DOCSLIB.ORG

The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Unfulfilled Promise AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Policy Note # 04 by Kurt Bassuener Berlin - Sarajevo AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis October 2015 Policy Note # 01Inflammatory political rhetoric by Bodo Weber http://democratizationpolicy.org and hate speech in Bosnia and Herzegovina:Berlin - Sarajevo political elites andSeptember the media 2015 A report from Atlantic Initiative & Democratization Policy Council Author: Kurt Bassuener Editing: Toby Vogel & DPC executive editorial board Berlin - Sarajevo October 2015 This paper was supported by: http://democratizationpolicy.org TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................... I INTRODUCTION AND BRIEF HISTORY ............................................................................................................ 1 FORCE STRUCTURE ........................................................................................................................................ 2 AFBIH MISSIONS AND THE ONGOING DEFENSE REVIEW .............................................................................. 3 THE AFBIH IN THE POLARIZED POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT ........................................................................... 5 Politicization in the Ranks ................................................................................................................ 7 The Regimental System .................................................................................................................... 8 Military Capability and Performance ............................................................................................... 9 2014’s Challenges .......................................................................................................................... 10 Defense Property ............................................................................................................................ 13 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................................... 14 http://democratizationpolicy.org PREFACE This DPC-Atlantic Initiative Policy Note is part of a series of occasional thematic papers which collectively compose the second edition of DPC and the AI’s Security Risk Analysis Study. The first edition, published in October 2011, assessed a full spectrum of risk factors: the functionality of government institutions at all levels, political use of conflict rhetoric in the media, police, army, privately-held weapons, private security companies, religious and ethnic radicalism, socio-economic strain, juvenile delinquency and sports violence, and the posture of the international community in BiH. This second edition assesses these same factors from the vantage point of the present day, including new information previously unavailable to the authors. These papers are not mere updates of the first edition; each Policy Note is a stand-alone assessment of the theme in question. However, where information from the 2011 edition remains relevant, it is included. This Policy Note Series was produced with the generous support of the Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), the Friedrich-Ebert- Foundation (FES) office in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Open Society Fund Bosnia and Herzegovina (OSF BiH). This paper was supported by DCAF. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH or “the force”) will mark its tenth anniversary in 2016 and stands as a useful reminder of the considerable progress achieved in the first decade following the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. However, the force was assembled just when all other state-building consolidation and reforms began to stop, stall or reverse.. The AFBiH is not immune to the effects of the polarized political environment and its attendant afflictions – patronage and clientelism, short-termism, and a lack of accountability. Furthermore, the Republika Srpska (RS) Government has perennially targeted the AFBiH’s budget for cuts as part of its policy to demilitarize BiH, and thereby further weaken the state. In addition, in much the same way that Dayton included compromises which have been proven to obstruct the creation of a functional and accountable governance system for BiH, the tradeoffs required to create the AFBiH impedes its integration. In particular, the maintenance of ethnic majority infantry battalions poses a risk in the event of the emergence of further interethnic polarization, as does the (ceremonial) regimental system – originally intended as a containment mechanism for Armija BiH, Vojske RS, and HVO traditions for veterans of these forces, but now being perpetuated by the encouragement of new recruits to join them. Full integration of the force down to the operational level remains unrealized. Furthermore, sources indicate that currying favor with political and religious authorities in pursuit of advancement has become ever more visible in the ranks. Progress toward the goal of NATO membership, questioned by both the RS Government and more recently by Serb member of the BiH Presidency Mladen Ivanić, has been hobbled by the fact that the ownership of defense property remains in dispute. Resolution of this issue, which would free troops from defending these sites for other duties, is an explicit requirement for the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) to be activated. Registration of this property, ruled State property by the BiH Constitutional Court and more recently the Court of BiH, was part of the coalition agreement for the BiH Government, but remains vehemently opposed by the RS. Despite these considerable impediments, the AFBiH has performed admirably, both abroad in peace support operations (with regular contingents supporting ISAF in Afghanistan) and at home. In the latter case, during and following the May 2014 flood emergency, the AFBiH saved lives and property of BiH citizens throughout the flood affected areas. This boosted morale considerably and connected the force to the citizenry as never before. The AFBiH was the only state, entity, or cantonal official body to emerge with its reputation enhanced through its flood response; all others performed miserably. This disaster response experience also identified deficiencies in equipment, training and preparation which can be remediated to ensure better performance in the future. Finally, the AFBiH is inducting “new blood” into the officer corps through a British-sponsored program to recruit university graduates. The effort was universally lauded in the author’s interviews as an avenue to further professionalize the force. In short, the problems identified with the AFBiH are essentially the same as they were four years ago, when the first edition of the DPC/Atlantic Initiative (AI) Security Risk Analysis was published. There is no AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis Paper Series #4 | I expectation that the AFBiH will generate destabilization or initiate inter-ethnic violence. But there is almost universal belief that in the event of such violence, it would collapse along its ethnic fault lines. The AFBiH cannot but reflect the politically-driven polarization which dominates the political arena in BiH. With these findings in mind, DPC and AI recommend the following to Western governments: 1) End the ambiguity on BiH security guarantees: The reduction of EUFOR to a paltry approximately 600 troops has conveyed the signal to politicians and citizens alike that there is no longer a credible deterrent to destabilizing actors, nor a capability to react to unforeseen crises or undeterrable threats. The EU and NATO need to finally state without ambiguity that any attempts to split BiH or initiate interethnic violence will be confronted forcefully. 2) Demonstrate steadfast Western solidarity and firmness regarding compliance with legal decisions relevant to defense property: The 2012 BiH Constitutional Court decision on State property has never been the rallying cry it should have been, given the resolution of the RS Government to defy it. There must be concrete consequences for RS Government decision- makers, which can include EU “restrictive measures.” 3) Continue long-term support to “new blood” in the AFBiH. The British-sponsored new officer induction program is universally praised. Other donors should consider similar or complimentary efforts to introduce new talent and skills into the AFBiH. 4) Provide support for force integration at the company level. Operational unit integration, particularly for units deployed abroad and for newly-inducted officers, is an important goal that needs to be an explicitly defined – and articulated – target for Western assistance. 5) Assign experts to assist in procurement, so the defense budget can be wisely spent in a timely fashion. Assistance in developing tenders and due diligence by Western militaries/MoDs would maximize the utility of the limited defense budget and external assistance. 6) Provide assistance in planning for natural disasters: An approach similar to the preliminary efforts that were undertaken to remediate serious deficiencies in police coordination should be undertaken for the AFBiH and the wider civil defense architecture in BiH, including the Ministry of Security and entity and cantonal bodies. 7) Provide or assist in procuring specialized equipment for civil emergencies, including through regional pooling/collaborative arrangements, focusing
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Policing the Police in Bosnia
    POLICING THE POLICE IN BOSNIA: A FURTHER REFORM AGENDA 10 May 2002 Balkans Report N°130 Sarajevo/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................................i I. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1 A. Current Context ...................................................................................................................1 B. The Origins Of UNMIBH/IPTF ..........................................................................................4 C. The Case For Joined-Up Police Reform..............................................................................7 II. POLICING STRUCTURES ..........................................................................................................9 A. Fragmentation......................................................................................................................9 B. Non-Cooperation With The Judiciary ...............................................................................12 C. The State Border Service (SBS) ........................................................................................15 D. Failures Of Regional Policing ...........................................................................................19 III. POLITICS AND POLICING ....................................................................................................... 22 IV. THE POLICING GAP: LOCAL CAPABILITIES
    [Show full text]
  • Vol. 2, No. 1 (Trinity 2018)
    Vol. 2, No. 1 (Trinity 2018) Th e 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force and America’s Endless War Harrison Akins Th e Intersection of the Bosnian War, the Mujahideen, and Counterterrorism Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina Nicola Mathieson Th e Quest for Islam in a Virtual Maze: How the Internet is Shaping Religious Knowledge among Young Muslims in Berlin-Kreuzberg Ines Gassal-Bosch Arab, Unionist, Republican: Th e Case of Ma'rūf al-Ruṣāfī Chris Hitchcock Memories and Narrations of “Nations” Past: Accounts of Early Migrants from Kerala in the Gulf in the Post-Oil Era M. H. Ilias 1 Oxford Middle East Review Vol. 2, No. 1 (Trinity 2018) Copyright © 2018 OMER | Oxford Middle East Review. All rights reserved. Senior Member Prof Eugene Rogan Managing Editors Krystel De Chiara, St Antony’s College Alexis Nicholson, St Antony’s College Section Editors Ameer Al-Khudari, St Antony’s College Ivo Bantel, St Antony’s College Manuel Giardino, Magdalen College Allison Holle, Exeter College Amaan Merali, St Cross College Bahar Saba, Wadham College Marral Shamshiri-Fard, St Antony’s College Chief Copy Editors Ceighley Cribb, St Antony’s College Naomi Lester, St Anne’s College Treasurer Naomi Lester, St Anne’s College Public Relations Manager Timo Schmidt, St Antony’s College Production Manager Allison Holle, Exeter College Events Manager Jeremy Jacobellis, Exeter College 2 Oxford Middle East Review is a non-partisan project that seeks to bring together a wide range of individuals with different backgrounds, beliefs, ideas, aspirations, viewpoints, and methodologies, while sharing an adherence to principles of equality, social justice, freedom of speech, and tolerance.
    [Show full text]
  • Bosnia and Herzegovina Report
    Country Report Bosnia and Herzegovina Gergana Tzvetkova, Mila Mancheva November 2019 This Country Report offers a detailed assessment of religious diversity and violent religious radicalisation in the above-named state. It is part of a series covering 23 countries (listed below) on four continents. More basic information about religious affiliation and state-religion relations in these states is available in our Country Profiles series. This report was produced by GREASE, an EU-funded research project investigating religious diversity, secularism and religiously inspired radicalisation. Countries covered in this series: Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Kingdom. http://grease.eui.eu The GREASE project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 770640 Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Report GREASE The EU-Funded GREASE project looks to Asia for insights on governing religious diversity and preventing radicalisation. Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania, GREASE is investigating how religious diversity is governed in over 20 countries. Our work focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices that may (or may not) prove useful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how different societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities and migrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be governed successfully, with an emphasis on countering radicalisation trends. While exploring religious governance models in other parts of the world, GREASE also attempts to unravel the European paradox of religious radicalisation despite growing secularisation.
    [Show full text]
  • The Intersection of the Bosnian War, the Mujahideen, and Counterterrorism Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina
    The Intersection of the Bosnian War, the Mujahideen, and Counterterrorism Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina Nicola Mathieson Drawing upon the history of the participation of the mujahideen during the Bosnian War (1992-1995), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has used counterterrorism measures against its Muslim population in a post-9/11 environment. BiH’s targeting of its Muslim community has been facilitated by the lack of an international definition of terrorism or a mechanism to monitor and chastise states that misuse counterterrorism measures. To appreciate the significance of this global problem, the subsequent policy piece specifically examines Republika Srpska’s use of counterterrorism measures to target members of the Bosniak community and emphasizes the importance of formalising a standard definition of terrorism. Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), has long prided itself on its secularity and geography as a European capital. BiH consists of three main ethnic groups: Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims.1 Bosnia’s Muslim population, known as Bosniaks, have long referred to themselves as “European Muslims,” usually enforcing a strict division between themselves and “Arab Muslims.” During recent years, there has been a perceived increase of “Arab” and “Islamic” influence in BiH. Illidža, a suburb west of Sarajevo, has become a hub of Arab tourism. International funding from Muslim states has contributed to the construction of Sunni mosques that stand in stark contrast to the traditional wooden mosques dotted throughout the hills of Sarajevo’s suburbs. Arab tourists are increasingly investing in property throughout BiH2 and local Sarajevans have particularly noted an increased visibility of women in hijabs and niqabs.3 These changes are perceived to have begun during the Bosnian War.
    [Show full text]
  • Policing the Police in Bosnia: a Further Reform Agenda
    POLICING THE POLICE IN BOSNIA: A FURTHER REFORM AGENDA 10 May 2002 Balkans Report No. 130 Sarajevo/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....................................................................i I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................1 A. Current Context ................................................................................................................................ 1 B. The Origins Of UNMIBH/IPTF ....................................................................................................... 4 C. The Case For Joined-Up Police Reform........................................................................................... 7 II. POLICING STRUCTURES ...........................................................................................................10 A. Fragmentation................................................................................................................................. 10 B. Non-Cooperation With The Judiciary ............................................................................................ 12 C. The State Border Service (SBS) ..................................................................................................... 16 D. Failures Of Regional Policing ........................................................................................................ 20 III. POLITICS AND POLICING ...........................................................................................................23
    [Show full text]
  • Bosnia and Herzegovina Center for the Study of Democracy September 2020
    Radicalisation and Resilience Case Study Bosnia and Herzegovina Center for the Study of Democracy September 2020 This case study is part of a series of in-depth reports on religiously motivated violent radicalisation - and resilience to it - in 12 countries. The series examines periods in which religious radicalisation and violence has escalated and analyses relevant policy and political discourses surrounding them. While seeking to identify factors that drove radicalisation and violence in each country, the case studies also critically assess programmes of prevention and resilience-building, identifying good practices. This series was produced by GREASE, an EU-funded research project investigating religious diversity, secularism and religiously inspired radicalisation. Countries covered in this series: Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Tunisia and the United Kingdom. http://grease.eui.eu The GREASE project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 770640 BiH Radicalisation and Resilience Case Study GREASE The EU-Funded GREASE project looks to Asia for insights on governing religious diversity and preventing radicalisation. Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania, GREASE is investigating how religious diversity is governed in over 20 countries. Our work focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices that may (or may not) prove useful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how different societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities and migrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be governed successfully, with an emphasis on countering radicalisation trends.
    [Show full text]
  • Bosnia and Herzegovina Center for the Study of Democracy September 2020
    Radicalisation and Resilience Case Study Bosnia and Herzegovina Center for the Study of Democracy September 2020 This case study is part of a series of in-depth reports on religiously motivated violent radicalisation - and resilience to it - in 12 countries. The series examines periods in which religious radicalisation and violence has escalated and analyses relevant policy and political discourses surrounding them. While seeking to identify factors that drove radicalisation and violence in each country, the case studies also critically assess programmes of prevention and resilience-building, identifying good practices. This series was produced by GREASE, an EU-funded research project investigating religious diversity, secularism and religiously inspired radicalisation. Countries covered in this series: Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Tunisia and the United Kingdom. http://grease.eui.eu The GREASE project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 770640 BiH Radicalisation and Resilience Case Study GREASE The EU-Funded GREASE project looks to Asia for insights on governing religious diversity and preventing radicalisation. Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania, GREASE is investigating how religious diversity is governed in over 20 countries. Our work focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices that may (or may not) prove useful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how different societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities and migrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be governed successfully, with an emphasis on countering radicalisation trends.
    [Show full text]