DOCSLIB.ORG

MODELS of COGNITION: the CLASSICAL/CONNECTIONIST DEBATE Suzanne E. Mccalden Submitted in Partial Fulfillrnent of the Requirernen

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
MODELS of COGNITION: the CLASSICAL/CONNECTIONIST DEBATE Suzanne E. Mccalden Submitted in Partial Fulfillrnent of the Requirernen MODELS OF COGNITION: THE CLASSICAL/CONNECTIONIST DEBATE Suzanne E. McCalden Submitted in partial fulfillrnent of the requirernents for the degree of Masters of Arts Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia August, 2000 @ Copyright by Suzanne E. McCalden National Library Bibliothèque nationale I*l of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395, nie Wellingtm Ottawa ON K1A ON4 UnawaON K1AW Canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence dowing the exclwive pemettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or seii reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic fonnats. la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts firom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent êeimprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. For David, Richard, Gordon, Douglas, and especially Evelyn . TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents v Acknowledgements vii Introduction 1 Chapter One: The Classical Theory of Cognition 4 Chapter Two: Comectionisrn and the Systematicity 34 Challenge Chapter Three: Connectionism v. The Language of 69 Thought Hypothesis Bibliography ABSTRACT Fodorts the language of thought hypothesis (LOT) and Smolensky's connectionism are examined. The systematicity debate is also examined. Fodor and Pylyshyn are correct in claiming that Smolensky's connectionisrn does not provide an account of systematicity. However, it is argued that Clark's connectionism does provide an account of systematicity though it is left open as to whether such an account is merely an implementation of the LOT. It is then argued that connectionism can trivially handle other cases concerning human cognition whereas the LOT cannot. Due to this, even if at one level of analysis connectionism is an irnplementation of the LOT, it offers a more viable and robust theory of huma cognition. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS To begin with, 1 would like to thank my various undergraduate professors who sparked my interest in philosophy. In particular. 1 am indebted to Andrew Irvine, Alan Richardson, and Kate Talmage. 1 would also like to thank the members of my thesis committee: Mike Hymers. my third reader; and Duncan MacIntosh, for coming aboard my thesis committee as second reader; and for reading and commenting on earlier drafts. Most of all, 1 would especially like to thank Chris Viger. my thesis supervisor, who, through his lectures in philosophy of mind and brain, inspired me to write my thesis on this subject. In addition. 1 would like to thank Chris for reading and comenting on al1 drafts; and for his enormous help in shaping the ideas presented in my thesis. INTRODUCTION: In 1975, Jerry Fodor published the book entitled The Language of Thought Hypothesis, which offered a theory of human cognition and which subsequently became the cornerstone theory in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. However, in the 1980fs, a new alternative theory of human cognition emerged -- connectionism. As with many competing theories, a debate ensued concerning what is referred to as 'systematicity': our ability to entertain certain thoughts is intrinsically connected to our ability to entertain certain others. The nature of the debate is this. Those in the LOT camp, such as Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn, daim that the LOT provides an account of systematicity but that connectionism does not. Those in the connectionism camp, such as Paul Smolensky and Andy Clark, daim that connectionism does provide an account of systematicity. The challenge that Fodor and Pylyshyn presented to the connectionists is this : ( 1) if mental representations exhibit constituent structure in connectionist models, then connectionism does not provide a novel account of systematicity. Simply, ccnnectionism is merely an implementation of the 2 LOT; and (2) if mental representations do not exhibit constituent structure in connectionist models, then systematicity is simply a mystery. In chapter one I provide an account of the Classical theory of human cognition, which includes the Computational Theory of Mind which claims that mental processes are simply computational processes, and the LOT. In chapter two 1 provide an account of connectionism. 1 then present the systematicity challenge and examine the central elements of the debate as presented by Fodor and Pylyshyn in the LOT camp and by Smolensky in the comectionist camp. The upshot of the debate is that Smolenskyfs argument in favour of connectionism does not provide an adequate account of systematicity. 1 then indicate that, by following Clark's argument, connectionism does offer an account of systematicity. However, it is left open as to whether connectionism is merely an implementation of the LOT. In chapter three I attempt to weaken Fodor's account of systematicity. I argue that there are certain cases concerning our ability to have certain thoughts, which are not entirely systematic. I then indicate that there are certain aspects concerning human cognition which connectionism can handle trivially but which the LOT cannot. Hence the thesis is that connectionism is a better mode1 of human cognition, in al1 its variations, even if the way it explains systematicity is by implementing a language of thought. Chapter One: The Classical Theory of Cognition 1. symbole and the Caqputatioaal meozy of Wnd '... language is a system of symbols which we know and uset (Stainton 1996, p. 1). But what are symbols? %en we talk of syrnbols, we usually take them to be things with syntax. The syntax of a symbol is its physical property (i.e.. its shape or form). However, individual syrnbols lack semantics (Le., meaning). It is only when we syntactically combine symbols that we are able to create meaningful words and sentences. For the purpose of this thesis, we are not concerned about the lexical nature of individual words (Le., how individual words get meaning) - that is for a theory of content to adüress. Rather. we are concerned with the syntactic properties of a sentence, and hence with the syntactic properties of the symbols whi-ch comprise it and certain of its semantic properties. We are also concerned with the fact that the syntactic properties of a sentence and certain of its semantic properties are related to human cognition (i.e., thinking). In other words, we are concerned with thinking (Le., mental processes) and syntax. And since thinking involves mental processes, thinking resides in the mind, 5 which in turn involves the manipulation of the syntax of symbols. This is the view that the mind is a syntactically driven machine. This view is held by, e.g., Daniel Dennett and Jewry Fodor: '... the brain ... is just a syntactic enginet (Dennett, 1987, p. 61 emphasis in original). 'There must be mental symbols because, in a nutshell, only symbols have syntax, and our best available theory of mental processes - indeed, the only available theory of mental processes that isntt known to be false - needs the picture of the mind as syntax- driven machine (Fodor, 1990, p. 23 emphasis in original). But how do we go about showing that the mind is a syntactically driven machine? One method is via a theoretical device known as a Turing Machine, which was developed by the mathematician/logician, Alan Turing. Turing developed such a machine to formalize the notion of computation. The formalization defined a class of physical mechanisms in terms of their formal properties of symbol manipulation and showed how the physical mechanisms could solve problems that nomally require human intelligence. Humans are also physical mechanisms capable of symbol manipulation. Thus, Turing's formalization of the notion of computation implied that machines could mimic the human mind (MacDonald 1995, pp. 4-5) . Turing machines work on symbolic computation: they follow a system of rules used to manipulate symbols. One such system of rules a Turing Machine may use is propositional or truth-functional logic. Propositional logic deals with arguments, which comprise a set of sentences with one or more premises and a conclusion. which is supposed to follow from the premises. An argument is said to be valid if and only if it is impossible to have al1 true premises with a false conclusion -- that is, if the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion. To put it in other terrns. a valid argument preserves the truth of the premises in the conclusion. Thus, a valid forma1 argument is said to be truth-preserving. Moreover, an argument is said to be valid if and only if it has a valid form. To put it another way, the validity of an argument is dependent upon its sentential form. The form of an argument has nothing to do with its subject matter; thus, its content is irrelevant to its validity. Propositional logic is a formal language, which includes a vocabulary of primitive elements (i.e.. symbols) and a set of formation rules (i.e., grammar) together with a set of axioms and/or rules of inference. The symbols are taken 8 For example, 1 can make an inference of the form P&Q, therefore P within a propositional or truth-functional logistic system. 1 am able to make such an inference irrespective of what P and Q mean. Such an inference is truth-preserving (Le., the syntactic properties of the symbols carry its semantic properties). And this is because P and Q are conjoined by the operator 'andr. The computations of a Turing machine take place on a tape, which is marked into squares.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Ouroboros Model, Proposal for Self-Organizing General Cognition Substantiated
    Opinion The Ouroboros Model, Proposal for Self-Organizing General Cognition Substantiated Knud Thomsen Paul Scherrer Institut, 5232 Villigen-PSI, Switzerland; [email protected] Abstract: The Ouroboros Model has been proposed as a biologically-inspired comprehensive cog- nitive architecture for general intelligence, comprising natural and artificial manifestations. The approach addresses very diverse fundamental desiderata of research in natural cognition and also artificial intelligence, AI. Here, it is described how the postulated structures have met with supportive evidence over recent years. The associated hypothesized processes could remedy pressing problems plaguing many, and even the most powerful current implementations of AI, including in particular deep neural networks. Some selected recent findings from very different fields are summoned, which illustrate the status and substantiate the proposal. Keywords: biological inspired cognitive architecture; deep neural networks; auto-catalytic genera- tion; self-reflective control; efficiency; robustness; common sense; transparency; trustworthiness 1. Introduction The Ouroboros Model was conceptualized as the basic structure for efficient self- Citation: Thomsen, K. The organizing cognition some time ago [1]. The intention there was to explain facets of natural Ouroboros Model, Proposal for cognition and to derive design recommendations for general artificial intelligence at the Self-Organizing General Cognition same time. Whereas it has been argued based on general considerations that this approach Substantiated. AI 2021, 2, 89–105. can shed some light on a wide variety of topics and problems, in terms of specific and https://doi.org/10.3390/ai2010007 comprehensive implementations the Ouroboros Model still is severely underexplored. Beyond some very rudimentary realizations in safeguards and safety installations, no Academic Editors: Rafał Drezewski˙ actual artificially intelligent system of this type has been built so far.
    [Show full text]
  • Cognitive Computing Systems: Potential and Future
    Cognitive Computing Systems: Potential and Future Venkat N Gudivada, Sharath Pankanti, Guna Seetharaman, and Yu Zhang March 2019 1 Characteristics of Cognitive Computing Systems Autonomous systems are self-contained and self-regulated entities which continually evolve them- selves in real-time in response to changes in their environment. Fundamental to this evolution is learning and development. Cognition is the basis for autonomous systems. Human cognition refers to those processes and systems that enable humans to perform both mundane and specialized tasks. Machine cognition refers to similar processes and systems that enable computers perform tasks at a level that rivals human performance. While human cognition employs biological and nat- ural means – brain and mind – for its realization, machine cognition views cognition as a type of computation. Cognitive Computing Systems are autonomous systems and are based on machine cognition. A cognitive system views the mind as a highly parallel information processor, uses vari- ous models for representing information, and employs algorithms for transforming and reasoning with the information. In contrast with conventional software systems, cognitive computing systems effectively deal with ambiguity, and conflicting and missing data. They fuse several sources of multi-modal data and incorporate context into computation. In making a decision or answering a query, they quantify uncertainty, generate multiple hypotheses and supporting evidence, and score hypotheses based on evidence. In other words, cognitive computing systems provide multiple ranked decisions and answers. These systems can elucidate reasoning underlying their decisions/answers. They are stateful, and understand various nuances of communication with humans. They are self-aware, and continuously learn, adapt, and evolve.
    [Show full text]
  • A Knowledge-Based Cognitive Architecture Supported by Machine Learning Algorithms for Interpretable Monitoring of Large-Scale Satellite Networks
    sensors Article A Knowledge-Based Cognitive Architecture Supported by Machine Learning Algorithms for Interpretable Monitoring of Large-Scale Satellite Networks John Oyekan 1, Windo Hutabarat 1, Christopher Turner 2,* , Ashutosh Tiwari 1, Hongmei He 3 and Raymon Gompelman 4 1 Department of Automatic Control and Systems Engineering, University of Sheffield, Portobello Street, Sheffield S1 3JD, UK; j.oyekan@sheffield.ac.uk (J.O.); w.hutabarat@sheffield.ac.uk (W.H.); a.tiwari@sheffield.ac.uk (A.T.) 2 Surrey Business School, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH, UK 3 School of Computer Science and Informatics, De Montfort University, The Gateway, Leicester LE1 9BH, UK; [email protected] 4 IDirect UK Ltd., Derwent House, University Way, Cranfield, Bedfordshire MK43 0AZ, UK; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected] Abstract: Cyber–physical systems such as satellite telecommunications networks generate vast amounts of data and currently, very crude data processing is used to extract salient information. Only a small subset of data is used reactively by operators for troubleshooting and finding problems. Sometimes, problematic events in the network may go undetected for weeks before they are reported. This becomes even more challenging as the size of the network grows due to the continuous prolif- Citation: Oyekan, J.; Hutabarat, W.; eration of Internet of Things type devices. To overcome these challenges, this research proposes a Turner, C.; Tiwari, A.; He, H.; knowledge-based cognitive architecture supported by machine learning algorithms for monitoring Gompelman, R. A Knowledge-Based satellite network traffic. The architecture is capable of supporting and augmenting infrastructure Cognitive Architecture Supported by Machine Learning Algorithms for engineers in finding and understanding the causes of faults in network through the fusion of the Interpretable Monitoring of results of machine learning models and rules derived from human domain experience.
    [Show full text]
  • Reinforcement Learning for Adaptive Theory of Mind in the Sigma Cognitive Architecture
    Reinforcement Learning for Adaptive Theory of Mind in the Sigma Cognitive Architecture David V. Pynadath1, Paul S. Rosenbloom1;2, and Stacy C. Marsella3 1 Institute for Creative Technologies 2 Department of Computer Science University of Southern California, Los Angeles CA, USA 3 Northeastern University, Boston MA, USA Abstract. One of the most common applications of human intelligence is so- cial interaction, where people must make effective decisions despite uncertainty about the potential behavior of others around them. Reinforcement learning (RL) provides one method for agents to acquire knowledge about such interactions. We investigate different methods of multiagent reinforcement learning within the Sigma cognitive architecture. We leverage Sigma’s architectural mechanism for gradient descent to realize four different approaches to multiagent learning: (1) with no explicit model of the other agent, (2) with a model of the other agent as following an unknown stationary policy, (3) with prior knowledge of the other agent’s possible reward functions, and (4) through inverse reinforcement learn- ing (IRL) of the other agent’s reward function. While the first three variations re-create existing approaches from the literature, the fourth represents a novel combination of RL and IRL for social decision-making. We show how all four styles of adaptive Theory of Mind are realized through Sigma’s same gradient descent algorithm, and we illustrate their behavior within an abstract negotiation task. 1 Introduction Human intelligence faces the daily challenge of interacting with other people. To make effective decisions, people must form beliefs about others and generate expectations about the behavior of others to inform their own behavior.
    [Show full text]
  • Neural Cognitive Architectures for Never-Ending Learning
    Neural Cognitive Architectures for Never-Ending Learning Author Committee Emmanouil Antonios Platanios Tom Mitchelly www.platanios.org Eric Horvitzz [email protected] Rich Caruanaz Graham Neubigy Abstract Allen Newell argued that the human mind functions as a single system and proposed the notion of a unified theory of cognition (UTC). Most existing work on UTCs has focused on symbolic approaches, such as the Soar architecture (Laird, 2012) and the ACT-R (Anderson et al., 2004) system. However, such approaches limit a system’s ability to perceive information of arbitrary modalities, require a significant amount of human input, and are restrictive in terms of the learning mechanisms they support (supervised learning, semi-supervised learning, reinforcement learning, etc.). For this reason, researchers in machine learning have recently shifted their focus towards subsymbolic processing with methods such as deep learning. Deep learning systems have become a standard for solving prediction problems in multiple application areas including computer vision, natural language processing, and robotics. However, many real-world problems require integrating multiple, distinct modalities of information (e.g., image, audio, language, etc.) in ways that machine learning models cannot currently handle well. Moreover, most deep learning approaches are not able to utilize information learned from solving one problem to directly help in solving another. They are also not capable of never-ending learning, failing on problems that are dynamic, ever-changing, and not fixed a priori, which is true of problems in the real world due to the dynamicity of nature. In this thesis, we aim to bridge the gap between UTCs, deep learning, and never-ending learning.
    [Show full text]
  • Connectionist Models of Cognition Michael S. C. Thomas and James L
    Connectionist models of cognition Michael S. C. Thomas and James L. McClelland 1 1. Introduction In this chapter, we review computer models of cognition that have focused on the use of neural networks. These architectures were inspired by research into how computation works in the brain and subsequent work has produced models of cognition with a distinctive flavor. Processing is characterized by patterns of activation across simple processing units connected together into complex networks. Knowledge is stored in the strength of the connections between units. It is for this reason that this approach to understanding cognition has gained the name of connectionism. 2. Background Over the last twenty years, connectionist modeling has formed an influential approach to the computational study of cognition. It is distinguished by its appeal to principles of neural computation to inspire the primitives that are included in its cognitive level models. Also known as artificial neural network (ANN) or parallel distributed processing (PDP) models, connectionism has been applied to a diverse range of cognitive abilities, including models of memory, attention, perception, action, language, concept formation, and reasoning (see, e.g., Houghton, 2005). While many of these models seek to capture adult function, connectionism places an emphasis on learning internal representations. This has led to an increasing focus on developmental phenomena and the origins of knowledge. Although, at its heart, connectionism comprises a set of computational formalisms,
    [Show full text]
  • Tomcat: Theory of Mind-Based Cognitive Architecture for Teams
    ToMCAT: Theory of Mind-based Cognitive Architecture for Teams September 25, 2019 1 Bay of Pigs invasion (April 1961) Cuban missile crisis (October 1962) Planned by the same team! The difference? Team dynamics. Source: Tetlock & Gardner, Superforecasting (2015) 2 What happens when one or more of the team members are machines? 3 Outline ● Architecture/overview & mission design (Adarsh) ● Hierarchical planning (Clay) ● Dialogue system (Mihai) ● Probabilistic Modeling (Kobus/Emily) ● fNIRS (Kobus/Emily) 4 ToMCAT Architecture Local environment Human teammate 5 Webcam sensor integration 6 Mission design criteria ● Induces emotion (must not be boring!) ● Natural language processing and dialogue can play a significant role. ● Requires hierarchical planning and decision making (inherent in Minecraft’s crafting system) ● Supports interesting multiplayer interactions (competition/cooperation) ● Supports perturbations 7 Starter mission: Search & Rescue with Crafting Context: Creepers have attacked the village, and the survivors are holed up in rooms in their houses, having blockaded the doors against the creepers. But they haven’t got long... Goal: Rescue villagers from creeper-infested village, within some time limit. Features ● Induces emotion (time limit, creepers are dangerous) ● Hierarchical planning (need to craft a weapon to defend against creepers) ● Plan monitoring (need to monitor player health) ● Natural language dialogue (the player can get hints from the agent) ● Natural extension to multiplayer mission. 8 Starter mission: Search & Rescue
    [Show full text]
  • A Comparison Among Cognitive Architectures: a Theoretical Analysis
    Procedia Computer Science Volume 71, 2015, Pages 56–61 2015 Annual International Conference on Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures A Comparison Among Cognitive Architectures: A Theoretical Analysis Danilo Fernando Lucentini1 and Ricardo Ribeiro Gudwin1 University of Campinas (UNICAMP), Campinas, S˜aoPaulo, Brazil [email protected], [email protected] Abstract In this paper we present a theoretical comparison among three of the most popular cogni- tive architectures: SOAR, LIDA and CLARION. These architectures are compared based on a set of cognitive functions supposed to exist in the human cognitive cycle, and how each ar- chitecture deals with them. The comparison emphasizes similarities and differences among the architectures, with the purpose to advise a potential user how to identify the best architecture to employ, depending on the situation. Keywords: Cognitive architectures, Cognitive science, SOAR, CLARION, LIDA 1 Introduction The study of cognitive architectures is a very popular research field in recent years, in the community of intelligent systems. A large body of cognitive architectures has been proposed in the literature (see [2] for a comprehensive table). Unfortunately, most of them are only barely described, without enough details to allow their computational implementation or a freely available source code, which might make them useful for general adoption. A cognitive architecture is basically a computational model that aims to describe, as accurately as possible, the underlying infrastructure for an intelligent system. Thus, the use of cognitive architectures facilitates substantially the effort expended to build artificial agents, by proposing specific models to the construction of such cognitive mechanisms. The focus of this paper is to compare three of the most popular cognitive architectures, which have a long tradition of development in their research groups and (our most strict criteria) pro- vide freely available computational frameworks, besides documentation, for the general public to use.
    [Show full text]
  • An Entropic Associative Memory Luis A
    www.nature.com/scientificreports OPEN An entropic associative memory Luis A. Pineda1*, Gibrán Fuentes1 & Rafael Morales2 Natural memories are associative, declarative and distributed, and memory retrieval is a constructive operation. In addition, cues of objects that are not contained in the memory are rejected directly. Symbolic computing memories resemble natural memories in their declarative character, and information can be stored and recovered explicitly; however, they are reproductive rather than constructive, and lack the associative and distributed properties. Sub-symbolic memories developed within the connectionist or artifcial neural networks paradigm are associative and distributed, but lack the declarative property, the capability of rejecting objects that are not included in the memory, and memory retrieval is also reproductive. In this paper we present a memory model that sustains the fve properties of natural memories. We use Relational-Indeterminate Computing to model associative memory registers that hold distributed representations of individual objects. This mode of computing has an intrinsic computing entropy which measures the indeterminacy of representations. This parameter determines the operational characteristics of the memory. Associative registers are embedded in an architecture that maps concrete images expressed in modality specifc bufers into abstract representations and vice versa. The framework has been used to model a visual memory holding the representations of hand-written digits. The system has been tested with a set of memory recognition and retrieval experiments with complete and severely occluded images. The results show that there is a range of entropy values, not too low and not too high, in which associative memory registers have a satisfactory performance. The experiments were implemented in a simulation using a standard computer with a GPU, but a parallel architecture may be built where the memory operations would take a very reduced number of computing steps.
    [Show full text]
  • The Cognitive-Emotional Design and Study of Architectural Space: a Scoping Review of Neuroarchitecture and Its Precursor Approaches
    sensors Review The Cognitive-Emotional Design and Study of Architectural Space: A Scoping Review of Neuroarchitecture and Its Precursor Approaches Juan Luis Higuera-Trujillo 1,2,* , Carmen Llinares 1 and Eduardo Macagno 3 1 Institute for Research and Innovation in Bioengineering (i3B), Universitat Politècnica de València, 46022 Valencia, Spain; [email protected] 2 Escuela de Arquitectura, Arte y Diseño (EAAD), Tecnologico de Monterrey, Monterrey 72453, Mexico 3 Division of Biological Sciences, University of California San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-0116, USA; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected] or [email protected]; Tel.: +34-963-877-518 Abstract: Humans respond cognitively and emotionally to the built environment. The modern possibility of recording the neural activity of subjects during exposure to environmental situations, using neuroscientific techniques and virtual reality, provides a promising framework for future design and studies of the built environment. The discipline derived is termed “neuroarchitecture”. Given neuroarchitecture’s transdisciplinary nature, it progresses needs to be reviewed in a contextualised way, together with its precursor approaches. The present article presents a scoping review, which maps out the broad areas on which the new discipline is based. The limitations, controversies, benefits, impact on the professional sectors involved, and potential of neuroarchitecture and its precursors’ approaches are critically addressed. Citation: Higuera-Trujillo, J.L.; Llinares, C.; Macagno, E. The Keywords: neuroarchitecture; emotional design; neuroscience; architecture; built environment; Cognitive-Emotional Design and review Study of Architectural Space: A Scoping Review of Neuroarchitecture and Its Precursor Approaches. Sensors 2021, 21, 2193. 1. Introduction https://doi.org/10.3390/s21062193 Architecture has various effects on people.
    [Show full text]
  • The Neural Cognitive Architecture
    A Standard Model of Mind: AAAI Technical Report FS-17-05 The Neural Cognitive Architecture Christian R. Huyck Middlesex University [email protected] London, UK NW4 4BT Abstract Development of a neuro-cognitive standard model will not be simple. It takes advantage of human functioning neu- The development of a cognitive architecture based on neurons ral and cognitive systems as a guide, and other behaving an- is currently viable. An initial architecture is proposed, and is based around a slow serial system, and a fast parallel system, imals, all of which use neurons for their minds. with additional subsystems for behaviours such as sensing, action and language. Current technology allows us to emulate Can We Do It Now millions of neurons in real time supporting the development Since neurons are Turing complete, it is possible to build and use of relatively sophisticated systems based on the ar- a cognitive architecture in neurons. While it is possible to chitecture. While knowledge of biological neural processing reimplement, for instance, ACT-R (Anderson and Lebiere and learning rules, and cognitive behaviour is extensive, it is 1998) in neurons, this reimplementation might not take full far from complete. This architecture provides a slowly vary- ing neural structure that forms the framework for cognition advantage of neural processing. None the less, it will be use- and learning. It will provide support for exploring biological ful to build basic components of the initial architecture in neural behaviour in functioning animals, and support for the less than biologically plausible ways. Once things are run- development of artificial systems based on neurons.
    [Show full text]
  • Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture
    Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis1 Jerry A. Fodor and Zenon W. Pylyshyn Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ ABSTRACT This paper explores the difference between Connectionist proposals for cognitive a r c h i t e c t u r e a n d t h e s o r t s o f m o d e l s t hat have traditionally been assum e d i n c o g n i t i v e s c i e n c e . W e c l a i m t h a t t h e m a j o r d i s t i n c t i o n i s t h a t , w h i l e b o t h Connectionist and Classical architectures postulate representational mental states, the latter but not the former are committed to a symbol-level of representation, or to a `language of thought': i.e., to representational states that have combinatorial syntactic and semantic structure. Several arguments for combinatorial structure in mental representations are then reviewed. These include arguments based on the `systematicity' of mental representation: i.e., on the fact that cognitive capacities always exhibit certain symmetries, so that the ability to entertain a given thought implies the ability to entertain thoughts with semantically related contents. We claim that such arguments make a powerful case that mind/brain architecture is not Connectionist at the cognitive level. We then consider the possibility that Connectionism may provide an account of the neural (or `abstract neurological') structures in which Classical cognitive architecture is implemented.
    [Show full text]