The Rise of Political Islam and Islamist Terrorism in Bangladesh
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The rise of Political Islam and Islamist Terrorism in Bangladesh Introduction On 1 July 2016, the traditionally tolerant and secular nation of Bangladesh catapulted to international headlines in the wake of the deadliest single terrorist attack the country had experienced in decades. With five pro-Islamic State (IS) terrorists storming into the Holey Artisan Bakery, a popular restaurant located in an upscale neighbourhood in the capital city of Dhaka, the 12-hour siege ended with the death of 20 hostages, 18 of which were foreigners.1 Although the IS claimed responsibility for the attack, there was no evidence to prove that the organization had directly aided or abetted the perpetrators, despite some reports claiming that the perpetrators had been in contact with the terrorist outfit.2 International concern over the attacks prompted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government, which had previously denied the presence of transnational Islamist terrorist organizations in the country, to launch a massive counter-terrorism operation in order to suppress any terrorist movements within the country. Three years after the Holey Artisan Bakery attack, Bangladesh has evanesced from international headlines and the radar of Western governments, despite the variegated history of Islamist terrorist violence and several sporadic attacks on non-Muslim minorities, as well as against Sufis, Ahmedis, liberal and secular social activists and foreigners. Regardless of the deepening political and social polarization taking place within the South Asian country, alongside with the intensifying threat posed by Islamic State’s and Al-Qaeda’s interests in Bangladesh, both local and international authorities have paid little attention to the potential hazards caused by such brewing Islamist violence. This paper explores whether Bangladesh could potentially become a future source of Jihadi manpower alongside the possible ramifications on other nations in the South Asian region. In order to assess the evolving threat posed by rising Islamist violence, this paper begins by outlining the Islamist terrorist milieu in Bangladesh by briefly describing both local and transnational Jihadist groups that are currently operational in the country. Thereafter, the 1 Kugelman, Michael & Ahmad, Atif. “Why Extremism Is on the Rise in Bangaldesh.” Foreign Affairs, July 27, 2017. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2017-07-27/why-extremism-rise-bangladesh (assessed October 20, 2019) 2 Animesh Rou, executive director of the New Delhi-based Society for Study of Peace and Conflict, said Bangladesh’s Islamist groups now “appear to be in regular contact” with IS, but mentioned that there was not enough evidence to prove the terrorist organization was providing “direct, material support” to militants in South Asia. See Al-Mahmood, Syed. “Bangladesh Attack Marks Tactical Shift in Islamic State Militants.” The Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2016. https://www.wsj.com/articles/terror-attack-on-bangladesh-cafe-leaves-20-dead- 1467455938 (assessed October 28, 2019) 1 paper explores the current demography of terrorist recruits in Bangladesh, underlining the role of social media in facilitating the process of radicalization. This is followed by an overview of the current counter-terrorism initiatives undertaken by the government, followed by an observation of how the deepening political polarization has facilitated the blossoming of Islamist terrorist groups within the nation. To end with, the paper analyses the wider ramifications of religious fundamentalism for both Bangladesh and the region of South Asian. The argument that this paper will put forth is that in order to further avoid potential home- grown terrorism and possible recruitment by transnational terrorist organizations, Bangladesh’s government cannot remain in a posture of denial vis-à-vis the presence of IS and Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) on its soil. Instead, Sheikh Hasina’s government must primarily begin by improving governance, the spirit of democracy and the rule of law, by putting aside the growing struggle for political power therewith enabling necessary counter-terrorism efforts to receive adequate attention. From ‘Success Story’ to the Rise of Islamist Terrorism Western nations have traditionally perceived Bangladesh as a ‘success story’ of a moderate, secular, Muslim democracy.3 As Dan Mozena, the then United States (US) Ambassador to Bangladesh, stated in March 2014: “Bangladesh is a moderate and generally secular and tolerant – though sometimes this is getting stretched at the moment – alternative to violent extremism in a very troubled part of the world”4. While religiously fuelled terrorism in Bangladesh may not be as lethal as in Pakistan or Afghanistan, Mozena’s assumption is, as a matter of fact, based on weak empirical grounds. According to statistics derived from the Global Terrorism Database maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), around 944 terrorist attacks have been recorded between 2000 and 2015.5 Whilst the perpetrators of the majority of the attacks remain unknown or were attributed to political parties, 114 were executed by verifiable Islamist terrorist groups.6 During recent years Bangladesh has experienced a creeping Islamism which has manifested itself in numerous terrorist attacks, often claimed by both local and 3 Fair, Christine C. “Political Islam and Islamist Terrorism in Bangladesh: What You Need to Know.” Foreign Policy Essay, January 28, 2018. https://www.lawfareblog.com/political-islam-and-islamist-terrorism-bangladesh- what-you-need-know (assessed October 25, 2019) 4 Gowen, Annie. “Bangladesh Military Strength: Current Military Capabilities and Available Firepower for 2016 Detailed.” (recited in Fair, Christine C. “Political Islam and Islamist Terrorism in Bangladesh: What You Need to Know.”, supra note 1) 5 Fair, Christine C., Hamza, Ali. & Heller, Rebecka. “Who Supports Suicide Terrorism in Bangladesh? What the Data Say”. Religion and Politics, 2017. 6 Between 2003 and May 2017, the government proscribed seven militant organizations: Shahadat-e-al Hikuma (February 9, 2003), Jama’atul Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB) and Jagrat Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) (on February 23, 2005), Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami (HUJI) (Cotber 17,2005), Hizb ut-Tahrir (October 22, 2009), Ansarullah Bangla Team (May 25, 2015), which claims to be the Bangladeshi chapter of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS).6 2 transnational Islamist terrorist organizations. Although identifying terrorist organizations in Bangladesh is challenging due to the absence of reliable data and constant name changing undertaken by the groups, press reports suggest that approximately 20 terrorist outfits are currently active inside the country, in contrast to law enforcement agencies which claim the number is much smaller, namely 12.7 The presence of Islamist terrorist groups in Bangladesh dates back to the late 1980s, when approximately 3,000 Bangladeshis reportedly left for Afghanistan to join the US and Saudi- sponsored anti-Soviet Jihad.8 As Bangladesh was receiving approximately 15% of its bilateral development assistance aid from the United States in the 1980s, Bangladeshi authorities were lenient on their nationals travelling to and from Afghanistan to wage Jihad.9 Equipped with the knowledge of insurgent warfare and Jihadist ideology acquired from the Afghan Taliban, Bangladeshi returnees were determined to establish their own Islamist terrorist groups in their homeland. One of the earliest examples of such groups is the Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI- B), formally founded in 1992 with funds from Al-Qaeda10 and led by three Afghanistan veterans – Mufti Abdur Rouf, Mowlana Abdus Salam and Mufti Abdu Hannan Sheikh.11 With the aim of transforming Bangladesh into an Islamic State, the HuJI-B carried out some of the earliest Islamist terrorist activities in the country; for instance, responsibility over the 1993 death threat against the feminist author Taslima Nasreen has been attributed to HuJI-B. Following the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US, HuJI-B established strong links with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Pakistani-based terrorist outfit, and at the peak of its operations in 2004, the group claimed that up to 15,000 members had been recruited from Madrassas (Islamic religious schools) in Bangladesh and Pakistan, although that number has not been properly verified.12 The group’s most notorious attack included the August 2004 grenade attack during an election rally meant to assassinate the then opposition leader and Chief of the Awami League party, Sheikh Hasina.13 Due to imprisonments and the killing of key leaders 7 Riaz, Ali & Parvez, Saimum. “Bangladeshi Militants: What Do We Know?” Terrorism and Political Violence 30, no. 7 (2018): 946. 8 Riaz, Ali. Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web. (London: Routledge, 2008). 9 Fair, Christine C., Hamza, Ali. & Heller, Rebecka. “Who Supports Suicide Terrorism in Bangladesh? What the Data Say”, supra note 5, 4. 10 Hasan, Mubashar. “Geopolitics of political Islam in Bangladesh.” Harvard Asia Quarterly, no 64. 11 “Who are the militants?” in Ali Riaz and C. Christine Fair (eds.), Political Islam and Governance in Bangladesh (Oxford, 2011), 71-90 12 Ramachandran, Sudha. “PART 2: Behind the Harkat-ul Jihad Al-Islami.” Asia Times Online, 10 December 2004. 13 Rana, Muhammad (translated by Saba Ansari). A to Z of Jehadi organizations in Pakistan. (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2005): 263.