California S·Tate University, Northridge in GEOGRAPHY a Thesis
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California s·tate University, Northridge EPIST~10LOGICAL ~JCERTAINTY IN GEOGRAPHY A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Geography by Glen David Dalton January, 1980 The Thesis of G. David Dalton is approved: f~obert Hoffpaui \ Gordon.tr. Lewthwai te, Committee Chairman California State University, Northridge ii DEDICATION To my father, Glen Deavers Dalton, in whose footsteps I humbly follow. iii ACKNOWLEDGE~ffiNTS I wish to thank my committee, Dr. Gordon R. Lewthwaite, Dr. Robert Hoffpauir, and Dr. Sidney Luckenbach, for their long and painstaking efforts in the drafting of this thesis. To Dr. W. Timothy Dagodag I give spe cial gratitude for always being there and for being the person he is. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page DEDICATION ........ ~ . • . iii ACKNO~EDGE:r.fEN'rS •••••••••••••••••••••••••-. • • • • • i v ABSTF..ACT . • • • • . • • . • . • . • • • . • . • . • • • vii Chapter I INTRODUCTION . 1 II QUANTITATIVE REVOLUTION .•...••••..••••• 16 a. Introduction ....................... 17 b. Pre-Revolution ..............•....•.• 18 c. Quantitative Revolution ..•.•.....•.. 22 d. Conclusion ......................... 32 e. Footnotes .......................... 33 III LOGICAL POSITIVISM .•.•...••...•..•.••.• 38 a. In troduc ti on ....................... 39 b. History ............................ 40 c. Tenets ............................. 44 d. Judgements ......................... 48 e. Reasons for Failure •....•.•........• 50 f. Conclusion .......................... 56 g. Footnotes .......... ·· ............... 59 IV UNCERTAINTY ....•...........•.....•..... 63 a. In troduc ti on ....................... 64 b. Truth .............................. 67 c. GOdel ............................... 70 d. Imperfect Justification of Kno-v:1edge Claims . ~ ........................... 72 e. Foundations ......................... 82 f. Empiricism Under Fire •.•.•...•..•..• 86 g.. New Directions ...•...•.•.•....•••••• 90 h. Co:t1.clusion ...................... ~ .. 100 i. Footnotes 103 v CONTE!J'.uDORARY GEOGRAPHY ••...•.•.•....••• 108 a. Introduction ....................... 109 b. Problems ........................... 109 c. Solutions .......................... 118 d. Conclusion ................... "' ..... 132 v e. Footnotes 134 VI CONCLUSION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 4 • • • • • ~ • • • • • • • • • • • 138 BIBLIOGRAPHY 143 vi I ABSTRACT EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY IN GEOGRAPHY by Glen David Dalton Master of Arts in Geography Contemporary epistemology yields uncertainty for the foun.dations of our knowledge. The quantitative revolution in geography developed problems when it strove for certain ty under the defunct epistemology of logical positivism. Logical positivism, both implicitly and explicitly espoused during the revolution, required verification (later, strict confirmation) of knowledge claims. Any claim that could not meet these criteria would be outside the realm of science and, hence, not cognitively significant. The tenets of logical positivism, however, were soon recogniz ed as being too strict. Even the founders of logical posi tivism advanced to other positions as it was shown through epistemology, logic, and science that verification and strict confirmation are not possible and that uncertainty is pervasive. Tarski showed that truth is a semantic function, not applicable to real-world claims. Godel sho"llred that any rich axiomatic system is incomplete. vii . I Modern neuropsychology and neurophysiology indicate that . I perception is a process which depends upon the autobiogra- phy of the individual perceiver for its context instead of an unambiguous 11 camera click 11 on a blank state. Thus, the empiricism of logical positivism is shown to be based on the false hope of certainty where none is known to exist. Problems in contemporary geography arise from reliance on the certainty of old epistemology, thus relegating some legitimate geographical studies to so-called pseudo- science. The abandonment of logical positivism for cur- rent epistemology will broaden the spectrum of what geogra phers can do. - viii p ' "It is not the function of the geographer to write philosophy; but if he aspires to be more than a competent routine techni cian, it is certainly one of his responsi bilities at least to be aware of philo sophical problems which may bear upon his \'IOrk. nl O.H.K. Spate CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 2 This thesis is concerned with current problems of fundamental philosophical import arising out of the quantitative revolution in geography in the 1950's. The emplo~~ent of the methodology and techniques of the quantitative revolution is valid only insofar as the more fundamental questions of how and what we can come to know are understood. These fundamental questions deal with theory of knowledge, or epistemology. Thus, the scope of this thesis is the intersection of geography and philosophy at the point where these epistemological questions of how and what 'VIe can come to know are raised. Through the millenia, fundamental questions concern ing the quest for knowledge have been debated by philo sophers. Various theories of knovrledge have been proposed, becoming more and more coherent with scientific theories in recent centuries, especially in the past generation. Thus, if our knowledge builds at all, epistemology builds and progresses in the manner that disciplines such as physics, neurophysiology, and psychology do. Empiricism is a broad epistemological world-vie~w~~~~~~~ which has been modified to yield contemporary logical empiricism, logical positivism, and nineteenth century positivism, among other offshoots of the main body of emptricism. Logical positivism, of special interest to us, 3 appeared in the first half of this century and is nO\'/ a dead issue among philosophers of science. It is logical positivism, however, that has become the explicit and implicit philosophical basis of the quantitative revolution. As late as 1975 Amedee and Golledge, .for instance, claim that "since about 1954, scientific work in geography has been almost exclusively logical positivism. Thus we describe what has overwhelm i.ngly prevailed in the discipline's recent history. n2 A decade earlier, however, the philosopher Karl Popper had said that "positivism is out of date science ..•. 11 3 A gen eration earlier logical positivism had met its demise. Thus, the quantitative revolution, to the extent that it relies on logical positivism, is not viablee The quantitative·revolution, in an attempt to make geography more scientific, ironically put its faith in an epistemological position that had been ignored by physic~ ists because of logical positivism's disastrous conse quences for scientific laws. Thus, today grave problems exist for geography both in that the use of sophisticated mathematics in geography is hindered by its association with logical positivism and also in that logical positivism would deny the value of any methodology but its own. Hence, an ideational4 approach in geography would be labeled as pseudo-science, hardly the view of current epistemology. There is great need, then, for geography to abandon logical positivism if it is not to be left alone among the disciplines. The solution to our problems with logical positivism would seem to lie in achieving an acquaintance with current epistemology, arrived at through discussions of (1) the errors during the quantitative revolution that led to our predicament in the first place; (2) the problems of logical positivism; (3) an indication of the great dif- ferences between logical positivism and contemporary epistemological thinking among philosophers of science and scientists; and (4) events in contemporary geography aris ing out of indifference to contemporary epistemology. Purpos~: The purpose of this thesis is to show the error of relying on logical positivism as the philosophical basis of geographical inquiry. In pointing out the problems of logical positivism it is hoped that two aims will be achieved: 1) that the use of mathematics in geography, freed from the onus of association with logical positivism, can be enhanced and 2) that the methodological restrictions imposed by logical positivism can be discarded. Although logical positivism is associated with the quantitative revolution, this thesis is not to be under stood a.s being critical of the use of mathematics in geography. On the contrary, it would seem that the employ- ment of .£lE£~ epistemological principles would enhance all aproaches to geographic inquiry. What is being criti cized in this thesis is the logical positivist position and 5 its exclusion of other approaches. In epistemology d•)Ubt has replaced the rigid tenets of logical positivism. It is hoped that by showing some of the areas of doubt in epistemology, geography can not only profit from a rejection of logical positivism, but also can avoid the trap of trying to catch up with physics, when in fact logical positivism was never accepted in physics. It is of the utmost importance to realize that logical positivism is not equivalent to science and that one does not entail the other. Science has existed through the ages, both before and after logical positivism's brief tenure in philosophy. Logical positivism would repeal the laws of nature or allow nonsense statements to become a part of the body of science, merely because of testing procedures designed to yield certainty where none can exist. It may be this hope for certainty that prompted some geographers to adopt an abandoned