The Path of Least Resistance: the Failure of Humanitarianism and American Foreign Policy in Sudan
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University of Central Florida STARS Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 2012 The Path Of Least Resistance: The Failure Of Humanitarianism And American Foreign Policy In Sudan Mark J. MacFarlane University of Central Florida Part of the History Commons Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact [email protected]. STARS Citation MacFarlane, Mark J., "The Path Of Least Resistance: The Failure Of Humanitarianism And American Foreign Policy In Sudan" (2012). Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019. 2318. https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/2318 THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE: THE FAILURE OF HUMANITARIANISM AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN SUDAN by MARK J. MACFARLANE B.A. State University of New York at Albany, 1994 A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of History in the College of Arts and Humanities at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida Spring Term 2012 © 2012 Mark J. MacFarlane ii ABSTRACT This thesis examines America’s response to civil war, dispossession, and humanitarian disaster in Sudan from the end of the Cold War up until the second Darfur uprising. While the number of scholarly works examining the overall conflict and humanitarian crisis are immense, less has been written in regard to America’s foreign policy in Sudan. The contemporary nature of the crisis and dearth of historical analysis does make establishing trends difficult; but recent works suggest a U.S. policy that is ill informed and therefore ineffectual in halting both the conflict and crisis in Sudan. However, contrary to this opinion, the evidence may demonstrate that United States policy, rather than a series of misjudgments or being simply ineffectual, has been more systematic, informed and purposeful. This thesis argues that while the United States wished for peace in Sudan, the historical evidence suggests that the path taken by the United States knowingly prolonged the suffering of millions of Sudanese. Furthermore, American policy makers have entrusted peace in Darfur and in other disparate regions of Sudan, as well as along the newly formed borders with South Sudan, to the National Congress Party (NCP) a regime Congress has labeled untrustworthy and despotic. The bulk of the research used in this examination covered the period from 1989- 2008. However, the independence achieved by the Republic of South Sudan in the summer of 2011 is taken into account in the final analysis of the thesis. The secondary sources both cited and considered for the thesis were substantial; these included academic articles, studies, and texts published over several decades in several related fields of study germane to the thesis topic. While a wide range of primary sources were used, the thesis relied heavily on United States Congressional records from 1989-2008 for analysis. iii I dedicate this thesis to my son Noah. May he be a harbinger of peace. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS It is a pleasure to thank those who made this thesis possible. First, I would like to thank my wife Zinthia who has given support, both academic, and in the form of constant encouragement. Thanks too for putting up with me through this long and arduous process. I am also grateful for the support and understanding of my friends and family. While work on my thesis limited my time with you, you were always in my thoughts. This thesis would not have been possible without the great knowledge and assistance I was able to acquire from all the wonderful professors at the University of Central Florida—most of all Dr. Ezekiel Walker who oversaw the process of writing this thesis and gave constant direction. Lastly, I am grateful to the number of individuals that read drafts of my thesis—at various stages of its completion—and were able to provide advice or comments. The feedback was helpful throughout the process. v TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................................................... vii CHAPTER ONE: AMERICA’S RESPONSE TO THE CONFLICT AND REFUGEE CRISIS IN SUDAN ............................................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER TWO: THE HISTORY OF CONFLICT AND DISPOSSESSION IN SUDAN ....... 22 CHAPTER THREE: THE US RESPONSE TO THE CONFLICT IN SUDAN: A CONVENIENT PEACE ................................................................................................... 44 CHAPTER FOUR: AMERICA’S RESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN SUDAN: THE FAILURE OF HUMANITARIANISM AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN ASYLUM .. 84 CHAPTER FIVE: AFTERWORD ............................................................................................. 109 ENDNOTES ............................................................................................................................... 123 vi LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AMIS African Mission in Sudan AU African Union CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement DUP Democratic Unionist party GNU Government of National Unity GOS Government of Sudan GoSS Government of South Sudan ICC International Criminal Court ICG International Crisis Group IGAD The Intergovernmental Authority for Development JEM Justice and Equality Movement NCP National Congress Party NDA National Democratic Alliance NIF National Islamic Front OLS Operation Lifeline Sudan PCP People’s Congress Party SAF Sudan Armed Forces SLA/M Sudan Liberation Movement/Army SPLA/M Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army UN United Nations UNAMID African/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan vii UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees UNSC United Nations Security Council viii CHAPTER ONE: AMERICA’S RESPONSE TO THE CONFLICT AND REFUGEE CRISIS IN SUDAN Sudan’s Civil War, which began in 1956, has been perhaps the world’s most pressing geopolitical dilemma. Prior to the new millennium, the conflict and the humanitarian crisis were only intermittingly halted by a respite of ten years brought about by the Addis Ababa peace agreement in 1972. The conflict then renewed with horrific intensity in 1983. Since then over two million people have died.1 Further, millions have been forced to flee their homes. On the surface the conflict involved rebels from the South fighting against various hegemonic Sudanese governments operating from Khartoum, which then expanded in 2002-2003 to the Western region of Darfur, threatening the supposed peace process (for those who put any stock in it) that had been underway between the Sudanese government and the Southern rebels. The peace process began the previous year and was to lead to the historic Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which was finalized in 2005. An important piece to the CPA was the 2011 referendum to decide whether the South would remain part of a united Sudan or separate. The South, choosing the latter path, formed the newly independent Republic of South Sudan on July 9, 2011. While this momentous event has given much reason for encouragement, many of the fundamental issues that plagued the two disparate regions, now two separate nations, remain unresolved. Dispossession and humanitarian disaster, both directly tied to the policies of the Sudanese government, continue to plague Sudan and South Sudan. In January, 2011, there were still an estimated 4.3 million Internally Displaced Persons* (IDPs) in Sudan. While many of these unfortunate persons presently languish within the borders of Sudan or South Sudan, * The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center estimated as of January 2011 that there were still 5 million internally displaced persons in Sudan. The UNHCR uses a lower figure of 4.3 million. (Both these figures include the region of southern Sudan that currently is the Republic of South Sudan.) 1 millions more continue to suffer outside the borders of their homeland as refugees. Additionally, in May, 2011, only months before the 2011 referendum, Northern forces seized the contested strategic oil-rich region of Abyei. The Seizure of Abyei, which was labeled by Southerners as an “act of war,”2 has led to violent clashes and thousands fleeing Abyei after the July independence of South Sudan. The crisis in Sudan has long been the topic of considerable scholarly interest. There have been countless scholarly works that point to the government in Khartoum as the cause for the inherent inequities in the Sudanese State as well as the impetus behind the history of conflict and dispossession. While the number of scholarly works examining the overall conflict and humanitarian crisis are immense, less has been written in regard to America’s foreign policy in Sudan. Contemporary scholars, including Peter W. Klein, author of “Tea and Sympathy: The United States and the Sudan Civil War, 1985-2005,” reasoned that while U.S. policy may be misguided at times and ineffectual, “the U.S. goal remains ending the war.”3 However, contrary to this opinion, evidence may demonstrate that United States policy, rather than a series of misjudgments or being ineffectual, has been more systematic, informed and purposeful. This thesis argues that while the United States wished for peace in Sudan, historical evidence suggests that the path