California s·tate University, Northridge

EPIST~10LOGICAL ~JCERTAINTY IN GEOGRAPHY

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Geography by Glen David Dalton

January, 1980 The Thesis of G. David Dalton is approved:

f~obert Hoffpaui \

Gordon.tr. Lewthwai te, Committee Chairman

California State University, Northridge

ii DEDICATION

To my father, Glen Deavers Dalton, in whose footsteps I humbly follow.

iii ACKNOWLEDGE~ffiNTS

I wish to thank my committee, Dr. Gordon R. Lewthwaite, Dr. Robert Hoffpauir, and Dr. Sidney Luckenbach, for their long and painstaking efforts in the drafting of this thesis. To Dr. W. Timothy Dagodag I give spe­ cial gratitude for always being there and for being the person he is.

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

DEDICATION ...... ~ ...... • ...... iii

ACKNO~EDGE:r.fEN'rS •••••••••••••••••••••••••-. • • • • • i v ABSTF..ACT . . • • • • . . . . • • . . • . . . . . • . . . • • • . • . . • . . . . • • • vii

Chapter I INTRODUCTION ...... 1 II QUANTITATIVE REVOLUTION .•...••••..••••• 16 a. Introduction ...... 17 b. Pre-Revolution ...... •....•.• 18 c. Quantitative Revolution ..•.•.....•.. 22 d. Conclusion ...... 32 e. Footnotes ...... 33 III LOGICAL POSITIVISM .•.•...••...•..•.••.• 38 a. In troduc ti on ...... 39 b. History ...... 40 c. Tenets ...... 44 d. Judgements ...... 48 e. Reasons for Failure •....•.•...... • 50 f. Conclusion ...... 56 g. Footnotes ...... ·· ...... 59 IV UNCERTAINTY ....•...... •.....•..... 63 a. In troduc ti on ...... 64 b. Truth ...... 67 c. GOdel ...... 70 d. Imperfect Justification of Kno-v:1edge Claims . ~ ...... 72 e. Foundations ...... 82 f. Empiricism Under Fire •.•.•...•..•..• 86 g.. New Directions ...•...•.•.•....•••••• 90 h. Co:t1.clusion ...... ~ .. . 100 i. Footnotes 103 v CONTE!J'.uDORARY GEOGRAPHY ••...•.•.•....••• 108 a. Introduction ...... 109 b. Problems ...... 109 c. Solutions ...... 118 d. Conclusion ...... "' ...... 132

v e. Footnotes 134

VI CONCLUSION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 4 • • • • • ~ • • • • • • • • • • • 138 BIBLIOGRAPHY 143

vi I

ABSTRACT

EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY IN GEOGRAPHY by Glen David Dalton Master of Arts in Geography

Contemporary epistemology yields uncertainty for the foun.dations of our knowledge. The quantitative revolution in geography developed problems when it strove for certain­ ty under the defunct epistemology of logical positivism. Logical positivism, both implicitly and explicitly espoused during the revolution, required verification (later, strict confirmation) of knowledge claims. Any claim that could not meet these criteria would be outside the realm of science and, hence, not cognitively significant. The tenets of logical positivism, however, were soon recogniz­ ed as being too strict. Even the founders of logical posi­ tivism advanced to other positions as it was shown through epistemology, logic, and science that verification and strict confirmation are not possible and that uncertainty is pervasive. Tarski showed that truth is a semantic function, not applicable to real-world claims. Godel sho"llred that any rich axiomatic system is incomplete.

vii . I

Modern neuropsychology and neurophysiology indicate that . I perception is a process which depends upon the autobiogra- phy of the individual perceiver for its context instead of an unambiguous 11 camera click 11 on a blank state. Thus, the empiricism of logical positivism is shown to be based on the false hope of certainty where none is known to exist. Problems in contemporary geography arise from reliance on the certainty of old epistemology, thus relegating some legitimate geographical studies to so-called pseudo- science. The abandonment of logical positivism for cur- rent epistemology will broaden the spectrum of what geogra­ phers can do.

- viii p '

"It is not the function of the geographer to write philosophy; but if he aspires to be more than a competent routine techni­ cian, it is certainly one of his responsi­ bilities at least to be aware of philo­ sophical problems which may bear upon his \'IOrk. nl O.H.K. Spate

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1 2

This thesis is concerned with current problems of fundamental philosophical import arising out of the quantitative revolution in geography in the 1950's. The

emplo~~ent of the methodology and techniques of the quantitative revolution is valid only insofar as the more fundamental questions of how and what we can come to know are understood. These fundamental questions deal with theory of knowledge, or epistemology. Thus, the scope of this thesis is the intersection of geography and philosophy at the point where these epistemological questions of how

and what 'VIe can come to know are raised. Through the millenia, fundamental questions concern­ ing the quest for knowledge have been debated by philo­ sophers. Various theories of knovrledge have been proposed, becoming more and more coherent with scientific theories in recent centuries, especially in the past generation. Thus, if our knowledge builds at all, epistemology builds and progresses in the manner that disciplines such as physics, neurophysiology, and psychology do.

Empiricism is a broad epistemological world-vie~w~~~~~~~­ which has been modified to yield contemporary logical empiricism, logical positivism, and nineteenth century positivism, among other offshoots of the main body of emptricism. Logical positivism, of special interest to us, 3

appeared in the first half of this century and is nO\'/ a dead issue among philosophers of science. It is logical positivism, however, that has become the explicit and implicit philosophical basis of the quantitative revolution. As late as 1975 Amedee and Golledge, .for instance, claim that "since about 1954, scientific work in geography has been almost exclusively logical positivism. Thus we describe what has overwhelm­ i.ngly prevailed in the discipline's recent history. n2 A decade earlier, however, the philosopher Karl Popper had said that "positivism is out of date science ..•. 11 3 A gen­ eration earlier logical positivism had met its demise. Thus, the quantitative revolution, to the extent that it relies on logical positivism, is not viablee The quantitative·revolution, in an attempt to make geography more scientific, ironically put its faith in an epistemological position that had been ignored by physic~ ists because of logical positivism's disastrous conse­ quences for scientific laws. Thus, today grave problems exist for geography both in that the use of sophisticated mathematics in geography is hindered by its association with logical positivism and also in that logical positivism would deny the value of any methodology but its own. Hence, an ideational4 approach in geography would be labeled as pseudo-science, hardly the view of current epistemology. There is great need, then, for geography to abandon logical positivism if it is not to be left alone among the disciplines. The solution to our problems with logical positivism would seem to lie in achieving an acquaintance with current epistemology, arrived at through discussions of (1) the errors during the quantitative revolution that led to our predicament in the first place; (2) the problems of logical positivism; (3) an indication of the great dif- ferences between logical positivism and contemporary epistemological thinking among philosophers of science and scientists; and (4) events in contemporary geography aris­ ing out of indifference to contemporary epistemology.

Purpos~: The purpose of this thesis is to show the error of relying on logical positivism as the philosophical basis of geographical inquiry. In pointing out the problems of logical positivism it is hoped that two aims will be achieved: 1) that the use of mathematics in geography, freed from the onus of association with logical positivism, can be enhanced and 2) that the methodological restrictions imposed by logical positivism can be discarded. Although logical positivism is associated with the quantitative revolution, this thesis is not to be under­ stood a.s being critical of the use of mathematics in geography. On the contrary, it would seem that the employ- ment of .£lE£~ epistemological principles would enhance all aproaches to geographic inquiry. What is being criti­ cized in this thesis is the logical positivist position and 5 its exclusion of other approaches. In epistemology d•)Ubt has replaced the rigid tenets of logical positivism. It is hoped that by showing some of the areas of doubt in epistemology, geography can not only profit from a rejection of logical positivism, but also can avoid the trap of trying to catch up with physics, when in fact logical positivism was never accepted in physics. It is of the utmost importance to realize that logical positivism is not equivalent to science and that one does not entail the other. Science has existed through the ages, both before and after logical positivism's brief tenure in philosophy. Logical positivism would repeal the laws of nature or allow nonsense statements to become a part of the body of science, merely because of testing procedures designed to yield certainty where none can exist. It may be this hope for certainty that prompted some geographers to adopt an abandoned philosophical posi­ tion and apply it to the quantitative revolution. Uncer­ tainty, however, would seem to be nothing new to science, nor does it provide excuse for incoherent knowledge claims or carelessness on the part of those who recognize uncer­ tainty. Scope: The scope of this thesis ls conceptual and current. Only when a point is being developed v.fill historic data be used, primarily in the discussion of the quantitative rev­ olution and of logical positivism. The th~~st of this 6

thesis is towards the intersection of current developments in geogr8.phy and current thinking in epistemology. To a lesser extent, other disciplines will be discussed when relevant. For instance, there will be some allusion to physics, not because we are interested in physics qua physics, but because certain limitations to our endeavors i.n geography are provided by the character of the physical t,miverse. This thesis is not a personal philosophy of what I think geography should be; rather, it is an attempt to reflect the current thinking of philosophers of science concerning epistemology. Therefore, no new philosophy is generated because all that is here attempted is the pre­ sentation of a counterpoint to the acceptance of logical positivism through the use of the very same (but more recent) resources (i.e.: philosophers of science) that are used by those geographers who would promote the ~cceptance of logical positivist doctrine. It is assumed that no discipline operates success­ fully in a vacuum. There is a nexus of disciplines inter­ acting with each other analogous to a systems analysis diagram. It is assumed that it is prudent to make use of the current state-of-the-art of each discipline when it generally coheres with the entire nexus. In other words, a. geographer does not plan that someday we will be able to travel faster than the speed of light and would be imprudent 7

to ignore this presently established principle of physics. Philosophers \vould be imprudent to i.gnore the information from psychology concer-aing the non-lineCl.l, holistic side of the brain. Although the ne:x-us of disciplines is not entire­ ly coherent, in that new developments are not always broad­ ly recognized, it would seem that one does need to be aware of developments from outside one's owr1 discipline which impinge upon one's work. Therefore, when geographers cite a philosophical position for the governru1ce of the direc­ tion in which geography should move, that position needs to be fully un.derstood. Justification: None of us exists tabula rasa. Each of us .has a philosophical outlook, whether or not it can be arti- culated or even brought to consciousness. Our accultura­ tion leads us to see the world through theory-laden eyes.5 As Feyerabend says, "on closer analysis we even find that there are no 'bare facts' at all but that the facts that enter our knowledge are already viewed in a certain way and are therefore essentially ideational."6 The way we inter­ pret the world is therefore a function of our philosophical outlook, which is in turn a function of our acculturation and our genetic endowment. Our acculturation has been strong enough to lead us to believe in the absoluteness of t.ime and space in one generation and then to reverse our beliefs to adopt those of relativity in the follovring gen­ eration. More recently it has led us to try to construct a 8

logical and positive foundation for science through the coupling of atomic sentences having absolute clarity and atomic facts derived through positive sense-data. However, as I shall attempt to show later, our ideas have changed, leaving us in a position of having no theory-free facts and no way of achieving absolute clarity in ordinary language. No·w the geographer might question the utility of having any concern at all with what philosophers have to say about how we order the world. Yet the geographer has been acculturated through his school years and surely orders the world differently from the Medieval geographer whose first thought was God, not critical science, or the Truk Islander who cannot articulate how he navigates. Furthermore, the philosophical acculturation that we re- ceive during our school years is probably not of the highest caliber, tnereby leaving us with something worse than a blank state --an erroneous state. Thus, it would seem that we must 11 unlearn" some naive approaches to vi. ew­ ing the \'/Orld and acquiring kno\'lledge through sophisticated discussion of epistemological questions using information bearing on epistemology not only from philosophers, but also from the entire nexus of disciplines. By so doing perhaps we can avoid past errors of principle such as the application of biological theory to society, resulting in Social Darwinism. Neither the world nor the method of achieving knowledge of the world i.s naively given to any of 9

us. All of us have learned, consciously or not, a way of ordering the world. This learning ls_ a product of our culture and is fallible and, furthermore, is based upon the impressions gleaned from school years as to how one should approach science, not upon sophisticated philosophical discussion. Therefore, it would seem prudent for geogra­ phers .to investigate the epistemological questions pertain­ ing to their work. Further justification of this thesis lies in the fact that a philosophical position has been introduced into geography through the quantitative revolution. As in all science, this position must be critically evaluated. Evaluation is especially relevant in this case since the epistemological position introduced with the quantitative revolution has been abandoned by epistemologists. Since logical positivism would label as pseudo-science any work that does not adhere to its espoused methodology, it becomes important to determine if such a label should apply to non-logical positivist geography. Recently, alternative positions have been espoused in geography. Guelke has introduced, through a series of articles, an idealist alternative which is largely based upon the understanding of how a people view the world and the alternatives available to them.7 The possibility of applying phenomenological con­ cepts to geography has been investigated by Tuan, Relph, 10

Buttimer, and I'1ercer and Powell. 8 An awareness of the claims of phenomenology allows us to see through tne claims of logical positivism by showing us ho·v,r, even in our daily lives, we exist in a life-world that yields a predisposition as to how we order the world. Walmsley has discussed prlenomenology and positivism dialectically, ap- parently attempting to reach a synthesis of the two ap- 9 proaches. However, he barely mentions logical positivism. So far as this writer is aware, there has not been a detailed defense nor a critique of logical positivism in geograpny, nor have I reason to believe that there has been a·detailed presentation in geography of some of the current ~pistemological reasoning that indicates the lack of our abilities to achieve certainty, a position at odds with the hopes of logical positivism. This thesis is an attempt to fill these lacunae. Overview: I shall first attempt to show how the quantitative revolution has been linked with logical positivism, both explJ.ci tly and implicitly. The relationships among Fred Schaefer, William Bunge, and the then-logical positivist philosopher, Gustav Bergmann, during the early stages of the quantitative revolution will be examined. Later allu- sions to logical positivism and its tenets will be discus­ sed. Indirect links to logical positivism will be examined through analysis of the writings of quantitative geogra- phers v1ho were evidently una\vare of the nature and pitfalls 11

of the position they were supporting. (Obviously, not all mathematically inclined geographers were or are involved in the logical positi.vist dilemma.) Follotving the chapter on the quanti ta tive revolu­ tion, logical positivism will be examined. A brief history of the movement will be given along with its tenets. Philosophers representing many different points of view will be cited, indicating their opinions regarding logical positivism. I shall attempt to show that knowledge of the demise of logical positivism is so common that it has filtered down to encyclopedias and textbooks. I shall then

attempt to present reasons for its failure~ such as the verifiability criterion that would declare the laws of physics to be pseudo-science. The failure of such a carefully and skillfully developed position as logical positivism has led to para­ digm shifts in epistemology. A chapter on current thinking in epistemology will attempt to indicate the nature and extent of the move away from certainty among philosophers of science. Several crucial areas of doubt will be exam­ ined in an attempt not only to show the reversal from posi­ tivist thinking, but also to put forth contemporary views relevant to geography. Through an understanding of the doubt prevalent in modern philosophy, geographers may then deem it prudent to move away from a positive position while being careful not to embrace just any anti-positivist posi- . I 12

tion that comes along. In dumping positivism and in recogni.zing that we apparently have no final answers in epistemology (or geography) we must also recognize that we may indeed have some good ideas about reality gleaned from the evident coherence of many of our knowledge claims from among the various disciplines. Merely because we can not be positive does not mean that we must abandon all hope that science can tell us something worthwhile and build (i.e., progress). Thus, although epistemologists may debate forever about whether or not there "really" is a world out there, many other epistemological questions are quite amenable to input from the sciences. An example of such input involves the question of whether or not sense­ data can serve as an ultimate foundation for sure knowledga It turns out that information from neurophysiology indicatffi that some of the data that reaches the retina is lost when the optic nerve transmits the information to the cortex, thus negating the sense-data position in epistemology.

1~erefore, changes in epistemology not only reflect the growth within the discipline, but also advances in the sciences. These changes and their rationality are some­ times ignored in some politically inspired anti-rational proposals for alternatives to logical positivism in geo- .graphy. Merely because logical positivism does not work does not mean that science and philosophy of science do not

\'Wrk. 13

A number of problems exist in contemporary geograph~ both because of the erroneous equation of logical posi­ tivism with science.and also because of an apparent indif­ ference to events currently taking place in epistemology.

Some of these problems will be discussed vis-~-vis contemp­ orary epi.stemology, wherein I shall attempt to show that in many cases ·they are merely pseudo-problems that will disap­ pear upon our achieving closer contact with the epistemology of philosophers of science. 14

FOOTNO'l'ES

1 O.H.K. Spate, Let He Enjoy (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1966), p. 188. 2 Douglas Amedee and Reginald G. Golledge, An ,Jn_t:~du9t1o~ .. to Scien:tific Reasoni~, in G~ographylNew York. John V.J.ley & Sons, Inc., 1975 , p. ~v.

4 The ideational point of view would search for reasons, not merely causes. It is conce1~ed with purposes and intentions regarding human actions. It may include subjective understanding, empathy, and other "non-objectivE!' modes of understanding. 5 I use "theory" here (and throughout the thesis) because of convention, although "hypothesis" or "model" might be better terminology in my opinion. 6 Paul Feyerabend, "Against Method: An Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, 11 in I:iinnesota .§_tudies J.n the Philoscmhy of Science, Vol. IV: Analyses of Tl'!,E;_,gries ~ods of' 1:-'h- sics and Ps cholo v, ed. by Hichael Rad..Yler and Stephen Winokur I11linneapolis: University of IVlin­ nesota Press, 1970), p. 20. 7 Leonard Guelke, "An Idealist Alternative in Human Geography," Annals of the Association of Am_§rican Geog:@.:: pher§., 6i+ (1974), 193-202; 11 0n Rethinking Historical Ge­ ography,11 Are~, 7 (1975), 135-38; "The Philosophy of Idealism, 11 Annals of the Association of Ainerican Geogra-- 1!..~~.£§., 66 (1976)' 168-b9. . -- 8 Yi-Fu Tuan, "Geography, Phenomenology, and the Study of Human Nature," Canadian Geogra,Eher, 15 (1971), 181-92; Edward Relph, "An Inquiry into the Relations Be- 15

t\Bertrand Russell

CHAPTER 2

QUANTITATIVE REVOLUTION 17

Introduction: As I shall presently attempt ·to show, Fred ----·---~ Schaefer's ar·ticle, "Exceptionalism in Geography: A Method­ ological Examination, 112 a factor precipitating the quanti- tative revolution, was influenced by his close relationship ¥lith Gustav Bergmann, then a logical positivist philo­ sopher. Yet by the mid-1960's Bergmann himself wrote in the preface of his book on logical positivism; HBy now logical positivism belongs to history. 113 Even further confounding the situation is the continued reliance on logical positivism, as pointed out by Amedeo and Golledge on page 3 , above. 4 How has this happened? The purpose of this chapter is to show the relation­ ship between the quantitative revolution and logical posi­ tivism. This chapter is not an historical account of the quantitative revolution; rather, it is limited in scope to the developrnents that brought logical positivism to geo- graphy. In tracing some of these developments perhaps we can more fully understand and thus rectify some of the current problems of the discipline. The chapter begins with the events leading up to the revolution. Then the relationships at Iovm State University among Bergmann, Schaefer, and Bunge are exam- ined. An attempt is then made to show the indirect influence of logical positivism on other leaders of the 18 quantitative revolution. Throughout this chapter the conflicting goals engendered by the opposing desires to be scientific and positivistic at the same time will be dis- cussed, although problems arising from these conflicting goals will be brought out in a later chapter.

Pre~olutiort: In expressing his opinion of Hartshorne, David Harvey \

vle may find, in pursuing our understanding of geography in isolation, that we are in the unedifying position of expounding \1/i th­ out reasonable foundation views which have generally been discredited in all other disciplines as well as in the philosophy of science. 5

\ihile it is a fact that in Hartshorne's Nature of Geograp~ there are only four out of 528 bibliographic entries having to do with philosophy of science,6 the discredited views which engender isolation today are those of logical posi­ tivism. Yet geography has not been close to its philo­ sophical bearings historically. Clarkson writes that when deterministic study was found to be a wrongly-defined process, geography fell ~~to.so~e disr7pute with scholars in other aJ..sc1pl1.nes .•• In attempting to eschew the grand theory prevalent in the early part of the century under the influence of Social Darwinism and environmental determinism, geography became idiographic, culminating in the chorological school of thought in which Hartshorne was the most influential thlnker. Sack, for instance, terms Hartshorne's chorology 19

11 the most influential and comprehensive in the English literature ..• "8 Yet Eichenbaum and Gale write of American geography as having "the minimum of contact with other science ..• from 1920 to 1955,"9 a period which extends from the beginning of the chorological movement in hnerica to the quantitative revolution. Now, whether or not it be true that geography was not in contact with other disciplines during the first half of this century, the point remains that there was little contact \'lith our supposed philosophical bearings. Further­ more, there had been a paradigm change from grand theory to idiographics. The grand theories were promulgated in the face of refuting evidence and finally collapsed as geography svd. tched to the opposite tack. As I have at­ tempted to show, however, the major treatise by the major proponent of the new paradigm had little reference to philosophy of science. Although there obviously had to be an underlying epistemology, it was merely not made explicit Hartshorne, iglplicitly, however, "was committed to empiri­ cism," as Sack puts it.10 We can hardly fault Hartshorne if he did not deem it necessary to make explicit the under­ lying epistemological assumptions of his chorology. Yet two problems arise out of the lack of formal contact with philosophy at the fundamental level. One problem is ex­ ogenous in that there was little defense against the ext_~ empiricism of the quantitative revolution. The 20

other problem is endogenous in that the lack of explicit epistemological bearings leaves room for, and perhaps even assumes, a view of the world that is naive (in the philo­ sophical, not the pejorative sense), wherein the world is as it "appears" to be. Let us examine the second problem first. It is a simple philosophical problem dealing with naive realism. Naive realism is the belief that the world is as we perceive it --a common-sense viewpoint. Now geographers may believe, so long as they are not proposing grand theory, but, rather, are counting barn& that trusting the

indubitability of one's O\·m senses is good enough. Such a point of view ignores the possibility of developing theories and laws and also ignores the problems associated with our senses. If one puts the left hand in ice-cold water and the right hand in hot water they feel ice-cold and hot respectively. If one then simultaneously removes both hands· and puts them in luke-warm water the luke-\varm water feels hot to the hand that was ice-cold and cold to the hand that was hot. Here our senses are telling us op­ posite things simultaneously. Although naive realism faces more formal objections, we can see that our senses can fool us. Geographical problems arise because of cultural vari­ ables among other reasons. Iilla t is not classified as a "normal" climate for William Morris Davis is quite normal for an Apache Indian. "When is a barn a garage? Where is 21

the line between "barrmess" and "shedness"? How many square miles does the United States have? Do we include Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, etc.? If we say "no", 'I that we merely want to talk about nation-states, then ,,..1hat is a nation-state? Where is the nation of the Sioux?

~~ere is the state of the Palestine Liberation Organiza- tion? Is Mongolia really a nation-state or closer to a Soviet republic? Why does one generation perceive the High Plains as the "Great American Desertll and another

generation a~ good farmland? Thus, if we do not make ex­ plicit our epistemology, but rely on the naive realism of common sense, then problems of intersubjective communica- tion occur. Burthermore, opportunities are ignored that V!Ould go beyond the recording of "facts" and generalizing, if such opportunities exist. Hartshorne recognizes the problem of naive realism indirectly when he says: Any science concerned with the study of reality --as distinct from pure mathematics-­ must use concepts that represent actual deformations of truth, however slight.ll Without an explicit epistemological statement, however, these "deformations" have varying implications. If one is a logical positivist, an empathetic report is a "deforma­ . I tion" that is metaphysics and mere pseudo-science which yields no cognitive result, thus nullifying much geogra­ phical worl~. The other problem lies in the fact that logical 22

positivism made so much headway in geography. If we had had closer contact with philosophy, then logical positivism \'TOuld not have been an open choice and we could have had

our mathematics without the problems inherent in an indif~ ference to our philosophical bearings. Hartshorne's historical foundation, while valuable as far as it went, did not appraise science or scholarly inquiry in general. It dealt with the history of one discipline. Some geographers thought that geography ought to have closer ties to other sciences, or at least ties to what they perceived as the methodology of other sciences. The quantitative revolution was their answer to the lacw1ae in the stated foundations of areal differentiation. The quantitative revolution began with an air of certainty provided by logical positivism. As Ian Burton remarked, "when you are involved in a revolution, it is difficult not to be a little cocky.nl2 The revolution received the direct influence of logical positivism at Iowa State University and it is to these events that we now turn. Quantitative Revolution: The spatial school of thought that grew out of the quantitative revolution was, as Sack says, "initiated by Schaefer's 'Exceptionalism in Geography'".l3 In replying to Schaefer's article in 1955, however, Hartshorne said: In total, almost every paragraph, indeed the great majority of individual sentences in 23

the cri ti.que, represents falsification, whether by commission or omission.l4 Since Schaefer had died in 1953 there was no chance for a dialogue bet1treen Schaefer and Hartshorne to clear the air. ; Schaefer could not further explain his claims in the light of Hartshorne's rebuttal because Schaefer was dead. The revolution thus had a cause to promote, no matter how ill- founded. The "cause'', however, is somewhat veiled in the events of Iowa State University. Let us examine them. Davies, in an introduction to a paper by Amedeo and Golledge in his book, The Conceutual Revolution in Geogra-: Qhy, says this about the philosopher, Gustav Bergmann's, influence on geography: The framework used in this discussion lthat of Amedeo and Golledge7 derives from the work of a former member of-the Vienna Circle lthe founders of logical positivism?, Gustav Bergman LSic7, a philosopher long resident at Iowa City. As the authors ~~edeo and Gol­ led€@7 were graduates at Iowa State Universi­ tyf they join a long list of geographers who seem to hav_Q been considerably influenced by Bergman's Lsic7 worK, in particular Schaefer, McCarty, and Bunge. Vl'nen the history of the conceptual revolution in geography is writ­ ten, Bergman's /Sic? influence may be seen to be considerable~5 That the influence of Bergmann's logical positivism has indeed been considerable can be seen from Bunge's 1968 tribute to Schaefer.16 In this tribute Bunge says that, Schaefer received a fine education in philo­ sophy of science from one of its inter­ .nationally renowned masters, Gustav Bergmann.l7 That the relationship between Schaefer and Bergmann was close .is attested by Bunge's statement that, since Schaefer had d.ied before his "Ex:ceptionalisrn" art.icle had been published, his L8chaefer's7 good friend Bergmann had to complete the final mechanics of pub- 1.__ J.ca t•·.1on. 18 Thus, a logical positivist philosopher completed the final work on a geography paper written by one of his proteges. Bunge cites the relationship between Bergmann and geogra­ phy elsewhere, also. In his Theoretical Geography, he says: The chapter on methodology was vrri tten with.extensive aid. Professor Gustav Bergmann of the Department of Philosophy of the State University of Iowa was especially valuable since he was a close friend and intellectual associate of Professor Fred Schaefer in Schaefer's classical work, 'Exceptionalism in Geo­ graphy: A Methodological Examination. ' Such help assured the representation of Schaefer9s position with unusual ac­ curacy. Here we can identify Bergmann's direct influence on both Schaefer and Bunge. Sack also points out that "Schaefer's viewpoint was embraced and extended by W. Bunge •..• n20 Schaefer's influence was, in fact, considerable. Sack indicates that Schaefer's point of view was taken by Berr~Marble, Haggett, and Morrill, for instance. 21 Warntz, in the preface to Bunge's tribute to Schaefer, says, Hodern Theoretical Geography, as an emerging discipline in American universi­ ties, clearly must recognize that its . strongest impetus came from Schaefer.22 About the time that Schaefer's article appeared, Garrison was conducting a class comprised of statistically ori.ented geography students at the University of Washington. Bunge says, it was Schaefer whom the gang that Garrison gathered together at the Uni­ versity of Washington poured /Sic7 over. Schaefer's methodology J.nterpreted Hoover, Losch and Christaller and latL~ched Garrison and his raiders. 23 Bergmann's logical positivism was influential through Bunge, himself, of course. v/arntz writes of Bunge as the American Geographer who clearly recognized Schaefer's role, who interpreted Schaefer's contributions, who accorded them proper respect, and who built upon them in his own work, Theoretical Geography ... that book so much_admired by so many~~ the younger Amerlcan geographers .... We have already seen that Bunge cites Bergmann as being

"especially valuable" in his Th~oretical Geography.25 But Bunge, himself, does not meet the objectivity called for in his logical positivist training when he "freely admits that he stands in great personal hostility relative to Richard Hartshorne" and when he claims that "Hartshorne felt battered and bruised" (by Schaefer) without citing any evl"d ence. 26 Now, it would not be at all accurate nor fair to lay Bunge's polemics at the feet of the quanti- tative revolution, but either the absolute objectivity of logical positivism applies or it does not. Bunge cannot have it both ways. Neither Bergmann nor any other revo- 26 lutionary can be saddled with Bunge's innuendos, but Bunge surely is. Showing disdain for the philosophy that he would impress upon the rest of us, Bunge writes in a style betraying that philosophy. For instance, again without evidence, he says : TQe guilt of those who betrayed him [Schaefer? is so deep that to this day, years after his death, the guilty can not restrain themselves from making personal attacks against him ... 27 Again we have the emotion: "He /]Jchaefe"f} hated 'mere description' ..•. 1128 The telling blow comes when, a year after J?ergmann had v1ri tten that logical positivism belongs to history (see above, page 17), Bunge credits Schaefer with introducing "modern philosophy of science" to geogra­ phy. 29 This "modern ph:ilosophy of science" (i.e. , logical positivism) reflects Bergmann's former position, held dur­ ing the period when Schaefer came under his influence, but a position rejected by Bergmann, of course, at the time of this remark by Bunge. Furthermore, logical positivism had lost its broad support years before the quantitative revo~ lution, as I shall attempt to point at in the next chapter. Logical positivism would claim that cognitive knowledge can be attained only through verification (later, strict con­ firmation). Yet Bunge's methods are at odds with the very position he supports. Bunge's influence, however, has not been inconsider­ able. In his Past President's Address to the Association d 2'7

American ,Geographers, Clyde Kohn stated that

the publication of this monogr~h ffiu.nge's Theoretical Geography/ had a great impact on the development of geo­ graphy as a theoretical-deductive science during the 1960's. A large number of articles can be cited to sup­ port this statement.30

'Taaffe shmvs Bunge 1 s name as one of six names on a chart of the evolution of the spatial view.31 Guelke mentions B'u1ge among six other geographers in a classification of the "new geography" in his article on the problems of the new geography.32 In 1974 Taaffe shows us that the influ- ence of 1ogi.cal positivism is still w.i th us as he speaks of "''raving a few tattered logical positivist flags" and of the need for verification, the heart of early logical posi­ tl.v.isrn. 33 Verification was a central tenet in the early days of logical positivism. For reasons that will be shown in the next chapter, verification does not work. The extent of logical positivist influence in geography is shown in Taaffe's statement about the spatial vie\'! that in the 1960's: A new ritual invocation preceded many articles as each new Ph.D. felt called upon to initiate his readers into the presumed mysteries of •.. verification.34 Hence in the 1960's geographers were attempting to apply a logical posi tivi.st principle that even the logical posi­ tivists had abandoned and that belonged to the early days of a dead epistemology. 2d

There are also subtle indications of an indifference to fundamental assumptions during the quantitative revolu- t.ion. In add.i.. tion to Bunge, Guelke lists Haggett,- Chorley, Harvey, Berry, Ackerman, and Burton as leaving absolutely no doubt that they consider geography to be a science that is es­ sentially similar to other sciences in its approach and methods.35 Yet some writings by the above group appear to be at odds with their aim of making geography more scientific. Cole Harris has stated, for instance, that the major methodological study of the 1960's, David Harvey's Exnlanation Ln Geography .•. is not well grounded in the current literature in philoso­ phy on explanation.36 Another problem is the call for verification and a lavJ-seeking geography simultaneously, since verification would reject all laws (as will be shown shortly). The call for geography to be more scientific is expressed by Bunge when he states in 'l'heoreti.cal Geogra12hy, the methodology endorsed here is one which leaves geography no excuse for not reaching full maturity as a science.37 But the methodology Bunge endorses includes a section on the dangers of plausibility as a standard to measure the worth of a theory. He quotes Philipp Frank, a logical posi- tivist, to endorse his position of not accepting a theory on its plausibility. 38 Here we have a direct link with logical positivism and the link denies what scient.ists do, ?0 "- ,.1

namely, utilize plausibility as one of the factors in dec5ding whether or not a theory stands. Central place theory has never been verified (nor has c:my other theory), yet some geographers evidently think that it is a plausi­ ble theory. Plausibility is subjective, an anathema to logical positivists, but since there is no perfect, certain test for theories, we judge. Another paradoxical situation arises in the use of the vmrd "paradigm" in the quantitative revolution. The word was put into widespread use in philosophy in the book, The Structure of Scientific Revolution~39 written by Thomas Kuhn. An example of the popularity of "paradigm" is the first chapter of Chorley and Haggett's §ocio­ ££2_J::tomic Jvl:odels in Geography. 40 Kuhn's name is mentioned here no less than nine times and "paradigm11 is used no less than forty times. Chorley and Haggett say, for instance, vie have looked at the traditional paradigmatic model of geography .... We have tentatively suggestrd an alterna­ tive model-based approach. •+ This "model-based approach" 'lt!as labelled "model-based paradigm" as a major subtitle of the chapter. The paradox lies in the fact that Kuhn is -anti- empiricist. He is anything but a positivist. Durbin says that Kuhn ,is the best contemporary exponent of an anti­ empiricist, hi.storica1ly grounded interpretation of science. Q 30

lVIcMulli.n points out that Kuhn does not support the concepts of. either logical or positive foundaticns for science. 43 Durbin says that "Kuhn is explicit in his opposition to the logical empiricist ideal. rr44 (Logical empiri.cism is the outgrovvth of logical positivism.) Kuhn's book is a socio- logy o:f science, attempting to be neither positive nor verifiable and not quantitative. According to logical positivist ideals, Kuhn's book is meaningless. Yet Kuhn's paradigm-svJi tch argument became a theme of the quantitative revolution. L~5 In the "'Introduction" to their book, Snatial

~' Berry and Marble write: lVIainstream research is unashamedly empirical; the B:6v' interests are frank­ ly theoretical. · There is little doubt that the revolutionaries wanted theory in a nomothetic geography. The extreme empiricism of logical positivism and the quantitative revolution, how­ ever, actually worked against theproduction of theory. Berry's extremely empiricist proposal for a data bank, or "geographic matrix", is a case in point. He would have information concerning characteristics of places stored in a matrix with dimensions of place, characteristic, and time.47 In addition to the conceptual problems of an infinitude of places, the fluid nature of some character­ istics that makes discrete "pigeon-holing" impractical, and the infinitude and symbiosis of characteristics, there is a 31

more profound problem. Such a procedure, simple inductive enumeration, cannot yield the theory Berry wants. t1ore

precisely; it yields, when accompanied by intuition~ an. infinite number of theories, only one of which can be cor-· rect and, therefore, is. useless. The amassing of great numbers of data and then the search for a theory in them leads at best to generalizations and is, in fact, anti- theoretical. For as Guelke points out, Berry's procedure 1eads "at best, to sophisticated statistical description.~8 The influence of the extreme empiricism of logical positivism on geography continues. In 1975 Amedeo and Golledge said that they emphasized topics largely associated with the reasoning of logical positiv­ ism (i.e., in terms of an explanatory schema the hypothetical-deductive model. 49

(The model is widely referred to as the hypothetic~­ deductive model.) Here is the heart of the epistemological problem in geography. The hypothetico-deductive model does not entail the presence of logical positivism at all. Pop- per traces the hypothetico-deductive model back to the Pre­ Socratics.50 The hypothetico-deductive model can be employed today, after the passing of logical positivism. The problem in geography lies in the muddling of termino- logy with "requirements" of science. The hypothetico­ deductive model (or something closely akin to it) is proba­ bly51 widely used in science and if logical positivists 32 proposed its use, they are merely one group among many that have done so. Logical positivism is simply not equatable with the methods of science. For one to be scientifi.c one does not have to be a logi~al posi.tivist. Conclusion: I have attempted to show the relationship bet­ ween the quantitative revolution and logical positivism. The tragedy of the quantitative revolution, with its noble goals s v:as its superficial contact with philosophy. In seeking lavJ, some geographers adopted an epistemology that would prohi.bit the successful culmination of the effort, in addition to prohibiting ideational studies. Let us turn no\v to an examination of logical positivism and see what philosophers have to say about its value and the reasons for its failure. FOOTNOTES

1 Bertrand Russell, The Problems of _Philos,oJ2Jl'l (London: Oxford University Press, 1969, first published 1912), pp. 156-57. 2 F'red K. Schaefer, 11 Exceptionalism in Geography: A Hethodolog:lcal Examination," Annals of the Association of ~ic~~G~9graphers, 43 (195~ · -- 3 Gustav Bergmann, 'rhe Metap"hysics_ of Logical Posi-. tivi.sm (2nd ed.; Madison, Wise.: The University of Wis­ cons1n Press, 1967), p. x. 4 Douglas Amedee and Reginald G. Golledge, An Intro­ duct:Lon to Sci.entific Reasoning in Geography (.New York:­ John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1975), p. iv. 5 David. Harve:r, Exolanation il}_Geograghv (London: Ed·vmrd Arnold (Publlshers)" Ltd., 1969), p. 5. 6 Richard Hartshorne, The Nature of Geogra2hy (Lancaster, Pa.: Association of American Geographers, 1939). 7 James D. Clarkson, "Ecology and Spatial Analysis," Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 60 \1970)7 70~ 8 Robert David Sack, "Chorology and Spatial Analysis, 11 PJmals of the Association of American Geographe~, 64 ~4o.---

9 Jack Eichenbaum and Stephen Gale, "Form, Function, and Process: A Methodological Inquiry, 11 Economic Geograp4Y:, 47 (1971), 532"-33. . 10 Sack, nchorology," p. 449. 11 Hartshorne, Nature, p. 286. 12 Ian Burton, "The Quantitative Revolution and Theoretical Geography," in The Conce:ztual Revolu.!_ion in Ge~y, ed. by Wayne K.D. Davies London: University of LondonPress, Ltd., 1972), p. 11+7 .. 13 Sack, "Chorology," p. 444. 14 Richard Hartshorne, "Exceptionalisrn in Geography Re-examined," Annals of the Association of American Geogra­ ,~:.:-.,nhers __ , 45 (1955} ' 243. 15 Wayne K.D. Davies, "Geography and the I'1ethods of Hodern Science," in !fle Conce_ptual Revolution in Geography, ed. by Wayne K.D. Davies (London: University of London Press, Ltd., 1972), p. 134. 1.6 William Bunge, Fred K. Schaefer and the Science of .G§..Q..zl:Q.R11Y, Harvard Papers in 'I'heoretical Geography --­ "[cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1968). 17 l,biq. ' p. 18. 18 Jbid.' p. 21. 19 William Bunge, Theoreti~ Geography (Lund: Royal University of Lund, Department of Geography, 1962), p. viii. 20 Sack, "Chorology," p. 439, footnote 2. 21 Ibid., p. 439, footnote 2. 22 William vlarntz' "Preface' II in Bunge' Schaefer' p. i. 23 Bunge, Schaefer, p. 17. 35

24- Warntz, "Preface,r: p. it. 25 Bunge, Theoretical Geo viii. 26 Bunge, Schaefe~, pp. 11 and 17. 27 Ibid., p. 11.

28 IbJ:d., p. 12. 29 .!EJ:d., p. 18. 30 Clyde F. Kohn, "The 1960's: A Decade of Progress in Geographical Research and Instruction," Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 60 (1970), 212, fOOtnote 4: · 31 Ed\-vard J. Taaffe, "The Spatial View in Context," Jmn~ls of j:he Association of American Geographer_p, 64 ( l9"74);L+: 32 Leonard Guelke, "Problems of Scientific Explana­ tion in Geography, 11 Canadian Geographer, 15 (1971), 51, footnote 3. 33 Taaffe, "The Spatial View," p. 11. 34 -~., p. 8. 35 Guelke, "Problems, 11 p. 51, footnote 3. 36 Cole Harris, Reflections on ~he Fertility of the Historical Geogr::_aphical Mule, Discussion Paper No. 10, Department of Geography, University of Toronto, 1970, p. 2. 37 Bunge~ Theoretical Geog_raphy, p. 36. 36

38 ~·, PP• 3-5. 39 Thomas S. Kuhn, 'l'he Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The"uni versi ty of CEfcag·o -Press r l%2T:- ~- 40 Richard J. Chorley and Peter Haggett, eds., So~norr!J:_c Mod~)-_§.. in Geography (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd. , l9b'?)'; Chapter 1, £_a~_sim. 4·1 £bid. J p. 39. '+2 Paul R. Du.rbin, ed. , Phil_?_S.OJ2hY. ..of. .. SciencE1..!_ An ~rod~c~ (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, l9b8J, p. xxi.

43 Ernan McMullin, "Empiricism at Sea," in t1ethod- ol.:_Q,EiiqE:1 _§-ng,_£f~s~12£ica~?.2:YS in the Natura1:~ Social ~ie~C~£, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 13, ed. by Robert S. Cohen and Marx VI. Wartofsky (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975), pp. 21-22. 44 Durbin, PhilosOEQy of Science, p. xxii. 45 In fairness to Chorley and Haggett, it should be pointed out that they are much less positivistic than their American contemporaries. 46 Brian J.L. Berry and Duane F. Marble, "Introduc­ tion," in p:Qatial Analysis: A Reager in Statistical_Geog_rB;= .2Qy, ed. by Br.tan ~r .L. Berry and Duane F. Marble (Engle­ wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 6. 47 Brian J. L. Berry, "Approaches to Regional Analysis: A Synthesis, 11 in .§.R.B;.tial ~n~ysis_; A Reader in Statistical G~.£hy, ed. by Brian J .L. Berry and Duane F. Harble ~Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), pp.24- 3'+. 37

48 Guelke, "Problems," pq 41. L:-9 Amedeo and Golledge, "Scientific Reasoning," pp. iii-iv~ 50 Karl R. Popper, Con·ectures and Refutations: The ~t~ of S~}en~~fic ~o~ledge New York: Basic Books, Publishers, i§b2), p. 14o. 51 "Probablyn is used because we do not know all of the cognitive processes and cannot account for the "intu.itive flash" that takes place in theorizing. 11 Everybody knows nowadays that logical positivism is dead.l!l Karl Popper

CHAPTER 3

LOGICAL POSITIVISM

- 38 39

Introduction: Logical positivism was an attempt to provide ---~---- a clear, precise differentiation between cognitlve know­ ledge claims and all other types of claim such as mystical, religious, metaphysical, etc. It had exceedingly strict criteria that had to be relaxed as it developed. It col­ lapsed, not only through the attrition of its criteria, but also because of frontal assaults on its basic tenets. The collapse '\'ras telling because logical positivism claimed to be the way to cognitive l~nowledge and science.

The purpose of this chapter is to shov1 that logical positivism is not viable. Both the opinion of phi.losophers of science, including former logical positivists, and demonstrations of its inadequacies will be presented as evidence. 1'hls examination of logical positivism will concen­ trate on its overall program and its tenets. It is not a history of the movement, although a brief historical intro­ duction will be given. The emphasis is on the question of the viability of logical positivism and the comments of philosophers of science thereon. It is felt that j_f geo- graphers can understand the problems of logical positivism then we can abandon such thinking for a more fruitful basis for our conceptualization. The nature of logical positivism will be dealt with first, followed by the opinions of philosophers of science on .:Lts worth. Finally, I shall attempt to demonstrate some of its shortcomings. Hi§.!ory: Logical positivism was an offshoot of empiricism. It attempted to provide a positive justification for knmv­ ledge claims solely through logic and observation (includ­ ing observability in principle), equating co~1itive mean­ ing \•Ti th its method of testing kno\vledge claims. It v.fas an attempt to provide strict rules for the justification of knowledge claims in response to the reaction of some to the introduction of relativity theory and quantum physics around the turn of the century. Let us back up for a moment in order to clarify the above paragraph, which is vital in that it expresses the rad~ d'~tre of logical positivism. The process of obtaining knowledge has two contexts --that of discovery and that of justification. There has been relatively lit­ tle epistemological discussion about the context of dis­ covery, which is the creative "leap" that yields theories, hypotheses, etc. The context of justification involves the justification of theories (and knowledge claims in general) once they have been proposed. There has been much debate on this point. Historically, the empiricist position has been that, in order to justify a knowledge claim, there must at least in principle be observational evidence provided. In addition, empiricism has required J -. ·-1-1.

that the argwnent of the knowledge claim be logical. 'l'he important point is that no other factors can enter the context of justification, such as intuition, coherence with the main body of thought, plausibility, reasonable- ness, etc. Empiricists claim that observation and logic

.§-lOQ.~ are necessary and sufficient conditions for the justification of knowledge claims. Empiricism, itself, is fotmdering because of these restrictions, but logical posi- tivism, a subset of empiricism, foundered because of its further restrictions on our attempts to justify knowledge claims. Logical positivists proposed logically strict tests of justification attempts. The first test proposed was that of verification. vvb.en that was found to be too strict, the test was modified to strict confirmation. (Both attempts failed because of problems with their logic.) Furthermore, logical positivists equated the method of

testability vli th cognitive meaning, i.e., knowledge in the usual scientific sense. That is, if a theory, say, could not meet the logical posi ti v.ist criterion of testability, then it would have no cognitive meaning --no scientific import. Therefore, the propositions of a theory would be either true or false --or meaningless. ":vleaningless"

theories (and other nmeaningless 11 knovlledge claims) v.rere described as pseudo-science. Religious claims fell into this category, as well as metaphysics. Anything not meet­ ing these criter1a was beyond the pale, including the theories of Freud, ideational stu.dies, and mysticism. Thus, there vJOuld be a sharp distinction between soience and non-sci.ence, and, furthermore, scientific claims would be the sum total of our true knowledge about the world. It was a ·tidy little system, but it did not work for reasons which will be explained later. The reason for all of this formalism was the rise of irrationality (in the phiiosophj.cal sense) with the advent of the irreconcilable problems with classical mechanics in the late nineteenth century, through the revolution of relativity, and into the revolution of quantum physics in the 1920's. The Western world-view had been repeatedly overwhelmed and the absolute confidence in the absolute Newtonian-Euclidean world-vie\•! had been shattered. Some people were picking up the pieces in new and strange ways. The future logical positivists saw a special threat to scien:cific thinking in the metaphysics of nineteenth century German idealism. A group of scholars, mostly scientists, began meeting in Vi.enna in order to meet thj.s perceived threat and to attempt to clear the air of the confusion engendered by the revolutions in physics. The Vienna Circle sought an improvement over nine­ teenth century positivism. In the nineteenth century August Comte had first brought coherence to the ideas of positivism and founded what he hoped would be a sci.encEf of sociology. Hach also developed a positivistic ph:Llosophy 4·3 that dealt mainly with physical science. Spencer's posi­ tivism was primarily political. It was Comte who was the dri.ving force in the effort to unify the studies of man ru1d the physical sciences and who has had lasting effect on what are now commonly referred to as the social sciences. In Cornte's proposed highest period of society's intellectu­ al development, the positive period, the only knowledge is observable and measurable fact. This is the essence of nineteenth century positivism, which still affects the .social sciences, although physical scientists do not appear to be ready to give up their unobservables ,. such as electrons and fields. "Comte's fundamental position," says V.E. Smith,

"equates all valid knowledge with science .... rr2 Further­ more, Smith explains that "Bergson ..• coined the term •scientism' to designate the tendency .•. to take modern science as the only valid knowledge of reality that man can claim."3 The question of scientism has led to a quagmire of problems as to the identity of geography. Many of these problems are perhaps merely definitional. No matter v,rhat we call what geographers do, it is obvious that if some geographers wish to unify their methodology with that of physics, then nineteenth century positivism does not offer a viable epistemological basis, since it would exclude un­ observable electrons from physics. Simon puts the peak of nineteenth century posit1.vism "in the last two decades" of the nineteenth century.4 A£ter that, positivism declined until the Vienna Circle came on the scene in the 1920's with a much more formal ap- preach. The Vienna Circle, however, dissolved by the time of World War II because of Hitler's presence, its members having been offered positions abroad. In the meantime, logical posi t.i vism had been founded and named by the Vi en- na Circle.

!~: The broad tenets of logical positivism are

~1_7 the unity of science can be and should be achieved without relying on metaphysics or theology.

~2_7 the decisive source of knowledge concerning matters of fact is the empirically verifiable report of the natural and social scientists .•.• ;-3 7 the task which falls to philo­ sophers is the logic of science.5 Before taking a deeper look at logical positivism, let us examine the above three tenets. The third tenet.is the least directly related to geography. It tells us the task of philosophers, who were no longer to debate age-old meta­ physical questions that yield no apparent solution, but who were to directly aid science by removing some of the logical obstacles through the clarification of language. Kraft, a member of the Vienna Circle, wrote: "There was one common tenet: that philosophy ought to be scientific."6 The first tenet, concerning the unity of science, both proclaims that there is, in fact, a unity of science (..- 4 _,) .

and also that it can be achieved from within the logical positivist conception of science, which not only dis- avowed theology, but also metaphysics even of the sort that is closely tied to physics, such as causality. As Kraft puts it, "metaphysics was to be completely eliminated, and thus the Vienna Circle was tied to positivism. 11 7 The unity of the ::;ciences means that the social and natural sciences must have the same fundamental methodology and it discourages the search for reasons, as opposed to causes, in the social sciences, especially if one believes that physics is the paradigm case of science and that reasons have no place in physics. Such a unity of the sciences, in leading to the abandonment of the search for reasons, leads to the search for causes and hence leads to the ideal of process laws of the type used in classical ce­ lestial mechanics. Concerning process laws, Brodbeck says: A description of a system is complete if, given that description at any one time, we can by means of laws infer its state at any other time .... If we knev.r all this then we would have what 8 Bergmann aptly calls 11 perfect knowledge.n Bergmann says that these process la\vS, when fully articu­ lated, are differential equations. 9 Thus, the unity of science of logical positivism would encourage the search for causes through process laws which are differential equations. Ideational geography, in its search for reasons, would be abandoned because of the improbability of putting a person's reasons in the form of differential equations and because reasons, being subjective, do not meet the testability requirements of logical positivism and, hence, '\vould be considered to be cogniti vely meaningless --pseudo­ science. The second tenet listed deals with testability. In saying that our knowledge devolves from the empirically verifiable report of the scientist, logical positivism at­ ternpted to provide extremely stringent criteria for the justification of knowledge claims. Kraft says that logical positi.vism restricted "all. positive knowledge to the special sciences ...• nlO Not only was the above restriction stringent, but the further restrictions involving veri­ fiability (and its replacement) and meaning take us deeper into the logical positivist philosophy. The verifiability (later, confirmability) theory of meaning was central to logical positivism. There was a desire for absolute certainty in the justification of know­ ledge claims. In order to be justified (in the empiricist sense of that word), a knowledge claim had to correspond to the truth. Then it could be accepted into the body of science, which represented the totality of all of our know­ ledge about the real world. Scientists would come up with knowledge claims which would then be verified (or not), claims which would then become cognitively meaningful (or not). Thts process was our sole route to knowledge about the real world for logical posi ti.vists. The fotmdation for this procedure was the logical positivist faith in the immutabili-ty of atomic facts and atomic sentences. 'rheories vvere mere instruments that could change, but facts, if they were ultimate, could not. Smith says that for logical positivists "the only meaningful knowledge of the world is that which can be embodied in the empirical propositions, ultimately about so-called atomic fact."ll He adds, "logical positivism \vould present 5.. ts own starting point for human }cno"Vlledge, namely atomlc fact embodied in atomic propositions."12 Thus, logical positivists would build kno~trledge about the real \'!Orld on what they assu:r,ed (metaphysically) to be perfectly safe foundations --atomic

.facts-- by 'ltray of what they assurned to be perfectly safe means --atomic propositions that had to be verified. Minute pieces of knowledge, added ever so carefully, vrould provide a true picture of reality. Their process would shO\v the meaninglessness of religious claims and meta­ physics from a cognitive point of viev1 and the pseudo­ science of Freud. It would allow only observable (in principle) data. Meaning would come through verification. A proposition that could not, in principle, be verified would be cognitively meaningless, having no place in science, hence no place in knov1ledge about the real world. Logical positivism was a tight system designed to keep •- . 48

,I science out of trouble, but, as events 1t1ere to shov!, it '\vould have destroyed physics through its verification _cequi:cemen t.

1ud~m~1ts: Before examining the reasons for the failure of logical pos:Ltivism, it may be instructive to attempt to indicate the widespread agreement _about its failure. Al·- though the reasons for its failure are somewhat technical, the message from philosophers of science is quite clear. In 1963 Wisdom wrote: nrt may be flogging a dead horse to question further the verifiability theory of mean­ ing, because there are no longer any logical positivists. ,;13 In 1961+ \vatkins wrote: Verification is an expression of the \'fish for certainty. It leads naturally to positivism (for metaphysical specula­ tions are inherently uncertain) and also to an inducti vist viev-r of confirmation v-rhereby observation reports quasi-verify scientific hypotheses. Verificationism, positivism, and inductivism hang to.lle­ ther --and they fall together too.lZ+ _ Mario Bunge, physicist and philosopher, to whom Amedeo and Golledge pay tribute in their 1975 book,15 said in 1965:

"I agree with Popper's central thesis that posi.ti vism is obsolete science .•.. nl6 Popper has a subtitle reading,

11 '\iho Killed Logical Positivism?" in a 1974 book honoring him by fellow philosophers.l7 Hesse, the 1978 president .I of the Philosophy of Science Association, says: Doubts about the adequacy of this posi­ tivist epistemology arose \vi thin the analysis of science itself It was 1-t9

soon found to be impossible to devise logical criteria of 11 verifiability" for scientific theories which do not admit either too little or too much.l8 Eight years before Amedeo and Golledge published their previously cited claims for logical positivism, commenting on the ver.ifiabili ty theory of meaning Nario Bunge said: ..• every empirically testable theory must be interpreted before we can hope to test it: we must know what it is about --and this is all that is meant by 11 meaningn. In short, meaning is necessary though in­ sufficient for testability, and the latter is sufficient though unnecessary for mean­ ing. Yet the popular doctrine is that mean­ ing and tes tabili. ty are equivalent. This doctrine, popularized by the Vienna Circle under the name of verifiability theo,ry o£: me~ning, has lonT since been abandoned by phllosophers .....9 Feigl, who with Blumberg gave logical positivism its 20 name, said in 1972: "But the tremendous influence of the persuasive prohibitionism of the positivists proved in the end detrimental. They did not achieve a tenable epistemolo­ gy.n21 He also speaks of his "liberation11 from logical pOS.l't' l VlSill.. 22 Furthermore, he refers to the meaning cri- terion of logical positivism as "notorious.n23 Logical positivism never recovered after World \Var II. The news of its fall has filtered dovm to the textbook level where Harre says, "I have tried to present the case for positivism as fairly as possible, though I believe the case against that point of view, on intellectual, historical, and moral grounds, to be overwhelming. 1124 Agassi is blunter: "It is unfortunate that the merits of positivism are so often exaggerated, since positivism is conducive to ignorance."25 Even at the encyclopedia level the condi- tion of' logical positivism is knmvn. Passmore writes in 'rhe Egs;_:yc1o12ec2:..::h.a of Philosophy: "Logical positivism, then, is dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes. 1126 i;{hy did it die? Reasons for failure: There are at least three reasons for the failure of logical positivism contained vri thin the tenets of J.og.ical positivism itself. In addition, there is the overall dissatisfaction with empiricism, of which logical positivism was a subset. Four points will be considered, then, in an attempt to show the impracticabili- ty of logical positivism. They are verification, strict confirmation, the equating of testabili.ty and meaning, and the decline of empiricism in general. Verification was the first major failure, .although the situation was temporarily "resolved" from within through its elimination. The verifiability theory of mean­ ing would simply "rule out as meaningless all scientific laws. n27 Hempel, in 1950, said : 'l'he verifiability requirement rules out all sentences of universal form and thus all statements purporting to express general laws; for these cannot be con­ clusively verified by any finite set of observational data.2e What Hempel is saying here i.s that all sentences of the form that lavrs tal\:e are ruled out by the verification 51 requirement. (This form is the universal form, wherein

the vrord 11 all" or some similar universal is used.) No finite amount of evidence can achieve conclusive verifica­ tion. Thus, sentences of the form "All(\) are \f " (e.g., "All swans are white.") are ruled out of science as car- rying no cognitive meaning. A statement such as 11 All cop­ per conducts electricity'' would not be close to being verif_:Le_d_ until every piece (whatever that is) of copper in the un].verse had been tested and found to conduct electric- ity., Even then, verification is not achieved because the universal statement is timeless and implies that all cop­ per has conducted and v'lill conduct electricity. There­ fore, under the verifiability criterion of meardng, the statement "All copper conducts electricity11 is cognitively meaningless, pseudo-science, and metaphysics. Hempel also points out that the verifiability cri- terion also would eliminate all sentences containing both universal and existential quantifiers. 29 Hence, many ordinary statements would be meaningless, such as: "For any language there exists at least one rule." Verifiabili­ ty does not merely rule such a statement out of science; it says that the sentence has no cognitive meaning whatso­ ever. Hempel made these remarks a generation ago in an article that summarized and expanded upon previou§_ death­ blmv objections to the verifiability and confirmabili ty theories of meaning. Hanson more recently pointed out the results of the dependence upon out-dated and erroneous philosophy: It {the verification principle? generated conversat.ion, consternation, and considerable confusion. It encouraged an "antitheoretical" develop­ ment within the sciences ... HDust-bowl empiricism!! as found amongst Question­ naire-designing Sociologists ... is not too far removed from the radical philo­ sophy of verification.30 The verifiability criterion of logical positivism was simply too restrictive. Not only did it rule out religion and everyday common-sense sentences, but it ruled out the l.a\vs of physics. Verifiability required a probability of one, that is, if a statement was verified, it had a probability of one of being true. The logical positivists soon realized the problems of such a requirement and modified their ver:.ifiability criterion to the "softer" confirmability criterion of meaning. The confirmability criterion of meaning (i.e., str~ confirmation) yielded the opposite results of veri­ fiability, however. Instead of being too narrow it was too broad. Nonsense statements could be regarded as scientific under the confirmation of logical positivism. The problem can be explained through reference to probability and by example. Verification was designed to y.ield a probability of one. Confirmation is also a kind of probability. It must obey (by design) the axioms of the probability calculus. One of these axioms deals with disjunctions. A disjune- tion is an either-or statement, such as: "Either it is raining or it is not raining." The probability calculus states that the probability of a disjunction is equal to

or greater than ei th~ of its disjuncts. That. is, if P

and Q are the two disjuncts then vre can say that

Pr(P or Q) ~ Pr(P) and Pr(P or Q) :;;;~ Pr(Q). For i-nstance, in rolling fair dice the probability of getting a 5 or a 6 is equal to or greater than the probability of getting a 5 and the probability of getting a 5 or a 6 is equal to or greater than the probability of getting a 6. The problem :for logical positivism here becomes outlandish when one side of the disjunction is a nonsense statement. Passmore gives the example of a scientific statement under the con- firmability criterion of logical positivism: "Either it is raining or the Absolute is not perfect.n 31 The entire statement vmuld be cogni ti vely meaningful and "scientific" under logical positivism. Thus, the confirmation criterion of meaning also failed. Along with the failure of the confirmation criterion,. logical positivism was simultaneously having trouble from numerous other quarters including its equating testability with cognitive meaning. Problems here come from two sources --logic and the meaning of the word "meaning. 11 Under logical positivism, statements had the alter- native of being not only true or false, but also cogni. ti ve-- ly meaningless. Passmore questions vrhether alternatives that are either true, false, or meaningless 11 are alter- native descriptions of the same kind of occurrence or whether to describe a sentence as meaningless is not tanta- mount to denying that any statement has been made, any 3? proposition put forward. ll ,_ In other words, for one thing we m.tght ask if the follo·vring t,,.,o sentences are the same kind: "Mars is the fourth planet from the Sun" and "Elec- trons do pink triangles." Even if we can not definitely show the truth or falsity of the first sentence, it does not appear to be meaningless in the sense that the second sentence can be construed to be meaningless. Passmore would further vmnder if we can say the second sentence is meaningless since §.Qf!l~thing has been said. Perhaps it would be better to say it is false (presumably). The meaning of "meaningH presents a more profound problem. r~1ario Bunge says: nno not mistake testability (a methodological requirement) for meaning (a semantical condition)."33 If we look upon testability as a methode- logical requirement and meaning as a semantical condition, then the equating of the two is a mixing of worlds of dis- course. To assume that meaning and testability are equi- valent goes against the usual usage of the terms and is itself a metaphysical assu.mption, a supposed anathema to logical positivism. J.h:5

'\'/hile logical positivism was foundering because of its inherent weaknesses there were also exogenous develop-­ ments leading to its demise. Feigl, a founder of logical positivism and now a logical empiricist says it is the time for "'beating-up' on the empiricists."34 Haxwell, a protege of the empiricist Bertrand Russell and co-editor with Feigl of major philo- sophical publications, says: As one raised (philosophically) in the empiricist tradition, I speal~ ~e,:r.: many years of experience and frog the heart. To have become convinced that empiricism is gravely defective~ both in letter and in spirit, has been a painful thing indeed. . .• To those, including a 12._B:,rt of myself, who are stil.l inclined to mourn its f8mpiricism's7 moribundness, I can only paraphrase (once more) Bertrand Russell and say that I am sorry, but it is not my fault.3? Since logical positivism is a subset of empiricism, any ills of empiricism are ills of logical positivism. rllaxwell says that empiricism is an "epistemological straightjacket."36 It has simply been too restrictive by trying to restrict knowledge claims to logic and observa- bility alone. Thus, the major tenets of empiricism, which logical positivism 12resmneE!, are foundering. Further pro­ blems for empi.ricism lie in its tendency to regard sense­ data (or at least the senses) as the primary basis for gathering-facts-on-which-to-build-theory. The movement, however, leads away from this point of view towards some- - _l

56

thing opposed to the basis of empiricism. We are now led to believe, contra empiricism, that a person has a theory

fi£_e_:~, by which he determines the facts. At the very least, it appears that facts and theorizing are interwoven, provid­ ing mutual feedback, no fact cognized v1i thout a theory and the theory updated by the facts. 'J.lhe paradigm shifts in epistemology since the fall of logical positivism, thus, have been :profound, as I shall attempt to show in detail in the following chapter. Conclusion: For several hundred years, until the late nine­ teenth century the Western vrorld-view had seemed safe and comprehensible. Having replaced Medieval vi.ews on God with the supremely rational classical mechanics of Newton, v1hi.ch made the universe no more than a big clock, vlestern man had only to plot the geography of the clock. Its vrorkings were understood. Then one shocking breakthrough after another took place --the irreducibility of dynamics to mechanics, wave vs. particle, special relativity, quantum mechanics, general relativity, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, and so on. Newton \vas only a special case and the universe was no longer a clock. vie no longer had sure answers. Two not surprising trends came out of the turmoil. One trend vms that our schools continued teaching the Newtonian physics world-view with only a fe\•J words about the nev1er physics and its implications because o.f the time-lag required for the information to filter to the 5'7

school teacher level, given the nature of our teacher-· training system which does not require a thorough ground­ ing in the fundamental philosophical and scientific issues of current .import. \•li th the exception of those children fortunate enough to be inspired and taught at home -or those who develop an early curiosity along these lines, the educated ft.. Inerican public has not been educated in what seem to be the fundamental issues of its times in the t·wentieth century. Hence, most of the educated public has grovm up with poorly formed and erroneous views about these issues. The result is the placing of faith in gram­ mar school errors, such as the belief that we actually know a 11 'rhe-Scientific-111ethod" that works or a grasp for the cer:.!?.J-Il!Y implied in the classical mechanics of over a century ago. Such beliefs are grist for the mill of logi­ cal positivism, a movement which rationally, however, set out to restore order from the chaos which was to.come out of the turmoil of the turn of the century. The second trend was a reaction to our loss of certainty about the world. This reaction attempted to find some certainty in the mind. Logical positivism was a reac­ tion to this trend and it attempted to find a method of justification of knowledge claims about the world that would be certain. Logical positivism attempted to draw a line bet\veen meaningful and meaningless statements about the world. The li.ne could not be dravm, which only shows that we are not omniscient. Verification, stri.ct confirmation, and meani.ng through testability failed because humansperceive the

vmrld through a ~ of senses and associated brain activity which blocks the complete view of reality and because the logic of verification, strict confirmation,

and meaning through testability \vas itself imperfect. We now recognize that we have no certain means to justify knowledge claims, and this hardly seems surprising to those not tmmersed in superhuman quests for certainty through reliance on Judeo-Christian beliefs about man's position in the universe. After all, if we believe that we do a better job of structuring reality than ants, then there may vrell be beings somewhere in the universe that are as far beyond our ability as we presume we are beyond the abili. ty oi:' ants. Al tb.ough logical positivism purported to be anything but a religious crusade, it nevertheless reflected the .culture of its origins. Even though we cannot fully extricate our­ selves from our cultural heritage, perhaps we can dispense with some of the anthropocentrism of our Western heritage and learn to face uncertainty. The following chapter is an investigation of the uncertainty of our times. - '4 -- ~-

59

FOOTNOTES

1 Karl R. Popper, 11 Autoblography of Karl Popper, 11 in The PhilosoRhY of Karl Po~er, ed. by Paul Arthur Schilpp n;a-sar:r:e-;l.I1·:-:~rary-of Li vi.ng Philosophers, 1974), p. 69. 2 Vincent E. Smith, Science and PhilosQP-}Y (Milwaukee : The Bruce Pub11. sblng co!i1pany s 19"6 5 , p • 137. 3 Ibj.d. , p. 181+. 4 W.~·1. Simon, European Positivism in the Nineteenth Centvry:_An;...~.s.say _:iE~ectt!aTtliS~r:y (Ithaca,- N.Y.: Cornell University Press, f9b3), p. 26 . 5 \Villi am Ernest Hocking and Richard Boyle 0 'Reilly Hocking, .TY..:l?..

11 Smith, Science and Philos22ty, p. 195. 12 Ibi..Q-..$, p. 211. 13 John \visdom, "lJJ:etamorphoses in the Verifiability Theory of Meaning," £1ind, 72 (1963), 335. 14 John \'l.N. vlatkins, 11 Confirmation, the Paradoxes, and Positivism, 11 in 11:l&__Qri_!_lcaC _Ap_P.roach to Scie~~.l21 fu~qJlli;~, (d. by I"lario Bunge London: The Free Press of Ulencoe, ~964), p. 115. 15 Douglas Amedeo and Reginald G. Golledge, A~ ,;r~:,.Qdl.:!£.ti2f!_l.O Scientific Reasonin~ "[Ne\v York: John Wile.y & Sons, Inc., 1975), p. vii. 16 Mario Bunge, 11 Reply to Popper," in f£2blems in the...fhil,Qp_cm.h:L_of §.2j.e~, ed. by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave ["Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1968), p. 14LL

17 Popper, "Autobiography," p. 69. 18 IVIary Hesse, _'J']1e _Struct_ur_e of Scientific Inf...~~~ (London: The I•1acmillan Press Ltd., 197Lt), p. _1.

19 Mario Bunge, Foundations of Physic~ (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1967), p. 57. 20 John Passmore, "Logical Positivism," The Encyclq::, E§dia of P.Jlilosophy, 1967, 5, 52. 21 Herbert Feig1, "New Reflections on Empiricism,!! in _tlebw Re~ings i!l Philosonhica)..:._~1ysis, ed. by Herbert Feigl, Wilfrid Sellars, and Keith Lehrer (New York: Apple­ ton-Century-Crofts, 1972), p. 12. 22 l'£2i£.' p. 9. 61

23 .J~, p. 3. 2h R. Harre, The Philosophies of Science: P.n Intro~ ductor:y Surv_9~ (London: 'I'he Oxford University Press, 1972), preface. 25 Joseph Agassi, "The Nature of Scientific Problems and 'I'heir Roots in Netaphysics," in The Cri_tical.ld?..12.roacp. tQ_ _§_~iepce -~L1d Philgso:Qhy, ed. by J'1ario Bunge-nJev1 York: 1'he Free Pres~• of Glencoe, 1964), p. 193. 26 Passmore, "Logical Positivism," p. 56. 27 Ib i,g. , p • 55 . 28 Carl Hempel, "Problems and Changes in the Empirj_c­ ist Criterion of T1~aning," in 1.2.~: Positivism, ed. by A.J. Ayer (Glencoe. Free Press, 1959), p. 218. 29 ItiQ., p. 218. 30 Norwood Russell Hanson, Q_gser.Y,.ation ~:nd Jh.""g)_l~ tion: A G\':Jd.~~~.l:..Q§op~:f Science (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, l97il"7 p. T4. 31 Passmore, "Logical Positivism," p. 55. 32 I~., p. 55. 33 Bunge, Physics, p. 57. 34 Herbert Feigl, "Empiricism at Bay?," in Method­ ol~gical and Historical Essays in the Natural and Socia~ Sci~~' Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 14, ed. by Robert S. Cohen and Harx VI. 11artofsky (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1971+), p. 1.

35 Grover Ma.xwell, "Induction and Empiricism: A 62

Bayesian-Frequentist Alternative," in Minnesota Studies in tl!_e E..lll:lS?~ of Sc~ience ~ _Y.Q.l.~. V:Ij__J;_llcJ.~.ction,.~._ Pr_9babil:.i ty, ~d Cont:~§ti?n, ed. by Grover l'1Iaxwell and Hobert I·II. Anderson, LTr. (Flinneapolis: University of .Minnesota Press, 1975), p. 109. 36 Ibid. , p. 109. "Scientific knowledge is justifiable opinion, grounded opinion --but still opinion."I Mario Bunge

CHAPTER 4

UNCERTAINTY

63 ----"

Introduction: "Newton, forgive me 11 is Einstein's --.-~.---- poignant phrase as he describes how he changed our view of the world. 2 One might ask how it is that such radical

changes as relativity can occur. Do we not have immutable foundations for our knowledge? The answer appears to be in the negative. Consequently, we have paradigm shifts. Paradigm shifts occur not only in the sciences, however. Philosophy, too, has its paradigm shifts as its information from the sciences changes and as philosophers develop new ideas for old problems. There have been paradigm shifts in philosophy since the zenith of logical positivism in pre-war days. Episte-· mology has undergone radical changes in recent decades, not only because of internal improvements, but also as a response to new scientific breakt~hroughs. These paradigm shifts are not merely fashions. Twentieth century episte~ mology is not a popularity poll any more than is physics. vlork in epistemology today requires an awareness of de- velopments in neurophysiology and psychology regarding perception, linguistics regarding language, physics regard- ing the nature of the universe, and so on. Thus, we have a forum for the discussion of how we can perceive, how information can be transmitted intersubjectively and to what extent, and the nature of the real world according to 65

this information. Since the days when logical positivism was on the rise, radical changes have occurred which ·v;e shall soon

discuss. ~:hese changes have resulted in paradigm shifts avtay from certainty. Tarski' s explication of truth in semantics has shovm that truth cannot be applied as a criterion for real.-v1orld problems. Go del has sho\1/11 that mathematics must be forever incomplete. Split brain

resea:cch hsts shovm that we evidently reason rationally and li:nea.J.1y wit:h the left side of tht:' brain while arriving at conclusions perhaps intuitively with the right side of the brain. Chomsl\:y has stressed our inabilt ty to bring to consciousness much of our linguistic ability, suggesting innate Hbioprogramming" or some simi.lar structure. Psy­ chology has shO\\rrl that vve unconsciously screen out most of our sensory input before i.t overwhelms our consciousness and long term memory. Geography and anthropology have shovm various v.rays of coding reality in different cultures, warning us of our ethnocentrism. As our knov!ledge of the real world changes, so does epistemology. Y.Ie are now very much less certain than under logical positivism and other essentially scientific philosophies of the first half of the century. The purpose of this chapter :Ls to show that un­ certainty about how and what we can come to know prevails in contemporary epistemology and why this reversal has 66

developed cluri.ng the past fe\•l decades. By indicating the positions of philosophers of science regarding the uncertainty of our knowledge claims, it is hoped that a geography even more amenable to varying paths to knowledge will be indicated. The ma:Ln problem that this chapter addresses ·which

concerns geography is that of the jt~E£.t::ill.£.ation of know:.

L~.c1.ge __ £1HimEi_. Can we be certain of the justification of our 1-mowledge claims? Is there some justificatory method such as verification which will yield certainty? Is there some device such as sense-data that will give us a sure

foundation on which to build sure knowledge? If v.Je are uncertain, then claims to the superiority of logical posi­ tivism and its behavioristic offshoots and, j_n fact, thei.,r

cl~o b~e un~y cor_r_~_c! a1212£S?...aCh vihi.le l~~~Jl..£

Q.:.t.,he~.... ~~p~ches as pseudo-science, will be seen to be unfounded. The first point to be explored in ·this chapter is truth. Types of truth theory will be discussed and the

results of •rarski' s theory ~>Jill be emphasized. Then Godel's incompleteness theorem will be discussed for its significance on the certainty of our abilities in mathe-­ matics and other formalized systems. Looking at real­ \'rorlcl problems next, the problem of determining the worth of a theory will be examined. Then the status of f01.mda­ tions for our knowledge claims will be discussed, followed 67

by a loolc at the empiricist problem of reliance on logic and observation alone for the justification of knowledge claims. Finally there will be a discussion of the paradigm change that has led to uncertainty. ,1-):'utg: We would like to know whether or not a knowledge claim about the real world is true. Historically, there have been three major approaches to truth. These three truth theories are correspondence, coherence, and prag­

matic. None of them appears to be sati.s~factory. (Tarski' s successful semantic theory of truth applies only within language, not to the real world.) In this section the three real vrorld truth theories and Tarski' s theory will be discussed. The correspondence theory of truth is generally as­ sociated \·Ti th empiricism. It holds that a knowledge claim reporting an observation which corresponds with reality is true. In daily life if we make the claim that the stop­ light is red and if it is indeed red, then that claim ·vmuld 29_rrespong to the truth. Perfect correspondence would yield a probability of one that a statement is true, which was the aim of verification under logical positivism. This correspondence theory, hmvever, has two main drawbacks. One drmvback is that in, say, quantum physics there is no observable thing. We do not directly observe electrons, so those who want to keep the observable­ theoretical distinction clear, such as behaviorists, have 68

noth:.Lng to observe for correspondence. The other dravrback is that correspondence rules between observation and theory had to be devised. The translation between observation and theory is imperfect in these correspondence rules. Our observations are imperfect, of course, also in that they are theory-laden and we see what we want to see to a certain extent. l'1ore will be said of this later. Observa­ tions are also imperfect in the sense that not all o:f the data that reaches our sense organs reaches the cortex. Even though correspondence beti:reen observations and reality in daily ]_j_fe may give us a high degree of belief' it is not absolutely certain. Furthermore, as optical illusion games sho"~:T, our observations are theory-laden. The coherence theory of truth is closer to what is used in the kind of science that is far removed from an observation base, such as theoretical physics. Theory­ laden observation enters the picture also. In theoretical physics it may be several theories dovm the line until actual observation talces place. Therefore, physicists would be more interested in hoi:r well a theory coh~~ with the remainder of the nomic nexus, or network of scientific propositions, rather than in matching observation to reali­ ty. Daily life events enter here also in that, say, if we are driving at night and suddenly see a paj_r of dim white lights ahead of us, we vrould probably assume that they are headl.-Lghts of an oncoming car since that coheres with our 69

past exper:Lence. However, we would \'/ant to be careful to consider that theymig~ be faulty tail lights or reverse lights. Coherence, of course, is not absolutely certain as we saw with the d01tmfall of the Newtonian-Euclidean world-view. No matter how coherent a system may be, the entire edifice may fall. The pragmatic theory of truth essentially says that if it works, then, it must be true. 'ife might be tempted to say that since our physics got us to the moon, then it must be true. Hmvever, a trip to the moon does not sho\v our physics to be absolutely correct, only nearly enough correct to get us there. Since the distance was not astro- nomically great, Nevrtonian, not Ei:nsteinian 1 mechanics was suffj.cient. Tarski' s semantic theory of truth has shmm that truth is only a semantic concept and is not.~pplicable to real-world situations. (Semantics is the study of the "relationship between language and 'reality'." 3) Pop- per says that through the work of 'l'arski and Go del (whom we shall discuss shortly) \ve knovr that only for a very poor artificial language can there exist a criterion of truth.4 Feigl, formerly of the Vienna Circle and long time opponent of Popper's views says: But the semantic notion of truth, as is generally admitted, does not by itself provide any criteria that would enable us to tell whether 1·1e have got hold of a truth, or even as to whether we have 70

got neC!-rer to (or farther from) the truth.5 Thus, both sides agree that the semantic theory of truth yields no truth criterion for real-vrorld situations, Popper

expressing also the conclusion that truth can be expressed only in an artifi.cial language (such as logic). Therefore, of the four truth theories it appears that Tars.ki' s is the only one that works and that it is not appl.i.cab1e to real-world and, hence, to geographical knowledge cla:Lrns. Q.9_del: Philosophers have long dravm a distinction between analytic and synthetic truths, although that distj_nction is becoming blurred now. However, synthetic truths are es- sentially real·-·v.rorld truths and analytic truths are es- sentially those of mathematics, logic, and perhaps defini- tions and a few o-ther categories such as the statement,

11 I am here-nm·J. 11 Analytic truths are generally held to be unassai1able,~since they require 110 real-world evidence

for justification. A typical analytic truth is 2 + 2 == 4. It had long been thought, of course, that even though we might have a problem in certainty and complete- ness in gathering knovvledge about the real world and in justifying knowledge claims -thereof, mathematics and logic were our ovm invention and in time they would be complete and consistent. Uncertainty prevaj_ls, however, even in our ovm invention. For one thing, v:e start with undefined terms, such as 11 set". r/lario Bunge says that our rna the~- --~ 71

matics begins with "corrigible" assumptions. 6 However, in 1931 Kurt Godel at the age of 25 shook the foundations of mathematics with his incompleteness theorem. Godel' s incompleteness theo:r'em shows that any rich axiomatic system, such as classical arithmetic, is in- herently i.ncomplete. Amsterdamski explains that "in the

1i.ght of Godel' s theorem, we know that even a mathematical system [like classical arithmetic? of knovrledge cannot escape incompleteness .... "? Furthermore, such a system cannot be show11 to be free of internal contradiction. Serious questions arise regarding our ability to formalize systems, including computers. Nagel and Nevrman say:

Today' s caJ.cuJ.ating machi.nes have 8. fixed set of directives built into them; these directives correspond to the fixed rules of inference of formalized axiomatic pro­ cedure. The machines thus supply ans\·rers to problems by operating in a step-by­ step manner, each step bcd.ng controlled by the built-in directives. But, as Godel showed in his incompleteness theorem, there are innumerable problerrrs in elementa­ ry nu:nber theory that :fall outside the scope of a fi.xed axiomat~Lc method, and that such engines are incapa1.J1e of answertng, however intricate and ingenious their built-in mechanisms may be and however rapid their operations.B Nagel and Ne·wman go on to say that Godel' s incom- p1eteness theorem "does mean that the resources of the human intellect have not been, and cannot be, fully formal- ized, and that new principles of demonstration forever awat t invention and discovery. 119 Thus, Nagel and Ne\VJnan -~

72

say that a computer with a fixed set of directives operat­ ing recurs1vely in a i'ormalized axiomatic system can never be applied successfully to some problems. They also say

that the resources of the ~Jl..ect cannot be fully formalized. It would thus appear that there are insur­ mountable problems for the accurate prediction of hunmn affairs. Two important conclusions can be drawn from the ef­ fects of Godel's incompleteness theorem. One conclusion is that our O'"m invention of mathematics is imperfect in nature at its most fundamental levels. Yle might not be too sur­ prised, then, if our knowledge of the real world is un­

certain. 'l'hs second conclusion lies in the area of human affairs. Although it may \vell be feasible to model human affairs in order to predict what will happen under given conditions, it appears that there are some things that humans can do that lie beyond the scope of formalized (logico-mathematical) explanation. Hence, htunan beings,

through our O\·m mathematical capabilities, provide an insur­ mountable problem for mathematical explanation.

' lrrlJ29:ct'ect i:?:.S.!.~fi.£,ation of k119wledf[~- £laims: The crux of the difficulties in both geography and philosophy to which this thesis is addressed is the debate over the ,j'qsti:fica­

tion of k~:.~e claims_. Can we or can vre not justify our knowledge claims about the real world with certainty? Ylhy not, if we believe our senses? VThy not, if we follovr '77. I.)

the scientific method? vvlhy not, if we limit our discus- sions to observables? Why not, if we communicate our find- ings in unambiguous statements? The answers are not easy and have led to Vigorous debate beb,leen philosophers in the first half of the century and geographers in the second half of the century. At stake is the issue as to whether or not we have a broad spectrum of approaches to geographi- cal study. Logical positivism claims to be e:::cc~J-..:::S:l.Y correct~ all other approaches being pseudo-science ~--or vvorse. The quest for knowledge can be divided into two phases: the context of discovery and the context of justi- fication. Epistemology is concerned with the context of justification --the justification of :V..nowledge claims. It has long been thought that we could justify with certainty at least some of our knowledge claims and, perhaps, that we could eventually justify all of them ·vJi th the .careful building up of knowledge from atomic facts and atomic statements. The historical precedent for such hopefulness is strong. It goes back to both our religious heritage and our geometry. Furthermore, counnon sense indicates that we do seem to kno·w the world around us well enough to survive. As mentioned before, the Judea-Christian heritage, of coursej teaches that man is the highest form of earthly life. It teaches that man is to have dominion over nature. It teaches that man has been made in the image Of an

omniscient god. .r~Tan would appear to be quite potent indeed. Chri.stiani ty has bowed to its god through the ages, with even the rational Descartes giving the body to nature but the mind to God. For Christianity, there has always been something special about man, so special that even today evolution is under attack in the schools by

those \•rho propose that man was made especially and directly

by their god. In such a culture i~t is not hard to under­ stand how :its philosophers might believe that man achieves certainty, at least i.n some small 1·rays. Furthermore, such a culture might give little thought to the possibility of beings more intelligent than man and, hence, ·to man's imperfections. Evidence Y.ras forthcoming that man had indeed achieved certainty. Euclid's geometry fit Ne·vrton' s uni­ verse and we had the synthetic _a_l?El2!:1· Relativity, of course, did 8.\vay with this picture of the universe, allow­ ing us to abandon the claim that the sun does not go around the earth for an observer on earth, but greatly

complicating the geometry of the un.. i verse on which there is no firm agreement. In the meantime, other geometries had been invented, shmving that Euclid's was merely one pos­ sibility.

If' we cannot be certain about grand things, might i. t not be possible to be certain about some small things and 'l5

attempt to build up on layers of firm foundations? It v-ras hoped, in the early part of this century, that we could take sense-data as given, i.e., as being unimpeachable. This is surely the common sense view. By building on thJs sense-data it was hoped that we could produce unimpeacha­ ble theories if we had an unambiguous language. Here, again, language was to be built up from unambiguous atomic statements; in the manner used in mathematics and logic. Of' course, mathematics and logic start with undefined terms and axioms. HovJever, it was soon found that natural languages (i.. e., English, German, French, etc.) are not unambiguous. Context had to be taken into account, not only of the subject matter at hand, but also of the en- vironment, including the speal-~er and 1i.stener. Each pera· son's expectations differ, yielding ambiguity. At the semantic level, Northrop says: "the ordinary language of natural history science is semantically ambigv.ous. Any of its words has several different epistemological kinds of meaning."10 At the pragmatics level, where we are con­ cerned with the envirorunent of language in use, we can perhaps understand why there is so much ambiguity by con­ sidering the important geographical term ''region". "\'fill a dictionary definition of "region11 present much light in a discussion among geographers? vf.o.ich geographer's concept of region is right? What does "region" mean? It means different things 76

to different people in varying circumstances. Yet the regional concept presUJllably plays a central role in geography. The same problems arise, of course, in trying to explicitly defi.ne "kno)rledge" or even something as simple as ndog". Natural language is ambiguous because of its pragmatics aspect, \'Therein the environment of its use

is never· the same from usage to usage. Thus, expectations differ. l<'urther complications arose in the attempt to build up frorn small pieces of sure k.novlledge via sense data.

From the quest for certainty at this point vre can go to radical emp:Lricism, or phenomenalism, and on to behavior­ ism's stress on observabili ty. I'·1ore will be said of the futility of behaviorism in a moment. Before following through on the problem of sense-data as a certain basis for our knowledge, however, it may be helpful to indicate the relationship among various epistemological positions. vie start with empiricism, an over:...arching episte­ mological tradition. Extreme empiricism is logical posi-· tivism, with its sophisticated attempt for certainty through the verifiability criterion of meaning. Radical empiricism is phenomenalism, a position even more extreme than logical positivi sm. Under radical emp.i.rj"cism early in this century it was hoped that vve could develop certain­ ty through sense-data, although the quest for atomic facts '\'ras not limited to phenomenalism. Out of logical positiv- ism (extreme empiricism) came the development of present- day logical empiricism. Logical empiricists still strive for the justification of knowledge claims through logic and observation (in principle) alone, although without seeking verification ('with its probability of one) and without equating meaning and testability. From rational empiricism (phenomenalism) there developed the dependence ll on observalJles (or for some, phenomena). This dependence on observables led to the mg~, not epistemo1ogy, of behaviorism in the social sciences. Behaviorism grew out of the hope that if we 1vere to limit our commentary to

~l:.Y.§.:9les (in this case behavior), then we would be truthfully reporting the facts wi ·th no preconceptions to misguide us. Behaviorism, though, has had its problems. l'·1axwell has the .following comment on its value: I shall not dvJell at all on the wearisome and depressing matters having to do with restrictive and truncating methodolog.:Les such as 2..12.££..Cltionisrq, pehay,;Lortsm, and r.Q_lated radically empirj_cist pos~i.. tions ... f_They.J to~al.ly lad\: ar:.y vj:<:-ble rationale 12 and are dlsastrously J.mpecnng progress ....

Now, let us go back and link behaviorism v1i th the quest for atomtc facts early in the century to see y1hy I1a}·:well feels so strongly. If our senses could be believed, then it would appear that each of us would have some pieces of knowledge about the real '>'!Ol''ld. Such pieces of know- ledge could be built upon and expanded. However, as I have 78

attempted to show on page 20, our senses cannot always be

trusted to provide us with correct information about the world. Furthermore, "''e are subject to hallucinations and dreams. Thus, we still do not have certainty. It was found that sense-data do not provide an unimpeachable gJven and the program to link atomic facts with atomic

sentences ended. Hovrevcr 1 an Jntcrest in observables had been generated in the social sciences, since the senses observe (in a broad manner of speaking). Fortunately,

physicists were not so gullible or we \'!ould have had no

qw0.nt"Lun physj.cs, since sub-atomic phenomena are not ob-

servable. Among a host of mj_stakes of behaviorists, f·1ax--

·well mal

or only) sub 1iect B§_ll£:£ of contemporary physics must be pointer readings rather than electrons{ neutrinos, mesons, energy, heat, etc .... ;13

Su.ch questions as to how we are to have no pre-

conceptions~ as to which behavior out of an infin]_ te amount

of behavior is to be selected for reporting, or hovr we deal with behavi.or fhlX as opposed to discrete pieces of behav- 79

ior~ and other destroying fallacies of behaviorism do not seem to stand in the way of this npse1..1do-scientific label, 11 14 as 1''1axwe..'~ "11 . t-erm.s 1-oe l 1avlor1sm.. . 'rhe quest for certainty in the justification of knowledge claims b.as come do\'Tn to confused methodology in the social sciences, but it pro-· ceecled along sophisticated lines elsewhere. In the previous chapter, verification under logical positivism was discussed. Verification was an attempt to justify l:nowledge claims. Other attempts have been made, including the strict confirmation of latter day logical posj_ ti vism. The early Popperian falsification vms the reverse procedure of verification, but having essentially the same goal of providing a strict line of demarcation between science and pseudo-science, metaphysics, etc. The problem lies in the selecting of variables to be considered in the process of justification. vve are trying to justify a knowledge claim. We may call such a knowledge clc=dm a theory: it does not matter how low level the theory is. It might be the theory of relativity or it mj_ght be the theory that the stop-light ahead is red. Let us call one variable 11 T" for theory. HaVing put forth a theory, we would 1ike to determine whether or not it is correct. Ideally, for the empiricist at least, we would prefer that it match the evidence. Under these conditions if ·v;e theorize that the stop-light ahead is red and it is, in fact, red then our theory is < - 80

correct. Let us call this observati.onal evidence ''On.

If tr.te only variables we have are T and 0, then we simply have to match them and our theory (T) is correct. Here is where the problem beg5.ns. The situation is not this simple, no matter what we have been told in grarmnar school science experiments. Another variable to consider is the initia.J, conditions. Let us la·bel this variable "I". If we test to check the theory against the observational ev.idence (OL then to ach.leve certai.nty, th.e initial condi.ti.ons must be perfectly recorded and perfectly replicated. If some­ one wants to check out our lmov1ledge claim that the stop~­ light ahead is indeed red, then the initial condi.ti.ons sur-­ rounding the event of making the knowledge claim must be duplicated. lffhat time of day ·vms it? Where was the sun? Is anybody color-blind? Hallucinating? \\fnat was the distance from the stop light? The angle? Vias the wind­ shield dusty? And so on. One can see that the complica­ tions soar-in attempting to list and meet all the important ini tia1 conditions regarding, say, stream dynamics or paleo-­ climatology. Therefore, the ,c;.qnjuns;_tto1_!. of T and I (lnstead of only T) vastly complicates our ideal of match­ ing T and 0. A further complication arises. Both in daily life . I and in science we are continually theorizing. Some of this theorizing is far removed from observation and all of it is interdependent. Therefore, any proposed theory (1') is ac- 81 companied by auxiliary theories. Let us call these aux-· iliary theories "A 17 • A theory regarding electrons cannot be checked by observation because we cannot observe elec­ trons. 1'herefore, auxiliary theories JJmst intervene.

These theories, i:~or instance, would be concerned with the track of a spot of light across a cathode ray tube, its relationsl:d..p to electrons. In our stop--light example, ·we would perh:1ps theorize regarding the apparent size of the light and the apparent distance of the light (almost instanta.neous1y and perhaps subconsciously) in order to help determine that it really is a stop-·light. ·vle might further theorize that it is not a reflection on the wind­ shields that it is not an optical illusion, and so forth. Now we are even farther from matching T and 0 in that we have added I and, now, A. So \ve now have to match the conjunction of '.r and I and A with 0. Now we might ask vrhat we would know if v.re go through the procedure of identi.fying the important inputs to each of these variables and it turns out that the conjunction of T and. I and A do indeed match 0. Have we definitely established·our theory? The answer is that we have not. The reason that we have not established our theory vii th certaj.nty Js that we chose particular inputs to I and particular inputs to A out of an inf~lli-.1&: number of possible i.nputs to both. Our chances of choosing the incorrect sets of inputs to I and A are therefore infinitely greater than 82

ou:r che.. nces of choosing the correct inputs. ~rhis statement does not mean that we necessarily always err in our theorief>, but that we can not ever be c~rtai.rr that our theories are correct, because even if they match 0, they are contaminated by I and A. Nm.,r let us reverse the procedure. If '"e go through all the proper procedures and find that the conjunction of

'1' and I and A do pot match 0, can 1·re then sa.y v1i th certain·-· ty that ou.r theory is j_ncorrect? To clC> so 'c'!Ou1d be es·- scnt.ial.ly employing the early Popperian fals:Lfication method. However, we cannot say with certainty that our theory is faJ.t:;e, because the problem may rnerely lie in one or more of the inputs to I and A. Suspicion of I and A is a commOJ.J. affair. The observing of vmter f10\ving up hill is probably not going to damage our theory that water flows dovm h.ill nearly so much as it v1j.ll 1nspire us to check for rotation of the \·ratercourse, or to check the ·water- course w5.th a level, etc.

In summary, vre have four variables to co:nsider (·r, I, A, and 0) and, therefore, when 'I' and 0 do not match

..,,,e do not know where the error lies. ·vlhen T and 0 do matcb1 we do not know whether or not we might have compensating errors. Therefore, the justification of knowledge claims

0 1 wrGn• !..' cert .a.urcyI d.oes no t appear ·t ,o b e poss1• o1 e. l5

~~io:os_: The question now becomes: Do we have any certain, firm, absolute foundattons for our knowledge about 83

the real world. The answer seems to be that we do not --

surely not from the empiricist point of vie~." and therefore not from the logical positivist and phenomenalist, hence

behaviorist and a3sociated points of view. If we are not

absolutely certain of at least .§.2!2~ knowledge to bu.ild some

foundation.s, hmvever, then hovr do we manage to survive j_n daily life? The answer to this question ei.ther way gives

no comfort to any form of empiric:Lsm. Let us examine the merits of our foundations. In the previous section I attempted to show the interrelationships of several variables. We see that a

theory is n.ot judged in a vacuum. A knowledge claim is not merely su.bjected to a test to determine how well it matches observational evidence --it is subjected to its ability to

fit in vr:L th the applicable parts of the nomic nexus. For

science, the follm·1ing commentary by Amsterdamski \•rill ex-- plain how "nomic nexusn is used. What determines the meaning of empiri.cal facts is a conceptual apparatus of various scientif'ic theorj_es 1·Ihich cannot always be reduced to each other, as well as a conceDtl,.wl auparatus of common sense know- ledge··~ lb ~-

At the common sense level we employ the nomic nextw also, of course, as we theorize aboutj for instance, water ap- parentl.y flov!.ing up hj_ll. The nomj_c nexus, in other words, is all our conceptual apparatus, understood imperfectly by any one person and imperfect in i tsel.f, although '>He con- tinua11y test our theories, large and small, against ito l\Tore will be said later of the claim of many philosophers that we even test our facts against it. If we had some sure first step in gathering kno\

tions in order to be successful. ;§xtr~!.ne empiricism at- tempted to equate testability with meaning and attempted verification as the method of justj_fication of k.novrledge

claims. ]:{ac~1 empiricism is in an even worse position, being farther from tb.e center. It attempt~~ to build know~ ledge directly from sense data. Thus, vd.thout "rock--bot- torn" these two forms of empiricism fan., leaving us with the more moderate 1:.£&-i.£§2. empiricism of present times. Ho\vever, logical empiricism is of no comfort to those geo- graphers who espouse logical positivism, which has been thoroughly attacked by logical empiricists, including FeigL the former logical positivist. Nor is logical empiric-ism of comfort to those geographers who espouse behaviorism, because its epistemological root is I.§.._dic~l. empiricism, an even more extreme form of empiricism than the extreme empiricism of logical positivism and it is in need of the rock-bottom .foundations (such as sense-data) that we have 86

From logical empiricism there is no place to

go for these geographers except to positions even fart~

away from logical posi.ti vism and the behaviorism of racHcal emp.lr:i.cj.sm. Furthermore, logical empiricism, in fact

empiric:Lsm .i..n general 1 ts under fire. Hare will be said of the problems of logical empiricism in the following sec- tion.

EmpJ.. :r::ts~~m J::tncler .~: Popper refers to positivism and

behaviorism as 11 sec1.1larized reJ.j_gions. n 22 The failure of both p:cograms is not in doubt among philosophers, as I have attempted to shovJ. Logical empiricism., however, still has a strong following among philosophers. Its merits are

being questioned 1 however, as empiricism declines with the momentum of the fai.lure of logical posi ti visrn and ,,ri th new findings in neurophysiology and psychology. A discussion of the problems of empiricism ·v1ill perhaps indicate just how far removed some thinking is from modern science.

Let us review for a moment to see how serious the s.i tuat:ion is. Mario Bunge says that radical empiricists 23 are paradoxically "on the side of the enemies of science. 11 In the previous chapter I have tried to show that extreme empiricism is a failure. Yet both extreme empirj_cism and H7

the radical empiricist methodology of behaviorism claim to be .exc1l!§..ivel.Y correct and both programs would relegate ideational studies to pseudo-science. We are not faced with positi.ons that are offered as mere alternatives. \'le

are faced with positions that claim to be uni.g,u~ly correct, to the detriment of any other efforts, including physics. The situation "'>vould be ludicrous, except that people are still .influenced. The closest position to these "secu- larized re1i.gions" today is not so much the defunct 1ogica1 positivism as logical ernpiricism, a philosophical posi ti.on that still has philosophers supporting it, but which is under fire. It is also a philosophical position whose members have decried its next of kin, logical positivism.

Any critici.sm of logical empiricism is doubly a criticism of logical positivism and behaviorism, since these posi- tions depend on a viable empiricism to start with. The advancement of geography, and especially of mathematics in geography, will hardly be helped by the maintaining of philosophical positions that vrould destroy physics in the name of the scientific method. Let us now exarnine sorne of the problems of empiricism through its contemporary repre- sec:.q~ta±iJT_e_,_].Q_g~_:J._ empiricism. -~------~- The goal of logical empiricism is the jus~t.t:f±-ca--!5-i-en of knowledge claims through the use of logic and obs~e~r'--'v._.a.,._-_· ______tional knowledge alone. No other mechanism, such as im- mediate intuition or innateness, vJould be allO\\red to count as

tovrardr; justification. In contrast VJi.th logical posi-·

·Uvisrn, logical empiricism does not equate meaning with tcstabil.i ty, but strict confirmation would be the means o:f justification. The hope is for the achievement of ob­ jective correspondence between observation and theory. For empiricJ.sm: justifj_cat.ion, itself, is an unquestioned need. I have previously attempted ·to .indicate the problcrns arisi.ng from s·tr.ict confirmatiordsrn and tb.e attempt to achieve correspondence between observation and theory. The core of empir.tcism, justification, vri.ll now be discussed. Justification depends on some method of correctly matching theory snd reality, such as confirmat.ion. No method seems to provide certainty, or even an. objectively knovm best possible knowledge. rriodern empiricists wou1d be assuaged if we merely knew that we had the best possible piece of knoHlcd.ge ---by means of some justificatory methods based on impeccable logic. However no method yet put forth (such as verification) has worked. The false hope of a foolproof method of achieving justification is based on the problems

of inductive logic. Inductive logic has never been logical~

ly established, itself, yet it is the key to any method of justif1cation. Whether simple inductive procedures or

inferent:Lal_pl~ocsEJ.ttFes-are- us·e-d-;--tnere remains the problem --- (for the empiricist) that non-deductive procedures are not

.lg_gls:aJJ~.Y. perfect. Maxwell explains: The mistaken belief that what I ha.ve been 89

calling 'simple .inductive procedures' prov.i.de the Q.Dl.:z:, or at least the £_:r_~jl;;;QLain§n-t, or at the very least the fundamental, means of confirming signifi­ can'tl~nOWledge claims has been rN~ponsible for a large number of the many dead ends reached in work on induction and confirm.3.­ tion as well as for rnuch of the gri.ef suf­ fered in general scientific methodology anct other areas of philosophy. For thj.s error fosters the view that the accretion of ln1owledge ~ both in common-sense con-~ texts and in "scientj_fic 11 ones, proceeds according to a set pattern, a pattern con­ siEd:;ing o:f the collection o.f (homogeneous, observational) data or evidence which, when subjected to the appropriate simple i.ndu.cti ve rule, automati.ca11y and mechani.,­ cally leads us to the correct (and eo ipso, thusly confirmed) knowledge cle.im. :7. -~-- .As far as the jL.l§ti.fi.cation or vindica."­ !i?}l of hypothetico~Tr1I"ereril:Tal reasom~ as a mode of confirma·Uon or as a means o.f nondeductive inference is concerned, it is in pretty much the same boat as simple inductive procedures. The crucial point is that, given any amount of data or evidence whatever, there wi11 alvJays be an infinitely large number of mutuc1.11y incom=· patible theories or hypotheses from vrhich ... the data may be inferred and ·which, therefore, as far as the logic of the situation is concerned, are-all equally v,rell confirmed by the data. Hypothetico~ inferential confirmation, then, is no bet­ ter off vindication--vdse, than simple inductive inference but, on the other hand, it does not seem to be any worse off either, since both appear to be infinitely bad off as far as deductive vindication is cm-icerned .... As far as logic is concerned, both simple induction and hypothetico­ .inferential reasoning conf:Lrm too much, so much that they are completely vrorthless unless bolstered by non-·logic?l., unvindi­ cable (I claim) assumptions.24

The empiricist, however, is defeated if non.-logical assu.. mptions enter the pi.cture, contaminating the empiricist reliance on logic and observation alone. Justification and 90

hence empiricism appear to be untenable. Our uncertainty is growing. move even farther away from the extreme forms of empiricism 'rhere are essentially t\·Jo positions to be discussed which are the reverse of empirici.st doctrines (as vrell as posi- tions taken bet1'reen these two proposals and empiricism). One position i.nvolves a notion dealing with innateness and the other says that our theories essentially determine our observations. No matter ·where we stand along these lines, we are farther than ever from extreme and radical empi.ric- ism and neither position gives credence to the empiricist claim that we can justify our knowledge claims in any sense

,. II • ' • A • t . '1 ( t . ' d ) f . . . t OJ.: Jus·-cu~lCcl. lon · uncon ·amlna.-ce . or empJ.rlcls· .s. Vle can either agree that we have absolutely no idea whether any of our science is correct or '"'e can agree that we have a fairly good idea that we are not too far off and progres- sing. In either case there is no comfort for any kind of empiricimn without the strict, uncon.tami.nated ju.st:ifica- tio:n demanded. by tb.e umbrella of empiricism for all of its branches, including logical positivism. Some of the reasons for the radically new developments in epistemology originate in scientific breakthroughs and some of the reasons can be attributed to continued developments direct­ ly on philosophical issues. At an.y rate~ the philosophical positions advanced by logical positivist and behaviorist geographers had been quashed by fellow empi.ricists decades ago" This section is intended to emphasize just how far \ve are from logical positivisrn and behavior.i..srn in modern science and philosophy. Let us first consider some devel- opments in science and then linlc these developn1ent,s with modern epistemology.

It hardly bears repeating that we can either have physics or we can have radical empiricism with its methodology of behaviorism. The two are diametrically op- posed. Quantum physics proposes unobservables --anathema to behavio.r:Lsts~- that are not merely not yr:::t observable,

Splitn~brain research indicates that one side of the brain is propositional and the other side is not. The impl:Lcations are that one side of the brain essentially analyzes and the other side synthesizes, or works in a Gestalt faGhion. Further implicat.ions arise from the pos- sibi1ity of a lack of unity of mind, whatever we may con- sider 11 m.ind 11 to be. The reasoning is this. Split-brai.n experiments have been done on both humans and animals, the human experiments devolving primarily from attempts to relieve epilepsy and other brain disorders. \'That is involved is the severing of corpus callosum and other com- m.issures (i.e. , the connecting links between the brain hemJ.spheres ) between the two halves of the cerebral cortex.~ Gazzaniga reports: 92

Taken together, our studies seem to demonstrate conclusively that in a split­ brain situation 'v'le are really deaJ.ing "~:Ji th two brains, each separately capable of men·t:al functions of a high order. . .. E. D. You.:n.g and. I have found that a split-­ brain monkey can indeed deal with nearly twice as rnuch information as a normal animal .... Vle have so far determined also that brain-bisected Lhuman7 patients can carry out tvro tasJ.::s as fast as a normal person can do one .... A11 thE-~ evidence indicates that separation of the hem:U;phures creates two independent spheres of consQ!ousness viitbin a single cranium .. , . c:.o

~.·he implications for the mtnd-body problem are enormous, of ccurse, leaving some relir;i.ous and anthropomorphic concepts of mind farther behind us than ever. It becomes easier for some) perhaps, to think of the brain as a great compu.ter -- or perhD.ps to think of a computer as a poor, but begi.nning, replica of the brain. Bogen ·wr:L tes:

In the hu.man, where J22:.0J2£~c.?£:.£1· thought is typically lateralized to one hemisphere, the other hemisphere evidently specializes in a different mode of thought, which may be called appositional. The rules or methods by ·v1hich proposi­ tional thought is elaborated on n this 11 side of the brain (the side which speaks, reads and vrri tes) have been subjected to analyses of syntax, semantics, mathematical logic; etc. for many years. The rules by v1hich appositional thought is elaborated on the other side of th.e braiYl will need study for many years to come.";P__7

Here we arrive at the possibi.li ty of intuition and knmving things non-rationally --a long step away from empiricism. Bogen considers the possibi.lj_ty that the brain produces the 93 rational:i.ty of science and the metaphoric non-rationality of art as a dual system. 28 It is not necessarily the case that that one of the "grammars" is higher than the other, merely that they are two ways of approaching reality. It may be that the 11 appos.i tional 11 side of the brain allows us to understand through art, metaphor, and simile what the propositional sj_de of the brain cannot utter. The case for humanistic geography and scientific geography through new modes of communication would seem to be reinforced. The case againc;t the 11 epistemologica1 straitjacket" of empiric­ ism, as Max:vwll terms it, 29 would also seem to be rein_: forced. Impressionistic painting and the novels of Tolstoi may add to our geographical understanding more than some have admitted. The changes regarding language, both in linguistics and in philosophy, have been revolutionary. There has been a reversal in philosophy, from the ideathat we could build up from unambiguous atomic statements to the idea that the meaning of a word or of a sentence is dependent on an ever-changing environment. This reversal largely re­ flects Chomsky's work in linguistics. However, additional changes have occurred in linguistics which some say leads to a neo-rationalist epistemology. Furthermore, the in­ nateness hypothesis in linguistics that suggests a nee­ rationalism can be coupled with an innateness hypothesis that explains why we are apparently fairly close to being correct so often in choosing one theory out of an infinite number both i.n science and in daily life --in other words that we survive. More will be said of choosing theories later. Now let us consider the revolution brought about by Chomsky. !>1aclay -v1ri tes that. the extraordinary and traumatic impact of the publication of .§~ct;J;~L§JJ~es by Noam Chomsl:y in 1957 can hardly be ap­ preciated by one ·who did not live through this upheaval. Chomsk:J: denies th.e funda­ mental assllrlliltion of L.linguistics7 struc­ turalism £tl1e 11nguistics of the pre·= Chomsky erf}] by arguing that an adequate linguistic descr1ptj_on of grammar cannot be derived by applying sets of operations to primary data but rather must; be viewed as a formal deductive theory whose object is to separate the grammatical sentences of a language from the ungrammatical ones and to provide a systematic account of the structure of grammatica1 sentences .... Chornsl{y 1 s work has led to a genui.ne scientific revo1ution •... 30 Chomsky's paradigm is known as generative transfor­ mational grammar. The major philosophical impllcations from Chomsky derive from the transformations between deep structure and surface structure and the proposal of a complicated deep structure. Chomsky explains the transfor­ mation: ... it seems to me reasonable to propose that; in every human language surface struc­ tures are generated from structures of a more abstract sort, which I will refer to as "deep structures," by certain formal operations of a very spec.i.al kind generally called 11 grammatical transformations.n ... Transformations applied in sequence to deep structures in accordance with certain fixed conventions and principles ultimately gen­ erate the surface structures of the sen­ tences of the language.31 An example given by Chomsky is the sentence: "'A wise man is honest.' n32 The surface structure consists of the.

subject 11 a wise man" and the predicate "is honest." The deep structure develops from a complex idea about vrho is honest.33 The transformation is done instantaneously and vli.thout conscious thought. Furthermore, we cannot articu-·

late the rules that \'le follow. The situation is even more remarkab1e in the case of young children, who construct a grammar on the basis of limited, and quite often wrong data. Not only are they not aware of the rules of trans-

formation~ they are not even aware of the rules of grammar, learned later in school. To explain this ability Chomsky

11 says that we must attribute to the organism 1 as an i:gp.~!~ property, a structure rich enough to account for the fact that the postulated grammar is acquired on the basis of the given conditions of access to data ••.. n34 fj!Iy italics..:.7 Chomsky then goes on to vie\'/ the child's acquisition of knowledge of language as a kind of theory construction . •.. The child's ultimate knowledge of language obviously extends far beyond the data presented to him .... The normal use of language characteristically involves new sentences, sentences that bear no point-by-point resenblance or analogy to those in the child's experience.3.5 Chomsky brings his findings to epistemology, decrying 96 '.

empiricism and favoring a rationalist approach.36 He says: I think that these facts suggest a theory of human intelligence tha't. has_a distinctly rationalist flavor. . •. [rherg} i.s no more point asking how these pri.nciples are lecnned than there is ;i.n asking how a child learns to breathe ...• 37 The question no-vr becomes one of wondering just how representative Chomsky is of modern linguistics. In 1971 lvlaclay saJ.d: 'I'be battle between Choms1cy and his critics is bei:ng fought according to rules which Chomsky himself developed and is essential­ ly a sectarian war among scholars who share a common understand.ing as to the general goals of linguistic analysis.38 About empiricism Chomsky says this: No one has succeeded in showing vrhy the highly specific empirj__ c.ts-t; accumpt.i.ons about how kno\vledge is acquired should be taken seriously. 'l'hey appear to offer no way to describe or account for the most characteristic and normal construction of human intel~Agence, such as linguistic competence . .JS Although one might disagree with Chomsky's assess- rnent that his vrork necessarily implies a rationalist perspective, deep structure is far removed from the empiri- ci.st view of linguistics that generative-transformational grammar has supplanted. Chomsky brings up the point of innateness to which vv-e shall return shortly. In the meantime, a short review of the mechanism of perception will, perhaps, indicate the futility of placing certainty in our senses. 1'he various sense modalities do not, of course, perceive all that hap- 0? ..-'I <'I p . I pens in the \'!Orld. We do not sense X~rays, bat 11 sonar", etc. However, of the information that arrives at the sense organs, vli.thl.n the effective range of those organs, not all gets through to the cerebral cortex. Let us take sight as an example. In addition to the fact that the optic nerve does not transmit all of the information received by the retina, other discrepancies in our abilities exist. The uncontaminated observation of empiriGism is neither a given nor even possib1e. On the contrary, each of us constructs the scene that \·te see,

~"L.~211' Neisser writes: In normal use the Lhuman7 eyes are rarely still for long. Apart from small tremors 1 th.eir most common movement is the 11 saccade. 11 Saccades usually take less than a twentieth of a second, but they happen several times each second •••. This means that there is a nev,r retinal image every fev.; hundred milliseconds. . • • Most . I people are ~i ther una'Vmre of their own eye movements [Saccade§./ or have erroneous notions about them. Far from being a copy of the retinal display, the visual world J.s somehO\·l constructed on the basis of informatim1takei1-rn-during many different fixations •••• In the kinetic depth effect the constrgctive nature of perception is particularly apparent. \fuat one sees is somehovt a composite based on information accu~ulated over a period of time ...• It seems .•• that perceiving involves a memory that is not representational but schematic. During a series of fixations the perceiver synthesizes a model or schema of the scene before him.... 'I'his construc­ ted vlhole is \·!hat guides his movements and it is \vhat he describes when he is being L· introspective. In short: it is what he sees. rO 98

Neisser concludes: "In short, the reaction of the nervous

system to st:Lmulat.ion by light is far from passive ...• eyes? are not so much peepholes as entry ports, sup­ firw . I plying ra.-v.r material for the constructlve act.i vi ty of the visual system. n4l It would appear that v1e have come a long way from certainty. Popper speaks of the mistaken idea that knowledge

\•li thout foundations is useless. 42 Referring to the sense- data problem, he says: When naive realism was criticised, sense­ data were introduced as the irreducible kernel of certainty for which our sense­ organs are responsible. But sense-data, untheoretical i terns of information, sim·­ ply do not exist. For we ~ operate 1vi th theories, some of which are even incorporated into our physiology .... A scientific theory is an organ we develop outsi.de our sk1n, whi.le an organ is a theory we develop inside our skin. Thi.s is one of the many reasons -v1hy the idea of completely untheoretical, and hence incorrigible, sense-data is mistaken. We can never free observation from the theoretical elements of interpretation. We always interpret; that is we theorize, on a conscious, on an unconscious, and on a physiological level. Standard physiological experiments illustrate this.43 As I have attempted to show, our physiological know-

ledge does indeed illustrate Popper's contention. In agre~ ment with Popper, Maxwell says,: "With Popper's contention

that theories~ or things very much l.ike theories, are built into us at even the unconscious and physiological levels I

• • • ag:r... ee ••.• lll~4 99

The problem associated with the following of ou·b·rorn epistemological positions is not merely that the epistemo­ logy is wrong, but also that the old epistemology vras influenced by old science. If \ve have no unimpeachable method of justifying knowledge claims and if our senses do not give us an objec­ tive vievr o.f the world, even within their ranges, then how can we krww that our appraisal of the real world is even close to be:Lng correct? We cannot knov.; with certainty, of

courses any more than vw know anything else about the real world with certainty. However, there are two options open to ans\vering the above question. Neither of them lends encouragement· to empiricism. First, let us presume that we camwt know things-·in-themsel ves -·-we know something of the qualities of things. We do not know a table in itself. We know some of the infinite number of its qualities, such as its shape, dimensions, etc. We are perhaps learning the

.§!rue~ of reality. Now we can ei.ther say that we can never have any idea about anything about the real world or the contrary. \ve could say that both our science and our every day conception of reality are entirely erroneous. This view is difficult to overcome and it surely is not empiricism. On the other hand, we could be somewhat more moderate and say that, after all, if we have survived, then we must be doing something right. In this case we recognize our limitations in -the realm of our senses and postulate 100

that 7 although we do not know the real world with certain­ ty, the notion that we have survived implies at least some ability to structure reality correctly ~no~&Q· Here it becomes feasible to propose the possibility that we have an innate predisposition to theorize reasonably correctly about the real '"orld, an evolutionary adaptation. Obvious­ lyt those be1ngs who could not theorize correctly enough to survive have not survived. An ability to choose a theory some\1hat close to being correct out of' an infinite nwnber of theories (as we apparently do continually) indi·~ cates a p:;:'edi.sposi tion to be able to survive i.n our en- vironment and leads one to consider the possibility that our knowledge (imperfect though it is) accumulates and that our science progresses. In all this argument v1e are giving the empiricist the benefit of the doubt. Yet despite that fact, we are a long v1ay from extreme empiric­ ism. Both modern science and modern philosophy show that we do not know the ·world objectively --that we theorize. Therefore, we either have no knowledge at all or we have limited abilities to theorize and gain imperfect knm1ledge. In either case we have abandoned the empiricist hope for logic and observation alone. We have had a paradigm change.. The new paradigm in epistemology reverses the old empiricist supposition that facts support theories and, in effect, says that our facts are theory-laden.

C~~~i2fl) I have attempted to indicate how far removed 101

we are from extreme and radical empiri.cist notions of certainty. We have found no method that will produce certainty in science and, in fact, the epistemological trend, backed by findings in logic, mathematics, and science leads us ever farther from the worthy but apparent­ ly unattainable goals of empiricism. Tarsld' s semantic theory of truth is the only truth theory that works and it is not applicable to real-world problems. Godel's incompleteness theorem shows that our mathematics is forever incomplete and imperfect. I have attempted to point out the problem of the justification of knowledge claims. The empiricist attempts at finding a sure method for justification, such as verification, have not succeeded. Therefore, we have no "rock-bottom" founda­

tions on which scientific and common·~sense knowledge can lie. With empiricism's lack of success in finding certain­ ty, either in fact or in methodology, empiricism is declin-­ ing. New breakthroughs in science point to the impossibili:·· ty of the methodology based on logic and observation alone that is the core of modern empiricism. In opposition to empiricism, and especially to the more extreme forms of emplricism, it appears that even our perception and our facts are theory-laden. We appear to be uncertain in logic, mathematics, science, and common-sense. The umbrella of empiricism does not seem to be capable of resist1ng new epistemologi- lU~ cal developments. Logical positivism is one step farther " ' removed from the reality of todayrs science and epistemolo­ gy~ since its modern successor, the logical empiricists, have disclaimed that movement. The radical empiricism of behaviorism is yet another step dmm the line in the development of empiricism. These more extreme positions vmre abandoned by empiricists because of the gro-vrth of uncertainty. Since the demise of logical posi·ti vism, un­ certainty has become even more pervasive. There \'!ould seem tope little advantage for geographers in promulgat­ iP~ a method based on certainty when philosophers them­ selves· have abandoned the method they devised. We have found no recipe. Restrictive methodologies have given us scholasticism, not knowledge. Some problems arising from a lack of interest in our philosoph.ical problems will be discussed in the next chapter. 103 f' '

FOOTNOTES

1 Iviario Bunge! Int£llion and S_£_:b,_er1ce (Englevmod Cliffs, N.J.: Prent1ce-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 24. 2 Albert Einstein, "Autobiographical Notesr" in A~:.£.~rt..J?J:r±.~te.,tnLE11:il:...Q..~QJ2h.?r:·~Ci91Ttiqt, ed. by Paul Arthur Schilpp (1\lew York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1951), p. 31. 3 Si.cL'"ley Luckenbach, Untitled draft, California State University, Northridge, Department of Philosophy, Mimeo­ graphed, p. I-10. 4 Karl R. · Popper, pbj_ecti ve KnowJ~~qg,e: }gl Evolt!:f::ion­ ary A£2roash (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1972}, p. ~ 5 Herbert Feigl, "New Reflectlons on Empiricism," in Ne~.e~9'l:.!!.e§... ~.11LP±li1o~lb~c~J._An'!J~r..~i~, ed. by Herbert Fei.gl, Vfi.lfi"id Sellars, and Keith Lehrer (New York: Apple­ ton-Century-Crofts, 1972), p. 8. 6 Bunge, ];n~ui tion and Sc~, p. 65. 7 Stefan Amsterdamski, Bet\veen Exnerience and Heta­ !lhy_si C§..Lfl~i+~~J CSJ:l ..X£2El~.fus .o'f fE"e1~o_l}:1tiQ.!.~;-sciQj:ic~; Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 35 (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975), p. 175. 8 Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, Godel's Proof (New York: New York University Press, 1958T~P: lOC~-- 9 J.l?,i

1'-l· Ibid., p. 153, footnote. 15 The substance of the commentary on T, I, A, and 0 has been suggested by Professor Grover Maxwell in person­ al conversation. Any shortcomings in its presentation are, of course;, mine. 16 A.msterdamski, Be:!::y~een ~~~t~'Q!l_ygcs, p. 112. 17 Ernest Nagel, 11 The Nature a.nd Aim of Science," in ptg.1Q.§.2PJlY_2.f.J22~-Toc.:l§.Y, ed. by Sldney Norgenbesser (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1967), p. 13. 18 Karl R. Popper, !Qe ~qgis of Scientij[lc PJ§£Qyery (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 195~). 111. 19 Popper, pbjec~}~~ Kn_p~-~e, p. 20. 105

20 Mario Bunge, Foundations o.f fl!::lsicf2_ (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1967), p~. 21 Herbert Feigl, "Empiricism at Bay?," in Met~. g]_Q..K~CC?-.Lal'lsL H~t~?:L.9_§J;l_Es s~n._!b:..~~I:§.Lancl.__§_Q_~l Sciences, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 17i:ed.-by Robert S. Cohen and Marx IV. Wartofsky (Dord­ recht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1974), p. 9.

23 Mario Bunge, "The Maturation of Science," in Prob-· .l€!!lEL..f.!L!J;:le_pl~LJ.osOJ2Qy o_f_§..~_:~' ed. by Imre Lalmtosan.cl Alan Nusgrave {A.IiiSterdam: North Holland Publishing Co. 5 1968), p. 136. .

21+ Maxwell, "Induction and Empi.ricism," pp. 123-26. 25 Michael S. Gazzaniga, "1~he Split Brain in I'1an, " in Tt\.£._Nature_of Ji!d!.!Lan ConJl.s:)-ousnes.§_, ed. by Robert E. Orn­ steii11San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1973), p. 88. 26 ~., pp. 98-100. 27 . Joseph E. Bogen, "The Other Side of the Brain: .An Appositional Mind," in The Nature of Human Consciousness, eel.· by Robert E. Ornstein (S.an F-;-rancis$co: -~r:H.-.-Freemar1 and Company, 1973), p. 119. 28 Ib:id. , p. 124. 29 111ax\vell, "Induction and Empiricism," p. 109. 30 Howard Maclay, "Overview, 11 in Semantic.§., ed. by Danny D. Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobov.i~>ridge: Univers.ity Press, 1971), p. 163. 106

31 Noam Chomsky, ~ua~a~q_~ind (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 197~p. 162. 32 Ibid., p. 29. 33 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 3'1- 11!.~2.. ' p • 170. 35 Ibid., p. 171. 36 Il2_:1d. , pp. 64 and 171.

37 l.Q;id. ' p. 171. 38 Maclay, "Overview," p. 178. 39 Chomsky, Langg__age and Hing, p. 6L.t. 40 Ulric Neisser, "The Processes of Vision," l.n The NatuLQ..2.1..J.it:1fr~_Co~~§S§,, ed. by Robert E. Ornsteiil "(San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1973), pp. 201-w 05. 41 I~?_i_q., p. 210. 42 Kar•l R. Popper, rr Is There an Epistemological Problem of Perception?," in "Discussion," in Grover IVIaxt.·rell, "Scientific Methodology and the Causal Theory of Percep­ tion, 11 in f.roblems in the Phi.losQl?l}y_o.f___§£J.e~~ ed. by Imre Lakatos and Alan l'ilusgrave [Amsterdam : North Holland Publishing Co., 1968), p. 163. 43 Ibid. p. 163. -~-·- ' 44 Grover Maxwell, "Reply," in "Discussion," in Grover Maxwell, "Scientific IVlethodology and the Causal 107

1'heory of Perception, n in Pr_obJ_Cfll§,_ in _th~e Philos,gPllY._Q_:f Sci~2£Jl, ed. by Imre Lakatos and Alan Hus-grave lAmsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1968), p. 172. 11 A restrictive view still exists."l Yi-Fu Tuan

CHAPTER 5

CONTE~WORARY GEOGRAPHY

108 . ' I 109

.illk9..d_llcti_s:m: Problems exist in contemporary geography

that do not need to continue if 'Ttle more fully examine our philosophical bearings. The purpose of this chapter is to examine some of our current problems and some solutions to them. '1\vo problems will be discussed. They are on vastly diffe:cent levels, but both stem from philosophical inno­ cence. One of them is essentially particularistic and involves the call for a theoretical geography without the knowledge of theory construction. The other problem is general. It encompasses erroneous views of science en­

couraged by logical positivism that lead to an impaired and constricted image of science. Solutions are then discussed. Alternatives to extreme empiricism v1hich have appeared recently in the

geographic literature are examined. Finally, broad sug~ gestions are presented, based upon the opportunities given us by current epistemology and science, in the hope that geography will take advantage of all of the potential that has heretofore remained buried.

prob].~l!l§.~ Of the two problems to be discussed, the first

deals \~i th deduction. The meaning of 11 deduction11 is evidently unclear to some geographers who hope to build formal theory, based upon deduction. 1.10

I.f we are going to have theory and employ the hypo­ thetico-deductive method in a nomothetic geography, then

an understanding of the meaning of "deduction" is impor~· ta.'1t. Yet errors about the meaning of "deduction" occur in two geographic publications about theory. One error occurs in Cole and King, wherein they say: "Deductive reasoning procedes from the general to the particular, from the theoretical to the specific."2 The other error occurs in a publicati.o:n of the Open University by Sarre, wherein he says; "The 'scientific method' includes •.• deduction (working from the general to the particular) ..•. "5

·An introductory logic book says: "One of the most widespread misconceptions of logic is .the belief that deductive arguments proceed from the general to the spe- cific, and inductive argt.lments proceed from the specific to

th. e genera_.1 Suc h a Vlew· lS· nonsense .••• n4 Skyrms gives an example of a deductively valid argu-

ment going from the £§rt~~~~?£ to the gQn~ral: One is a lucky number. Three is a lucky number. Five is a lucky number. Seven is a lucky number. Nine is a lucky number. Ailodct--rrumb8rS·behieenO and 10 are lucky. 5 Of course, a .valid deductive argwnent can also go from the general to the particular, the general to the general, and the particular to the particular. If we construe Cole and King and Sarre to be talk- ing about deductive exp1a.na.t~2ll' not deductive a.rgu...'Tient, 111

then they are still incorrect. While one form of deductive explanation can go from a statement o:f universal lavv(s) and initial conditions to a statement about a particular event, another form goes from universal laws to universal gener- ality. Carney and Scheer give the following format: Universal Law 1 Universal·Lav.r 2

Thus, deducti.ve explanation is not limited to a universal- to--particular form. Sarre's error is particularly unfortunate, because on the following page he emphasizes the importance of the construction of theories.? Dictionaries are quite often misleadin_g about the meaning of 11 deduction, 11 just as they are about other vvords. They are hardly a reliable guide for scholarly use, as witness the effort of geographers to define 11 geography", evidently not being satj__ sfied with dictionary definitions.

Vle cannot know what deduction is about from dictionaries a..nd we cannot have a meaningful discussion on explanation in geography until we know what deduction is about. 'I'he solu.tion li.es in our gaining an awareness in logic t just as geographers have become more mvare of the value of mathe- matics. Since logic can be considered advanced mathematics, . . an effort towards logic would not even be a qua11tative 112

change for geographers. The second problem to be examined is concerned with the tendency to equate science or scientific methodology with logical positivism. The ramifications go beyond mere obfuscation. Not only has a ritual methodology appeared 1 but a strav.r=man allows science to become the target for certain reli.gious or political anti--intellectualism, and seientific jargon, in addition becomes inf1ated 9 leaving u.s with pseudo ..·science. One of the problems of the advocacy of logical posi­ tivism and its goal in geography is that it can put the scientific endeavor in a bad light. Zelinski warns us of a uchur·ch of Science. n8 It may be argu.ed that we are not emphasiz:Lng the humanities enough in our techn.ologically oriented universities and that we are perhaps better at building roads and aqueducts than 'ltJe are in appreciating the timelessness of the experiences of Odysseus. Yet science, too, can inspire a,,,e as we consider an unbounded but finite universe or the tremendously complicated "song" of the whale with its enormous brain. An educational system that produces punchers of holes in computer cards (as opposed to designers of computer-oriented problems) and engineers of steel and glass slabs for homes, in contra-­ distinction to the methods of Einstein and the architects of the Notre Dame, however, Inight better be labeled the Church of Technology. Yet something is to be said for the 113

label of "Church of Scienceu, but·it is not scientists who are its members. Its members are those who !hill.}£ that they are being scientific by following the supposed the-scj_en- tific~method. 'l'heir claims of having un.iquely correct methodology in spite of the evidence are indeed those of the faithful.

'J~he Church of Science, even though it is an anachro-~ nism, is a ·threat however. Science and the Church of Science car1 become confused in people's minds, to the detriment of science. I believe that Zelinski has this problem in his Presidential Address to the Association of Anterican Geographers. 9 Some of the issues he :r·aises go beyor.d the problems of the Church of Science to '\!.rhat I believe is unwarranted criticism of some of the notions of science itself. vfe run the risk- of throwing the baby out with the bath-vrater. Even so, Zelinski's article makes us think. One point Zelinski brings up is what he terms the

11 axiom" of 11 uni versal validity" --seem.i:ngly a confused synonym for the notion of the uniformity of nature.10 He says: How can one posit universal validity for conclusions extracted by means of a provisional system of logic from a biased set of data taken by less than infallible obr.:1ervers using imperfect instruments over a period of at most a few centuries in an unimaginably vast universe that may be at least 10,000,000,000 years old?ll 114

There is a series of misconceptions here, some of them ironically ba.sed on radical empiricist ideas about the need :for testi.ng knowledge claims. For one thing, theorJes are ---·-~ ....ce.stedr not; axioms. Axioms are gi Y.E;.l1~.' although, since they arJt givens they are assuredly presumptions and subject to the faith that ultimately underlies our most fundamental notions. One does not need to consider a statement of the uniformi.ty of nature an axiom, however. Nor does one need to consider it a theory. It is usually considered a second order lavv, well away from any need for testing. ·Some would go even farther than this, as will be point~ed out. First we need to discuss lav1s. Host philosophers of science regard laws of nature

(such as Newton's first lm'l of motion) as untestable. Even logical positivists considered them similar to warrants-­ untestable. 'l'he ideal gas law, ·by its very nature, is untestable since there is no ideal gas. Laws can be con- s.i.dered as guides for our arrangement of the nomic nexu.s.

The notion of the uniformity of nature 1 however, is genei·a1:- ly considered a ~.11.9: order law --·a priori knowledge, having no origins in the real world. It,does not matter at all what data we do or do not have. A second order law, or

I. a\'/ of laws, is one step farther ar..vay from the need for testing than is even the ideal gas law. Toulmin would go even farther and say that the notion of the ·uniformity of nature is a meth,od, more than a premise. 12 Whether we call 115

it a method. or a law of laws, there is nothing reaJ.-.. world ox· testable in i.t. It is a guide for us, not to explain the universe, but to put some order into our structuring of the real vrorld. We are merely saying that there are three feet .in a yard. Einstein built the special theory of

\ relativity from only two points: 1) the constancy of the speed of 1ight and 2) the notion of the uniformity of 'The notJon of the tmifor·mi ty of no.tu:ce is our

,;';L.2£1Q.£,;i :Lrrvcntion, not a fact taken from the real world.

vlbat is most telling about Zelinski 1 s article is that our Association's former president felt it necessary ·to warn his fe11ow geographers about pitfalls concerning bGlief ir1 HThe Solubility of All Questions," 11 li'inal,

Perfect Knowledge, 11 and "Total Scientific Objectivity. ul4.

Zeli.nskl, too Y see~s to be apprehensive about our philo- sophical soph:Ls·tication. Perhaps one reason that Zelinski felt it necessary to Dpeak out on the issue lj_es in the education of geogra~ phers. As vie sink into the morass of a dead philosophical position, Gould makes his recommendations f'or the education of geographers in "The Open Geographic Cu.rriculum. ul.5 He recommends course-work in detail in mathematics and also recommends computer science . 1 6 He does not mention philo-­ sophy. Einstein did. 17 Are we speaking of education or -craJ.nJ.ng.' . ' ? Are we speaking of science or technology? Zelinski.' s article indi.cates some of the dangers 116 i' '

inherent in associating logical positivism with the method­ ology of science. 'I•he Church of Science syndrome seems to call for an inflation of jargon as social scienti.sts try to

erm.J.late physics with a v:rong-headed opinion of how physics gets done. If physics has laws, then sociB.l science, for ·

them, \10U1d need 1a'\AJS. Ho\

generaliza:ti on.s and lavl-like s ta tements ( \\rha tever they are) are not lm,rs. Ne\

Another problem developing out of the Church of

Scienct~ is tha·t logical positivism can become a straw=man for science. If we equate logical positivism and science (or scientific methodology), and if logical positivism is so easy to reject, then we erroneously reject science (or scientific methodology) -v1hen logical positivism i.s rejected.

The problem takes two aspects -~innocent and deliberate rejection. In the case of innocent rejection, confusion arises when it is discovered that there are no unquesti.onably r:tght answt:H'S. Since logical positivism (hence, science) 1.17

promised us these answers (the argument might run), then

'We cannot really trust science. Therefore, (one might say)

\'le might as v!ell throw it all out and proceed on reli.gious faith or our personal predilections. Zelinskits suspicion of the tmiformi-'cy of nature might be an example of this

type of re;ject:ion. Deliberate rejection for political or religious reasons sent much of \'!estern sclence to the Muslim vJOrld

for the \'los tern world 1 s thousand year flirtation with anti­ raticmali ty. The Lysenko af.. fair reminds us hmv thin ou.r veneer of c1 vilization is. One· \'Jho \¥ishes to shm'l the

un.ique acceptability of his ovm 1 say, political mover..11ent does not wish to have the critical spirit of. science interfere 'VJ'i th his propaganda. Therefore, he ca.tJ. use logical positivism as a straw-man to undermine some people's respect for science. He can refute logical positivism and

claim that we cannot prove anything after all ~-so wh.y not

accer)t his program, which at least has SUCh·-and-SUCh §_OC'j~ advantages? 'rhe ansvver is, of course, that vm already know that \ve cannot prove anything in science, but neither can he, and our program of critical questioning is at least partially self-correctinge Most important, our program is based upon coherence with the entire nomic nexus of science and common sense and possi.bly the innate ability to reach theOJ::'ies not too far from the trt:s.th. Lysenko's program might have made the enemies of intellectual freedom happy, l1B

but 1 t did not cohere vri th the broad knowledge of biology and even th.e foes of intellectual freedom had to drop

Lysenkoism eventually. Sci.ence has never provided certain~ ty, but the straw-man is there until we all realize that that is a11 that logical pos.itivism is.

Solu.t:Lons: Du.rin.g the 1970's there has been an episterna-~ _.,.---~""-".4'""'.4·~-·=-~~...,_,. "- logical awakening in geography. Geographers have proposed aJ:t:eJ."'natj_ves to an extreme empiric:Lst approach to geo- e;raphica.J. study. As opposed to the tenor of this thesis, most; of these proposals have not been in the tradition of philosophers of science; rather, they have sought the sup-, port of some combination of existentialism and phenomena-

1ogy, A danger arises here 5 hov;ever, that seems to ty})ify the presen.t state of geography. Tuan has succeedE::d in avoiding the trap to vrhich an existentialist-phenomena- logical vie·w can lead, but Buttimer apparently has not. Her dile®na seems to reflect the present state of geogra- phy. Let us reflect on the development and implications of these alternati.ves to extreme empiricj.sm .18 Essentially, the resul·t of the proposals by Tuan and Butti.mer lead to the following situation: Tuan arrives at a viable humanistic geography and avoids discussion of the problem of a viable epistemological approach for scientific geography. Butt.imer wavers betvmen science and humanism; she supports phenomenology, out as a ~r?~~tlYe for the scientist; and she offers no epistemological solution for 119

the sc5.ence she finally supports, although she apparently vmuld ltke to have phenomenology be the ep1stemological

solution. 19 \'J'.Clile ~ruan 1 s and Butti.mer 1 s articles were in press in 1976, Entrikin published a critique of human- is tic geography, primarily based upon previous WJ:'itings of 'l'uan and Buttimer. 20 Thus, three~ articles appeared in the

i'ew monthn of each other concerni.ng the potent.ially inter~ actlng questions of humanism and existential-phenomenalism.

1.1uan and Buttimer offer alternatives in geography. But the

\•rhat their positions are alternatives to. Do they offer direct a1 ternati ves to the extreme empi.ricism of logical positivism? Or do they offer direct alt.ernattves to some- th:Lng else that would offer indirect altm:'natives to logical positivism by abrogating the need to rely on logical positivism? Here is where I believe 'luan succeeds and Buttimer faLls. Before sorting through these positions, let us consider some terminology. · Aside from the sci.entific philosophical terms that have been in use throughout thi.s thesis, the key words here are "humanistic", "science", "existentialism", and "phenomenology". It is not possible, of course 9 to provide concise definitions of these terms, but let u.s see how they can be used.

Yfe can enter into a morass in trying to dravl a line 120

between science and hwnanism. The failure of logical positivism and the abandonment of the early Popper's

falsificationisrn 1 both of which attempted to differentiate science f1..,om everything else, attest to the fact that we have not been able to dra\·1 a line of demarcation around

science. Science ~~ be said to be an enterprise that

searches f'or causes. Others vmuld .include reasons ix1 the

scien:ttfi.c cmdeavor in order to include studies of inten·~

tion and meaning. It mj,ght be said, on the other hands that the humanities do not seek knowledge, yet a typical humani.sti.c effort, such as the investigation and discussion

of the notion of place, can yield knowledge by bringing nevr insi.ght and awareness concerning place through the ques­ tions raised. Furthel"Jnore, there is no reason why one can·= no·t be both a scientist and a humanist. Perhaps tho best way to arr.i.ve at the difference betvreen hmnanism and science is to examine the terms in the context of both a particular author and historical usage and attempt to determine hov.r they are used and what an author's motivation and background are. Tuan says that 11 huinanistic geography reflects u:pon geographical phenomena with the ultimate purpose of achieving a better understanding of man and his condition. 11 21 He adds that "historical usage thus allm'ls us to define humanism as an expansive view of what the human person is and can _do.u22 In the case of geography,

Tu.an says-~ "Humanistic geography . • • specifically tries to 121

und<::rstand how geographical activi t.ies and phenomena reveal

the quali·ty of human m·1areness. n 23 Perhaps we might say ...._Lhat hi.storically the sciences have been concerned with the

structuring of reality as accurately as possible -vihile the humanities have dealt \vith less definitive questions, the answer·s to which yield no particular hope of consensus.

'l'he scient:i.. st might ask vJhat people in various cultures

thinl~ of the notion of place. The humanist might ask whi.ch culture is correct in its notion of place, \l!i thout

the a1m of arriving at a correct ans-vver, but \'lith the hope of stimulat.ing discussion and a',rareness on the topic. Let us turn nov1 to an examination of existentiali.sm,

one of the positions a hu1nanistic geogra})her; might consider as a basis for his work. Existentialism is not a unified philosophlcal posi­ tion. It is self-consci:ously eclectic, taking pride in the laclc of agreement among its adherents. Existentialists repudiate any systematic body of beliefs. 24- They claim that the person can:not be abstracted from his environment, the exact opposite of empiricist beli.ef. Abstraction and analy·tici ty are missing the poin·t for the existentialist, who is concerned with man's existence in his environment, or his being. For existentialists, a person's environment . i ('w·i th emphasis on person) has meaning only i.n terms of the goals of the person, who has intentions and thereby acts on the environment. 122

Much existentialist work is done in the realm of

ethics and values and, therefore, not of dJ._r~ect interest to geographers looking for methodological support. How- ever, there are points in existentialism that could apply to matters concerning methodology in geography. One point of possible interest is existentialism's stress on man as he exists in h.is environment (in the broadest sense of

11 environment"). Instead of abstracting man as a variable to study$ the existentialist would study man-environment Holism is not unique to existentialism, of course, but the movement gives strong and new support to such a position. The holism of theoretical physics, where the f:i~.1d is the unit of analysis, places the holiE:-i;i.c no­ tion of existentialisn~ in interesting company .:Yi§:li:.Y:i§. the atomism of behaviorism. The anti-rational aspect of existentialism is con- tained matnly 1n its ethical stance, but the methodological aspects of the movement (such as holism) may be of some interest to geographers. For instance, their emphasis on the meaning of the immediate existential situation of the person reflects the importance of intentions, because mean-~ ing comes through intentions, for existentialists. Inten­ tions, in tur.a, are the heart of the ideational approach to methodology in geography and are also the heart of the non~ reductionist approach in philosophy --an approach that claims that the study of hu.rnans cannot be entirely reduced 123

to physics~ even in principle. Intenttons also lead us to phenomenology. In fact, the points concern1ng intentions are so important that they bear repeating and some explica­ tion. Let us come to the question of intentions from a di.fferent d:Lrection. Logical posi ti.vists ·wanted to unify science by being able to reduce (in principle) all science to physics. Their hope was that we could fully explain all human behavior in terms of brain-· states, avotding all lnentallstic notions. (This is the heart of behaviorism.) In other words, the logical positivist, reductionist hope has been that we could say of Jones that his such-and-such neurons are firing as opposed to the mentalistic report that would say that Jones '"ants an ice cream cone ("wants" being a ro.entalir,tic vmrd). The brain·-state position would use a physi.calistlc langua.ge --one with no mentalis·tic words in it. A physicalistic language has no \.Yords such as \vants, be1i.eves, intends, loves, hates --i.e., no words that we commonly employ in our description of people's Ql?:..nt.?l. states. This reductionist approach with its physi­ calistic language is interested in cau.~S'..§., not reasons. Let us talce the J-ones example again. The answer to the query "Why is Jones licking his lips?" is, for the reductionist: the .C2..§}·!:2e. of Jones' lip­ licking ££h~Y:!-.2£. is the .firing of such-and":"such neurons. The answer to the query for the non-reductionist is: the rea2.91! for ,Jones 1 acti?l1 is that he y1~ some ice cream.

11 Firi.ng" is physical and "'-vants" is mental. 11 Cause" is reduction:Lst and behaviorist. "Reason" is non-reductionist and ideational. Host important, 11 behavi01"' 11 and "action" do not "equate 11 across philosophical position lines, as did the other underlined words in the above example. \'le have to add JJ:l.1~S:!l.~.~on-.§, to the action side. Actions are intend- ~·-~~"' ed. So intention comes into the picture at this point. Intention.t:; 2.re central to a non-reductionist, ideational geography that wants to give explanati.ons in reasons instead of neuron-firing (or whatever) causes. These a.re the intentions of existentialism, but they take us now to phenomenology, where they are central. Phenomenology, like existentialism, has been pri.ma- rily a Continental philosophy 9 while empiricism has found its developme:n.t in the Anglo-Saxon vrorld. Phenomenology, v1ith its holism, has spmv.r-:ted Q.~sts.Q.J! psychology in opposi~~ tion to the atomistic, empiricist behaviorism.

Phenomenology, li.ke its founder, Husserl 1 is rigo­ rous, although perhaps its sJi.~ct application as a full­ fledged £12i~i~mo~ggica1.;: base is difficult. The greatest value of phenomenology for geographers may lie in some of its tenets. Here, we come back to intentionality.

Hos·t modern epistemology is interested in two aspects of our quest for knoy;!ledge: the )iQl"].d and the

.J..anl?~v~g,_~ that we use to intersubjective1y comm1.micate our flndings about the world. Let us look at the question of language now, since this seems to be the aspect of phenome- nology of greatest value to geographers and si.nce the language issue is so important to phenomenology. Phenomenology was founded in order to clarify the linguist:Lc .:Lssu.e of intenti.onali ty as it applies to the issue of reductionism. It had been thought that if all language could be reduced to a physicalistic language, then redu.ct;ion (in princj_pJ.e) of the social sc:iences to the physical sciences would be possible. In opposition to this progr·am, it vras thought that v10rds of intention -- intending something-- provided evidence against language reduct5.on. Thus~ intentionality can be used to differ- entia:te tbe physical from the mental, providing evidence against behaviorism ('l,.lhich is physicalistic).

·when Husserl founded phenomenology he expanded the issue of .:Lntentiona1i ty. Intentionali-ty had previously been thought of in the setting of an activity of.the mind, or au act, and its intentional object. .An intention always had an object. Hovrever, some objects are non~· existent (e.g. , unicorn..s) and so it was debatable as to \'lhether or not one could have an intention about such an object. Husserl placed his noema between the act and the object. Follesdal explains that each act has a noema. By this noema [the acJ;} is directed towards its object, if it has any. . • . \'Jhen we think of a l26

centaur, our act of thinking has a noema, bu.t it has no object. . • . Because of its noema, however, even such an act is direct;ed. 25 Thus, the linguistic problem is overcome and the validity of the argument for t:he necessity for intentional language is strengthened. The noema is essentially the meaning of the act. It is phenomenology's job to analyze noemata. So the phenomenologist essentially analyzes the meaning of acts (i.e. , activ.i ties of the mind). It is important to note that the phenomena that the phenomenologist considers are not the original objects, but the noemata. The real vrorld

of objects is put aside (bracketed) by the phenomenologist

u in order to clarify how the 1·10rld is 'constituted 1 by his consciousness. He observes that he expects a tree to have a back ..•. 1126 So far we have, then, good support for the idea- tional point of vie\'1 because of the necessity of· inten~- tional language and we have a more-or-less introspective research program. We do not, however, have a way to justify knowledge claims. But Husserl later developed the concept of life-world in an attempt to bring intersubjec- tivi ty into focus. This life-vTOrld allows for a more-or- less empathetic approach, but this is dependent upon the ego becoming immersed among the others in the li.fe-world. 27 Husserl's program does not meet empiricist criteria 127

of knowledge claim justificati.on; however, empiricism has not proved viable and current analytic philosophy is not nearly so far removed from Husserl as was logical positiv­ ism. Husserl fe1 t that "scientific expressions and sen~~ tences have meaning for us only insofar as they state something about the life-world. . .. \ve must try to un­ cover the structures of the life-world .... rr28 Husserl' s program has resolved f:>ome linguistic problems important to maintaining an intentional langu.age and, hence, a non-reductionist hwnan geography. His es­ sentially empathetic life-·world. leaves the desire for cor~~ respondence between theory and evidence unfulfilled~ but in certain respects his program is that of the ,pragmatism of some philosophers of science. Existential-phenomenology evolves from the attempt to apply the phenomenolog.ical method while ru1.derstand.ing the importance of ill.§ll in his (total) environment --his exis.tential "mrld. vle are to attempt to understand man's life-world. '£he position does not so much seek ans\'1ers about the nature· of knovrledge as it does the nature of the person. ltfith this background, let us now examine the alternatives that Tuan and Buttimer have presented.

Humanistic geography and existential~·phenomenology have been closely associated in the past, but need not necessarily be so associated. Entrikin's critique of humanistic geography, in press before new articles appeared 128

by 'Iuan. and Buttimer, reaches the conclusion that humanistic geography is best portrayed as a rorm of criticism •••• As criticism, hmvever, the humanist perspective does not fulfill the role suggested by some of its proponents of providing the essential insight, or presupposi ti.onless basis for, a scientific geography.29 En-trikin does acknowledge in a footnote, however, that tv.ro articles have appeared during final preparation of this manuscript which are di~rectly related to its theme: • • . In theE>e two arti.cles both authors change thetr views concerning the potenti<::tl role of existential phenomenology i.n geography from the views they ha.cl expressed in earJ.j_er articles. More specifically, 'I'uan and Buttimer have reduced ·the role of the phenomenological method in their research. 'I'he reducti.on of the role of the nhenornen~·· ologicEJ.1 method is compatible with the r conclusions presented in this article.30 There can be some confusion here, hm·rever. To be sure, the reduction of the role of, the phenomenological method in the newly publi8hed articles by Tuan and Buttimer matched Entrikin's conclusions about its weakness. However, his fundamental conclusion was that humanistic geography was worthy only as a-critique of scientific geography; but this conclusion 1>JaS reached on the assumption of the use of the phenomenological method in humanistic geography. If Tuan and Buttimer have indeed reduced the role of the phenomen­ ological method, then Entrikin' s conclusion on the vvorth of humanistic geography no longer holds. Tuan and Buttimer have, themselves, reached differ- f) •

129 ' .

ent cox1cJ.usions. Let us examine Buttimer' s position first. Butt1mer, in her "Grasping the Dynamism of Lifeworld", has a some\vhat vacillating post tion regarding both phenomenology and htm1anism. In the introductory part of her article she scorns science and praises the humanistic geographer.31 She goes on to criticize ·what she terms "positive science"

for i.ts 11 re:ductionism, rationality, and the separation of

1 subjects' and 'objects' in empirical research. 1132 How- ever, in the conclusion she speaks of "our activities as

11 scientists 9 indicating that she thinks of herself as a -;: scientist. 3:J She arrives at this position while recog.aiz- ing the problems associated v.ri th existential-phenomenology. The role of phenomenology would be indirect in scientific research. As Buttimer says, "it is in the spirit of the phenomenological purpose, then, rather than in the practice

of phenomenological procedures, that one finds direction.11 3'+ She says that phenomenology provides not so much a pro- cedure as a perspective: Neither phenomenology nor existentialism can provide ready-made solutions to the epistemological problems facing science today, nor do they offer clear operational procedures to guide the empirical investi­ gator. If they are tmderstood as per­ spectives, however, -v1hich point toward the exploration of new facets of geographic enquiry, then our recognition of them could be a valuable and timely development.35 Thus, existential-phenomenol9gy would provide neither an epistemological foundation nor a methodology for Buttimer. 130

She says that phenomenology 1s to be used as a personal starting point for the scientist in self-examination and 7.6 awareness.:; In essence, in this paper Buttimer rejects existen- tialism and phenomenology as competitors for episte- mological bases for scientific vmrk. They v10uld provide a perspecti.ve.for the scientist, perhaps as objectivity, religion or values might provide a perspective~ Buttimer aeems to vacillate between wanting to be a humanist and settl:ing for being a scientist, although perhaps she still hopes to do both. However, her article does not rescue humanism; rather, it seems to ask scientists to adopt a humanistic perspective along with what Butti.mer vmuld con- sidE"r their necessary analyticity. For Buttimer, exis- tential-"phenomenology cannot accomplish what was hoped for and she leans towards science. The situation in Tuan's case is different. He maintains a humanistic position. Tuan had written in 1971 in favor of existentialism and phenomenology in geography.37 He said that phenomenology,· being concerned \'lith essences, could ask, "'-'rhat t for example, is the essence of man, space, or.experience?"3B He wrote of an existentialist realm 11 of the will and search for meaning", saying that."the method appropriate to it is phenomenological. 11 39 By 1976, however, when 1'uan published his "Hu.manis­ hO tj.c Geogra.phy", he had clari.fied his humanistic position 131 and left the question of philosophical choice open. He says: 11 'I'he humanist . . . must seek a philosophy su:L ted to his purpose. uLl-1 He thus does not base llu.:nanisti.c geography necessarily on some combination of existentialism or phe- nomenology. It appears that he uses 11 philosophyn in a broad sense, not necessarily only in reference to episte- mology or method. He w:ci tes:

A humanist geographr~r • . • must have a keen Jnterest in philosophy, :for philosophy raises fundamP.nta1 questions of epistemolo-­ gy to \!Jhich he can seel-;: exemplifications in the real \'lorld. Ph.ilosophy also provides a unified noint of view from which a whole range of' h~man phenomena can be systematical­ ly evaluatect.42 '1\.tan is thereby not committed to a particular epistemo1ogi- • cal stance, yet, if he so desires, he can maintain an ex.istential~~phenomenologist 11 perspecti ve". 'l'uan simply skirts the issue of epistemology.. He does not skirt humanism, hmvever. Tuan unquestionably considers himself a humanist.

For 'l'uan, the hwnanist's 11 main function as a geographer is to cla.rify the meaning of concepts, symbols, and aspira­ tions as they pe~tain to space and place. nL~3 Humanistic geqgraphy ·vmuld contribute to science "material of which the scientist, confined in his own conceptual frame, may not be a-ware.n44 Tuan's perspective on the relationship between science and humanism is that "the humanist today does not; deny scientific perspectives on man; he builds on them.n45 132

Thus, as opposed to Buttimer, Tuan remains avm,redly humar:listic. The existentialist outlook that encourages

eclecticism i.s evident in 'fuan 1 s ministrations. The epis­ temological question of how we can arrive at knowledge is

replaced by the humanist 1 s question of how vfe can broaden our perspectives. Tuan offers an alternative to the ills present in sci.entif'ic geography. Unlike the logical posi vi tists,

T'uan' s alternative is not presented as the uniquely cor­ :cect choice. Current epistemology and science now recog­ nize the importance of the synthesizi.ng side of the brain

and it would seem important that we utilize both ·the analytJc and synthetic modes of thought., perhaps in both humanistic and scientific work. fgn.

Some proposed solutions have bE:)en put forth and examined~ Perhaps the most important solution lies in a more rigorous awareness of the events in our sister disciplines which indicate .fundamental alterations in our world-view. Instead of advocating restrictive epistemological positions that have been disavowed by epistemologists, geographers might pursue the opposite direction. Physicists cannot tallt and empathize v1ith their subject matter. \'le have a great advantage, at least in human geography, that allows us, albeit imperfectly, to glean some sense of the 133

intentions and purposes of our subject matter. \'le need :not search only for causes, but for reasons also. \ve rj_sk

our lives daily in empathetically trusting what vre believe

·will be the actions of others in traffic, for instance.

\'le have an ins.ight into their intentions and purposes. Of

course, vle are not always correct, but \ve do not have certai.nty ·when we seek the causes of overt behavior either. The 1978 president of the Philosophy of Science As­ sociation, Mary Hesse, encourages the broadening of our ef­ forts when she-:? says: 11 • • • we must look to the studies of man, society and history ... whose methods and aims are not exhausted by those of natural science.u46 If we are interes·'ced in more than sophisticated descrj,ption of the landscape, we can seek the purposes and intentions of the people who make the landscape in order to 8XJ.2Jajn the human aspects of the landscape. At the same time, of course, mathematical models will continue to gi.ve us valuable insight and ideas. FOOTNOTES

1 Yi=·Fu Tuan, "Humanif.rtic Geography," Annals of the h.$S_~~J:is:.~l..sLLAmer_i_cag_fieogp~~rs, 66 (19'76}:~26'6':-~~ 2 John P. Cole and Cuchlai.ne A.I'1. King~ Quantitative .QQ.Q..&£.§J~J:l:~LL~~e~;l1~1~-Sl~!.~~~x~s!~Wf.<2r l.g:,.2~~-Q.?o ~Jii"TLorlciOn: --­ tToml \'hJey {~: :Jons L·ca. ~ 19681 , p. o7l. 3 PbjJ.lip Sarre, 11 Geographic Data and Hethods, 11 in ;g!y_q).lJJ.~oD.".2E~.. ll?YC?..lll!;i:.?n -~in:.....9.~2.tg'lrtlhY1 (Portsmouth, England: 'I'he Open Unj.versi ty Press, 1971;, p. 49. 4 Brian Skyrms, Choice and Chance: An Introduction to ln.Q.UC t:1ve J::.Qf~Ls ( Belmont~~-ca'lff~DTC.ker1SC>nPu5II s11Ii1g-~-~~ Company, Inc., 1966), p. 13 • .5 Il:?.:ts!·, p. 13 . 6 J"ames D. Carney and Richard K. Scheer, Fundamentals Q.f:_I~Q€2:__9. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964-T;--p:-·--2+61.-~ 7 Sarre, "Geographic Data and Methods;" p. 50. 8 Vfilbur Zelinski, "The Demigod's Dilemma," Annals of ~ A§..§2£i~jj:211_9.f._A_Ill£I~~raJ?._b,.~~., 65 ( 1975) -;--£~~-; 9 --Ibi.d. 10 Jlll..Q. ' p. 132. ll IbJ:.9.• , p. 132 . 12 Stephen Toulmin, ]'h~ .I:l!Jlopophy of Science: An I~~.:_t:'Lo11 (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltci."-;- l953); pp:~l38- 39. 135

13 Lincoln Barnett, The Universe and Dr. Einstein (2nd revised ed. ; New York·!~Ba"D-Eam-f.foofS.. ;- 1957T,-p:-"?+'S-: 14 Zelinski, "Demigod's Dilemma,H pp. 131-33. 15 Peter R. Gould, n'l,he Open Geogra:phic Curriculum," .1(· n r~5£~1t.£~},~.iJ.:!. G~gJ?;rgillhY, ed. by Richard J. Chorley London: l',.lethuen and Co., Ltd., 1973). 16 ]J~. , 1?.§.§ s im. 17 Einstein is philosophical in his writings, of course. He says specifically that nsciencEJ without epistemology is --insofar as it is thinkable at all-- pr:Lmi tive and muddled. 1t Albert EirJstein~ nnemarks Concern-· ing the Essays Brought Together·in This Co-operative Volume, 11 trans. by Paul Arthur Schilpp, in AlQgpt J~;~:.D.e.t~Jn,,;_ \hl:.lQ,sop)l~?:;-··§_Cl1~~.1::t_:l::~2,~,. ~d. by Paul Art~ur Schilpf (2nd ed.; ~~e\!f York: .tudor Pub1J.Shlng Company, 1951) , p. 68 +. 18 '.euan, "Humanistic Geography 11 and Al:me Buttimer, "Grasp.inq; the Dynamism of Lifev;orld, 11 Annals of the As­ soc;:.}§~lL2f._A~eJj£..§L1l.._C.Leo~p_hers, 66 T19'T6T:--~----~-----~ 19 Tuan, "Humanistic Geography," ~m and Buttimer "Lifeworld, 11 Q_ass];.£!. 20 J. Nicholas Entrikin, "Contemporary Humanism in, GeogTaohy~ n Annals of the Associat.:Lon of American Geo.2:ra~ nher:@,, >. 66 (19'7b";:----~---~-~~.. --~-----~-----

21 'fuan, "Humanistic Geography, 11 p. 266. 22 Jbid.' p. 266. 23 llli•t p. 267. 24 vlal ter Kaufmann, E3.istEt~·ti§:.1i?.l!L.ft2J1.1.J}q_§_"t.Q2V;;'i1£l!:

:t.g_.§£trt:t.~ (Cleveland: The \'forld Publishing Company 9 19~)b), 136

p. 12. 25 Dagfinn Follesdal, 11 An Introduction to Phenorne~ no1og;y for Analytic Philosophers, 11 in _ggll~lE.illi?Tary_l~lit£.§.2:: --~~lJ.:lYl-Ja::.uD.~ ~§.c(.:..Df1~ g;c·. ?-an:,vlr._9 , .. :. ed. by Raymond E. Olson and A1)rthony 1 _ 1 ~ 1 0 8 The Johns Hopkins Press, 1972 , p. 422. 26 I~i9:· , pp. 424-25. 27

28 p. L~27. 29 Entrikin, "Contemporary Hwnanism, 11 pp. 631-32. 30 Ibid., p. 615, footnote 2. 31 But timer, HLife-vmrld, 11 p. 277. 32 Ibid. , p. 278. Here \'le have an example of the equi vocatim1i.n the social sciences concerning the \>mrd "positi.ve". Of co~rse science is not QQ_~~:~.t'jL§.r nor are philosophers of sclence. But the term stl.ll provides a good straw·~-man as well as inviting misconception. Con= trivecl careless use of 0 posi ti ve" in the socj.al sciences is both confusing and isolationist. 33 -·Ib'.:1.0.., ' p. 291. 34 Ibid. , p. 280. -~-- 35 Ibi:;,J;., p. 278. 36 J.Ql.d. ' passim. 3? Yi~~I•'u Tuan, "Geography, Phenomenology, and the Study of Human Nature," Carl§diall_Gs9£ti£J1~1:, 15 (1971). 1 .,!... "3'7~-

38 Ib_~.q., p. 181. 39 1J?j_<;!., ' p. 18 3·

L~o 'l"uan, "1-lunmnistic Geography. 11 41 Ib:.~£. , p. 275. 42 =l::.J-t;,;.I'- . 1 ' p. 275. 43 Tb. l ;.;;=~~~£!: • ' p. 275. 1+4 .±..:919:· ' p. 274 .

1.~5 Ibid., p. 276. 11 These were the days when a curious scholar felt no need to stop at the border of his :V•. nowledge. "Thus i.t ·v,ras during most of the long . c~-o-r.y l' ll.l hl ;;::o c~ "'· o..c-J. de·:.<'. -::o.."' • Preston ,James

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

138 139

S~,t~tf!!.ar:y: ':Chis thesis has attempted to show that our method­ ological perspectives in geography can be broadened through the repudiation of the now-defunct logical positivism. The quantitative revolution, while providing a broad acceptance of soph1sttcated techniques, made some appeal to unsound philoE:iophy. \1hile promulgating a nomothetic geography the quantitative revolution adopted a philosophical position that would either relegate law to pseudo-science or allow nonsense statements to become law. 1'he quantitative revo­ lution, instead of being the wave of the future, fell into a 12..~~?.1: philosophy for its basis and has yet to give us a single lavv. That logical positivism is indeed a failure is at­ tested to by philosophers of various orientations, includ­ ing i. ts fo'UDders, as I r.t'dVe attempted to show. 1'he reasons for its demise lie in its ]~o~all,y impossible requirements .for the ju.st.ification of knov.Jledge claims and its equating of meaning with testability. Furthermore, its superordi­ nate philosophy, ·empiricism, is undergoing problems as we learn more about perception ar:td language. Uncertainty has replaced our formerly rather culture­ bound ideLl that we could achieve certainty in our kno\vledge of the real world. The paradigm shift in epistemology since the days of the Depression has been towards regarding facts as theory-·laden, instead of the opposite hope of early twentieth century philosophy, as espoused i.n logical pos:i.tivism and phenomenalism. Not only does it appear that we cannot justify knowledge claims with certainty, but also that each of us con§trlJ._c;.!§. a reality as a part of the process of perception. Furthermore, the intersubjective communication of science is hindered by th.e subjective nature of language, wherein meaning is embedded in en­ vironmental context. Thus, we apparently have no given sense~-datat no given context·~ free intersubjecti ve com- munication by which to communicate the imperfect percep- tions of the senses, and no given justificatory recipe for judging knowledge claims so communicated, imperfectly at that. Vle do the best we can. Perfection, not surprising- ly, is not ours. An apparent disinterest _in our changing w·orld-·vie\v (broughtabout by advances in science and philosophy) has led to some problems in contemporary geography. Hovvever, in the 1970's there have been a number of alternative directions proposed for geography as the problems of the quantitative revolution become manifest. Perhaps the most important solutio~ to our problems lies in maintaining an open attitude toward our fundamental assumptions as to how we go about gaining geographical knowledge. Further research: Logical positivism was but one form of .....,~---~-""--,---...... - empiricism. The influence of empiricism in general on geography needs further explication. However, although logical positivism is a dead issue in philosophy, empiric­ ism is not; therefore, the issues are not as clear-cut. Yet, empiricism (in its contemporary form of logical

empirici.sm) has problems adn1i tted even by j_ ts adherents. It would seem prudent, then, for geographers to be skeptical of empiricism and to invest1gate those problems more fvJ.ly.

fQ)l9J.1ls~_£g;:: As long as geographers speak encouragingly of logical positivism and its tenets, such as the verification

crlterion, they are encouraging an .~J..ys~ recipe fo:c trw

justification of ln1ovlledge claims ~-a recipe which has been

shovm to produce pseudo-science· because of its 1.2.gl.£..s~::l imperfections. In order for geography to maintain a viable position among the disci.pli.nes, logical posi,ti vism as a

basi.s for geographical inquiry should be abandoned for cur~·

~1 epistemology, ~ science, and common sense. If the critical spirit of science is not restored in geogra­ phy, then we are merely scholastics, vrriting for each othe-r, heard by no one else, and regressing to the intel­ lectual climate of a millenium ago. The recent epistemo­ logical mAJakening in geography, however, bodes well for the future of the discipline. FOOTNOTES

l · Preston James, .A1.l...EQ.§!D.b;J;_~_}t~~:-1d§_: A~.Ji;hg~tqJ::Lof .Q:eQ.g£~12hlf£~l~~212. (Indianapolis: 'rhe Odyssey Press, 1972), p. 17. 2 Classical empiricism was destroyed by Hu.'1le. 143

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