Comment Letter on File No. S7-22-06
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Repo Haircuts and Economic Capital: a Theory of Repo Pricing Wujiang Lou1 1St Draft February 2016; Updated June, 2020
Repo Haircuts and Economic Capital: A Theory of Repo Pricing Wujiang Lou1 1st draft February 2016; Updated June, 2020 Abstract A repurchase agreement lets investors borrow cash to buy securities. Financier only lends to securities’ market value after a haircut and charges interest. Repo pricing is characterized with its puzzling dual pricing measures: repo haircut and repo spread. This article develops a repo haircut model by designing haircuts to achieve high credit criteria, and identifies economic capital for repo’s default risk as the main driver of repo pricing. A simple repo spread formula is obtained that relates spread to haircuts negative linearly. An investor wishing to minimize all-in funding cost can settle at an optimal combination of haircut and repo rate. The model empirically reproduces repo haircut hikes concerning asset backed securities during the financial crisis. It explains tri-party and bilateral repo haircut differences, quantifies shortening tenor’s risk reduction effect, and sets a limit on excess liquidity intermediating dealers can extract between money market funds and hedge funds. Keywords: repo haircut model, repo pricing, repo spread, repo formula, repo pricing puzzle. JEL Classification: G23, G24, G33 A repurchase agreement (repo) is an everyday securities financing tool that lets investors borrow cash to fund the purchase or carry of securities by using the securities as collateral. In its typical transaction form, the borrower of cash or seller sells a security to the lender at an initial purchase price and agrees to purchase it back at a predetermined repurchase price on a future date. On the repo maturity date T, the lender (or the buyer) sells the security back to the borrower. -
Repurchase Agreements, Securities Lending, Gold Swaps and Gold Loans: an Update
SNA/M2.04/26 Repurchase agreements, securities lending, gold swaps and gold loans: An update Prepared by the IMF for the December 2004 Meeting of the Advisory Expert Group on National Accounts (For information) This paper is for the information of the members of the Advisory Expert Group (AEG), regarding the currently accepted treatment of repurchase agreements, securities lending without cash collateral1, gold loans, and gold swaps2. The paper also sets out areas where work is continuing by the IMF Committee on Balance of Payments (Committee) and on which the Committee will provide further reports in due course. Repurchase agreements and securities lending without cash collateral Background A securities repurchase agreement (repo) is an arrangement involving the sale of securities at a specified price with a commitment to repurchase the same or similar securities at a fixed price on a specified future date. Margin payments may also be made3. A repo viewed from the point of view of the cash provider is called a reverse repo. When the funds are repaid (along with an interest payment) the securities are returned to the “cash taker”4. The 1 The term securities (or stock or bond) lending is sometimes used to describe both types of reverse transactions described in this note. In order to distingush between those used involving the exchange of cash and those that do not involve the exchange of cash, this note uses the term “repurchase agreements” for those involving cash and “securities lending without cash collateral” for those not involving the exchange of cash. 2 A fuller description of repurchase agreements, securities lending, gold loans and gold swaps can be found at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2001/01-16.pdf 3 “Margin” represents the value of the securities delivered that is in excess of the cash provided. -
Line of Credit Promissory Note
LINE OF CREDIT PROMISSORY NOTE $500.000.00 April 17. 2018 Loan Amount Date FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned makers PFMAN LLC, a Florida limited liability company and ORBITAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a Delaware corporation (collectively, the "Maker") jointly and severally hereby promise to pay to the order of HARDEE COUNTY INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (the "Lender"), at its offices located at 107 East Main Street, Wauchula, Florida 33873, or at such other place as the holder hereof may from time to time designate in writing, in collected funds or U.S. legal tender, the sum specified in this Promissory Note (the "Note"), the principal sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($500,000.00), or such lesser amount outstanding at maturity (the "Principal"), together with interest accrued from the date hereof on the unpaid principal balance at the interest rate or rates per annum set forth herein under Section 3, and any other amounts due in accordance with the terms specified in this Note. The undersigned Maker also promises to pay (i) late charges, fees, and other charges as specified herein, and (ii) the cost of all fees paid or to be paid to public officials for recording, perfecting, maintaining, canceling and/or releasing any security interest in any Collateral securing this Note. This Note is referred to in, and was executed and delivered in connection with, a certain Security Agreement, dated April 17, 2018, by and among the Maker and Lender (the "Security Agreement"). Maker covenants and agrees as follows: 1. PRINCIPAL. This Note evidences a revolving line ofcredit. Prior to an Event ofDefault (as defined in Section 9), Maker may borrow, repay, and reborrow hereunder, provided, however, the total outstanding principal balance shall not exceed FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($500.000.00) at any time. -
NCUA IRPS 85-2 -- Repurchase Agreements of Depository Institutions with Securities Dealers and Others 11/85
NCUA IRPS 85-2 -- Repurchase Agreements of Depository Institutions with Securities Dealers and Others 11/85 NCUA-IR - 85-2 REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS 11/85 NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION Repurchase Agreements of Depository Institutions with Securities Dealers and Others Interpretive Ruling and Policy Statement Number 85-2 AGENCY: National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) ACTION: Interpretive Ruling and Policy Statement Number 85-2. SUMMARY: The NCUA Board has adopted as its statement of general policy for Federal credit unions the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council ("FFIEC") Supervisory Policy entitled "Repurchase Agreements of Depository Institutions with Securities Dealers and Others." EFFECTIVE DATE: November 14, 1985. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Donald W. Sorrels, Office of Examination and Insurance, or Steven R. Bisker, Assistant General Counsel, NCUA, 1776 G Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20456, or telephone (202) 357-1065 (Mr. Sorrels) or (202) 357-1030 (Mr. Bisker). SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On October 21, 1985, the FFIEC approved a recommendation to each of the participating Federal financial institution regulatory agencies to adopt its Supervisory Policy entitled "Repurchase Agreements of Depository Institutions with Securities Dealers and Others." The NCUA Board, at its November 14, 1985, meeting, adopted the Supervisory Policy as its general policy for Federal credit unions. For the most part, the Supervisory Policy elaborates on what is already required of FCU's under NCUA's Rules and Regulations, Part 703 -- Investment and Deposit Activities. The Supervisory Policy sets out guidelines which are recognized to be safe and sound practices when engaging in repurchase and reverse repurchase transactions. FCU's involved in these transactions should follow the guidelines. -
Agriculture Real Estate First Mortgage and Participation
AGRICULTURAL REAL ESTATE FIRST MORTGAGE LOANS – Whole Loans and Participations This Eligibility Checklist assists pledgors who have executed the appropriate Advances, Pledge and Security Agreement in determining eligibility of loans for pledging to FHLB Des Moines. A “NO” answer indicates the loan is not eligible under FHLB Des Moines guidelines. GE GENERAL ELIGIBILITY YES NO The requirements of this checklist are specific to the collateral type shown above. Certain Eligible Member Collateral requirements are common to ALL pledged loan collateral as identified in Collateral Procedures. The preparer should have familiarity prior to proceeding with eligibility determination via this checklist. For ease, a summation of these requirements is provided: General Eligibility Checklist. PN PROMISSORY NOTE YES NO 1. Note Execution: Executed with proper signatories and capacities as authorized by any applicable borrowing resolution/other authority. 2. Loan Terms: Matures and requires principal & interest payments to amortize the loan within a 30 year term or less (measured from first payment date following origination or last modification). 3. Disbursement: Loan is fully disbursed and non-revolving. 4. Whole Loans and Participations: Loans must be reported properly based on ownership of the loan. All Participation loans must meet the requirements found in the Participation Loan Guidelines. (Note: 100% participations purchased are not eligible). • Whole Loan: The loan is not participated and is reported in type code 1407. • Retained Participation: The loan is reported in type code 1472. • Purchased Participation: The loan is reported in type code 1572. SI SECURITY INSTRUMENT: Mortgage (or Deed of Trust) and/or Security Agreement YES NO 1. Security Instrument Existence: Note is secured with an unexpired mortgage recorded in the proper jurisdiction. -
1-4 FAMILY RESIDENTIAL FIRST MORTGAGE LOANS – Whole
1-4 FAMILY RESIDENTIAL FIRST MORTGAGE LOANS – Whole Loans and Participations This Eligibility Checklist assists pledgors who have executed the appropriate Advances, Pledge and Security Agreement in determining eligibility of loans for pledging to FHLB Des Moines. A “NO” answer indicates the loan is not eligible under FHLB Des Moines guidelines. GE GENERAL ELIGIBILITY YES NO The requirements of this checklist are specific to the collateral type shown above. Certain Eligible Member Collateral requirements are common to ALL pledged loan collateral as identified in Collateral Procedures. The preparer should have familiarity prior to proceeding with eligibility determination via this checklist. For ease, a summation of these requirements is provided: General Eligibility Checklist. PN PROMISSORY NOTE YES NO 1. Note Execution: Executed with proper signatories and capacities as authorized by any applicable borrowing resolution/other authority. 2. Loan Terms: Matures and requires principal & interest payments to amortize the loan within a 40 year term or less (measured from first payment date following origination or last modification). 3. Disbursement: Loan is fully disbursed and non-revolving. 4. Whole Loans and Participations: Loans must be reported properly based on ownership of the loan. See the Type Code Reporting Instructions section at the end of this checklist for proper type code reporting. • For participation loans, the loan meets the eligibility requirements found in the Participation Loan Guidelines. (Note: 100% participations purchased are not eligible). SI SECURITY INSTRUMENT: Mortgage (or Deed of Trust) and/or Security Agreement YES NO 1. Security Instrument Existence: Note is secured with an unexpired mortgage recorded in the proper jurisdiction. -
A Theory of Repurchase Agreements, Collateral Re-Use, and Repo Intermediation∗
A Theory of Repurchase Agreements, Collateral Re-use, and Repo Intermediation∗ Piero Gottardi Vincent Maurin European University Institute Stockholm School of Economics Cyril Monnet University of Bern, SZ Gerzensee This version: November, 2017 Abstract We show that repurchase agreements (repos) arise as the instrument of choice to borrow in a competitive model with limited commitment. The repo contract traded in equilibrium provides insurance against fluctuations in the asset price in states where collateral value is high and maximizes borrowing capacity when it is low. Haircuts increase both with counterparty risk and asset risk. In equilibrium, lenders choose to re-use collateral. This increases the circulation of the asset and generates a \collateral multiplier" effect. Finally, we show that intermediation by dealers may endogenously arise in equilibrium, with chains of repos among traders. ∗We thank audiences at the Third African Search & Matching Workshop, Bank of Canada, EBI Oslo, SED 2016, EFA Oslo 2016, London FTG 2016 Meeting, the 2015 Money, Banking, and Liquidity Summer Workshop at the St Louis Fed, The Philadelphia Fed, the Sveriges Riksbank, Surrey, Essex, CORE and University of Roma Tor Vergata for very helpful comments. 1 1 Introduction Gorton and Metrick(2012) argue that the financial panic of 2007-08 started with a run on the market for repurchase agreements (repos). Lenders drastically increased the haircut requested for some types of collateral, or stopped lending altogether. This view was very influential in shaping our understanding of the crisis.1 Many attempts to understand repos more deeply as well as calls for regulation quickly followed.2 The very idea that a run on repos could lead to a financial market meltdown speaks to their importance for money markets. -
New Trends in Repurchase Agreements Frequently Asked Questions
New Trends in Repurchase Agreements Frequently Asked Questions Q&A | February 2020 The market for repurchase agreements (repos) made headlines in September 2019 after an unexpected spike in overnight rates sparked Federal Reserve (Fed) intervention. Repos are a critical part of the plumbing of the short- term investment markets, but may be less familiar to public funds investors. For many, the impact of the repo market is felt through investments in money market funds and local government investment pools (LGIPs). In an effort to provide better insight into the repo market, and to answer some of the more frequently asked questions regarding this topic, we conducted the following Q&A session with Jeffrey Rowe, CFA, Managing Director and Senior Portfolio Manager with oversight of 16 PFM-managed LGIPs and Chris Blackwood, Managing Director and Administrator of Colorado Statewide Investment Pool (CSIP), a PFM-managed LGIP. What is a repurchase agreement? How are repos used by investors? Blackwood: Although the mechanics differ, a repo is Blackwood: Many repo users are entities with large similar to a collateralized loan. A repo is a funding tool amounts of cash to invest, such as money market used by large financial institutions, such as commercial funds, LGIPs and corporations. Repos are attractive banks, insurance companies and investment banks. because they are typically transacted with high credit Many of these institutions have assets, such as quality counterparties and are typically collateralized Treasuries and agencies, they want to own long term, at a minimum of 102% of the amount invested. Thus, but they also have short-term funding needs. -
Broker-Dealer Use of “Idle” Customer Assets: Customer Protection with Sweep Programs and Securities Lending
TEPE – FINAL BROKER-DEALER USE OF “IDLE” CUSTOMER ASSETS: CUSTOMER PROTECTION WITH SWEEP PROGRAMS AND SECURITIES LENDING George Tepe∗ Equity investors, whether hedge funds or retail investors, must trade stocks through broker-dealers, and when these investors are not actively trading, their securities and uninvested cash remain with their broker-dealer. What broker-dealers do with these “idle” customer assets is a vast and largely unexamined business that is a key source of revenue for broker-dealers. This Note provides the first comprehensive examination of the trade-offs in regulating broker-dealer use of idle customer assets through case studies of broker-dealer sweeps of uninvested customer cash, broker- dealer lending of customer margin securities, and the effect of securities lending on customers’ shareholder votes. On one hand, broker-dealer use of idle customer assets potentially increases agency costs and systemic risk by increasing broker-dealer interconnectedness and allowing broker-dealers to profit off customer assets. On the other hand, proper use of idle assets can generate positive outcomes for customers through higher returns and positive social benefits for the general market. This Note proposes and examines potential reforms like increased disclosure and ∗ J.D. Candidate 2017, Columbia Law School; B.A. 2014, Amherst College. The author would like to thank Professor Gabriel Rauterberg for his invaluable guidance and feedback. He would also like to thank the Office of Financial Responsibility in the Division of Trading and Markets at the Securities and Exchange Commission, and especially Mark Attar, for the internship and education that inspired this Note. Finally, the author is grateful to Chloe McKenzie for her unwavering support and the editorial staff of the Columbia Business Law Review for their assistance in preparing this Note for Publication. -
Shadow Banking and New Lending Channels
377 11. S HADOW B ANKING AND N EW L ENDING CHANNELS – P AST AND F UTURE Patricia Jackson 1 11.1. I NTRODUCTION The history of shadow banking is one of shifts in the type of institution involved, and rate growth, but there are two common elements across the decades. Shadow banking has caused or been at the heart of various financial crises in different periods and one important factor behind its growth has been the style and extent of bank regulation. In the 1970s and 1980s the growth in shadow banking (then called secondary banking or non-bank banking) tended to be related to property lending and, even though it was not complex, the crises were sufficiently severe to require central bank/ government intervention. The 1990s steadily saw more and more complex structures being used in shadow banking peaking in 2007/8 and being central to the financial crisis. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) estimates that the size of the global shadow banking system grew from USD 26 trillion in 2002 to USD 62 trillion in 2007 (FSB (2012a)). One question is what lies ahead. The Basel III capital and liquidity buffers and wider uncertainty regarding future regulatory change have led to deleveraging and this in turn is leading shadow banking again to grow. The FSB (2012a) indicates that after falling slightly in 2008 shadow banking assets have now grown above 2007 levels 2 but the market is focused more on traditional banking products than was the case pre-crisis. There has also been a proliferation of different types of lending channel. -
The Treatment of Mortgage Loan Repurchase Agreements in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
March 2008 / Issue 5 A legal update from Dechert’s Finance and Real Estate Group In this issue p1 Mortgage Loan Repurchase Agreements The Treatment of Mortgage Loan Repurchase p2 Safe Harbor and Agreements in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Related Bankruptcy Code Provisions In a recent case of first impression, a bankruptcy then re-purchase such loans from the repo buyer in p3 Factual Background of the Case court held that a contract for, among other things, exchange for the transfer of funds from the repo the sale and repurchase of mortgage loans was a seller to the repo buyer. p4 The Bankruptcy “repurchase agreement” as defined in Section Court’s Analysis and 101(47) of the Bankruptcy Code, and the amended The repo buyer’s re-transfer of the mortgage loans Holding “safe harbor” provisions of Sections 555 and 559 or the interests in mortgage loans to the repo seller p5 Significance of the of the Bankruptcy Code were applicable; however, should occur no later than one year after the initial Decision the safe harbor provisions did not apply to the transfer2 in exchange for the transfer of funds from servicing rights for the mortgage loans. the repo seller. The re-purchase price paid by the repo seller would consist of the original purchase In Calyon New York Branch v. American Home price paid to the repo seller plus a premium to Mortgage Corp. (In re American Home Mortgage, compensate the repo buyer for both the time value Inc.),1 the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of of its money and the risk associated with the Delaware recently held that a contract providing transaction. -
Rehypothecation and Securities Commingling in the United States and the United Kingdom
2009 STANDARDIZATION OF SECURITIES REGULATION 253 STANDARDIZATION OF SECURITIES REGULATION: REHYPOTHECATION AND SECURITIES COMMINGLING IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM MARIYA DERYUGINA∗ I. Introduction While securities laws and regulations in the United States strictly prohibit United States brokers and dealers from rehypothecating and commingling their clients’ securities in most circumstances, United Kingdom regulations to a much larger extent permit both rehypothe- cation and the commingling of broker assets with customer assets. The asymmetry in the legal rules governing transactions in these two large and interrelated financial markets has led to customer confusion regarding the ownership or title status of their securities, misunder- standing regarding the customers’ legal rights in any given trans- action or investment, and an increase in the transaction costs associ- ated with obtaining prime brokerage services. Industry participants largely ignored, failed to notice or failed to consider the full implications of this large regulatory discrepancy until the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (“Lehman”) in the United States and the subsequent collapse of its affiliate, Lehman Brothers International (Europe) in the United Kingdom. While the United States bankruptcy of Lehman proceeded relatively smoothly, United Kingdom rehypothecation and asset commingling rules stifled the resolution process. Hedge funds and other clients of the United Kingdom affiliate of Lehman were unable to withdraw or reclaim the assets they had placed with the broker, leading to massive market losses and, in some cases, to the failure of hedge fund businesses. The Lehman failure highlighted the riskiness of allowing rehypothecation and the commingling of client assets in the United Kingdom and the benefits of prohibiting such practices.