Mining Capitalism and Contentious Politics in Bangladesh

MINING CAPITALISM AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN BANGLADESH

Muhammad Omar Faruque

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Sociology University of Toronto

MINING CAPITALISM AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN BANGLADESH

Muhammad Omar Faruque

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Sociology University of Toronto

2019

Abstract

This dissertation analyses a social movement in Bangladesh fighting a potentially environmentally destructive resource extraction project as well as the country’s neoliberal energy policies.

Grassroots community grievances against an open pit coalmine in Phulbari in the northwest region started small but culminated in a multi-scalar social movement, including anti-corporate mobilization against privatization of resource extraction at the national level. It also inspired a group of transnational advocacy groups to support the anti-mining movement. Drawing on critical development, social movement, and critical globalization scholarships, the dissertation analyses three distinct scales of the anti-coalmine social mobilizations: local, national, and transnational.

Based on a set of qualitative interviews with local/national activists and transnational advocacy groups, I examine each of these scales through the lens of a specific theoretical approach. At the local level, drawing on scholarship on critical development studies, I consider the development of contentious political agency of grassroots communities to analyse the dynamics of the countermovement against ‘accumulation by dispossession.’ At the national scale, I engage with critical globalization scholarship to analyse discourses of a radical social organization to challenge neoliberal development and its dominant narrative of capitalist modernity. I pay attention to the

ii significance of its political rhetoric (nationalist imaginaries) to articulate a counter-hegemonic political agenda. Finally, at the transnational level, I use sociological scholarship on transnational activism to analyse the mobilization of transnational advocacy groups supporting grassroots mobilization to critically reflect on the dynamics of alliances of differently positioned actors who, although united to achieve a common goal, share different worldviews on how to confront the power of global capital in the periphery. I conclude with the lessons learned from the analysis of the

Phulbari movement. I focus on three issues: the salient features of the movement, which can be applied in other cases, the significance of the Phulbari movement to confront resource extraction, and a note on rethinking coal politics in the era of climate crisis.

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To Sheikh Muhammad Shaheedullah & Anu Muhammad

In recognition of their dedication to social movements to ensure the national resources in Bangladesh benefit its people

Acknowledgements

Before moving to acknowledging the contribution of many individuals, I want to mention my intellectual debt to several scholars whose works swayed my thinking as I wrote this dissertation. Stuart Kirsch’s research on political struggles of indigenous communities against environmental damage and landscape destruction caused by mining corporations in the Pacific region shaped my understanding of resource politics in Bangladesh. His book, Mining Capitalism: The Relationship between Corporations and their Critics, clarifies many subtle issues of grassroots struggles against extractive capital. I have borrowed part of the title of his book. However, I have taken a different perspective to examine the political struggles against resource extraction in Bangladesh and drawn on a broad range of sociological scholarship on development, globalization, and social movements. Philip McMichael’s work on critical development studies provided me with a convincing conceptual framework to dissect struggles against capitalist modernity. His book, Contesting Development: Critical Struggles for Social Change, emphasizes that popular discontent over ‘development’ in the global South is rooted in the ‘market calculus’ of neoliberal capitalism. Another significant influence on my thinking was Indian novelist and social critic, Arundhati Roy. Her non-fiction writing on the Save Narmada Movement (The Cost of Living) and social struggles over mineral development projects in tribal areas in India (Capitalism: A Ghost Story) triggered my interest in Bangladesh’s struggles.

This project took longer than I anticipated, but despite many setbacks, I managed to complete it. I was slowed down but not halted by the many barriers I encountered. Many individuals helped me in various ways to overcome the challenges. It would not have been possible without the support of my mentors – a group of wonderful faculty members in the Department of Sociology at the University of Toronto. I must convey my deepest gratitude to all members of my dissertation committee: John Hannigan, Josée Johnston, Erik Schneiderhan, Bernd Baldus, and Zaheer Baber. Since the inception of the project, they have provided much needed intellectual support. Their input shaped the theoretical and empirical analysis of the materials. Every interaction with them helped me solve numerous problems that I was grappling with. They were very generous in agreeing to read various drafts of each chapter and offer incisive comments. Their contributions have been vital.

I am deeply indebted to my interlocutors in Dhaka and Phulbari who graciously shared their time. They patiently accommodated my requests for often lengthy conversations on various aspects of mining conflict and resource politics in Bangladesh. Some of them gave me relevant materials as well. The assistance of my local companion in Phulbari was indispensable, as it allowed me to carry out research in a place unknown to me. Without his labour and commitment, it would have been difficult to navigate remote rural areas and identify relevant participants. A group of transnational advocacy organizations located in various countries in the global North generously responded to my requests to participate in this study. Some members of the Bangladeshis diaspora in the United Kingdom, actively involved in transnational activism on the Phulbari coal project, agreed to be interviewed by telephone. I have refrained from mentioning any names here to protect the privacy of my interlocutors and local companion, as I promised them during my fieldwork. There is no doubt that without their cooperation, the research would have been unthinkable.

Many individuals in Bangladesh provided myriad forms of support over the years. I owe them an enormous debt. It is not entirely possible to thank all of them individually. However, several persons deserve special thanks. Professor A. Barkat was kind enough to instruct his staff at the Bangladesh Economic Association to supply me with some relevant documents. K. Alam was very patient in helping me collect materials from NCBD’s archive. Without his efforts, it would not have been possible to organize documents of NCBD’s activism spanning nearly two decades. A. Ferdousee assisted me by organizing these archival materials and collecting other relevant documents from several sources in Dhaka. L. K. Mondal helped me recruit two graduate students from Dhaka University to conduct archival research at its central library and the library of the weekly newspaper Ekota. I. Hoque collected two audio-visual materials relevant to this project. Reza and Shahid responded to my urgent requests over the years to collect new and out of print books from various publishers in Dhaka. Kibria Bhai engaged his staff to find old copies of a weekly magazine in its archives. Anis Bhai quickly responded to my request and collected copies of archival materials from a private source. Rubel Bhai and Zaeed Bhai supplied rare copies of old magazines and audio-visual materials respectively. I am thankful to all of them for their support.

Two friends of mine deserve special mention. During their time at the University of Toronto, Vincent Chua (now at National University of Singapore) and Jing Shen (now at University of Mannheim, Germany) were my closest friends. Their support was critical for my survival in a city far from home. Numerous lunches, dinners, and movies together helped me feel that I belonged. I have fond memories of spending time together and discussing various issues, academic and non-academic. Vincent also helped me overcome my weakness in dealing with advanced statistical techniques required for two graduate courses. Thank you, Vincent and Jing.

During 2008-2014, I was a faculty member (first a Lecturer, then an Assistant Professor) in the Department of Sociology at the University of Dhaka. The University graciously granted me study leave, enabling me to begin my graduate studies at the University of Toronto. I gratefully acknowledge the support provided by the Chairs of the Department of Sociology and the Vice Chancellors of the University of Dhaka during this period.

I gratefully acknowledge the financial support I received from various institutions at the University of Toronto to carry out fieldwork: School of Graduate Studies, Faculty of Arts and Science, Munk School of Global Affairs, and the Department of Sociology. I am thankful to Zaheer Baber, John Hannigan, and the successive Associate Chairs of Graduate Studies in the Department of Sociology for strongly recommending my applications for funding. Sandy Welsh, former Associate Chair of Graduate Studies, deserves special mention for her support at the beginning of my graduate work.

Public higher education in Bangladesh allowed me the opportunity to embark on an academic career. I cannot emphasize enough the value of the gift of a free education – free of charge from elementary school to the completion of my Master’s in Sociology at the University of Dhaka. Once I was in Canada, various scholarships and grants from the federal and the provincial (Ontario) governments, as part of their funding of public universities, provided vital financial support. My work greatly benefited from the support offered by both countries.

Some portions of this research were presented at conferences of the Canadian Sociological Association, American Sociological Association, Eastern Sociological Society, Association for

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Asian Studies, International Rural Sociology Association, Society for the Study of Social Problems, Global Studies Association, and International Sociological Association. I gratefully acknowledge the helpful feedback I received from the conference participants.

The staff of the Interlibrary Loan Department at the John P. Robarts Research Library at the University of Toronto offered wonderful services. I am grateful to them for their patience in supplying me materials from various Canadian and American universities. John Manalo, IT administrator in the Department of Sociology, helped me survive numerous technical problems with my computers. Sherri Klassen, the research coordinator in the Department of Sociology, was very supportive by systematically organizing relevant information for my Research Ethics Protocol approved by the Research Ethics Board (Social Sciences, Humanities and Education) of the University of Toronto. Former and current staff members in the Department of Sociology were wonderful people whose support was essential. I also gratefully acknowledge Dr. Elizabeth Thompson for providing copyediting and proofreading services, according to the guidelines laid out in ‘Guidelines for Ethical Editing of Theses and Dissertations.’

My parents and my wife’s parents are ongoing sources of emotional support. My younger brother paid attention to my concerns when needed, and his help was greatly appreciated. From the beginning to the end of the project, Shifon Bhai worked to make sure I received research materials collected from various sources in Dhaka. I cannot thank them enough.

Finally, I owe an enormous debt to my wife, Ishrat. Her patience helped me focus on my research and writing. Without her love and enduring capacity to accommodate my academic stress, this project would not have been completed. She took on the heavy burden of family responsibilities and relieved me of many duties in taking care of our children, Ibtisaam and Wajiha. Both have grown up with this project. Its completion is exciting news for them because making noise is part of their daily activities, and Baba will no longer ask them to be quiet at home.

M. Omar Faruque Toronto, January 2019

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Table of Contents

Abstract ii Acknowledgements v List of Tables x List of Maps xi List of Appendices xii List of Acronyms xiii

Chapter 1 1

Introduction

Chapter 2 39

Research Methodology

Chapter 3 71

Against Dispossession: Extractive Capital and Subaltern Countermovement in Phulbari

Chapter 4 117

Privatizing Nature: Resource Development and Nationalist Imaginaries in Bangladesh

Chapter 5 155

Beyond the Border: Corporate Mining, Transnational Activism, and the Politics of Movement Alliance

Chapter 6 195

Conclusion

References 223 Appendices 259

List of Tables

Table-2.1: Interviews by Scales and Types of Participants 59 Table-2.2: List of Protest Events 67 Table-2.3: Documentary Films on the Phulbari Coal Project and Political Struggles 68 Table-5.1: PAN members, country of origin, and major organizational goals (2007-2014) 169

List of Maps

Map-1: Bangladesh (South Asia) xv Map-2: Dinajpur District (Site of Field work) xvi

List of Appendices

1. Timeline of the Phulbari Movement and Related Events 259 2. The Phulbari Agreement (Memorandum of Understanding) 280 3. Manifesto of NCBD 281 4. Land Area of the Mining Zone 284 5. Internal Migration in Northern Bangladesh 286 6. Copyright Acknowledgements 287

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List of Acronyms

ADB Asian Development Bank AECB Asia Energy Corporation (Bangladesh) Pty Ltd BAF Bangladesh Adivasi Forum BAL Bangladesh Awami League BAPA Bangladesh Paribesh Andolon BCMCL Barapukuria Coal Mining Company Limited BEN Bangladesh Environment Network BIC Bank Information Centre BMD Bureau of Mineral Development BNP Bangladesh Nationalist party BWI Bretton Woods Institutions CG Caretaker Government CPP Committee to Protect Phulbari DoE Department of Environment ECC Environmental Clearance Certificate EIU Economic Intelligence Unit EMRD Energy and Mineral Resources Division FBCCI Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industries FDI Foreign Direct Investment GCS Global Civil Society GOB Government of Bangladesh GSB Geological Survey of Bangladesh GTZ German Technical Agency IAP International Accountability Project ICSID International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes IIFC Infrastructure Investment Facilitation Centre INGO International NGO IOC International Oil Company IWM Institute of Water Modelling

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JAP Jatiya Adivasi Parishad JKKS Jatiya Krishak Khetmajur Samiti LMN London Mining Network MOU Memorandum of Understanding MP Member of Parliament MPEMR Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources NCBD National Committee to Protect Oil-Gas, Mineral Resources, Power and Ports NCBDP NCBD, Phulbari NCP National Contact Point NGO Non-Governmental Organization NIMBY Not in My Backyard NOC No Objection Certificate OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development PAN Phulbari Action Network PM Prime Minister PSMP Power System Master Plan SAP Structural Adjustment Policies TAN Transnational Advocacy Network UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNO Upazila Nirbahi Officer WDM World Development Movement

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Map-1: Bangladesh (South Asia)

Source: Banglapedia—the National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh © Asiatic Society of Bangladesh; used with permission. Note: The red rectangle indicates the study area (Dinajpur District) in Bangladesh.

Map-2: Dinajpur District (Site of Field work)

Source: Banglapedia—the National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh © Asiatic Society of Bangladesh; used with permission. Note: The red rectangle indicates the study area in Dinajpur District.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Phulbari, my beloved Phulbari! Remember the thousands of flaming flowers Fanning out like blood-red hibiscus Into the breast of a dark-skinned girl, Or mirroring themselves onto each seed of Tarikul’s blood? Phulbari, my beloved Phulbari! Remember Amin, the light of your life? Or Salekin, the bold soul Born into a bold mother on your bold soil? Phulbari, my beloved Phulbari- Do you remember?

Swear upon your soil, crude yet rejuvenating, Swear upon your glittery sun, sweet breeze and crystal water The harvest of your paddy fields, and the songs of your flowers and birds Swear upon them too, Or swear upon Amin’s life, Swear upon even your honor, Phulbari- Just remember that we will never let your lush greenery Turn into black coals. Never ever!

Also, we will never abandon our home Built on your soil Will rather barter our robust life for it instead Will never let our plough or our scythe Slither away from our hand Neither will we put away The warm love for the paddy field That we have been carrying gently inside us …

Never will we give in to the sugary promises made to us Never will we ever buy into the license to loot and ravage Phulbari, my Phulbari! Are you listening?1

1 Original Bangla Song © Samageet (Lyrics: Amal Akash); translation © M. M. Haque; used with permission.

1.1 Introduction

This dissertation is about social mobilizations against a mineral resource development project – an open pit coal mine – in Bangladesh. The Phulbari coal project, located in the northwest region, was part of Bangladesh’s national energy development plan to meet the growing demands of energy and power to achieve higher economic growth, reduce energy poverty, and ensure sustainable development. Bureaucratic and political elites characterized it as a landmark development project to solve Bangladesh’s continuing energy and power crisis that had been crippling economic growth.2 They had developed an ambitious agenda to make Bangladesh a middle-income country by 2021, the year Bangladesh celebrates its 50th anniversary, and coal extraction and power generation was part of the plan (GOB 2012).

However, energy development projects are replete with social displacement and dispossession.

Resource extraction in the form of coal mining causes ‘slow violence’ in many forms, such as landscape destruction, livelihood disruption, water contamination, loss of biodiversity, and other types of environmental damage (see Nixon 2011). Scholarly research shows that ‘the energy underpinning our lives is often made possible through violence – to both human and non-human populations’ (Huber 2015: 330; also see Sawyer 2004; Widener 2011; Gardner 2012). Seeing this type of violence in Bangladesh, centred on the conflict over the construction of a large open

2 A recent estimate of the World Bank shows that the demand exceeds the supply of power, and the Bangladeshi per capita annual consumption of power is among the lowest levels in the world. Furthermore, power outage is a severe problem, leading to losses of about two to three percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). http://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2016/10/07/bangladesh-ensuring-a-reliable-and-quality-energy-supply (accessed 5 January 2017).

2 pit coal mine in Phulbari, motivated me to dig deeper and trace the underlying factors of the mining conflict and the politics of resource extraction. As an embodiment of contentious politics,3 I consider this mining conflict an excellent research site to examine sociological issues relevant to neoliberal globalization and social movements in the global periphery.4 Mineral extraction is a significant aspect of neoliberal globalization; capitalist logics and corporate practices shape the lives of many communities in resource-rich countries (see Jacka 2018). It also creates political spaces for contention. The material, socio-cultural, and environmental consequences of mining generate important mobilizations against resource development.

More specifically, this dissertation presents a sociological analysis of different scales (i.e., local, national, and transnational) of countermovement against the power of the state and corporate capital in Bangladesh. The movement began in peasant and indigenous communities in a remote rural area, Phulbari, a town near the India-Bangladesh border, 300 kilometres northwest of

Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh.5 The Phulbari movement, as it is popularly known, has made energy and resource politics one of the most contested public policy areas in the last decade

(2005-2016). 6 It is a case of popular struggle against neoliberal global capitalism and a manifestation of alter-globalization or a global justice movement because it challenges the

3 Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow (2007) introduced this concept in social movement studies. They defined it as ‘interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims or third parties’ (2007:4). As this definition makes clear, contentious politics have three interrelated features: contention (making claims), collective action (coordinating efforts), and politics (dealing with agents of governments). Oppositional mobilization against the Phulbari coal mine involved all three components of contentious politics. 4 In this dissertation, I have used ‘global periphery’, ‘global South’, and ‘developing countries’ interchangeably. 5 See Map-1 and Map-2. 6 See Appendix-1 for a detailed timeline of the Phulbari movement and related events.

3 dominant paradigm of development (i.e., neoliberal development), as well as its human and environmental costs.

Although in some ways, the Phulbari movement can be characterized as a peasant movement typical of those erupting in South Asia during both the colonial and the postcolonial era (see

Islam 2007; Umar 2017), the 21st-century peasant movements in the global South are different from their colonial predecessors in both political opportunities and threats. Postcolonial capitalism in the global periphery has transformed power relations between the state, capital, and the peasantry (Chatterjee 2008). A critical aspect of the power dynamics is the growing discontent of peasant communities with globalized capital and the neoliberal state, especially the propensity of the latter to grab land in the name of economic growth and development. The main outcome of neoliberal development is the separation of primary producers from the means of production; Karl Marx (1965) theorized this phenomenon as ‘primitive accumulation.’ David

Harvey (2005) shows Marx’s theory of primitive accumulation is no longer simply a characteristic of early capitalism; it also characterizes contemporary global capitalism. Harvey

(2005) coins a phrase, ‘accumulation by dispossession,’ to emphasize the ongoing relevance of

Marx’s theory of ‘primitive accumulation’ and develop a nuanced critique of contemporary global capitalism. He mentions several cases of popular movements against capital and the state in the global South. In fact, subaltern resistance against the dominant paradigm of ‘development’ is a growing phenomenon in the global South (see Nilsen and Roy 2015; Levien 2018; Nielsen

2018; Nielsen and Nilsen 2016). Peasant communities and their civil society supporters are challenging capital and the state to transform the status quo in policy discourses vis-à-vis capitalist modernity and development, and the subaltern movement against ‘accumulation by dispossession’ gaining ground (Motta and Nilsen 2011; Desai 2016). Grassroots movements,

4 developing from localized grievances, expand into broader political struggles against neoliberal development. This dissertation provides a theoretically grounded empirical analysis of one of these movements against ‘accumulation by dispossession.’

This study is not only intended to produce knowledge on a localized ‘particular’ case of social struggle over land and resources or what Harvey (2001) calls a case of ‘militant particularism.’ I also see its significance in providing empirical materials to refine or reformulate existing theories of social movement studies and critical globalization studies. Specific cases of social struggles are often ‘agenda setters for critical theory’ (Fraser 1989:2), and they allow scholars to ‘translate the creativity of social movements back into theory’ (Wolford 2010:7). Moreover, this research will have an impact on social science scholarship on social struggles in contemporary South

Asia. There are abundant scholarly works on the political economy of subaltern struggles contesting capitalist development interventions in India (Nilsen and Roy 2015; Nilsen and

Nielsen 2016; Desai 2016; Nielsen and Oskarsson 2017). However, except a few recent works

(Adnan 2013; Gardner 2012), these similar issues in Bangladesh remain understudied. This dissertation will fill this gap.

1.2 An Overview of the Research Context

In this section, I focus on the political economy of neoliberal reforms in Bangladesh. In so doing,

I highlight how structural adjustment policies (SAP), a significant policy instrument of Bretton

Woods Institutions (BWIs),7 shaped Bangladesh’s policymaking process. I then briefly discuss the state-society relations in Bangladesh. The section ends with an overview of the neoliberal transformation of the energy sector. It is significant to note that anti-corporate mobilization against the privatization of resource extraction has emerged as a reaction to such policy transformation.

1.2.1 Structural Adjustment and Policymaking in Bangladesh

During 1947-1971, Bangladesh was the eastern part of Pakistan separated by more than 1000 kilometres of Indian territory. Soon after the Great Partition of British India, Bengalis – the majority people living in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) – felt the neocolonial rule of West

Pakistani political elites deprived them of the fair share of economic development of a new country (Jahan 1972). State-sponsored capitalist development, a key process of the growth of the bourgeois class in Pakistan, which favoured West Pakistani traders and industrialists angered the

Bengalis (Sobhan and Ahmad 1980). Gradually, a Bengali nationalist movement emerged in East

Pakistan in the 1960s; its adherents demanded greater economic and political autonomy (Sobhan

2007). Military rulers refused the demands and unleashed state violence on the people of East

Pakistan in March 1971.8 Eventually, Bangladesh emerged as a new nation-state after a bloody

7 The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 8 In the general elections held in 1970, Awami League won the majority vote. However, the military regime declined to transfer power to the leader of the Bengali nationalist movement, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of Awami League, widely known as the father of the nation in Bangladesh.

6 liberation war with Pakistani military on 16 December 1971 (see Sisson and Rose 1990; Riaz

2016; van Schendel 2009; Lewis 2011).

Soon after independence, Bangladesh adopted a socialist model of development, and nationalized all industries owned by both Bengalis and West Pakistanis (GOB 1973; Robinson and Griffin 1974).9 With mounting pressure from the bourgeois class connected to the ruling party, Bangladesh Awami League, the government made some concessions and allowed limited private investment (Sobhan and Ahmad 1980).10 This was a very difficult period for the ruling party, especially as it was governing a war-torn country. Several natural calamities and the Oil

Crisis of 1973 created enormous fiscal challenges leading to a disastrous famine in 1974,11 forcing the government to seek financial support from BWIs. Although the government received a certain amount help from the International Monetary Fund after agreeing to implement its harsh conditionalities, no one wanted to offer long-term assistance to implement a socialist agenda during the era of Cold War politics (Matin 1986; also see Sobhan 1984). Economic crises accompanied political crises; the ruling party abandoned a multi-party parliamentary democratic system and established a one-party presidential rule in January 1975 led by the father of the nation, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (see Riaz 2016; Ali 2010). A few months later, on 15 August, military officers killed the president and a new era began in the history of Bangladesh. Military dictators established their absolute control over the economy and polity.

9 During the liberation war, West Pakistani entrepreneurs and industrialists abandoned their properties and left East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). The new government, led by Bangladesh Awami League, took over these properties. 10 See Islam (1979) for a meticulous analysis of development planning during this era. 11 See Sobhan (1979) for an analysis of food crisis and famine in Bangladesh.

The new regime abandoned the socialist path taken by the former regime and gradually began market-oriented economic reforms. Successive military regimes during 1976-1990 were keen to restructure the economy to broaden its support base among the bourgeoisie. New industrial policies, investment policies, and foreign investment protection law were introduced in the

1980s. BWIs increased their efforts to engage with the military regimes and provided financial and technical assistance under various structural adjustment programs (SAPs). The goal was to reduce the role of the state and create a market-oriented private sector led economy (see Islam

1988). Eventually, a liberalized economy, influenced by the ‘Washington Consensus’ of BWIs

(Williamson 2008), altered Bangladesh’s economic planning, and the private sector gradually emerged as a key driver of economic growth. The transition to a democratic political system in the early 1990s did not change the course of neoliberal economic reforms (see Riaz 2005).

In short, the influence of BWIs on Bangladesh’s policymaking process increased in the mid-

1970s when various exogenous and endogenous factors forced the Bangladeshi government to seek financial support (Sobhan 1984; Rahman 2007). Their influence was heightened during the successive military regimes, as these regimes depended on BWIs to consolidate their political power (Quadir 2000). More specifically, they implemented comprehensive neoliberal economic reforms to broaden their political support base among traders and industrialists. This allowed them to legitimize their authoritarian regimes and subvert political opposition, creating a congenial environment for BWIs to advance their economic doctrines. The implementation of

SAPs in the 1980s in a weak economy lacking appropriate institutional practices (Ahluwalia and

Mahmud 2004) led to what Bangladeshi economists have termed ‘the decade of stagnation’

(Sobhan 1991).12 It is important to note that the return to a democratic regime in the early 1990s did not change the course of events. Successive democratically elected governments followed the same path. Qadir (2000:197) observes that the logic of using ‘market reforms as an instrument to build and maintain political coalitions’ to ‘consolidate the power of ruling elites’ was in place as early as the 1990s.

1.2.2 State, Class, and Politics in Bangladesh

The rise of a ‘neo-rich’ class in Bangladesh since the 1980s as an outcome of neoliberal economic reforms coupled with the increased flow of foreign aid has had a significant effect on state-society relations (Siddiqui 2010; Riaz 2005). Scholarly research characterizes this consequence as ‘commercialization of politics’ (Islam 2016; Riaz 2008). As Riaz argues, ‘The newly rich classes created by the liberalization and privatization policies pursued since the 1980s have joined political parties in droves since the new democratic era began in the 1990s’

(2008:49). This neo-rich class views politics as a profit-making investment where a businessperson/industrialist can buy a seat in the national parliament without having any experience of politics. Grassroots activists are powerless to resist this process because of the undemocratic nature of party politics; political parties are highly centralized and lack a culture of democratic practice inside their party apparatuses (Mannan et al. 2015). Informal decision- making with absolute power and control in the hands of a few top brass is a characteristic of

Bangladeshi political parties (e.g., BAL, BNP) who have been ruling the country since its

12 See Adnan (2014) and Akash (2017) for a review of neoliberal policy reforms and their multiple impacts on Bangladeshi economy.

9 emergence in 1971 (Amundsen 2016). In a recent study on the accountability and representation of the Parliament of Bangladesh, a member of Parliament (MP) noted: ‘You can now buy yourself an MP nomination the same way as you buy air ticket to Singapore: pay up and off you go!’ (Amundsen 2014:140). One consequence leads to another in this peculiar political system, where the rule of law depends on the desires of the ruling elites. The outcome is what a political economist calls ‘the criminalization of economy and politics’ (Barkat 2016). According to

Barkat, poverty, deprivation, and discrimination have increased in the last four decades, and a small of group has become very wealthy through rent-seeking process. The market, government, and the state have helped them in this process (see Barkat 2016).13 Rent-seeking has become ‘an integral part of Bangladesh politics,’ as successive governments, irrespective of their political ideology or commitment to the rule of law, have tolerated criminal activities ‘in the name of political activism’ (Riaz 2008:49).

How can the ‘neo-rich’ class do this? Islam (2016) says the phenomenon is connected to the nature of the state in a peripheral capitalist society where the state controls enormous resources and shapes development agenda. The neo-rich class in Bangladesh, due to their class characteristics shaped by primitive capital accumulation (Adnan 2014; Rahman 2003), need access to state power to retain its status, as the state has emerged as ‘the most important instrument for accumulating capital’ (Islam 2016:78).

13 Despite being one of the poorest countries in the world, Bangladesh had the fastest growth of ultra-wealthy people between 2012 and 2017. See Daily Star, 12 September 2018, https://www.thedailystar.net/online/news/fastest- growing-rich-population-country-bangladesh-report-1632385 (accessed 28 September 2018).

1.2.3 Neoliberal Reforms in the Energy Sector

Despite poor infrastructure, weak institutions, and financial constraints in a war-torn country, during 1972-1975, Bangladesh’s ruling party adopted a legal and policy framework to develop its institutional capacity for resource development. Although the energy sector remained nationalized, the government enacted the Petroleum Act 1974 to facilitate the participation of foreign energy companies.14 The primary objective was that state-owned companies would learn by working together with experienced foreign companies, thus allowing Bangladesh to achieve substantial institutional capacity to develop its natural resources. To consolidate its nationalist agenda, the government bought five gas fields from Shell Petroleum Company Limited in

August 1975 and ‘laid the foundation of energy security of the country by introducing sole ownership of the state over these major gas fields’ (Petrobangla 2015:15).

However, this nationalist policy framework took a step backward during the military regime which came to power in 1976. Under the BWI’s structural adjustment programs, successive military regimes inaugurated rigorous legal and policy reforms to obtain access to much-needed international financial assistance. The legal and policy framework of the energy sector was no exception. The earlier policy (national ownership) was abandoned, and market-friendly policies were adopted to fulfill the conditionalities of BWIs.

14 The government made deals with IOCs to explore oil and gas only in off-shore areas, while it kept on-shore areas for the state-owned company.

A noteworthy effort of the World Bank, in this regard, was the implementation of its Energy

Sector Adjustment Credit Program (World Bank 1992). It aimed to redesign existing laws and policies of loan recipient countries to ensure the interests of foreign private capital would not be thwarted. The key purpose of the Energy Sector Adjustment Credit Program was to retrench the state’s authority and to favour market forces. In other words, the goal was to rescind nationalization of the energy sector. As a result, new policies and legal frameworks were introduced to increase the role of market forces, primarily to attract foreign investments (World

Bank, 1993, 1995). Significant changes were made in the energy sector; a national petroleum policy (1993) and a national energy policy (1996) were designed to create a liberalized market- friendly policy framework (see Islam 2001; GOB 1996).

In short, privatization and de-nationalization became an essential element of the Bangladeshi energy strategy (World Bank 1995). As per the recommendations of BWIs, legal and regulatory frameworks were reformed to reduce the role of the state and increase the participation of foreign corporations (World Bank 1999). Consequently, the Bangladeshi government made deals with several international oil companies (IOCs) between 1993 and 1998. Multinational corporations were gradually involved in power supply and mineral development. Over time, foreign companies established firm control and drastically minimized the role of state-owned companies

(e.g., Petrobangla and its subsidiaries) in the resource extraction sector.

1. 3 Neoliberal Market Reforms and Social Protests: A Research Puzzle

I am intrigued by the puzzle that neoliberal market reforms do not always generate similar responses from opponent groups. My interest in the political economy of development in the global periphery and my close reading of neoliberal globalization and counter-hegemonic social movements in those countries (Almeida 2014; Simmons 2016; Kaup 2013; Silva 2009;

Sandbrook 2014; Cox and Nilsen 2014; Motta and Nilsen 2011) have shaped my views on this puzzle. The political economy of development in the global periphery is a direct outcome of market-oriented economic reforms implemented by BWIs. These reforms, in turn, are critical ingredients of structural adjustment policies influenced by the market fundamentalist ideas laid out in the doctrine of the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Williamson 2008; also see Stiglitz 2002;

Evans and Sewell Jr. 2013).

As mentioned above, these changes began in the early 1980s in Bangladesh and have had many devastating consequences. The most significant was the closure of the largest jute manufacturing industry in June 2002, causing the loss of employment of more than 30,000 workers. The World

Bank and foreign investors in Bangladesh hailed this action of the Bangladeshi government (led by Bangladesh Nationalist Party, BNP).15 Not everyone agreed: some Bangladeshi economists termed it ‘a decision against national interest’ and the outcome of ‘internal and international conspiracies to destroy the jute sector of the country.’16 Tellingly, the Bangladeshi Prime

15 New Nation, 20 July 2002. 16 Daily Star, 26 August 2008.

Minister recently alleged that the BNP regime killed the jute manufacturing industry17 by implementing loan conditions of the World Bank. She said BNP considered the Bank’s prescription to be a divine order and closed jute industries accordingly.18

Apart from the loss of employment opportunities for a vast number of low-skilled working-class people, the critical infrastructure of the jute manufacturing industry, which employed more than

20 million workers, was destroyed. Several million jute producers were affected.19 Unlike other export-oriented manufacturing sectors, such as the garment industry, jute production contributes to domestic economic development. For example, according to an estimate of the Bangladeshi government, $1 income from jute export is equivalent to $4 revenue from export of goods in the garment industry.20 Despite the significant contribution to Bangladesh’s economy, the BWIs and ruling elites downsized this sector to reduce the role of the state in the management of the economy (a key agenda of neoliberal globalization).

As shown above, neoliberal economic policies were designed by both internal and external forces to reduce the traditional role of the state and integrate the Bangladeshi economy into the global capitalist system. Scholarly analysis of privatization in Bangladesh has pointed to BWIs’ erroneous assessment of the positive outcomes of privatization in a peripheral country; its structural adjustment policies, such analysts say, ignore complex social and political aspects of economic arrangements (Uddin and Hopper 2003). Bangladesh has become an exporter of raw

17 See ‘Pat Shilpa’ in Banglapedia—the National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh. 18 Prothom Alo, 9 March 2017. 19 Jute Policy 2016, Department of Jute, Ministry of Textile and Jute, Government of Bangladesh. 20 Ibid, p.3.

14 jute to other countries, and these countries will reap the benefits of value-added jute-based manufacturing products (Barkat 2003; Muhammad 2002; Alamgir and Cairns 2014).21

The uncritical adoption of neoliberal reform policies, which originated from BWIs’ loan conditionalities (Sobhan 1996), occasioned this change (Barkat 2003).22

The neoliberal policy agenda, a recipe of market fundamentalism (Stiglitz 2002; Evans and

Sewell Jr. 2014), authored by BWIs and Bangladesh’s ruling elites (during both authoritarian and democratic regimes) has gone unchallenged (Quadir 2000). There has been no significant resistance to neoliberal reforms in the industrial sector; the working class and their political patrons have failed to mobilize popular support against these disastrous policies (see SAPRI

2004; Samhati 2009). Although political opportunity structures and organizational resources are conducive to anti-neoliberal mobilizations similar to those in many Latin American countries

(see Silva 2009; Almeida 2014), leftist political forces and civil society groups have failed to organize collective movements to oppose the disastrous policy regime (Nuruzzaman 2006).

Interestingly, similar neoliberal reforms in the energy/resource extraction sector generated different political responses, mirroring similar Latin American social movements which mobilized against neoliberal states to resist predatory resource extraction policies (see Veltmeyer and Petras 2014). Starting in the late 1990s, after the formation of NCBD (the National

Committee to Protect Oil Gas Mineral Resources Power and Ports),23 we observe a vibrant

21 This policy paradigm echoes that of the British colonial period. The rise of the city of Manchester resulted in the death of Dhaka, a manufacturing city in East Bengal (McMichael 2012:33-34; also see Tharoor 2017). 22 See Muhammad (2017) for an excellent narrative on the demise of the Bangladeshi jute sector as a result of SAPs. 23 See appendix-3: NCBD’s Manifesto.

15 political activism against those policies aiming to reduce the role of the state and increase the role of private (preferably foreign) capital. This is an intriguing puzzle. Why do neoliberal reforms in one sector go unchallenged, while similar changes in another sector generate intense political resistance?

1.4 Researching Subaltern Practice of Politics: The Rationale

Paul Collier, in his excellent study on resource politics and corruption, provides many examples of how corrupt officials and multinational resource extraction companies are likely to benefit from natural resources in poor countries, not the people themselves. For Collier, ‘The natural assets of [poor countries] will continue to be plundered unless a critical mass of ordinary citizens realizes the importance of getting the key decisions right’ (2010:207, emphasis added). The topic of this dissertation, the Phulbari movement, is such a case in Bangladesh; it mobilized a sustained movement to force key government decisions on resource extraction and formed a critical mass of ordinary citizens to resist resource plunder.

My interest in the politics of resource extraction in Bangladesh was influenced by several events that occurred before I began this project. I observed them as an undergraduate student at the

University of Dhaka, one of the epicentres of political activism against the privatization of resource extraction.24 I will mention two of those events to situate my interest in the broader

24 There is a rich tradition of study groups (pathchakra) among students in Dhaka University. These groups often play significant roles in political activism. They publish magazines, pamphlets, and posters on contemporary social, political and literary issues. Two such groups (Lokojo and Suchana Adhyayan Chakra) published magazines and

16 context of energy politics25 in Bangladesh: 1) American pressure on the Bangladeshi government to export natural gas to India; and 2) the resignation of Bangladesh’s Energy Minister over allegations of bribery involving a Canadian energy company.

First, during 1998-2000, Bangladesh’s public sphere was preoccupied with multiple and contradictory views on the politics of natural resources. As mentioned earlier, several international oil companies (IOCs), mostly American, signed deals with the Bangladeshi government (GOB) during 1993-199826 to explore oil and gas.27 These IOCs were doubtful whether their investments in Bangladesh would generate the desired returns. They thought

Bangladesh’s domestic market was not big enough to absorb an increasing supply of gas. They asked GOB to allow export of gas to the international market, preferably to the energy-hungry neighbouring country, India. Amidst these intense negotiations, Bangladeshi media were buzzing over the upcoming visit of the US President Bill Clinton in March 2000, the first visit of an

American President to Bangladesh. The US was putting pressure on GOB to allow its IOCs to export gas to India. Before the President’s visit, several officials of the US administration visited

Bangladesh and lobbied Bangladeshi officials and political elites to support the idea. Ruling

pamphlets to sway public opinion against privatization of resource extraction and GOB’s plan to allow gas export. Suchana’s magazine, Jwali na’ udhim kittei, assessed the debate over gas export and urged people to mobilize against the policy of the Bangladeshi government (see Suchana 1999). Lokojo published pamphlets on IOCs, such as Unocal and Shell, to expose resource plunder in various countries (see Lokojo 2001a, 2001b). 25 I have used energy politics and politics of resource extraction (resource politics) interchangeably. Exploration and development of natural resources (gas and coal) are an integral part of energy development agenda in Bangladesh. 26 BNP was in power during 1991-1996 and BAL was in power during 1996-2000. 27 Unlike the nationalist policy of the government during 1972-1975, post-1990 governments decided to involve IOCs to explore oil and gas. It was a clear manifestation of neoliberal reforms introduced in the 1980s to reduce the role of public sector participation in resource development.

17 party (Bangladesh Awami League, BAL) leaders, especially the Finance Minister, were in favour, and FBCCI,28 the leading business association, agreed with American corporations that exporting gas was the better option to reap the benefit of natural assets.

However, Bangladeshi Prime Minister (PM) Sheikh Hasina29 was not on the same page as her

Finance Minister. The IOCs and their powerful lobbyists expected that the presence of the US

President during the signing of several bilateral deals would be the best strategy to persuade the

PM. During their meeting, President Clinton urged PM Hasina to allow American IOCs to export gas to India. She replied, ‘On the question of export of gas, our position remains that after fully meeting our domestic requirements and ensuring gas for 50 years for the use of future generations, the remaining surplus will be available for export’ (Peters and Woolley 2000: paragraph#10). This issue also dominated discussions during her return visit to the US several months later. She told BBC, ‘Our first priority is to our people. First, we should fulfill our people’s needs.’30

This issue continued to be highly contested as various political parties and civil society groups opposed the export of petroleum and mineral resources. A coalition of leftist political parties enforced a countrywide hartal (strike)31 to exert pressure on the government not to surrender to the lobby of American IOCs. It also became a critical issue of Bangladeshi power politics in the

28 Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industries (FBCCI). 29 The leader of BAL since 1981. 30 BBC News, ‘Landmark trip for Bangladesh Premier,’ 16 October 2000. 31 Hartal, a form of protest tactic used in Bangladesh and in other parts of South Asia, is ‘a constitutionally recognized political method for articulating any political demand’ and ‘a legitimate democratic right’ (see UNDP 2005; Islam 2015).

18 next national election in 2001. During the election, former US President Jimmy Carter visited

Bangladesh as an international election observer. He invited the leaders of two main political parties (BAL and BNP) to a meeting and asked them about their positions on the export of gas to

India. The BAL leader, the former PM, reiterated her position mentioned above. She later argued that her arch rival, the leader of BNP, had agreed to US demands and alleged that her party lost the election to BNP for not permitting American IOCs to export gas to India. She claimed that the BNP leader gave muchleka (undertaking) to sell gas to India (Kibria 2011).32 After assuming power, the new government, led by BNP, considered the matter seriously, and the issue again became highly contested. Left Democratic Front, a coalition of several leftist parties, enforced a countrywide hartal in November (2001) to protest GOB’s move to export gas to India.33

Second, Bangladesh’s Energy Minister (a leader of BNP) resigned in June 2005 over allegations that a Canadian energy company bribed him to delay a multimillion-dollar compensation claim against the company for its negligence that caused a gas well blowout in January of that year.

The bribe included a luxury SUV and a trip to New York and Calgary.34 The Bangladeshi government claimed compensation for the loss of gas and the damage to the environment.

Although both parties denied the allegations, a Canadian court found the company guilty in June

2011, and it agreed to pay a $9.5 million fine. A group of civil society organizations filed public interest litigation in Bangladesh’s High Court; the Court ordered GOB not to pay the Canadian company any of its outstanding bills. Meanwhile, the company filed lawsuits against GOB with

ICSID—a private international court under the auspices of the World Bank. ICSID ruled in

32 Energy Bangla, 29 October 2013; Daily Star, 12 March 2017. 33 GOB abandoned its plan by the end of 2002. 34 ‘Niko Resources pleads guilty in Bangladesh bribery case.’ The Globe and Mail 24 June 2011.

19 favour of the company and asked GOB to pay its outstanding bills. In its challenge of ICSID’s verdict, GOB argued that the company bribed the Energy Minister, and its deal with GOB to sign unsolicited contracts was made possible by bribing other actors involved in the deal-making process. The matter is still pending with ICSID.35 A recent report shows the cost of damage caused by the blowout is $1.05 billion.36 This example shows how natural resources in developing countries can be plundered by corrupt alliances of multinational energy companies and power elites.

These two events offer a glimpse into resource politics in Bangladesh. Although I have cited events related to gas development projects, these cases are relevant to the ‘energy complex’

(similar to Michael Watts’s concept of ‘oil complex’ in Nigeria)37 vis-à-vis coal politics in contemporary Bangladesh. An energy complex is conceptualized as a network of powerful actors who influence government policies and shape resource extraction to maximize corporate profits, while depriving the country of the value of its natural assets. Scholars have meticulously documented the influence of these actors in natural resource development in the global South

(Collier 2010; Williams and Le Billon 2017). The connection between foreign investment, corruption, and resource plunder in developing countries is notable (Wiig and Kolstad 2014;

Kolstad and Wiig 2013). Dysfunctional institutions in many developing countries are beneficial

35 In August 2017, Bangladesh’s highest court ruled that the two deals the Canadian company signed with the Bangladeshi government were illegal and ordered the government to confiscate the properties of the Canadian company (Prothom Alo, 24 August 2017) 36 Daily Star, 7 April 2017. 37 Watts (2004).

20 to multinational energy corporations; they share resource income with those willing to help them and deprive the entire population of a resource rich country (Wiig and Kolstad 2010).

However, the global neoliberal agenda of resource extraction (i.e. the view that market forces are an efficient means to manage resource extraction, and foreign private companies are preferable to state-owned entities) has not gone unchallenged in Bangladesh. Various subaltern actors have challenged extractive capital and the neoliberal state. Borrowing the phrase of Cox and Nilsen

(2014), I conceptualize their struggles over resource development as a conflict between two opposing movements: a ‘movement from above’ and a ‘movement from below.’

The movement from above included GOB, multilateral financial institutions, development agencies of various Western countries, UN organizations, representatives of global capital in

Bangladesh, think-tanks, business elites, and corporate media. Their neoliberal economic policy agenda emphasized the liberalization of trade and finance, the minimal role of the state, increased power and authority of private capital, and export-oriented economic policy. They supported the Phulbari coal project38 for two reasons. First, the project involved vast amounts of foreign investment, and this, in turn, would lead to economic growth and development. Second, the mining company planned to make Bangladesh a coal exporting country; this would turn a peripheral economy into a regional economic leader.

38 This is a multi-billion dollar ($2.5 billion) foreign investment project planned by a British mining company. The social movement I analyze in this dissertation vigorously campaigned against the mining company and the state.

The movement from below featured a group of subaltern actors. Here, I conceptualize ‘subaltern’ in a loose sense to denote those actors with less power than those in the movement from above who can influence policymaking. The movement included local community groups, their urban allies (i.e., national civil society groups), and several transnational advocacy groups based in other countries of the global North.

This dissertation suggests the latter type of movement can delegitimize the former. To make my case, I have used one of the most contentious development projects, the Phulbari coal project, as an empirical case. A sociological study of such a ‘movement from below’ is an intellectually significant project because it analyzes a subaltern practice of politics that opposes ‘accumulation by dispossession,’ which, as Harvey (2005) shows, is a dominant mode of capital accumulation in the era of neoliberal globalization. Under this process, rights over common resources are privatized, severely curtailing collective ownership of mineral resources.

1.5 Empirical Context: The Phulbari Coal Project

An Australian mining company, BHP, began resource exploration in the northern region of

Bangladesh in 1994 and discovered the Phulbari coal mine in 1997. However, BHP decided not to develop the mine for environmental reasons.39 A new mining company created by two senior managers of BHP, Asian Energy Corporation (Bangladesh) Pty Ltd (AECB), acquired the

39 According to an official of GOB’s Bureau of Mineral Development, BHP was not interested in developing an open pit mine because coal in Phulbari was found at a depth of more than 130 metres. BHP did not find it economically attractive (Daily Star, 28 August 2006).

Phulbari coal project, and the Bangladeshi government approved AECB's assignment agreement in February 1998.40 After securing a political guarantee from the BNP regime in 2002, AECB began feasibility studies to develop an open pit coal mine. Open pit mining is an environmentally destructive resource extraction method requiring the displacement of people living in the mining zone. It also damages ground water system, farmland, and local biodiversity. Local communities bear the brunt of widespread social, cultural, and environmental havoc. In other words, this form of resource extraction is tied to large-scale violence of the type mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.

AECB submitted its feasibility study for GOB’s approval in October 2005.41 It argued that the

Phulbari coal project would contribute one percent to Bangladesh’s annual gross domestic product (GDP). The project, it claimed, would also help to diversify Bangladesh’s export business by creating a new export sector and increasing the opportunity to earn foreign currency, which would, in turn, improve its balance of payment system (AECB 2006). For adherents of neoliberal economic policy, AECB’s project was an ideal choice for Bangladesh’s economic growth and prosperity because it included a huge amount of foreign investment (about $2.5 billion) and would diversify the export industry. Therefore, international financial institutions, think-tanks, political and economic elites, and corporate media overwhelmingly supported

AECB’s plan.42

40 See Faruque (2016) for an analysis of the transfer of contract from BHP to AECB. 41 It sought approval for developing a vast open pit coal mine to produce 15 million tons of coal annually. Twelve million tons would be exported to Asian markets, particularly India. 42 According to AECB, the development of its mine would require around 6000 hectares of land. It would also require displacement and resettlement of more than 40,000 people including 2300 indigenous peoples of different ethnic groups. AECB characterized its project as a ‘win-win situation’ for both the company and GOB.

The AECB narrative did not bode well for local communities.43 Some local elites and politically conscious activists first sounded the alarm in early 2005. They alleged that AECB and comprador political elites had formed an alliance to deprive the country of its mineral resources.

They also claimed the mine would destroy highly fertile farmland, affect the livelihood of hundreds of thousands of people, and damage the environment. They were not convinced by the pro-economic growth narratives and began to organize. They formed the Committee to Protect

Phulbari (CPP) in June 2005 to mobilize grassroots communities against the mining company and urged the PM to reconsider AECB’s project. In its petition to the PM, CPP forcefully argued that local people would not allow building open pit coal mine, as it would destroy their ancestral places (graveyard), land, homes, and other properties.44

After a few months, seeing no outcome of their protest, CPP formed a strategic alliance with

NCBD, known for its activism against privatization of resource extraction. NCBD is ‘a politically conscious social organization engaged in the patriotic democratic movement to review and analyze public policies for proper use of our natural resources to ensure the development of a better national economy and to safely express and promote their views in society to form public opinion’ (Kabir 2012:125). CPP and NCBD agreed to share their material and symbolic resources to realize a common goal: driving AECB out of Bangladesh and forcing GOB to build

43 Scholarly research on mining conflicts in the global South shows that the promise of modernity, as manifested in carefully crafted discourses of mining corporations and state agencies, does not generate a positive outcome in reality (Adunbi 2015; Ferguson 2006; Butler 2015; Kirsch 2006; Sawyer 2004; Li 2015). Host communities, who have been promised a better situation, frequently suffer multiple economic and environmental challenges, creating discontent (Ferguson 1999; Kirsch 2014; Widener 2011). The narrative of AECB belongs in this category. 44 CPP sent the same petition to the Prime Minister several times. It received no response and became a ‘dead letter.’

24 a coal mine that would not damage the environment and disrupt the livelihood of local communities.

NCBD repackaged local grievances and connected them to its broader anti-corporate movement agenda. For NCBD, a protest against a multinational mining company was not merely a local concern. The group read it through the wider lens of neoliberal global capitalism in the global periphery. Its Marxist diagnosis of the problem led NCBD to articulate three key demands expressed as Three NOs: no to open pit mining, no to foreign ownership of mineral resources, and no to export of mineral resources (NCBD 2005). NCBD’s mobilization discourses mediated local and global questions to strengthen its political struggle against corporate capital. In so doing, it created a new political space or what Nancy Fraser (1997) calls ‘subaltern counterpublics’ to contest neoliberalism at the national level by reintroducing the role of the state. Eventually, an anti-mining movement emerging from localized concerns galvanized a broader political struggle against global capitalism.

CPP and NCBD organized protest events in Phulbari and Dhaka, but GOB and AECB largely ignored them. NCBD announced a gherao (encircle) program on 26 August 2006. Media reports suggest a huge participation of peasants and indigenous peoples in this protest event to gherao

AECB’s office in Phulbari. State security forces killed three protesters, resulting in mayhem in the region for several days. On 30 August, a GOB negotiation team agreed to accept all demands

25 and a memorandum of understanding was signed between GOB and NCBD.45 Consequently, the government refused to approve AECB’s feasibility study and shelved the coal project.46

During 2007-2014, GOB and AECB tried to reintroduce the agenda, but NCBD and its local allies47 collectively resisted these initiatives. A group of transnational advocacy groups joined the movement in 2008. They formed a loosely coordinated coalition, Phulbari Action Network

(PAN)48 to support the movement. PAN took the matter to the United Nations and OECD’s

National Contact Point in the UK. A group of UN Human Rights Specialists urged GOB not to move ahead with the Phulbari coal project because it would affect various rights of hundreds of thousands of local people. UK’s National Contact Point, under the auspices of OECD, found that

AECB had violated part of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. PAN members also successfully persuaded some global investors to withdraw from AECB’s project. For example, Asian Development Bank, which planned to provide political risk insurance to AECB, suspended its investment.

45 See appendix-2. 46 Li (2007) suggests development programs designed by experts (policymakers, multilateral financial institutions, and foreign private capital) are accompanied by the counter-mobilization of those who are the targets of these programs. The former considers the solution of a contentious issue as a technical matter. The latter are concerned with the political economy and cultural issues. The Phulbari movement emerged as a reaction to a development challenge, when policymakers failed to address complicated and messy political matters. The movement contested the mainstream development model which took the form of what Ferguson (1994) calls an ‘anti-politics machine’ as it ‘excludes political-economic relations from their diagnoses and prescription’ (Li 2007:7). Both Ferguson (1994) and Li (2007) argue that the depoliticized practice of the ‘anti-politics machine’ can have unintended consequences. The Phulbari movement is about those unintended consequences. In other words, the movement is a practice of politics—a critical challenge to neoliberal development. 47 NCBDP (the Phulbari chapter of NCBD) and a community group led by the current mayor of Phulbari municipality. 48 See Chapter 5.

Although GOB took various initiatives during this period to support AECB, its policymakers gradually realized the dangers associated with open pit mining, but it took almost a decade for

GOB to acknowledge the validity of NCBD’s claim. In February 2014, Bangladesh’s Prime

Minister49 instructed the officials of the Energy Ministry to put aside the domestic coal development plan and to formulate a new energy plan. She suggested keeping coal for future generations and hoped that new technology might be developed to extract coal without harming land and the environment. GOB’s new decision was based on the fact that fertile land and ground water were two critical resources to ensure food security, and the country desperately needed to achieve this. In addition, GOB planned to reduce poverty by growing the economy through advances in agriculture in rural Bangladesh.50 Recently GOB took several initiatives to design a new energy plan.51

49 The Prime Minister also holds the portfolio of Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry. 50 In a recent study, the World Bank confirmed agriculture is a key driver in reducing poverty in Bangladesh (World Bank 2016). 51 GOB decided not to accept AECB’s feasibility study and engaged Geological Survey of Bangladesh (GSB) to conduct a new feasibility study on the Phulbari coal field. GSB suggested that open pit mining in Phulbari would cause long-term adverse socio-economic and environmental effects (EMRD 2016). GOB recently (September 2016) decided to ban open pit mining in Bangladesh. Despite this recent policy change, AECB remains positive on the potential of its project. This optimism is based on two issues: first, the government has not made any formal announcement to cancel its agreement and second, GOB’s new power sector master plan (2016) stipulated that large coal-based power plants would be built to achieve its developmental targets by 2041 (see GOB 2016). Moreover, this new plan has a provision advising the Bangladeshi government ‘to extract coal from Phulbari [coal mine] using the controversial open pit mining method to meet a small part of the demand for coal for power generation and other industrial uses’ (New Age, June 28, 2016).

1.6 Objectives and Research Questions

Against the backdrop of neoliberal market reforms mentioned earlier, I am interested in contemporary social movements in Bangladesh which have emerged in response to ruling elites’ uncritical adoption of neoliberal policy agenda to reduce the role of the state. This project fits into the core agenda of contemporary Political Sociology where neoliberal globalization and counter-hegemonic social movements are empirically exciting and theoretically provocative topics (see Evans 2005).

The major objective of this research is to tease out the layers of the dynamics of contention vis-à- vis neoliberal market reforms in Bangladesh as manifest in the conflict over the construction of the Phulbari coal mine. This anti-mining conflict is also the springboard of a countermovement against neoliberal globalization, namely NCBD’s struggle over resource development in

Bangladesh. I intend to understand the role of political imaginaries in shaping both grassroots community grievances against the mining corporation and the broader political struggle against privatization of resource extraction.

This analysis is different from other analyses of mining conflicts in the global South because it goes beyond a typical environmental conflict, often considered as NIMBY (Not in My Backyard) activism. The case examined here cuts through the relationship between power and resistance in

Bangladesh. The conflict over the Phulbari coal project emerged as a community reaction against a foreign mining company who had disregarded grassroots sentiments. However, from the start, certain elements gave it a distinctive character as a political movement against ‘accumulation by

28 dispossession’ in the neoliberal era. The three key demands52 of the Phulbari movement made it a unique mobilization against global capital looking for a new investment frontier in the global periphery. Moreover, some salient features of the movement, as highlighted in the last chapter

(the conclusion to the dissertation), make it a noteworthy model of social movements confronting the nexus of the state and corporate capital.

I am specifically interested in exploring the underlying factors contributing to the emergence of the political movement against the neoliberal transformation of the energy sector in Bangladesh.

As mentioned earlier, I am fascinated by the puzzle that neoliberal reforms in the energy sector provoked action, but similar reforms in other sectors of Bangladesh’s economy did not. Did a particular aspect of national political economy galvanize this activism? This leads to my overarching research question: what are the dynamics of the interplay between the ‘global’ and the ‘national’? Here ‘global’ denotes ‘the globalization project,’53 and ‘national’ means both the actions of political elites and oppositional forces such as local communities and civil society groups (e.g., NCBD).54 I explore specific research questions in each empirical chapter to examine this broad question. Chapter 3 asks how subaltern communities develop contentious political agency to mobilize against powerful forces such as corporate capital and the state.

Chapter 4 considers the role of resource nationalist political imaginaries in the age of neoliberal

52 No Open pit Mining; No Export of Mineral Resources; and No Foreign Company Ownership of Resource Extraction Projects. 53 See McMichael (2012: 112). 54 Unlike many students of critical globalization studies, I am less concerned with ‘local’ grassroots community actions as they are commonly portrayed in the literature: as a binary opposition of global-local. Instead, I am more concerned with the ‘national’ scale. I explore political developments at the ‘national’ level which may contain elements of grassroots community issues.

29 economy and politics. Chapter 5 asks how a civil society group, known for its radical anti- corproate mobilizations, negotiated its power and authority to form a strategic alliance with advocacy groups based in the global North. 55 Collectively, these empirical chapters offer a substantive analysis of a countermovement in the global periphery.

1.7 Existing Scholarship on Mining Conflict in Bangladesh

In recent years, there has been growing interest among scholars of various social science disciplines (anthropologists, sociologists, and geographers) to analyze resource politics in

Bangladesh. This scholarship is mostly concerned with two highly publicized and much contested resource extraction projects: 1) Bibiyana gas field in the northeast region56 and 2)

Phulbari coal mine in the northwest region.57 Both projects involved foreign multinational companies, a key issue of popular mobilizations against privatized resource extraction. In this section, I will highlight the main arguments of various scholarly works on the conflict over the

Phulbari coal mine58 and show how my work will contribute to this scholarship.

55 For other work based on this research, see Faruque (forthcoming, 2018a, 2018b, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c). 56 For an excellent anthropological analysis of this project, see Gardner (2012). 57 Das (2009) and Gain (2013) offer a descriptive account of this case. A rigorous and critical analysis of various aspects of the planned coal mine project such as displacement, resettlement, and environmental and social impact can be found in Kalafut and Moody (2008). Faruque (2016) provides an analysis of corporate strategies of the mining company behind the Phulbari coal project. 58 Many are in the form of PhD/MA theses. I have used only those available online.

Annie (2010) applies anthropological perspectives of human security to analyze local communities’ participation in the anti-coal mine movement in Phulbari. Her ethnographic work shows that a complex changing perception of human security, shaped by peoples’ relationship with the local context, motivated them to join the movement. Perceived threats of coal mining and the resulting concerns over access to and control of resources were critical factors in local people’s understanding of human security. This understanding motivated them to support the local movement and to take part in its protest activities. She also looks at gendered variations of human security and shows that women’s participation and the factors that mobilized their views on the coal mine and the national energy crisis were different from those of their male counterparts. The localized notion of human security (risk of displacement, feeling of insecurity outside the local community), Annie shows, was so significant for the survival of these communities that they did not dare to participate in high-risk protest actions to send a signal to bureaucratic and political elites. Although her work considers the local context, Annie’s ethnography does not offer a rigorous analysis of the conflict by taking into account its connections to broader national context of resource politics.

Drawing on cultural approaches to social movement studies, Luthfa (2011, 2015) extends this narrative by arguing that state repression against violent protest actions fails to deter activists from ‘high-risk’ actions. She suggests that activists’ emotions and their obligations to the community supersede repression and violation. Ahsan (2016) refutes this cultural approach in the

Phulbari context, however. He suggests that a subaltern perspective of peasant movements in

South Asia,59 which emphasizes the material context for the development of political

59 For an excellent introduction to this perspective, see Chaturvedi (2000).

31 consciousness among subaltern classes, is the most appropriate conceptual framework to understand the resistance to the mining company and the Bangladeshi state.

Like Annie, Alam (2015) focuses on the local context of the anti-mining movement. He shows that land was the central issue of the conflict in Phulbari. Protesters and the Bangladeshi state had different perspectives about land. For the state, the critical concern was the resource beneath the land, while for the protesters, ‘land is power, land is subsistence, and land is identity’ (Alam

2015:21). The large-scale displacement due to coal mining would make many people landless— and this was a key local concern. Alam’s ethnography sheds light on the power structure and internal tensions of the local mobilization.

Alam and Annie’s anthropological studies are limited in scope.60 In contrast, Nuremowla (2012) and Chowdhury (2012) examine the conflict using a broader anthropological perspective. For

Nuremowla (2012), the local mobilization can be diagnosed by using the concept of rootedness.

The context of the daily life of an individual rooted in a rural community setting was a significant aspect of his/her understanding of the coal mine project. He argues that this context often gets lost in public discourses of anti-mining movements, led by urban activists with different understandings. Like Alam, Nuremowla (2012) pays attention to tensions among actors involved with the anti-mining movement in Phulbari. However, unlike Alam, he focuses on the discourses of the movement at both the local and national level and shows how a coalition of the two levels was possible despite their different ideas and concerns. In a recent article, Nuremowla

(2016) emphasizes this point by arguing that in the specific context of a rural community with a

60 Both are MA theses.

32 unique settlement history in the mining zone, the emotions connected to displacement and land loss drove people to the anti-mining movement. He sees a disjuncture between this context and discourses of national-level activists occupied with issues like nationalism and imperialism.

Chowdhury’s ethnography (2012) situates the emergence of the anti-mining movement in

Phulbari in the broader context of political crisis in Bangladesh during 2006-2007. The military- led caretaker government declared a state of emergency to ‘clean up’ a political system plagued by massive corruption and lack of transparency and accountability. She draws parallels between the actions of protesters against those collaborating with the mining company and the anti- corruption drive of the military-led government. In other words, Chowdhury’s concern is to navigate the complex terrain of democracy and development in the global periphery where the arrival of a multinational mining company and its planned coal mine project was a site of political conflict; the conflict stemmed from dissimilar understandings of the value of resource extraction and the state of democracy in Bangladeshi society. For Chowdhury (2016), the varied understandings of resources and democracy constitute a potential site of politics for a better future.

While these studies focus on anti-mining mobilization at the local site in Phulbari, Luthfa (2017), a sociologist, draws attention to the role of a transnational coalition which supported local mobilization. She suggests that activists’ obligation to the environment was a critical issue that sustained collaboration between local and national activists and several transnational advocacy networks. Luthfa’s empirical analysis of the transnational coalition suggests that national-level

33 activists played a significant role in countering ‘the environmental colonialism of the west’ in the global South (2017:128).

Going beyond the analysis of the local site, Bedi (2015), a geographer, focuses on the competing narratives of two significant actors involved in the conflict over the Phulbari coal mine. She analyzes human rights discourses of a group of UN experts61 and the rebuttal of the mining company deploying a different perspective of human rights discourse. She argues that the use of different human rights narratives in connection with the right to food of local communities represents two competing interests: mining profit and right to food.

My work will contribute to social science scholarship on contested resource extraction in the following ways:

1. Much of the work discussed above correctly emphasizes that fear of dispossession

mobilized the local people against the mining company but seems to take for granted that

grievances automatically give rise to social movements. Social movement scholarship

does not support this view (Snow and Soule 2010). Accordingly, my take on the rise of

local mobilization is to ask how a local community transformed from conformity to

rebellion. In so doing, I pay attention to the development of contentious political agency

to strengthen a countermovement against ‘accumulation by dispossession.’62

61 A group of transnational advocacy organizations (PAN members) mobilized UN resources to halt the Phulbari coal mine project. See Chapter 5. 62 Chapter 3 presents this analysis in light of recent theoretical interventions on primitive accumulation and counter- movements.

2. Nuremowla’s (2012, 2016) studies are concerned with the disjuncture between local and

national discourses. In contrast, I suggest that national-level discourses do not displace

local-level discourses; rather, the former extend the latter by situating them in the broader

context of the political economy of global capitalism and resource extraction. National-

level activists mediate local and global discourses of development and resistance. None

of the work mentioned above seriously considers the macro context of popular

mobilization at the national level against privatized resource extraction as a response to

structural adjustment policies of Bretton Woods Institutions.63 NCBD’s discourses and

political rhetoric of resource nationalism should be read in this context. I pay special

attention to this topic, using the lens of critical globalization studies to analyze how a

radical social movement challenged mainstream development thinking and its narrative

of capitalist modernity.64

3. This dissertation extends Luthfa’s (2017) analysis of transnational coalition by

emphasizing the dynamics of coalition between two differently positioned actors

committed to work on a common agenda. While Luthfa focuses on the outcomes of such

a coalition, I concentrate on the politics of strategic alliances beyond borders. My

empirical analysis of the transnational coalition (PAN) is based on recent developments

(e.g. PAN’s mobilization of global governance institutions as a transnational mobilizing

structure), obviously missing in Luthfa’s earlier account of the phenomenon. 65

4. Finally, existing studies, including those published recently (e.g. Luthfa 2017;

Nuremowla 2016; Chowdhury 2016), do not consider post-2006 developments to reflect

63 See Babb (2005) for a sociological analysis of the social consequences of structural adjustment policies. 64 See chapter 4. 65 See Chapter 5.

on the broader implications of subaltern social movements against the power of the state

and extractive capital. Alam’s (2015) recent work also fails to take into account post-

2006 developments. Many treat the Phulbari movement as a one-time static event. I take

a longer view and consider all relevant events during 2005-2016 vis-à-vis activists’

actions and policy responses of the state and the mining company to understand this as a

case of dynamic popular mobilization. This allows me to establish connections between

movement strategies and outcomes and sketch a complex narrative of the politics of

resource extraction in Bangladesh.

1.8 Organization

The rest of the dissertation is organized into five chapters. Chapter 2 presents the research methodology used in this dissertation. It includes the rationale for my methodological choice, the researcher’s positionality, and reflections on field notes and on the politics of research on contentious issues, data collection methods, and data analysis strategies. The following three chapters form the main body of the dissertation. Each chapter, written in the format of a journal article, contains an analysis of each of the three scales of the Phulbari movement.

Chapter 3 deals with local-level mobilization to shed light on the development of contentious political agency. In this chapter, I analyze the emergence of the anti-mining political agency of grassroots communities who would bear the brunt of the slow violence of the extractive industry.

Drawing on scholarship on primitive accumulation, dispossession, and counter-movements, I show how the material and emotional urge of grassroots communities to protect their

36 society/community gave rise to their political agency with the intervention of ‘organic intellectuals’. These ‘organic intellectuals’ shaped the consciousness of the subaltern actors on the frontlines of the political struggles.

Chapter 4 analyzes the activism of NCBD, the principal protagonist of the Phulbari movement at the national level during the last decade. I pay attention to its movement rhetoric and the political meaning of its nationalist imaginaries to develop counter-hegemonic discourses contesting pro- market agenda of the state and the mining company. In this chapter, I am interested in how

NCBD articulates its political imaginaries centring on nature, nation, and the state to achieve its movement agenda more generally. I engage with critical globalization scholarship vis-à-vis the power of the state and the ability of counter-movements to contest neoliberal global capitalism.

The analysis demonstrates the relevance of the national context in mediating local and global questions for effective political mobilization. As it demonstrates, NCBD articulates nationalist imaginaries to mobilize a political vision of the ‘national’ in an era of neoliberal globalism.

Chapter 5 examines the dynamics of a movement alliance to engage ‘beyond the border’ activists in the Phulbari movement. Drawing on sociological scholarship on transnational activism, in this chapter, I examine the dynamics of a strategic alliance between a coalition of advocacy groups from the global North and NCBD, a Bangladeshi radical social movement organization. I find the existing perspectives provide useful analytical tools but cannot fully explain this particular case. The activists in the global South were independent enough to adopt their own strategies, thus avoiding some pitfalls of transnational activism.

In Chapter 6, I conclude with the lessons learned from the analysis of the Phulbari movement. I focus on two issues: 1) the salient features of the movement which could be applied in other cases; 2) the significance of the Phulbari movement to confront resource extraction; and 3) a note on rethinking coal politics in the era of climate crisis.

CHAPTER 2

Research Methodology

2.1 Introduction

Although I have included a section titled ‘Method and Data’ in each empirical chapter, I think it appropriate to clarify my methodological choices for the larger research project. I adopt what

Carroll (2004) calls ‘critical strategies for social research,’ and I draw inspiration from the writings of Pierre Bourdieu (1998, 2003) and Michael Burawoy (2005), as both offer useful methodological guidelines for sociological research in the neoliberal era.

Burawoy’s call for a public sociology-oriented research inspires me (Burawoy 2005). This research is guided by a desire to challenge domination and injustice. Smith (2008) is quite clear:

‘Given the enormous inequalities of our day, I find it hard even to fathom the notion that any scholar might want to remain a neutral analyst of social reality, even if this were possible’ (Smith

2008: ix-x). In Genealogies of Citizenship, Somers (2008) explains why a scientific sociological study takes the form of public sociology: ‘Rather than passively accepting the current erosion of citizenship and rights, we need to reclaim their original promise, and to address the racial, ethnic, and gender injustices submerged beneath their beneficient sheen. And as rights are inexorably matters of the public sphere, it is also a project in public sociology’ (Somers 2008:xvii).

Bourdieu positions the argument at the heart of academia. He contends: ‘The canonical opposition … between “scholarship” and “commitment” is devoid of foundation… scholars have a decisive role to play in the struggle against the new neoliberal doxa. … Today’s researchers

39 must innovate an improbable but indispensable combination: scholarship with commitment’

(2003:18, 23, 24). In fact, the mode of inquiry which shaped my understanding of conducting research on social movements against extractive capital in the global South is both an intellectual and a political project to ‘[defend] the interests of humanity … in times of market tyranny and state despotism’ (Burawoy 2005:24).1

My methodological choices involve several elements of a ‘praxis-oriented strategy of social inquiry’ (Carroll 2004:1). This form of inquiry offers a sharp critique of ‘status quo arrangement and understandings’ that are often reproduced and reinforced by sociological research. Carroll puts it succinctly: ‘In a socially unjust world, knowledge of the social that does not challenge injustice [and domination] is like to play a role in reproducing it’ (2004:3). Carroll proposes a critical alternative to the dominant mode of social research and emphasizes three significant concerns/functions of researchers: an oppositional inquiry to investigate and criticize structures and practices of domination; a radical analysis to get to the root of matters to grasp the deeper

1 The work of three social theorists inspired me to choose this methodological approach. Instead of maintaining a ‘critical distance’ for the sake of abstract theorizing, I found it both interesting and challenging to support the overall perspective of social movements confronting extractive industry in Bangladesh. David Harvey’s theorizing of capitalism and uneven development emanates from his engagement with various forms of activism, such as the living wage movement and other movements on the housing crisis, state repression, and racial injustice in Baltimore (Castree and Gregory 2008). Michel Foucault’s theory of power was influenced by his political engagement, especially his work with an organization that he founded (The Information Group on Prisons). Hoffman meticulously analyzes ‘the relationship between Foucault’s political life and the development of his thinking about power from the early 1970s to the 1980s to highlight this methodological position (2014:2, original emphasis). Pierre Bourdieu, arguably one of the most influential sociologists of our time, intervened in the public sphere from the beginning of his intellectual life in the early 1960s. As Poupeau and Discepolo argue, ‘A constant reflection on the “social conditions of possibility” of his political commitment inspired him to distance himself from pedagogic scientism and from the spontaneism of “free intellectuals” that was so current at that time’ (in Bourdieu 2008: xiii).

40 and systemic basis of the challenges we face; and a strategy of subversion to disturb the ordinary, taken-for-granted assumptions and understandings (2004: 3).

This alternative mode of inquiry draws inspiration from Bourdieu. In a short book, Acts of

Resistance: Against the Tyranny of the Market, Bourdieu (1998) seems optimistic about the future generation of sociologists and their ability to combine scholarship with commitment: ‘I hope [to] provide useful weapons to all those who are striving to resist the scourge of neoliberalism. … Our dream, as social scientists, might be part of our research to be useful to the social movement … to communicate the most advanced findings of research’ (1998: vi, 58). In this spirit, I undertook this research project to analyze a radical/progressive social movement against global extractive capital and the neoliberal state and to extend a helping hand (armed with sophisticated sociological findings) to a critical social movement which, as a subaltern counterpublic, contests the dominant public sphere.

Political theorist Nancy Fraser theorizes the role of subaltern counterpublics in her engagement with Habermas’s theory of public sphere which she defines as ‘parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses, which in turn permit them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs

(Fraser 1997: 81, quoted in Carroll 2004: 394). For both Fraser and Carroll, the praxis-oriented strategy of social research considers critical social movements as a vehicle for understanding the world, while articulating ways to change it in emancipatory ways. Sociologists can serve the goal of public sociology by analyzing the role of these movements as subaltern counterpublics in opposing the state, capital, and corporate media as dominant and hegemonic public spheres.

2.2 On Positionality

Positionality, i.e. the role and identity of researchers as ‘they intersect and are in a relationship with the context and setting of the research,’ is a significant methodological issue in a qualitative research project based on in-depth interviews (Ravitch and Carl 2016:11). As Cammett argues, since the quality of findings of such a study is contingent on access to appropriate sources of data, ‘social scientists should care about the effects of positionality on the research process’

(2013:127). The in-depth interview requires the researcher’s sincere efforts to build rapport between ‘the participants in the dialogue – a process that implies the need for reflection on the perception of the interviewer by the interviewee or respondent community’ (ibid).

Critical scholarship on mining conflicts (the subject of this dissertation) shows two aspects of this relationship. An outsider scholar taking an objective/neutral position in the analysis of a dispute between a mining company and host communities or taking the side of the corporation fails to develop a nuanced understanding of the issue because of a lack of access to appropriate sources of data. Actors involved in the conflict view a neutral position as irrelevant and the limited access to actors who are against the mining company constrains analysis of the latter

(Kirsch n.d).2 In other words, a positivist positionality results in the researcher’s failure to get access to appropriate data. My interlocutors3 were curious to know more about the use of my research. My access to prospective participants was dependent on aligning my positionality in their favour. Although I was fully aware of the critique of engaged scholarship that says such a

2 I am grateful to Professor Stuart Kirsch for allowing me to use his unpublished work. 3 Throughout this dissertation, I use this term to refer to the participants of my research project in Dhaka, Phulbari, and elsewhere.

42 way of doing science politicizes the research agenda (see Kirsch 2018), I did not hesitate to maintain the commitment of public sociology and engaged scholarship and explained my positionality to my prospective participants. The following passage shows an exchange with one of my interlocutors. My interlocutor wanted to make sure his views of development fit with my perspective before the beginning of our conversation.

Researcher (R): My broader interest is in the political economy of development in

Bangladesh. Through this lens, I will examine resource politics and social movements in

Bangladesh.

Participant (P): How do you see ‘development’? Is it the way that mainstream

economists view it? Or the way Arundhati Roy or Amartya Sen analyze development?

There is a vast difference between these two perspectives.

R: I am very critical of the perspectives of mainstream economists and one of the most

significant neoliberal globalizers4 e.g. the World Bank and sympathetic to Roy’s

trenchant critique of neoliberal development paradigm. Sen’s ideas, explained in

Development as Freedom, have also shaped by perspective.

P: That’s great. We can talk about what is happening in Bangladesh regarding energy,

resource extraction, and social movements.

For a sensitive and contentious topic like the conflict over the Phulbari coal mine, the interlocutors’ perception of the researcher’s positionality necessarily affects their attitudes to the research and the topics of dialogue.

4 See Woods (2006).

Following the practice of influential scholars in ‘critical development studies’ (Li 2007;

Ferguson 1994; Mitchell 2002), in my role as a critic, I wish to ‘expand the possibilities for thinking critically’ about extractive capital and subaltern mobilizations opposing the actions of mining corporations. Dominant thinking on development challenges, influenced by the ‘expert views’ of those working in the global/local ‘development aid industry,’ generally perceives the problem in ‘technical terms’ to design practical solutions. In so doing, they leave out complex and messy political questions underlying those challenges. Li (2007) prefers to take the stance of a critic, and I follow her in this project; I seek to problematize the role of experts of the

‘development aid industry’ or what she calls, ‘rendering technical,’ because this positionality allows me to take a broader view on a contested development project. In my case, the disputed agenda is mining and energy politics in the global periphery in the era of neoliberal rationality. It is significant to emphasize that critics’ insightful analyses of the problem are informed by the experiences of actors closely connected to the contested issue (the coal mine) and whose well- being is the key concern of experts (i.e. national policymakers and multilateral financial institutions).

However, I deviate from the position of those critical scholars, like Li (2007) and Ferguson

(1994), who do not prescribe a solution to a problem. They refuse to take a position on the contentious issues they examine in their seminal works on the political economy of development in the global South. Rankin argues that the critic-expert binary, exemplified in Li’s ethnographic work, is problematic, and she advocates forging ‘new modes of collective political agency’ through collaboration between ‘seemingly intractable subject position’ such as critics, experts,

44 challengers etc. (2010: 227-229). In an influential essay on this topic, Sivaramakrishnan and

Agrawal suggest that the ‘new radical critics’ of development can position their arguments seriously only if they offer ‘alternative forms of engagement that could lead to social change that is more in favor of the dispossessed.’ ‘General programs of political action’ are required

(Sivaramkrishnan and Agrawal 2003:30). I concur with this positionality and do not hesitate to support the view of the challengers who offer alternative programs of political action to make sure the mineral resources of an impoverished country are better utilized to maximize national interests. In my view, critical scholars have a moral responsibility to contribute to forging a ‘new mode of collective political agency’ to oppose neoliberal rationality and to propose or support alternative programs of action.

I categorize my role in this research project as a social critic5, a form of engaged scholarship. In this, I deviate from the dominant mode of sociological scholarship: objective positivist sociology. The role of a social critic is to use sociological theories and methods to expose power relations underlying the destruction caused by development, the ravages of environmental damage, and the misery of subaltern communities whose voices are, more often than not, ignored by political elites. I am also sympathetic to the view that another productive use of engaged scholarship could be a scholar’s engagement in advocacy for local communities to ‘translate their grievances into forms that can be heard outside the community’ (Low and Merry 2010:

S210). Significant in this regard is Stuart Kirsch’s ethnographic work in the Pacific region

(Kirsch 2014). This form of engaged scholarship is a logical extension of public sociology

(Burawoy 2005).

5 For work as a ‘social critic,’ see Ferguson (1994), Tsing (2005), and Li (2007).

During my fieldwork, many of my interlocutors asked how my research would contribute to their struggle against extractive capital and the state. To reiterate, I did not take an objective and positivist position. I told them I would write op-eds in Bangladeshi newspapers and use my research findings to draw the attention of Bangladeshi policymakers to problems related to the proposed extraction of coal.6 I consider this to be an example of advocacy via engaged scholarship. I should emphasize that such a commitment does not represent a compromise with scientific sociology. Rather, researchers have an obligation to apply scientific sociology to expose power relations that produce and reproduce social problems. The objective is to make sociological research politically relevant.

2.3 Reflections on Anecdotes from Field Notes

Activists involved in social movements against extractive capital are often suspicious of researchers’ motives – with good reason. In cases reported in the media, mining companies have hired private intelligence firms to infiltrate activists’ circles and social movement organizations in the guise of researchers and documentary film-makers. The Guardian recently reported that a spy from a British corporate intelligence firm infiltrated a global movement against the use of asbestos. The spy introduced himself as a sympathetic documentary film-maker; he got access to sensitive materials about the movement, its leaders, mobilization tactics, funding, and plans. The

6 On the eve of the 10th anniversary of the Phulbari Day (August 26) in 2016, I wrote a lengthy op-ed; it was published as a three-part series in a Bangladeshi newspaper, Banikbarta. I also wrote an article (in Bengali) published by a quarterly magazine on politics, economics and society, Sarbojonkotha. See Faruque (2016a, 2016b). During 2016-2018, I published 15 op-eds in Banikbarta and other newspapers and magazines, in which I drew on my academic research on energy and resource politics.

46 firm shared this information with a mining company doing business in the asbestos industry.

Activists involved with the movement have filed a lawsuit against the intelligence firm (Cobain

2016).

This story reminds me of my experience when I conducted my fieldwork. In both Dhaka and

Phulbari, I was repeatedly asked about the purpose of my research and my role as a researcher.

Activists and ordinary people in Phulbari areas inquired about my real intention. They knew about my social identity (a former teacher at a public university in Bangladesh and currently a doctoral student at a Canadian university). This social identity has two sides. On the one hand,

Bangladeshi people usually respect a professor and believe in his/her ability to understand an issue objectively. On the other hand, they are suspicious of professors who work as consultants for INGOs, UN organizations, and international financial institutions. They were very suspicious that I might be an agent of the mining company or the Bangladeshi government (GOB). They believed I was in Phulbari in the guise of an academic researcher to collect information about those involved in the anti-coal mine movement.

In summer 2009, I interviewed an activist in a remote village in Phulbari. To have a calm and quiet environment away from the crowded bazaar and nearby tea-stalls, he took me to a plantation site near his home. We sat down on the grass face-to-face and talked about his participation in the movement. I asked him about the beginning of the mining project, especially his community’s reactions to activities of the mining company and its local agents.7 We also talked about the beginning of the anti-mining movement, its organizational structure at the

7 Many are local power elites and elected representatives of the local government administration (Union Parishad).

47 village level, the role of Phulbari-based movement leaders, and their connections to Dhaka-based

NCBD activists, and the role of local elites and officials of government agencies. We spent more than two hours. After this interview, I informally talked to several people while having tea at a nearby schoolyard and walking the village road. I returned to Phulbari at the end of the day. I received a phone call from my interlocutor asking me if I knew an NCBD leader in Dhaka and whether he was aware of my fieldwork in Phulbari. When I replied affirmatively, he seemed to have been relieved of an enormous burden. We met again during a weekly Bazaar Day8 in

Phulbari, and he told me that after his interview with me, he was very nervous and asked others about me and my purpose of visiting villages and talking to people about the coal mine.

On another day, I was going to a village in Khanpur Union in Birampur.9 On the way, I saw a group of women taking a break from their work as rural road maintenance workers. I was talking to them about the quality of rural roads in the area, the type of work they typically do, and the wages they receive from the Rural Road Maintenance Program of the Local Government

Engineering Department (LGED).10 During our conversation, I asked them about the coal mine and local movement against it. Contrary to my assumptions that there was no meaningful participation of women in the movement and women were not aware of broad political issues regarding anti-mining activism, they explained the logic of the movement in their terms and why they would continue it even if the GOB refused to listen to them. Suddenly, the leader of the team shouted at the woman who was talking to me about her fear of being displaced if the coal

8 People from nearby villages come to Phulbari town to do their weekly shopping. 9 See annex-4. 10 I was curious because I had conducted evaluative research on LGED’s work while I was a researcher at the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (2002-2005).

48 mine received GOB’s approval. She asked her why she was telling me (a stranger!) about how women in rural areas cooperated with their male partners to strengthen the movement, particularly during its most critical moment in August 2006. She feared that I might be an agent of GOB’s intelligence agency. All of a sudden, an older adult approached me; he was passing by but decided to stop after hearing our conversation about the coal mine. He was outraged and asked me about my profession. I explained the purpose of my visit to the area. He seemed okay with that and talked to me for about an hour on the spot under a scorching sun. He began by asking me if I would report it to the mining company or GOB. He did not care about my response and said:

It does not matter what you will do with this report. You can write my name and other

information such as how much land I own; what I do for a living etc. I will tell you

everything. However, one thing I want you to do, if you are a journalist or a spy, say to

the mining company and the Bangladeshi government that we do not want the coal mine.

If the government wants to do it, they should kill us first so that there will be no

opposition to the coal mine.

On another occasion, I went to a protest event organized by leftist student groups and held at a university near Dhaka. Several NCBD activists and professors of the university spoke at the event, which concluded with songs and dramas performed by cultural activists in those groups.

These songs were about people’s resistance, resource plundering, the role of multinational corporations in the global South, and the nature of national ruling elites as close partners of global forces. At the end of the event, I met one these groups and talked about their engagement

49 with NCBD. During our conversation, they asked several questions about me and the research project. One wondered whether the mining company would be the beneficiary of my research.

Another mentioned that academics conduct research for a variety of purposes. In effect, they wanted to know about the nature and politics of my research agenda to make sure that my project fit with their parameters, i.e., who was benefitting from the academic research on social movements.

I dealt with this question many times in both formal interviews and informal conversations in

Dhaka and Phulbari. During formal interviews, my interlocutors read the consent form and a summary of my research project (both written in Bengali). For those who could not read, I explained my purpose, and they agreed to be interviewed using a digital recorder. Transnational activists whom I interviewed also raised the issue; gaining their trust was a process of complex negotiation. Unlike local and national activists, they were situated in far-flung geographical locations and were worried about state and corporate surveillance. Many were not entirely convinced that academic research would benefit the local communities on the frontlines of mobilization against powerful forces. Transnational activists depend on NCBD’s contact person and other activist-academics who play the role of gatekeeper. If a researcher wants access to the transnational activists involved with the Phulbari Action Network (PAN), he or she must go through the contacts.11 I managed to gain the trust of several activists who played an instrumental role in organizing a transnational campaign against the mining company, particularly in Japan, the UK, Australia, Germany, and at the United Nations. I assume that some gatekeepers who

11 See Chapter 5.

50 knew about my project made positive comments to those transnational activists who agreed to take part in an online interview.12

2.4 Dispassionate Research on a Contentious Issue

My choice not to be a dispassionate researcher was influenced by the biographies of some influential social theorists whose involvement with social movements and political debates serve as the foundation of their theoretical work. These include Foucault and Bourdieu whose social theories were at least partly informed by their involvement with various types of social movements (Fominaya and Cox 2013). The interaction with my interlocutors during my initial phase of fieldwork in Phulbari was another influence. The following anecdote from my field notes illustrates this aspect of my methodological choice:

One day I was going to a village in Birampur. My guide rented a motorbike to take me to

the village. As we entered the village, my guide stopped the bike and greeted an older

adult whom he knew due to his involvement with the Phulbari movement. After

exchanging greetings, the person asked my guide: ‘Who is this gentleman? I have never

seen him before in the area.’ My guide replied that I came to the area to learn about the

Phulbari movement. Then the person looked at me and asked: ‘Sure, you will learn about

our protest against the mining company. What is our benefit? How will your learning be

useful to us?’ He did not ask me whether I supported their movement or opposed it. He

12 Several PAN members told me they had positive feedback from their respective contact persons (gatekeepers) in Bangladesh.

asked me those questions because he thought I looked like someone working either for

the government or the mining company. And my presence in the area, as an outsider,

meant to him that new initiatives were taken to begin the extraction [suspended after the

August 2006 violent protest]. I did not directly answer his questions. I only told him that I

wanted to learn about the movement as it was a historical case of a popular uprising. My

guide went a step further and said that I would later write a book about the movement.

As mentioned earlier, I faced similar questions many times during the first phase of my fieldwork in 2009. After more than six years, a new phase of violent mobilization erupted in

Phulbari in November 2012 when people protested a directive of the Home Ministry of GOB, advising the local administration to cooperate with the mining company on a new survey in the area. Local communities and activists considered a breach of the agreement signed between the government and activists on 30 August 2006.13 I called one of my interlocutors from Toronto, and he said: ‘Bhai, we are again on the street and facing policy brutality. Write about us.’ When I went to Phulbari a month later in December 2012, everybody asked me whether I knew what happened in November. One of my interlocutors said, ‘Bhai, you are doing research on us, and we are fighting with police. Keep us in your thoughts and prayers.’ These exchanges are suggestive of the politics of research in an era of neoliberal globalization when weak people in a remote corner of the global South face powerful external forces of global capital and their local allies. The oppressed hope researchers’ intellectual support will help them mobilize by powerful counter-narratives. A scholar cannot fulfill this objective by following a positivist, objective, and dispassionate research method.

13 See Appendix-2.

Sociologist Amita Baviskar conducted a significant study on the struggle of tribal communities against a large dam in India14 in the early 1990s (Baviskar 1995). She reflects on the politics of research in a foreword to a book by another sociologist (Dwivedi 2006), based on extensive research on the same project. Dwivedi chose to conduct his research by distancing himself from both pro- and anti-dam campaigns to produce an objective social scientific knowledge. Baviskar opposes this practice of dispassionate sociological research. As she argues:

For after analyzing who says what, and who will gain or lose, and demarcating areas of

uncertainty and ignorance, we still have to make judgments. We have to arrive at

provisional understandings of goodness and badness in order to orient action. This is a

hazardous process, always ‘subject to revision’, but essential nevertheless. As someone

who strives to practice … ‘public sociology’, trying to be a partisan yet critical

interlocutor on issues of social justice, I found myself irked by [Dwivedi’s] quietism.

(2006: xxiii, original emphasis)

Baviskar ends with a note on her conversation with a man from a village near the dam site, where she stayed during her fieldwork. The man reported that his arable lands were submerged in rising waters and his crops had disappeared under water: ‘My life has drowned … a boat now sails over my fields.’ He also said government officials laughed at him when he went to the town to pick up relief goods as a displaced person; he was involved with the anti-dam movement for more than two decades, and this had caused a lot of trouble for government agencies (2006: xxiv-xxv). After the Supreme Court of India ruled against the movement in 2000, the pro-dam

14 Narmada Bachao Andolon (Save the Narmada Movement).

53 campaign won, and those who had challenged the state (like this man) were now dependent on its mercy. Government officials and pro-dam people enjoyed the opportunity to humiliate them.

For Baviskar, development which causes gains for one group and losses for another requires ‘a sustained critique of political economy.’ In so doing, a scholar makes an error if he or she opts to be a dispassionate observer. My choice is not all that unusual in sociology. Students of contentious politics revolving around issues of dispossession, inequality, marginalization, and social justice find it harder to be dispassionate or what Baviskar terms tatasth (a Hindi word meaning on the riverbank, unmoved by the current).

Setting aside the paradox of development which motivates many scholars to take part in social justice struggles, I suggest that dispassionate research is not suitable for sociology more generally, because, as Anthony Giddens (1982) argues, it has ‘a subversive quality.’ Sociology is an intellectually important discipline for ‘its subversive or critical character,’ and sociologists study social issues which are sources of conflict and controversies. Giddens contends:

‘Sociology cannot remain a purely academic subject, if “academic” means a disinterested and remote scholarly pursuit, followed solely within the enclosed walls of the university’ (1982:3).

By the same token, social movement scholars cannot always maintain a distance from the movements they study. According to Kathleen Blee, ‘Some [scholars] reveal their support, or are themselves involved in the movements they study. Such personal and political involvement with

54 activists can get scholars an entrée to important or nuanced information about movement participants and operations that are generally only available to insiders’ (Blee 2013:604).15

2.5 Data Collection Methods

I used various methods to collect empirical data, including in-depth interviews, participant observation at protest events, organizational documents, reports of the mining company (AECB) and government agencies (GOB), and newspaper reports published in local and national newspapers during 2004-2016.

2.5.1 In-depth Interviews

Sociologists who rely on interpretive epistemologies as a methodological framework frequently use qualitative in-depth interviews to collect data. In this framework, interpreting the meaning of human action is a way to generate empirical knowledge (della Porta 2014). In social movement studies, semi-structured in-depth interviews are used to investigate the ‘micro-dynamics of commitment’ of rank-and-file activists (ibid: 231). Scholars interested in ‘people’s interpretations of reality’ prefer this method of collecting empirical data (ibid: 258). Semi- structured interviews ‘reveal the nuances of many activists’ perceptions’ and are suitable in both interviews with key informants and focus group discussions. Key informants are significant

15 Verta Taylor (1998, cited in Blee 2013) got access to activists by being an advocate for the movement on postpartum depression.

55 sources of empirical data on social movements because, as insiders, they ‘can provide information on particular aspects of a social movement, such as its tactics or strategies, modes of recruitment, internal dynamics, membership compositions, or future plans and goals’ (Blee

2013:603). In my case, such informants could offer their individual perspectives on the anti-mine movement as rank-and-file members who were well aware of the background of the movement and its logic/rationale. In-depth interviews also permit the researcher to ‘give a voice’ to participants/activists. In this sense, academic research gives subaltern activists a platform for sharing their thoughts. Participants’ stories are essential ingredients if a researcher is to make sense of the formation and development of any social movement. They are useful for both micro- and meso-level analysis of the dynamics of social movements, including the cognitive and emotional dimensions of activists and organizational aspects of movement mobilization (Blee

2012; Skocpol and Williamson 2013). They are also useful to generate new hypotheses and evaluate existing ones (della Porta 2014).

Given this understanding, I employed in-depth interviews as the primary research method to collect empirical data. I interviewed 80 activists associated with the movement against the

Phulbari coal mine, as well as energy experts (Table 2.1).16 I also conducted follow-up interviews when any significant development happened after my fieldwork.

I used an interview guide to conduct these semi-structured interviews. The guide included a set of questions; I probed certain topics depending on the level of engagement and expertise of the

16 Apart from these formal in-depth interviews, I talked to many people on various occasions. I did not include these in my analysis, as they were casual conversations.

56 interviewee. Interviews conducted in Dhaka were lengthy, averaging two hours. Those in

Phulbari were not as long, averaging an hour.

While conducting interviews with the major leaders/activists in Phulbari and Dhaka, I paid particular attention to their life histories to understand ‘how activists evaluate and make sense of their experiences in social movements’ (Blee 2013:603). I followed a purposive sampling method to identify these participants. Choosing purposive sampling is a common practice in social movement scholarship. As Blee suggests, ‘For less institutionalized social movements or those whose memberships are not well documented, scholars often rely on snowballing sampling, asking initial interviewees to suggest or contact others to be interviewed’ (ibid:604).17

I faced tremendous challenges when I attempted to interview transnational activists involved with the Phulbari Action Network (PAN) in 2014. I contacted each organization involved with

PAN.18 Initially, I received a response from a handful of organizations. I was frustrated by my inability to contact several activists who were instrumental in PAN’s mobilization. As I was trying to figure out how to reach them, one of my interlocutors in Dhaka helped me contact activists of NCBD’s UK chapter.19 These activists collaborate with PAN members in collective actions. The following observation of one of the UK activists offers some clues to my initial failure:

17 All interviews were conducted in Bengali and recorded with a digital tape-recorder. No research assistant was used to conduct and transcribe these interviews. 18 See Chapter 5. 19 Members of the Bangladeshi diaspora in London created the UK chapter of NCBD in 2009 to mobilize fellow Bangladeshis living in the UK and other European countries against the Phulbari coal mine.

Why will they respond to your emails? They are skeptical of scholarly research, which

does not serve the interests of local communities in Phulbari. If they are convinced that

your work will help local people in some ways, they will certainly be happy to be part of

your research. They do not want to spend time for something that has no relevance to

their work on the Phulbari movement. For example, they know that I work for local

communities, and I will not bother them about any other interests. Therefore, whenever I

contact them, they respond immediately.

The observation surprised me – I had expected these activists to be more interested in participating in my research.

As mentioned earlier, transnational advocacy organizations (TANs)—members of PAN—have doubts about the practical use of academic research on contentious subjects for some valid reasons. Finally, however, five PAN members agreed to take part in the data collection process.

Negotiating access to TANs was an interesting part of this research. I learned a great deal about the complex terrain of the politics of research on the extractive industry. Instead of a face-to-face interview via digital technology, we agreed to use an interview checklist; participants filled it out to give their opinions on their activism vis-à-vis the Phulbari movement.20

20 I explain this issue in chapter 5.

Table-2.1: Interviews by Scales and Types of Participants21

Scale Type of Participant Number Local Leader 8 Activist 10 Community member/participant22 19 National Leader 11 Activist 17 Academic/former bureaucrat 4 Energy expert23 3 Transnational Organizer/PAN representative24 8 Total25 80

At the local scale, leaders are executive committee members of NCBDP, activists are grassroots organizers in rural areas, and community members/movement participants include peasants, small traders, agricultural labourers, business people, elected representatives, and community elites. At the national scale, leaders are representatives of the political parties who are members of NCBD’s governing body; activists include members of various political parties and social and cultural organizations.

Interviews at the local level covered issues related to movement formation, organizational issues, movement demands, community mobilization, and protest events. My goal was to gather substantial empirical evidence on the grassroots movement against the mining company. At the national scale, my goal was to collect information about the formation of the NCBD movement against the privatization of resource extraction, its organizational structure, movement

21 Officials of Bangladesh’s Energy Ministry and the mining company did not respond to interview requests; to offset this refusal, I used lengthy media interviews of these officials. 22 Two of these interviews were conducted by telephone. 23 These interviews were conducted by telephone. 24 Three of these interviews were with activists of NCBD’s UK chapter and were conducted by telephone. 25 This does not include 10 follow up interviews, which I conducted by telephone during 2014-2015.

59 agenda/demands, and the connection between local and national movements vis-à-vis the

Phulbari coal mine. Finally, my interview with PAN members included questions on PAN’s formation, organizational structure, mobilization tactics, articulation of movement demands, interaction with local and national activists in Bangladesh, engagement with various global institutions, and shareholder activism.

For local-scale interviews, I carefully studied documents of the mining company and identified the locations to ensure places fell within the core mining zone (10-kilometre radius of the central coal deposit). Although I interviewed activists and community people to ensure diverse views from across the mining area, I paid particular attention to four locations, as I had discovered that these communities were very vocal. I looked into various historical and political factors that might account for this variation.

2.5.1.1 Local Data Sites and Interviewees

The first location, Phulbari town, is the epicentre of the movement at the local level. More than

80 percent of Phulbari town falls within the core mining zone. In addition, the settlement history of the various Phulbari communities since the Indian Partition in 194726 is connected to participation. The other three locations were chosen for the reasons mentioned below. To maintain anonymity, I will refer to these as village-1, village-2, and village-3.

26 Many residents have been living on the properties of people who left for India; these were declared as vested property (the Bangladeshi government owns these properties).

Village-1 is a historically significant place. The leftist peasant organizations active in this region have inherited collective mobilization practices against powerful forces from one of the most famous peasant movements in South Asia, the Tebhaga movement, a peasant uprising against

British colonial rulers. The leftist activists who organize grassroots communities in this area frame the anti-coal mine movement in Marxist terms. They frequently refer to multinational mining companies as plunderers of national assets in developing countries.

Village-2 consists of communities of a non-local group who settled in the area in the early 1970s.

They migrated from another area mostly because recurrent river erosion had destroyed their land and homes.27 They cleared vast areas of government-owned forest land for their homes and cultivation. The majority have no land title. If the coal mine were developed, they would lose everything, with no financial compensation as they are illegal occupants of government land. In this area, the anti-coal mine movement is considered an action to save a community which worked very hard to build its current place of living and working.

Village-3 is a cluster of communities of half a dozen groups of Adivasis (indigenous people):

Santal, Munda, Pahan, Oraon, Mormu, and Malo. Historically, they have a very contentious relationship with neighbouring Muslim Bengalis and the state. Muslim Bengalis have taken over much of their lands using corrupt practices of local land administration. In addition, they have been discriminated against by money lenders and unscrupulous Bengali traders. Forcible dispossession of property happens on a regular basis. The state machinery has failed to protect these marginalized groups, and there is a lack of mutual trust between them and Muslim Bengalis

27 See Annex 5.

61 and the state. In this area, the anti-coal mine movement is a collective community response to various forms of discrimination and marginalization.

Participants in this study included those actively involved in the movement against the Phulbari coal mine. They had different functions: some organized the movement, framed agendas/demands, interacted with opponents, mobilized strategic resources; others interacted with and mobilized grassroots communities to gather support for the campaign. Still others were active participants (movement supporters) but remained outside the leader/activist category.

Following the work of Raka Ray (1999), before beginning the field work, I reviewed a set of newspaper reports published between 2005 and 2007 to learn more about the movement and its local- and national-level actors. These reports also contained information about organizations involved in mobilizing a series of protest events. From these reports, I prepared a list of leaders and activists (potential research participants) who participated in various events. I contacted them and requested an interview. Among the actors in the movement, especially at the national level, I met university professors, political and cultural activists whom I knew from my student life at the University of Dhaka. After I had explained my research purpose, some helped me contact other activists in Dhaka and Phulbari by advising me on a list of names I had created using media sources. Using information from conversations with local leaders/activists, I prepared a list of locations of active grassroots mobilizations within the core mining zone. I met several grassroots activists/participants and expressed my desire to have longer conversations about the movement at a later date. In this way, I came up with a final list of potential research participants. I requested an interview, and I recruited those who voluntarily agreed to a formal interview.

Based on my previous research experience in Bangladesh, I decided not to ask for written consent indicating participants’ willingness to be interviewed. There is a culturally specific concern about signing documents in Bangladesh. It creates confusion; extra effort is required to ease the situation.28 To avoid this, I obtained informed consent for participation in this research by requesting participants’ oral consent. Some in Phulbari and Dhaka read a translated version of the consent form and gave verbal consent. In other cases, I read the consent form (translated into

Bengali) and obtained verbal consent for participation. I maintained field notes to keep a record of each interview. In each case, I ensured that the participants did not feel any pressure to participate. I explained the research purpose, the issues to be discussed, and the process that would be followed to maintain the confidentiality of collected information. All participants agreed voluntarily to participate in the research.

Research on social and environmental conflict can be emotionally painful for both interviewer and interviewees. The anecdotes given above hint at this. However, an encounter with one of my interlocutors explains it more clearly. I went to a Santal village in January 2013 to interview a villager whom I identified as a key informant on local mobilization. The following paragraph from my field notes sheds light how the experience can be painful for both the interviewer and the interviewee:

28 My guide also told me that someone conducted interviews with movement participants in several rural areas, videoed those interviews and posted them online. It was not clear whether the researcher had obtained permission to visually record and publish the interviews. One of my interlocutors was willing to talk to me but did not allow me to record our conversation using a digital tape recorder. When my guide asked the participant why he was unwilling to record the conversation, he explained that someone had published interviews about the movement, and this could create problems in the workplace. I did not contact the researcher to avoid any further complications it might cause.

My guide took me to a village of indigenous people mostly Santals. He asked several

people to determine the location of the house of a person whom we planned to interview.

When we arrived, our intended person was not willing to talk to an outsider. My guide

convinced him, and he finally agreed to speak to me. We sat on a bench in his front yard.

I was looking at him, and he was looking at a house at a 90-degree angle to my position.

During our conversation for more than an hour, he never looked at me. Although he

talked to me very gently, he seemed very annoyed. His body language indicated that my

conversation with him about something that would ‘destroy’ his land and livelihood

added an insult to his injuries. He asked me several times what my opinion was regarding

the planned ‘destructive’ coal mine project on his land. He asked me whether I thought

enough about their destiny if AECB developed the coal mine. Talking about coal mine

and its anticipated impacts on marginalized indigenous people was a painful experience

for him. His facial expression depicted anxiety and rage. As a researcher, I felt quite

uncomfortable as he thought I was not bold enough to discredit AECB’s plan and support

their movement against the coal mine. His view was that there was no value of any

discussion on either positive or negative aspect of a coal mine when it was evident,

according to their opinion, that the coal mine would destroy the land and livelihood of

hundreds of thousands of people.

2.5.1.2 The Mining Company (AECB) and GOB Officials

My failure to interview significant agents in AECB (the mining company) and in the

Bangladeshi government (GOB) needs further explanation (see footnote to Table 2.1). When my repeated emails to AECB went unanswered, I tried another strategy to get in touch with a

64 company official. I used my social networks in Dhaka and managed to contact a member of

AECB’s media and communication department. When I told him about my plan to interview one or more senior AECB officials for an academic research, he explained the reasons for AECB’s lack of enthusiasm:

Many researchers and journalists come to us to collect information on the Phulbari coal

project. But they use this information to discredit our business. Their research and

analysis do not help AECB at all. Researchers collect information from us as a way of

their self-defense i.e. fulfilling requirements of their research protocol. Our boss and

senior officials lost interest in providing information to researchers.

During my fieldwork in 2013, I tried my best to contact officials of various agencies of

Bangladesh’s Energy Ministry. None agreed to participate in my research. They did not offer any explanation. A mid-level official, sympathetic to academic work on energy issues, explained why no official was willing to be a participant:

Officials of various agencies of the Energy Ministry always fear that they may lose the

job if they provide any critical information to outsiders. There is an (informal) instruction

from senior officials in each rank not to disclose any information to outsiders. A senior

official of our agency lost his job and was sent to jail for sharing information with an

outsider. After a prolonged legal battle, he returned to his job.

Nonetheless, I was optimistic that I could get official information by using Right to Information

(RTI) procedures. Although each agency of the Bangladeshi government has a legal

65 responsibility to provide information to RTI applicants, however, there is no specific timeline to make a decision on an application. An official of the Energy Ministry explained that the relevant

RTI official of an agency could not make a decision. In the case of the Energy Ministry, there is an informal process to seek approval of the Junior Minister to get information. This process is the result of a centralized bureaucratic authority – a key feature of Bangladeshi administrative culture. For example, if I applied to get information from BMD (Bureau of Mineral

Development), BMD officials would send it to Petrobangla, which, in turn, would send it to

EMRD (Energy and Mineral Resources Division) to seek the Minister’s approval. An official of the Energy Ministry who worked in a field office outside Dhaka told me that even if the Minister approved my application, it would take years to fulfill my request. When I wanted to get a copy of a report from an Energy Ministry agency through RTI, an official told me that this would be a futile attempt for the reasons mentioned above.

2.5.2 Participatory Observation

Although the interview data are the heart of my analysis, I have used several additional sources of empirical evidence. For example, I participated in various protest events (Table 2.2) to observe local and national mobilizations. I attended protest events organized by NCBD, its

Phulbari chapter (NCBDP), and other groups connected to the movement. Of these events, the most significant were mass rallies in Phulbari to commemorate 26 August (Phulbari Day) in

2009 and 2013. From early morning until evening, I observed public events organized by

NCBDP and other local groups to celebrate their victory against the mining company and to remember the sacrifice of those killed on that day in 2006. In addition to documenting these

66 events, I talked to many people about the protest in 2005-2006 and its continuation. Other activities in which I participated in as an observer were held in Dhaka. My observation of these events yielded useful information about collective claims-making and interactions with opponents.

Table-2.2: List of Protest Events

Time Description of the Event 2009 Rally organized by Left Democratic Alliance, Dhaka 2009 Discussion meeting organized by Banglar Pathshala, Dhaka 2009 Seminar organized by Weekly Shaptahik, Dhaka 2009 Press conference organized by NCBD, Dhaka 2009 Rally on Phulbari Day organized by NCBDP, Phulbari 2009 Rally organized by NCBD, Dhaka 2009 Rally organized by NCBD, Dhaka 2009 Discussion meeting organized by NCBD, Dhaka 2009 Rally organized by NCBD, Dhaka 2012 Discussion meeting organized by NCBD, Dhaka 2013 Rally organized by NCBDP, Phulbari 2013 Rally on Phulbari Day organized by NCBDP, Phulbari 2013 Seminar organized by Weekly Shaptahik, Dhaka

2.5.3 Documents

I consulted volumes of reports of the mining company and various agencies of GOB available for public use. These were significant sources of empirical data on the actions of these two powerful actors. I also used newspaper reports on coal mining and energy policies in Bangladesh published during 2004-2016. Finally, I drew on a set of organizational documents of various groups involved in the Phulbari movement. These included leaflets, pamphlets, press statements, newspaper op-eds, posters, petitions, magazines, and position papers. These documents offered mobilization discourses of these groups, making them central to an understanding of how oppositional voices could delegitimize the dominant discourses.

2.5.4 Visual Media

Visual media such as documentary films are used to influence public discourses; they play a significant role in communication affecting social relationships (Grady 2008). Sociologists consider visual media to be cultural products. At the same time, they change popular discourses and influence mobilization and political outcomes (Vasi et al. 2015). Activists of the Phulbari movement and the mining company have both made several documentary films on the Phulbari coal mine project (Table 2.3). I considered these films significant sources of additional empirical data because they contain public discourses on the contention. The films give specific examples of widespread support for/against the social movements and/or the mining company.

Table-2.3: Documentary Films on the Phulbari Coal Project and Anti-Mining Mobilization

Documentary Film Sponsor/Producer Phulbari: The Coal Capital of Bangladesh AECB Coal Can Show the Light AECB Phulbarir Satdin NCBD Phulbarir Raktapataka Independent Filmmaker Dudh Kayla Independent Filmmaker Hara Kayla Khoni Chaina Independent Filmmaker Phulbari SEHD (Environmental NGO) Phulbari Debo Na Independent Filmmaker

2.6 Data Analysis

As mentioned earlier, my interviews with rank-and-file activists and energy experts were the crux of my empirical research. These interviews revealed activists’ perceptions, interpretations, and assessments of movement-related issues. Instead of following a rigorous technical analysis of qualitative data, such as developing an elaborate coding scheme and analytic categories drawn

68 from this scheme (Blee 2013; della Porta 2014), I opted for a narrow approach, one more suitable to my goals. Some scholars are skeptical of the positivist method of categorizing and quantifying qualitative data to make generalizations. For example, Alvesson argues, ‘I am less convinced that the careful and detailed sorting, codification, and categorizing of interview accounts is always the best way of producing interesting research results’ (Alvesson 2011:59), and he calls for a more reflexive analysis of interview materials. Biernacki’s Reinventing Evidence in Social

Inquiry (2012) challenges the practice of the formal coding of a vast number of texts (e.g. interview transcripts and other literary works). He considers coding techniques to be ritual habits of social scientists who have accepted dominant scientific norms to deal with the positivist critiques of interpretive social science methodology. Others point out that coding is used by social movement scholars and sociologists for systematic analysis of empirical materials to generate hypotheses and test theories. Such researchers use both deductive and inductive codes to sort and reorganize interview materials (Blee 2012; Campbell and Pedersen 2014).

To analyze my empirical materials, I adopted a technique of ‘intensive interpretation’ (Alvesson

2011) of my interview materials by corroborating the statements of one interviewee with the context and statements of others. My interpretive process comprised three steps. First, I listened to audio versions of all interviews several times and transcribed them.29 Second, I carefully read each transcription. A scholar’s choice of interview transcription can vary from full transcription to fragmentary or partial transcription. Researchers judge which section of the interview is of interest. In this case, I selected appropriate and informative sections for their rich analytical value only (see della Porta 2014). Repeated reading of transcriptions is a good strategy. McCracken

29 I did not translate these transcriptions into English.

(1998, quoted in della Porta 2014:252) suggests three readings: the first reading is about observation, the second is about interpretation, and the third is about connecting observations. As della Porta suggests, ‘a deep reading and re-reading of hundreds of transcribed pages’ is required for a careful analysis of interview materials (2014:258). These strategies also help researchers to develop a coding scheme – a list of themes and categories for analyzing qualitative data. I developed such a scheme, albeit a narrow one, to identify salient issues/themes in each interview.

This is akin to Blee’s methodological guidelines in her study of grassroots political activism in

Pittsburgh where ‘a list of themes and categories was generated inductively from several systematic readings of all data to capture nuances and develop new lines of inquiry (Blee

2012:149).’30 Third, I selected relevant quotations to probe theoretical issues and articulate theoretically driven arguments. My goal was to offer a nuanced analysis of the movement by connecting particular local, national, and global issues. A close reading of various documents and my field notes (on interviews and participatory observations) yielded additional evidence on particular events and gave me a broader view of the movement in light of the ‘lifeworld’ of the main actors.31 It enriched the overall analysis of various scales of the movement and its implications.

30 However, while she attempted to code all data using the inductive coding scheme, I re-read interview transcriptions following the scheme and selected relevant portions of a transcript for empirical analysis. 31 Here I followed Schurman and Munro (2010).

CHAPTER 3

Against Dispossession: Extractive Capital and Subaltern Countermovement in Phulbari

Abstract:

Transforming natural resources such as land into a commodity has deepened the power of extractive capital and dispossessed many subaltern communities in the global South. Drawing on scholarship on primitive accumulation, dispossession, and countermovement, this chapter examines the Phulbari Andolon in Bangladesh. In the chapter, I analyze the emergence of the anti-mining political agency of grassroots communities who would bear the brunt of the slow violence of the extractive industry. I show how the material and emotional urge of grassroots groups to protect their society/community gave rise to their political agency with the intervention of ‘organic intellectuals’. These ‘organic intellectuals’ shaped the consciousness of the subaltern actors on the frontlines of the political struggles.

3.1 Introduction

A coalmine will take away our land; give us begging baskets; We do not believe in false

assurance and development discourses (a slogan of the Phulbari Andolon).

On 23 September 2016, a report in a Bangladeshi newspaper, ‘Govt backtracks on open-pit mining in Barapukuria, Phulbari’, said that the Energy and Mineral Resources Division (EMRD)

71 of the Bangladeshi government had given up on open pit mining in Bangladesh,1 backing away from its earlier decision to develop domestic coal fields in Phulbari and Barapukuria. This critical policy decision was not an isolated instance. In early 2014, the Prime Minister had instructed EMRD to move away from coal extraction and focus on food security and the protection of farmers’ land.2 In 2015, several Bangladeshi newspapers reported that the mining license for the British company seeking to develop the Phulbari coalmine, Asia Energy

Corporation (Bangladesh) Pty Ltd (AECB), was cancelled by EMRD3 after it rejected AECB’s feasibility study and engaged the Geological Survey of Bangladesh (GSB), an EMRD agency, to conduct a new one.

These policy changes in Bangladesh’s energy and mineral development sector are intertwined with an anti-mining mobilization, popularly known as the Phulbari Andolon (movement). Local communities in Phulbari region were not willing to hand over their land to a coal mine. Starting in April 2005, they campaigned against AECB (the company got a licence for a mine in 2004) and urged the Bangladeshi government to rescind the project. For ten years (2005-2015), the anti-mining movement put enormous pressure on policymakers to rethink the mineral development agenda.

Against the backdrop of the conflict over the Phulbari coal project, in this chapter, I ask a simple yet critical research question: why did local communities turn against the mining company, which had been credited by political and bureaucratic elites as a significant driver of economic

1 Daily Sun, 23 September 2016. 2 Daily Star, 7 February 2014. 3 Prothom Alo, 22 January 2015; New Age, 7 July 2015; Prothom Alo, 22 July 2015.

72 development? Drawing on seminal work by David Harvey (2003) and Karl Polanyi (2001), I adopt a political economy perspective to analyze the emergence of political agency among subaltern actors (peasant and indigenous peoples) who drove AECB out of the region and forced the Bangladeshi government to make a U-turn on its mineral development agenda.

Globalization and neoliberal economic reforms have created new opportunities for foreign capital in a deregulated and liberalized market economy in the global South (Harvey 2003;

McMichael 2010). The increasing intrusion of the extractive industry into hitherto untouched territories exemplifies the new dynamics of global capital, creating what Harvey (2003) calls

‘accumulation by dispossession.’ 4 As Harvey’s phrase suggests, the intrusion of global capital causes various unwelcome transformations in the host economy in the global South (see Almeida

2015; Singh and Bourgouin 2013; Sawyer 2004). Dispossession of land and environmental destruction are two examples. At the same time, however, this expanding power of capital creates a political space for subaltern communities. More specifically, local communities, such as peasants and indigenous peoples, who are the locus of the planned extraction, organize anti- dispossession movements to contest global capital’s plans (Haarstad 2012; Bebbington 2012;

Bebbington and Bury 2013; Sawyer and Gomez 2012).

This chapter analyzes a subaltern countermovement against a potentially environmentally destructive open pit coalmine in Phulbari, a densely populated agricultural community in the northwest region of Bangladesh. Even though AECB’s mine would displace more than 40,000

4 In a recent work, sociologist Jason Moore (2015) examined the inherent logics of capitalist system, particularly its enormous capacity to exploit what he calls ‘cheap nature’ such as labor, food, energy, and raw materials.

73 people, damage about 6000 hectares of farmland, 5 and pollute local water resources and biodiversity, political and bureaucratic elites supported the project as it would involve huge amounts of foreign direct investment (nearly US$2.5 billion). Local communities did not view the project through the lens of modernity and development, however. They argued that the coalmine would destroy their key source of livelihood: the land (CPP 2005). An urban anti- capitalist radical social movement organization, the National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas,

Mineral Resources, Power and Ports (NCBD) joined the local mobilization, strengthening it and scaling up its concerns to a national level. According to NCBD, AECB would plunder

Bangladesh’s precious national resources; thus, the deal between AECB and the Bangladeshi government failed to protect Bangladesh’s ‘national interests’ (NCBD 2005).

Local and national activists made three key demands (widely known among activists as the

‘Three NOs’). These demands define the political character of the Phulbari Andolon: 1) open pit mining should not be allowed; 2) a foreign company cannot own Bangladesh’s mineral resources; 3) export of mineral resources should not be allowed (Bablu 2005; Muhammad 2005).

The relentless efforts of the activists during 2005-2006 forced the Bangladeshi government to suspend AECB’s activities and shelve the coalmine for an indefinite period. Although AECB and the Bangladeshi government took several initiatives to restart the project during 2007-2014, reinvigorated local mobilization pushed back. Realizing the significant political implications of

5 AECB did not provide accurate statistics. According to an expert committee, commissioned by the Bangladeshi government in 2006, more than 50,000 people would be directly affected and about 220,000 people would be indirectly affected by mining activities. These numbers would be more than that in 2018. My own calculations suggest AECB’s statistics do not match the latest official statistics. An NCBDP leader said it was a corporate strategy of the mining company to reduce the overall cost of the project and get the consent of the policymakers (PHU #3).

74 the mining conflict, during 2015-2016, the Bangladeshi government made several decisions,6 two of which are noted above, signalling the death of the mega-project. Those decisions indicate the victory of a sustained local movement (2005-2016) against global extractive capital and its allies.

I am interested in the anti-dispossession politics that emerged in Phulbari during the formative phase of the anti-mining movement (April 2005- August 2006).7 I ask: How do we explain the development of local resistance to a multinational mining company? In other words, I am interested in the political agency of an anti-dispossession movement that emerged at the grassroots level in Phulbari. In so doing, I also draw on Gramsci’s seminal work to shed light on the role of ‘organic intellectuals’ in the development of local resistance. In short, in this chapter,

I analyze the connection between the politics of dispossession and the emergence of the political agency of subaltern actors.

In a recent study on anti-dispossession politics in India, Levien (2013) notes the lack of an appropriate theory of political agency in the social sciences to explain the ‘distinct’ nature of politics emerging from anti-dispossession politics in the global South. I take this as my point of departure in this chapter. I suggest that a combination of the work of Harvey, Polanyi, and

Gramsci can offer analytical tools to understand the political agency underpinning anti- dispossession politics in the global South. I argue that the desire to protect their society and

6 See Faruque (2018b) footnote 21 for a list of these decisions. 7 The Phulbari Andolon informally began in April 2005, and in August 2006 it forced the Bangladeshi government to accept its key demands.

75 community from the intrusion of predatory8 extractive capital initially mobilizes subaltern communities. Gradually this mobilization culminates in an anti-dispossession countermovement.

Over time, ‘organic intellectuals’ of these communities who are immersed in the practices of politics (at local, national, and transnational scales) help transform the subjective consciousness of subaltern actors, offering counter-narratives to dominant development discourses and shaping the political agency of their fellow activists.

The Phulbari Andolon is an interesting case study. Here, a subaltern mobilization against a multinational mining company in a local community in the global periphery culminated in a countermovement to challenge the ‘epistemic privilege’ of contemporary development thinking shaped by the ‘market calculus’ of neoliberal global capitalism (McMichael 2010:3). There is abundant scholarly work on the political economy of popular struggles over land and the environment in India (see Desai 2016; Levien 2018; Nielsen 2018; Nilsen 2010), but except for a very few recent works (Adnan 2013; Gardner 2012), similar issues in Bangladesh are understudied. The chapter helps fill this gap.

The rest of the chapter begins with a review of analytical issues mentioned in the literature on primitive accumulation, dispossession, commodification, and countermovement. Section two explains the sources of data and methods employed to collect data. Section three presents empirical findings on the counter-movement in Phulbari. Section four is a brief discussion and conclusion.

8 I take this notion of global extractive capital from Veltmeyer and Petras (2014:235) and Mailey (2015).

3.2 Global Capital and Countermovement: Analytical Issues

3.2.1 Primitive Accumulation, Commodification, and Dispossession

The literature on primitive accumulation, dispossession, and social movements owes much to

Harvey (2003) and Polanyi (2001). They offer a useful conceptual framework to analyze the complex relationship between the expansion of global capital in the periphery and the reaction of local communities, the topic of this chapter. Harvey’s theorizing of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ is helpful in understanding anti-dispossession politics in the global South (Levien

2012; Adnan 2013), while Polanyi’s analysis of fictitious commodities and counter-movements offers useful analytical tools to examine the conflict between global capital and local communities. Levien (2013) suggests that although Harvey (2003) and Polanyi (2001) are useful to explain the politics of dispossession in the neoliberal era, they do not explain the emergence of political agency. I suggest Gramsci’s theory of ‘organic intellectuals’ makes sense of political agency and anti-dispossession movements in the global South. Combining the three is a promising way to approach the formative phase of the Phulbari Andolon.

In The New Imperialism, Harvey invokes Marx’s (1965) concept of ‘primitive accumulation’

(‘the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production’)9 and argues that it remains ‘powerfully present within capital’s historical geography’ (2003:145). For Harvey,

9 For Harvey, the most significant processes of primitive accumulation are ‘the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant population, the conversion of various forms of property rights (common, collective, and state, etc.) into exclusive private property rights, the suspension of rights to the commons’ (Harvey 2003:145).

Marx correctly highlights the processes of capital accumulation ‘based upon predation, fraud, and violence’ but incorrectly imagines them to be exclusively features of a ‘primitive’ or

‘original’ stage of capitalism (2003:144). Harvey suggests that capitalists pursue strategies of primitive accumulation, which he calls ‘accumulation by dispossession’. Pointing to the ‘inside- outside dialectic’ of capitalism, Harvey posits an ‘organic relation between expanded reproduction on the one hand and the often violent processes of dispossession on the other’; this dialectic is a significant feature of ‘the historical geography of capitalism’ (2003:141-142). A critical actor in accumulation by dispossession is the state; ‘with its monopoly of violence and definitions of legality’, the state is involved in ‘both backing and promoting the processes’

(2003:145).

Harvey says accumulation by dispossession generates political struggle (2003:166–168).

Although he says the resulting movements represent ‘a less focused political dynamic of social action,’ he sees their revolutionary potential in the global South (2003: 67). Harvey’s theory of accumulation by dispossession is a fertile terrain for understanding contemporary land grabs and the political struggles they generate. As anthropologist Taniya Li argues, ‘the transformational sequence appropriation-displacement-exploitation-accumulation, the core process explored by

Marx in Capital, is operative in agrarian setting in many parts of the global South’ (2007:20).

In Marx’s original formulation, primitive accumulation happened with the forceful eviction of peasants to make them a proletariat dependent on wage labour (Marx 1965). Although basing his arguments on Marx, Harvey says new techniques are used to commodify peasant lands in the

78 contemporary era of neoliberal global capitalism. Today’s peasants are dispossessed to make opportunities for private capital.

‘Accumulation by dispossession’ creates large-scale ‘land grab’ whereby individuals and corporations seek access to huge amounts of land for capitalist ventures. The state often facilitates the process (Levien 2012; Adnan 2013). Unsurprisingly, this is contested by local communities who face the consequences of transformation. The protest grows, as NGOs and civil society groups join local people to challenge the intrusion of capital into domains hitherto outside the control of market forces.

Polanyi’s The Great Transformation (2001 [1957]) is a helpful guide to the consequences of self- regulated market forces. Polanyi says the shift to self-regulating markets was made possible by the construction of what he calls a ‘fictitious commodity’:

Labor, land, and money are obviously not commodities; the postulate that anything that is

bought and sold must have been produced for sale is emphatically untrue in regard to

them. In other words, according to the empirical definition of a commodity they are not

commodities. Labor is the only other name of human activity which goes with life itself,

which in turn is not produced for sale but for entirely different reasons, nor can that

activity be detached from the rest of life, be stored or mobilized; land is only other name

for nature, which is not produced by man; actual money, finally, is merely a token of

purchasing power which, as a rule, is not produced at all, but comes into being through

the mechanism of banking or state finance. None of them are produced for sale. The

commodity description of labor, land, and money is entirely fictitious. (Polanyi 2001:75-

76, original emphasis)

For present purposes, the most important point is the connection between fictitious commodities and a double movement. For Polanyi, the institutional effects of the expansion of the market economy leads to an inevitable reaction, wherein society seeks to protect itself from the destruction caused by market forces: ‘the extension of the market organisation in respect to genuine commodities was accompanied by its restriction in respect to fictitious ones. … a deep- seated movement sprang into being to resist the pernicious effects of a market-controlled economy’ (2001:79-80). Polanyi says two contradictory ‘organizing’ principles comprise a

‘double movement’—an inherent feature of a ‘market society’: ‘The one was the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at the establishment of a self-regulating market … [and] the other was the principle of social protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as productive organization’ (2001:138).

In recent years, drawing on Polanyi (2001), a growing body of scholarship is concerned with the devastating consequences of global capitalism, particularly its neoliberal ideology to create abundant opportunities for deregulated market forces. Scholars use Polanyi’s conceptualization of the ‘re-embedding of economy into society’ to explain how the neoliberal ideology of global capitalism has destroyed the embeddedness of the economy in the norms, regulations, and moral principles of society, which ensure greater good for all, including the natural environment (Evans

2014; Guven and Sandbrook 2014; Sandbrook 2011; Burawoy 2014, 2015).

Polanyi’s work is especially helpful in this chapter, as it sheds light on the political logics of mobilization against the subordination of society to market forces. His theorizing of the double movement serves as an analytical foundation to explain the oppositional consciousness of movements against the global expansion of market domination. Other scholars have examined the connection between neoliberal globalization and contemporary social movements around the world (Burawoy 2012, 2014, 2015; Evans 2014, 2015; Reich 2014; Fraser 2011, 2013). Three aspects are especially important: his theorizing of market fundamentalism (also see Stiglitz 2002;

Block and Somers 2013, Evans and Sewell Jr. 2013), fictitious commodities, and countermovement (Burawoy 2012, 2015, Evans 2014, 2015). As Burawoy suggests, Polanyi’s analysis of fictitious commodities helps explain both the ‘underlying forces’ and ‘language’ of social movements against the intrusion of market forces (2015:21). Social movements frame their key messages by articulating the destructive nature of commodification. Levien (2013) adds a significant modification to Polanyi’s theorizing of fictitious commodities and the emergence of counter-movements. For him, a countermovement is not the result of commodification. Rather, it is the result of coercive commodification, often jointly implemented by the state and capital.

Polanyi’s framework and recent sociological scholarship are relevant to understand the connection between the commodification of land as a fictitious commodity and the resulting counter-movements of local communities. Commodification is at the core of numerous social movements in the global South to protect natural resources from the encroachment of market forces (Levien 2012; Adnan 2013). A key process of the commodification of land, as Harvey

(2003) shows, is the dispossession of its primary users. Special economic zones (Levien 2012,

Nielsen 2018), land grabs (Adnan 2013; Gardner 2012; White et al. 2013; Wolford et al. 2013;

McMichael 2010; Sassen 2010), large dams (Nilsen 2010), and mines (Bebbington and Bury

2013; Bebbington 2012) are at the heart of many social movements in the global South, as all these processes pose significant threats to local communities.

3.2.2 Organic Intellectuals and Political Agency

Scholars have shown the role of ideas in social movements (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Bedford

1988). They note that ideas are transformed into culturally resonant movement ‘frames’ to garner wider public support for a particular protest,10 and they emphasize that an act of interpretation is required to make a particular issue into a social problem. This act of interpretation repackages certain ideas and helps form an oppositional consciousness vis-à-vis the issue, which is now constructed as a social problem. Who articulates these ideas in the formative phase of a mobilization? I draw on Gramsci’s theory of ‘organic intellectuals’ to answer this question. I contend that organic intellectuals of affected social groups (in this case, peasants and indigenous peoples) first identify an issue as a problem and then offer a perspective that differs from the dominant narrative.11 This perspective is predicated on their lived experience and worldviews.

10 Snow defines frame as a ‘schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large’ (1986: 464, emphasis mine). To emphasize the significance of framing process in social movements, Snow and Benford (1992) say the emergence of mass mobilization is unlikely in the absence of meaningful and culturally resonant collective action frames. 11 I draw on Schurman and Munro’s (2010) study of anti-biotechnology movements in Europe and the United States. However, I extend it using Gramsci’s perspective.

In Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Antonio Gramsci (1971) writes about the role of intellectuals in revolutionary movements:

Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function

in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or

more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own

function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields. (1971:5; my

emphasis)

For Gramsci, an organic intellectual is distinguished from a traditional intellectual because he or she maintains ‘active participation in practical life as constructor, organizer, “permanent persuader” and not just a simple orator’ (1971:10). Organic intellectuals translate their specialized knowledge into ‘directives’ to actively engage people in movement politics. Gramsci argues they play a critical role in ‘conquering’ the ideas, narratives and discourses of traditional intellectuals who represent the interests of the ruling elites. A social group’s success in doing so i.e., developing counter-hegemonic discourses, depends on the prospect of creating its own organic intellectuals. Although for Gramsci, everyone is a potential intellectual (1971:9), only some individuals work with ideas and disseminate them to create collective will among various strata of population.

I use Gramsci’s notion to conceptualize oppositional consciousness and political agency in my

Bangladeshi case study. To Gramsci, the political agency of a social group is connected to the work of its organic intellectuals. Organic intellectuals contribute to the articulation of a

‘collective will’ and thereby make a new collective identity of a group of actors. Their role in

83 articulating new ideas and making a new identity for a group of actors leads to the emergence of the political agency of their social groups. On the role of organic intellectuals in politics,

Gramsci notes:

A human mass does not ‘distinguish’ itself, does not become independent in its own right

without, in the widest sense, organizing itself; and there is no organization without

intellectuals, that is without organizers and leaders, in other words, without the

theoretical aspect of the theory-practice nexus being distinguished concretely by the

existence of a group of people ‘specialized’ in conceptual and philosophical elaboration

of ideas. (1971:334)

Many scholars have applied the concept of the organic intellectual in their work. For example,

Humphrys operationalizes organic intellectuals as a layer of activists who ‘[emerge] from subaltern groupings but [play] a directive (leadership) role within them, having both knowledge and political skills … to develop the collective will’ (2013:375). She suggests the work of organic intellectuals is significant because it contributes to ‘building unity and sustaining a collective will’ (ibid). Bond et al. (2013) show that organic intellectuals contribute to transforming social movements to creatively craft political actions in response to the broader agenda of neoliberal globalization. Gunderson’s (2010) Gramscian analysis of the ideological transformation of indigenous communities who became the support base of the Zapatista uprising in Mexico suggests organic intellectuals emanating from a subaltern group can develop their own perspectives, independent of the role played by traditional intellectuals, to emerge as a new collective political subject. Rothman and Oliver (1999) indicate the role of organic

84 intellectuals in many local mobilizations in the global South where movements are connected to national and global economics and politics. They disseminate new ideas and thus strengthen subaltern movements against powerful forces (Morton 2007). Susser (2011) contends that

Gramsci’s framework of organic intellectuals is helpful to understand the transmission of ideas to subaltern groups to organize the politics of possibility. Gramsci’s ideas also shed light on the dialectical nature of social movements, i.e., how social movements reveal power concealed in cultural process and articulate new practices opposing hegemonic culture and power (Moodie

2002).

Through their counter-narratives, organic intellectuals contest ‘the common sense’ hegemony of ruling elites and create a ground for alternative discourses (counter-hegemony). They raise burning questions on the issues that social movement organizations deal with (Aronowitz 2009).

3.3 Method and Data

This chapter draws on qualitative data gathered from three sources: 1) 40 in-depth interviews; 2) movement documents produced by various organizations involved with the Phulbari Andolon; 3) reports written by AECB and the Bangladeshi government.

I interviewed three categories of people in Phulbari region: leaders, activists, and community members/movement participants. Leaders (8) were based in Phulbari town and were executive

85 committee members of NCBDP12; activists (10) were grassroots organizers in rural areas; community members/movement participants (19) included peasants, small traders, farm labourers, business people, elected representatives, and community leaders. I also interviewed an indigenous leader who is active both locally and nationally to gather evidence on indigenous peoples’ issues vis-à-vis the coalmine. The interviews covered movement formation, organizational issues, movement demands, community mobilization, and protest events. My goal was to gather substantial empirical evidence about the grassroots movement. I also interviewed two NCBD leaders based in Dhaka, to gather evidence on NCBD’s involvement. These interviews were conducted in two phases during summer 2009 and winter 2013.13

Before conducting local-scale interviews, I carefully studied documents of the mining company and identified locations within the core mining zone (10-kilometre radius of the central coal deposit). Although I interviewed activists and community people to ensure diverse views across the mining area, I paid particular attention to four locations, as I had discovered that those communities were very vocal. I looked into various historical and political factors that might account for this variation. The first location, Phulbari town, was the epicentre of the movement at a local level. More than 80 percent of Phulbari town is in the core mining zone. Moreover, the settlement history of different communities in Phulbari region since the Indian Partition in

12 NCBDP is the Phulbari chapter of NCBD. 13 To maintain anonymity, I use numerical codes (i.e., PHU # 1, 2, 3 for interviews conducted in Phulbari region and DHA # 1, 2, 3 for interviews conducted in Dhaka) when citing comments or referring to evidence from these interviews.

194714 affected movement participation. The other three locations were chosen for the reasons mentioned below. To maintain anonymity, I refer to these as village-1, village-2, and village-3.

Village-1 is a historically significant place. Leftist peasant organizations are active in this region.

These groups have inherited collective mobilization practices from one of the most famous peasant movements in South Asia, the Tebhaga movement, a peasant uprising against British colonial rulers. The leftist activists who organized the grassroots protests in this area framed the anti-mining movement in Marxist terms. They frequently referred to multinational mining companies as plunderers of national assets in developing countries.

Village-2 consists of communities of a non-local group, who settled here in the early 1970s.

They migrated from another area mostly because recurrent river erosion had destroyed their land and homes.15 They cleared vast areas of government-owned forest land for their homes and fields. The majority have no land title. If the coal mine were developed, they would lose everything, with no financial compensation as they are illegal occupants of government land. In this area, the anti-mining movement was considered an action to save a community which had worked very hard to build its current place of living and working.

Village-3 is a cluster of communities of indigenous people, including Santal, Munda, Pahan,

Oraon, Mormu, and Malo. Historically, they have had a very contentious relationship with neighbouring Bengali Muslims and the state. Bengali Muslims have taken over much of their

14 Many residents live on properties left by people who have gone to India; these are considered vested property (the Bangladeshi government owns these properties). 15 See appendix-5.

87 land using corrupt practices of local land administration. They have also been discriminated against by money lenders and unscrupulous Bengali traders. Forcible dispossession of property happens on a regular basis. The state machinery has failed to protect them, and they trust neither

Bengali Muslims nor the state. In this area, the anti-mining movement was a collective community response to existing discrimination and marginalization.

In addition to these interviews, I used a set of movement documents produced by organizations involved with the movement. These included pamphlets, posters, magazines, newsletters, and press statements. I also relied on volumes of AECB reports, available on its website,16 and reports of various government agencies.

3.4 Mining and Anti-Dispossession Politics in Phulbari

3.4.1 The Phulbari Andolon and Local Voices

The Phubari coalmine was projected to cover four sub-districts in Dinajpur district, about 300 kilometres northwest of Dhaka: Phulbari, Birampur, Parbatipur, and Nawabganj. More than 100 villages and Phulbari town would be affected (AECB 2006).17 Phulbari would be the most affected area, with 80 percent of the town falling into the core mining zone; hence, it was the centre of the anti-mining political activism. The economy is based on agricultural production.

According to recent statistics, about 60 percent of households are involved in farming

16 My repeated requests for an interview with AECB officials received no response. 17 See appendix-4.

88 activities.18 More than 50 percent own little or no land. The region is densely populated, with about 868 people per square kilometre. The poverty maps of Bangladesh show that about 40-50 percent of the households are moderately poor and about 30 percent are extremely poor. 19 A recent study20 reports that the region has higher poverty rates (35 percent) than the national average rate (24 percent). Overall, more than 64 percent are categorized as poor.

In a series of studies in 2005, AECB reported that local communities overwhelmingly supported its coalmine project, even though they would be directly affected:

The acquisition of land will impact on the livelihoods and income-generating potential of

all households and businesses within the mine footprint. Agriculture forms an important

part of local livelihoods with landless and land-poor households typically relying on the

sale of their labor in farm-based activities. The decrease in total available cultivable land

resulting from the land acquisition process will affect land owners, sharecroppers,

persons leasing land and agricultural labors who depend on agriculture to survive.

Seventy four percent of all reported household incomes in the area were generated from

agriculture related activities. Loss of land can also have impacts on forms of livelihood

and income-generating activities that rely on access to common property and natural

resources.21

18 BBS, Dinajpur District Statistics 2011 (Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2013); BBS, Census of Agriculture 2008 Dinajpur District Series (Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2011). 19 BBS, Poverty Maps of Bangladesh 2010: Key Findings (Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2014). 20 BBS. 2017. Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2016. Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. 21 AECB. 2006. Phulbari Coal Project: Environmental and Social Impact Assessment, Volume 1 (Executive Summary). Dhaka: AECB. p. 36.

Another report from 2005 claimed that notwithstanding the substantial loss of livelihood and properties, local people considered the mine was necessary for national economic development.

They would accept compensation and support its resettlement plan: ‘[A] large majority of the respondents (79.3 percent) agreed that “The coal project is necessary for the development of the country.” … In the same survey, 74.1 percent agreed with the statement: “As long as fair compensation is paid for affected assets, I will support the coal project.”’22 In other words,

AECB claimed to enjoy the widespread support of local communities.

However, this narrative sharply contradicts the reality I observed in my fieldwork in 2009 and

2012. My interviews with activists and community people clearly show AECB’s project was at the centre of the political conflict in Phulbari. Yes, many people were initially supportive, but they began to protest even before the company had completed its feasibility studies. Mobilization began in April 2005, and in August 2006, a large protest turned violent, with state security forces killing three protesters. This shocking event forced the Bangladeshi government to withdraw its support of AECB.

How did this happen? As I go on to show, the perceptions of local people were radically transformed by a carefully crafted movement agenda, and their initial acceptance of the project turned into active protest. Eventually, development and modernity were perceived as destruction and loss. An NCBDP leader says:

22 AECB. 2006. Phulbari Coal Project: Public Consultation and Disclosure Plan. Dhaka: AECB. p. 35.

We were very happy in the beginning when we knew that valuable coal resources were

found in Phulbari. We were happy because we thought extraction of these resources

would develop this region; our country would benefit; our economy would be better; and

there would be a major change in our fortunes. We cooperated with the mining company

to do its studies. We participated in AECB’s meetings. Its officials told us that the

development of the coalmine would give us better lives and better employment

opportunities; it would contribute to the overall development of the region. Despite this

promise, we had many concerns. Some concerned people collected more information

about the project to know more about the mining company and its business in

Bangladesh. When we knew that our country would receive only 6 percent of coal as

royalty and 94 percent would be company’s resource which they could export to

international markets, we thought how was it possible? The resource is ours; yet we

would receive only six percent. What kind of agreement had the Bangladeshi government

signed with AECB? We decided that we would not allow this to happen. (PHU # 2)

The anti-dispossession movement began with a mass rally in April 2005 organized by JKKS, a leftist peasant and farm laborers association. JKKS leaders argued that a foreign company (i.e.,

AECB) should not be allowed to own Bangladesh’s precious mineral resources.23 Although

JKKS was obviously concerned with the political aspect, it emphasized two other critical issues: land dispossession and environmental damage. It denounced the deal as anti-state and characterized AECB and its political and bureaucratic allies as ‘plunderers.’24 JKKS’s robust

23 Here, JKKS refers to the royalty rate for open pit coal mining. Under Bangladesh’s mineral law, the mining company would pay six percent royalty to the government (PHU # 3). 24 JKKS Press Statement, 17 April 2005; Pamphlet, Jatiya Ganafront, July 2005.

91 critique of AECB’s discourses of modernity and development (Bablu 2005; Ganafront 2005) drew the attention of other local political elites; an organized movement was launched in June

2005 with the creation of Phulbari Raksha Committee (Committee to Protect Phulbari, CPP).

CPP organized processions, rallies, human chains, and hartals (shut-downs of businesses and administrative activities) in Phulbari and submitted petitions to the Prime Minister urging her to suspend the coalmine project. Its main mobilization frame centred on the loss of land and livelihood for large numbers of people. As they put it, they refused to be ‘refugees’ simply to profit a foreign company. For CPP, land was more than a small production unit; monetary compensation could not substitute for the enduring value of land. Social ties and ancestral symbols such as graveyards were also significant. In a land-scarce country like Bangladesh, CPP argued, the mining company could not accommodate the needs of a huge number of displaced people.25 CPP also built an alliance with Dhaka-based NCBD to strengthen its capacities at the local level and scale up the mobilization to the national level. After a year of mobilization, internal conflict between CPP and NCBD led to CPP’s demobilization in July 2006.26 JKKS and other local activists and community leaders formed the Phulbari chapter of NCBD (NCBDP) and continued mobilization.

NCBD and its local allies (i.e., NCBDP) felt the need to increase the intensity of mobilization.

They observed that none of the mobilization tactics had resulted in a tangible outcome. The

Bangladeshi government did not respond to their demands, and AECB continued its pre-mining

25 CPP Leaflet, June 2005; CPP Petition to the Prime Minister, 18 June 2005. 26 I discuss the breakdown of CPP-NCBD alliance elsewhere. See Faruque (2018a).

92 activities. As the mobilization tactics seemed to have been ignored, NCBD announced that its activists would gherao (encircle) AECB’s office on 26 August 2006. To organize the protest event, NCBDP mobilized an intensive campaign throughout the region.

A critical part of this campaign was the dissemination of counter-narratives in an ‘easy-to- understand’ format (one-page leaflet) as opposed to the glossy English-language pamphlets of

AECB. NCBDP organized a series of small-scale meetings with local communities throughout the region and engaged people in a critical dialogue to educate them. During these consultations, rather than imposing their own (leftist) political views of the effect of foreign investment, capitalism/imperialism, and development on local people, the NCBDP activists translated their anti-mining perspectives into local and national symbols, which resonated with local communities. Global political issues—neoliberal capitalism and anti-capitalist social movements—were translated into local and sometimes national matters. 27 These small-scale meetings, locally known as uṭhāna baiṭhaka (backyard meetings), were instrumental in transforming people’s understanding of the coalmine and the mining company (PHU # 7).

However, such transformation did not emerge suddenly; it took more than a year of continuous engagement. Ultimately, these meetings helped local people understand the social, political, and economic context, internalize those issues in their own terms, and develop an oppositional consciousness.

This micro-mobilization process strengthened the political agency of the local communities. As

Freire suggests, ‘To surmount the situation of oppression, people must first critically recognize

27 See Faruque (2017) for an analysis of movement slogans.

93 its causes, so that through transforming action they can create a new situation’ (2000:47, emphasis mine). Uṭhāna baiṭhaka was a space for such an exercise to create a new situation—a new (anti-mining political) identity. Local people turned from ‘conformists’ to ‘rebels.’ The voices of the local people included below reflect this subjective transformation of consciousness.

Dinajpur district is known as Dhaner Rajdhani (Rice Capital) of Bangladesh.28 AECB wanted to transform it into a Kaylar Rajdhani (Coal Capital).29 The CEO of AECB told a BBC reporter that

‘coal under the ground is worth more than growing rice on the surface.’30 Local people across the region disagreed. A farmer asked me: ‘Could you please explain to me whether rice production is more profitable than the extraction of coal?’ His following observation represents the views of many people:

We produce rice as our main crop. Unlike other regions of the country, our area is free

from floods. Most of the lands are used to produce rice during two major crop-cycles

(aman and boro season). We do not consume it all; we sell a major portion to the local

market and from there it goes everywhere in the country. We supply a major food item to

everyone in the country including political elites. Why don’t they understand that the loss

of such a good-quality fertile farmland will drastically reduce Bangladesh’s rice

production and make us dependent on foreign help? (PHU # 18)

28 For a visual presentation, see Phulbarir Sat Din, a documentary on the Phulbari Andolon produced by NCBD. 29 For a visual presentation, see Phulbari, the coal capital of Bangladesh, a documentary produced by AECB. 30 James Melik, ‘Bangladesh coal divides region.’ BBC News, 12 July 2006, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5080386.stm (accessed 27 September 2014).

The financial compensation offered by AECB also failed to persuade local people. The mining company and senior officials of the Bangladeshi government thought an increased amount of compensation would create a favourable environment for AECB, but local people did not consider a one-time financial payment, no matter how much it was, would compensate for the loss of land—an eternal property. A farmer who owned a small piece of land reacted in the following way:

Displacement will destroy all our belongings. I do not want the coalmine. I have a small

piece of land. My grandfather cultivated it; then my father inherited part of it and

maintained his family with earnings from this land. Now I am cultivating the part which I

have gotten from my father; after me, my son will do the same; it will continue following

the family lineage. But the mine will destroy it forever. I won’t be able to buy a similar

piece of land with the money anywhere in the region. (PHU # 34)

One area of the mining zone comprises a cluster of villages where a non-local group called

Chapaiyyas settled in the early 1970s. As mentioned previously, they colonized a large area of government-owned forest and cleared it for agriculture, but most have no land title.31 The specific settlement history of this community shaped their participation in the anti-mining movement in a unique way. Their relationship to the land was more complex than people living in other areas within the mining zone. The lack of legal documentation made them more

31 In-depth interview with a community leader (PHU # 16) with vast knowledge of the settlement history of this community.

95 vulnerable.32 More specifically, they would not receive any financial compensation. The anti- mining movement in this area was a struggle to save a group of people who had worked very hard to build a community. A teacher at a local Madrasa (religious school) explains the fear of his community:

For 40 years we gradually settled in this area. Local people in the area do not respect us.

They are not interested in marriage with us. Now after many years, the relationship with

them has improved. It has been a result of 40 years of living side by side. If we are

evicted from here, our future will become uncertain. We won’t receive any financial

compensation because we do not have legal documents to prove our land ownership. If

the coalmine is built, we will become refugees again. We first became refugees 40 years

ago after losing our land because of river erosion and migrated to this area. It took 40

years to build a society here. If evicted again, we won’t be able to build a society in a

lifetime. (PHU # 15)

Fears of losing honour and social prestige were concerns for well-off rural residents. They were worried that they would be forced to live in resettlement villages alongside poor people. A rich farmer explains his fearing of losing social prestige and becoming a refugee:33

32 My empirical findings are supported by historical studies on this community. For example, Cambridge historian Joya Chatterji (2013:289) contends the Chapaiyyas are specialized in colonizing rich tracts of land and transforming them for farming. One of her informants said, ‘We got this land only after we cleared this land and settled here. … We were living in Chapai [Nawabganj] and losing our land to the river; then one of us got word that this place was a forest and that if we reclaimed it, it would belong to us.’ 33 Local people use the term udbastu (refugee) to refer to people who lost their home and land because of river erosion and the climate change induced flooding of coastal regions (nadibhanga manush). The Bangladeshi

I have 40-50 bighas of land. I am an honourable person in the area. People come to me

for various needs. I do my best to help them. I have four big houses, which are used for

different purposes throughout the year. How do I stay in a house of two rooms [in the

resettlement villages]? Suppose I was given several lakhs of Taka [Bangladeshi currency]

as compensation. But where do I get this amount of land? On the other hand, I will

become a refugee by losing my home and agricultural land. Nobody respects refugees.

(PHU # 27)

Although NCBD connected local and national questions with global issues (e.g., neoliberal global capitalism and counter-movements against it), the main concern of local people was simply to stop the mining company and save their land. This is evident in the observation of an

NCBDP activist involved in the mobilization of many grassroots communities:

It does not matter whether the Bangladeshi government gets six percent or twenty percent

royalty; or whether the government makes a profit or loss from the mining company.

Local people are concerned about their land. … We must remember that land is not just a

source of livelihood. Rural people have multifaceted relationships with land, which are

beyond monetary compensation. (PHU # 7)

government creates resettlement villages (locally known as guccha gram) to rehabilitate them. These villages are under-resourced and crowded. I interviewed several people who either currently lived in a guccha gram or lived near one. Those in a guccha gram were either landless or had lost their land due to natural calamities, and the government had relocated them. They told me that their neighbours did not like them because they lived in a guccha gram (PHU # 37). Rich people living in rural areas, whom I interviewed, considered a guccha gram to be a place for the destitute, with social problems part of everyday living (PHU # 27).

An NCBD leader echoes this concern: ‘Their [local people] self-interest was the prime mover; national question, the politics of foreign investment and corrupt nexus between ruling elites and multinational corporations were secondary issues’ (DHA # 1)

However, the continuous interactions with well-trained leftist political activists (of NCBDP) educated the local people. They began to understand the connection between local self-interest and national concerns. An activist explains that NCBDP’s carefully designed movement messages helped to transform people’s thinking about the coalmine:

The percentage of royalty, whether it is six or twenty, does not matter to people in rural

communities. Their lands and community relations are what matter the most to them.

Their opposition to the mining company was, in the beginning, based on pure self-

interest. However, continuous campaigns with easy-to-understand messages portrayed

that the coalmine would have catastrophic consequences and the future of local

communities was in great danger. This helped to change people’s views. Now if you ask

people in rural areas, they will describe the perceived risks of the coalmine by connecting

their self-interest [dispossession of land] to issues such as bideshi beniya, lootpat (foreign

company, plunder), and national interest. Initially these were not in their minds to

develop oppositional views against the mining company.34 (PHU # 1)

34 In interviews with local people, I observed that many connected both personal and national interests. As a rich farmer told me that why the government engaged a foreign company (AECB) to extract coal. It could wait for some years, and then ‘our people’ (Bangladesh’s own company and people) could do the job. As a result, ‘our resources’ would remain in the country and ‘our desh’ (country) would benefit (PHU # 19).

Activists of the anti-dispossession movement were also concerned with the democratic values of the ruling elites. As one activist observes:

The government can do it [allowing the mining company to build the coalmine] using

force and violence; the government has that power. But ours is a democratic country. If

the government’s actions are not based on people’s expectations, this form of governance

does not practice democracy. If there is democracy, people will be the centre of power. If

the government does not accept it, our political parties should bring another new system

to run the country, where the government’s wishes will be followed. The country will be

run as per the demands of the ruling elites. We will have no right to protest against its

actions. If we do not leave [from our land], the government will force us to leave. Then

the government can begin the mining work. It has the power to do it by displacing us and

even by not resettling us somewhere. The government has the power. Therefore, we must

be united to resist any move of the government and the mining company to build the

mine. So, we have been continuing our struggle against these powerful forces. (PHU #

17)

This was not initially the concern of the local people, but over time, they began to adopt this larger discourse. In the following comment, a female farm worker questions the credibility of a democratically elected government which supports dispossession:

Where will we go leaving our desh (village)? What kind of government do we have,

which wants to dispossess us? We optimistically voted for them. But did we elect them to

sell our desh to a foreign company? We will not allow this to happen; we will not abide

by the government’s order and we will resist such a destructive plan. (PHU # 23)

A careful review of interview transcripts with community members/movement participants shows that one or more of the following issues (all related to livelihood and security) motivated them to join the anti-dispossession movement: loss of land, loss of community relations, stigma of refugees, loss of honour, prestige and social capital, and a lack of trust in the government’s commitment to pay compensation and resettle people with adequate resources. Items transcending local concerns appear as well: for example, the mine as plundering precious national resources and the corrupt nexus of a foreign mining company and national political elites. Concerns about indigenous peoples were also mentioned.

3.4.2 Political Agency of Subalterns: The Role of Organic Intellectuals

Social movement scholars agree that objective conditions or grievances are not enough to trigger collective action (Snow and Soule 2010). For Gramsci, the subjective process of grasping an objective condition and connecting it to the broader social and political world is a key issue in creating the political agency of subaltern actors. Sociologists who deploy political process theory emphasize this subjective process to understand the emergence of political agency. For example,

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McAdam (1982) uses the process of ‘cognitive liberation’ to question the dominant narrative/discourse of a particular problem.

During the formative phase of the Phulbari Andolon, two local organic intellectuals played a vital role in mobilizing subaltern communities. The first, AIB, was a political activist involved with peasant and farm labourers’ activism in the region. He was the regional coordinator of a peasant’s organization35 during the formative phase of the anti-mining movement. He was elected Chairman of the Phulbari sub-district in 2009; his contribution to the anti-mining movement played a key role in his victory. The other, RS, a member of an indigenous community (Adivasi), was a human rights activist working for the rights of marginalized indigenous peoples living in the northern region of Bangladesh. He was also the president of an indigenous people’s organization,36 nationally known for its activities for indigenous peoples.

Deeply immersed in everyday activities of their communities, they examined the politics of the extractive industry in the global South and the implications for their communities. Their counter- narratives challenged the corporate-friendly ‘development’ discourses of the political and bureaucratic elites. Both helped shape the critical consciousness of their community members; this, in turn, shaped their political agency and their participation. In the following two subsections I elaborate on the actions of these two activists that shaped the political consciousness of peasants and indigenous communities.

35 Jatiya Krishak Khetmajur Samity (JKKS), an affiliate of Jatiya Ganafront, a leftist political party. 36 Jatiya Adivasi Parishad (JAP).

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3.4.2.1 Peasant Politics and the Phulbari Andolon

Peasant politics in Phulbari region has a long history. During the British colonial period, the region was a centre of peasant movements. One well-known example is the Tebagha movement, organized by leftist political groups (Bose 1986; Dhanagare 1976; Sen 1972).37 During my fieldwork, many activists and community leaders talked about the glorious role of the political leaders who organized these movements. Given this history and the local pride in past protests, it is not surprising that the activities of a foreign mining company raised the suspicions of some political activists trained in Marxist politics who worked with peasants and labourers.

AIB was very curious about the mining company and its actions in the region. At the mass rally in Phulbari organized by JKKS, mentioned previously, AIB talked about the mining company and emphasized that the coalmine project would not ensure national interests. In a press briefing after the rally, he suggested that the mining company would plunder one of Bangladesh’s precious national resources (JKKS 2005). AIB viewed the activities of the mining company through a particular lens; his critical ideas emanated from his Marxist political ideology and his practical experience working with peasants and farm labourers in the region.

Based on his concerns, he wrote the first critique of the mining company and its activities in

Phulbari (see Bablu 2005). He came up with the idea of conducting a study to compare benefits and losses if the project went ahead. Using his social and political networks, he collected various

37 An account of this and other peasant movements is beyond the scope of this chapter.

102 documents of the mining company from different sources.38 A member of his political group got in touch with some company officials who supplied additional information without the knowledge of the mining company officials in Dhaka and Phulbari. His political comrades, some of whom hailed from Phulbari, met with a number of people in Dhaka who had expertise on mining projects to get more expert opinions on the mine. During this information gathering process, AIB realized that the mining company did not provide accurate information in its bulletins distributed in the region.39 AIB collected information, analyzed the potential losses and benefits of the coalmine, connected economy and politics to craft a movement agenda, and disseminated his analysis in the form of a pamphlet. This pamphlet (see Ganafront 2005) represented the first attempt to offer a counter-narrative opposing the mining company’s narrative of ‘development and economic growth’.

The pamphlet was distributed in the region to inform peasant communities about the dangers of the proposed coalmine. This happened very early in the community mobilization, and the pamphlet certainly worked as a guideline to mobilization. It vividly showed the huge loss of agricultural land and the annual production of a variety of crops over the period of the mine’s life

(more than 35 years). AECB had ignored this critical aspect of local economy in its feasibility studies (AECB 2006). Two expert committees commissioned by the Bangladeshi government later validated the claims made in AIB’s study (Bablu 2005).

38 The mining company did not have an information centre in Phulbari at that time (early 2005). Therefore, the only information is what the mining company publicized in several English-language bulletins. 39 One of them notes that information related to various studies the mining company had completed by that time was kept secret (PHU # 3). Two expert committees (2006, 2012) appointed by the Bangladeshi government later identified many loopholes in these studies.

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Another feature of this pamphlet was its presentation of the technical term ‘mining royalties’ in such a way that local communities could easily understand it. During my fieldwork, I observed that local community leaders used the language in this pamphlet when they talked about mining royalties. They equated the meager payment as ‘plundering our resources.’ They also translated it into ‘desh beche deya’ (selling the country’s resources to foreign companies). What is most striking about this pamphlet is that it framed the opposition to the mining company not only as an environmental disaster or large-scale dispossession and community breakdown, but also as a political program in the context of the role of multinational energy corporations in plundering mineral resources in the global South.

For AIB, the pamphlet changed people’s perceptions and motivated them to join the anti-mining movement. He suggests:

First it was a spontaneous outburst, which was later guided by a well-organized action

program based on a particular political perspective. It was not just spontaneous reaction;

it had an organizational structure. Our movement was developed in different phases by

creating the political consciousness of local people. The question of national interest was

a dominant theme. A sustained campaign among grassroots communities over a period of

more than a year helped build the strong organizational structure of the movement. This

is no longer an issue of the spontaneous reaction of local communities; the movement,

since then, is directed by a movement organization with strong logic and rationalities

against the mining company. (PHU # 3)

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AIB’s role was significant. His work provided the critical ingredients to articulate a movement agenda and culturally and politically resonant movement framings.40 He stepped in at an opportune time when there was a critical lack of information. In addition, many progressive political activists and sympathetic intellectuals were fiercely against any proposition to mobilize an anti-mining movement. They viewed foreign investment and the coalmine as significant for the development of a backward region in Bangladesh.41 AIB’s persistence proved them wrong.

He eventually emerged as one of the key leaders of the anti-mining movement. A grassroots activist who regularly interacted with AIB and worked very hard to disseminate his messages in rural communities says:

These [mineral] resources are our national wealth. According to Bangladesh’s

constitution, we, the people are the owner of these resources; these do not belong to any

individual or the government. Our government cannot sell it to a foreign company. This

is our country; this is our resources; The government cannot make a secret deal with

multinational companies, which also plundered mineral resources in many countries. Our

only choice is to organize a powerful movement against it. (PHU # 7)

40 The three key demands of the Andolon (three NOs) originated from AIB’s diagnosis of the problem. NCBD later adopted it and confronted the mining company and its allies at the national level (see NCBD 2005). 41 Interview with AIB in Phulbari (summer 2009). I have refrained from quoting this comment directly to avoid revealing the identity of people he was referring to.

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3.4.2.2 Indigenous People’s Rights and the Phulbari Andolon

RS was involved with indigenous rights. He articulated a particular meaning of the Phulbari coalmine and mobilized the grievances of Adivasis (indigenous peoples). As a member of an indigenous group (the Santal), the victims of deprivation and racial discrimination, RS dedicated his labour to organizing indigenous peoples to demand constitutional recognition and end discrimination. Through the activities of JAP, he advocated for the rights of indigenous peoples in the northern region of Bangladesh. Working with many like-minded national and international

NGOs and human rights groups, he became one of the leading voices representing various groups of indigenous peoples living in northern Bangladesh, commonly called plain-land Adivasi

(indigenous people). Through his participation in international forums, including the UN

Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples, he regularly interacted with community leaders from countries facing similar human rights violations. A key item on his agenda was to ensure the land rights of his people and protect them from dispossession.

Indigenous peoples are losing their lands in Bangladesh for several reasons. Recent studies

(Barkat 2009, 2018; Knight 2014, Soren et al. 2014, Kamal et al. 2006) point to land grabbing42 by Bengali Muslims. They use political networks and corrupt land administration system to take the lands of indigenous peoples.

42 The issue of land grabbing is rooted in the Partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. The India-Pakistan war in 1965 and the liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971 also contributed (Knight 2014). A detailed analysis of the political economy of land grabbing and violation of rights is beyond the scope of this chapter (see Soren et al. 2014; Knight 2014).

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When RS learned about the mining company and its project in Phulbari, he quickly realized the possible implications for indigenous peoples. He had seen firsthand how his people were being mistreated not only by majority Bengali Muslims but also by the officials of various government agencies. During our conversation, he highlighted that the lack of constitutional recognition of their political and cultural identity created a major impediment to organizing a collective political agency against land grabbing and other forms of human rights violations. Drawing on his vast experience, he said the planned coalmine would drive out indigenous peoples. They would lose their lands and their sole means of livelihood, i.e. working as farm labourers for

Bengali and non-Bengali people. In his view, the mine would make them an extinct species. The large-scale displacement and resettlement would destroy the solidarity of indigenous communities. They would be forced to migrate to different places and in the absence of a community and strong kinship bonds, they would vanish, RS explained to me. When I asked him about particular cases, he frequently mentioned cases of mining conflicts in South Asia,

Southeast Asia, and Latin America. He visited some mining areas in India to get first-hand knowledge of the situation of indigenous peoples. The following quotation is extracted from my long conversation with RS:

Although both Bengalis and Adivasis [indigenous peoples] will be displaced by the

mining company, our big concern is the fate of Adivasis. Where will they go? If we

migrate to another place, we will not get any land to make our living place. Bengali

Muslims will not sell their lands to us. I thought Adivasis of this area would be lost

forever. History tells us that mining projects mean dispossession, killing, and sexual

exploitation of Adivasis. … Once they are displaced from their specific region, they lose

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their identity. Displacement means annihilation of Adivasis. … This is not a mere lesson

from history. I have seen how these happened in different regions in India. I have visited

a few mining projects in India. This experience has helped me to envisage what will

happen in Phulbari if the mining company begins its project. I have realized that the

consequences [of mining activities] will be catastrophic. This has motivated us to

organize resistance to the mining company. A compensation package cannot offset the

loss that Adivasis will endure. (PHU # 38)

His worldview, shaped by his activism for the rights of indigenous peoples, pushed him to work out a plan to organize a movement against the mining company. Together with one of the most influential national indigenous peoples’ organizations (Bangladesh Adivasi Forum, BAF), he organized the 2006 mass rally in Phulbari. This protest event helped ignite indigenous communities’ opposition to the mining company. Several influential indigenous leaders, including the chairman of the Regional Council of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (also the president of BAF), spoke at the rally and urged the Bangladeshi government to stop the mining company.

Indigenous people’s protests were widely covered by national media outlets.43

Later RS organized a rally and human chain in Phulbari in June 2006. Indigenous peoples living in the mine zone participated. They declared a mass action to encircle AECB’s local office in

Phulbari. In collaboration with NCBD, RS and other indigenous peoples’ organizations also

43 Daily Star had a report on the front page: http://archive.thedailystar.net/2006/05/01/d60501011914.htm (accessed 15 March 2015).

108 organized a rally at the Central Shaheed Minar44 in Dhaka to draw the attention of the

Bangladeshi government and the mining company. They urged the government not to go ahead with the mining company plan as it would destroy indigenous peoples.

RS’s leadership role in mobilizing indigenous people sent a strong signal to the Bangladeshi government. This was indicated in a conversation between the Energy Adviser to the

Bangladeshi Prime Minister and the US Ambassador to Bangladesh. The US Ambassador met with the Bangladeshi official to ‘resolve several pressing issues’ such as ‘authorizing coal mining.’45 The Energy Adviser told the Ambassador that, ‘the proposed coal mine in Phulbari was politically sensitive, in light of the impoverished, historically oppressed tribal community

[Adivasis] residing on the land’46

RS’s role was significant for a particular reason. Although indigenous peoples would face specific challenges if the coalmine project went ahead, the leaders and activists involved with the anti-mining movement did not pay attention to their cause, possibly because of the small population or possibly because the leaders considered their fate was similar to the fate of others, mostly Bengali Muslims and non-Muslims. Right from the start, however, RS made it abundantly clear that the situation of indigenous peoples would be quite different from that of

Bengali Muslims and non-Muslims simply because of their social, economic, and political

44 The Central Shahid Minar, a monument to the martyrs of the Language Movement 1952, is an important public space, with ‘a special place in the heart of the city as well as in the hearts of the Bengalis.’ It is a symbol of ‘political protests and emancipation’ and ‘the emblem of democratic struggle’ (Khondker 2009:130). 45 The US Ambassador was concerned because AECB had 60 percent American investment. 46 US Embassy Dhaka. 29 July 2009. ‘Ambassador urges Prime Minister’s Adviser to accelerate energy sector development,’ available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09DHAKA741_a.html (accessed 15 January 2015).

109 marginalization. This lack of attention drove him to employ more aggressive tactics with more disruptive aims (e.g., encircling AECB’s office in Phulbari) to put indigenous peoples and the mining company in direct confrontation. This happened at a time when other activists were using conventional peaceful tactics like mass rallies, human chains, and weekly processions.47

Another key contribution of RS in shaping the agenda of the anti-mining movement was his challenge of the mining company’s demographic and anthropological studies. He forcefully argued that AECB highly underestimated the number of affected indigenous peoples. He consulted with local community leaders and estimated the number of indigenous peoples living in the mine zone. His estimates, although they cannot be verified from official sources, suggested the number would be 20 times more than AECB’s predictions (AECB 2006). My examination of recent census data48 partially supports RS’s view that AECB underreported indigenous people’s population size. He also confronted the findings of the anthropological study conducted by the mining company (see Mannan 2005). According to this study, indigenous peoples largely supported the coalmine and expressed satisfaction with AECB’s commitment to develop a culturally sensitive plan for the rehabilitation of indigenous peoples. RS considered these findings were manufactured evidence.49 An observation by an indigenous community leader supports RS’s view:

47 In the Bangladeshi context, political activists adopt aggressive tactics if their usage of conventional peaceful tactics fails to draw attention of its targets. 48 For the first time, the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics included a new category to identify indigenous people in the 2011 Household and Population Census. However, RS did not believe that census data were accurate. During an interview, he described how census enumerators erase the identity of indigenous peoples and merge it with other religious minority groups. 49 For a critical analysis of the role of anthropologists in mining conflicts, see Coumans (2011).

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The officials of AECB came to our village several times. They discussed many positive

aspects of the coalmine. They told us that our socio-economic situation would be

improved; it would be better than the present condition. They showed us the hope of

profit. We have always said, we won’t leave the land. As often as they came, we said the

same thing. (PHU # 13)

Ultimately, RS’s work (rally, human chain etc.) helped develop the critical consciousness of indigenous communities and made them a key force in any protest events in the region. His political tactics to bring leading members of the indigenous people’s movement in Bangladesh to

Phulbari and portray the mining company and the state as a serious threat to the livelihoods and security of indigenous peoples cemented their oppositional consciousness. Their colourful participation in the August 2006 events in huge numbers with cultural symbols gave evidence of such consciousness.

RS’s work was significant for another reason. There is a historical animosity between Bengali

Muslims and indigenous peoples. An activist of NCBDP suggested that in the beginning indigenous peoples did not want to take part in protest events because they believed that if there was any chaos or conflict with security forces, Bengali Muslim leaders and activists would leave them alone to face police brutality.50 The presence of RS and activists of his organization (JAP) guaranteed that their representatives were an integral part of the Andolon.

50 Interview with an activist of NCBDP who initiated contacts with several leaders of Adivasi communities.

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The above narrative of the role of two key activists (local organic intellectuals) shows that although mobilizing grievances, resources, organizations, and political opportunities are necessary conditions for social movements to emerge, the role of organic intellectuals is critical to articulate alternative ideas which will eventually serve as catalysts for political action.

Social movements emerge from the thoughtful articulation of grievances as a problem. AIB’s counter-narrative created the foundation of the three key demands of the Phulbari Andolon. His work encouraged others, including NCBD, to examine the narratives of AECB more closely.

More significantly, his political critique of AECB’s mining deal with the Bangladeshi government was validated by the junior Energy Minister who in March 2006 said the deal with the mining company failed to protect Bangladesh’s national interests.51 Meanwhile, RS’s political understanding of mining and dispossession of Adivasis and the historical context and growing marginalization of his communities in North Bengal forced him to think well ahead of others to critically examine the effects of coal mining on Adivasis. His critiques of AECB’s project forced the Bangladeshi government to acknowledge that the project was located on a site where marginalized Adivasis live, making it a politically sensitive issue.

A significant contribution of organic intellectuals is their connection of seemingly disparate issues. The Phulbari coalmine has been identified as an economic, cultural, ecological, and political problem. The economic problem was ownership of natural resources; the cultural problem was the symbolic meaning of place; the ecological question was the impact of coal mining on the natural environment; and the political problem was state sovereignty in the

51 ‘Phulbari: Energy Advisor Demands Punishment to Both AL, BNP Governments’, bdnews24.com, 13 March 2006.

112 neoliberal era. AIB’s training in Marxist politics and RS’s experience in activism in indigenous peoples’ issues pushed them to connect these disparate issues to articulate logical, meaningful, and politically and culturally resonant ideas to create new meanings of resource extraction and foreign investment in Bangladesh.

3.5 Discussion and Conclusion

The above narrative points to the dialectical nature of capitalists’ drive to uproot peasants to create new sites for accumulating capital. Marx and Harvey emphasize that the logics of capitalist development rationalize the enclosure of peasants’ lands to transform these resources into a vehicle of accumulation. In neoliberal development, the free flow of capital is enabled by neoliberal policies of deregulation and privatization, creating opportunities for extractive capital to implement ‘development’ projects, which dispossess people. In fact, in recent years,

‘development’ has become synonymous with accumulation by dispossession (see West 2016). In the Phulbari case, the commodification of land can be viewed as a capitalist strategy to increase corporate profits at the cost of the livelihood and security of thousands. Here and elsewhere, the market calculus of global capitalism undermines any social, cultural and political processes that may hinder capitalistic goals.

In the Phulbari Andolon, we can also read movement grievances through a Polanyian framework of the commodification of fictitious commodities. The commodification of land embodied in the development of a mine would lead to dispossession and pauperization. Many would join the

113 ranks of ‘new labour’ in a low-paid urban industrial sector, the exploitative global apparel industry. Meanwhile, wealthy investors from far flung places would accumulate more capital.

The whole process centres on turning a vast tract of land and its resources underneath into a high-priced commodity.

Scholars have meticulously documented that the commodification of land and natural resources, although a rational action in terms of the logics of the neoliberal economy, has devastating consequences for local communities, national economies, political structures, and the environment (see Kirsch 2014; Sassen 2014). Land has both tangible and intangible value. It represents the livelihood and security of peasant and indigenous communities, and its possible loss ignites rebellion. Set in this context, the Phulbari Andolon is a peasant uprising against the predatory practices of global extractive capital whose narrow economic view focuses on maximizing capital accumulation at the cost of cultural harmony.

Although a few in the peasant and indigenous communities may have been suspicious of the

Phulbari mine and what it might entail, it took the intervention of ‘organic intellectuals’ to trigger their political agency. In the chapter, I mention two of these. During the formative phase of the Phulbari Andolon, both were instrumental in challenging the discourse of development disseminated by the mining company and supported by government and business. These organic intellectuals were rooted in local/community activism; their experiences motivated them to diagnose the problem differently and construct the coalmine as an economic, political, and cultural problem.

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Oppositional consciousness is required if a social movement is to be effective. For this to happen, Mansbridge says activists ‘need an apparatus involving both reason and emotion [to create] an empowering mental state that prepares members of an oppressed group to act to undermine, reform, or overthrow a system of … domination’ (2001:4-5). The two organic intellectuals I discuss in this chapter were guided by both aspects. They combined logical analyses and political convictions with emotions that resonated culturally with the desires of local communities to define the problem, politicize the issue, identify enemies, and craft mobilization. They undermined the narrative of the mining company and inserted a different one.

The Phulbari Andolon was a high-profile contemporary anti-dispossession countermovement in

Bangladesh. In this case, the market logics of neoliberalism rationalized dispossession by arguing that mineral extraction would help regional development and spur national economic growth. Business and government stuck to narrow economic arguments and reiterated the corporate views of the mining company. The narrative of the state and the mining company became what Gramsci calls ‘common sense’ (1971:323), masking the ideology and social forces behind it. The counternarrative of the Phulbari Andolon, carefully articulated by organic intellectuals of local communities, challenged this common sense.

Although NCBD activists desire to see a change in ruling elites’ policy choices vis-à-vis the making of an alternative development paradigm, so far, this new political agenda remains a dream, as Bangladesh’s ruling elites show no sign of rejecting the neoliberal mantra. This failure notwithstanding, the achievements of the Phulbari Andolon are astounding. The Andolon put

115 enormous pressure on the Bangladeshi government to refuse a mining lease to AECB. It consistently resisted the government and the mining company. It forced government agencies to assess some contentious issues overlooked by the mining company. But the most significant achievement was the change in the attitudes of the political and bureaucratic elites. The following observation of the Prime Minister clearly indicates such change: ‘I cannot go for open- pit mining [at] the cost of food security and displacement of a large number of people.’ 52

Political and bureaucratic elites now realize that the livelihoods of farmers and food security are more critical than corporate profits in the name of ‘development.’

52 In a meeting with the officials of the Energy Ministry, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister (also Energy Minister) expressed this opinion (Daily Sun 2015, ‘PM says no to open-pit mining’, 10 April, p.16).

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CHAPTER 4

Privatizing Nature:

Resource Development and Nationalist Imaginaries in Bangladesh

Abstract

Contemporary scholarship on neoliberal globalization and counter-hegemonic movements tends to focus on the global dimension of political struggles. The role of nationalist imaginaries to mobilize grievances against neoliberal globalization receives little attention in this literature. Drawing on the case of NCBD, known for its radical anti-corporate movements in Bangladesh, I probe these ideas. NCBD strengthened and scaled up the anti-mining movement in Phulbari from the local to the national level. In this chapter, I am interested in how NCBD articulates its political imaginaries centering on nature, nation, and the state to achieve its movement agenda, more generally. I engage with critical globalization scholarship vis-à-vis the power of the state and the ability of countermovement to contest neoliberal global capitalism. Based on qualitative data derived from a set of interviews and movement relevant documents, I demonstrate the relevance of national context in mediating local and global questions for effective political mobilization. In short, NCBD articulates nationalist imaginaries to mobilize a political vision of the ‘national’ in an era of neoliberal globalism.

4.1 Introduction

Energy resources (oil, gas, coal) play an enormous role in nation-building projects. As national economies are increasingly being incorporated into global markets, and neoliberal policies are shaping the terms of this engagement, struggles over these resources have intensified. Civil

117 society groups frequently contest the policies favoured by the state and corporate capital and mobilize popular movements against them (see Gardner 2012; Kirsch 2014; Spronk and Webber

2007; Bebbington 2012). These groups articulate new meanings of ‘nation’ and ‘nature’ in the age of the ‘global.’. They seek to redefine resource development1 and offer a more complex understanding of national sovereignty and national interests (Kohl and Farthing 2012; Perreault and Valdivia 2010).

This chapter analyzes the political struggle to stop the privatization of resource development in

Bangladesh. It focuses on the activism of a civil society group, the National Committee to

Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power and Port (NCBD).2 NCBD was a key partner of the anti-mining movement in Phulbari, strengthening and scaling up the movement from the local to the national level. Its oppositional discourses broadened the scope of the movement by mediating the local and the global and articulating nationalist imaginaries to resist neoliberal globalization manifested in the nexus of the state and global extractive capital. In this chapter, I am interested in how NCBD articulates its political imaginaries centering on nature, nation, and state to achieve its movement agenda more generally. I engage with critical globalization scholarship vis-à-vis the power of the state and the possibility of countermovement3 to contest and resist the

‘market fundamentalism’4 of neoliberal global capitalism.

1 In this chapter ‘resource development’ refers to the extraction of petroleum and mineral resources. 2 See appendix-3: NCBD’s Manifesto. 3 I use countermovement and counter-hegemonic movement interchangeably. 4 I borrow this phrase from Evans and Sewell (2013:37).

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Contemporary scholarship on neoliberal globalization and counter-hegemonic movements tends to focus on the global dimension of political struggles and emphasizes the role of global civil society (Castells 2008; Evans 2000, 2008; Falk 1998; Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004; Lipschutz

1992; Kaldor 2003). Some scholars argue the emergence of cosmopolitan global democracy is an effective strategy to resist the unintended consequences of neoliberal globalization (Archibugi et al. 1998; Beck 2005, 2006; Held 1998; Smith 2008, Falk 1999, 1995). Others say nationalist political imaginaries have been transformed into global imaginaries. They emphasize the emergence of new ideational formations assembled around the global (Steger, Goodman and

Wilson 2012; Steger and Wilson 2012; Steger 2008). They consider the possibility of emancipatory politics at the level of global rather than national. Yet the approach underestimates the role of progressive politics within a nation-state. Nationalist imaginaries used to mobilize grievances against neoliberal globalization receive little attention in this literature (Johnston and

Laxer 2003; Laxer and Halperin 2003; Laxer 2003; also see Calhoun 2002, 2003, 2007;

Goodman and James 2007). I draw on the conflict over Bangladesh’s national coal policy and

NCBD’s role in it to contribute to engage with this literature. I ask why the ‘national’ is a critical site of political struggle against corporate globalization. How does NCBD articulate its mobilization discourses to rationalize its ‘nationalist’ rhetoric to strengthen a countermovement against the nexus of the state and corporate capital?

The analysis demonstrates the relevance of the national context for progressive political struggles confronting neoliberal globalization. Bangladesh’s peripheral location in the globalized economy and its dependent form of development suggest that national-level factors mediate the local and the global in the creation of counter-hegemonic discourses. Scholars argue that nationalist

119 imagination is often a key mobilizing force in struggles against neoliberal globalization (see

Johnston and Laxer 2003; Laxer and Halperin 2003). Building on this argument, I engage with those who claim that in an era of globalization, national-level politics is no longer effective. I disagree with these analysts. I suggest that the state, nation, and nationalism play a critical role in organizing successful counter-hegemonic movements. I show how NCBD emphasizes ‘national’ issues to mediate the conflict between the global and the local, one example of which was the

Phulbari movement, by articulating new political imaginaries (i.e., nationalist rhetoric). In so doing, it mobilizes a political vision of the ‘national’ in the era of neoliberal globalism.

The rest of the chapter is organized into five sections. It begins with an overview of the scholarly debate on neoliberal globalization, nation-state, and countermovement. This is followed by a brief note on method and data utilized here. Section three explains the emergence of NCBD as a countermovement challenging the nexus of the state and corporate capital in resource development. Sections four and five contain empirical evidence on two interrelated aspects:

NCBD’s engagement with the making of Bangladesh’s national coal policy and NCBD’s discourses vis-à-vis nationalist imaginaries on resource development. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the main finding: the relevance of national context in mediating local and global questions for effective political mobilization. It demonstrates that NCBD articulates nationalist imaginaries to mobilize a political vision of the ‘national’ in an era of neoliberal globalism.

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4.2 Neoliberal Globalization, Nation-State, and Countermovement

Contemporary scholarship on political struggles against neoliberal globalization5 tends to focus on the global dimension of countermovement rather than on the actual fight happening at the national level where actions of powerful actors representing structural forces of global capitalism are grounded (Smith 2008). Interestingly, neoliberal globalization serves a double purpose: on the one hand, it advances the interests of transnational capital, and on the other hand, it creates conditions for the emergence of counter-hegemonic anti-systemic movements challenging the desires of transnational capital and its allies (Sklair 2001; Carroll 2010; Evans 2008).

Some globalization theorists emphasize the power of global civil society (GCS) to mobilize counter-hegemonic struggles against global capital and its driving forces, such as various global governance institutions (see Anheier et al. 2001; Kaldor et al. 2003; Kaldor 2003). GCS is viewed as a central actor in bringing together oppositional forces to launch coordinated countermovement against states and global forces. As Keane argues, GCS refers to ‘all those parts of life that are not the state… it is a synonym for everything that exists outside of and beyond the reach of the territorial state and other institutions of governance’ (2003:9, emphasis original). Scholarship on GCS tends to circumvent state-centred activism because some theorists think the market logics of neoliberal globalization (‘globalization-from-above’) have instrumentalized nation-states to implement a set of policies: privatization, free-trade, fiscal

5 Neoliberal globalization is conceptualized here as ‘a new mode of capital regulation supporting the free [world- wide] movement of capital. Its prescriptions include dismantling national economic sovereignty over foreign ownership, investment and exchange; privatizing public enterprises and deregulating businesses; reducing public expenditures, balancing budgets, and lowering corporate taxes’ (Johnston 2003:86).

121 austerity, and competitiveness (Falk 1998:105). Therefore, GCS (or ‘globalization-from-below’) is ‘a vehicle for the transnational promotion of substantive democracy as counter-weight to neoliberalism’ (Falk 1998:108). According to Kaldor, GCS aims for global rule of law, global justice and global empowerment; the goal is to civilize or democratize globalization (2003:8).

Beck (2005) highlights the significance of a new politics away from the nation-state and argues that a culture of globality, globalized modernization, and global problems (e.g. manufactured risks) has become a tangible foundation of social life, and the nation-state as a frame of reference is not equipped to deal with the issue. Beck’s diagnosis suggests that nation-state based international politics has been replaced by a more complex ‘subpolitical and global political meta-power game’ (2005:6). In a similar vein, Archibugi (2000) and Held (1995), known for their theories of cosmopolitan democracy, contend that the nation-state and the nation-state system cannot handle current problems; they urge the development of a new flexible framework based on the rights of the global citizen, freed from territorial restrictions.

As clear from above arguments, some scholars suggest the end of the nation-state ushered in the advent of a post-national world (also see Appadurai 1996; Benhabib 2009). Other scholars consider this claim is an exaggeration; sovereign states, they say, exercise considerable power to nurture and guide neoliberal transformation (see Sassen 2006, Aronowitz 2003; James 2002).

Contrary to the widely held perspective that the state has a reduced role in the neoliberal era,

Harvey (2009:56) argues that neoliberalism is strengthened by the state’s engagement. Klein

(2007) persuasively shows that in the postcolonial world, the state is a critical agent in shaping the nexus between global institutions and corporate power. Piven (2009:299) is dissatisfied with

122 the claims of scholars who celebrate autonomous local participatory actions6 to ‘disarticulate’ the state (Dawson 2009; Menser 2009). Goodman and James make this argument quite clear: ‘In relation to the present, nation-states continue to be relevant. With all the changes, they continue to be the dominant form of community-polity in the world today, making compatriots out of abstract strangers and drawing people into uneven but still powerful frames of ambiguous solidarity’ (2007:1).

The GCS theorization of the political possibility of countermovement in the era of neoliberal globalism has been criticized by scholars on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Tarrow

(2005) contends GCS scholars fail to adequately address the relationship between states and international institutions: ‘Sustaining collective action across borders on the part of people who seldom see one another and who lack embedded relations of trust is difficult. [Moreover], the repertoires of contention grow out of and lodged in local and national context’ (Tarrow 2005:7, emphasis added). Neo-Gramscian scholarship on counter-hegemonic struggles draws our attention to the political nature of GCS and suggests that movements organized by dominant

GCS groups often work to support ‘the dominance of capital in national politics, in international relations, in global governance and in mass communications’ (Carroll 2010:206). In a similar vein, Ford cautions that although GCS is ‘a terrain for both legitimizing and challenging global governance’ (2003:129), it works within a particular framework in which specific structural and discursive forces shape movement agenda. Therefore, GCS movements may contribute to

‘reproducing rather than challenging’ the global hegemony of corporate capital (ibid). Conway

6 Such as participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, struggles against water privatization in Bolivia, workplace takeovers in Argentina, the Landless Workers Movement in Brazil, and Via Campesina.

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(2013:67-69) also sees the limits of GCS movements as a path toward emancipatory politics challenging neoliberal globalism.

Globalization theorists who advocate for GCS-based politics tend to downplay the role of nation and nationalism in galvanizing counter-hegemonic political imaginaries, but these are critical elements of a growing number of social movements fighting neoliberal globalization. Calhoun argues that GCS scholars underestimate the values and privileges of nation and nationalism as categories of identity and politics (2003, 2007). For Calhoun, ‘nation [as an abstract category is] a helpful mediation between the local and the global. ... this is one crucial reason why nationalism is unlikely to disappear any time soon. Globalization, where it occurs, is likely to call forth new and different nationalisms and more generally politics of identity’ (2007:100).

Such scholarship tends to emphasize a binary context, globalization versus localization, and this,

Calhoun suggests, ‘neglects the importance of states as arenas for democratic struggles, and agents for contesting an economic power which has not ceased to be centralized as it has become global’ (2007:100). The state, nationalism, and the discourses of nationalist imaginary will remain central issues in our globalized world.

Theoretically grounded empirical research on the key claims of GCS and cosmopolitan democracy scholarship supports Calhoun’s critique. For example, Johnston’s analysis of

Zapatismo, the transnational network engaged with Zapatista rebels in Chiapas, Mexico shows that ‘actually existing solidarity’, at least in this case, does not possess the cohesiveness and extensiveness implied by such notions as ‘global civil society’ or ‘transnational social movements’ (2003:85). She emphasizes the material impacts of neoliberal policies in Chiapas’

124 political economy and shows that these policies affected local subsistence agriculture to promote

‘capital-intensive commodity production at the expense of local, democratic control over land and other resources’ (ibid: 87). The Zapatista movement was grounded on this local/national political economy. She contends that although Zapatista rebels contested neoliberal globalism, they saw the state as ‘necessary for creating conditions for socio-economic equity and self- determination’ and their vision was to have ‘a state that is democratic and responsive to citizens’

(2003:87).

Considering these theoretical and empirical critiques of GCS-based globalization theories, Laxer and Halperin ask two pertinent questions: where should resistance be focused and where does political action work best in opposing globalism? Instead of fighting at the global level, they say

‘strong efforts at national and local levels’ can produce significant results, while cross-border solidarities depend on ‘the ability of nationally and locally mobilized forces to forge links with similarly mobilized forces abroad’ (Laxer and Halperin 2003:15). Similarly, Smith suggests that although alter-globalization movements target global political agents (e.g., Bretton Woods

Institutions and multinational corporations) to contest the globalization of economic power, ‘the state in its national incarnation’ remains a critical target of these movements at both local and global scales (Smith 2009:9). Movements rooted in local and national contexts can establish

‘strong cords of political connectedness’ to mobilize against neoliberal globalization (Ratner

2010:275). Drawing on Benedict Anderson’s seminal work (2006), Campbell and Hall (2015) argue that even in the era of globalization and cosmopolitan hype, the nation-state is still a place, which provides its citizens a sense of belonging. For them, nationalism (or nationalist imaginaries) is a significant source of state-centred political struggle. Johnston and Laxer

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(2003:41), therefore, encourage scholars to examine two neglected dimensions of political struggles against neoliberal globalization: ‘the value of nationalism in resistance to globalism’ and ‘the targeting of national governments by transnational movements’ (Johnston and Laxer

2003: 41). They argue that states, nations, and nationalism are critical elements of processes and agents of movements that challenge neoliberal globalism. They use solid empirical evidence to validate Calhoun’s (2007) contention that nationally-rooted movements build a strong sense of national identities that connect the global and local. In doing so, they reject the tendency to adopt a narrow focus on either localism or cosmopolitan globalism (2003:78).

Drawing on this scholarly debate, in this chapter, I explore two key aspects of political resistance to neoliberal global capitalism: movement site and movement imaginary. Across three different movement sites (global, national, and local), think globally and act locally is a popular vision of many civil society groups (Saul 2006). Notwithstanding the sporadic successes of these movements, Harvey (2005) is cautious about celebrating their victory. For him, a locally rooted political vision cannot move forward to achieve broader political objectives. By the same token,

Saul (2006) cautions us not to become fascinated with the global-local binary. He draws attention to movement imaginaries. An imaginary is a strategic political frame used to articulate movement discourses and attract popular support from a wider population. An effective resistance requires two interrelated frames (imaginaries). The first is a democratic imaginary.

The goal is the democratization of public policymaking to achieve accountability. The democratic imaginary aims to build a solid foundation for a countermovement, but it will not achieve much unless it is coupled with the second imaginary—a nationalist imaginary, which advocates for greater state control to counteract the power and authority of global capital.

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4.3 Method and Data

This chapter is based on qualitative data derived from a set of in-depth interviews and various relevant documents. During summer 2013, I interviewed a group of NCBD activists. NCBD’s members include left-wing political parties, academics, retired bureaucrats, and cultural and political activists. I recruited participants from each of these categories and conducted 32 interviews.7

To begin the interview process, I made a list of political parties who were members of NCBD and of the representatives of each party who were members of NCBD’s central governing body

(National Council). I asked a senior leader of each political party to participate in my research and ensured that the participant was an active member of NCBD’s central governing body. I also included members who did not represent any political party but were members of the central governing body. I interviewed 11 members, including both party and non-party members.

Based on a careful reading of newspapers reports on NCBD’s activism, I prepared a list of cultural and political activists, academics, and retired bureaucrats who regularly participated in

NCBD’s programs. After preliminary discussions with several activists at the start of my work, I used a standard qualitative sampling technique – snowballing process – and derived a list of potential participants. I conducted 21 interviews; of these, 17 were with NCBD activists involved

7 To maintain anonymity, I use numerical codes (i.e., DHA Interview # 1, 2, 3) when giving quotations or referring to evidence taken from these interviews.

127 with various Dhaka-based cultural and political groups. The rest of the interviews were with academics and retired bureaucrats.

I used an open-ended interview guide to conduct the interviews. The guide included various issues, such as the background and the formation of NCBD, its engagement with the anti-mining movement in Phulbari, its broader movement agenda and tactics, outcomes and challenges of the movement, and participants’ views on several contentious issues, such as the role of foreign investment and international financial institutions, policymaking processes in the resource development sector, the integration of peripheral countries (e.g., Bangladesh) into the global economy and the protection of national interests, the role of the state, and the efficacy of political movements at the national level in an era of neoliberal global capitalism.

In addition to these interviews, I gathered evidence from a set of documents. These included: a) pamphlets and other movement-related literature of NCBD; b) newspaper reports on NCBD’s programs and resource development; and c) legal and policy documents of various government agencies. I collected these documents from various sources: the central office of NCBD, the archives of Dhaka University’s Central Library, and the Bangladesh Government Press archive.

4.4 The Emergence of NCBD as a Countermovement: Background and Key Demands

NCBD emerged as a civil society group opposing the neoliberal transformation of Bangladesh’s energy policies and aiming to persuade the state to safeguard ‘national interests’ in a changing global and national economic context. This transformation began in the 1980s, when the World

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Bank financed several projects to improve the technical and institutional capacity of the state- owned energy company and its various agencies. Among its projects was the first comprehensive study of the energy sector in Bangladesh in 1982; the study recommended a specific plan of action for investments and program planning. A key recommendation was to engage foreign private capital and create an export-oriented policy (World Bank 1982, 1999). Between 1983 and

1990, the World Bank financed technical support programs to facilitate the government’s efforts to engage foreign corporations in oil and gas exploration. It also aimed to reform the existing legal and policy framework which assigned exclusive rights of oil and gas exploration to the state. In the Bank’s view, the framework needed review and revision if foreign corporations were to be engaged (World Bank 1991). Eventually, the visionary policy of national ownership, adopted in 1974-1975, was abandoned, and market-oriented corporate-friendly policies were adopted to fulfill the conditions of Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs). One of the significant projects was the Petroleum Exploration Promotion Program (PEPP) funded by the World Bank

‘to design and implement a program that would open up hydrocarbon exploration of the geologically prospective areas of countries … and to establish the pre-conditions necessary to promote the interests of the international oil companies in the exploration and development of petroleum resources of such areas’ (Oduolowu 1992:4). Another Bank-funded project, Energy

Sector Adjustment Credit, was implemented between 1989 and 1990 to assist the Bangladeshi government in reforming its energy policies and strengthening its institutions in the energy sector

(World Bank 1992a). Finally, the Bank recommended dismantling the state-owned exploration company and other similar agencies to pave the way for privatization (World Bank 1992b).

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Following the Bank’s recommendations, the Bangladeshi government brought in a new economic policy regime in the early 1990s to create a favourable business environment for foreign corporations. New investment and industrial policies were introduced to increase the role of market forces, most notably to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) in various sectors

(World Bank 1993, 1995). The energy sector gained new momentum when several multinational corporations expressed an interest in doing business in Bangladesh. The Bangladeshi government formulated a national petroleum policy (1993) and national energy policy (1996) to create a policy framework for resource development. A key objective was to increase private sector participation (see Islam 2001). This was a major shift in national policy framework: 20 years earlier, in 1974-1975, Bangladesh had nationalized oil and gas exploration enterprises and bought five gas fields from a multinational company, Shell, to protect national interests and ensure the long-term energy security of the country (see Imam 2013). Although a state-owned petroleum and mineral exploration and development company, Petrobangla, continued to discover and develop gas fields, the new policy favoured foreign corporations.

Two critical events in 1997 led to NCBD’s activism. First, a massive blowout occurred in a gas field operated by an American company, Occidental Petroleum Corporation. Second, another

American company, Unocal Corporation was pushing for a deal to develop a gas field discovered by the state-owned company. In this case, the goal was to create the necessary infrastructure to export natural gas to India. These two events grabbed the attention of left-wing political parties and progressive students’ organizations at Dhaka University.8 Veteran left politicians urged the government to protect national interests when allowing foreign investments in oil and gas

8 These student’s organizations formed a group called Tel-gas lunthon protirodh procar cell to support anti- corporate mobilization.

130 exploration projects (Shaptahik Ekota 1998a). They organized a national convention,

‘Bangladesh’s Oil and Gas Resources and National Interest,’ in Dhaka on 18 August 1998

(Shaheedullah 2002). In his keynote presentation, Professor M. M. Akash of Dhaka University explained how production sharing contracts signed with IOCs would fail to maximize national interests. He argued that the terms and conditions favoured foreign corporations, and the deals would damage the national petroleum exploration company (Akash 1998). Convention participants demanded that the government refrain from signing any deal going against

Bangladesh’s national interests. They urged it to formulate a national policy and national plan of action (Shaptahik Ekota 1998b). The outcome of the convention was the formation of NCBD in

December 1998.

Broadly speaking, NCBD targets neoliberal energy policies as a vehicle to articulate nationalist imaginaries vis-à-vis mineral resources (nature and nation). Its manifesto (Ghoshona o paricalona nitimala) sums up its main demands:

I) Mineral resources of Bangladesh belong to the people of the country. Hence, for any

kind of development of these resources, 100 percent ownership of the people over these

resources has to be guaranteed. II) The objective of extraction and development of these

mineral resources will be to ensure its best use in the productive sector for dynamic

economic growth. III) Since these resources are limited and non-renewable, export of

these resources, in any form, cannot be allowed. IV) Existing national institutions have to

be strengthened to increase their capability to undertake resource exploration and

development programs. Effective steps have to be taken to develop necessary skilled

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human resources and experts. V) Extraction and development of mineral resources have

to be done without destroying environment, lands, and livelihoods. VI) A comprehensive

energy policy has to be formulated in alignment with these demands. Necessary laws

must be enacted to implement this policy (NCBD 2009).

Generally speaking, NCBD wants the state to play a more active and pragmatic role in a changing economic context, whereby globally peripheral countries like Bangladesh are being integrated into the global capitalist system. Instead of making policies institutionalizing the role of foreign corporate capital in resource development, they urge the state to assume a central role, managing the country’s strategic resources by strengthening the institutional capabilities of national organizations (i.e., state-owned resource development entities). The realization of these demands, NCBD argues, would maximize the benefits of petroleum and mineral resources.

Under current corporate-friendly arrangements, they claim, multinational companies take the major share of precious resources. While proponents of neoliberal globalization (e.g., BWIs, policymakers, business elites) advocate for more pro-market transformations and the reduced role of the state, NCBD calls for the state to balance corporate and national interests (DHA

Interview # 1, 2).

Many argue that in the neoliberal era, the state has lost its power to corporate capital (Appadurai

1996; Hardt and Negri 2000), but NCBD’s movement agenda, as evident in the above demands, articulates a different political vision, re-establishing the centrality of the nation-state to advance a ‘pro-people’ political agenda. It reimagines the power of the state to materialize those demands.

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Even though globalizers9 have weakened the state and altered its legal and policy framework, in the view of NCBD, it remains (or could become) a powerful entity. To resist neoliberal globalization, progressive politics should not abandon the state but push for changes through popular mobilizations to establish a sustainable path of nationally-based economic growth.

4.5 NCBD’s Role in the Making of National Coal Policy (2005-2015)

As mentioned above, nationalist rhetoric is a significant aspect of NCBD’s movement agenda. In this section, I explain how NCBD engaged with the making of Bangladesh’s national coal policy from 2005 to 2015 to establish the rationale of its nationalist imaginary.

When NCBD began its mobilization against the Phulbari coal mine in 2005, it framed the contract with AECB as a deal that marginalized Bangladesh’s national interests (NCBD 2005). It said the contract violated existing mineral law and rules.10 According to the Mines and Mineral

Rules 1968 (amended 1989), the royalty rate for coal development should be 20 percent (GOB

1989:9373). Yet the government signed a contract with an Australian mining company, BHP, on

9 I borrow this phrase from Woods (2006). 10 These are the Mines and Mineral Resources (Control and Development) Act 1992, and the Mines and Mineral Rules 1968 (amended 1989). The latter was recently replaced by the Mines and Mineral Rules 2012.

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20 August 1994 (AECB took over from BHP in 1998) to grant it a prospecting license and mining lease for Phulbari coal mine at a significantly lower royalty rate.11

NCBD’s mobilization drew the attention of government officials. The adviser to the Energy

Ministry (a junior minister) instructed his officials to review the existing licensing rules and royalty rates for coal mining (New Age 2005).12 A senior official informed local media that a new coal policy was required to secure national interests when engaging foreign mining corporations in resource development (Daily Star 2005). Several months later, the same adviser revealed that the contract with the mining company (BHP/AECB) did not do so (Daily Star

2006). In effect, the government and NCBD agreed on a critical issue: the existing rules for mineral development were not enough to safeguard the ‘national interests’ of a state if the government was desperate to attract foreign investments.

Against this backdrop of the necessity to review relevant rules, the Energy Ministry began to prepare a national coal policy in August 2005. A state-owned consulting company, Infrastructure

Investment Facilitation Centre (IIFC) was hired to formulate the policy.13 IIFC presented its first version in December 2005. It recommended keeping a low royalty rate as per the existing mine

11 Clause 5 of this contract says the mining company will pay ‘royalty at the rate of six (6%) percent’ (cited in Rahman 2008:15). 12 Although the Mines and Mineral Rules 1968 (amended 1989) was further amended in 1995 to lower the royalty rate (six percent for open pit coal mining), no one raised any questions until 2005. Besides the critiques of NCBD and others opposing the Phulbari coal mine, the Energy Ministry became interested in the issue because two foreign companies wanted to develop coal resources in Bangladesh. Increasing the royalty rate would certainly help the government gain more, should these resource development projects move ahead. 13 The Bangladeshi government created IIFC with the financial and technical support of the World Bank and other western development agencies in 2000 to promote and facilitate private sector participation in the infrastructure sector (Islam 2003).

134 and mineral rules.14 It further recommended that the potential international investor should decide on the mining method considering economic viability and competitive energy markets, and that the investor should be allowed to export coal. Finally, it said the two largest coal fields should be developed by foreign mining corporations using open pit mining (GOB 2005:26).

Not surprisingly, NCBD argued that the proposed policy was biased towards foreign corporate interests. This view was echoed by several energy experts. They had two main objections. First, the IIFC recommendations incorporated the choices of the foreign mining corporations interested in developing coal mines. Second, the IIFC recommended export of minerals without paying serious attention to domestic demand, keeping pace with increasing economic growth, or long- term national interests (Kamal 2006; Islam 2010a).

The Energy Ministry prepared a revised version of the policy by the end of 2006. This revision recommended a variable royalty rate (instead of a fixed one) and stricter environmental guidelines (Khan 2006a). The low royalty rate (six percent) would be applicable if a mining company sold coal only in the local market. If it wanted to export coal, the royalty rate would be increased, with a rate determined by a formula based on the export value of coal. In other words, instead of a fixed royalty rate, the policy proposed a variable royalty rate that depended on the market for the coal (local or foreign). It also said about 40 percent of coal must be left for domestic use. The mining company opposed these recommendations and suggested it would

14 The Energy Ministry made a major amendment of the Mines and Mineral Rules 1968 in 1995 and introduced a new royalty rate for coal exploration depending on the mining method. In the amendment, the royalty rate is six percent for open-pit mining and five percent for underground mining (GOB 1995:4544 E). Subsequent amendments in 1999 and 2004 kept the royalty rate unchanged (GOB 1999, 2004).

135 create obstacles to foreign investors interested in coal development in Bangladesh (Khan 2006b; bdnews24 2006).

AECB’s opposition and NCBD’s unwillingness to accept the recommended policy moved the

Energy Ministry to form a technical advisory committee in June 2007 to review the proposed policy and make recommendations. The committee consulted various stakeholders, including local communities in Northern Bangladesh (where all coal fields are located) (GOB 2007b). It recommended establishing a public sector coal development company (Coal-Bangla). Coal-

Bangla would undertake coal development and engage foreign mining corporations, if necessary, through a joint venture project. The export of coal, it said, could be considered after ensuring national energy security for 50 years. The committee recommended enacting a new law on land reclamation after the completion of mining operations to return lands to their owners. Instead of a fixed royalty rate, it proposed that a coal sector development committee would fix the royalty rate based on a number of factors, such as the cost of coal production, the price of coal in the international market, or the unit cost of coal-based electricity. Since Bangladesh had no experience of open pit mining, the committee suggested that a small-scale open pit mine could be built in the northern part of Barapukuria coal mine to measure the hydrological and environmental effects of this type of mining. If the results were satisfactory, the government could allow open pit mining on a commercial basis (GOB 2007b).

Many energy experts praised the work of the committee because it considered the views of a wide range of stakeholders, consulted with local communities, and recommended a comprehensive national coal policy (Imam 2008; Khalequzzaman 2010). Even so, NCBD did not

136 accept it. They demanded that the coal policy must prohibit open pit mining and any export of mineral resources. They also opposed the participation of foreign mining corporations. They emphasized that Bangladesh was heavily dependent on natural gas for its energy consumption.

There would be a gas supply crisis in the near future, they said, and coal would be the only available primary energy. Therefore, coal resources should not be made available to foreign corporations whose goal would be to extract as much as possible and maximize profits (NCBD

2007).

In 2009, the Energy Ministry took a fresh initiative to finalize the coal policy. It invited a panel of non-resident Bangladeshi energy experts to propose a suitable coal policy and mining option.

The panel recommended ensuring the long-term energy security of the country, strengthening legal and institutional frameworks to deal with a variety of environmental issues, creating an environmental watchdog to ensure the transparency and accountability of mining corporations, analyzing specific geological, environmental, and socio-economic aspects before selecting a mining method, and considering resettlement and rehabilitation issues (See Khalequzzaman

2010). Based on these recommendations, the Energy Ministry released a new coal policy in

October 2010 and invited public opinions (GOB 2010).

NCBD provided an extensive critique of the proposed policy and outlined an alternative one.

For NCBD, it was not acceptable because it favoured corporate interests over national interests.

NCBD also rejected the policy because it failed to consider the key issues laid out in a

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between NCBD and the government in August

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2006.15 NCBD said resource development must be fully controlled by the state to ensure maximum utilization of resources for its people. According to NCBD, enacting a new law to prohibit the export of any mineral resource was required to prevent resource plunder (NCBD

2010). 16 NCBD’s resource nationalist position is vividly expressed in the following statement:

‘Clearly, this [proposed] policy has been created in favour of the interests of multinational companies and against the interests of the people of Bangladesh … For all energy resources including coal, full ownership and authority of the state must be maintained.’17

NCBD’s resource nationalist demand was supported by an eminent energy expert (Islam 2010b), who argued that the Bangladeshi government should play a greater role in coal development instead of encouraging the participation of foreign mining corporations. He noted that India had nationalized coal development in 1973, and about 95 percent of its coal was now developed under public sector management.

Moving beyond resource nationalist rhetoric, an NCBD activist raises fundamental questions about capitalist logics of resource development that put profit before the well-being of nature and humans. Using coal development as an illustration, he urges a radical rethinking of development discourses:

Those who represent capital around the world, profits are their main concern … They

destroy the nature for profit in such a manner that endangers the lives of hundreds of

15 In the MOU, the government agreed not to allow open pit mining in Bangladesh. 16 As of the time of writing (August 2018), the Ministry has not published the final version of the policy. 17 This quotation is taken from NCBD’s critique of the proposed Bangladesh Coal Policy 2010.

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thousands of people. The destruction of nature means the destruction of human beings’

survival. If we consider ‘development’ from the perspective of ‘human well-being,’ it

will alter the dominant paradigm of development. We have to articulate a new discourse.

We have seen the expression of capital. We have seen how it works. Now, the task is to

organize social movements … against the predatory capital. The goal is to create new

vocabularies for the people, which will transform the dominant view and create a new

perspective of development. This requires new thinking, praxis, and organized

movements.18

The above narrative of the making of the national coal policy points to the centrality of the

‘national’ question, with a conflict between two competing interests—corporate interests and national interests. On the one hand, the mining company hoping to develop the Phulbari mine has resisted progressive changes in national coal policy because these changes will affect its investment plans. On the other hand, NCBD and others have mobilized against any corporate- friendly coal policy.

4.6 NCBD’s Resistance to Neoliberal Globalization: Movement Site and Political Imaginaries

In this section, I focus on two aspects of countermovement against neoliberal globalization: the movement site (global versus national) and the use of persuasive political imaginaries to

18 This quotation is taken from Phulabaṛi debo na, a documentary made by a PAN member.

139 mobilize popular support. More specifically, I shift my attention to NCBD activists to uncover how they articulate discourses on nature (i.e., petroleum and mineral resources) and nation vis-à- vis these two parameters to mobilize a countermovement against neoliberal corporate globalization (i.e., foreign capital and globalized extractive industry). Their ideas are helpful to engage with the theoretical perspectives of critical globalization scholarship discussed earlier.

4.6.1 Movement Site

As mentioned in the literature section, many globalization theorists argue that the nation-state and its sovereignty are in crisis; both global capital and various global institutional mechanisms have undermined its efficacy and relevance. NCBD activists acknowledge this changing context.

However, they suggest that, far from losing its relevance, the nation (and the state) can assert its power against global capital and its internal and external allies. An activist explains:

As long as imperialism is present as an integral part of a globalized market, an oppressed

community is also present as a nation and nation-state. Communities living within a

sovereign political boundary can claim general and specific interests of their people.

These interests are intertwined with their democratic aspirations of a nation-state. If we

consider these aspirations as a collective national consciousness to assert national

interest, we will see that this is very much vibrant and relevant in many societies in the

world. (DHA Interview # 3)

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In these comments, the NCBD activist clearly emphasizes the significance of the nation-state to address the ramifications of neoliberal globalization entangled with the politics of imperialism.

The state has the power (both institutional and organizational) to address grievances, and it is the responsibility of the state to uphold its national interests while engaging with supranational forces. Therefore, for NCBD activists, the state is the centre and target of its alter-globalization countermovement. Another activist says:

The state takes the full responsibility to implement the agenda of global corporate capital.

It reforms its policies to safeguard corporate interests. When we protest against the

mining company [AECB], the state applies repressive measures to protect corporate

interests. Therefore, we must fight against the state. Without facing the state, we cannot

fight against global corporate capital. (DHA Interview # 2)

State-centred countermovement at the national level is not only aimed at confronting global capital and its neoliberal policy agenda. NCBD activists feel the necessity to confront the state for another significant reason. Each state has a unique socio-economic and political context.

Therefore, its integration into the global capitalism system has context-specific outcomes requiring state intervention. As the following comment emphasizes, the most significant context is the class structure, as it mediates the outcome of a state’s integration into the global capitalist system:

There is still national territorial boundary of each sovereign state. Every state has its own

legal and institutional structures. It has specific social and economic policy framework. It

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has its own security forces. It has visible existence despite enormous power of global

capital, metropolitan states, and global institutions. To achieve our goals, we have to deal

with these [forces] at the national level. To make tangible changes in the nature [and

functions] of the state in the neoliberal era, we have to achieve a lot at the national level.

Each society has specific cultural traits [which shape its class structure and state-society

relations]. We must take into account these issues. … A global movement is unable to

pay attention to these issues. It is unable to fight against the state and local ruling elites

who play the decisive role. (DHA Interview # 5)

To this, another activist adds: ‘The bourgeois political parties, which come to power in

Bangladesh use that power to protect the interests of domestic and foreign looters. Any movement for protection of national resources must make this visible to the public’ (DHA

Interview # 21).

Although NCBD activists are aware of the significance of organizing a broader global movement

(i.e. alter-globalization or global justice), they suggest that only a proper diagnosis of the problem to identify one’s enemies can determine the appropriate site of political struggle. In the case of the Phulbari mine (and the national coal policy), for example, although the local problem was rooted in global issues (e.g., market economy and the power of corporate capital), the comprador class within ruling elites (rent-seeking political and bureaucratic elites) and state apparatuses at the national level (captured by the rent-seekers) were the most significant aspects of the problem. In alliance with powerful external (global) forces, national (local) actors are the authors of the neoliberal policy agenda in Bangladesh. Therefore, as the above two quotations

142 show, movements at the national scale can meaningfully engage with these forces to protect the people’s interests (jonogoner swartha). NCBD activists argue that without organizing a powerful social movement at the national level, there can be no solid oppositional movement against corporate globalization at the global level. Moreover, movements at the national level, they suggest, involve the specific character of state-society relations as mentioned above, and this often loses its place in a global movement. For NCBD activists, global movements such as

World Social Forum are less effective to achieve real changes. One activist observes:

The power centre must be targeted. Now there is no World State that it can be a

legitimate target of global movements. As a result, we must target the state which is the

centre of power till now. What can be learned from the Occupy Movement in this regard?

Although anarchists [organizers of the Occupy Movement] do not consider it necessary to

confront the state, the Occupy Movement has proved it [state-centred movement] is

necessary because it is the state which applies force on challengers. (DHA Interview #

19)

In short, NCBD’s movement agenda articulates a nationalist imaginary, whereby the nation-state is the key site of resistance against corporate globalization. Unlike the claims of many globalization theorists who give primacy to global-scale struggles, NCBD is very much focused on struggles at the national level to challenge those state policies, which, they claim, are designed to fulfill the desires of global capital and its local compradors. Although in the view of

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NCBD, states in the global South often allow external imperialist forces19 to advance their geopolitical and corporate interests, the state remains a critical institution for its people to realize their demands and aspirations. For example, the Bangladeshi state was established in 1971 when its people sacrificed their lives in a bloody liberation war with Pakistan. They have a legitimate desire to make the state their own. In other words, the state should fulfill their needs as promised in the 1971 liberation war (Kabir 2015). To ensure the state protects the needs and interests of the people, NCBD confronts the ruling elites, believing that such engagements (via direct social movement actions) will gradually shape the democratic nature of the state. Any alternative, such as the abandonment of the state as a political site (as many global civil society advocates suggest) is not an option. In this sense, the state is very relevant; for NCBD, continuing a political struggle within the boundary of the state is critical to fight corporate capital and its agenda in the global South.

4.6.2 Political Imaginaries

A careful analysis of NCBD’s political imaginaries clearly reveals a ‘resource nationalist’ popular struggle. Resource nationalism refers to a policy where states either nationalize resource development projects run by domestic or foreign private corporations or assert more control and ownership of such projects and reduce the share of private corporations (Haslam and Heidrich

19 NCBD activists consider MNCs headquartered in powerful countries in the global North as imperialist forces, as their interests are tied to the geopolitical interests of those countries.

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2016). NCBD activists are very cautious in their use of this concept, however, and in this sub- section, I explain why.

NCBD avoids the use of ‘resource nationalism’ in its movement discourses. To refer to its key demands, NCBD uses a different phrase, ‘people’s ownership’ (jonogoner malikana). Although resource nationalism (i.e., more state control of resource development) is often used as a synonym for the assertion of national interests, NCBD’s disdain for this phrase is connected to its desire to articulate a more nuanced discourse on the politics of neoliberal resource development in the global South. An NCBD activist explains the reason:

Resource nationalism is a derogatory term used by the proponents of neoliberal

globalization to delegitimize [civil society] movements, which challenge MNC’s

monopoly control of national resources in the global South and seek to reclaim people’s

(i.e., state) ownership. Multinational corporations and their local and global allies

characterize these mobilizations as a threat to development. (DHA Interview # 16)

NCBD demands replace ‘state ownership’ with ‘people’s ownership.’ Although the categories signify the same phenomenon (resource nationalism), NCBD distinguishes its movement from nationalist political movements. For NCBD, the term ‘nationalist’ has a built-in bias for nationalist struggles which aim to strengthen the power of the nationalist bourgeois class in the guise of national development and the emancipation of the masses. If the state is not democratic and state machineries are captured by the dominant bourgeois class, the demand for increasing

‘state ownership’ (i.e., resource nationalism) will be futile. Keeping this pitfall of ‘resource

145 nationalism’ in mind, NCBD is very cautious when characterizing its movement agenda (DHA

Interview # 2, 6).

NCBD’s use of jonogoner malikana (people’s ownership), as explained above, is connected to its radical perspective of the state and class structure in postcolonial societies. Influenced by the postcolonial writings of Frantz Fanon (2004), this perspective offers a trenchant critique of the nationalist politics of ruling elites and nationalist bourgeois class in Bangladesh (see Alam

2011). The following observation by an NCBD activist highlights this postcolonial perspective:

Our views of ‘people’s ownership’ do not promote nationalist politics. Nationalist politics

in postcolonial societies refer to the power and authority of national bourgeoisie class.

Nationalist politics strives to establish hegemony and domination of the national

bourgeoisie class in all spheres of politics and economy. We do not support any form of

nationalist politics because we do not believe that national bourgeois class will ensure the

rights of the people. Their interests are closely tied to those of transnational capitalist

class. In state policies, they prefer foreign private ownership to state ownership, because

MNCs will employ them as their domestic junior partners. (DHA Interview # 10)

NCBD activists argue that their movement can be cautiously labelled a nationalist movement insofar as it opposes imperialist aggression by foreign corporations. However, as highlighted in the above quotation, they are equally critical of the role of the national bourgeois class (i.e. dominant groups of industrialists and entrepreneurs) which, for them, can no longer function independently to contribute to national economic growth and prosperity. They are part of a

146 transnational corporate class which, as Robinson argues, colonizes ‘the state in new ways’

(2014:42). Since their interests are tied to those of global corporate capital, so NCBD activists believe, any threat to the latter prevents the former from supporting radical social movements aiming to change state policies to ensure better use of national (petroleum and mineral) resources, which will ultimately benefit the national bourgeois class.20 NCBD’s perspective on the national bourgeois class echoes Amin’s observation: ‘The failed ruling classes in the countries of the global South have largely accepted their role of subaltern compradors’ (Amin

2008:74).

As the above analysis shows, NCBD activists make a nuanced distinction between ‘people’s ownership’ and ‘state ownership.’ For them, these are separate phrases in terms of their political spirit in state-society relations. Unlike state ownership, people’s ownership is contingent on having the views of the masses, not the ruling elites, reflected in policymaking on resource development. An activist says, ‘In fact, ensuring people’s participation in the policy-making process is a critical step. For the time being (until there is a new state with a radical [socialist] political agenda), this is what we can call ‘people’s ownership’ (DHA Interview # 7). The value goes beyond simply the participation of the masses in policy-making; it translates into their economic benefits. They can see the outcome of ‘people’s ownership.’ The activist explains it further:

For example, the price of natural gas is low if produced by the state-owned company.

Everyone can enjoy its economic benefits because it reduces the cost of other energy-

20 State ownership and management will reduce energy price at the consumer level; this is a good thing for industrialists who are the major consumers of bulk energy products.

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related products. This will automatically ensure people’s sense of ownership of their

mineral resources. In other words, people’s participation in policy-making process

secures their interests. In broad sense, this is what we refer to as people’s ownership.

(DHA Interview # 7)

NCBD’s preference for ‘people’s ownership’ (jonogoner malikana) is also rooted in its Marxist political vision, which despises the politics of nationalism. 21 NCBD activists criticize nationalism and its violent form of political practices:

In the Bangladeshi context, nationalist movements, which are the successors of the

Bengali Nationalist Movement of the 1960s that led to Bangladesh’s liberation war with

Pakistan in 1971 adopt exclusionary principles. Such movements popularize dislike of

heterogeneity and diversity of cultures and political identities. State repression of the

indigenous peoples in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in the name of the unity of a

homogenous nation-state of the Bengalis is a glaring example of the violent outcome of

nationalist movements. (DHA Interview # 20)

NCBD uses the phrase ‘people’s ownership’ to avoid negative connotations of the politics of nationalism, as evident in the above observation. This phrase – with its imagined citizenry of ‘the people’ within the nation-state – articulates nationalist sentiments vis-à-vis resource development. NCBD has transformed policy discourses on resource development as a major site

21 It is interesting to note that Bangladesh’s Constitution considers all inhabitants as Bengali; therefore, the state erases the presence of a diverse cultural and political identity in Bangladesh.

148 of political struggle by focusing on the need for state-owned public enterprises to ensure the greater public good.

NCBD’s nationalist imaginaries expose the contradiction between two opposing practices of political economy: first, Bangladesh’s structural dependence on financial and policy support from BWIs and other international development agencies, which are united in pushing for policies shaped by ‘the Washington Consensus’22 to create access for export-oriented foreign investments; second, popular nationalist imaginaries of greater power, control, and capability of public institutions.

4.7 Discussion and Conclusion

Natural resources such as oil, gas, and other minerals play a significant role in the nation-making process. As Watts puts it, these resources ‘always invoke the spatial lexicon in which the nation figures prominently’ (Watts 2001: 206, my emphasis). Accordingly, natural resources are strategic material resources which help to construct nationalist imaginaries (see Coronil 1997;

Apter 2005). Although globalizers consider ‘resource nationalism’ to be a threat to foreign capital, critical scholarship on social struggles against globalization and the extractive industry connects it to a complex relationship of nature, nation, and nationalist imaginaries (see Watts

2001; Perrault 2013; Perreault and Valdivia 2010; Kohl and Farthing 2012).

22 This term refers to a set of economic policies such as privatization, liberalization, deregulation, and fiscal discipline aimed at integrating peripheral countries into the global capitalist system. For details, see Williamson (2008).

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Natural resources serve as a springboard for articulating discourses of nationalism as a reaction to the domination of global capital and their local partners in the global South. Neoliberal economic policies facilitate foreign investment in resource development and prioritize an export- oriented business model in natural resource governance. This type of resource governance creates a multilayered relationship between natural resources and nationalist imaginaries, such that the extraction of natural resources becomes ‘integral to the production of nationalist ideologies’ (Perreault 2013:70). Resource extraction is, as Huber contends, ‘central to the production of narratives of nationalism and belonging’ (2015:330). This nationalist imaginary has two implications. On the one hand, neoliberal states and global corporations can rationalize the dispossession and environmental destruction required for economic growth. Many resource- rich states in the global South also invoke the rhetoric of nationalism to legitimize increased state power in resource extraction to move away from neoliberal policies of resource governance

(Childs and Hearn 2016; Ovadia 2016; Emel et al. 2011). On the other hand, civil society groups can organize counter-hegemonic movements against the power of foreign corporations favoured by neoliberal states by invoking political imaginaries such as national sovereignty and people’s ownership (Perreault and Valdivia 2010; Bebbington and Bury 2013). NCBD is a good example of the latter.

Scholars who view ‘global’ as the most effective scale of political struggles for the welfare of the masses consider that the state has become transnationalized, and in the traditional sense of its functions, the state is no longer a centre of political decision-making (Hardt and Negri 2004;

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Habermas 2001).23 Therefore, as de Sousa Santos argues, ‘the object of the struggle (be it a decision of the WTO, a World Bank policy, or a TNC’s decision to explore for oil in indigenous territory) is outside the national space and … the scale of the struggle, from this viewpoint, must be increasingly global’ (2005:53-54). NCBD’s discourses vis-à-vis movement site and movement imaginary remind us that many political decision-making processes on, for example, how to deal with a WTO provision, or World Bank’s conditionalities, or a resource extraction project by a multinational corporation, are finalized at the national level by the state and its ruling elites. Prioritizing a global scale of protest does not make sense. NCBD’s engagement with coal development reinforces the idea of social movement scholars (e.g., Tarrow 2005) that when movement repertoires are rooted in local and national contexts, there is a greater possibility that a countermovement can successfully confront its enemies by targeting the national government and deploying nationalism as a mobilization tactic.

As I have shown in this chapter, NCBD strongly opposes the involvement of multinational corporations in resource development and advocates greater state control (people’s ownership) over these resources. Its movement agenda and discourses tend to delegitimize dominant narratives of the state and capital. For this reason, policymakers have trouble addressing its demands in the national coal policy. The meaning of these demands is rooted in the organizational character of NCBD as a civil society group. Its left/progressive political agenda seeks to reinvigorate national sovereignty to protect the people’s interests. This radical social movement is committed to articulating counter-hegemonic discourses by questioning dominant worldviews on resource extraction and national development. It asks the state to fight against

23 For a trenchant critique of this view see Wood (2005:5-6).

151 global capitalist interests in specific local instances, as in Phulbari. The struggle over resource development, thus, combines local and national issues related to global capital’s drive. In other words, resource politics in Bangladesh reflects contested discourses of nature, nation, nationalism, and the state.

Globalization scholarship often uses certain movements (e.g. Zapatista, ATTAC) as poster cases to support the political possibility of GCS-based global social movements (Castells 2004).

Despite their transnational salience, however, some of these movements are grounded in specific national contexts (see Johnston 2003). Their political imaginaries have influenced many other movements around the world (Khasnabish 2008), yet these are nationally-rooted movements

(Johnston and Laxer 2003). For example, ATTAC advocates the strengthening of ‘national sovereignty’ to fight the devastating impact of neoliberal globalization (Hardt 2002).

For the most part, scholars and activists emphasize either ‘global’ or ‘local’ rather than

‘national,’ and this emphasis elides national political imaginaries. However, as NCBD’s case shows, counter-hegemonic movements rely on nationalist imaginaries to attack dominant forces of neoliberal globalization. As Steger and Wilson argue, ‘the “global” does not simply erase the

“local” or the “national” but the former binds the latter more strongly to its own meaning orbit’

(2012:450). The findings of this chapter corroborate this perspective. My data suggest NCBD’s critical diagnosis of the discourses and policies of neoliberal globalism encourage these particular anti-capitalist activists to articulate new nationalist political imaginaries. Its framing of local and national movements is influenced by these imaginaries. In effect, it contests ‘global’ issues by placing ‘national/local’ into the broader context of neoliberal global capitalism.

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NCBD’s struggle can be compared to that of similar movements in Latin America where civil society groups strongly oppose foreign corporations and demand greater state control of resource extraction. These movements have a common theme – ‘complex articulations of citizenship, territory, and nation;’ consequently, ‘natural resources figure into constructions of the nations’

(Perreault and Valdivia 2010). Opposing hegemonic neoliberal policies associated with resource development, these movements present alternative political imaginaries and contest the dominant meaning of ‘development.’ As Perreault and Valdivia aptly put it, ‘resource struggles are never only about resources. … political economy and cultural politics are inseparable in resource conflicts’ (2010: 697).

Since the state is a ‘constitutive element’ of global capitalism (Panitch 1994), NCBD chooses not to avoid or dismiss the state. Its political vision is similar to the vision of those movements within the World Social Forum who advocate strengthening the national sovereignty of the state to implement their political agenda (see Hardt 2002). Such a vision contradicts GCS theorists and activists (even within the World Social Forum) who favour global activism and avoid any engagement with the state.

To reiterate, NCBD is a useful case to probe a significant debate in critical globalization studies.

It highlights the significance of the ‘national’ question and the relevance of the nation-state as a site of political struggle in the neoliberal era. While many scholars posit that the ‘national’ is irrelevant as a key imaginary of political struggle against corporate globalization, for the NCBD movement, the ‘national’ scale is an important site to mediate political struggles involving local and global issues. A good example is the proposed Phulbari coal mine. Locally, land-dependent

153 communities contested a resource development project. Globally, corporate capital was searching new resource frontiers in the global South. Once NCBD became involved in the

Phulbari movement, it transformed a localized community struggle into a broader anti-corporate political struggle in which both local and global were implicated. In doing so, it questioned the legitimacy of the national policymaking process and the government’s promotion of corporate interests. It asked the government to assume its proper role – protecting its people. In other words, the discursive and political struggle of NCBD underscores that the nationalist imaginary

(jonogoner malikana, jonogoner swartho) remains a valuable component of political struggle in the neoliberal era.

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CHAPTER 5

Beyond the Border: Corporate Mining, Transnational Activism, and the Politics of Movement Alliance

Abstract

Scholarship on transnational activism suggests that activists in the global South are weak, have fewer resources, and are constrained by a lack of political opportunities. These factors force them to seek help from stronger advocacy groups in the global North. Considering the case of transnational activism against a coalmine project in Bangladesh, I examine the dynamics of a strategic alliance between a coalition of advocacy groups from the global North and a Bangladeshi radical social movement organization. I find the existing perspectives provide useful analytical tools; however, one must be careful when applying those tools to fully explain transnational activism in cases when a southern partner does not require financial support. I suggest we need a more nuanced analysis of the power dynamics of a transnational activist alliance. The chapter shows that some activist groups in the global South, at least the one examined here, are independent enough to adopt their own strategies, thus avoiding some pitfalls of transnational activism.

5.1 Introduction

The primary aim of the Phulbari Action Network (PAN), a loosely coordinated and informal coalition of transnational advocacy groups based in the global North, was to block an open pit coalmine project in Phulbari, a rural town in northern Bangladesh. The project had been proposed by a British mining company, GCM Resources, and its Bangladeshi subsidiary, Asia

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Energy Corporation Bangladesh (AECB).1 A Bangladeshi activist group, the National

Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power and Ports (NCBD), was also involved in the protest. This radical social movement organization had been formed in 1998 to oppose policies introduced in the early 1990s to privatize petroleum and mineral resource extraction

(Shaheedullah 2002, 2009).2 NCBD mobilized several successful campaigns against Bangladeshi ruling elites and their allies, for example, multilateral financial institutions and global corporate capital (see Faruque 2017a). The anti-mining movement was one such successful mobilization.

In 2006, NCBD and its allies forced the Bangladeshi government to agree to shelve the coalmine project (Gain 2007; Muhammad 2007; Das 2009).3

In this chapter, I draw on sociological scholarship on transnational activism (della Porta and

Tarrow 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998a; Khagram et al. 2002; Tarrow 2005; Tarrow and

McAdam 2005) to examine the politics of the strategic alliance between activists from the global

North (PAN) and the global South (NCBD).4 I am specifically interested in the extent to which a southern actor can maintain autonomy and what strategies it might adopt to continue a partnership without losing power and authority. This case warrants scholarly treatment for two reasons. First, in contrast to the typical pattern of organizations in the global South subordinating

1 More information about this project is available at: http://www.gcmplc.com/ (accessed 30 August 2015). 2 See appendix-3: NCBD’s Manifesto. This gives a clear picture of its nature as a radical social movement organization. 3 However, AECB did not suspend its project and the Bangladeshi government did not cancel its agreement. AECB remains active and hopes that the Bangladeshi government will soon grant a mining permit (GCM 2017). 4 My take in this chapter is different from existing scholarship (e.g., Luthfa 2017). My interest lies in the peculiar nature of the strategic alliance between PAN and NCBD. I seek to explain the dynamics of the movement alliance. Another key distinction is that my research involves data on PAN’s activism during 2007-2014. Luthfa’s work, though published in 2017, does not include several critical phases.

156 their own goals to retain the support of organizations in the global North (see Bob 2005; Bandy and Smith 2005), in this case, the partner based in the global South adopted strategies shaped by the radical characteristics of its own political agenda. Second, unlike most cases in the literature

(see Keck and Sikkink 1998a), Bangladeshi activists can organize political programs (albeit on a limited scale), even under authoritarian military regimes.

The chapter contributes to scholarship on transnational activism in two ways. First, it adds a component (i.e., a new target of transnational activism) to the very influential ‘boomerang pattern’ theory of transnational activism (Keck and Sikkink 1998a). For Keck and Sikkink, states in the global South are the main targets of transnational activism. The key assumption is that the collaboration between local and transnational activists is intended to exert pressure on nation- states to reform their policies. However, the model needs to take into account other targets of contemporary transnational activism: multinational corporations and supranational organizations.

I suggest that today’s transnational activism includes strategic tactics to put pressure on these entities. Second, the literature shows a pattern of southern actors asking for help from advocacy groups in the global North (Keck and Sikkink 1998a). Drawing on Bob (2005) and Pallas (2013),

I show that northern advocacy groups also search for cases (campaigns/movements) in the global

South to further their agenda, legitimize their actions, and enhance their profile as an advocacy group. Northern actors carefully select their cases, looking for those which will advance their interests. The desire for a transnational coalition works both ways, with both sides carefully calculating costs and benefits.

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This rest of the chapter has five sections. It begins with a review of the literature to identify some conceptual understandings of transnational activism. The data and methods are described in section two. The next two sections contain empirical evidence. Section three narrates the emergence of the Phulbari Action Network (PAN) and its work during 2007-2014. Section four analyzes the politics of the strategic alliance between PAN and NCBD. This is followed by a discussion and conclusion. The chapter shows that some activist groups in the global South, at least the one examined here, are independent enough to adopt their own strategies, thus avoiding some pitfalls of transnational activism. It also emphasizes that scholars need to seek a more nuanced analysis of the power dynamics of transnational activist alliances.

5.2 Transnational Activism: Analytical Issues

Transnational activism refers to ‘the coordinated international campaigns on the part of networks of activists against international actors, other states, or international institutions’ (della Porta and

Tarrow 2005:7). Social movement scholars characterize transnational activism or the upward movement of activism from local/national to transnational as ‘scale shift’, i.e., ‘a change in the number and level of coordinated contentious actions leading to broader contention involving a wider range of actors and bridging their claims and identities’ (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly

2001:331). Scale shifts do not occur in a vacuum. Both upward and downward scale shifts require the agency of activists. As von Bülow argues, ‘Choices concerning the scale of contention are directly linked to actors’ interpretation of international and domestic political contexts’ (2013:58, emphasis added). This view problematizes the core idea of a dominant social

158 movement theory – political opportunity structure. The theory emphasizes the role of opportunities or threats as objective realities (Tarrow 2011). von Bülow (2013) adds to this by focusing on the agency of activists to determine which political opportunity and threat structures affect their actions and strategies when they are forming transnational alliances.

Shifting scale requires activists to creatively repackage their mobilizing frames to make ‘a change in the meaning and scope of the object of the claim’. In the process, activists working on different scales come closer and ‘produce new alliances, new targets, and changes in the foci of claims and perhaps even new identities’ (Tarrow 2005: 121). These new alliances can be formal or informal, i.e., densely or loosely structured. Formal alliances adopt structured communication patterns to engage their stakeholders (Keck and Sikkink 1998a; Sikkink 2011) but the sharing of ideas and information among members of informal coalitions is neither routinized nor organized

(Smith and Bandy 2005). In both formal and informal alliances, activists ‘mobilize domestic and international resources and opportunities to advance claims on behalf of external actors against external opponents, or in favor of goals they hold in common with transnational allies’ (Tarrow

2005: 43). Transnational activism has different configurations, depending on the degree of connection and mobilization among activist groups. Khagram et al. identify three such configurations: transnational advocacy networks, transnational coalitions, and transnational social movements (2002:7). Networks are often based on informal contacts, coalitions involve more coordination of strategies and tactics to influence policy making, and social movements are characterized by common purposes and solidarity connecting actors in multiple locations.

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How do transnational activists perform their tasks – or what Tarrow calls ‘minding other people’s business’ (1998:189)? To respond to this question, I draw on Keck and Sikkink (1998a) and Tarrow (2005). Arguably, Keck and Sikkink’s theory of transnational activism (‘the boomerang pattern’) provides the most influential analytical tool. ‘The boomerang pattern’ of transnational activism, according to Keck and Sikkink, is typical of a network of advocacy groups ‘who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services’ (1998a:2). Of course, disparate actors may also collaborate; for Keck and Sikkink, the closure of political opportunities motivates domestic actors to ‘bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside’

(1998a:12). Transnational activists ‘argue, persuade, strategize, document, lobby, pressure, and complain’ to present their cases in appropriate forums (1998a: x). Their four main strategies are:

(1) information politics, or the ability to quickly and credibly generate politically usable information and move it to where it will have the most impact; (2) symbolic politics, or the ability to call on symbols, actions, or stories that make sense of a situation for an audience that is frequently far away; (3) leverage politics, or the ability to call on powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence; and (4) accountability politics, or the effort to hold powerful actors to their previously stated policies or principles (Keck and Sikkink 1998a:16).

Since the publication of Keck and Sikkink’s seminal work, some notable changes have occurred; new dimensions have been added to the motivations for forming alliances beyond borders, the targets of activism, and the process of making coalitions. To address these new dimensions,

Sikkink has developed a new analytic scheme of engagement among actors at various scales.

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This refined conceptualization of transnational activism considers the openness and closure of both domestic and international political structures. One of its new configurations is an

‘insider/outsider coalition’ that emerges when ‘domestic activists … privilege domestic political change, but will keep international activism as a complementary and compensatory option’

(2005:165). ‘Insider-outsider coalitions’ widen the scope of activism and lead to broader outcomes. Another aspect of these changes, as Pellow (2007:63) emphasizes, is that transnational coalitions, although still concerned about state power, are increasingly deploying their energies to engage with corporate power.

Sidney Tarrow takes Sikkink’s modifications into account and develops an analytically sophisticated process model of transnational activism. He argues that transnational activists adopt a combination of six political processes to achieve their goals: global framing (‘the mobilization of international symbols to frame domestic conflicts’); internalization (‘a response to foreign or international pressures within domestic politics’); diffusion (‘the transfer of claims or forms of contention from one site to the other’); scale shift (‘the coordination of collective action at a different level than where it began’); externalization (‘the vertical projection of domestic claims onto international institutions or foreign actors’); and transnational coalition formation (‘the horizontal formation of common networks among actors from different countries with similar claims’) (Tarrow 2005:32).

Are transnational organizations working on the issues of the global South ‘principled issue groups’ as Keck and Sikkink (1998a) argue? Or do they perform a very strict cost and benefit analysis when selecting cases? Bob (2005) provides a meticulous account of how weak southern

161 actors solicit help and powerful northern actors pick clients. He argues that the screening process often leaves out calls from desperate groups who genuinely need help. In order to be part of

TANs (transnational advocacy networks), activists in the global South have to conform to the needs and agenda of their distant (northern) partners, and this could alienate a movement from its base. Northern advocacy groups often choose their southern partners based on their political agenda, not their altruism. Thus, southern activists must ‘craft their messages to resonate abroad’

(Bob 2005:4, emphasis added). Pallas’s (2013) study on transnational civil society and democratizing global governance shows advocacy groups in the global North have their own agenda when they join coalitions. Other scholars (Brooks 2005; Hartel 2006) suggest northern activists give priority to their own agenda when working on campaign strategies and tactics, paying little attention to organizational initiatives at the local/national level in the global South.

This practice often results in an incorrect diagnosis of the problem, and the solutions proposed by the transnational campaign will not benefit the people/communities they want to help.

According to Keck and Sikkink (1998a), the legitimacy of transnational advocacy networks rests on their ‘moral authority,’ which allows them to put pressure on other actors (e.g., governments, corporations, and multilateral institutions). Yet critical scholarship shows these groups are not solely motivated by their moral authority; their actions are also determined by instrumental concerns (Prakash and Gugerty 2010; Bob 2010). Bob (2005) and Pallas (2013) show that TANs include a variety of advocacy groups. While many TANs can be characterized as moral actors guided by values, as emphasized by Keck and Skkink (1998a), other advocacy groups are concerned about their own survival and growth.

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Transnational alliances come at a cost for advocacy groups in the global South. According to

Tarrow (2011), southern organizations active in transnational networks can be delinked from their domestic struggles. In addition, competition for resources and power may favour those groups who are ‘active and creative militants’ over weak groups. The financial support of northern organizations also affects movement dynamics. Chowdhury (2011) highlights two critical issues. First, the financial contributions of northern organizations contribute to the deradicalization of movement agendas in the global South, transforming a movement’s ‘radical vision of structural change… into a neoliberal one of incremental change and individual transformation’ (2011:27). Second, activists’ efforts to form an alliance with actors beyond national borders may ‘hinder a more nuanced engagement with diverse realities on the ground’

(2011: 176).

Even in North-South alliances based on shared values, internal tensions often lead to a failure to agree on decisions/resolutions (Rucht 2009). Asymmetric power relations are another striking feature of transnational activism. Power imbalances, exclusion from internal decision-making processes, and a lack of control over financial resources often create tensions in transnational coalitions, as these coalition-based relationships are neither horizontal nor reciprocal (von Bülow

2010, 2013). Power asymmetry can occur because of organizational culture and processes (Wood

2005; Bandy and Smith 2005). Spalding (2016) shows that apart from resource inequalities and cultural traits, conflicts within transnational networks can be traced to the nature of the hierarchy, whether centralized and top-down or decentralized and horizontal. Power asymmetry within transnational alliances also raises questions about the representation of individual constituents

(Sikkink 2002).

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Do southern activists play a passive role while their northern partners shape the movement agenda? Social movement scholars argue that local activists in the global South are not passive recipients of support from external actors based in the global North (Rothman and Oliver 1999).

Rather, they play a proactive role, influencing the network building process by offering critical support to gather relevant information and context-specific analysis. Southern activists can also impose their terms on their transnational allies and defend their priorities. Various critical analyses of the Zapatista movement in Mexico and the rural women’s movement in Brazil show the power of southern activists to set their terms and negotiate agendas while working in a coalition with northern advocacy groups (see Evans 2014).

5.3 Method and Data

This chapter draws on qualitative data gathered from two sources: 1) eight in-depth interviews and 2) a set of documents published by PAN members and the parent company of AECB, GCM

Resources Plc. I interviewed four activists involved with PAN and four Bangladeshi activists involved with coordinating the tasks of PAN members and NCBD. Although PAN includes about a dozen organizations, many do not have direct involvement with its agenda. I was referred to documents on the case and to active members. Eventually, I interviewed people in four organizations belonging to PAN.5 Of the four Bangladeshi activists, three were based in London

5 Despite repeated attempts, I could not interview anyone in two UK-based organizations who were very active members of PAN. Representatives of both organizations initially agreed to be interviewed. One later declined, and the other did not reply to my multiple emails. A Bangladeshi activist later informed me that these two organizations

164 and were members of the UK branch of NCBD.6 The fourth7 was a leader of NCBD based in

Dhaka, a very influential person in the organization who helped to shape NCBD’s movement agenda and mobilization tactics. I used an open-ended interview schedule. All interviews were conducted in 2014. Collectively, they provide empirical evidence of the dynamics of a strategic alliance between activists in the global North and global South.8

My empirical data also come from research reports, pamphlets, PAN’s complaints submitted to various global governance institutions (UN, UK NCP under OECD Guidelines), reports on annual general meetings of GCM Resources, PAN’s letters to various actors whom its members identified as their key targets, and memoranda submitted by PAN members to various parliamentary committees of the UK government. These documents were a significant source of empirical evidence for three reasons. First, they provided the perspectives of PAN members on the mining company and its project. Second, they emphasized PAN members’ understanding of the political struggles of local communities in the global South affected by the activities of both international financial institutions (IFIs) and multinational companies. Third, they provided

were not very enthusiastic about talking to academics, whose work, they consider, contributes little or nothing to grassroots community resistance to mining corporations. 6 NCBD created its UK Branch in 2002 to mobilize the support of the Bangladeshi diaspora for its anti-gas export movement. It remained dormant for several years. In 2008, a new executive committee was formed to mobilize a London-based movement to support NCBD’s causes in Bangladesh. A Bangladeshi activist involved with it since its new beginning in 2008 explains their objective: ‘Our goal was to create a pressure group in London, where the mining company is registered. We believed that our works in London would create reactions in the Bangladeshi media. We contacted various advocacy groups in London. A momentum for mobilization against AECB was created through various mass campaigns among Bangladeshi communities’ (TAN Interview # 2). 7 Throughout this chapter, I will refer to him as Mr. Rahman (a pseudonym). 8 To maintain anonymity, I will use numerical codes (i.e., TAN Interview # 1, 2, 3) when citing comments or referring to evidence from these interviews.

165 information on the framing of contentious issues (i.e. constructing the mining company’s project as a problem), the discourses PAN members employed to articulate their grievances, and the mobilization tactics used during 2007-2014. Finally, in the documents of the mining company, I used annual reports, letters to PAN members and the UN Special Rapporteurs, and a memorandum submitted to a parliamentary committee of the UK government.

5.4 The Phulbari Action Network and ‘Beyond the Border’ Activism

NCBD was already involved in the fight against the mine when a political crisis in Bangladesh triggered the idea to ‘scale up’ social mobilization, resulting in the formation of the Phulbari

Action Network (PAN). Bangladesh was going through political turmoil in 2006 (see Riaz

2016:115-117). Protests and violent clashes between the ruling political party and a coalition of opposition parties erupted all over the country (Hagerty 2007). The military intervened on 11

January 2007 and forced the President to declare a state of emergency. A military-led Caretaker

Government (CG)9 took power and banned all forms of political activities (Hagerty 2008). Soon after the CG assumed power, AECB increased its efforts to get government approval for its mining project. The decision to grant the mining permit had been on hold since a violent protest in Phulbari in August 2006.10

9 For an excellent analysis of this peculiar form of government, see Zaman Khan (2018). 10 This protest forced the Bangladeshi government to negotiate with NCBD. Finally, the government signed an MOU with NCBD on 30 August 2006 and agreed that it would withdraw AECB from Phulbari; moreover, it would not allow open pit mining anywhere in Bangladesh. For a sociological analysis of the movement, see Faruque (2017b).

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Three interrelated events happened during the first few months of the CG. First, AECB stepped up its lobby of government officials, and several advisers (ministers) of the CG discussed the prospect of developing the Phulbari coalmine with local media. Second, an army officer began a survey in Phulbari asking local people whether they would support the mining project if proper compensation were paid for loss of property and displacement. Third, the security forces arrested a leader of NCBDP.11 These events, coupled with the political environment during the emergency rule, made NCBD very nervous. Some feared AECB would begin mining activity under the protection of state security forces.12 Given these circumstances, a leader of NCBD (Mr.

Rahman) thought a transnational campaign could help them. According to Mr. Rahman, the main motive was to keep NCBD’s resistance active outside the country if they could not organize anything inside the country.

The violent protests and the killing of three protesters on 26 August 2006 received wide coverage in both national and international media. A Japanese environmental NGO (JACSES) investigated it in late 2006.13 JACSES became interested because the Asian Development Bank

(ADB) was considering a private sector loan of $100 million and a political risk guarantee of

$200 million for AECB. The Government of Japan is the largest financial contributor to ADB.

JACSES’s investigation identified human rights violations, serious environmental effects, and

11 NCBDP is the Phulbari branch of NCBD. 12 NCBD’s knowledge of the role of military regimes in Africa to protect mining companies and suppress anti- mining struggles played a role here. 13 JACSES monitors development projects supported by Japan’s aid money to document environmental destruction and human rights violation.

167 inadequate disclosure of critical information; it concluded that ADB should not finance the

Phulbari coal project (JACSES 2007).

During the 40th annual meeting of the ADB Board of Governors in 2007, NGO Forum on ADB – a network of civil society organizations working to hold ADB accountable – organized a people’s forum to discuss social, environmental, and political impacts of ADB-financed development projects.14 JACSES invited Mr. Rahman to participate. He had conversations with many advocacy groups and asked them to include the Phulbari coal project in their campaigns.

Some smaller organizations who belonged to various transnational advocacy networks agreed to work on the case.15 These non-governmental organizations worked on a multitude of issues (see

Table-5.1), but all found at least one common thematic concern. During 2007-2008, they worked together and collaborated with NCBD to mobilize a transnational campaign against AECB. The main goal was to lobby global investors, including ADB and the UK government,16 to withdraw their financial and political support. This collaboration led to an informal partnership among various advocacy groups based in North America, Europe, Australia, and Asia and the formation of the Phulbari Action Network (PAN) to coordinate the campaign. Thus, PAN combined the features of both a transnational network and a coalition (Khagram et al. 2002).

14 More about this advocacy network is available at https://www.forum-adb.org/ (accessed 2 April 2015). 15 TAN Interview #1. 16 Since AECB’s parent company is a registered UK company, it receives government support to expand its business around the world.

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Table-5.1: PAN members, country of origin, and major organizational goals (2007-2014)

Organization Country Goal (s) International USA Seeking to end forced eviction and create new global Accountability Project policy and practice for development that respects people’s homes, environment and human rights Bank Information Centre USA Influencing the World Bank and other international financial institutions to promote social and economic justice and ecological sustainability Cultural Survival USA Defending Indigenous People’s rights to their lands, languages and culture Mangrove Action Project USA Conserving and restoring mangrove forests around the globe Accountability Counsel USA Assisting communities around the world to defend their environmental and human rights London Mining Network UK Holding mining industry to account and supporting the communities around the world who are badly affected by mining World Development UK Fighting for economic justice and an end to global Movement (Global Justice poverty Now) Mines and Communities UK Publishing information about various aspects of global mining industry and its impact Urgewald Germany Addressing the underlying cause of global environmental destruction and poverty/calling on international companies and banks to step back from destructive projects and to adopt binding environmental and social standards BankTrack The Tracking the operations and investments of private Netherlands sector banks (commercial banks) and their effect on people and the planet Both ENDS The Working towards a sustainable future for our planet Netherlands Berne Declaration Switzerland Promoting more equitable, sustainable and democratic North-South relations World Organization Switzerland Working for the protection and the promotion of against Torture (OMCT) human rights in the world Aid Watch Australia Monitoring Australia’s aid and trade and promoting development alternatives based on social and environmental justice JACSES Japan Promoting social and environmental justice in Japan and beyond NGO Forum on ADB Philippines Making the Asian Development Bank responsible and accountable for the impacts of its projects and policies Source: PAN member’s documents and websites (prepared by the author).

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PAN’s activism began with the creation of a knowledge bank to articulate its mobilization frames and discourses.17 A PAN member – Bank Information Center (BIC) – commissioned two studies to examine AECB’s Environment and Social Impact Assessment Report and its

Resettlement Plan. These studies18 provided an evidence-based critical analysis of the Phulabri coalmine project and its multifaceted effects. PAN members used these studies to create their own narratives to subvert the ‘scientific claims’ of AECB19 and to shape what Keck and Sikkink

(1998a) call ‘information politics’ against their target. As a group of counter-experts, they contested the expertise of AECB’s industry specialists and articulated campaign frames to persuade AECB’s investors to pull out of the project. Based on a rigorous analysis of ADB’s policy documents, PAN created a counter-narrative which included a detailed analysis of

AECB’s mishandling of ADB’s safeguard policies and guidelines (NGO Forum on ADB 2008).

Drawing on this counter-narrative, PAN members (in collaboration with NCBD) prepared two letters, which were sent to the president and executive directors of ADB.20

17 Pellow (2007) emphasizes that transnational advocacy groups have expertise and resources to analyze complex policy documents and to articulate appropriate mobilization frames to challenge dominant development discourses embedded in those policies. 18 These two studies were later published as a book by a Dhaka-based publishing company. See Kalafut and Moody (2008). 19 They widely disseminated these counter-narratives on the Phulbari coalmine. To attain their objectives, i.e., to persuade GCM’s investors, PAN members distributed the studies to GCM’s shareholders at its annual general meeting in December 2008. 20 The first letter was signed by 42 community leaders in Phulbari. Another letter was signed by 63 environmental NGOs from across the world. The former raised several issues, such as misrepresentation of community support in AECB’s environmental impact assessment studies, violation of Bangladesh’s laws on mineral resource development and environmental protection, unrealistic resettlement plan, and violation of ADB’s energy policy. It also raised concerns about Bangladesh’s political situation, highlighting that the military-led CG suspended the Constitution, declared a state of emergency, and restricted fundamental rights, including freedom of speech and assembly. The letter specifically referred to ADB’s own policies which were violated by AECB.

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This ‘beyond the border’ activism was supplemented by ‘within the border’ activism by some

PAN members. For example, Urgewald (Germany) and Aidwatch (Australia) mobilized campaigns in their countries to garner domestic public support.21 They framed the problem as a

‘wrong act’ of their own governments. Both Germany and Australia are on ADB’s executive board, and they make a large annual financial contribution. These PAN members said taxpayer money should not be spent in development projects causing environmental destruction and violating human rights.22 They lobbied their members of parliament and country representatives to oppose ADB’s involvement with AECB’s project in Bangladesh. Although ADB initially rejected PAN’s critiques, claiming that AECB conducted extensive scientific studies, and its coal mine would significantly advance Bangladesh’s economy (ADB 2008), it later decided not to approve its private sector loan and political risk guarantee in April 2008.

Concurrently, PAN members continued to lobby to persuade other global banks/investors

(Barclays, RBS, UBS, and Credit Suisse) involved with AECB’s parent company (GCM

Resources Plc).23 Barclays and RBS decided to sell their shares in GCM Resources in June and

October 2008 respectively (WDM 2008b, 2008c).

21 Both PAN members invited Mr. Rahman to participate in their campaigns in Germany and Australia. Members of the Bangladeshi diaspora in those countries also organized events to inform German and Australian audiences about their countries’ role in Bangladesh via ADB’s involvement with AECB (TAN Interview # 1, 7). 22 TAN Interview # 7. 23 IAP and WDM attended Barclays' annual general meeting in April 2008 and demanded that the bank discontinue its relationship with GCM Resources. WDM’s members and supporters wrote letters to Barclays demanding its withdrawal. PAN also mobilized the support of more than 100 advocacy groups from across the world who endorsed their letters to these banks/investors.

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PAN’s successful use of ‘information politics’ affirms the positive role of the expertise and skills of transnational advocacy groups. NCBD, the Bangladeshi organization involved in the protest, noticed it as well. An NCBD member I interviewed said:

Our movement was not concerned with various international policy frameworks [such as

ADB’s policies]. We were very much focused on a local and national scale of

mobilization. We were preoccupied with AECB’s role. We did not think about the roles

of other actors like ADB. PAN’s work on ADB’s role and their advocacy program to

exert pressure on ADB sent a strong message to both AECB and the Bangladeshi

government. PAN members identified many challenges in ADB’s own policy

frameworks. The nature of the professional resources [expertise and skills] required to

engage with ADB’s legal frameworks was beyond our capacity. Had there been no such

engagement [of PAN members], ADB would have been reluctant to withdraw from

AECB’s project. ADB would have manoeuvred loopholes in its legal framework to stick

to AECB. (TAN Interview #1)

After persuading several investors, two PAN members24 shifted their attention to engaging with the institutional norms and practices of the UK government.25 They used ‘access to information’ requests and obtained evidence to show that two government agencies – the Department for

Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) and the Department for International

24 UK-based LMN, WDM. 25 AECB’s parent company, GCM Resources Plc is a British mining company and registered with the Alternative Investment Market of the London Stock Exchange. It is the official policy of the UK government to promote business interests of companies registered in the UK around the world.

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Development (DFID) – provided support to AECB. They used the evidence to frame PAN’s opposition to AECB’s mining project as ‘a case of business ethics and human rights’ and submitted several memoranda to the joint parliamentary committees on business and human rights, and international development (LMN 2009, 2012; WDM 2008a, 2009). This helped PAN members garner the support of some Members of Parliament in the UK; these MPs raised questions during a parliamentary debate on the UK’s policy to AECB’s business in Bangladesh.

Finally, PAN’s activists targeted institutional norms and practices of global governance organizations, particularly the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD). As noted, transnational advocacy groups have the expertise and skills required to engage with national and global institutional mechanisms.

Hence, they generally prefer to work within existing institutional mechanisms to address their grievances (Tarrow 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998a). A member of PAN (US-based IAP) sent an urgent appeal to seven Special Rapporteurs of the UN Human Rights Commission arguing that the Phulbari coalmine project would result in grave human rights violations (IAP 2011). Drawing on several international human rights covenants, IAP emphasized human rights discourses and claimed that the project would violate ten types of individual rights, including right to food, water, housing etc. The outcome of this institutional engagement was a press statement26 issued by the UN Special Rapporteurs on 28 February 2012.27 They recommended that the Bangladeshi

26 This press release received wide media coverage in Bangladesh. For PAN members, this was a major victory. It highlights the value of their skills, expertise, and resources to navigate institutional norms and practices. 27 Although the UN Special Rapporteurs sought a response from the Bangladeshi government, reminding it of its obligation under various human rights covenants to check the accuracy of IAP’s claims and report on the case to the UN Human Rights Council, Bangladesh did not respond to their request.

173 government ‘must ensure that any policy concerning open-pit coal mining includes robust safeguards to protect human rights. In the interim, the Phulbari coalmine should not be allowed to proceed because of the massive disruptions it is expected to cause’ (United Nations 2012, Para

#1).

PAN’s success in engaging with the UN motivated them to mobilize more institutional norms and practices of global governance organizations. IAP and WDM jointly submitted a complaint to the National Contact Point (NCP) of the UK government in December 2012.28 They claimed that AECB had violated several provisions of the OECD Guidelines on business ethics and human rights.29 After nearly two years of investigation, NCP rejected a major part of the complaint and upheld a very small part.30 NCP’s decision was a serious blow to PAN’s effort to

28 NCP is an agency of the UK government. It was established by many member countries of the OECD to show their commitment to promote and implement the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD 2011). It is based on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (United Nations 2011; Ruggie 2013). NCP has two key functions. The first is a step-by-step assessment of complaints resulting in an investigation report to identify if any actions of corporations under scrutiny violated any obligations set out in the OECD Guidelines. The second involves inviting dissenting parties to initiate a dialogue and reconcile conflicting issues. The UK NCP is part of its Department of International Trade (DIT) and partly funded by the Department for International Development (DFID). The DIT helps UK business grows global markets. 29 According to IAP and WDM, AECB violated several chapters of the OECD Guidelines. These are obligations under Chapter 2 (paragraphs 2 and 7), Chapter 3 (paragraph 2), and Chapter 4 (paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5). Paragraph 2 in Chapter 2 is about MNC’s commitment to respect the human rights of people affected by their operations; paragraph 7 urges MNCs to adopt self-regulatory practices and management systems to gain the trust and confidence of people in societies where they do business. Chapter 3 (paragraph 2) is concerned about MNC’s disclosure obligations. Chapter 4 (paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5) addresses other aspects of human rights issues. It maintains that MNCs should ‘avoid infringing human rights’; ‘address human rights impacts’; and ‘carry out appropriate human rights due diligence’ (OECD 2011). 30 According to NCP’s final report on the complaint, AECB did not violate any human rights related obligations mentioned in Chapters 2 and 4. It also found no evidence that AECB violated obligations under Chapter 3. It only

174 bring AECB to its knees. NCBD’s reaction was somewhat different, however, as the following observation of a UK-based Bangladeshi activist shows:

NCBD is a different type of social movement organization. It relies on direct action-

based struggles. We are not interested in activism through established institutional

framework such as engaging with courts and specialized government organizations such

as NCP. We believe in people’s struggles. For us and the people of Phulbari, winning or

losing in the case of an NCP complaint is not a big issue, if there is an active local and

national mass-based struggle in Bangladesh. In fact, mining companies such as

GCM/AECB do not care about institutional activism (such as using OECD guidelines or

the UN principles on business and human rights). Mining companies have skills and

expertise to ‘technically manage’ these pressures. They only fear local community

mobilization. (TAN Interview #2)

In addition to these various forms of activism to address their grievances, during 2008-2014 several PAN members collaborated with the UK-based NCBD activists to organize demonstrations during GCM’s annual general meeting in London.31 They also participated in these meetings as GCM’s shareholders and proxy shareholders. Transnational advocacy groups working on mining issues commonly employ this strategic tactic (Kirsch 2014). The objective is

found that AECB partly breached obligations under paragraph 7 in Chapter 2, on gaining the trust and confidence of communities affected by its operations (NCP 2014). 31 Since 2015, this annual protest event has been organized by NCBD’s UK branch. A few advocacy groups (including a PAN member, LMN) sympathetic to their cause join them. LMN publishes an annual report based on this protest inside and outside the annual general meeting.

175 to get access to annual meetings and engage in debates with senior executives. They also bring local community people to participate in the annual meetings of mining companies. A

Bangladeshi activist involved with the UK branch of NCBD explains this tactic:

A critical strategy of PAN’s activism in London is to participate in GCM’s annual

general meeting. A PAN member bought few shares of GCM Resources Plc. Buying

GCM’s shares is a political tactic; it does not mean that a PAN member wants to be part

of the mining company and to make money from its investments. It is a tactic to get

access to the annual general meeting. There is no other legal opportunity to raise

activists’ concerns in the annual meetings of mining companies. Members of the

Bangladeshi diaspora in the UK also get an opportunity to participate in these annual

meetings as proxy shareholders. They raise various questions as representatives of their

fellow citizens in Bangladesh, particularly those of Phulbari region. This provides PAN

members an opportunity to engage in debates over the Phulbari coalmine project. (TAN

Interview #3)

Involving members of the Bangladeshi diaspora in the UK was a novel way for PAN members to engage with senior officials of the mining company. A former Bangladeshi activist explains:

By involving members of the Bangladeshi diaspora, PAN members avoid their legitimacy

crisis, i.e., the question about representation. Who represents the interests of local

communities in GCM’s annual meetings? Can a transnational advocacy group based in

London represent grassroots communities of Phulbari? In fact, the voice of a Bangladeshi

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citizen is more credible than that of a transnational advocacy group. Some members of

the Bangladeshi diaspora hail from Phulbari region. Their participation as proxy

shareholders makes it more credible than that of transnational activists from far flung

areas in the global North. (TAN Interview #3)

The formation of the Phulbari Action Network supports existing scholarship on transnational activism in at least one way. When domestic actors in the global South are blocked by the lack of political opportunity structures, they may choose to move beyond the border of the state and seek help from advocacy groups in the global North. In this case, the NCBD sought help when it faced a political crisis in Bangladesh. The military-led CG restricted political activism and forced

NCBD to seek help. However, despite the military rule, there were opportunities (although limited in scale) to continue political programs, and NCBD took full advantage of them.

Notwithstanding political crises in Bangladesh since 1972, there was an environment to exercise free or partially free political rights (Ahmed et al. 2014). There was always a congenial atmosphere for political activism to thrive at both grassroots and national levels. Various administrative measures, including violent repression, did not prevent vibrant political activism; political movements and mass political action against the state and other forces continued in

Bangladesh. In this sense, the Bangladeshi case is unlike many repressive and authoritarian regimes in Latin America and elsewhere – and these are the main case studies for much of the scholarship on transnational activism. Even during the military regime, ‘politics in ... Bangladesh did not revert to a form of repressive authoritarianism’ (Ahmed et al. 2014: 261). NCBD took advantage of this and deployed alternative strategies (e.g., changing tactics and mobilization frames, seeking the support of human rights organizations, using different names for

177 organizations, such as ‘a group of concerned citizens’) to continue its movement (TAN Interview

#1).32

The above narrative on PAN’s activism during the eight years of its existence shows that its main repertoire of collection action was using existing institutional frameworks to address grievances.

Armed with a counter-narrative of ‘the problem,’ it combined ‘information politics’ and

‘accountability politics’ to discredit its opponents. This strategy resulted in the withdrawal of several investors, including the most significant one, ADB. Unfortunately, the financial loss did not stop AECB from continuing its efforts to go ahead with the mining project. Therefore, PAN members changed their tactics and drew on international human rights discourses to engage with institutional norms and practices of the UK government and other global governance organizations, such as the UN and the OECD. PAN’s engagement with these institutional processes did not have a substantial positive outcome. Although the UN Special Rapporteurs released a press statement urging the Bangladeshi government to reconsider AECB’s mining project, neither the Bangladeshi government nor AECB took it seriously. And NCP’s investigation did not find that AECB violated human rights regulations laid out in the OECD

Guidelines. These not-so-positive outcomes point to the failure of PAN’s human rights-based mobilization strategies.33

32 My analysis of reports published in local media during 2007-2008 shows that NCBD carefully deployed these alternative strategies and mobilized the support of other allies, such as the Public University Teacher’s Association, a group of eminent citizens; in this fashion, they kept the issues alive in the public sphere during a critical political time. 33 PAN’s failure to have any tangible effect on the UK government to change its policies toward AECB also raises a critical question about another aspect of transnational activism. Olesen draws attention to ‘the discursive dimension of transnational activists’ opportunities and constraints’ (2011:2, original emphasis). He argues that transnational

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Although many transnational advocacy groups use human rights as a theme in the ‘master frame’ of their activism (Khagram et al. 2002), PAN’s failure to win the NCP complaint in its entirety suggests the limits of campaigns based solely on human rights discourse. I argue that PAN’s framing of its campaign against AECB as a human rights agenda erased its connection to the larger issue, i.e., neoliberal resource governance in the global South. In effect, PAN used a narrow perspective to diagnose a complex problem. Human rights-centred mobilization tactics fail to absorb many critical issues on the core agendas of social movements in the global South.

NCBD’s struggle wasn’t really about human rights violations in local communities; it was more about privatizing resource extraction, the increasing power of global capital and the reduced role of the state, environmental and social risks, and citizenship and democracy in the global South.

5.5 The Politics of the Strategic Alliance of PAN and NCBD

PAN’s activism and its alliance with NCBD during 2007-2014 reveals some fascinating aspects of transnational activism and the dynamics of strategic alliances between northern and southern activists. A common strategy of transnational advocacy groups is to engage with existing institutional norms and practices to realize their goals (Tarrow 2005). To what extent this strategy produces the expected outcome depends on the pragmatic choice of mobilization tactics.

In this section, I explain how two very different activist groups formed ‘an alliance of convenience,’ with the partner from the global South (NCBD) adopting certain strategies to

activists’ use of discursive opportunities is shaped by ‘powerful actors [e.g., states, institutions, corporations] in the transnational political system’ as they create constraints on their strategic choices by limiting ‘the scope of political process by creating and reinforcing certain values, practices, … and frames’ (Olesen 2011:5).

179 creatively work with the partner from the global North (PAN), thus achieving mutual goals while retaining autonomy and authority.

First, there was never total harmony between the two groups, partly because they were so very different. For one thing, the coalition of NGO-led advocacy groups from the north and the radical social movement organization from the south disagreed on mobilization tactics. Although

NCBD collaborated with PAN members during the NCP process, it was skeptical about the process and the possible outcome. The following observation makes this clear:

Transnational advocacy groups work as NGOs. Their mobilization tactics such as

institutional engagements with various stakeholders, who are also the targets of the

movement, fit into their issue-specific narrow interests. NCBD – a politically engaged

social movement organization – does not consider these processes as effective

mobilization tactics. This tactic, as the NCP processes show, does not result in expected

outcome. (TAN Interview #1)

Notwithstanding its hard work, PAN lost power and authority when NCP rejected its complaint.

PAN had exhausted every strategic tactic on which it had expertise and skills.34 However, this did not affect NCBD. As a radical social movement organization, it rejected any form of institutional engagement, preferring direct action-based political struggle. Although PAN

34 There has been no collective activity of PAN members since NCP published its final report in November 2014. The last activity was a follow up report to NCP in June 2015 submitted by a PAN member, one of the two members who submitted the original complaint in December 2012. NCP published its ‘Follow up Statement’ in September 2015.

180 members were unhappy with NCP’s final decision, NCBD activists did not see it as surprising.

According to Mr. Rahman, NCBD feared this outcome from the beginning. He suggested that

INGOs and other advocacy groups (such as PAN members) prefer to follow the traditional way of addressing grievances. By traditional way, he meant the exploitation of institutional norms and practices to engage with opponents. However, as a social movement organization, NCBD had a concrete political agenda vis-à-vis resource extraction and saw this process as futile. Such processes, he suggested, are part of a broader political agenda of global governance organizations to ensure the ‘democratic’ participation of all stakeholders. Many multilateral global governance organizations have therefore introduced institutional norms and practices to address grievances. Transnational advocacy groups exploit these practices on behalf of remote grassroots communities to address their grievances. Mr. Rahman suggested that there is a built-in bias towards corporate capital in this system of ‘civil society engagement’. NCP processes, both

PAN and NCBD believed, were biased towards multinational corporations (TAN Interview #1,

5).35 For Mr. Rahman and other Bangladeshi activists (TAN Interview #3), this built-in bias vividly showed the limits of PAN’s transnational activism.

Another reason for the tense relationship between PAN and NCBD was the culture of engagement. Transnational activists, like the members of PAN, commonly negotiate with their opponents on behalf of grassroots communities. But for NCBD, negotiation was not an option.

PAN’s complaint to NCP is a good illustration of the gap between the two. When NCP receives a complaint, it assesses it and invites both parties to join a dialogue to reconcile the conflict. In this

35 For PAN’s critique of the NCP process, see Christine Haigh’s article in The Guardian (10 February 2015) available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/feb/10/the-global- system-for-holding-corporations-to-account-is-in-need-of-serious-reform (accessed 1 March 2015).

181 instance, NCP wanted to act as a mediator between PAN members and the mining company to resolve the complaint through dialogue. PAN members refused,36 but this was only because

NCBD did not allow them to negotiate. NCBD retained full authority to determine the tactics to engage with NCP. When PAN members prepared the initial draft of the complaint, they were willing to negotiate; they were familiar with the process and knew how to deal with it. However,

NCBD insisted that the complaint must not lead to negotiation. The following observation makes this quite clear:

It’s true that PAN succeeded in ADB’s case; ADB withdrew from its engagement with

AECB. However, it happened for a variety of reasons; ADB felt pressure from many

quarters. But OCED/NCP’s mechanism was different. It is like allowing a multinational

company an opportunity to adjust its actions if it makes any mistake while doing its

business operations. This does not fit into NCBD’s movement agenda. Therefore, we

made it quite clear in the beginning of the OECD/NCP submission that there was no way

to negotiate our movement demands with the mining company. AECB would have to

cancel its Phulbari coal project and leave Bangladesh. These issues are non-negotiable. If

such a claim could not be made in the complaint, there was no necessity to engage with

OECD/NCP’s mechanism. (TAN Interview #1)

NCBD’s decision to keep no option open for negotiation and dialogue with the multinational corporation reflects a neo-Marxist approach to NGO-led politics and development (see Petras and Veltmeyer 2011; Petras 1997, 1999). For NCBD, a critical issue was that transnational

36 I reviewed several complaints to the UK NCP; they revealed that PAN’s refusal was a very unusual tactic.

182 advocacy groups are often co-opted by government agencies and corporations. This echoes

Tarrow’s argument that sometimes transnational activists work as ‘“insiders”, lobbying and collaborating with international elites to the point of co-optation’ (2005:29). Kirsch (2014) provides examples of how INGOs have been co-opted by mining industries, indicating NCBD had reason to be cautious.

In addition, many advocacy groups work in close collaboration with multilateral organizations, government agencies, and multinational corporations and participate in programs sponsored by these actors as part of their civil society engagement initiatives.37 Critical analysis of such initiatives suggests they aim to neutralize opposition and radical criticism (see Esteves, Motta, and Cox 2009).38 The uncritical embracing of institutional engagement results in the failure to achieve the radical changes advocacy groups and social movements are aiming for. Such practices also depoliticise a movement’s agenda and support mainstream neoliberal market forces, the ostensible enemies of these advocacy groups and movements (see de Sousa Santos

2005; Dauvergne and LeBaron 2014). Given this context, NCBD was less optimistic about

PAN’s use of human rights violations to fight the mining company.39

37 Mining companies engage both domestic and international NGOs as their strategic partners for a variety of purposes, notably to improve relationships with local communities and to monitor company-community relations. Some NGOs also lobby mining companies to design sustainable mining development schemes and ensure financial safety nets, such as ‘development funds’ for affected communities (Kirsch 2014; Butler 2015; Wang 2015). 38 NGOs’ engagement with multilateral organizations through their civil society engagement initiatives is a concern for both activists and critical scholars. Joachim argues that ‘the “structuring” effects of the institutional environment’ of international organizations (e.g., the UN, OECD, ADB) on INGOs and civil society organizations, shape these actors’ behavior, understanding, and interests (2011:214). Also important is the fact that ‘the interests or identities of NGOs change due to their interaction with other actors’ (Joachim and Locher 2009:169). 39 However, the apprehension was not well founded. Since the 1980s, NGOs working on various aspects of the extractive industry have contributed to many positive changes to better regulate the industry. They have influenced

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Scholars point to crises of mutual trust between advocacy groups in the global North and global

South (Wood 2005). PAN’s filing of a complaint with NCP had all the earmarks of a potential crisis, but the collaboration between PAN and NCBD avoided this danger when both agreed to the terms set by NCBD.

A second critical issue in strategic alliances formed by northern and southern activists is autonomy. ‘Scale shifts’ from local to global or vice versa have advantages and disadvantages.

Activists on both sides need each other (Rothman and Oliver 1999). Networking with advocacy groups in the global North certainly helps movements in the global South to internationalize their local campaigns, but this cooperation has risks. Scholars connect these risks to dynamics of power (Bandy and Smith 2005; Chowdhury 2011). Power inequalities often lead to co-optation of local (southern) groups’ agenda and discourses of contention in such a way that the local voice is erased and the views of powerful organizations of the global North are supported (Bob 2005;

Keck and Sikkink 1998b).

In the Bangladeshi case, some PAN members wanted to frame the problem using global discourses of climate change, but the new transnational framing might erase the key movement agenda of NCBD and its local allies in Phulbari. Fearing this, NCBD did not allow PAN members to articulate the problem in this way (TAN Interview #1). This obvious example of the

international financial institutions to adopt various safeguard policies and worked with the UN to recommend guidelines for mining corporations and their financiers to reduce harmful impacts of their resource extraction projects. They have also made significant contributions to addressing the concerns of indigenous communities affected by mining operations. See Kirsch (2014:199-211) for a review of some of these achievements.

184 power relations between PAN and NCBD does not support the view that activists in the global

South are weak and play a passive role in partnerships.

The following two quotations explain how NCBD maintained its autonomy. A London-based

Bangladeshi activist says their strategy was the following:

The collaboration between PAN members and NCBD is a quite different form of

transnational activism. Our goal is to maintain a strategic partnership with PAN

members. We have a specific agenda. We are the authority; we do not mobilize them for

all sort of issues. We do not always seek their support to address our concerns. Our

engagement with PAN members is guided by a bottom-up approach of political

mobilization. (TAN Interview #4)

To this, a Bangladeshi activist involved with the UK branch of NCBD adds other issues:

In terms of strategic collaboration between PAN and NCBD, there are some notable

distinctions. First, many transnational advocacy groups including some members of PAN

bring grassroots community activists from the global South who actively take part in

various anti-mining resistance movements in London to ensure local people’s

participation in annual meetings of the respective mining companies, headquartered in the

UK. They use the voices of these people and their actions in these annual meetings in

their campaign materials to garner wider public support for their causes. NCBD does not

allow PAN members to apply this tactic. PAN members cannot reach out to local

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communities in Phulbari on their own. NCBD has specific ideological choices. It does

not want to legitimize GCM’s activities by participating in its annual meetings. In fact, its

position is very clear; it does not want any sort of negotiation with GCM and/or its

Bangladeshi subsidiary. Second, NCBD does not allow PAN members to interfere in its

decision-making process. (TAN Interview #2)

NGO-based local campaigns in the global South are likely to be more vulnerable to unequal power dynamics than the NCBD, as these movements/campaigns are often fully or partially dependent on financial resources provided by northern INGOs/advocacy groups. As Anyidoho and Crawford argue, ‘A local NGO may feel obliged to adopt the funder’s agenda in order to increase its prospects for sustaining the flow of funds’ (2014:495). Local campaigns also risk losing their local support base and legitimacy if they frequently participate in international campaigns to maintain collaboration with their partners in the global North. Leaders of these campaigns may be perceived by local communities as an ‘appendage or mouthpiece of an international actor’ (ibid). Governments often consider this networking as sabotaging national interests.

However, the nature of partnership with a politically grounded social movement organization like NCBD is different. This is evident in the following observation:

There are many kinds of NGOs in the global North. Some work for the interests of global

capital, while other NGOs and advocacy organizations work to challenge the power of

global capital and international financial institutions. However, the direct involvement of

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INGOs in our activism would raise questions about our political agenda. We would lose

our credibility as a home-grown political movement. (TAN Interview #1)

NCBD avoided these pitfalls of transnational activism. It gave priority to local and national campaigns, and it controlled the financial collaboration. Financial collaboration between INGOs/ advocacy groups and local and national activists in the global South often results in a backlash against foreigners’ involvement in national issues (Tsing 2005). NCBD was aware of this at the beginning of its interaction with PAN members and made sure there were no financial flows between local/national and transnational actors. Such a relationship would undermine the credibility of their struggle, and opponents would characterize their movement as a conspiracy fostered by foreign actors with vested interests (TAN Interview #1).

NCBD made another strategic choice to maintain autonomy and avoid conflict: it did not allow

PAN members to interact with local/national activists. This was, in part, a strategy to avoid divisions between local and national activists. Interactions between actors in multiple locations often create tensions and conflicts (Brooks 2007; Hartel 2006; Kraemer et al. 2013; Kumar 2014;

Spalding 2013). Local activists frequently put the blame squarely on their transnational partners because they sponsor foreign visits and offer financial assistance to local activists (Kraemer et al.

2013). NCBD worked to avoid this.

Despite these dynamics (or perhaps because of them), the two groups worked together to advance a common interest. Both benefitted from this partnership. A Bangladeshi activist eloquently explains this mutual benefit:

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PAN members’ participation in our mobilization is a tactical choice for both groups. For

us, the benefit is that the participation of these organizations, based in the global North

[particularly in the UK and the USA], has a significant symbolic value; it drew the

attention of some global newspapers such as The Guardian. The complaint to NCP would

not have been accepted for further investigation by the UK Government had it been

submitted by any activist from Phulbari or Dhaka. This [collaboration] also serves PAN

members’ interest as well. Media publicity and NCP’s investigation legitimizes their

work. … PAN members campaign for us to be accepted by the society where they

operate, along with other advocacy groups. It also gives them an opportunity to build

their [activist] profile so that other local communities [who need support of transnational

advocacy groups] can trust them to address their causes. (TAN Interview #4)

Finally, NCBD adopted a strategy to draw a clear boundary between local/national and transnational activism. Transnational activism vis-à-vis coal and energy frequently takes the form of an ‘anti-coal’ or ‘beyond coal’ movement. NCBD was very cautious about adopting such framing. At the start of the Phulbari Andolon, NCBD took the position that Bangladesh could not afford to keep its coal resources undeveloped, but it advocated environment-friendly methods of coal extraction to be utilized only for domestic power plants (NCBD 2005). Its movement literature contains no references to climate change or fossil fuel. NCBD made a clear distinction between its discourses and those of many PAN members active in global climate change (anti- fossil fuel) movements. This stance is partly explained by the internal political dynamics in

Bangladesh vis-à-vis government—civil society (NGO) relations. Bangladeshi NGOs and civil

188 society groups are mostly funded by foreign donors, and they undertake programs in line with the preferred agenda of their donors (Haque 2002; Khan 2013; Stiles 2002). Government agencies often see these actors as pawns of foreign patrons, especially when their position contradicts the government’s narratives. This gives government agencies an opportunity to delegitimize any mobilization organized by NGOs and civil society groups by labelling them

‘agents’ of foreign entities. NCBD avoided this trap by keeping a distance from the narratives of global climate change and fossil fuel. It refused to adopt others’ viewpoints to maintain its identity as a homegrown social movement.

5.6 Discussion and Conclusion

Scaling up from local and national to a transnational level helps grassroots communities strengthen their activism against multinational corporations, supranational organizations, and states. By scaling up, local and national movements in the global South can take advantage of the resources of northern actors, especially if they need to target forces beyond their national boundary (e.g., Asian Development Bank). They generally lack the organizational resources to do so, however, and transnational advocacy groups help them fill this gap by deploying their own organizational resources and intellectual skills to deal with supranational organizations.

PAN’s work on the anti-mining movement in Bangladesh served two purposes. First, PAN members acted as intermediaries at the global level to persuade powerful actors beyond the reach of NCBD. Second, NCBD and its anti-mining movement benefited from PAN’s expertise, specifically its knowledge of strategic tactics in transnational advocacy, such as ‘complementary

189 mobilization of resources, discourses of persuasion, access to power, and forms of leverage’

(Kirsch 2014:188).

Despite the many positive contributions that can be made by transnational advocacy networks based in the global North, NCBD was reluctant to directly involve outside activists in its movement. It did not expect that outsider activists would solve its problems. They could, at best, raise the issues in global forums and engage with various forces (global banks, investors, and financial institutions) that figured into NCBD’s agenda of stopping the Phulbari mine. They might even successfully persuade those other forces to accept the movement agenda – but NCBD considered such achievements an additional and unexpected support. Its strategic choices were rooted in the belief that a strong national movement with organized grassroots activism could confront the neoliberal policies of ruling political elites.

The dynamics of the partnership between PAN and NCBD direct our attention to a broader issue: the dynamics of power relations between partners of an alliance. Institutional engagement gradually changes the character of transnational activism and leads to the routinization of politics. Dauvergne and LeBaron warn about the pitfalls of activism of large transnational advocacy groups fighting neoliberal global capitalism. They argue that transnational activism against powerful global forces can be corporatized and the radical agenda of social change lost, with advocacy groups conforming to their opponents’ views (2014:137). Many advocacy groups seek market-friendly solutions to advance their causes and speak in ‘market-friendly language’

(2014:1). In contrast, NCBD worked to keep full control of the movement agenda, despite the collaboration with PAN, because it feared that PAN’s active involvement in domestic activism

190 would curtail the legitimacy of the movement. Its activism could be labelled by the government and the mining company as an act of outsiders, and its legitimate concerns could be tainted by allegations of foreign interference.

In short, NCBD took advantage of the partnership with PAN and chose its strategies wisely. For one thing, it was careful not to involve PAN members in a close relationship with local communities or national activists, because it feared a backlash from the government and the mining company.40 NCBD’s political understanding of NGOs’ involvement in global governance mechanisms and their partnerships with multinational corporations and supranational organizations was a significant factor in this decision.41 NCBD’s leftist political ideology was another factor. This ideology informed its opposition to the power of global capital, the neoliberal transformation of economic policies, and above all, the privatization of strategic

‘national’ resources (petroleum and minerals). NCBD’s political ideology as manifest in its three key demands vis-à-vis the Phulbari coal mine42 acted as constraint in selecting like-minded

40 During the protest events of 26 August 2006, the mining company and the government blamed NCBD for instigating local communities. The mining company also labelled NCBD an outside radical group who wanted to thwart economic development in the northern region of the country. 41 NCBD’s skepticism about INGOs is supported by scholarly research. For example, Ferguson (2006) and Goldman (2005) have analyzed the relationship between multilateral financial institutions (e.g., the World Bank) and transnational civil society organizations to understand the larger implication of such relationships. They argue that these organizations play a significant role in institutionalizing neoliberal globalization. The civil society engagement programs of multilateral financial institutions result in what Goldman calls the ‘neoliberalization of civil society’ (2005:270). 42 Its three key demands signify this political character: 1) open pit mining should not be allowed; 2) a foreign company cannot own Bangladesh’s mineral resources; 3) export of mineral resources should not be allowed (NCBD 2005).

191 partners. NCBD’s limited and cautious engagement with PAN members was, therefore, rooted in its nature as a radical social movement organization.

NCBD’s members include leftist political parties43 and progressive activists and professionals.

As a leader of this organization, Mr. Rahman’s view of global politics and radical political mobilization in the global South represents that of NCBD and its strategies to engage with external actors. In general, NCBD members do not perceive INGOs and their local NGO partners as progressive forces because of their association with global corporate capital and supranational organizations; instead, they see them as agents of western capitalist and imperialist forces. They view the actions of local NGOs who are the domestic partners of INGOs as obstacles to mobilizing grassroots communities to achieve radical social transformation.44 Mr. Rahman cautiously shared this view; he believed there were many kinds of NGOs in the global North, with many northern advocacy groups working on issues relevant to southern politically engaged movements (e.g., NCBD). Yet their source of financing, their motivation for/interest in engaging with southern movements, particularly those organized by radical political forces, and their close relationships with supranational organizations created doubt.45

43 These parties have different political goals and leftist principles, but they united under NCBD to confront Bangladesh’s neoliberal energy policies. 44 Mannan captures this view: ‘To [Marxists], NGOs, as agents of imperialism, transformed to produce an image of themselves as agents of apolitical organizations … [They] argue that NGOs offer a buffer zone between the state and society and mitigate social tensions and political conflicts inherent in capitalism’ (2015:6). 45 PAN members (particularly those active in the coalition) were aware of NCBD’s view. Therefore, they preferred to avoid direct collaboration locally/nationally (TAN Interview #5). NCBD’s political nature also created uneasiness among some PAN members (TAN Interview #1).

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Overall, the collaboration between PAN and NCBD can be characterized as an alliance of convenience. Their partnership reflects what Tarrow (2005) calls an ‘instrumental coalition.’ The

PAN-NCBD alliance is not reflective of transnational activism dictated by principled values as suggested in the literature. Rather, as noted by a Bangladeshi activist (TAN Interview #4), PAN members showed interest in NCBD’s case because they thought it would significantly improve their own organizational reputation. Although PAN did not achieve its objectives and failed in its submission to NCP, PAN members retained hope that strong local and national movements (such as NCBD) would ultimately be able to influence the policies of the Bangladeshi government

(TAN Interview #5, 8). They hoped the domestic actors would get stronger and would keep

AECB out of business and persuade the Bangladeshi government to formulate a national coal policy, incorporating NCBD’s movement agenda.46

Based on my data showing the hard work of PAN members to persuade the United Nations, the

Asian Development Bank, and several global banks in their favour, I claim PAN’s work gave credibility to NCBD’s anti-mining movement at the international level, something beyond the reach of NCBD’s organizational and intellectual capacities. Although they did not have tangible successes in terms of forcing AECB to abandon its project, PAN members certainly achieved some intangible outcomes. They successfully engaged with institutional mechanisms of global governance organizations (e.g., ADB, the UN, the OECD) to delegitimize AECB’s discourses.

Borrowing from Kirsch’s analysis, I therefore suggest that notwithstanding the failure and limitations of PAN’s activism, in this particular case, ‘NGOs [and advocacy groups] played a

46 They can only work as sympathizers to amplify the concern of grassroots communities in the UK and elsewhere when needed (TAN Interview #5, 8).

193 central role in political struggles [against mining corporations]. The vitality and creativity of

[these organizations] … have allowed the political movements with which they collaborate to stay one step ahead of corporations and industries’ (Kirsch 2014:225). Instrumental coalitions, like the one analyzed in this chapter, can energize activists across the world to utilize their resources to support the causes of grassroots communities in a remote corner of the global South, communities who are facing the ‘slow violence’ of development and modernity espoused by multinational corporations, their investors, and the states.

Scholars on transnational activism suggest domestic actors in the global South import discourse and frames when they participate in transnational advocacy networks; this permits them to repackage their movement agendas and strengthen their repertoires of collection action (Tarrow

2005; Spalding 2016). My analysis shows that this strategy of building alliances beyond borders can be contingent on the organizational nature and political orientation of social movement organizations in the global South. The discourses and frames used by northern organizations involved in TANs may not fit into the movement agenda and political nature of local/national actors in the global South. As the case analyzed in this chapter shows, under such circumstances, these partners may adopt a convenient strategy to fight a common enemy. Southern actors may form an ‘event centred’ loose coalition and develop a working relationship without losing their autonomy and falling into the pitfalls of transnational activism, such as power struggles between northern and southern actors. These aspects of power dynamics within transnational activism, I suggest, require a careful conceptualization of ‘the boomerang pattern’ theory of transnational activism.

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CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

The preceding empirical chapters have examined three different scales of the Phulbari movement: local, national, and transnational. In this chapter, I emphasize the lessons that can be learned from this analysis of a mining conflict in a remote corner of the global South. The concluding chapter consists of four sections. First, I show that an ‘ecology of agents’ strengthened the social struggle against the power of the state and corporate capital. Second, I highlight some salient features of the movement. I also pay attention to significant context- specific features. Third, I shed light on the significance of the Phulbari movement more generally. And finally, I conclude by discussing a few ideas for further research and emphasizing caution when rethinking coal politics in an era of climate crisis.

6.1 Formation of an ‘Ecology of Agents’

An ‘ecology of agents’ – the collaboration between actors who have different types of resources, capacities, and strength/weakness – is instrumental in achieving both a common goal shared by all actors and specific goals of each actor. In such collaboration, each actor uses its resources and strengths at an appropriate scale to mobilize against its opponents. As Evans correctly observes:

‘Only when [these agents] operate synergistically, each reinforcing the other’s strengths and compensating for the other’s foibles, is success likely’ (2002:22). In this section, I describe the

195 nature of such collaboration vis-à-vis the Phulbari movement. I draw on three vignettes to refer to different concerns/goals of three different agents involved with the Phulbari movement.

First, two different community responses to mining and dispossession are illustrated below, one in India, the other in Bangladesh.

An underground fire has been burning for over a century beneath India’s largest coalfield.

Two decades of unrestrained open-cast mining has brought the fire to the surface with

dreadful consequences for three-quarters of a million people. Thousands of homes have

already been destroyed; their inhabitants forced into a squalid accommodation; hospitals

have been inundated with victims of toxic fumes. So, what lies behind this appalling

human and environmental disaster? ... This is Jharia [in Eastern India], the coalfields of

India. … It was a very nice place, small town … this was a kind of El Dorado at that

time… Today look at the desolation of this place… the very coal has become a curse for

us.1

In the above observation, an Indian activist vividly describes the politics of resource development in Eastern India, not very far from Phulbari.2 His commentary shows the devastating impact of coal mining – one of India’s largest land grabs. A group of activists from

Phulbari visited Jharia in November 2013 to see an open pit coalmine for the first time in their lives and learn from local people about the impact of coal mining. During their tour, they visited

1 This quotation is taken from India: The Burning City, a documentary by Gautam Singh and Dom Rotheroe, aired on Aljazeera English on 5 January 2017. 2 Four hundred kilometres southwest across the Bangladesh-India border near Phulbari.

196 the mining zone, talked to affected villagers, met with local state officials, and participated in dialogues with grassroots activists. Seven years ago, they participated in a popular uprising in

Phulbari against an open-pit coal mine. Local communities voiced their opposition to coal mining:

No, we do not want the coalmine. What will we eat? … We work daily for our

subsistence, we eat from what we earn. That is all we have. If this land is turned into a

coalmine, those who eat in exchange of daily wages, where will they go? Where will we

live? How will we survive? … We are poor people. If I lose my home, how will I earn a

living? What use will be the coalmine?’ Who will it benefit? … If the coalmine comes,

we … will be scattered from our relatives, we will lose our ties … Where will we go?3

Both observations refer to adverse consequences of resource extraction. However, there is a vast difference in terms of community response in Jharia and Phulbari. Local communities in Jharia could not mobilize meaningful resistance against the land grab and dispossession. State officials forcefully displaced people, promising rehabilitation and better employment opportunities; the cost of human and environmental destruction seemed less relevant. Notwithstanding similar promises made by government officials and the mining company, local communities in Phulbari mobilized a successful resistance movement. Their defence of land-based economic, social, and cultural practices forced the Bangladeshi government to withdraw the mining company from

Phulbari and sign a Memorandum of Understanding agreeing that there would be no open pit

3 This quotation is taken from the narrative of Phulabaṛir Raktapataka, a documentary on the anti-mining movement in Phulbari (see Ahmed 2008).

197 coal mine anywhere in the country, and the mining company would not be allowed to work in

Bangladesh. This vignette suggests that similar resource extraction projects do not generate similar responses from affected communities. Specific political contexts create opportunities and challenges for local communities and civil society groups to confront potentially environmentally destructive mining projects.

Second, in January 2015, there was a fierce debate in a leading Bangladeshi newspaper about the effects of anti-mining mobilization on the prospect of foreign direct investments (FDIs) in

Bangladesh. The debate ensued after local communities in Phulbari vandalized properties of the mining company (AECB) in November 2014 when its chief executive officer visited the area to organize a community engagement program and sway public opinion in favour of its planned coalmine project, which had been shelved in August 2006 after a violent anti-mining protest. The local protestors also set up road- and railway-blockades to express their disapproval of the activities of AECB.4 In an op-ed titled, ‘Farewell to FDI?’5 an assistant editor of the Daily Star argued that the protest was damaging the image of the country and sending the ‘wrong signal’ to foreign investors intending to do business in Bangladesh. Two responses to this op-ed were published the following week: one by an activist-academic associated with NCBD6 and the other by an NCBD activist.7 The former characterized the protest as a ‘symbol of a successful resistance’ to defend ‘national and environmental interests.’ Citing the cases of resource extraction in several countries in Latin America and Africa, and characterizing them as a

4 See Daily Star, 27 November 2014, p.13. 5 See Daily Star, 13 January 2015, p.6. 6 See Daily Star, 18 January 2015, p.7. 7 See Daily Star, 20 January 2015, p.7.

198 resource curse, the author distinguished between ‘bad’ and ‘responsible’ investments and challenged the dominant pro-market neoliberal perspective, which champions the role of FDI in generating growth and prosperity in developing countries. Meanwhile, the latter writer, the

NCBD activist, suggested the op-ed author misrepresented many significant facts and argued that the Bangladeshi government had a ‘legal and moral obligation’ to fulfill its commitment in the

Memorandum of Understanding signed between the government’s representatives and NCBD on

30 August 2006.8

This debate9 on contested foreign investment in the global South laid bare the question of

‘national interests’ in an era of neoliberal global capitalism. Pro-market agents championed the role of capital (preferably foreign private capital) in economic development. Oppositional agents, like NCBD, associated with left-leaning progressive politics, considered this as a dogmatic view

(reminiscent of ‘market fundamentalism’) and argued for the state (public sector) to play a role, particularly in managing strategic national wealth, such as petroleum and mineral resources

(resource nationalist view).

8 The first clause of the MOU reads: ‘All contracts with Asia Energy [AECB] will be cancelled; Asia Energy will be withdrawn from four upazilas [sub-district] including Phulbari and Bangladesh. Open pit coal mine will not be developed anywhere in the country including above four upazilas. If any other method is used to mine coal, it will be done on the basis of people’s consent’ (see appendix-2). 9 This debate on the role of FDI in resource extraction first appeared in the Bangladeshi public sphere in 2005 when an organized mobilization began against the FDI-driven Phulbari coalmine project. Similar narratives and counternarratives appeared in the aftermath of violent protests in Phulbari in August 2006. Both Australian and British High Commissioners in Dhaka urged the Bangladeshi government to protect the interests of foreign investors. They characterized community mobilization against the coalmine as ‘wrong signal’ to foreign investors (see Daily Star, 28 August 2006, 2 September 2006). A newspaper editorial and many op-eds echoed their views (for example, see Daily Star, 1 September 2006). Oppositional agents offered counternarratives challenging the assumptions of these views (see Muhammad 2007:73-85, 131-136 for a representative argument of this camp).

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Third, an activist associated with a transnational advocacy network narrates her frustration after seeing the cozy relationship between corporations and the governments which supported them:

Considering the global reach and impact of multinational corporations and the constant

accounts of conflict and claims of human rights and environmental abuses caused by or

related to their operations, it seems unbelievable that there is no rigorous system of

international accountability…In practice, in a world where the government-corporate

nexus seems to become ever more tight and intimate, the few public mechanisms of

accountability that we have seem to be in danger of becoming little more than window

dressings.10

Here, the activist talks about the alleged failure of the British National Contact Point (NCP) to turn its commitment into actual practice.11 She raises questions about the credibility and transparency of a global governance mechanism such as the NCP to ensure the accountability of multinational corporations.

These three vignettes emphasize the concerns of three different groups of actors involved with the Phulbari movement: local communities, urban political activists, and transnational civil

10 Christine Haigh. ‘The global system for holding corporations to account is in need of serious reform.’ The Guardian, 10 February 2015. 11 National Contact Point (NCP) is an institutional mechanism established by member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to monitor the implementation of a voluntary code on responsible business conduct by multinational corporations within their jurisdiction (http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/guidelines/). Two PAN members submitted the complaint against the parent company of AECB (GCM Resources Plc) to the British NCP.

200 society groups. These actors are preoccupied with disparate issues: the ‘moral economy’12 of land-dependent peasants and indigenous communities, the ‘resource nationalist’ political agenda of anti-corporate political activists, and global governance mechanisms to ensure the accountability of multinational corporations and international financial institutions (e.g., World

Bank, Asian Development Bank). The collaboration among these actors for a common cause

(i.e., putting pressure on the Bangladeshi government and the mining company to shelve the

Phulbari coal project) created the possibility for oppositional political agency to confront the structure shaped by neoliberal globalization at the global and national level.

As mentioned in the beginning of this section, an ‘ecology of agents’ mobilizes differently positioned actors who use their resources and strengths at an appropriate scale to target a common opponent. This is exactly what happened in the case of the Phulbari coal project.

Grassroots communities actively participated in protest events. National-level political activists supported them, using their academic capacity and political training (in Marxist politics) to mediate the local and global issues vis-à-vis resource development. Transnational advocacy groups (PAN members) used their skills and resources to engage with global political opportunity structures such as the United Nations to exert pressure on the Bangladeshi government and the financiers of the mining company (e.g., Asian Development Bank, other international banks). Their collective efforts indicate how popular resistance in the periphery culminated in a critical social struggle to challenge the ‘epistemic privilege’ of contemporary

12 E. P. Thomson first introduced the term in an essay in 1971. James Scott (1976) offers further analysis in his work on peasant rebellion in Vietnam. For a contemporary relevance of this term to understand peasant resistance in the era of neoliberal globalization, see Edelman (2005).

201 hegemonic development discourses shaped by ‘the market calculus’ of neoliberal global capitalism (McMichael 2010:3).

6.2 The Phulbari Movement: Some Salient Features

How did the Phulbari movement succeed? In this section, I highlight some of its salient features.

These are: 1) the role of Marxist politics; 2) alliance building with the right kind13 of national- level civil society group(s); 3) firm commitment to a set of non-negotiable key demands; and 4)

13 This characterization of civil society groups warrants some clarification. NGOs/civil society groups are the subject of much controversy in the Bangladeshi context (Khan 2013:245-266). As civil society groups are the product of the political context, their politicized behaviour influences their oppositional discourses and tactics (Tasnim 2017). Furthermore, although NGOs/civil society groups are widely considered to work in the interests of ordinary citizens, in the Bangladeshi context, Quadir (2003) disputes this. Notwithstanding their capacity and good deeds in line with their pro-poor development and rights-based agenda, Quadir argues that these are hardly autonomous organizations vis-à-vis their relationships with the state and other political forces in the society. Put differently, dominant political forces shape the context and scope of civil society groups. Critical scholarship on NGOs shows that their role in strengthening good governance and democratic principles in developing countries is entangled with their incorporation into the neoliberal doctrine of economic reforms and democratic politics this secures their private interest at the expense of greater public interest (Kamat 2004). It is significant to emphasize that, notwithstanding the political influence of both national and global forces, some NGOs/civil society groups do good work and adopt radical approaches (i.e., challenging dominant perspectives) to advance their cause. A problem emerges, as Roy (2014:33) argues, when they are influenced by the global development industry controlled by multilateral institutions, corporations, and wealthy foundations. Their funding conditionalities silence resistance. Ismail and Kamat (2018:569) put it aptly: ‘What makes NGOs distinct is their ambivalence: the fact that they are, on the one hand, a “favoured institutional form” … of the neoliberal state and, on the other, capable of building alliances against neoliberalism, particularly in times of polarisation and crisis.’ Given this context, local/grassroots activists must judiciously choose their allies, looking for those who are free from the control of forces which may undermine their movement agenda. Scholarly research shows that NGO-activist alliances often create rifts among committed local activists (Kraemer et al. 2013; Kapoor 2013). Careful deliberation is required to avoid such conflict.

202 the role of transnational advocacy groups. The first two features laid a solid foundation for the third one, which eventually led to the popular mobilization against the Phulbari coal project. The fourth feature helped the movement to internationalize its demands to persuade opponents who were beyond the reach of both local and national activists.

The local activists who began the anti-mining movement were trained in Marxist-oriented peasant and labour politics. Their political worldview led them to create a particular narrative about the mining company and its business in Bangladesh, one influenced by their take on the nature of ruling elites and the political economy of resource development in the Bangladeshi context. Based on this narrative, they articulated ideas about resource development and disseminated them throughout the mining region. These ideas were not simply driven by a leftist political agenda to resist ‘imperialist’ multinational corporations, however. They resonated with the concerns of local communities about dispossession, displacement, and environmental damage. Land-dependent peasants and indigenous communities quickly accepted the anti-mining ideas and supported protest events en masse.

Local activists knew they needed support from allies at the national level. The idea to scale up the movement emerged after both the mining company and the government ignored their demands. Fortunately, they were able to establish a connection with NCBD, known for its anti- corporate activism. Although there were many other civil society groups and NGOs who could have been allies, only NCBD seemed a perfect choice.14 NCBD, unlike NGOs and advocacy

14 Although three civil society groups (Nagorik [Citizen] Commission of the Bangladesh Economic Association, Bangladesh Paribesh Andolon, Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers’ Association) were sympathetic to the grievances of local communities, the mode of their functioning was not suitable to address the movement agenda of

203 groups dependent on external organizations for financial resources, is a financially and politically independent civil society group, known for its antagonism to Bangladesh’s ruling elites. Its assessment of the Phulbari coal project resonated with the views of local activists and grassroots communities. Such external support was critical for another reason as well. In this case, the conflict between local communities and the mining company was not an example of

NIMBYism. It was rooted in a wider issue: the negative consequences of the government’s adoption of neoliberal policies in Bangladesh’s energy sector. NCBD bolstered the movement agenda by connecting local concerns with national questions that were part of the problem

(neoliberal resource governance). NCBD articulated a counter-narrative to displace the dominant logics of its opponents. Local activists and communities were convinced by NCBD’s narrative.

Other civil society groups, in their respective capacities, amplified the message. These collective efforts persuaded unlikely allies (e.g., high-ranking business elites and some government officials within the Energy Ministry). NCBD’s constant dissemination of movement issues in the national public sphere kept the issue at the forefront of public policy debate, something subaltern communities could not do because of a lack of resources and skills.

Both local and national activists remained committed to a set of non-negotiable key demands and none needed to compromise its preferred movement agenda. Their shared worldviews influenced by Marxist politics helped cement the commitment. This is a major strength of partnerships forged by differently positioned actors confronting a common enemy. The lack of such strength often creates rifts between movement partners.

local campaigners. This is not a place to elaborate on the matter, so suffice it to say that the political connections of the former with ruling elites and the reformist nature of the latter failed to address the grievances of the Phulbari movement.

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Finally, during a critical political situation in 2007-2008, NCBD, by then leading the movement in collaboration with its local partners,15 made a concerted effort to engage with transnational advocacy groups (i.e., PAN). Its strategies were influenced by its understanding of the mode of functioning of international NGOs and advocacy groups in the global South. It was cautiously selective, keeping these groups out of both local- and national-level activities. PAN members were not allowed to participate in the activities of NCBD and its local partners. A key factor driving its careful engagement was that the direct participation of external agents in local and national activism could lead to changes in the movement agenda and the flow of external resources might divide local actors. Moreover, external organizations might choose to work independently with other civil society groups and NGOs to advance their preferred movement agenda after they established a foothold in the local setting. Another factor associated with this strategy was the close collaboration of many international NGOs and transnational advocacy groups with mining corporations, international financial institutions (e.g., World Bank, Asian

Development Bank), and Western development agencies (e.g., USAID and DFID). Ultimately,

NCBD created a partnership without becoming trapped in the power dynamics of transnational collaboration. Given its particular skills and expertise, the transnational advocacy network

(PAN) helped the Phulbari movement confront forces beyond the border and mobilized global political opportunity structures far beyond the reach of local and national activists. In other words, its vitality and creativity were advantageous to its partners in Bangladesh.

15 NCBD, as the representative of the Phulbari movement, was party to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed on 30 August 2006.

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In a nutshell, the Phulbari movement succeeded because differently positioned local, national, and transnational activists cooperated with each other to advance a common goal: putting pressure on the mining company and the Bangladeshi government to abandon the Phulbari coal project. The Phulbari movement offers a model of a successful social struggle confronting powerful opponents. Subaltern communities, notwithstanding the legitimacy of their grievances

(dispossession, displacement, environmental damage), can reach a certain point in mobilization and then get stuck. As in this case, their opponents can ignore them. They need external allies both at the national and transnational level to provide the necessary resources to confront their opponents.16

Although the above model is not unusual, certain case-specific features make the Phulbari movement noteworthy.17 In the South Asian context, the movement confronts the nexus of the state and global corporate capital that commonly ushers in a violent process of land dispossession in the name of development (see Levien 2018; Nielsen 2018). I emphasize three of these specific features. These features helped the movement select the right partners when needed, retain control of the meaning-making process (i.e., the framing of the contentious issue), and avoid backlash.

16 To what extent this model can be applied in other cases? Drawing on Tilly and Goodin’s (2006) conceptual framework of contextual political analysis, I suggest that a movement’s repertoire of tactics depends on the historical and institutional context. 17 Many anti-mining movements in Latin America and South Asia involve such a mobilization strategy. Some have succeeded (see Kohl and Farthing 2006 for a Bolivian case; Kumar 2014 for an Indian case).

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1) NCBD’s nature as an anti-corporate radical social movement organization: NCBD’s position, influenced by its ‘resource nationalist’ narrative, made it a good ally of local activists. As NCBD activists suggest, NGOs and mainstream civil society groups, often an integral part of a neoliberal policy agenda, could have derailed the original movement agenda in favour of a more reformist environmental mobilization. NCBD made it difficult for its opponents to deal with the conflict, as its key demands were non-negotiable. The prolonged debate over the formulation of the national coal policy is an indication of such difficulty.

2) Keeping mainstream NGOs out of the grassroots activism: This feature of the Phulbari movement was rooted in NCBD’s perception of the nature of mainstream NGOs in Bangladesh; these are mostly service providing agencies and fully dependent on external donors. As

Bangladeshi NGOs and civil society groups are funded by foreign donors (e.g., governments, international financial institutions, corporations, foundations, and INGOs), they undertake programs in line with the preferred agenda of their donors. They lack the autonomy to carry out an independent progressive agenda. Even progressive NGOs/advocacy groups committed to environmental justice have limited power to take on contentious issue such as mining conflicts.

Moreover, because of their dependency on external donors, many NGOs have a crisis of legitimacy when they engage with local communities, as it may be done to advance their specific interests. NGOs often play a dubious role in confronting corporate interests, particularly in the extractive industry. Their engagement with international NGOs/advocacy groups, given their financial relationships with mining corporations, international financial institutions, and Western development agencies, compromises their credibility to confront resource development projects.

Moreover, many NGOs prefer to work as partners of mining corporations to ease tensions with

207 grassroots communities and make it easier for them obtain a ‘social license to operate’ in their territory. Mining corporations may also engage NGOs to implement a corporate social responsibility program, a mechanism to depoliticize mining conflicts.18 Against this NGO/civil society backdrop, local activists in Phulbari maintained a constant surveillance in the mining region to monitor whether any local or national NGOs did anything to advance the interests of the mining company. NCBDP activists suggested that (local and national) NGOs worked very closely with rural communities throughout the region (as elsewhere in the country), as they had beneficiary groups in rural areas. After the 2006 protest events (which forced the Bangladesh government to withdraw mining company officials from the Phulbari area), the mining company,

NCBDP activists thought, might use NGOs to continue its relationship with grassroots communities. Therefore, they engaged with the local NGO community (many of whom also work for national and international NGOs) and cautioned them not to take any action supported by the mining company.19 They carefully observed any suspicious activity of NGOs in the region. 20 The strategy weakened the capacity of the mining company to build a credible

18 Notwithstanding this trend, in many countries, NGOS/civil society groups help subaltern communities mobilize against the predatory behavior of mining corporations and the social and environmental harms caused by their mining operations. 19 I drew on my interviews with three NCBDP leaders. 20 In 2010, two NGO staff were doing an opinion survey in a local community. They asked their respondents various questions about their socio-economic situation, similar to the questions the mining company asked in 2005 during its socio-economic surveys. Local activists interrogated them about their work. They replied that their organization was hired by the Local Government Ministry to conduct a socio-economic survey in the area. A local government representative, a resident of that community, confirmed that they provided false information. Local activists handed over them to the police administration. Again in 2012, the mining company hired a Dhaka-based NGO to conduct an opinion survey in the region. It required such a survey to submit results to an inquiry committee formed by the UK Government. Local activists did not allow it to conduct the survey.

208 company-community relationship, a badly needed institutional requirement for any mining operation.

3) Restraining the involvement of transnational advocacy networks: The engagement of external allies (transnational advocacy networks, TANs) is a contentious issue in mining conflicts in the global South. Mining corporations often discredit their critics for their lack of legitimate representation of grassroots communities. TANs also influence movement agendas, which may contradict local concerns. Finally, their financial contribution to local/national activism may create tensions among local and national activists. Such financial relationships give their opponents an opportunity to discredit ‘genuine’ local/national mobilization by labelling it as driven by external vested interests. NCBD and its local partners avoided these pitfalls.

6.3 The Significance of the Phulbari Movement

In this section, I delve into the political significance of the Phulbari movement. I focus on two issues: 1) the value of nationally-rooted activism; and 2) ‘the politics of time’ as a new approach to movements confronting global extractive capital.

6.3.1 Nationally-rooted Activism

To illustrate the political significance of the Phulbari movement, I pay attention to the confrontation of multinational corporations by nationally-rooted activists. NCBD and its local

209 allies, although they collaborated with PAN members, did not consider transnational activism a good way to address local/national grievances. Rather, they emphasized the significance of a strong national-level movement. This movement strategy is significant for several reasons. First, it helps oppositional actors to actively engage with national policy discourses vis-à-vis the contentious issues. Second, the participation in national public sphere is helpful to shape public opinion and confront opponents head-on. Third, the movement gains solid credibility and legitimacy as a home-grown oppositional actor.

Other social mobilizations in Bangladesh, including a movement against industrial agribusiness and biotechnology and a food sovereignty movement, highlight the value of nationally-rooted activism. In the former case, Naya Krishi Andolon or New Agricultural Movement (NAM) is actively involved in several transnational advocacy networks (TANs), which mobilize against the increasing role of big corporations and biotechnology in agriculture (see Mazhar 2007). NAM activists regularly participate in events organized by these TANs both regionally and globally.

However, NAM’s activism at the national level is very limited, and its mobilization of various repertoires is too weak to make much noise.21 NAM and its allies have failed to generate a noticeable debate in public policy discourses, notwithstanding their significant work with grassroots farming communities. In the latter case, a federation of peasant associations

(Bangladesh Krishak Federation, BKF) advocates for the rights of landless peasant communities within the framework of the food sovereignty movement. BKF is a member of the transnational agrarian movement, la via campesina (see Desmarais 2007). It regularly participates in transnational events and contributes to action programs. However, BKF’s mobilization and its

21 Media coverage indicates whether a mobilization can make a significant mark in the national public sphere.

210 impact on public policy debate is invisible at the national level. Its participation in transnational activism does not translate into a meaningful resistance at the national level.22

These two cases do not offer credible evidence that southern activists can make a substantial contribution using their knowledge and resources in domestic activism (see Silva 2013; Tarrow

2005; von Bülow 2010). We need to be more careful when we examine the efficacy of TANs in galvanizing domestic activism in the global South. Such activism can achieve very little if there is no powerful activism at the local and national level (see Evans 2005). When a strong national advocacy group can mobilize popular support, engage in public policy debate, and articulate counter-narratives to challenge dominant views on the contested agenda, social movements confronting the state and capital in the global South can be successful (also see Kraemer et al.

2013). NCBD is such a civil society group; unlike NAM and BKF, in the case of the Phubari mine, it adopted strategic choices rooted more at the national level than the transnational level.

6.3.2 The Politics of Time

Anthropologist Stuart Kirsch (2014) argues that political movements against mining corporations can realize their goals if they deploy ‘the politics of time.’ Kirsch argues there is contradiction between the short-term material interests of mining corporations and the long-term ‘slow violence’ of resource extraction, especially its environmental effects. Political struggles against

22 Engagement in transnational advocacy beyond borders is often driven by the material interests of NGOs and civil society groups in Bangladesh. Participation in beyond the border activism guarantees the flow of resources from the global North to South. Their inclination to be active in beyond the border activism undercuts the possibility of creating domestic constituencies and mobilizing right-based struggles.

211 such environmental destruction must ‘bring these longer temporal horizons into public consciousness and make them subject to political and economic calculations’ before the actual mining operations begin (2014:191). In so doing, these struggles bring the future environmental risks and hazards into the present. It is important to remember that scholarly research on mining conflicts shows that affected communities have little effect on mining corporations once a mine begins production (see Bebbington 2012; Bebbington and Bury 2013; Deonandan and Dougherty

2016; Horowitz and Watts 2017). With a well-organized movement involving local communities, national civil society groups, and transnational advocacy networks, the affected communities can, at best, demand some compensation for the loss of property and environmental destruction but not a full remedy of various forms of rights violation which scholars call ‘slow violence’ unleashed by the extractive industry (see Nixon 2011; Gamu and Dauvergne 2018).

‘The politics of time’ is a new tactic. It seeks to confront mining corporations head-on before they begin mining operations. Such activism aims to create obstacles so that mining corporations cannot easily mobilize necessary capital and get government approval. It can be an effective strategy to confront corporations and challenge ‘the means by which elites extend their power over the body politic through their control over the social construction of time’ (Kirsch

2014:191).

Despite its promise, few anti-mining movements have used ‘the politics of time’ as stipulated in

Kirsch’s framework. Herein lies the significance of the Phulbari movement; it is one of very few cases where an anti-mining movement has confronted the state and corporate capital at the initial stage of mining projects. Although the mining company (AECB) has never acknowledged that

212 the claims of the Phulbari movement were credible, after ten years, the Bangladeshi government did so. Relentless activism based on ‘the politics of time’ ensured this achievement.23

It is difficult to organize social movements against the state and mining corporations. It is difficult to prove the problems of a mining project before any actual physical activity starts. The long-term ‘slow violence’ of resource extraction is not visible at the beginning. Proponents of resource extraction projects simply say detracting views are devoid of scientific foundation.

Meanwhile, ruling elites and mining corporations can persuade public opinion in favour of the project by emphasizing short-term economic benefits of resource extraction and the trickle-down impact of such economic benefits. Yet in the Phulbari case, anti-mining activists answered the challenge. Local activists began mobilization immediately after the mining company began its socio-economic surveys. It was difficult to mobilize popular support, and local activists realized they needed help to attract followers and strengthen the oppositional logics of their movement.

Although leftist political groups, progressive activists, and intellectuals were very much aware of resource plunder in Bangladesh,24 they thought the Phulbari coal project was necessary for

Bangladesh’s economic development. Local activists faced tremendous challenges to win their support.25 A group of committed activists (local and national) worked diligently to dissect

23 For some of these cases, see Kirsch (2012, 2014). 24 Schimitar’s Haripur oil and gas development project (1986), KAFCO’s natural gas use project (1990), and Unocal’s Bibiyana gas export project (2001) are well-known cases. 25 A local leader (NCBDP activist) explains the difficulty: ‘In early 2005 when I approached a number of senior leaders of various leftist political parties, they were not convinced by my arguments. Similar things happened when I met some eminent progressive intellectuals in Dhaka. First, they did not understand what I explained to them, because none of them had any idea about open pit coal mining by a multinational company in Bangladesh. Second, they thought that I was against the coalmine, which, for them, was not a good idea. Third, they argued that the

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AECB’s project documents and reviewed cases of political struggles against mining around the world, especially in Latin America and Africa, to craft a movement agenda and culturally and politically resonant movement frames. They rejected the ‘corporate science’ of the mining company26 and emphasized the long-term effects of the project (e.g., the future production of environmental risks and the weakening of national interests). Rejecting the dominant discourses of neoliberal development, they articulated a counter-narrative which resonated with the social, cultural, and political interests of various groups, including local farming communities, indigenous peoples (Adivasis), political activists and civil society groups working at the national level. Committed activists worked to translate movement ‘frames’ into practical socio-economic concerns to reach a wider audience both at the local and national level.27 Their ideas attracted local communities, who participated in mass demonstrations, and national-level civil society groups, who lent their moral support. Such commitment and collaboration invoking the strategies of ‘the politics of time’ strengthened the movement when the mining company was just about to seek government approval and build a partnership with various financial stakeholders.

Based on his meticulous analysis of political movements against mining corporations in the

Pacific region, Kirsch (2014) suggests that movements based on ‘the politics of time’ have enormous potential to confront mining corporations and prevent the long-term effects of the loss of land and livelihood and environmental destruction. The Phulbari movement is an excellent

coalmine would be a good thing for our economy. However, they later understood that the project would be another case of resource plunder.’ 26 For a critical analysis of this phenomenon, see Faruque (2017). 27 They regularly publish opinion pieces in newspapers and magazines and present counter-arguments against the logics of the proponents of the Phulbari coal project. In fact, their collective efforts and NCBD’s activism have created an opportunity to produce knowledge about resource politics in Bangladesh.

214 example. The movement gained popular support by emphasizing the ‘longue durée’ of the mine’s potentially damaging impacts. Various reports of the Bangladeshi government, published much later, identified serious socio-economic and environmental ramifications of the coal project. These reports legitimized the views of the anti-mining movement. In the end, the relentless grassroots mobilization forced the government to put a hold on development, making the Phulbari movement a significant addition to political struggles against the state and corporate capital in South Asia. In this case, ‘land grab’ was prevented.

6.4 Coda

I conclude this chapter by drawing attention to two issues. First, I discuss some ideas for further research on the topic explored in the dissertation; second, I offer a cautionary note for rethinking coal politics vis-à-vis climate change and the use of fossil fuel.

6.4.1 Agenda for Further Research

The Phulbari coal project can be characterized as a case of ‘the looting machine.’28 The ruling elites made a deal with the mining company allowing it to export all extracted resources without paying export tax; they guaranteed there would be no change in the royalty rate during the mining period (more than 38 years), and the mining company would be allowed to use an

‘offshore account,’ a tool used to prevent a country from getting its fair share of resource

28 See Burgis (2015) for a careful analysis of this phenomenon in the African context.

215 development (Rahman 2008).29 It is not unusual that corruption in natural resource development benefits extractive companies and a tiny group of ruling elites at the cost of the development of a country (see Williams and Le Billon 2017). Scholars label this phenomenon the ‘resource curse.’30 The resource curse augments what dependency theorists (such as Andre Gunder Frank) refer to as ‘the development of underdevelopment.’ Simply stated, the Phulbari movement has helped Bangladesh avoid a resource curse (see Muhammad 2014).31 Engaging with the literature on the resource curse, future researchers can explore the formation of the interplay of corporations and states in the specific historical and institutional context of Bangladeshi politics where, deal-making vis-à-vis resource extraction (gas and coal), activists claim, favours corporate interests at the cost of national socio-economic development. Recent research (see

Bebbington et al. 2018) draws on new conceptual frameworks such as ‘political settlement’ – defined as the ‘distribution of organizational power’ in a society32 to examine the dynamics of resource governance in developing countries. Other researchers can contribute to this emergent scholarship by emphasizing the dynamics of political settlement in the Bangladeshi context. New research in this area should also appreciate the role of civil society groups who contest various

29 International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, ICIJ’s research has revealed that mining firms in Africa use tax havens (offshore accounts) to exploit the continent (see The Guardian 25 July 2016). 30 It refers to ‘the failure of many resource-rich countries to benefit fully from their natural resource wealth, and for governments in these countries to respond effectively to public welfare needs … [These] countries tend to have higher rates of conflict and authoritarianism, and lower rates of economic stability and economic growth, compared to their non-resource-rich neighbors’ (NRGI 2015:1). Also see Humphreys et al. (2007). 31 Resource extraction, accompanied by myriad forms of rights violations and the violence of development, often fails to achieve what it purports to do. In different countries, coal mining has failed to generate trickle-down benefits to local communities. Mining projects often fail to compensate local people for their loss of property, endangered livelihood, displacement, and environmental damage. Poverty and underdevelopment are corollaries of coal mining in many countries (see Balch 2013; Amnesty International India 2016). 32 See Khan (2017) for a conceptual analysis of this framework.

216 dynamics of political settlement. For example, one of the slogans of the Phulbari movement is:

‘amar mati amar ma; Nigeria hobena.’33 This slogan refers to the resource curse in Nigeria.

Nigeria is a resource rich country, but it has failed to materialize the benefits of its resources because of a corrupt nexus between its political elites and international oil companies. It also refers to cases of environmental destruction in the Niger Delta where a multinational corporation

(Shell) destroyed vast tracts of land for oil extraction (see Bob 2005; Okonta and Douglas 2003).

The Phulbari movement energized activists and civil society groups to resist cozy relationships between corporations and the state, sustained by a specific context of political settlement.34

6.4.2 Rethinking Coal Politics

One of the significant achievements of the Phulbari movement was its ability to force the

Bangladeshi government to shelve the coal mine project. However, the mining company (AECB) did not abandon the project. During the last 12 years, it has kept alive its hope for getting government approval to begin the mining operation, albeit on a limited scale, in Dhaka and

London. Recent policy changes in Bangladesh helped the mining company renew its timid hope.

33 ‘Our land is our mother; we won’t let it be like Nigeria.’ 34 As part of the celebration of the victory of the Phulbari movement on 26 August, each year, activists address other contested development projects such as the construction of a large coal-based power plant near the Sundarbans (Muhammad 2018). The Sundarbans is the world’s largest mangrove forest and a UNESCO world heritage site. Since 2011, many NCBD activists, along with an alliance of 53 civil society groups, have been mobilizing against the project to protect a fragile natural resource, a critical source of livelihood for millions of people living in the nearby coastal region and a natural barrier against cyclones, the frequency and dreadfulness of which have increased with the changing climate. See Chelsea Harvey’s report titled, “A new power plant could devastate the world’s largest mangrove forest.” The Washington Post, July 18, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy- environment/wp/2016/07/18/a-new-power-plant-could-devastate-the-worlds-largest-mangrove-forest/?noredirect=on (accessed 10 January 2017).

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The Bangladeshi government announced a new Power System Master Plan (PSMP) in June

2016, stipulating that by 2041, it would generate 35 percent of the planned power capacity

(60,000MW) from coal-based plants.35 The PSMP gave the mining company an excellent opportunity; it redesigned the coal mine project as a combined coal mine and power project: ‘The

Company is now proposing that 6,000MW of power generating capacity be established in conjunction with mine development, which would consume the mine’s full thermal coal production. This is a major value-adding step that underpins the coal mine’s economic sustainability’ (GCM 2018:2). AECB feels confident that remaking the coal mine proposal presents ‘a holistic power solution’ to the Bangladeshi government, given its positioning of coal- based power plants as a key component of its PSMP (GCM 2018:2). Another policy document36 has also kept the door open for indigenous coal development to ease the crisis of the supply of primary energy.

Since the mining company has not abandoned the coal project and recently redesigned it by aligning its goal with the government’s new PSMP that emphasized the use of domestic and imported coal, the time has come for civil society groups like NCBD and its local allies to rethink their coal politics agenda. The discourses of the anti-mining movement must address the risks of climates change in so far as these are related to the increasing use of fossil fuel such as coal. This rethinking is required to strengthen the ‘gains’ of the Phulbari movement. Although local communities in Phulbari region are primarily concerned with protecting land, livelihood, and the environment, progressive political activist groups like NCBD need to be more visionary

35 Annual Report 2016-2017, Power Division of the Ministry of Power, Energy, and Mineral Resources, pp.2-3. 36 Seventh Five Year Plan: 2016-2020, Planning Commission, Government of Bangladesh.

218 to address the broader concern such as climate change. Their opposition to coal mining must go beyond the debate over issues such as environmentally friendly mining methods, ownership of state-owned enterprises, and the use of resources to meet domestic demands. They must consider this impending crisis to address coal politics more broadly.

Scientific reports on global climate change show that Bangladesh is one of the countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change (see Roy et al. 2016). A recent report of the World

Bank suggests that ‘more than three-quarters of Bangladesh’s population is at risk of declining living standards due to rising temperature and erratic rainfall from climate change.’ The report presents a very dark future for Bangladeshi people: ‘Bangladesh’s average annual temperatures are expected to rise by 1.0°C to 1.5°C by 2050 even if preventive measures are taken along the lines of those recommended by the Paris climate change agreement of 2015. If no measures are taken, then the country’s average temperatures are predicted to increase by 1.0°C to 2.5°C’ (my emphasis).37 The effects of climate change are so frightening38 that the Bangladeshi government cannot afford to follow the policy of ‘business as usual.’ A recent annual report (2016-2017) of

Power Division, an agency of the Energy Ministry, shows that the government has commissioned 19 new coal-based power plants, now at various stages of construction. Energy and climate change scholars urge the government to move towards clean energy. Two recently suggested that ‘Going by the numbers – economic, job creation and environmental – there really

37 World Bank (2018), South Asia’s Hotspots: The Impact of Temperature and Precipitation Changes on Living Standards (see https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/09/26/bangladesh-rising-temperature- affects-living-standards-of-134-million-people, accessed 10 December 2018). 38 A New York Times report documents the sufferings of people living in Bangladesh’s coastal areas (see https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/29/world/asia/facing-rising-seas-bangladesh-confronts-the-consequences-of- climate-change.html, accessed 15 June 2015).

219 should be no debate. The choice is solar.’39 The government must take the issue of rising temperature very seriously, and political activists and advocacy groups cannot preclude coal mining and climate change concerns when forming their agendas.

Bangladesh has been hailed internationally for its role in designing an effective policy framework for addressing climate change-induced risks and vulnerabilities. The United Nations

Environment Programme (UNEP) recognized Bangladesh’s achievement by awarding its Prime

Minister ‘the champion of the earth’ award in the policy leadership category in 2015 for her government’s ‘forward-looking policy initiatives and investments’ to make sure that ‘current and future generations of Bangladeshis are better prepared to address climate change risks and reverse the impacts of environmental degradation.’ The UNEP cites her role in several of

Bangladesh’s outstanding achievements in ensuing social and economic development in the era of climate crisis, such as the formulation of a ‘progressive’ Climate Change Strategy and Action

Plan in 2009; Bangladesh was ‘the first developing country to frame such a coordinated action plan’ and the initiative of the government ‘to set up its own Climate Change Trust Fund’ by mobilizing substantial amount of domestic resources.40 The recent policy developments to increase the use of coal to reduce energy poverty and enhance economic growth suggest this commendable work is in jeopardy.

These policy changes should also be understood in the broader context of regional power politics vis-à-vis trade and investment among powerful countries in Asia. A recent report in a

Bangladeshi newspaper shows an interesting dynamic of coal politics in the country. For

39 See Daily Star report on this study at https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/environment/the-superior-choice- 1534639 (accessed 16 February 2018). 40 See https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/09/508702 (accessed 20 June 2017).

220 example, even though China is moving towards green energy, it is, the report claims,

‘bankrolling Bangladesh’s fossil-fuel driven energy sector.’41 A German anti-coal advocacy group reports that many Asian companies, including those of China and Japan, use taxpayer money to step up funding for coal-based power plants, blamed for global warming, in several

Asian countries, including Bangladesh.42 The World Bank is also a major player despite making a commitment to stop funding fossil fuel projects.43 Advocacy groups claim that the Bank is

‘indirectly financing a boom in some of Asia's dirtiest coal-fired power generation.’44 It is not only external actors who play the game; there are internal actors as well. As a New York

Times Op-ed suggests, ‘Although Bangladesh has great potential for renewables, policymakers haven’t put in the necessary investment or planning to developing them. This is partly because of cronyism and corruption, and vested interests that are eager to maintain fossil-fuel monopolies.’45 The Bangladeshi government, despite taking a firm position during global climate talks to address its challenges, is aggressively moving towards using coal.46

41 See Daily Star report at https://www.thedailystar.net/star-weekend/meet-the-coal-power-plants-1518427 (accessed 12 January 2018). 42 For this report by Urgewald in collaboration with CDP and Natural Resources Defense Council see https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-04/china-s-funding-for-coal-draws-scrutiny-as-climate-concern- grows (accessed 10 January 2019). 43 See the Guardian, 12 December 2017 (https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/dec/12/uk-banks-join- multinationals-pledge-come-clean-climate-change-risks-mark-carney, accessed 25 January 2018). 44 See Dhaka Tribune 3 November 2016 (see https://www.dhakatribune.com/business/economy/2016/10/03/worldbank-secretly-finances-asian-coal-boom, accessed 12 January 2017) 45 Joseph Allchin, ‘Bangladesh’s Coal Delusion,’ New York Times, 4 March 2014 (see https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/05/opinion/bangladeshs-coal-delusion.html, accessed 2 January 2015). 46 See the Guardian, 2 March 2016 (https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/mar/02/thousands-to-march- protest-coal-plant-threat-bangladeshs-sundarbans-forest, accessed 2 March 2016).

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Despite this bleak scenario, there is a sign of hope. Activists in the Phulbari movement are moving towards addressing climate change issues. They express grave concerns about the dangerous plan of the Bangladeshi government to increase the use of coal for power generation.

Opposing the coal-based PSMP, NCBD advocates for the use of renewable energy sources. It recently unveiled an alternative plan,47 which it argued, would save US $19 billion by 2041.

According to NCBD, Bangladeshi people can get cheaper power from environmentally friendly sources than from the coal-based sources proposed by the government. It argues that more than

55 percent of the required electricity could be generated by renewable resources such as solar, wind, and waste energy. Moreover, this alternative power system plan, NCBD suggests, would reduce the burden of foreign debt, as its plan advocates the use of local resources.48 An NCBD activist calls its alternative power plan a ‘people’s master plan for a liveable future,’ one that opposes the ‘pro-corporate agenda’ of the Bangladeshi government.49

47 NCBD, The Alternative Power and Energy Plan for Bangladesh (abridged version), July 2017. 48 Daily Star, 23 July 2017 (see https://www.thedailystar.net/city/alternative-energy-plan-can-save-19b-1437355, accessed 24 July 2017). 49 See Anu Muhammad, ‘people’s master plan for a liveable future,’ Daily Star, 28 July 2017 (see https://www.thedailystar.net/star-weekend/opinion/peoples-master-plan-livable-future-1439680, accessed 30 July 2017).

222

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Appendices

1. Timeline of the Phulbari Movement and Related Events

No Date • Mineral development in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was governed by The East Pakistan Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1967 (East Pakistan Act No. II of 1968), pursuant to which The East Pakistan Mines and Minerals Rules 1968 was promulgated. This is the first legal framework for regulating resource extraction in Bangladesh. August 1968 • The Dacca [Dhaka] Gazette, 267-MD: The Government of East Pakistan [now Bangladesh]—Commerce and Industries Department published The East Pakistan Mines and Minerals Rules, 1968. As per its Third Schedule, coal royalty was 10 percent (p.992). August 1987 • Bangladesh Gazette, SRO-174: The Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources (MPEMR) amended the Third Schedule of Mines and Minerals Rules, 1968 to fix the coal royalty rate as 20 percent (p.4859). November 1989 • Bangladesh Gazette, SRO-380: MPEMR amended several sections of Mines and Minerals Rules, 1968. As per its 3rd schedule, coal royalty rate remained as 20 percent (p.9373). November 1992 • Bangladesh Gazette (Act No. 39 of 1992): The Government of Bangladesh (GOB) passed Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1992 to replace The East Pakistan Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1967. July 1994 • GOB signed a deal with a newly formed state-owned mineral company (BCMCL) to

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develop the Barapukuria coal mine. The deal included coal royalty rate as 20 percent. August 1994 • GOB signed an agreement with an Australian mining company, BHP Minerals, to explore and mine coal in northern Bangladesh. According to the agreement with BHP, the royalty rate is 6 percent. Activists and energy experts argue that GOB has violated existing mineral law by reducing the royalty rate. No public notice in the form of an official gazette notification in this regard was published to date. December 1995 • Bangladesh Gazette, SRO-232: MPEMR amended several sections of Mines and Minerals Rules, 1968. As per its 11th schedule, coal royalty rate was fixed as 5 percent (underground mining) and 6 percent (open pit mining) (p.4544). Activists and energy experts argue that this amendment was done to fulfill conditions set out in GOB’s agreement with BHP. January 1996 • Bangladesh Gazette PIC-43/95: MPEMR published National Energy Policy which was approved by GOB on 9 November 1995. This policy has institutionalized neoliberal transformation of the energy sector, which began in the 1980s as an agenda of Bretton Woods Institutions’ Structural Adjustment Programs in Bangladesh. January 1997 • BHP discovered the Phulbari coal mine. October 1997 • Two senior managers of BHP co-founded Asia Energy Corporation (Bangladesh) Pty Ltd (AECB) and incorporated it in New South Wales, Australia. December 1997 • BHP received GOB’s permission to assign its agreement and licenses to AECB; AECB signed an agreement with BHP to acquire its Phulbari coal mine project; and AECB received GOB’s permission to do business in Bangladesh. February 1998 • GOB signed an agreement with AECB to assign the agreement signed between GOB and BHP in 1994.

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May 1998 • AECB incorporated with the Registrar of Joint Stock Company, Bangladesh. December 1998 • The National Committee to Protect Oil-Gas, Power and Ports (NCBD) was formed to mobilize against privatization of resource extraction. September 2003 • A new mining company named Asia Energy Plc was incorporated in London. It acquired 100 percent of AECB, which holds the licenses to explore and mine the Phulbari Coal Project. April 2004 • AECB’s parent company, Asia Energy Plc was admitted to the Alternative Investment Market of the London Stock Exchange. May 2004 • Bangladesh Gazette, SRO-131: MPEMR amended several sections of Mines and Minerals Rules, 1968. As per its 11th schedule, coal royalty rate remained as 5 percent (underground mining) and 6 percent (open pit mining) (p.2819) November 2004 • After its pre-feasibility study in 2000 AECB planned to develop an open pit coal mine to produce annually 9 million tonnes of coal, with 6 million tonnes allocated for a mine mouth power station and the balance earmarked for Bangladesh’s domestic markets. • AECB later changed the plan and moved from a project geared towards meeting domestic needs of primary energy to an export oriented mega mining project. Substantial increase in the price of coal, propelled by market-driven demand from China and India forced AECB to change its plan. April 2005 • Jatiya Krishak Khetmajur Samiti (JKKS) organized a rally in Phulbari and raised several critical issues about the proposed Phulbari coal mine. This is first political action against the mining company (AECB). JKKS argued that AECB’s project would destroy vast tract of farmland and ground water resources. The company

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would make lots of profit and the country would get very little if the project continued JKKS argued. Another local community organization, Phulbari Community Council also hold a mass rally in Phulbari and urged the government and AECB to reconsider the coal mine project as it would cause damage to the environment and loss of land and livelihoods. June 2005 • Phulbari Raksha Committee (Committee to Protect Phulbari, or CPP) was formed to mobilize grassroots movement against the mining company (AECB). • CPP organized its first rally in Phulbari and urged the government to stop the cancellation of the Phulbari coal project. It gave GOB 21 days to meet its demands. • The convenor of CPP, the mayor of Phulbari municipality cancelled the No- Objection Certificate (NOC) given to AECB on 15 January 2005. NOC is a legal document the mining company requires to work in his jurisdiction. • CPP sent a petition to the Prime Minister. They made it clear that local people would not allow AECB to build its planned coal mine. CPP argued that the coal mine would destroy land and livelihood of local people. The mining company would make enormous amount of profit, it mentioned in the petition. July 2005 • Jatiya Ganafront, an NCBD member distributed a pamphlet (Phulbari: Whose Losses Whose Gains) in Phulbari. • CPP formed a 5 kilometers long human chain in Dhaka-Dinajpur highway to protest against AECB’s coal mine project. August 2005 • NCBD and CPP signed a memorandum to form a strategic alliance and strengthen the movement against the mining company (AECB). NCBD also renamed its organization to include ‘mineral resources’ to its protest agenda. • The adviser of MPEMR formed a committee headed by a joint secretary of the ministry to review the existing mine and mineral rules in order to increase royalty and various license fees. September 2005

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• CPP organized another large mass rally in Phulbari. Its leaders argued that the planned coal mine would displace thousands of people and destroy the environment. • AECB received Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) from the Department of Environment for its coal mine project. ECC is valid for one year. AECB has to renew it every year of its operation in Phulbari. • Barapukuria coal mine began commercial production. • The Secretary of Energy and Mineral Resources Division (a division of MPEMR) said that GOB would formulate a comprehensive coal policy with regard to foreign investment, infrastructure, its usage and development. He also said that GOB would welcome foreign investment in coal exploration but would make no compromise with foreign companies on the question of national interest while striking any deal. October 2005 • AECB submitted its feasibility study of the Phulbari coal mine and a scheme of development to MPEMR for government’s approval with an aim to begin mining in 2007. • NCBD organized a workshop in Dhaka to discuss its diagnosis of the Phulbari coal mine project with various stakeholders: local community leaders, CPP activists, NCBD members, energy experts, and academics. Later, it published a booklet, Phulbari: Whose Gains Whose losses (NCBD 2005). November 2005 • MPEMR formed a technical expert committee headed by a professor of Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology to assess AECB’s feasibility study and scheme of development. December 2005 • MPEMR engaged a state-owned consulting firm, IIFC (Infrastructure Investment Facilitation Centre) to prepare a coal policy. IIFC proposed to develop two open pit coal mines in Phulbari and Barapukuria by two foreign companies, AECB and Tata (India) respectively. January 2006 • Bangladesh Paribesh Andolon (BAPA), a leading group of environmentalists

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organized a seminar in Dhaka titled, “Open pit mining: its consequences on environment and economy.” Participants argued that Bangladesh would lose BDT 9000 crore (excluding the loss of life and damage to the environment) if the mining company extracts coal. [Note: 1 Crore = 10 million] March 2006 • At a public rally in Dinajpur, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister announced that her government would develop and produce coal from Phulbari soon. • In collaboration with CPP, NCBD held a rally in Phulbari and concluded its first protest event, Dhaka-Phulbari road march. They announced “The Phulbari Declaration” and urged the Government to cancel the coal mine project. • Citizens’ Commission of Bangladesh Economic Association criticized recently unveiled draft national coal policy and argued that the policy was anti-people and it violated the constitution. • The energy adviser told Bangladeshi media that the agreement with AECB did not protect national interest and demanded punishment for those responsible. He said, “How an agreement like this can be signed in a sovereign country?” April 2006 • Jatiya Adivasi Parishad (JAP) organized a mass rally in Phulbari. The president of Bangladesh Adivasi Forum urged the government to cancel the project considering its devastating impact on indigenous people living in the region. May 2006 • FBCCI, Bangladesh’s leading business organization urged the government to renegotiate the deal with AECB. It argued that the royalty rate was low compared to similar agreements in other countries. June 2006 • Bangladesh Gazette (Volume 6, p.643); Bureau of Mineral Development (BMD) published a notice about the assignment agreement between AECB and the Bangladeshi government. BMD published this notice after 8 years and 2 months of the signing of the agreement with AECB. July 2006

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• CPP enforced a half-day hartal (shutdown) program in Phulbari and gheroa the office of the UNO (Upazila Nirbahi Office). • NCBD announced a protest event to gherao (encircle) the mining company office in Phulbari on 26 August 2006. August 2006 • CPP-NCBD collaboration broke down; NCBD revived its Phulbari chapter (NCBDP) created during its Anti-Gas Export Movement in 2002 against an American oil company, Unocal. • On 26 August, NCBD organized a grand rally in Phulbari. Media reports suggest that more than 50,000 people attended the rally. State security force killed three protesters. • On 30 August, GOB signed a memorandum (the Phulbari Agreement) with NCBD; agreed to implement its every demand, and withdrew mining company officials from Phulbari. The chief negotiator of GOB told media, “Why would we honour a deal that goes against the interest of the country?” • Opposition political parties led by BAL enforced a countrywide dawn to dusk hartal on August 30 protesting the killing of people in Phulbari. • Citizen’s commission of Bangladesh Economic Association demanded immediate cancellation of the contract with AECB. • Asia Energy Plc suspended its share trading at the London Stock Exchange for two months (31 August - 6 October). September 2006 • The leader of the main opposition political party (Bangladesh Awami League, BAL) went to Phulbari. She expressed solidarity with the movement and saluted local people in a public rally. She also cautioned the government (led by her arch rival, Bangladesh Nationalist party, BNP) not to dillydally to implement the memorandum (the Phulbari Agreement). • Technical expert committee submitted its report to MPEMR. The committee identified many critical issues and recommended not to approve AECB’s feasibility study and scheme of development. According to the committee, AECB failed to

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address some significant issues such as impacts of mining on agriculture, ground water and local people. AECB also reduced the number of displaced population. The committee also noted that it did not find overwhelming support of local people for AECB’s mine project. This contradicted the claims of AECB. • Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) termed the memorandum (the Phulbari Agreement) as a blow to foreign investment prospects in Bangladesh. • There was heated debate in Bangladesh’s parliament over Phulbari coal mine. Opposition parties grilled several ministers. • Department of Environment (DoE) asked AECB to submit more documents to consider its application to renew ECC. I think after August 2006 events in Phulbari, DoE is careful to scrutinize AECB’s scientific documents. Moreover, an official of DoE was a member of the expert committee, which evaluated AECB’s feasibility study and therefore DoE had more scientific analysis of AECB’s study. Since September 2006 AECB has no ECC to operate in Phulbari area. As of this writing in June 2017, Department of Environment did not renew AECB’s ECC. October 2006 • Prime Minister instructed the Energy Ministry to take necessary steps to scrap the agreement with AECB. January 2007 • On January 11, a military-led Caretaker Government (CG) ousted the previous president-led Caretaker Government and declared a state of emergency throughout the country. • Asia Energy Plc has changed its name to Global Coal Management Plc. • Bangladesh Paribesh Andolon (BAPA) condemned this renewed attempt of AECB to move ahead with its Phulbari coal mine. February 2007 • Joint security forces arrested a senior leader of NCBD, Phulbari. • Udbigna Nagarik Samaj, a group of concerned citizens urged the CG to cancel its contract with AECB and demanded the disclosure of expert committee report submitted in September 2006.

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• NCBD submitted a petition to the chief adviser of the CG and urged him to cancel the Phulbari coal project and punish those who were involved in this corrupt deal with AECB. • NCBD submitted another petition to the adviser of the CG in charge of the Environment Ministry urging him not to renew ECC of AECB. It also urged him to punish those DoE officials who gave AECB ECC for one year in September 2005 without adequately examining its documents on devastating effects of open pit mining on the environment. • Energy adviser of the CG asked AECB officials to gain confidence of local people on its coal mine project. • British High Commission, Australian High Commission, and USAID asked the Bangladeshi government about its position on AECB’s Phulbari coal mine project. April 2007 • AECB sent a letter to finance adviser of the CG and pointed out the benefits of its project to protect Bangladesh’s energy security. • Energy adviser of the CG announced that the government would not make any decision until national coal policy was finalized. May 2007 • UNDP, Bangladesh submitted a new energy policy to MPEMR. The energy adviser of the CG told that the ministry would take into account it while preparing a new energy policy. June 2007 • CG formed an Advisery Committee headed by Professor Abdul Matin Patwary, the Vice Chancellor of Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology to prepare a national coal policy. • Bangladesh Environment Network (BEN), a global network of pro-environment Bangladeshis raised concerns against the initiative of the [Bangladeshi] government to move ahead with a coal policy geared toward open pit coal mining. July 2007 • AECB, in collaboration with German mining company RWE, sponsored a tour for a

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group of Bangladeshi journalists to visit several coal mine operated by RWE. During and after the visit, these journalists published a series of reports in their newspapers supporting the views of AECB about open pit mining in Phulbari. However, they did not mention that their visit to Germany was sponsored by the mining company and designed by RWE, which also had connection with AECB. • NCBD argued that the CG had no right to sign deal on energy resources. It threatened to sue the government if it takes any step to violate the memorandum (the Phulbari Agreement) signed between the previous government and NCBD on 30 August 2006. October 2007 • Finance adviser of the CG told that AECB wanted to renegotiate terms of its contracts with the Bangladeshi government. • Asian Development Bank (ADB) expressed concern about government’s indecision about AECB’s investment proposal (i.e. its feasibility study and mine development scheme). • Director General of ADB’s South Asia Department met the Energy Adviser and offered all kinds of financial assistance in developing Bangladesh’s coal sector, including the Phulbari coal mine. He urged the Adviser to take quick decision on AECB’s plan to development the Phulbari coal mine. November 2007 • NCBD organized a conference in Dhaka Press club where community leaders from Phulbari areas reiterated their opposition to AECB’s coal mine project. December 2007 • The Advisory Committee submitted its report submitted its report to MPEMR. January 2008 • Global Coal Management Plc has changed its name to GCM Resources Plc. February 2008 • A leading activist of NCBD and a renowned public intellectual received death threat for his involvement in the movement to protect gas and coal. April 2008 • Asian Development Bank (ADB) postponed its funding of AECB’s coal mine project.

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ADB earlier agreed to offer $300 million as political risk insurance guarantee. May 2008 • NCBD urged the CG to leave the decision about Phulbari coal mine for the next elected government. • A GOB intelligence agency submitted a special report and suggested that the government suspend activities of AECB to avert deterioration in law and order in Phulbari area. June 2008 • A report titled “Sustainable Energy Development in Bangladesh: Coal as an Alternative Energy Resource” commissioned by UNDP, Bangladesh was published. It recommended increasing the use of coal resources to solve energy crisis. The report also urged GOB to give approval of AECB’s feasibility study to go ahead with its planned mine project. A careful reading of the report shows that the consultants engaged by UNDP, Bangladesh did not conduct any independent study on the Phulbari coal mine. They used AECB’s reports and reiterated its arguments without subjecting them to critical scrutiny. October 2008 • US ambassador in Dhaka met energy adviser of the CG and asked him about government’s position regarding AECB’s feasibility study and scheme of development. In a diplomatic cable dated October 6, US embassy in Dhaka suggested that the government feared that mass protest might erupt against development of coal resources. It also stated that the energy adviser mentioned that “Asia Energy’s existing contract for the Phulbari coal field called for a guaranteed rate of return in excess of GOB policy at the time the contract was signed.” January 2009 • A leading activist of anti-coal mine movement and a leader of NCBDP was elected as chairman of Phulbari Upazila Parishad. His involvement with NCBDP was a catalyst for his electoral success. He defeated a ruling party candidate. March 2009 • Huge tract of land subsided in Barapukuria mining zone. Media reports suggest that

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once fertile crop land looks like a large water. It affected around 3000 people and 650 acres land. June 2009 • BAL-led new government invited a multidisciplinary panel of non-resident Bangladeshi energy experts and organized a workshop on national coal policy in a luxury resort. July 2009 • US ambassador in Dhaka met the energy adviser of the Prime Minister and urged him to allow AECB the authorization to coal mining in Phulbari. The adviser suggested that coal mining in Phulbari was a politically sensitive issue. In a diplomatic cable dated July 29, US embassy in Dhaka mentioned that “Asia Energy, the company behind the Phulbari project, has sixty percent U.S. investment. Asia Energy officials told the ambassador on July 29 they were cautiously optimistic that the project would win government approval in the coming months.” It also noted that the adviser mentioned that GOB would “build support for the project through the parliamentary process.” September 2009 • German government arranged a tour for the Bangladeshi environment minister to visit several coal mines operated by RWE. Upon return, the minister filed a report with the government favoring open pit mining method for Phulbari. October 2009 • UNDP, Bangladesh and German Technical Agency, GTZ agreed to provide $3 million to MPEMR to conduct a feasibility study for an open pit coal mine in northern part of Barapukuria. • NCBD organized a national convention in Dhaka and presented a list of demands on the energy sector to the new BAL-led government. November 2009 • A visiting German business delegation urged GOB to take immediate decision on mining method for Phulbari coal mine. February 2010

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• AECB submitted a new proposal to MPEMR offering the government 10 percent equity share in its coal mine project. It also proposed that the Bangladeshi government needed no investment in the project to claim this equity share. April 2010 • Bangladesh’s Prime Minister (PM), who was also the Energy Minister, instructed her officials to plan for building an open-pit coal mine in northern part of Barapukuria. • The PM also mentioned that there was no possibility of moving ahead with similar plan in Phulbari because the issue was politically very sensitive. • The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Bangladesh Chapter organized a conference titled, “Energy for Growth” in Dhaka and recommended open pit coal mining for Bangladesh. It suggested that any decision in this regard should take into account the issue of rehabilitation of affected people and loss of agricultural lands. October 2010 • MPEMR published a draft coal policy and invited public opinion on it. • GOB passed a law, Speedy Supply of Power and Energy (Special Provision) Act, 2010 ‘for quick disposal of contract in power and energy sector to meet the demand for power and energy within a short time.’ The law was passed for two years (until 2012). No decision taken under this law can be challenged in any court. • NCBD organized a grand rally in Phulbari after concluding its 7-days Dhaka-Phulbari long march. It urged the government to implement its demands that were agreed on 30 August 2006. • Ministry of Forest and Environment published Bangladesh Environment Conservation (Amendment) Act 2010 passed by the parliament. It included strict rules for project proponents to get environment clearance certificate. A project proponent must submit a report on public opinion about its project and the availability of project-related information to public (p.9128). January 2011 • A leader of anti-coal mine movement was elected as the mayor of Phulbari municipality. His election campaign used symbols of anti-mining movement. February 2011

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• MPEMR prepared Power System Master Plan 2010 which stipulated that 50 percent electricity would be generated by using domestic coal. • AECB sponsored a tour for members of the Parliamentary Committee on MPEMR to visit German coal mine operated by RWE. Upon their return, the committee recommended open pit mining for the Phulbari coal mine. September 2011 • MPEMR formed an expert committee headed by former chairman of Petrobangla to provide opinion on the method of mining for Bangladesh’s coal fields. December 2011 • Sixth Five Year Plan (2011-2015) published by the Planning Commission mentioned that GOB would undertake various actions to create favorable public opinion about open pit coal mining. • According to the Plan, national coal policy will be finalized by the end of 2015. January 2012 • Bangladesh’s Prime Minister suggested that her government would keep coal for future generations. She expected that new technologies would be developed to extract coal without harming land, water, and the environment. February 2012 • In response to an ‘urgent appeal’ submitted by a American advocacy group (IAP), a group of United Nations independent human rights experts warned the Bangladeshi government that open pit coal mine in Phulbari would threaten human rights of hundreds of thousands of people and jeopardize their access to basic needs. June 2012 • MPEMR made new Mines and Minerals Rules 2012 to replace Mines and Mineral Rules 1968. Tensed debates over royalty rate notwithstanding, the ministry made no changes in the new Mine and Minerals Rules. As per its Eleventh Schedule, royalty rate for coal mining remained the same (5 percent/underground mining; 6 percent/open pit mining). This indicates that GOB did not take into account the opinion of NCBD and other actors in making this new law. July 2012

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• The consultant engaged by UNDP, Bangladesh who co-authored its 2008 report on coal resources in Bangladesh became AECB’s expert and urged the Bangladeshi government to go ahead with open pit mining in Phulbari. September 2012 • GOB extended the Speedy Supply of Power and Energy (Special Provision) Act, 2010 for two more years (until October 2014). October 2012 • An expert committee formed in September 2011submitted its report to MPEMR suggesting that open pit mining in Phulbari was feasible. It also urged the government to undertake a small open pit mine in northern part of Barapukuria. These points were widely circulated in Bangladeshi media. However, a careful reading of the report shows that the committee identified several critical issues vis-à-vis AECB’s scientific studies on the Phulbari coal mine. It argued that these scientific studies did not address many significant issues. It also suggested that AECB’s justification of open pit mining for Phulbari coal mine by comparing it with German coal mine operated by RWE did not make any sense. Instead of leasing out coal mine to a foreign company, it proposed a new ownership model based on Production Sharing Contract practiced in oil and gas development project. None of these issues was highlighted in media reports. • Ministry of Home Affairs sent two letters to local administration in Dinajpur and Phulbari to cooperate with AECB, which wanted to conduct some surveys in the region. November 2012 • AECB submitted a new proposal to MPEMR and added a new incentive for the government to its earlier proposal submitted in 2010. In this new proposal, the mining company proposed that it would build a mine mouth 2000 MW coal-fired power plant. • NCBDP organized mass protest against this initiative. They argued that the Home Ministry letters violated the 2006 Memorandum (the Phulbari Agreement). It enforced a two-day hartal (strike) in the region. Local administration declared a

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temporary ban (i.e. impose Section 144 of Bangladesh code of criminal procedure) on the freedom of assembly to control violent protest events. • An official of AECB said that Phulbari, which has the largest deposit of some 572 million tonnes out of the country's total reserves of some 3.0 billion tonnes, would be much cheaper than the imported coal. Keeping such an important huge energy source untapped for years is tantamount to simply depriving the people of the country of the benefits of the God-gifted mineral resources. • In light of recent mass uprising in Phulbari, the Adviser to the Prime Minister on Energy Affairs told the media that AECB was not awarded any contract for extracting coal from Phulbari. AECB has bought an exploration licence simply for conducting a survey and the company is yet to be given a coalmine development licence. He also said that the national interest could not be protected by any multinational or foreign company. The government would look into the issue in a proper manner as it had been estimated that a large number of people would be immediately displaced by the project and irrigation channels and wells would dry up. December 2012 • At a public dialogue organized by BBC Bangla Service in Dinajpur, a cabinet member and also the MP (Member of Parliament) of the mining area told that GOB must go for open pit mining in Phulabri because it would allow extraction of 95 percent coal resources. He argued that underground mining would allow extraction of only 15 percent resource and the rest 85 percent resources would be wasted. He emphasized that open pit coal mine in Phulbari would supply primary energy to generate 5000 MW electricity for the next 50 years. It is significant to note that none of this information reflects the reality. Even the mining company does not claim this rate of return of its mining project. Political elites have been using such fictional information to create public opinion in favor of the mining company. • BCMCL, a state-owned mining company expressed willingness to development the Phulbari coal mine. • The Planning Commission submitted a report to the MPEMR recommended open pit mining for the Phulbari coal mine. It termed the coal mine project as ‘a creative destruction.’

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• Two transnational advocacy groups, IAP and WDM, submitted a complaint to the UK National Contact Point (NCP) raising concerns under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises about the actions of GCM Resources plc, parent company of AECB in Bangladesh. June 2013 • The UK NCP has decided that some of the issues raised in the complaint of IAP and WDM merit further examination. It has accepted the complaint for further consideration and published its initial statement in June 2013. December 2013 • Commissioned by Hydrocarbon Unit (an agency of MPEMR) PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) submitted its final report, titled Mines and Minerals Development. It recommended making a new contract model for coal development, which is similar to production sharing contract already in practice in gas development projects in Bangladesh. PWC also suggested that further exploration work was necessary in Phulbari coal mine to firm up and upgrade the resources of seams. This was not included in AECB’s feasibility study. February 2014 • Bangladesh’s Prime Minister instructed the MPEMR to put aside coal development and create a new energy development plan based on alternative choices for the sources of primary energy. July 2014 • The State Minister of the MPEMR announced that the ministry would begin country’s first open pit coal mining in northern part of Barapukuria coal mine in September 2014. August 2014 • GOB extended the Speedy Supply of Power and Energy (Special Provision) Act, 2010 for another four years (until October 2018). October 2014 • Petrobangla appointed Institute of Water Modelling (IWM) to conduct a feasibility study for constructing a small open pit coal mine in northern part of Barapukuria.

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IWM submitted its report and recommended that open pit mining was feasible if ground water management could properly be managed. November 2014 • Another round of violent mass protest erupted in Phulbari when the CEO of the mining company visited Phulbari and held a meeting with a group of local people. • BCMCL, a state-owned mineral company under Petrobangla which operates Barapukuria coal mine rejected IWM’s report for its failure to follow various aspects of the terms of reference. BCMCL argued that IWM’s study did not properly address the impact of open pit mining on ground water system. • The UK NCP for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises published its final report on the assessment of a complaint against AECB’s parent company, GCM Resources Plc, submitted by two transnational advocacy groups (IAP and WDM). The NCP found that the mining company partly breached its obligations under Chapter II, Paragraph 7 (which provides that enterprises should develop self- regulatory practices and management systems that foster confidence and trust in the societies they operate in.). December 2014 • MPEMR informed Bangladeshi media that the government would take action against AECB for its activities in Phulbari. It also mentioned that AECB had no valid contract to work in Phulbari. • MPEMR cancelled Power System Master Plan 2010 and engaged a Japanese company to prepare a new plan by the end of 2015. • AECB filed a lawsuit against anti-coal mine activists for their alleged role in vandalizing AECB’s properties last month. • NCBDP held a mass rally and urged GOB to fully implement ‘the Phulbari agreement.’ They threatened to stage radical mobilization tactics if their demands were not met within one month. January 2015 • Petrobangla decided to scrutinize IWM’s study, which recommended open pit mining in northern part of Barapukuria coal mine. Petrobangla suggested that IWM’s study

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did not adequately address agricultural and environmental issues. June 2015 • The State Minister of the MPEMR announced that BAL-led government would not allow open pit mining to protect precious farm land and livelihoods of peasant community. He mentioned that the PM instructed the ministry to craft an energy plan in such as way as to protect peasant and their land. July 2015 • MPEMR announced that AECB’s feasibility study was unacceptable. It also engaged Geological Survey of Bangladesh (an agency of MPEMR) to carry out a new feasibility study of the Phulbari coal mine. • MPEMR engaged Hydrocarbon Unit to finalize national coal policy. It took various actions in the following months to finalize the policy. September 2015 • The UK NCP published a follow-up statement on the complaint of IAP and WDM. According to the report, the mining company ‘has not yet been able to complete its updated ESIA.’ Therefore, the decision stated in its final report (released in November 2014) remains valid. October 2015 • Hydrocarbon Unit organized a workshop on domestic coal production. November 2015 • Hydrocarbon Unit organized a workshop on the necessity of creating a new organization for managing coal production. December 2015 • Hydrocarbon Unit organized a workshop on determining appropriate method of coal mining for different coal mines of Bangladesh. • GoB approved its Seventh Five Year Plan (2016-2020) on 20 October 2015 and the Planning Commission published it in December 2015. The Plan mentions that “Despite its rich endowment, Bangladesh is yet to establish or implement National Coal Policy for the strategic utilization of domestic coal. The Draft Policy was developed in 2007 and since then it has been suspended mainly due to the debate

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around environment and social impact of mining coal. A key step that will be taken in the Seventh Plan is to finalize and adopt the National Coal Policy” (p.316). However, unlike Sixth Five Year Plan (2011-2015), this Plan does not include any timeline regarding the finalization of this policy. • The mayor of Phulbari municipality, a leading activist of anti-coal mine movement defeated a ruling party candidate and was re-elected for another four-year term. March 2016 • Geological Survey of Bangladesh (GSB) began drilling works in Phulbari to conduct a new feasibility study on the coal mine. Since (August) 2006 events, NCBDP strictly maintained an informal embargo on any geological and social survey works in the mining zone. When NCBDP confronted GSB officials about the nature of their works, they were told that GSB was working on an earthquake-related study. NCBDP did not allow them to continue its work. June 2016 • MPEMR unveiled a new Power System Master Plan, 2016 which recommended using imported coal to run coal-based power plants. August 2016 • An international consulting firm engaged by MPEMR submitted its report and recommended that open pit mining was not feasible in Barapukuria due to its devastating impact on agriculture, ground water and local bio-diversity. It also suggested that open pit mining was also not possible in Phulbari for similar reasons. September 2016 • MPEMR announced that it would not build open pit coal mine in Barapukuria and Phulbari to protect land and the environment. A senior official of MPEMR told Bangladeshi media: “we are giving up open-pit mining in Barapukuria.” October 2016 • Indian State Minister for Power and Coal sent a proposal to GOB to extract coal from Bangladesh’s northwestern region and import the high-quality bituminous coal. December 2016 • In its recent annual report, GCM Resources Plc, the parent company of AECB

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mentioned that it remained “positive on the potential of the Phulbari Coal and Power Project and are advancing the company towards realizing its objectives.” January 2017 • Geological Survey of Bangladesh (GSB) recommended that open pit mining in Phulbari would jeopardize agricultural activities and local people’s livelihood. Mineral extraction would cause long-term adverse socio-economic effects. February 2017 • Geological Survey of Bangladesh (GSB) recommended that open pit mining in the northern part of Barapukuria coal mine would not be a financially viable project. • MPEMR engaged an American company to conduct a feasibility study for the expansion of the existing underground coal mine in Barapukuria. April 2017 • AECB’s litigation against anti-coal mine activists who allegedly vandalized its office and other properties in November 2014 was accepted in a local court. GOB suspended the mayor of Phulbari municipality (also a leading activist against the coal mine) for being charged in AECB’s litigation. • The mayor of Phulbari municipality had challenged GOB’s decision. He was reinstated on April 10 after Bangladesh’s High Court granted his appeal. May 2017 • NCBDP organized an hour-long blockade in Phulbari and demanded full implementation of ‘the Phulbari Agreement.’ July 2017 • NCBD disseminated an alternative ‘Energy and Power System Master Plan (2017- 2050)’ and suggested more use of renewable primary energy sources to meet growing needs of energy and power. August 2017 • NCBD and NCBDP demanded the withdrawal of ‘false’ litigation of the mining company against NCBDP activists, expulsion of the mining company from Bangladesh; and the full implementation of the Phulbari Agreement.

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2. The Phulbari Agreement1

Both parties agreed that the demands of the National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power and Ports—Phulbari [NCBDP] would be implemented in the following way: a) All contracts with Asia Energy [AECB] will be cancelled; Asia Energy will be withdrawn from four upazilas [sub-district] including Phulbari and Bangladesh. Open pit coal mine will not be developed anywhere in the country including above four upazilas. If any other method is used to mine coal, it will be done on the basis of people’s consent. b) The [Bangladeshi] Government will pay BDT 200,000 as compensation to each family whose member was killed by [state] security forces. c) BDT 900,000 will be allocated as compensation for wounded person and other people whose shop, hotel restaurant, rickshaw, van, mike, and house were vandalized. Upazila Nirbahi Officer, Phulbari, Assistant Police Commissioner, Phulbari Circle, a representative of Civil Surgeon, and two members of the National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power, and Port—Phulbari [NCBDP] will determine the loss and distribute the money. d) A one-member inquiry committee headed by Additional District Magistrate has been formed to submit an investigation report. Upon receiving the report, further actions will be taken. e) A committee comprising an Additional District Commissioner, an Assistant Police Commissioner and two representatives of the National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power, and Port—Phulbari [NCBDP] will be formed to investigate the recovery of disappeared dead bodies. In light of its report, further action will be taken. f) A memorial tower will be built by the [Bangladeshi] Government to commemorate those killed at a suitable site on the side of New Phulbari Bridge. g) The Superintendent of Police will take necessary action against the identified dalals [brokers] of Asia Energy [AECB] based on the specific allegation. All lawsuits and general diaries filed against the leaders of anti-coal mine movement will be withdrawn, and they will not be charged with further lawsuits.

1 The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the Bangladeshi Government and NCBD on 30 August 2006. ©NCBD; translated (and abridged) from the original Bengali version; used with permission.

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3. Manifesto (Ghoshona) of NCBD2

Introduction After many secret agreements to plunder oil and gas resources of Bangladesh, thereby depriving the people, damaging the economy, and endangering national interests, came to light, anti-imperialist progressive political parties and leading citizens met at a convention on 18 August 1998 and formed the ‘National Committee to Protect Oil and Gas for National Interest’. They were later joined by several other political parties. Taking into account the increasing imperialist aggression in the power and port sectors, in 2002 it was renamed the ‘National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Power, and Ports.’ After learning about the secret deal involving the Phulabari coal project, members decided to include mineral resources and renamed it once again, this time to ‘National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources and Power and Ports.’

Goals and Objectives Among the mineral resources of Bangladesh, natural gas and coal are significant, but there is an increasing possibility of accessing other mineral resources, including oil. There are many valuable minerals found in land and sand in areas along the sea coast. Although limited, non-renewable resources are invaluable for Bangladesh. They can play a significant role in the development of infrastructure, including industry, electricity, education, and healthcare.

As common property, mineral resources belong to the people. Although this is officially recognized in the constitution of Bangladesh, the state policies and activities are influenced by the US and its allies; as a result, the trend is to have mineral resources controlled by multinational capital. Instead of using resources to make substantial changes through electrification and industrialization, the state turns them into a lucrative source of revenue for multinational companies. As a result, a major portion is under the control of multinational corporations. Subsidies worth of millions of dollars are paid to these companies every year in the gas sector alone. The power sector is in an abysmal state, plagued by the gas shortage, corruption, and resource plunder. Even seaports, a significant national institution, are unprotected.

2 The National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources and Power and Port; ©NCBD; translated from the original Bengali version; used with permission.

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The primary goal of the National Committee is to establish people’s control over these resources, in other words, to protect national resources from being grabbed by imperialist and hegemonic states and multinational corporations and to ensure the best use of these resources to serve the interests of the people. To attain this goal, the National Committee strives to cancel all anti-people contracts on national resources, including oil, gas, coal, and other mineral resources, as well as electrical power and seaports. It seeks to play a useful role in ensuring pro-people utilization of these resources and institutions. It also provides assistance to all political, social, cultural, and economic movements aligned with this goal.

Policy Position of the National Committee on National Resources and National Institutions: 1) Mineral resources belong to the people of Bangladesh. Hence, for any development of these resources, 100 percent ownership of the people has to be guaranteed. 2) The objective of extraction and development of mineral resources should be to ensure their best use by meeting the needs of the people. 3) Since these resources are limited and non-renewable, their export, in any form, should not be allowed. 4) Existing national institutions have to be strengthened to increase their capability to undertake resource exploration and development. If necessary, new institutions have to be established. Active steps have to be taken to develop appropriate skilled personnel and experts. 5) Exploration and development of mineral resources must be done without destroying human lives, their livelihoods, and the environment. 6) A comprehensive energy policy has to be formulated in light of the policies mentioned above. Necessary laws must be enacted to implement these policies. 7) Necessary institutional arrangements have to be undertaken for proper production and distribution of power as per the comprehensive energy policy. For the sake of national security, the production and distribution of electricity must be done by national institutions. 8) Chittagong and Mongla Ports are national organizations. While they are important for the country’s trade and commerce, they are not merely commercial organizations. These ports or any deep seaport must remain under national ownership to protect national security and sovereignty. 9) The maritime boundary has to be properly delimited, and national ownership of all resources within this sea area has to be ensured.

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10) All oil and gas contracts, coal projects, and all other development projects in this sector funded and assisted by international organizations such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and USAID, which go against the policies mentioned above, must be scrapped. 11) Compensation for the damage caused by blowouts in Tengratila and Magurchara gas fields must be collected. 12) Individuals involved with signing contracts damaging to national interests and going against the current and future wellbeing of the people have to be severely punished. Their properties have to be confiscated and utilized to enhance the national capacity to explore and extract mineral resources.

During recent years, although the interests of imperialism, multinational capital, and their local associates have increased in Bangladesh’s oil, gas, coal, seaport and power sectors, the people of Bangladesh have become more aware of the problem because of the actions of the National Committee. There is an increased interest and activism among people vis-à-vis the development of minerals as national resources, ports as national institutions, and the power sector as a national priority area.

The National Committee has already undertaken actions to cancel Production Sharing Contracts in oil and gas industry and to shelve initiatives of exporting gas and of leasing Chittagong Port to a foreign company. These include country-wide long marches and rallies. As a result, the plan to export gas was postponed and the economy was saved from enormous damage. The movement was also able to stop the occupation of the Chittagong Port by an American company. The last achievement of the National Committee was to avert the Phulbari coal project which would have caused severe damage to human lives and the environment.

To build a brighter future for the people of Bangladesh, it is essential to ensure the people’s control of resources and public institutions. To achieve this goal, the primary task of the National Committee is to expand research, campaigns, and mass movements. The National Committee has been doing this by uniting and activating the country’s democratic and progressive political parties, organizations, and individuals.

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4. Land Area of the Mining Zone

4.1 Phulbari and Birampur Upazila3

Percentage of Land within the Mining Zone4

Phulbari Upazila: Birampur Upazila:

Phulbari Municipality: 71 Percent Khanpur Union: 35 Percent Khayerbari Union: 35 Percent

3 Red circled areas are part of the planned mining zone, which will lose substantial part of farming land. 4 AECB. 2006. Phulbari Coal Project: Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (Volume-1). Dhaka: Asia Energy Corporation Bangladesh (AECB.), chapter-10, p.10.

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4.2 Nawabganj and Parbatipur Upazila5

Percentage of Land within the Mining Zone6

Nawabganj Upazila: Parbatipur Upazila:

Joypur Union- 36 Percent Hamidpur Union- 18 Percent

5 Red circled areas are part of the planned mining zone, which will lose substantial part of farming land. 6 AECB. 2006. Phulbari Coal Project: Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (Volume-1). Dhaka: Asia Energy Corporation Bangladesh (AECB.), chapter-10, p.10.

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5. Internal Migration in Northern Bangladesh7

7 River erosion displaced many people in Nawabganj district located on the bank of the Padma river. A recent NASA report shows that more than 66,000 hectares of land lost since 1967 due to erosion on both sides of the Padma river (see https://www.thedailystar.net/country/news/over-66000-hectares-lost-padma-1967-nasa-report- 1633810, accessed 14 September 2018). Several communities from these affected areas (red circled area, left side map) migrated to Dinajpur district (red circled area, right side map). They have cleared government-owned forest land for home and cultivation. These people have a unique cultural marker as an outsider in the area. Local people use a derogatory term ‘Chapaiyya’ to identify this community. The specific settlement history of this community members has shaped their role and participation in the anti-coal mine movement in a very unique way. Their relationship to land is more complex than people living in other areas within the mining zone. Colonizing land without any legal documents has made them the most vulnerable group to deal with resettlement and compensation package of the mining company. My empirical findings on this aspect are also supported by historical studies on this community. For example, Cambridge historian Joya Chatterji contends that Chapaiyyas are specialized in colonizing rich tracts of land and transform them for farming. One of her informants said, ‘We got this land only after we cleared this land and settled here. … We were living in Chapai [Nawabganj] and losing our land to the river; then one of us got word that this place was a forest and that if we reclaimed it, it would belong to us.’ See Joya Chatterji. 2013. “Dispositions and Destinations: Refugee Agency and “Mobility Capital” in the Bengal Dispora, 1947-2007.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 55(2), p.289.

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6. Copyright Acknowledgements

I gratefully acknowledge the permission provided by the following individuals/organizations to use their copyrighted works in this dissertation:

1. Professor AKM Golam Rabbani, General Secretary, Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, Dhaka.

2. Mr. Amal Akash, President, Singer, and Songwriter, Samageet, Dhaka.

3. Mr. M. Mahmudul Haque, Senior Lecturer, Department of English and Humanities, BRAC University, Dhaka.

4. Professor Anu Muhammad, Member Secretary, National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power, and Ports (NCBD), Dhaka.

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