Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Sharing Networks
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University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 2003 Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Sharing Networks Lior Strahilevitz Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Lior Strahilevitz, "Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Sharing Networks," 89 Virginia Law Review 505 (2003). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW VOLUME 89 MAY 2003 NUMBER 3 ARTICLE CHARISMATIC CODE, SOCIAL NORMS, AND THE EMERGENCE OF COOPERATION ON THE FILE- SWAPPING NETWORKS Lior Jacob Strahilevitz * INTROD U CTION ................................................................................... 507 I. AN INTRODUCTION TO NAPSTER, GNUTELLA, AND THE FILE-SWAPPING HYBRIDS ........................................... 510 A . Nap ster ................................................................................... 511 1. Napster in Brief ............................... 511 2. Napster's G rowth ............................................................. 512 3. The Napster Litigation and Its Fallout.......................... 513 B . G n utella .................................................................................. 515 1. G nutella's Structure......................................................... 516 2. G nutella's Growth ........................................................... 519 C. File-SwappingH ybrids ......................................................... 519 D. CooperativeBehavior on Napster, Gnutella, and the Hybrids .............. .......................... 521 Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks are owed to Mi- chael Abramowicz, Anne Alstott, Theodore Angelis, Robert Ellickson, Dan Kahan, Doug Lichtman, Glynn Lunney, Mark Nadel, Leslie Pollner, Eric Posner, Eric Shum- sky, Cass Sunstein, Rebecca Tushnet, and Adrian Vermeule for their helpful com- ments and criticisms on earlier drafts, and Colin McNary for his valuable research as- sistance. In addition, conversations and exchanges with Amy Adler, Robert Axelrod, Vicki Been, Richard Brooks, Karol Brown, Leandra Lederman, Mark Lemley, Law- rence Lessig, Saul Levmore, Tracey Meares, Peter Menell, Tony Miles, Kimberly Mills, Randy Picker, Bill Stuntz, and Tamara Watts were instrumental in improving the Article. Finally, thanks to workshop participants at the University of Chicago, Yale, Stanford, Berkeley, NYU, Northwestern, Hastings, George Mason, and UCLA. 505 506 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 89:505 1. Files Are Shared in Sufficient Quantities...................... 523 2. Files Are Usually Accurately Labeled and of High Q uality .............................................................................. 529 3. A Failureof Cooperation: TransmissionDisruptions A re Frequent..................................................................... 532 II. FILE-SWAPPING NORMS .............................................................. 534 A. The Social Norms Framework: The Emergence of N o rms ..................................................................................... 537 B. How the Pro-File-SwappingNorms Emerged .................... 538 1. N orm Entrepreneurs....................................................... 538 2. Opinion L eaders.............................................................. 539 3. P olling D ata ..................................................................... 542 a. Norm Enforcement - Anti-File-Swapping.............. 544 b. Norm Enforcement - Pro-File-Swapping............... 545 III. CHARISMATIC CODE AND COOPERATIVE NORMS IN LOOSE-K NIT G ROUPS .................................................................. 547 A. CharismaticCode Defined.................................................... 548 B. The Distorted Im age .............................................................. 550 C. Reinforcing Reciprocity ........................................................ 554 D. The Norm of Reciprocity in Loose-Knit Groups ............... 557 1. File-Sharingas Guilt Alleviation ................................... 563 2. Reciprocity Cascades....................................................... 567 3. Holdouts ........................................................................... 571 4. Alternative Explanations................................................ 573 IV. UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING THE FILE-SWAPPING M O VEM ENT ................................................................................... 576 A. Napster and the Failureof Law as an Expressivist Tool ...576 1. The Importance of the Injunction.................................. 577 2. The Porous Filter............................................................. 578 3. The Clearinghousefor Napster Alternatives................. 578 4. The Youth Vanguard ...................................................... 580 5. The Injunction in Retrospect.......................................... 582 B. The Self-Help Strategy........................................................... 582 1. Uploading Inferior or Incomplete Copies..................... 583 2. Mischievous Misidentification........................................ 585 3. PotentialD rawbacks ....................................................... 586 C. Taxing Uploading.................................................................. 587 D. The Power of Information and Un-CharismaticCode ...... 590 2003] Cooperationon the File-SwappingNetworks 507 E. Strengthening the File-Swapping Movement ...................... 593 C O N CLU SIO N ....................................................................................... 594 INTRODUCTION T HREE years ago, no one had heard of Napster or Gnutella. Over the past few years, however, Napster and Gnutella, along with their subsequent imitators, have grown into arguably the larg- est international networks of illegality in human history. At its peak Napster had approximately 70 million users,' the overwhelm- ing majority of whom used the service to obtain unlicensed copies of copyrighted sound recordings by swapping music files with other users.2 Although adverse court decisions eventually brought Nap- ster to its knees, file-swapping users have simply taken their "busi- ness" elsewhere, and a plethora of file-swapping networks, includ- ing Gnutella, have taken Napster's place. By 2002, another application, Kazaa, had twice as many users as Napster had at its peak.' According to a recent estimate, as many as 40 million Americans use a peer-to-peer network to obtain copyrighted con- tent every week.' There is something else happening with these networks besides the widespread copyright infringement they encourage, and it may be even more interesting. After all, there is little mystery as to why 'Matt Richtel, With Napster Down, Its Audience Fans Out, N.Y. Times, July 20, 2001, at Al; Kelly Zito, Online Music Firm Settles Lawsuit with Publishers, S.F. Chron., Sept. 25, 2001, at C1. 2A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902-03 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ("The evidence shows that virtually all Napster users download or upload copyrighted files and that the vast majority of the music available on Napster is copyrighted."). 'Amy Harmon, Gazing into 2003: Economy Intrudes on Dreams of New Services- Music Attracting Consumers to the Online Jukebox, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 2002, at C3; see also Gwendolyn Mariano, Napster Rivals Winning Popularity Contest, ZDNet Austi., at http://www.zdnet.com.au/printfriendly?AT=2000024981-20261702 (Nov. 6, 2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (noting that the Ka- zaa/Grokster network was predicted to have passed Napster in terms of number of simultaneous user; by November of 2001); Richard Menta, RIAA and MPAA Sue Morpheus, Grokster, and KaZaa, at http://www.mp3newswire.net/stories/2001/ sue-morpheus.html (Oct. 3, 2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) ("According to WebNoize, 3.05 billion files were downloaded in August via the lead- in Napster clones. At its peak last February Napster delivered 2.79 billion files."). Doug Bedell, Pay to Play? No Way: New Legislation, Record Labels Are Going After File-Sharing Networks, San Diego Union Trib., July 29, 2002, at E3 (citing a re- cent study by the San Francisco research firm Odyssey). 508 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 89:505 tens of millions of individuals have chosen to use these networks to download free, high-quality sound recordings. The more puzzling question is why tens of millions of individuals have chosen to up- load free, high-quality sound recordings to their fellow anonymous users. Downloading content from a peer-to-peer network depends entirely on another user's willingness to upload such content. While users of these networks have been free to download as much content as they want without ever having to share their content, a substantial number of users still elected to share. Seen in this light, the file-swapping networks are a triumph of cooperation, and a shining beacon of kindness to strangers. In this Article, I will provide an explanation for why so many Internet users make their unlicensed copies of copyrighted content available to perfect strangers despite the absence of obvious