were flown to Kiel, Goltz used his ingenuity to acquire and where, following rapid conversion to jury-rig French seaplanes for rescue du­ white-painted rescue models, they ties. The army discovered two three-en­ joined the Air-Sea Rescue Service late in gine Breguet-Bizerte seaplanes on a lake July.34 near Bordeaux.* Mechanics repaired The Luftwaffe bombed Dover on 22 these planes, and they were soon active May and carried out its first attacks on in support of German SAR efforts. When, RAF airfields three days later.35 In spite in late July, the additional Heinkels of the fighting over the Channel, Seenot- became available, Seenotdienst units dienst units did not move into France were established at Le Havre, Saint-Na- until after the armistice was signed on 22 zaire, and Royan.37 June 1940. Goltz toured the French and The Luftwaffe mauled the Royal Air Belgian coasts in late June and decided Force during the Battle of France. Dur­ to establish three centers for air-sea res­ ing May and June 1940, the RAF, by offi­ cue. He selected Boulogne as the center cial British accounts, lost 959 aircraft, for northern Channel rescue operations, including 477 fighters.38 On 4 June, Cherbourg for the south Channel, and Fighter Command’s inventory totaled Brest for the Atlantic. In Holland, an Air- only 466 operational machines, of which Sea Rescue Service Center was attached 331 were Supermarine Spitfires and to the Naval Command Hague, and a Hawker Hurricanes. The British aircraft base was established at Schellingwoude industry provided replacements for most to monitor North Sea activities.36 of these losses by mid-July; nevertheless, Two Heinkels and two rescue boats combat attrition continued. The absence were assigned to each of these bases. of an effective SAR capability aggravated Since the 12 He 59s procured from the •Later the Vichy government provided six additional Breguets for the quartermaster had not been delivered, German Air-Sea Rescue Service. 47 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the situation since the downing of an air­ ish pilots preferred to bail out rather craft in the Channel or North Sea usually than ditch their mangled machines, and meant the loss of its aircrew.39 after hitting the water they could rely The Seenotdienst deployed with the only on their Mae West life jackets. Luftwaffe as the Germans massed along the English Channel in late June and early July. Luftflotten 2 and 3 established I\ riecsmarine and Luftwaffe an operational boundary by drawing an He 59 operations in the Channel were arbitrary line north from the mouth of less humanitarian than those of the See­ the Seine through the center of England notdienst. Navy Heinkels laid mines into Scotland. By British estimates, the along British shipping lanes and at the German air order of battle (AOB) stood entrances to ports and harbors. At night at 1200 light bombers, 280 Ju 87 Stuka Luftwaffe Heinkels flew to selected loca­ dive bombers, 760 single-engine and 220 tions along the English coast to drop off twin-engine fighters.40 spies and saboteurs. No wonder the Brit­ At the end of June, German troops ish became wary of the intentions of were poised at Pas-de-Calais, prepared white-painted rescue planes operating to initiate Operation Seelowe (sea lion), near their coast.42 the invasion of Britain. Both Hitler and The flight log of Group Captain A. C. Goering agreed on the necessity of Deere recorded that on 11 July 1940, achieving air superiority before conduct­ “. . .we had just crossed the coast at Deal ing the Channel crossing. The Battle of where I spotted a silver-colored seaplane Britain began with the Luftwaffe at­ with Red Cross markings . . . behind it tempting to engage and destroy the were a dozen Me 109s.”43 A fight ensued RAF. It was during this phase of opera­ in which the seaplane was forced down. tions, when much of the fighting cen­ The Heinkel and its crew were captured. tered over the Channel, that the Entries in the pilot’s log noted positions German Air-Sea Rescue Service proved and movements of British convoys. its value. Reconnaissance being definitely a mili­ Adolf Galland, one of Germany’s top tary and not a humanitarian function, fighter aces, emphasized the importance the British decided to take repressive of survival in the water following shoot- measures. On 13 July the Air Ministry down. According to Galland, since even released Bulletin 1254 which stated that single-engine German fighters carried as of 20 July air-sea rescue planes would inflatable rubber dinghies, it was prefer­ be shot down.44 able to ditch rather than bail out over the Sir Winston Churchill presented a water. The Bf 109 and the Bf 110 usually somewhat less legalistic and more san­ floated for up to 60 seconds after first guine interpretation of the issue when touching the water. A cool-headed pilot he wrote, “We did not recognize this had plenty of time to unstrap, scramble means of rescuing enemy pilots so they out, inflate his collapsible dinghy, and could come and bomb our civil popula­ clear the aircraft.41 tion again ... all German air ambulances British fighter pilots were not so fortu­ were forced down or shot down by our nate. Cockpit space in both the Spitfire fighters on definite orders approved by and the Hurricane was not sufficient to the War Cabinet.”45 It was Churchill’s accommodate an inflatable dinghy. Brit­ contention that since the 1929 Geneva SEENOTDIENST 49 Convention made no specific mention of rescue airplanes, such aircraft were not Still another aspect of the German Air-Sea Rescue entitled to its protection. Service was the use of air-rescue buoys. EA 5 The Germans claimed that their res­ (below) floated in the English Channel. Another cue aircraft were protected by Articles 3, (bottom) awaited launching on the beach at Lessay. 6, and 17 of the Convention. According to Article 3, “ . . . the belligerent who remains in possession of the field of battle shall take measures to search for the wounded.” Article 6 provided that, “Mo­ bile sanitary formations, i.e., those which are intended to accompany armies in the field, and the fixed establishments be­ longing to the sanitary service shall be protected and respected by the belliger­ ents.” Article 17 claimed that, “Vehicles equipped for sanitary evacuation, travel­ ing singly or in convoy, shall be treated as mobile sanitary formations. . . . ”46 After 20 July, British attacks on See- notdienst aircraft increased in frequen­ cy and ferocity. Colonel Otto Dreyer, squadron commander of the rescue unit at Cherbourg, reported that a British bomber machine-gunned his white- painted, red cross-marked, unarmed Heinkel as it taxied toward a downed air­ crew. Dreyer’s Heinkel caught fire and sank, but the crew escaped on their life rafts and floated ashore on the Isle of Al­ derney the next day.47 In the light of the British actions, the General Staff ordered all rescue aircraft armed and painted to match the ca­ mouflage schemes in use in their area of operations. Though armed, the slow and cumbersome Heinkels and Breguet-Bi- zertes were no match for Spitfires and Hurricanes. In August, fighters began es­ corting rescue aircraft whenever mission requirements entailed operations in proximity to the English coast. Adolf Gal- land spoke of the gallantry of rescue crews that, with fighter escort, flew into the Thames estuary to pick up German and even English flyers.48 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW By autumn, the primary focus of the air war had shifted to the interior of Eng­ land as the Luftwaffe began bombing cit­ ies. The rescue forces varied their tactics according to the needs of the Luftwaffe and the policies of the British. Since fighter operations no longer centered on massive sweeps at specific times and places to draw the RAF into combat, res­ cue patrols were no longer needed. In October 1940, the Germans introduced the Sea Rescue Float as one remedy for the changing needs of the air war. These buoy-type floats contained bunks, blan­ kets, dry clothes, food, water, and dis­ tress signals. Their distinctive yellow paint made them visible for many miles. Periodically, rescue boats as well as Heinkels checked the buoys. Since they attracted any distressed aviator, British and German alike, the RAF also sent launches to make occasional checks. The hapless airmen who made it to one of these floats never knew if they might be rescued by their own forces or picked up by the enemy and interned for the rest of the war.49 During the Battle of Britain the See- J notdienst performed a valuable service because German pilots who were shot down over the sea stood a good chance of being rescued. The actions of the Air-Sea Rescue Service crews drew high praise from fighter pilots like Adolf Galland. Cramped cockpits precluded dinghies But, in a way, it was the British who paid in Hurricanes (top of page) and Spitfires. British the highest compliments to the effective­ pilots forced to bail out over water had ness of the German rescue efforts. In the only their Mae West jackets for survival . • summer of 1940 the Air Ministry decid­ Me 109s and Me 110s (opposite) became the ed to destroy the Seenotdienst through primary escorts for rescue missions. military action, but, when Coastal Com­ mand sought to improve its almost nonexistent SAR program in 1941, they drew heavily on their enemy’s model. Losses suffered by the RAF in the Channel and North Sea made it evident that an improved rescue capability was The Me 109 had room for a dinghy. Since the plane Boated for as much as 60 seconds after ditching, German pilots had time to inBate Me 110 and move away from their sinking aircraft.

Me 109

51 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW urgently needed. In late July 1940, Air H. “Hap” Arnold, Commanding Gener­ Vice iMarshal Keith R. Park, Air Officer al, United States Army Air Forces, Commanding No. 11 Group of Fighter became concerned with the need for res­ Command, borrowed 12 Lysander sin­ cue. In September 1942, the Royal Air gle-engine patrol aircraft from Army Force and the USAAF held a conference Cooperation Command. These planes that led to an agreement on coordination worked in coordinated rescue efforts of SAR efforts in the North Sea and with launches and Royal Navy ships to English Channel.54 locate and retrieve downed airmen.50 American rescue pioneers learned Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur T. Harris, Air from the Seenotdienst, and by 1945 air- Officer Commanding No. 5 Group of sea rescue had improved to the point Bomber Command, called a meeting at where chances of rescue were good, giv­ the Air Ministry in London to draft a en adequate planning and pre-position­ plan for coordinating rescue efforts. The ing of forces. Rescue equipment, much result was the establishment of a joint of it patterned on German models, de­ RAF/Royal Navy rescue apparatus, with veloped as the war progressed. Through­ the RAF responsible for organizing and out the war nearly 5000 USAAF aircrew performing aerial search and the Navy members were rescued, testifying to the for making the actual pickup.51 improved conditions in air-sea rescue. The growing British awareness of res­ By the end of the war, combat crews cue needs was reflected in an improved could reasonably expect to be picked up record. While the rescue of a flyer if they were shot down.55 downed off the coast in the summer of In World War II a number of German, 1940 was a rarity, between February and British, and American airmen dedicated August 1941, of the 1200 aircrew mem­ themselves to the saving of human lives. bers who went down in the Channel or These men resolved that their comrades North Sea, 444 were saved.52 During the were not to be abandoned—not to death, same period the Seenotdienst picked up or suffering, or captivity. This spirit 78 other downed British flyers.53 soared above the carnage of war to pro­ The United States, like Great Britain, claim a credo of rescue that has survived entered World War II with almost no air- up to the present. sea rescue capability. As American air­ Office of Air Force History crew casualties climbed, General Henry

Notes I. Carl Hess, "The Air-Sea Rescue Service of the Luftwaffe in World War ates, Together with the Final Protocol and the Agreement Concerning the II 1 unpublished manuscript. Air University, German Monograph Series. Military Occupation of the Rhineland. Article 202," 28 June 1919, in 1955), p. 52. Charles I. Bevans. editor. Treaties and Other International .Agreements of 2. Michael Howard. The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion o f the United States of America. 1776-1949, vol. 2: Multilateral. 1918-1930, France. 1870-1871 (New York. 1962). pp. 325-26. p. 130. (The Treaty of Versailles) 3. John L. Vandegrift, Jr., editor, A History of the Air Rescue Service 9. Herbert Molloy Mason. Jr., The Rise of the Luftwaffe: Forging the (Winter Park. Florida. 1959), pp. 2-3. Secret German Air Weapon, 1918-1940 (New York. 1973), pp. 72-87. 4. Robert F. Futrell. Development of Aeromedical Evacuation in the 10. Francis L. Carsten, The Reichswehr and Politics. 1918 to 1945 (Ox­ USAF 1909-1960 (Research Studies Institute, Air University. 1960). pp. ford, 1966). p. 221. 9-10. 11. John W. Wheeler-Bennett. The Nemesis of Power The German Army 5. Ibid. in Politics, 1918-1945 (London, 1953), pp. 130-33. 6. Vandegrift, p. 3. 12. William Green, Warplanes o f the Third Reich (New York, 1970). p. 7. Richard Suchenwirth, The Development of the German Air Force. 404. 1919-1939 (Air University, German Monograph Series. 1968), pp. ix-x. 13. See Mason, pp. 151-64; Suchenwirth. pp. 12-17; Wheeler-Bennett. 8. The Peace Treaty Between Germany and the Allies and their Associ­ pp. 130-33. SEENO TDIENST 53

14. Leonard Mosely. The Reich Marshal: A Biography ot Hermann Coer- 34. Hess, pp. 8-9. ing (New York, 1974), pp. 183-85. 35. Speidel, p. 31. 15. See Mason, pp. 151-64; and Suchenwirth. pp. 12-17. 36. Hess, pp. 56-59. 16. Hess, pp. 27-28. 37. Ibid., p. 61. 17 Ibid. 38. Richards, voL 1, p. 150. 18. Suchenwirth, p. 176. 39. Derek Dempster and Derek Wood, The Narrow Margin. The Buttle 19. Hess, pp. 6-7. of Britain and the Rise of Air Power, 1930-1940 (New York, 1961), pp. 20. Air Ministry. The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, 1939-1945 81-100. (London. 1947), pp. 33-34. 40. Air Ministry, Rise and Foil of the German Air Force, pp. 75-76. 21. See Hess, p. 31; Suchenwirth. p. 259. 41. Adolf Calland, The First and the Last: The Rise and Fall o f the 22. Professor Dr. Schroeder. "Medical and Health Services in the Ger­ German Fighter Forces, 1938-1945 (New York, 1954), p. 45. man Air Force" (unpublished manuscript. Air University, German Mono­ 42. Green, pp. 276-77. graph Series, 1968), pp. 89-93. 43. Dempster and Wood. pp. 240-41. 23. Denis Richards, Royal Air Force. 1939-1945, voL I: The Fight at 44. Air Ministry Bulletin No. 1254, 13 July 1940. Quoted in James M. Odds (London, 1953). pp. 42-43. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights (London, 1947), p. 361. 24. Cajus Bekker. The Luftwaffe War Diaries (New York. 1969), pp. 45. WinstonS. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, voL II of The Second World 87-94. War (Boston, 1946), p. 332. 25. Hess, p. 33a. 46. "Convention of Geneva of 27 July, 1929, for the Amelioration of the 26. Frank E. Ransom. Air Sea Rescue: 1941-1952 (Research Studies Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field," found in Institute, Air University, 1954), p. 23. Bevans, Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 2. Multilateral, 27. Mason, pp. 319-20. p. 971. 28. Ibid. 47. Hess. p. 61a 29. Hess, pp. 38a-39. 48. Calland, p. 33. 30. Ibid. 49. Vandegrift, pp. 6-7. 31. See Karl-Heinz Volker, Die Deutesche Luftwaffe, 1933-1939, Auf- 50. Richards, p. 159. bauffuhrung und Rustung der Luftwaffe sowie die Entwicldung der deusc- 51. Dempster and Wood, p. 297. hen Luftkriegstheorie (Stuttgart. 1967), p. 288; and Hess, p. 35. 52. Denis Richards and Hilary St. George Saunders. Royal Air Force 32. B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (New York, 1939-1945, vol. II; The Fight Avails (London, 1954), pp. 87-88. 1970), p. 65. 53. Hess, Appendix, p. 170. 33. Wilhelm Speidel, "Luftwaffe Operations in the West. 1939-40, Part 54. Vandegrift, p, 10. IV. Operation Celb (Yellow)" (unpublished Air University Study in the 55. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, editors, The Army Air German Monograph Series, 1955), pp. 440-41. Forces in World War II, vol. VII: Services around the World (Chicago. 1958), p. 480.

Acknowledgment We are grateful to Harry R. Fletcher and Deryl W. Robinson of the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center for help in locating the photographs used to illustrate this article. All the photographs are from the Center's archival collection. The Editor TERRORISM AS A MILITARY WEAPON

Jay Mallin

ERRORISM is a disease of modern society. It is a virus growing in an ill Tbody. The effects of the virus can sometimes be ameliorated, but there is no certain cure. The causes of terrorism are diverse; of­ ten one cause overlaps another or sev­ eral causes. There is the social cause: Uruguayan young people denied their rightful place in a society that was stag­ nating. There is the racial cause: black and Indian militant groups in the United States. And, of course, there is the politi­ cal cause: Israelis seeking independence from Great Britain; Cubans seeking free­ dom from Dictator Batista and then from Dictator Castro; Algerians seeking inde­ It is a dress which is justly supposed pendence from France; northern Irish to carry no small terror to the enemy, Catholics seeking to destroy British rule, who think every such person a and, conversely, Irish Protestants seek­ complete marksman. ing to neutralize the Catholics. Each instance was or is one of armed General George Washington' conflict—in a word, of war. Whether the cause be social discontent or national as­ 54 pirations, a larger or smaller segment of Terrorism is a tangled skein, and any a population wars on another segment or observer attempting to unravel and on a foreign adversary. The feasible separate one thread leaves himself open weapon is terrorism. A military observer, to criticism, justified criticism. “You say Colonel William D. Neale, noted, “Ter­ terrorism is a military weapon. What ror, it is obvious, is a legitimate instru­ about the kidnappings solely for financial ment of national policy.’’2 gain in Italy and the brigandage in Ar­ The complexity of causes of terrorism, gentina motivated by monetary profit?” the diverse ideologies that have em­ Precisely. The skein is a mess of ployed terrorism, the multitudinous threads; it may not be possible to sepa­ arms and tactics available to terrorists— rate any one of them cleanly. Neverthe­ all these factors have made terrorism less, the effort is worth attempting if it one of the most complicated problems of contributes a pinpoint of light in what is the times. Certainly the scope of the certainly a long, dark tunnel. This article problem defies understanding by any will attempt to focus on one thread: ter­ single discipline. Terrorism is a tangled rorism as a military weapon. skein of varied human motivations, ac­ In September 1972 the world was tions, hopes, emotions, and goals. stunned to learn that the Twentieth A conference on terrorism and politi­ Olympic Games, a symbol of internation­ cal crimes held in 1973 made the follow­ al harmony, had been attacked by politi­ ing conclusion, among others: cal terrorists. A group of urban guerrillas The problem of the prevention and sup­ belonging to the Palestinian Black Sep­ pression of “terrorism” arises in part be­ tember movement had forced their way cause there is no clear understanding of into the Israeli quarters at the Olympic the causes leading to conduct constituting Village and seized nine hostages. The “terrorism.” The International Communi­ guerrillas issued a number of demands, ty has been unable to arrive at a universal­ including one for the release of 200 ly accepted definition of “terrorism” and Palestinian prisoners in Israel. Day-long has so far failed to control such activity.3 negotiations took place between the Terrorism cannot be explained by psy­ guerrillas and the West German govern­ chologists who construct facile theories. ment, and eventually the government It cannot be countered by police who appeared to accede to the Palestinian de­ view terrorism as simply one more type mands. An accord was reached whereby of criminal activity: identify the crimi­ the terrorists, together with their hos­ nals, arrest them, throw them in prison tages, were to be taken to an airport and or perhaps shoot them, and the problem there provided with air transportation to is solved. Terrorism cannot be handled Egypt. At Fiirstenfeldbruck Airport, by conventional military men who scoff however, German snipers opened fire on at it as being beneath their notice. the terrorists, and in the resulting battle The academician who wishes to study all Israeli hostages died, as did four guer­ terrorism with academic dispassionate­ rillas, a police officer, and a helicopter ness finds theories, explanations, and pilot. chronological statistics but little else. Thanks to the sophistication of mod­ Penetrating interviews with genuine ern communication systems, people in terrorists, for example, are of minimal many lands were kept abreast of devel­ availability. opments minute by minute. Americans 55 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW watched television in fascination as tinian cause. It encouraged future moves events unfolded before their eyes. When by Palestinian terrorists—the historical the final holocaust occurred at the Ger­ record attests to this. As a psychological man airport, shock, horror, and revulsion blow the Olympic attack demonstrated swept the civilized world. that wherever Israeli figures of promi­ The question was repeatedly asked, nence went abroad, whether they be dip­ what did the Palestinians hope to gain by lomats or athletes or whatever, they their action? Did not the kidnappings— were susceptible to terrorist attack. and the resulting killings—do their cause War is armed conflict, and armed con­ far more harm than good? The actions of flict is the province of the military. Ter­ terrorists, however, cannot be measured rorism is a form of armed conflict; it is in the way other acts of war or revolution therefore within the military sphere. are appraised. Urban guerrillas do not When diplomats fail, soldiers take over. march to the same drum that regular sol­ When soldiers fail, terrorists take over. diers or even rural guerrillas march to. The political terrorist, however, is a sol­ Colonel Neale stated: dier, too. He wears no uniform, he may have received little or no training, he Terroristic violence must be totally ruth­ may accept minimal discipline, his orga­ less, for moral scruples and terror do not nization may be ephemeral—but he is a mix and one or the other must be rejected. soldier. He engages in armed conflict in There can be no such thing as a weak dose pursuit of a cause. His weapons are the of terror. The hand that controls the whip gun and the explosive. His battlefield is must be firm and implacable.4 the city street, and his targets are the Although not generally viewed as vulnerable points of modern society. such, the Olympic action was neverthe­ Certainly not all terrorists are soldiers. less fundamentally a military move. Hav­ Not all terrorism is military. For pur­ ing failed in three conventional wars to poses of this article, it is postulated that defeat the Israelis, the Arabs and Pales­ terrorism is military when: tinians resorted to unconventional tac­ • It is utilized as a substitute for tics: specifically, terrorism in the border “regular” warfare, as in the case of the zones and against Israeli installations in Palestinians against the Israelis. foreign lands. If the Arab leaders had not • It is used in conjunction with themselves been conventional, they other military activities, as in the cases of might have utilized unconventional tac­ Cuba (against Batista) and Vietnam tics much earlier—perhaps more suc­ (against the Saigon administrations). cessfully than were their efforts to defeat • It is used as the chosen weapon the Israelis in “regular” warfare. of conflict by a population segment Basically, terrorism is a form of psycho­ against another segment and/or a for­ logical warfare (frighten your enemy; eign power, as in Northern Ireland. publicize your cause). Seen within this Terrorism is sometimes believed to be context, the Olympic attack achieved its synonymous with urban guerrilla war­ purpose. Kidnapping the Israeli athletes fare. Urban guerrilla warfare, however, did no military harm to Israel. As a psy­ is a broader term: it encompasses urban chological blow, however, it probably terrorism but other actions as well, i.e., boosted Palestinian morale, and it cer­ ambushes, street skirmishes, assaults on tainly spotlighted worldwide the Pales­ official installations, and other types of TERRORISM A MILITARY WEAPON 57 hit-and-run urban combat. Also, it may need not meet the rugged demands of be noted that terrorism is not confined to rural and hill fighting. In the cities there urban zones: it can be conducted in rural is an abundance of potential targets. The areas as well, as was notably the case in countryside offers few targets. In the cit­ South Vietnam. ies there are opportunities for militant Thus, terrorism in certain circum­ actions (such as the placing of bombs) stances is conducted as a military tactic. that do not necessarily entail direct per­ The purpose of military action is often to sonal conflict with the police. In the achieve political goals. “For political countryside guerrillas must eventually aims are the end and war is the means prove themselves by combat with units . . . ” stated Clausewitz.5 In some in­ of the regular army. Rural guerrilla war­ stances terrorism is a part of the means, fare requires a great deal of physical ex­ or is the means. ertion with few gratifying results over a Terrorism as a tactic can be traced long period. In urban areas guerrillas can back to ancient times. Today’s terrorists commit spectacular acts that garner take human hostages; Incas of old seized great publicity and, then, if they have the idols of the people they had con­ not been identified by the authorities, quered and held these as hostages to can return to “normal” lives until the ensure that the defeated would not time comes for their next violent action. rebel. Terrorism as a tactic of urban The growing technological complexity guerrilla warfare dates back to the strug­ of our times increases the vulnerability gles in the past century and in this cen­ of modern life. Not only does technology tury to Russian revolutionaries against engender vulnerability, it also develops the czars. The concept of terrorism as a more sophisticated weapons that can kill military instrument, however, is com­ or endanger more people and do more paratively new. One of the papers devel­ damage. Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski oped at the first National Security Affairs aptly referred to “the global nervous sys­ Conference, held at the National War tem”;7 Swedish Premier Olof Palme, at College in 1974, noted: the United Nations, discussed “technolo­ Despite Mao’s emphasis on the relation­ gy’s multiplication of the power to de­ ship between guerrilla warfare and the ru­ stroy.”8 ral peasant, despite the doctrinaire vision One has but to look about a modern of armed, revolutionary conflict culminat­ city and he will see a plethora of targets. ing on the open battlefield, and despite Aqueduct pumping stations and con­ the role of rural warfare in the most im­ duits, power stations and lines, tele­ portant revolutions of the past half-cen­ phone exchanges, post offices, airport tury, the rapid urbanization of much of control towers, radio and television sta­ the world now suggests new opportuni­ tions—all these form part of a city’s nerv­ ties, and hence new strategies for revolu­ ous system. Terrorists can shoot at tionary warfare, and, in particular, a new policemen, rob banks, sabotage industri­ attitude toward the role of the city as the al machinery, kill government officials, ultimate revolutionary battlefield.6 incapacitate vehicles, and set bombs in For the political militant, urban guer­ theaters and other public localities. De­ rilla warfare offers clear advantages over struction of an enemy’s cities is an ac­ rural guerrilla warfare. If he is a city cepted strategy of modern warfare; youth, he can remain in the cities and whether it be accomplished by aerial 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW bombers or by land-bound terrorists is liberate themselves is revolutionary vio­ merely a matter of means. The National lence and revolutionary war.”11 (Empha­ War College paper previously noted also sis is Giap’s.) By “revolutionary violence” pointed out: Giap probably meant all available means The destruction of a hydroelectric system, of warfare, including terrorism. the crippling of a central computer bank, Guevara alone approached the subject the acceleration of a social disorder by ra­ of urban guerrilla warfare as a specific cist and counterracist assassination, the type of combat, and then he did so only undermining of an economy by the pollu­ in brief. In his book La Guerra de Guer­ tion of an entire wheat crop ... all these rillas he provided limited recognition to are but mere samples of the kind of vio­ what he called “sub-urban warfare.” The lence which would lend itself to strategic sub-urban guerrilla group, he stated, manipulation. Although disguised in the should not carry out “independent ac­ name of revolution or rebellion, such vio­ tions” but rather should “second the ac­ lence could be decisive in terms of dis­ tion of the larger groups in another tracting a nation, or isolating it, or even area.” As for terrorism itself, Guevara paralyzing it. It would be, in effect, a new said, “We sincerely believe that that is a form of war.9 negative weapon, that it does not pro­ As postulated, terrorism could be used duce in any way the effects desired, that in conjunction with “regular” military it can turn a people against a determi­ activities. Or it could be used as a substi­ nate revolutionary movement and that it tute. Colonel Seale R. Doss sets forth in brings with it a loss of life among those the aforementioned paper that, “with who carry it out far greater than the be­ the rapidly shifting alliances and nefits it renders.” Guevara separated ter­ animosities of the modern world, no na­ rorism from assassination, which he felt tion could be quite sure in any case just was “licit” although only in “very selec­ which foreign power had (or even if tive circumstances,” namely, against “a some foreign power had) sponsored its leader of the oppression.”12 disasters, for such violence would lend La Guerra de Guerrillas has served as itself, like underworld money, to politi­ a basic instructional book for Latin cal laundering.”10 American guerrillas. It has, however, no Because terrorism as an instrument of instructions for urban guerrilla warfare. war is a relatively new concept, there has This is especially interesting in view of been little doctrinal categorization or in­ the fact that the urban guerrilla move­ terpretation of, or doctrinal direction ment played as important a role, perhaps for, this type of warfare specifically. The a more decisive role, than did the rural three foremost warrior-theoreticians of guerrillas in the 1956-1958 Cuban civil guerrilla warfare, Mao Tse-tung, Vo war. Fidel Castro and Guevara pre­ Nguyen Giap, and Ernesto “Che” ferred, however, to promote the mys­ Guevara, virtually ignored this method tique of the rural guerrilla. They had of combat. Giap has said only that “ to the been rural guerrilla captains, and it did counter-revolutionary violence of the not suit the historic position they envi­ enemy, our people must deGnitely op­ sioned for themselves to grant recogni­ pose [place in opposition] revolutionary tion to the urban clandestine movement violence,” and that “the most correct that participated so significantly in the path to be followed by the peoples to conflict.13 TERRORISM A MILITARY WEAPON 59 There was a practical consideration as The only document specifically deal­ well in the Castro-Guevara effort to de­ ing with urban guerrilla warfare that has velop the mystique of the rural guerrilla. received international recognition was Almost as soon as Castro came to power written by a Brazilian politician-turned- in Cuba, that small country launched an terrorist, Carlos Marighella. Marighella extensive program of subversion, with wrote the Minimanual of the Urban most of the effort concentrated on creat­ Guerrilla for use by Brazilian terrorists, ing Udeksta guerrilla movements in rural but its instructional contents are valid for areas of Latin America. Castro and guerrillas in any city in the world. Ma­ Guevara sought to duplicate their own righella stated: guerrilla operation: launched from The urban guerrilla is an implacable ene­ abroad, it had functioned in isolated ru­ my of the government and systematically ral areas. Guerrilla warfare, declared inflicts damage on the authorities and on Guevara, is “the central axis of the strug­ the men who dominate the country and gle” in Latin America.14 So deeply did exercise power. The principal task of the Guevara believe in the guerrilla mys­ urban guerrilla is to distract, to wear out, tique that eventually it led him to his to demoralize the militarists, the military death in Bolivia. It was only after repeat­ dictatorship and its repressive forces, and ed failures, including Guevara’s death, also to attack and destroy the wealth and that Castro turned his attention to urban property of the North Americans, the for­ movements. eign managers, and the Brazilian upper- A perusal of other military instruction­ class.20 al literature reveals a similar dearth of Marighella declared: “The urban guer­ attention to urban guerrilla warfare. rilla is a man who fights the military dic­ North Vietnamese Lieutenant General tatorship with arms, using Hoang Van Thai’s Some Aspects of Guer- unconventional methods. . . . The urban I rilla Warfare in Vietnam15 deals entirely guerrilla follows a political goal . . . ”21 | with rural combat. The Handbook for It is interesting to note that just as Mao, Volunteers of the Irish Republican Army16 prophet of rural guerrilla warfare, believed is a fine basic book on rural guerrilla that type of combat was secondary to “regu­ warfare, and much that it says is applica­ lar” warfare,22 Marighella, prophet of urban ble to urban guerrilla combat, but it does guerrilla warfare, envisioned urban combat not touch on this specifically despite the as supplementary to rural guerrilla combat. long utilization of urban terrorist tactics He stated that the function of urban guerrilla by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Bert warfare was “to wear out, demoralize, and “Yank” Levy’s Guerrilla Warfare17 has a distract the enemy forces, permitting the brief chapter on “the city guerrilla,” but emergence and survival of rural guerrilla the book is primarily about rural guerril­ warfare which is destined to play the deci­ la warfare. Spanish General Alberto sive role in the revolutionary war.”23 Bayo’s One Hundred and Fifty Questions As for terrorism specifically, Marighella to a Guerrilla18 and Swiss Major H. von said, “Terrorism is an arm the revolutionary Dach Bern’s Total Resistance!9 also have can never relinquish.”24 It is also a weapon material useful to an urban guerrilla, par­ the military cannot ignore. ticularly in regard to sabotage activities, but again the books are concerned main­ A nyone writing about ter­ ly with rural guerrillas. rorism labors under the difficulty that it 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW has not been possible for anyone to de­ on of psychological warfare. The pur­ velop an entirely satisfactory definition pose, as the very word indicates, is to of terrorism. Mainly this is due to the fact engender terror in the foe. The terror that there is no precise understanding of thrust encompasses the following in­ what the term “terrorism” encompasses. gredients: There are too many grey areas of vio­ • Terrorism publicizes the terror­ lence and of intimidation that may or ists’ political cause. may not be labeled as terroristic. • Terrorism demonstrates the ca­ Whether any particular area of activity pability of the terrorists to strike blows. or specific act is indeed terroristic largely • Terrorism heartens sympathiz­ ers of the terrorists’ cause. depends on the circumstances within • Terrorism disconcerts the ene­ which this is undertaken. Example: Is sa­ my. botage a form of terrorism? Seeking an • Terrorism eventually—the ulti­ answer, we go full circle, for whether sa­ mate goal—demoralizes the enemy and botage is terroristic depends on the defi­ paralyzes him. nition of terrorism. • Conceivably, in certain circum­ Therefore, in this article the following stances, terrorism could deter potential working definition is offered: allies of the terrorists’ target country Political terrorism is the threat of violence from assisting that country. (“If you pro­ or an act or series of acts of violence effect­ vide aid to our enemy, we will unleash ed through surreptitious means by an in­ our terror tactics against you, too.”) dividual, an organization, or a people to • Sabotage causes material dam­ further his or their political goals. age to an enemy’s vital installations; the damage, in turn, has a psychological Under this definition sabotage com­ effect on the foe and on the populace. It mitted for political purposes is indeed a frightens the foe and emboldens the ally. form of terrorism. Terrorists function within an area con­ Perhaps there is no such thing as “mili­ trolled by the enemy whether it be a me­ tary terrorism.” Or perhaps this is tropolis or an airliner in flight. The merely a semantic lack. At any rate, ter­ terrorists either: rorism is one form of military activity • Represent a significant portion that can be utilized by an organization or of the population (as in the case of a a people in pursuit of their political goals. struggle against an unpopular dictator), Terrorism is a military weapon. and their actions are applauded, even (Most often, terrorism consists of a se­ when they cause discomfort to the popu­ ries of acts of violence. All terrorism is lation (as when rebels knocked out a sub­ criminal in the eyes of the government stantial portion of Havana’s electric and that is assailed. But there may be “crimi­ water systems during the Cuban civil nal terrorism” in which the violence is war).25 committed purely for monetary, not • Do not receive any significant political gain. Frequently this type of ter­ amount of popular support and are gen­ rorism will disguise itself as political ter­ erally condemned as outlaws (the minus­ rorism, especially in situations wherein cule ethnic militant groups in the United genuine political terrorism is rampant, States are an example). e.g., the Argentine situation.) • Or, are foreign or foreign-sup- Terrorism as a military arm is a weap­ ported and are seeking to destroy the TERRORISM A MILITARY WEAPON 61 enemy’s control structure or to achieve gentina, and Northern Ireland—the mili­ some other political result (as in the case tary took over primary responsibility for of the IRA bombs in restaurants and oth­ combating terrorists because the police er public places in London). were overwhelmed.26 In those cases cit­ Whereas in Case One the terrorist may ed where the military sought to maintain try to minimize civilian casualties in or­ foreign control over populations, it is sig­ der not to turn the population against nificant that the independence struggles him, in Case Three the more casualties were nevertheless successful (except in there are the better the terrorist feels his Ireland, where the conflict continues). In goals are served: he is applying ruthless the two countries where indigenous mili­ pressure against his enemy, and the tary have sought to suppress major ter­ number of casualties is a measure of his rorist movements, the military were success. In Case Two, whether the ter­ successful in one instance (Uruguay), and rorist concerns himself over civilian the outcome is as yet inconclusive in the casualties is largely determined by other (Argentina). One may reasonably whether his fanaticism is tempered by gather from this that terrorism is an mercy. effective weapon when used by a sub­ stantial portion of a population against foreign occupation troops. As a weapon A t what point does terror­ against indigenous authorities supported ism become the concern of the “regular” by a military establishment, its efficacy is military? For a military establishment open to question. Terrorism appears to that is attacking, terrorism can be used have succeeded only in such cases as a substitute for conventional warfare wherein it was used in conjunction with or in conjunction with conventional war­ other military tactics (Cuba, South Viet­ fare and/or rural guerrilla warfare. For a nam). military establishment that is responsible There appear to be three fundamental for defending an area or a country, the functions of terrorism as a military weap­ military role in the handling of a terrorist on: problem is determined by local circum­ • Psychological warfare—De­ stances: Is the government of the coun­ moralize the enemy (his government, try under attack run by civilians or by armed forces, police, even the civilian the military? What constitutional and population) through assassinations, bomb other legal responsibilities and restric­ explosions, agitation, and so on. The Viet tions are placed on the military? What Cong utilized the entire arsenal of vio­ useful capabilities do the military have lence in their campaign in South Viet­ that the police do not have? nam. The level of intensity of terrorist activ­ • Material destruction—Destroy ity appears to be a determinant of mili­ or damage the enemy’s utilities, com­ tary response more than any other munications, and industries. Destruction factor. In most national cases military ac­ by sabotage, particularly against specific tivity has been largely limited to guard targets limited in size, can be as effective and military intelligence duties in sup­ as destruction by air raid. port of the police authorities. In other • Economic damage—Engender cases, however—notably in pre-Israel a state of psychological unease and un­ Palestine, Cyprus, Algeria, Uruguay, Ar­ certainty in a city or a country and com­ 62 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW merce dries up, investment funds vanish. organizations, such as the Central Intelli­ The deterioration of the Cuban economy gence Agency. In general, of the military during the 1956-58 revolution was a ma­ branches only the U.S. Marines recog­ jor factor in the downfall of the Batista nized the military importance of Viet regime. Cong terrorism and sought not only to Terrorism utilized as a military weap­ conquer territory but to hold it and to on, whether by a foreign power or by provide security for its inhabitants.27 It is domestic insurgents, is somewhat akin to interesting to note that the U.S. Joint air raids: it is warfare conducted in the Chiefs of Staff s Dictionary of Military enemy’s rear. In both cases the tactic and Associated Terms finds no place for aims at destroying the foe’s installations, the words “terror” or “terrorism.”28 killing his officials, and battering his U.S. military interest in terrorism ap­ morale. Lamentably, in both cases the pears to be minimal. The fact that one of deaths of civilians are an additional re­ the panels at the National War College’s sult, unacknowledged as a goal but nev­ National Security Affairs Conference ertheless often deliberately sought. dealt with “‘New’ Forms of Violence in the International Milieu” was encourag­ ing. There have been lectures and panels I F, THEN, terrorism is a mili­ at the Institute for Military Assistance at tary weapon—a weapon to be used for a Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and a pro- military goal: the defeat of an enemy— tection-against-terrorism manual for U.S. how much recognition of this weapon military personnel being sent overseas has been extended by “regular” military has been written there. The Air Universi­ establishments? Traditionally the regu­ ty Review has published a number of lar military have looked askance at any relevant articles. This attention, how­ type of unconventional warfare. This re­ ever, must be considered inadequate in mains true today even though the line of view of the enormity of the problem. differentiation between conventional Major General Edward G. Lansdale, and unconventional warfare grows in­ USAF (Ret) has warned: creasingly blurred. In the cases of the We live in a revolutionary era. My hunch British, Israeli, Argentine, and Uruguay­ is that history is waiting to play a deadly an armies, the military have been forced joke on us. It did so on recent graduates of by circumstances to recognize their re­ the Imperial Defence College in London, sponsibility in dealing with terrorism. who now find themselves facing the sav­ agery of revolutionary warfare in North­ Reality has legitimatized the bastard, ern Ireland. It did so on Pakistani officers military terrorism, in fact if not in name. under General Niazi, who undoubtedly The daring Israeli commando rescue of wish now that they had learned better 102 airline-hijack hostages at Entebbe, ways of coping with the Mukti Bahini Uganda, in July 1976 was a dramatic ex­ guerrillas. It is starting to do so on Argen­ ample of the utilization of military tine graduates of the Escuela Nacional de power in a counterterror endeavor. Guerra in Buenos Aires, who are waking In South Vietnam terrorism was a ma­ up to the fact that Marxist ERP guerrillas jor problem facing the American and intend to win themselves a country with South Vietnamese forces. Nevertheless the methods of the Tupamaros next the main responsibility for combating it door.29 was turned over to civilian intelligence There are existing situations and pos- TERRORISM A MILITARY WEAPON 63 sible situations which counsel greater un­ Or they take another major edifice in an derstanding of terrorism by the U.S. American city. Handling the crisis is military. .American military personnel beyond the means of the police. have already been subjected to terrorist • Terrorists have a nuclear weap­ attacks in countries as diverse and far on or a major bacterial weapon. They apart as Iran and Guatemala. It is not hold the weapon in a heavily guarded inconceivable that an international ter­ building in the center of a city, and they rorist organization might decide, for tac­ threaten to devastate the city if their de­ tical and ideological reasons, to strike at mands are not met. Again the situation is U.S. military personnel and even installa­ beyond the capability of the police. tions in a number of countries. (NATO, Hypothetical situations, yes. But ter­ concerned over the spread of terrorism, rorists have seized buildings in other conducted through the intelligence countries, and the U.S. government is agencies of its member states a study of concerned over the possibility of terror­ an international terrorist organization ists obtaining a nuclear bomb. These that is believed to operate globally.)30 situations could occur within the United The United States provides military States. The U.S. military would do well to equipment and guidance to a substantial prepare to assist if they are called upon number of friendly countries. Of what to do so. use is tank warfare doctrine to an army confronted with a major terrorist prob­ Beyond that is the necessity of recog­ lem? Are U.S. Military Advisory Groups nizing that in today’s world terrorism is prepared to provide the assistance often a military weapon. General Robert needed? Another scenario: U.S. forces E. Lee said of the Confederacy’s own are stationed in a foreign country, per­ guerrillas, “I regard the whole system as haps as part of an international peace­ an unmixed evil.”31 Evil or not, guerrilla keeping force, and the local rebels resort warfare has been employed by innumer­ to terror tactics. Are the U.S. military able combatants down through the ages, prepared to cope with such a situation? always bedeviling the regulars. Disdain­ There are additional scenarios that ing it will not make it go away. Disdain­ might require military involvement in ing terrorism will not make it go away, terror situations within the United States either. Unhappy though it may make the itself, much as troops were required at graduate of the Imperial Defence Col­ critical moments during the civil rights lege, or of the Escuela Nacional de Guer­ struggle of the sixties. Recognizing the ra, or of the U.S. Military Academy, it is constitutional and historical limitations a tactic that must be dealt with. Far bet­ on the military and recognizing that a ter that the U.S. military be prepared terror level akin to those in Argentina than that they, too, be caught by sur­ and Northern Ireland is not likely to de­ prise. Tactics must be studied, doctrines velop in the United States within the must be developed, defenses must be foreseeable future, one can, neverthe­ constructed. For, as one writer stated, less, postulate situations in which the “Step by step, almost imperceptibly, military would have to exercise counter- without anyone being aware that a fatal terror capabilities. Two possibilities: watershed has been crossed, mankind • Terrorists seize the Capitol in has descended into the age of terror.”32 Washington while Congress is in session. Coral Gables, Florida 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Notes 17. Panther Publications (Boulder, Colorado, 1964). 18. Twenty-eighth edition (Havana. 1961). I. Richard M. Ketchum, The Winter Soldiers (New York, 1973). Wash­ 19. Panther Publications (Boulder, 1965). ington prescribed the "rifle dress" for his troops because it was associated 20. Carlos Marighella, "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla," Tricontinen­ in the minds of the British with the apparel worn by skilled riflemen. tal (Havana, November 1970). 2. Colonel William D. Neale, USA (Ret), "Terror—Oldest Weapon in the 21. Ibid. Arsenal,” Army. August 1973. 22. “When we say that in the entire war (against Japan] mobile warfare 3. M. Cherif Bassiouni, editor, International Terrorism and Political is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary, we mean that the outcome Crimes (Springfield, Illinois, 1975). of the war depends mainly on regular warfare, especially in its mobile form, 4. Neale, op. cit. and that guerrilla warfare cannot shoulder the main responsibility in decid­ 5. H. Rothfels in Makers of Modern Strategy, Edward Mead Earle, editor ing the outcome." From "On Protracted War" in Selected Military Writings (New York, 1970). of Mao Tse-tung (Peking, 1963). 6. Colonel Seale R. Doss in Defense Planning for the 1980's & the Chang­ 23. Marighella, op. cit. ing International Environment (Washington. D.C.. 1975). 24. Ibid. 7. "The U.S. and the Skyjackers: Where Power Is Vulnerable,” Time, 21 25. Mallin, op. cit. September 1971. 26. Robert Taber. The War of the Flea (New York, 1965); Challenge and 8. "The City as Battlefield: A Global Concern," Time. 2 November 1970. Response in Internal Conflict (three volumes, Washington, D.C., 1967, 9. Doss, op. cit. 1968). 10. Ibid. 27. William R. Corson, The Betrayal (New York, 1968). II. Vo Nguyen Giap, The South Vietnam People Will Win (Hanoi, 1965). 28. Washington, D.C., 1972. 12. Ernesto Guevara, La Cuerra de Guerrillas (Havana, 1960). 29. Major General Edward G. Lansdale, USAF (Ret), “The Opposite 13. See Jaime Suchlicki's University Students and Revolution in Cuba. Number," Air University Review, July-August 1972. 1920-1968(Coral Cables, Florida, 1969); Ruby Hart Phillips's Cuba, Island 30. “Radical Nations Aid, Finance Global Terror, NATO Thinks," Miami o f Paradox (New York, 1959); Jay Mallin's Fortress Cuba (Chicago, 1965). Herald. 6 February 1976. 14. Guevara, "Cuerrilla Warfare: A Method," Cuba Socialista, September 31. Bruce Catton, A Stillness at Appomattox (New York, 1953). 1962. 32. Paul Johnson, quoted in David Fromkin's “The Strategy of Terror­ 15. Foreign Languages Publishing House (Hanoi, 1965). ism," Foreign Affairs. July 1975. 16. Issued by General Headquarters. 1965.

We deplore the visible assertion of military power when it breaks the peace but we praise the quiet assertion of military power when it keeps the peace. G eoffrey Blainey AIR-TO-AIR TRAINING UNDER THE DOC SYSTEM Colonel Robert D. Russ

air force review ROBABLY the most glamorized the Korean War. This article will discuss and least understood aspect of aerial the Designed Operational Capability warfare has been air-to-air combat. (DOC) training system—its genesis, its PVictories usually go to the best weaponimplementation in the 4th Tactical system—an amalgamation of aircraft Fighter Wing, and the degree of its suc­ performance, aerial weapons, and air­ cess. crew skills. During the Korean War, swept wing F-86 Sabres were pitted genesis against MiG-15 jets. At the end of the In 1972, the Tactical Fighter Symposium war the Sabre pilots had established a addressed two of the most vital issues ten-to-one margin of victory over the confronting tactical aviation: tactics and best in the Communist inventory, the training. The symposium concluded that MiG-15. From its growth and experience both areas required a thorough review in during the Korean hostilities, the USAF light of Air Force combat experience in emerged with a powerful counterair Southeast Asia. Two primary recommen­ force. However, the intervening years dations concerning training were made. between 1953 and the start of the South­ First, training should be optimized; and east Asia conflict saw a gradual deteriora­ second, training should be more realistic. tion in the air-to-air capability of tactical Optimized training was to be based on air forces. Aircraft development empha­ reducing the number of roles required in sized the nuclear role; the air-to-air gun multipurpose tactical aircraft. Aircrews was considered anachronistic, and air­ would concentrate primarily on either crew training was fragmented. the air-to-air or air-to-surface role, but At the start of the Southeast Asia con­ not on both. They would maintain a se­ flict, the capability of tactical air power condary but less-demanding capability to engage in air-to-air fighting was, at in the other role. Sorties and events rath­ best, less than optimum. Early aerial en­ er than flying hours were to be used as a gagements over North Vietnam made measure of merit. Realism was to be en­ this evident, and it was much later in the hanced by providing an authentic war­ conflict before this trend was reversed. like environment during exercises and Concentrated training, improved weap­ upgrading the facilities in which training ons development, and aircrew speciali­ was to be conducted. zation allowed this reversal. The lesson The program remained in the concep­ was not to be forgotten, and major efforts tual stage until 1973, when the fuel crisis within Tactical Air Command and the provided the catalyst necessary to trans­ Air Staff were initiated. A training sys­ form talk into action. An important tem was needed that would prevent a meeting was held to review tactical re­ loss in capability such as occurred after quirements in the late fall of 1973 at Continued on page 70 66 F-4E armed with Sparrow missiles and bombs Tactical Air Command’s 4th Tactical Fighter Wing trains in F-4Es to achieve its air-to-air and air-to-surface Designed Operational Capability (DOC). Here F-4s are armed with AIM-7 Sparrow missiles (below) and AIM-9 Sidewinders (opposite), both used in the training program.

70 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Headquarters USAF. Representatives three levels of aircrew proficiency: (1) from all commands that employ tactical Basic proBciency aircrews were those air power were in attendance. As a result that would maintain basic flying skills in of this meeting, the entire training sys­ the aircraft, including instrument and tem for operational units was realigned. night proficiency. They would not be re­ The operational capability of each tacti­ quired to maintain weapons delivery cal fighter squadron was designed to op­ qualification nor meet formal training re­ timize training in either a primary quirements for weapons employment air-to-air role or a primary air-to-surface systems. (2) Mission capable aircrews role. Those units with multipurpose were those that would require a mini­ fighter aircraft (e.g., the F-4) would be mum of additional training before intro­ assigned a primary and a secondary De­ duction into combat. These aircrews signed Operational Capability.* Further were expected to complete formal train­ delineation was provided in terms of sor­ ing in both air-to-air and air-to-surface ties required versus aircrew proficiency weapons employment but at a reduced level. level. Staff and/or supervisory personnel The program was structured within were included in this category. (3) Mis­ sion ready was the designation applied •Each DOC entails specialization in either air-to-surface or air-to-air weapons employment. The air-to-air DOC encompasses two segments: air to those aircrews that could be intro­ superiority, which involves offensive air-to-air weapons employment; and air defense, which involves area or boundary defense. The air-to-surface duced directly into combat in the event DOCs are divided into conventional and nuclear weapons employment. of war. They would maintain the full AIR FORCE REVIEW 71 complement of formal training require­ primary DOC of air-to-air superiority ments in both air-to-air and/or air-to-sur- and a secondary DOC of air-to-surface. face roles. Equipped with three squadrons of the Concurrent with the new DOC train­ latest models of the F-4E, the wing pre­ ing system, a major effort was exerted to pared to implement the training pro­ add realism to the program by upgrading gram on 1 July 1974. For an air-to-air the air-to-surface ranges, improving ex­ unit, that meant providing sufficient ercise scenarios, and providing realistic training to ensure that tactical maneuv­ air-to-air targets. Thus, a generalized ers to achieve missile- and gun-firing training program was transformed into a parameters were second nature to every specialized program—one designed to mission ready aircrew in the wing. To enable the fighter force to gain a high accomplish this, a carefully structured degree of proficiency and combat capa­ stair-step approach was developed. bility and maintain this capability’ as a visible deterrent to aggression. Im­ Air combat tactics plementation of this program was the next step. Air combat maneuvers stair-step approach Basic fighter maneuvers Within the Tactical Air Command the The academic program 4th Tactical Fighter Wing was assigned a Southeast Asia experience 72 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW SEA experience. The program was including information on man and ma­ based on lessons learned in Southeast chine, were provided each time the ag­ Asia. The majority of the aircrews were gressor squadron deployed to Seymour combat veterans and had, in varying de­ Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina. grees, some form of air-to-air experience. Air defense networks were covered in Some had MiG kills to their credit while detail, with emphasis on the European many others had MiG engagements. All theater. However, the single most im­ were eager to use their experience to de­ portant aspect of the program was velop an air-to-air capability second to thorough and detailed training in the none. Further, the introduction of new employment of F-4 weapon systems. equipment and improved hardware Delivery and employment envelopes, capabilities dictated a look at fighter tac­ switchology, and techniques were em­ tics from a new vantage point. Major phasized for each weapon system. The modifications were required in how we AIM-7 Sparrow, AIM-9 Sidewinder, and fight. For example, the TISEO,* which the 20-mm cannon were the heart of aca­ was introduced into combat during the demic training. Thus, the perennial waning days of the war, caused a minor problem of missed switches and improp­ revolution in fighter formations and em­ er ordnance release parameters was ad­ ployment. With Southeast Asia expertise dressed and emphasized. Weapons as a basis, a review of current tactics, employment was the forte of the aca­ procedures, and employment formations demic training. was undertaken. The result was im­ Basic Sghter maneuvers. The third proved training scenarios, new proficien­ level on the stairsteps, basic fighter ma­ cy exercises, and an expanded academic neuvers (BFM), enabled the aircrews to program. The foundation was laid, and practice in the air what they had learned the program commenced. on the ground. Basic fighter maneuvers Academic training. The academic pro­ were practiced single ship against a co­ gram was structured to provide a con­ operative target. The cooperative target centrated initial block of instruction need not be equipped with a complex followed by yearlong continuation train­ fire control system, and the aggressor ing. Three major areas of ground train­ squadron T-38s became an excellent ing received emphasis: enemy threat vehicle for this purpose. The saving in capabilities, employment environment, fuel by using a T-38 instead of an F-4 and weapon systems employment. Ex­ provided an added benefit. Proper weap­ perts from the Fighter Weapons School ons employment parameters and switch­ and Aggressor Squadron at Nellis Air ology, emphasized during the academic Force Base, Nevada, provided compre­ sessions, were evaluated during the BFM hensive initial training. Each aircrew ex­ and subsequent phases. Trigger squeeze, perienced in condensed form the same missile tone, and frames on target were air-to-air syllabus training that is used in all evaluated and compared against stan­ the USAF Fighter Weapons Instructor dards. Course. Subsequently, extensive sessions A maneuver called “cine track" was on the entire gamut of enemy threats, introduced into the BFM phase. This ma­ •Target Identification System. Electro-Optical. A gimbal mounted, high neuver requires the fighter to track an resolution, closed-circuit TV system with a dual field of view. The system allows the aircrew to make a visual identification of a target at extended adversary through a predetermined ma­ ranges. neuver. The aircrew must ensure coor­ AIR FORCE REVIEW 73 dinated tracking with proper Air combat tactics. At the top of the switchology and trigger discipline. Simu­ stairs were the air combat tactics (ACT) lated bullets fired and gun camera missions. All the lessons learned and frames on target are counted and must practiced in the preceding steps were in­ meet a definitive standard to be awarded tegrated into this phase. Good proce­ a “kill.” Cine track is a good example of dures, strong supervision, and strict the well ordered and structured phase aircrew discipline are the guts of ACT w hich is BFM. training. Emphasis was shifted from air­ Congeneric with that exercise was an­ crew coordination to the tactical part­ other useful tool called “agility exer­ nership. Formed elements were utilized cises.” As the name implies, the insofar as possible, so that a higher level maneuver requires agile thought as well of coordination and understanding could as coordination. These one-versus-one evolve among the tactical partners. The exercises tested the aircrews’ skill at in­ tactical partnership became the new terpreting the opposing aircraft’s ma­ watchword in air-to-air circles. It is more neuver as well as applying a flexible and has replaced the fighting countermaneuver to achieve a missile or wing formation, which was sacrosanct cannon tracking solution. Time criteria during the salad days of rigid “fluid four” were specified for each distinct maneu­ tactics. ver; ammunition expended and frames The heresy of a wingman taking a shot on target were evaluated. The same type is now considered antiquated. Each of structured and controlled environ­ member of the flight is considered a po­ ment was maintained that characterized tential shooter, but strict flight discipline the cine track. Both maneuvers have is observed. Nothing has been taken specific training objectives, and even the away from the leader; he has more re­ best aircrews benefited from frequent sources now at his disposal, namely, one practice of these exercises. or two aircraft with good ordnance and Air combat maneuvers. The final two fire control systems, depending upon the stairsteps are closely related. The air formation. On the attack, confusion is combat maneuvers (ACM) phase is, in a avoided by a set of “free or engaged word, structured. Innovative tactics fighter responsibilities,” which are as were not the objective; rather, canned familiar to the aircrews as the checklist. practice in offensive and defensive ma­ The engaged fighter still has the respon­ neuvering was required. Aircrew coordi­ sibility of killing the bandits, while the nation and precise radio transmissions, free fighter checks six, monitors fuel, and two areas which pose continuous prob­ directs the fight to bring continuous lems, were especially emphasized. pressure on the enemy aircraft. Lookout Again, dissimilar sorties were especially responsibilities have changed somewhat valuable, and ideas were crossfed from although doctrine is the same. other fighter units by the aggressor pi­ While ACT is the apex, it is not all- lots. Missions ranged from defensive inclusive. It is open-ended, allowing for two-ship patrol formation, practicing ini­ growth and refinement of tactics. It is the tial moves, to offensive sequential at­ area in which overall air-to-air capability tack.* A minimum of two aircraft maneuvering with the objective of bringing should be measured. When aircrews can continual pressure on the enemy aircraft. Pauses are planned in the attack effectively employ their weapon system to facilitate repositioning by the fighter aircraft. in this arena, they are mission ready. 74 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

M or e than two years have passed since the increase in proficiency of the air­ the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing imple­ crews. We may expect that changes will mented an air-to-air training program continue to occur; however, the system under the Designed Operational Capa­ has demonstrated the latitude to be ac­ bility system. Specialization has enabled commodating. the standards and the realism of the In summary, the DOC system of train­ training to be raised. The stair-step ap­ ing has enabled the fighter force to gain proach has permitted real growth in and maintain that high degree of profi­ effectiveness. The overall readiness of ciency and combat capability so essential the command has increased significantly. in maintaining our deterrent posture. The glamor of air-to-air combat remains Baron Manfred von Richthofen is credit­ undiminished, but the DOC system has ed with the words: “Fighter pilots have provided a method to prevent the val­ to rove in the area allotted them in any leys in experience that have occurred in way they like. And when they spot an the past. Air-to-air training has been enemy they attack and shoot them down transformed from its previous rocky . . . anything else is rubbish.” The DOC course to one that is optimized and real­ training system cannot add anything to istic. This method has been accom­ his message. It can and does permit us to plished without compromising safety; train the way we should fight. indeed, its cause has been promoted by the structured nature of the training and Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina

The real armaments race is in one sense a substitute for war. It may seem a very expensive substitute, but compared to war it is cheap. It is commonly seen as an intentional preparation for war, a competition which brings war closer, but it may be rather a deliberate postponing of war, an attempt to use stronger threats in preference to war. Whether it ends in war depends not on accidents and misunderstandings; it depends ultimately on the rival nations’ perceptions of their power to defeat one another. G eo f f r ey Blainey NATIONAL MILITARY SPACE DOCTRINE Colonel Morgan W. Sanborn

PACE DOCTRINE within the Unit­ ed States Department of Defense is Sevolving slowly. It is being born with all the pains that attended the birth of air doctrine in the 1930 s. It is a controversi­ al subject. The best summary of what our na­ tional military space doctrine consists of today is contained in one sentence: “Space is not a mission; it’s a medium.”1 This essentially negative comment falls considerably short of delineating a posi­ tive doctrine or approach to a military potential of inestimable value. Military space needs a very positive direction, a direction of utmost foresight and imagi- 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW nation to ensure that it is developed ate realization of the inevitability of speedily and intelligently. Space could World War II forced a change to this un­ be a vital factor in military confronta­ imaginative, “not invented here” official tions of the future. party line,where doctrine was overtaken According to recent official speeches by events. Not until the Air Force had and writings on space doctrine, there are been created as a separate service was four basic reasons for using space systems air doctrine properly recognized and al­ for various military support functions.2 lowed to grow. Uniqueness —Some functions essen­ The parallels between our approach to tially can be done only from space; for space today and our approach to air example, a near real-time warning of a power yesterday are too obvious to ig­ ballistic missile attack. nore. Perhaps the most surprising part is Economics —Some functions, such as that neither Department of Defense long-haul communications, are done (DOD) directives nor Joint Chiefs of Staff more economically from space.

Notes 3. Aerospace Daily. 24 July 1975, p. 129. I Thu statement is often heard in conversations within the Pentagon. 4. James R. Schlesinger. "Defense Planning and Budgeting, The Issue of 2 Remarks by Brigadier General Henry B. Stelling. Jr., Director of Space. Centralized Control,” Rand Corporation. 1964. DCS/R&D. Hq L'SAF. at the twenty-first annual meeting of the American 5. General Jacob E Smart, "Strategic Implications of Space Activities." Astronauhca) Society. Denver. Colorado. 26 August 1975 Strategic Review, Fall 1974. p. 21. HOULD we buy more or less of gadg­ et A? Should we reduce deployment SB by a few percentage points or not? Most current articles on defense policy stay at the level of asking such questions as these. What is missing in nearly all of the contributions to the debate is an ex­ amination of some fundamental assump­ tions and implications of the cornerstone of American defense policies, nuclear deterrence: hoping and confidently ex­ pecting to persuade the Soviet Union not to attack us by threatening thermonu­ clear counterattack. Most public officials, writers, and ordinary folk deem deter­ rence to be reliable and proper. Deter­ rence is widely accepted as one of the DETERRENCE: few “givens” in contemporary affairs. RECKLESS PRUDENCE But if a principal function of the intel­ lectual is—almost by definition—to sub­ ject society’s “given” operating assumptions to continuous scrutiny, then surely few topics are more in need of this Dr . J ames A. Stecenca ongoing critical examination than deter­ rence doctrine. According to this doctrine, the govern­ ment in Moscow can be counted on to behave like a rational individual. It will value survival more than any other goal. It will be well-informed. It will carefully calculate all the consequences and all the pros and cons of each option in every crisis. It will be sensible. And it will cau­ tiously adopt limited objectives in the in­ ternational arena so as not to incur American wrath and revenge. Hawed mortals But the Soviet government is run by a collection of people. And most of what we know about both human behavior and governmental decision-making should make us skeptical about the rosy picture the confident proponents of de­ terrence paint. 80 IN MY OPINION 81 People can be counted on to behave trols on executive discretion. Paradoxi­ rationally only part of the time, nonra- cally, those in our society most critical tionally and even irrationally the rest. and suspicious of the Soviet government Frequently throughout history they —call them conservatives or hawks— have held some things more dear than who ought to have the gravest doubts “mere” survival—honor and glory come about Kremlin dependability are, to mind. To some extent people are also nonetheless, the staunchest and most usually captive of habit or ideology or confident supporters of deterrence doc­ public opinion. And they may be poorly trines and attendant weapon systems informed, especially about secrecy- and budgets. shrouded military capabilities and inten­ “But,” someone is sure to say, “deter­ tions. They are clearly capable of evil rence has worked pretty well these past and folly, error and accident, mispercep­ thirty years, hasn’t it?” Can we really be tion and delusion, incompetence and sure, though? Perhaps, like the fellow passion. standing on the corner waving his arms The problem may be compounded and blowing a whistle who had managed when such decisions are made by small to convince himself that he was thereby groups of people rather than by single successfully keeping the elephants from individuals. What psychologist Irving attacking, we have convinced ourselves Janis calls “groupthink” sets in, with all that the only reason the Russians have the members of the group so anxious to not conquered Europe is because we get along with each other, maintain their have frightened them into restraint. power positions, appease the group lead­ They, of course, have likewise managed er, and push the interests of their respec­ to convince themselves that the only rea­ tive bureaucracies that they suspend the son their system has not been over­ critical thinking required for rational thrown by angry Westerners is that they decision-making. have frightened us into abandoning such The problem is certainly further ag­ goals. Historians may well conclude that gravated in a crisis situation when time neither side ever had the intentions the pressures, poorer information, fear, ex­ other feared and thought it had dis­ haustion, higher risks, and a tendency to­ couraged with threats of nuclear retalia­ ward belligerent machismo all cause a tion. deterioration in the already low level of And, anyway, even if it could some­ rationality we can expect from the how be proved that nuclear deterrence flawed mortals hovering over the but­ has kept the peace for the past thirty tons. years, these same historians would be Can we really count on the Soviet sys­ quick to point out that thirty years is not tem always to work so well, producing a very long time, that devices for keep­ wise leadership groups that will behave ing the peace in other times have so rationally on into the 1980s and worked as long only to fail later. beyond even in the gravest crises? Most It ought to be clear to all of us that of us know too much history to have that deterrence—really a form of applied kind of confidence in the performance of psychology—is historically, psychologi­ any political system, perhaps especially cally, and politically naive to a dangerous highly personalistic authoritarian degree, our confidence in it quite unwar­ regimes lacking institutionalized con­ ranted. One of these days—if, alas, the 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW balloon goes up—I suspect the survivors elected civilians endure even as military will say: “Of course deterrence was men and military thinking gain in politi­ bound to fail; how silly that we ever had cal influence during a time of continuous any faith in it!” national insecurity? Can a traditionally liberal and humane society survive as ethical doubts such even as its people and their leaders become calloused by their acceptance of Since government policies also ought to nuclear holocaust as an instrument of na­ be judged on ethical as well as practical tional policy? And, if deterrence fails (as grounds, we should look, too, at some of it has, of course, countless times through­ the more troublesome ethical implica­ out history), whatever Americans sur­ tions of nuclear deterrence policies. vive the catastrophe will surely not enjoy Our government openly and una­ the blessings of liberty and democracy bashedly contemplates the deliberate during the extended, harsh recuperative killing of tens of millions of people, most period. Of what moral character is a of them noncombatants. In the au­ means which itself endangers or surren­ thoritarian countries of Eastern Europe ders the end? and Asia against which the United States would retaliate, the people we hold hos­ tage have so little to say about their beyond nation states governments’ decisions that they could If deterrence, then, is not only unreliable hardly be deemed culpable of aggression but also morally bankrupt, what shall we and thus deserving of annihilation. And do, now that we realize our predica­ in neighboring countries not even par­ ment? Or, you might say, “OK, suppose ties to the quarrel, the citizens and eco­ nuclear deterrence is dangerous and logical support systems would not­ repugnant; what alternative do you sug­ withstanding suffer permanent radioac­ gest?” Well, less reliance on threats and tive poisoning. Could this undiscriminat­ other negative sanctions and more reli­ ing genocidal and ecological destruction ance on positive incentives would be a even conceivably be deemed justifiable start; people ordinarily seem to react vengeance? For that matter, is ven­ better to offers of mutually beneficial geance of any kind consistent with our deals than to scare tactics. We are now deepest moral convictions? betting our lives that the Soviet leaders Second, if decisions to retaliate must are ordinary and sensible enough to be be virtually automatic and instantane­ dependable custodians of nuclear weap­ ous, how can the decisions of our Presi­ ons and advanced delivery systems. Pre­ dent and his associates possibly be based sumably, they are thus likewise sensible on moral choice which requires time- enough to be manipulable with induce­ consuming reflection and consideration ments. So let us have less self-righteous­ of alternatives, as well as—under our ness and more detente, arms control, democratic system—at least some role expanded trade, and improved diploma­ for public opinion? cy—the usual liberal approaches that Finally, might society’s values that de­ have finally caught on even with conser­ terrence is designed to protect be endan­ vative administrations. Shifting our em­ gered by the nuclear deterrent itself? phasis increasingly away from negative Can a constitutional polity governed by and toward positive approaches may IN MY OPINION 83 help. Developing and relying increasing­ years ago, thermonuclear weapons and ly on programs with a positive cast and ICBMs may force the replacement of ob­ moving the violent tools back into their solescent national states and govern­ proper place of final resort would be an ments. If deterrence is no defense, improvement over the present threat perhaps there is none to be found. The system in global relations. Such a shift of whole effort to “improve” deterrence emphasis would also, of course, result in may be just as doomed as were the efforts more ethically agreeable policies. that I suppose were made by sixteenth But maybe one day soon we will have century defense intellectuals and mili­ to concede that there is no way to recon­ tary planners to “improve” their moats cile continued national sovereignties on and castle walls to protect against threats the one hand and the nuclear weapons that they could not quite see were un­ that have rendered governments unable dermining the entire social and political to perform their key function of protect­ order. We are probably now living in the ing their citizens on the other. Just as transition period between the age of na­ gunpowder, revolutionary ideals, and in­ tion states and whatever era is around dustrial commerce spelled doom for the the corner. feudal system of castles and moats 400 Purdue University

Ours is a strategy of deterrence; theirs is a strategy of war­ fighting. D r . M alcolm R. C urrie Director of Defense Research and Engineering Commander's Digest. June 17, 1976 NEVER AWAKE A SLEEPING GIANT Captain James O. Younts III, USA So Gideon, and the hundred men that were with him, came unto the outside of the camp in the beginning of the middle watch; and they had but newly set the watch: and they blew the trum­ pets, and brake the pitchers that were in their hands. And the three companies blew the trumpets, and brake the pitchers, and held the lamps in their left hands, and the trumpets in their right hands to blow withal: and they cried, The sword of the Lord, and of Gideon. And they stood every man in his place round about the camp: and all the host ran, and cried, and fled. J udges 7:19-21

NE OF the earliest recorded exam­ lights, was perceived by them to repre­ ples of psychological warfare oc­ sent a force of some 30,000 men. The curred three millenniums ago.confusion and fear were so general that O Outnumbered and in a tactically inferiorthose Midianites who were not fleeing position, Gideon was about to take it on were killing each other. (Judges 7:22) the chin. Well aware that the table of This combination of deception and organization and equipment for a stan­ surprise used to assist the tactician is but dard night attack called for one light car­ one facet of an esoteric type of warfare. rier and one trumpeter per 100 men, he On a strategic level it has caused the used this same awareness on the part of shifting of divisions and the saving of his enemy, the Midianites, to rout them. thousands of lives. Each of his 300 Israelites was equipped “Operation Mincemeat,” popularly with torches, vases, and trumpets. The known from the book The Man Who vases were used to conceal the torches Never Was,1 was a spectacular deception until the propitious moment, when the that facilitated the Allied invasion of Sici­ vases were deliberately shattered. ly. The corpse of a fictional Major Wil­ The Midianites, sleeping blissfully in a liam Martin of Britain’s Royal Marines valley (Judges 7:1), were suddenly sub­ was “buried” at the mouth of the Huelva jected to a deafening blare of trumpets. River in Spain. The incoming tide depos­ The noise, in combination with 300 ited him on the beach, where it ap­ 84 IN MY OPINION 85 peared that he had been in a plane crash. cepts and extracted the following princi­ Documents he carried were designed to ple: convince the Germans that the attack on Sicily would only be a feint while the In preparing for armed insurrection, propa­ main attacks would be in Greece and ganda is the essential task to be performed. Sardinia. The deception was so effective During the insurrection, propaganda is even that Hitler continued to believe it for more important than fighting. two weeks after the invasion of Sicily, G ener al Vo Nguyen Gia p 4 sent Rommel to Greece, and moved many of the torpedo boats from Sicily to Giap is apparently referring to local Greece.2 propaganda, but he is clearly aware of The impact of this alternative weapon the impact of actions and their interpre­ system has been recognized by some of tation on the international community. the greatest strategists—military and In his book People’s War, People ’sArmy, civilian—throughout history. he makes reference to “world opinion” Hence to fight and conquer in all your bat­ and the press as if the effect of North tles is not supreme excellence; supreme Vietnamese actions on these groups excellence consists in breaking the ene­ were more crucial than the realities of my’s resistance without fighting. the battlefield. At the risk of seeming Sun Tzu3 simplistic, one finds in retrospect that he appears to have a superlative grasp of Sun Tzu was a famous general of China political realities. Was it not Clausewitz (ca. 500 B.C.) whose writings are de­ who said. “War is politics continued by scribed by B. H. Liddell Hart as unsur­ other means”? If war is politics, then the passed in their comprehensiveness and principal objective of war is to cause the depth of understanding of strategy and opponent to change his government to tactics. Sun Tzu expresses the belief that one with which we can live and work in it is the moral and intellectual compo­ peace. An enemy is not a people, per­ nents of man which are decisive in war, haps not even an army, but a govern­ and only when they are properly applied ment. Inescapably, then, a goal of war can war be waged successfully. War as a ultimately involves manipulation in the construct is to be thoroughly studied in internal affairs of another nation. Our advance; the enemy’s plans frustrated, real targets, therefore, are the minds of his alliances broken up. Cleavages are to the enemy—perceptions and attitudes, be created between commanders and not bodies. subordinates, the enemy demoralized, There is a widely held view that psy­ his will to fight broken before actual hos­ chological operations (PSYOP) and its tilities begin. Sun Tzu considers national wartime component, psychological war­ unity an essential prerequisite for victo­ fare, are something a nation or its armed ry while the corollary is to cause disunity forces can elect to do or not to do. This within the opposing state. He writes that view is based on the concept that PSYOP an indispensable preliminary to battle is is an independent activity of specialists to attack the mind of the enemy. or that there is something inherently evil Although we are dealing in generali­ embodied in the concept. Such views ig­ ties, it appears that another lesser known nore the fact that whatever this nation, but brilliant strategist refined the con­ including the military, does or does not 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW do, the international community will in­ Americans was ignored, which is to say terpret or perceive as evidence of U.S. that a long-term psychological overview intentions or policies. was not included in the Japanese plan­ If programs are explained, they are ning, at least not in the military plan­ less subject to misinterpretation. If there ning. Although a great military success in is no direct explanation, then the action the short run, the attack was self-defeat­ will be interpreted by others. One im­ ing in the long run. It was a sensational plication is that although actions might defeat for the United States and instru­ speak louder than words, the action is mental in paving the way for American subject to several interpretations, and it entry into World War II. General is in our best interest to provide meaning Yamamoto is quoted as saying that to the action. “Pearl Harbor awoke a sleeping giant.” Psychological efforts conducted to As an instrument of national power, effect a desired international result the PSYOP role supports, complements, before a war must be continued with or amplifies diplomatic, political, eco­ greater emphasis in support of hostilities nomic, and military actions. At all levels until national objectives are achieved. As there are two requirements for PSYOP Sun Tzu makes explicit, success is predi­ effectiveness: a voice in the policy plan­ cated on a strong national resolve. Alter­ ning process and coordination among natively, strategists must take full the various agencies involved. advantage of all internal vulnerabilities The PSYOP planner must participate in the mental resolve of an enemy. in the policy planning process at its in­ The psychological ramifications of a ception. Too frequently, especially at combat action must be taken into consid­ lower levels, he is approached either in­ eration. Just as the planning staff will cidentally or as a last resort. Policy guide­ prepare psychological advantages and lines have already been established, and disadvantages of each course of action implementation has started. Without a for the commander, as do the intelli­ coordinated national policy directing the gence and the training and operations different aspects of a comprehensive personnel, so this same type of analysis at psychological operations effort, PSYOP the strategic level might have dissuaded has only a latent capability. Its character­ the Japanese from attacking Pearl Har­ istics of economy, flexibility, and mini­ bor. The failure to take a wholistic per­ mal loss of life make it a highly attractive spective and the concomitant lack of addition to our strategic arsenal. coordination were causal agents in the In spite of these apparent advantages, eventual Japanese decision. Taken in the psychological operations and psychologi­ context of prevailing American public cal warfare remain misunderstood, ma­ opinion in November 1941, the failure ligned, and generally ignored until a war becomes aggravated. The manifestation comes along. Then an ad hoc psychologi­ of this opinion—Congress—had retained cal operations committee is quickly a selective service capability by the slen­ created at the national level, frequently der margin of one vote. The mood of the evolving into a permanent committee country was clear. It would take an ex­ with significant responsibility for policy traordinary event to arouse and unite as well as operational decisions. Unfortu­ the American public. Essentially, the nately, the metamorphosis is usually not prevailing attitude of tens of millions of complete until the middle of a war so the IN MY OPINION 87 system does not become fruitful for chance. It follows that coordination must months or even years after a war begins. be conducted prior to implementation Because there is no separate standing and continued throughout the duration committee during peacetime to perform of a program. this function, the ad hoc committee makes the same mistakes that were made by the ad hoc committee at the In an age of increasing budget conscious­ beginning of the previous war. There is ness, perhaps the story of Gideon has in­ no institutional memory to provide con­ creasing relevance. As his costs were tinuity and avoid repetition of mistakes. negligible (clay vases and candles), so, of While it functions, the committee per­ all weapon support systems, PSYOP is forms one more essential activity in addi­ clearly the least expensive. As a flexible tion to shaping policy—coordination. instrument it provides options in situa­ This ensures that varied, seemingly un­ tions short of war and in every level of related programs are directed toward conflict. The lack of association between the same national objective. Viewed in­ bloodshed and effectiveness is illustrated dependently, they appear autonomous. by the “mopping up” operations in the In fact, these programs are different South Pacific. Local PSYOP teams with means used to achieve that end deemed the 1st Cavalry Division on Leyte were appropriate by the Commander-in- able to “clean out caves in which isolated Chief. Coordination ensures unity of but desperate enemy soldiers were effort with either minimum redundancy holed up. Often this was accomplished or planned redundancy. Reinforcement without the loss of a single American of a particular message is not left to life.”5 Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Notes I. Ewen Montagu, The Man Who Never Was (London: Evans Brothers 3. Sun Tzu Wu, The Art of War. translated by Lionel Ciles (Harrisburg, Limited, 1953). Pennsylvania: The Military Service Publishing Company. 1944), p. 48. 2. William E. Dougherty and Moms Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare 4. Ceneral Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army (New York: Casebook I Baltimore Johns Hopkins Press. 1956), p. 384. Hereafter cited Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 77, 79. as Casebook. 5. Casebook, pp. 213-14. books and ideas

ZUMWALT, AN INTELLECTUAL ADMIRAL D r . P aolo E. Coletta If there s one thing I can't stand it's an intellectual admiral. H enr y Kissincer

1

HE FIRST thought that flashed into though he stresses his successes, he also Tmy mind on receiving Admiral Elmo honestly acknowledges where he failed R. Zumwalt’s On Watch f was that it con­ to change “the system” either in the tained the author’s platform for his cam­ Navy or in the foreign policy decision­ paign for the U.S. Senate. In view of the making process. What we find, then, are election results, perhaps I was wrong. the memoirs of a sailor who rose to the Next question: Did the author seek to top leadership post in the Navy and w'ho immortalize himself in an autobiography is not afraid to name names. highlighting his strengths and accom­ The story concentrates on the years plishments and hiding his weaknesses 1970-74, while the Admiral was on and failures? Answer: Yes and no; for al­ watch as Chief of Naval Operations. It f Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Ret), On Watch: A Mem­ oir (New York: Quadrangle, 1976, $12.50), xv and 511 pages, chronology, appendixes, maps, charts, glossary, index. 88 BOOKS AND IDEAS 89 tellsliovv he tried to reform the Navy and to the United States, a threat empha­ bring it “up to speed” in various ways. In sized to him by General George C. Mar­ addition it details his relations with many shall and by the lowering of America’s agencies at the highest levels of govern­ defense posture by Secretary of Defense ment: the Joint Chiefs of StaflF, the Na­ Louis A. Johnson. For three years, 1962- tional Security Council, the White House 65, he learned much, as an assistant in Office, the Presidency itself. the billet of Director of the Arms Control Following his graduation from the Na­ Division, International Security Affairs, val Academy in 1943, Zumwalt con­ from that great public servant, Paul H. tinued his education in billets both at sea Nitze. He acquired what he says was the and ashore. At sea he realized that the equivalent of a Ph.D. in politico-military demand for very expensive and relative­ affairs that later stood him in good stead ly defenseless nuclear-powered surface when he became Chief of Naval Opera­ warships emanating from the politically tions, thus a member of the Joint Chiefs powerful potentate Admiral Hyman G. of Staff and principal naval adviser to the Rickover precluded the acquisition of President. As Commander U.S. Naval less expensive yet vitally necessary ships Forces Vietnam, he faced not only “the that could exercise sea control, that is, fire of the enemy in the field but the in­ protect America’s overseas lines of com­ difference or even the contempt of an all munication. Second, he saw that the too large segment of the public at Navy suffered from Mickey Mouse, tradi­ home.” (p. 34) He decried the massive tions outmoded by social change. Third, American involvement in Vietnam be­ such were the defense budgets of the cause it consumed resources better used Nixon administration and the compara­ to support American interests else­ tive growth of the Soviet Navy that the where. Thus, he applauded the Vietnam- U.S. Navy verged on becoming second ization program and then cheered rate and thus unable to support Ameri­ America’s withdrawal. It was from what can interests worldwide, as the Nixon appeared to be a dead-end tour with the Doctrine posited. Fourth, he noted that “brown water” (riverine) navy that he the administration would accept a sec­ was called to be CNO—a surface sailor ondary position in strategic arms limita­ following nine years in that billet of na­ tions merely in order to reach an val aviators—and began his battles with agreement with the Soviets. Last, he saw such administration favorites as Henry that administration decisions and the Kissinger and Alexander Haig and the lack of correctly placed American naval redoubtable leaders of the congressional power, as in the Indian Ocean, enabled armed services and appropriations com­ the Soviets to further their interests at mittees. the expense of American objectives. The remaining almost 500 pages of On In three delightful opening chapters, Watch deal with high-low, or the mix of Zumwalt traces the history of his World nuclear-powered and conventional War II service in the Western Pacific; ships, aircraft, and weapons the Navy how he met the girl he then married and should have, including a penetrating de­ who bore him four children; and how he scription of the political machinations of would have preferred to become a physi­ Rickover (chapters 5-6); the drive to cian like both his parents yet remained open the Navy to minorities (not without in the Navy because of the Soviet threat such problems as the flareups on the 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Constellation, Hassayampa, and Kitty agreement on the limitation of strategic Hawk); the various Z-grams that eradi­ arms offered by the Russians. He found cated Mickey Mouse regulations (chap­ that the unification of the armed forces ters 7-10); and almost 200 pages provided for in the National Security Act (chapters 12-20) mostly on failure to con­ of 1947 as amended still has not eradicat­ vince the administration to adopt ed single service viewpoints and that the courses of action that would make and administration did not furnish him nec­ keep America strong in face of the Soviet essary information. threat. Extremely useful are the Zumwalt’s watch, of course, occurred chronology and the appendixes, the lat­ during the Watergate mess, when gov­ ter of which deal with comparative U.S.- ernmental matters were largely handled U.S.S.R. naval and mercantile capabili­ by either Kissinger or Haig. As CNO he ties. found much opposition within his ser­ vice when he changed the Navy’s social order to match that of society as a whole. H ow does Zumwalt appear When he wanted to say unpleasant in historical perspective? He is like the things to the administration, he was Perrys and Isherwoods who wanted threatened by Kissinger and others that steam-powered rather than sailing ships; his budget would be cut or that he would like Stephen B. Luce and Alfred Thayer be fired. Paranoia and duplicity rather Mahan who would teach the meaning of than candor and honesty prevailed. He, sea power; and most like Bradley A. therefore, decided not to accept the Fiske, who served as the equivalent of cushy job offered him as head of the Vet­ CNO during the early years of Wood- erans Administration and, after his row Wilson’s administration and who watch ended, to appeal to the people. He was not listened to when he demanded has done so, with verve and the best in­ that America prepare for a war he saw stincts of a patriot who knows that the coming. United States will only be as militarily Specifically, how can a CNO influence strong as the people want it to be. administration policy? Zumwalt found While the full story cannot appear un­ that his recommendations for the kind of til Nixon, Rickover, Kissinger, Haig, and Navy he thought the nation should have former Secretary of the Navy John W. were not generally accepted by the ad­ Warner, among others, tell their side of ministration, especially by Rickover and it—if they ever do— On Watch remains such Congressmen as William Proxmire a terrifying tale of an administration so and Les Aspin. Nor were these three involved in escaping from the moral much concerned about maintaining morass it had created and so dependent parity with the Russians. Rather they on a Lone Ranger to decide its foreign seemed to accept Kissinger’s fatalistic policies that the primary rule of national belief that the U.S. is a decadent power life, security, was neglected. and would be well-advised to grasp any U.S. Naval Academy and foreign affairs of the nations surveyed POTPOURRI will find the historical analysis more than sufficient to supply a basic understanding of the succeeding discussion. The Asian special­ Asia and the Road Ahead: Issues for the Ma­ ist will find the discussion sound if not in­ jor Powers by Robert A. Scalapino. Berke­ novative. Undoubtedly, readers will find ley: University of California Press, 1975, some analytical points debatable and will index, x + 337 pages, $10.95, $3.95 paper. argue with some of Scalapino’s conclusions, although believers in realpolitik will find this Any work by Professor Scalapino, a leading volume to their taste. scholar among American students of Asia, is In short, Professor Scalapino has produced worth reading. This particular book deserves a book that should be read by Air Force offi­ special attention because it reviews the Pa- cers with an interest in Asia or world politics. cific-Asian area following the failure of U.S. As a bonus, the study concludes with a valu­ policy in Indochina. Scalapino’s message is able bibliographic essay containing some stated explicitly in the Preface, ... if the tw’enty-two pages of source material. trauma of America’s first major political-mili­ tary defeat, that in Indochina, leads to a tri­ Dr. Paul H. B. Godwin umph of isolationism, new or old, we shall, in Documentary Research Division my opinion, face grave problems in the not Air University distant future.” (p. x) Scalapino’s concern, then, is to chart and interpret the course of international relations in Asia since World War II and discuss the alternatives available The Lessons of Vietnam by W. Scott Thomp­ to the major powers in the region. son and Donaldson D. Frizzell. New The analysis takes place on two levels. The York: Crane, Russak & Co., Inc., 1976,277 Pacific-Asian area is divided into five strate­ pages, $16.50. gic regions (the Pacific Ocean, Northeast Asia, the Continental Center, Southeast Asia, and South Asia); this is followed by a review “There were many ways of winning the of the foreign policies of six selected “major Vietnam War; there was only one way of los­ powers” in their domestic settings within a ing it, and we figured out that one possible transregional, regional, and bilateral context. w’ay.” This statement, attributed to Herman The six countries selected consist of three Kahn, probably only slightly overstates the global powers: the United States, the thesis of this most interesting and stimulating U.S.S.R., and Japan; China, a regional power book by Colonel Frizzell and Dr. Thompson. with some global influence; and India and The work is the result of a colloquium, Indonesia as major regional powers. One “The Military Lessons of the Vietnamese could quibble with the selection of Indonesia War,” held at Tufts University’s Fletcher as the major Southeast Asian power, but it is School of Law and Diplomacy in 1973-74 difficult to refute the argument that Djakarta and later broadened to a study of the politi­ is potentially the power center of the region. co-military lessons at a conference in May | The great strength of Scalapino’s analysis is 1974. The list of participants in these confer­ (the scope of the issues he covers and the bal- ences reads like a who’s who of the U.S. par­ lance he establishes between his discussion of ticipation in the conflict, and their most Iglobal and regional politics and the particu­ candid comments offer the serious student of lar policies pursued by the nations that form military planning or history much food for {the core of his work. The reader unfamiliar serious thought. (with the course of world politics in Asia or The authors have taken excerpts from the lone who is not familiar with the domestic papers presented and the panel discussions 91 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW of these two gatherings and woven them Every one of us, whether we call ourselves with their own comments into a vivid and officers, educators, or simply human beings, revealing account of the attitudes, decisions, should read this book. It is the only book that actions, successes, and failures of the Ameri­ I have read in recent years that leads me to can effort in Vietnam. In so doing, they have complete and extended praise. Why? Be­ written a book of considerable value not only cause it is an absorbing, enriching, and enter­ to those who will be responsible for future taining experience. Because it is sheer U.S. political and military decisions but to the delight—ebullient, exuberant, and uncom­ historians who will analyze this conflict fur­ promising. ther. To begin with, The Great War is a scholar­ It has often been charged that the losers in ly work that engages both the intellect and a war are the ones most capable of determin­ the emotions. It impacts the mind and gut, ing the mistakes of that wrar and avoiding evoking the awful experience of war; and them during the next conflict. For the first yet, at the same time, it is often so funny that time in its history, the United States finds I laughed out loud. itself occupying the position of loser. It is im­ When Fussell tells us how the soldiers in perative, then, that we learn the lessons of the trenches could be sure they would re­ this past conflict and avoid them in the fu­ ceive their cigarettes and cakes if their pack­ ture. Just as important is the need to avoid ages were stamped “Army Temperance the m/s-lessons. This book, properly used, Society Publications” and then turns and dis­ should be a good starting point for the study cusses the “Principle of Threes” in literature necessary to accomplish these goals. and life, we can readily sense the range of his Beginning with the Strategic Background, enterprise. the book progresses through such topics as He proves again and again that he is not the Evolution of National Security Policy and only a fine researcher but a writer nonpareil. the Vietnam War, the French Experience, His skills are manifestly sharp and deep. the American Approach to the War, the Mili­ While definitively describing the blood and tary War of Attrition, Psychological Factors, mud of trench warfare, he interlaces his lan­ and almost every major facet of the conflict. guage with cuts and quotes from other Each subject is analyzed from several view­ sources in such a splendid way that he turns points, some conclusions are drawn, and in­ the whole exercise into a magnificent jour­ dividual opinions of lessons to be learned are ney through the literary world of “the war to listed. Thus, the reader who still harbors end all wars.” In doing so, he walks us along emotional ties with the conflict will find the the beauty-roads of nineteenth-century adrenalin flowing and his ire at his own per­ idealism and well into the jagged rubble of sonal prejudice of the war being revived. modern skepticism. Poetry, myth, and narra­ U.S. participation—long on technological tion are explored like caves and haunted innovation/short on institutional innovation, houses. long on good intent/short on ability to carry His meticulous discussion of the literature out that intent because of bureaucratic in­ before, during, and after “The Doughboy ertia—is clearly laid out in this most interest­ Years” clarifies the germinal aspects of those ing and informative text. ideas, postures, and feelings about our world Lieutenant Colonel Edward H. Turek which we have come to possess—or which Maxwell AFB, Alabama have come to possess us. His concept of memory and that which causes the content of memory is magnificently developed. His explanation of how and why many of us have The Great War and Modern Memory by Paul realized the world as absurd, teetering on Fussell. London: Oxford University Press, the cutting-edge of irony, is the most power­ 1975, index, notes + 363 pages, $13.95. ful and persuasive that I have discovered. BOOKS AND IDEAS 93 Fussell makes it quite clear that war is con­ Thus, the question is whether individual es­ ceptual, an awesome game that any number says warrant our examining the whole text. can play. He shows how inventions and un­ From the perspective of national security, derstandings, poetry or bullets, are impos­ the essays by only a hypothetical question sible without previously known types and Morton A. Kaplan (“Uncertainty and Securi­ models and that the imaginative leap to the ty”) and Donald Brennan ("National Security new cannot be realized without them: Con- in Fortress America”) are provocative and tent-of-mind is all-important to that leap. incisive, and they merit study. The ageless These themes are illustrated with detail, question of the American withdrawal from range, and sensitive humanity, covering a Europe and the impact of a severance of the wide horizon of sources, with anal­ U.S.-Japanese security treaty are subjects of yses of the contributions of Siegfried Sas- a risk analysis by University of Chicago jsoon, Robert Graves, Wilfred Owen, Professor Kaplan. Brennan, of the Hudson 'Edmund Blunden, Anthony Burgess, and Institute, posits a military policy of noninter­ dozens of others. vention and asks how the consequent reduc­ There are so many fine aspects of The tions in general purpose forces might Great War that it is difficult to cover even a adversely affect us. Would Japan occupy Ha­ fraction of them, but Fussell’s diversity of waii or the Soviets assert that Alaska was perceptions, his poetic rendering of com­ “legitimate” Soviet territory? Other essays munication, his clarification of mind-set, and examine the fundamental importance of eco­ fhis shaping of iconic forms are just a few' that nomics, technological and scientific advance­ imake every chapter continuously exciting ment, raw materials, and they are (and stimulating. Headings like “A Satire of well-developed presentations. However, the Circumstance,” “The Troglodyte World,” remaining essays on how “isolation” might ‘Oh What a Literary War,” and "Persistence affect America’s position and societal devel­ and Memory” are mere indicators of what opment (the theme of the 1974 conference) awaits the reader of this richly rewarding are less satisfactory. aook. It is all so right, so compassionate, so Readers will, however, be pleased to see ;hare-able! little of the redundancy so common to such By guiding us into an understanding of joint enterprises. In addition, a second Kap­ aow we infused that first quarter of the twen- lan essay would be useful to those unfamil­ ieth century into the bloodstream of our iar with the basics of alliance politics. ives, Fussell may have helped us survive this Collectively, the authors succeed in re­ inal quarter. For that notion, I thank him minding us that such great questions of our rnd highly recommend his Great War and age as monetary reform, raw materials, Modern Memory.* trade, and alliance cohesion necessitate solu­ Dr. Porter J. Crow tions that will assuredly alter the prevailing Educational Advisor to the Commandant conceptions of national security policy. This Air Command and Staff College book, then, is a sketch map to our future. •Editor's Note; Fussell's book received the 1976 National Book Award in Roy A. Werner he Arts and Letters category. Washington, D.C. isolation or Interdependence? Today’s Choices for Tomorrow’s World edited by The United States Air Force: A Turbulent Morton A. Kaplan. New York: Free Press, History by Herbert Molloy Mason, Jr. New 1975, 254 pages, $10.00. York: Mason/Charter, 1976, 284 pages, $12.95. Generally, essay collections on significant opics suffer from articles of uneven quality. Old wine in old bottles. There is absolutely 94 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW nothing new in this book, and it is not a his­ one little line to the submarines. He explicit­ tory in the scholarly sense. An attempt is ly credits Linebacker II for bringing North made to cram 70 years of history into 284 Vietnam back to the conference table; of pages: the work does not have the technical course, we of the Air Force establishment features required to qualify as serious schol­ would like to have some incontrovertible arship; it is based wholly on common, printed proof that that was so. But Mason does not do sources; and its interpretations are so con­ much for his case when, in the next para­ ventional that they do not bear repeating. In graph, he quotes a Britisher as saying: short, the work is “drum and trumpet” his­ “ . .North Vietnam requires at least a million tory written for the popular market. tons of grain a year from outside sources, and Mason, a professional writer specializing in they were really tight for food in January of aviation, makes fewer errors of fact than one 1973. They had to sign then.” usually associates with a book of this kind: the Herbert Molloy Mason has a very good Hornet was sunk in the Battle of the Coral writing style, and no air power enthusiast Sea, and the Tactical Air Command conduct­ will be much inclined to contest the tone of ed the air war in Vietnam. A Turbulent His­ the author’s ideas. Yet, the book is so superfi­ tory is mainly a narrative description of cial and travels such a well-worn path that events, not an interpretation. Where the au­ there could be very few professional officers thor does wander into the realm of ideas, he who would learn much from it. is more Popish than the Pope, more hawkish Lieutenant Colonel David R. Mets than the hawk. He goes further than does the Air University Review U.S. Army Air Forces official history in claim­ Maxwell AFB, Alabama ing victory for the B-29s over Japan, leaving the contributors

C iit a in Euii H. T iiso ki). Jh (M.A., Universi­ ty of Alabama) is assigned to the Office of Air Force History, Hq USAF. where he is researching and writing a history of search M vjiiii W *vnk L. Mon m i iv. (M.A.. University and rescue in Southeast Asia. Additionally, of Southern California) is assigned to the he is studying for his Ph.D. in military his­ telecommunications branch, SAMTEt \ tory at George Washington University. Ok O-kt is W. T ikh (Ph.D.. Stanford Univer- Vandenberg AFB. California. A distin­ Previous assignments have included tours as sitj ) is a Vice President of Deere & Compa­ guished graduate of Officer Training School an intelligence analyst in Thailand and at ny, Moline, Illinois. Dr. Tarr spent five years in 1963, he served as communications chief Hq Strategic Air Command. in the federal government as Assistant of maintenance at Ellington AFB and Ram- Secretary of the Air Force, Manpower and stein AFB and as a base wire officer at Tan Reserve .Affairs; Director. Selective Service Son Nhut. Prior to his present assignment, System; and Under Secretary of State for he was Chief, Operations Division, Direc­ Security Assistance and Acting Deputy Un­ torate of Communications-Electronics. der Secretary of State for Management. Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force, March Before going to Washington, he was Presi­ AFB. California. Major Morawitz is a gradu­ dent of Lawrence University at Appleton, ate of the Communications-Electronics Staff jWisconsin. Officer Course.

J u M ii.i.iN (A.B., Florida Southern College), sIajok Phihkii W. Rim o' (M.A., Texas Tech) Mi)on Josn'ii M Sum (B.S.. The Citadel; journalist, has been a witness at firsthand of s assigned to the Air Force Logistics Man- M.B.A.. Samford University) is a Systems terrorism in Cuba, Vietnam. Uruguay, Ar­ igement Center. Gunter .Air Force Station. Program Staff Officer, Hq USAF. He has gentina. and elsewhere. He is the author of Alabama. He enlisted as an airman third been a C-124, C-97, and C-123 pilot in six books, two of which deal entirely with ;lass, attended Officer Training School, and MAC. DSA, and TAC. He has served in con­ terrorism, and has lectured on the subject at las been assigned to a variety of duties, from tract administration as Detachment Com­ the Pentagon, Fort Bragg. North Carolina, ircraft maintenance officer in tactical mander at Fairchild Industries, Florida, and and the Air Force Special Operations ighter wings in TAC and PACAF to Special Deputy Commander of the AFPRO at Rock- School, as well as at civilian seminars, and Assistant to the Chief of Staff. Major Rocap etdyne, California. Major Syslo is a graduate college conferences. Mr. Mallin is a regular 5 a graduate of Squadron Officer School and of Squadron Officer School, the Armed contributor to the Review: his "Terrorism as Air Command and Staff College and author Forces Staff College, and the Industrial Col­ a Political Weapon" was published in the >f other published articles. lege of the Armed Forces. July-August 1971 issue. 95 O imin k i Roman D. Riw (M.B.A., George Washington University) is Commander, 4th Tactical Fighter Wing. Seymour Johnson C vitain Jwies O. Younts 111. U.S. Army, AFB, North Carolina, where he previously (USM A: M.A., Texas Christian University) is served as Vice Commander. Following pilot an instructor in the Psychological Opera­ training, he attended gunnery school and tions Department of the School of Interna­ was then assigned to RAF Bentwaters and tional Studies. Institute for Military- stateside flying slots. He is a command pilot Assistance. Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He with more than 4000 flying hours and 242 is a graduate of the .Army and Air Force combat missions in Southeast Asia. At the psychological operations courses and of the Pentagon he served as Plans Officer on the Infantry Officer Advanced Course. He Air Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Colo­ served as company commander with a nel Russ is a Distinguished Craduate of Air mechanized batallion in Vietnam. Captain Command and Staff College and National Younts has published in Infantry magazine. War College.

Dk Junes A. Stkc.kiw.a (Ph.D., UCLA) is Professor of Political Science at Purdue Uni­ versity. A specialist in international rela­ tions and military affairs, his writings include The Politics of Military Policy. The United Nations Force in Cyprus, and The Global Community as w'ell as articles and reviews in professional and popular periodi­ cals. As an Army enlisted man. he spent 1960-61 in Korea, a news writer and TV announcer with the Armed Forces network. Du P soijO E. Coletts iPh.D., University of Missouri) is in the History Department. United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Cm.oMKi. M oikivn W. Svm'iuiv iM.S.. Louisi­ Maryland. He served with a Naval Reserve ana Tech University) is assigned to the surf ace division from 1951 to 1955 and then Office of the Director of Space. Hq USAF. taught strategy and tactics at Naval Reserve Commissioned in 1955, he has flown the F- Officers School. His publications include a 86D, F-102. T-33. T-29. T-39 and an OV-10 three-volume biography of W. J. Bry an, a flying tour in Southeast Asia. Other assign­ book of essays on the foreign policies of Wil­ ments were with the Aerospace Test Wing, liam McKinley (editor), The Presidency of Vandenberg AFB, California, and as Chief, William Howard Taft. and. forthcoming. I Space Transportation System Division, The U.S. Xasy and Defense l niScation. \ Space Test Group. Patrick AFB. Florida. 1947- 1953. Dr. Coletta spent three war­ Colonel Sanborn is a graduate of Air War time years in the Navy and retired after 30 College. years of Naval Reserve service.

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "A Call from the Wilderness” by Major Donald J. Alberts, USAF, as the outstanding article in the November-December 1976 issue of Air University Review. EDITORIAL STAFF C olonel Glenn E. W asson, USAF Editor L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Ric h a r d E. H ansen, USAF Associate Editor L ie u t e n a n t Colonel David R. M ets, USAF Acquisitions Editor J ack H. Mooney Managing Editor J ohn A. W estcott, J r . Art Director and Production Manager E nrique Gaston Associate Editor, Spanish Language Edition L ia Mid o s i May Patterson Associate Editor, Portuguese Language Edition W il l ia m J. D e P aola Art Exlitor and Illustrator R udolph W. Morgan Financial and Administrative Manager

ADVISERS C olonel Eldon W. Downs Hq Air Forcr Institute of Technology C olonel Russell A. T ur ner II Ha Air Force Logistics Command D r . H ar o l d M. H el f man //

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