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Aquinas' Principle of Individuation
Aquinas' Principle of Individuation Patrick W. Hughes Denison University Saint Thomas Aquinas, the Thirteenth Century Catholic theologian and philosopher was one of the first Medieval philosophers to attempt to reconcile the newly re-introduced Aristotelian system with the Catholic religious thought ofthe day. Aquinas' numerous commentaries on Aristotle and his adoption of the Aristotelian thought form the basis for the whole of Aquinian metaphysics (as well as the basic Aristotileanism which pervades Aquinas' whole systematic philosophy), In this paper I will deal with a specific yet fundamental principle ofAquinianmetaphysics-the principle of individuation. On first reading of the Aquinian texts, the principle of individuation appears to be stated succinctly, yet further investigation into the concept of individuation reveals problems and ambiguities. As it is necessary for an understanding of the problem of individuation in the Aquinian system, I will start off with the basic ontology ofAquinas and then will proceed with one interpretation of the ambiguities which exist in the texts regarding the principle of individuation. I will then give a counter interpretation that Aquinas might level against my interpretation and the problems ofmy interpretation; finally, I will analyze any problems that arise from the Aquinian response. 1. Primary Substance in Aristotle and Aquinas The difficulty in dealing with systematic philosophy is that it is difficult to know where to begin, since each concept is built upon previous concepts and all of the concepts are fundamentally interrelated. Neverthe less, I shall start by explicating Aquinas' fundamental ontology. Aquinas, following Aristotle, points out that the world is made up of individual things-or what Aquinas calls "primary substances", Socrates, Rover, and the pine tree in my yard are all existing individual primary substances in the world. -
MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY NEO-THOMIST APPROACHES to MODERN PSYCHOLOGY Dissertation Submitted to the College of Arts and Sciences Of
MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY NEO-THOMIST APPROACHES TO MODERN PSYCHOLOGY Dissertation Submitted to The College of Arts and Sciences of the UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Theology By Matthew Glen Minix UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON Dayton, Ohio December 2016 MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY NEO-THOMIST APPROACHES TO MODERN PSYCHOLOGY Name: Minix, Matthew G. APPROVED BY: _____________________________________ Sandra A. Yocum, Ph.D. Dissertation Director _____________________________________ William L. Portier, Ph.D. Dissertation Reader. _____________________________________ Anthony Burke Smith, Ph.D. Dissertation Reader _____________________________________ John A. Inglis, Ph.D. Dissertation Reader _____________________________________ Jack J. Bauer, Ph.D. _____________________________________ Daniel Speed Thompson, Ph.D. Chair, Department of Religious Studies ii © Copyright by Matthew Glen Minix All rights reserved 2016 iii ABSTRACT MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY NEO-THOMIST APPROACHES TO MODERN PSYCHOLOGY Name: Minix, Matthew Glen University of Dayton Advisor: Dr. Sandra A. Yocum This dissertation considers a spectrum of five distinct approaches that mid-twentieth century neo-Thomist Catholic thinkers utilized when engaging with the tradition of modern scientific psychology: a critical approach, a reformulation approach, a synthetic approach, a particular [Jungian] approach, and a personalist approach. This work argues that mid-twentieth century neo-Thomists were essentially united in their concerns about the metaphysical principles of many modern psychologists as well as in their worries that these same modern psychologists had a tendency to overlook the transcendent dimension of human existence. This work shows that the first four neo-Thomist thinkers failed to bring the traditions of neo-Thomism and modern psychology together to the extent that they suggested purely theoretical ways of reconciling them. -
Aristotle on Perception
Aristotle on Perception Aristotle spends a great deal of time in DA discussing the topic of sense-perception. But what is his theory of perception? In is surprisingly difficult to get clear on exactly what it is. He begins his discussion of perception in II.5 by saying that perception: a. “occurs in being moved and affected.” b. “seems to be a type of alteration.” c. is a process in which “like is affected by like.” Much of his subsequent discussion is on the physics and physiology of perception: a. Each sense has a sense-organ. b. Each sense has a medium (e.g., air, water). c. Each sense has its own proper objects (of sight, color; of hearing, sound). d. The proper object of a sense is a qualification of an external object. E.g., the color (red) we perceive is a quality of some individual body (a tomato). e. Perception is (or involves) a causal process leading from the external object through the medium to the sense-organ, and ultimately to the “primary” sense- organ in the heart. f. This process is one in which the sensible quality of the external object (e.g., its color) is transferred to the sense-organ of the perceiver. (For details on this process, see the II.7 discussion of sight as the transmission of color from the object of perception through the intervening medium—water or air—to the eye.) Qualification: Perception is not an alteration All of this makes it seem as if Aristotle thinks of perception as a physiological process. -
The Concept Of'nature'in Aristotle, Avicenna and Averroes
doi: 10.1590/0100-512X2015n13103cb THE CONCEPT OF ‘NATURE’ IN ARISTOTLE, AVICENNA AND AVERROES* Catarina Belo** [email protected] RESUMO O presente artigo trata da ‘natureza’ enquanto objeto da física, ou da ciência natural, tal como descrita por Aristóteles na “Física”. Também trata das definições da natureza, especificamente a natureza física, fornecidas por Avicena (m. 1037) e Averróis (m. 1198) nos seus comentários à “Física” de Aristóteles. Avicena e Averróis partilham da conceção da natureza de Aristóteles enquanto princípio de movimento e repouso. Enquanto para Aristóteles o objeto da física parece ser a natureza, ou aquilo que existe por natureza, Avicena defende que é o corpo natural, e Averróis afirma que o objeto da física, ou ciência natural, consiste nas coisas naturais, apresentando uma ênfase algo diferente. Palavras-chave Natureza, física, substância, Aristóteles, Avicena, Averróis. ABSTRACT This study is concerned with ‘nature’ specifically as the subject-matter of physics, or natural science, as described by Aristotle in his “Physics”. It also discusses the definitions of nature, and more specifically physical nature, provided by Avicenna (d. 1037) and Averroes (d. 1198) in their commentaries on Aristotle’s “Physics”. Avicenna and Averroes share Aristotle’s conception of nature as a principle of motion and rest. While according to Aristotle the subject matter of physics appears to be nature, * An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Medieval Congress 2008, University of Leeds, United Kingdom, 7-10 July 2008. I am grateful for the comments on my paper by the other congress participants. ** Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy – The American University in Cairo. -
Form, Essence, Soul: Distinguishing Principles of Thomistic Metaphysics
FORM, ESSENCE, SOUL: DISTINGUISHING PRINCIPLES OF THOMISTIC METAPHYSICS JOSHUA P. HOCHSCHILD I. INTRODUCTION What is the difference between the substantial form, the essence, and the soul of a living material substance? Each of these three items would normally be considered in a course in Thomistic philosophy. In my experience, there reaches a point where students begin to wonder how these terms are related and even whether it is necessary to de scribe the metaphysical principles of things in so many different ways. I have found it useful, for my own understanding and my teaching, to exploit, even to foster, some potential confusions precisely in order to focus on them, and in the process illuminate certain distinctions and insights in Thomistic philosophy. II. CONFUSIONS Presentations of Thomistic metaphysics can tend to present the substantial form, essence, and soul as if they are basically the same thing. Aquinas himself, after all, sometimes treats "form" as syn onymous with "essence,"1 and they seem to serve the same basic metaphysical task: both are causes not only of a thing's being the kind of thing it is, but of its just being.2 And, as causes, the causality exercised by both the essence and the form is formal, not material or efficient.3 As for the soul, Aquinas of course adopts its Aristotelian 1 Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, ch. 1: "Dicitur etiam forma secundum quod per formam significatur certitudo uniuscuiusque rei, ut <licit Avicenna in II Metaphysicae suae." 2 Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, ch. 1: "Et hoc est quod Philosophus frequenter nominat quod quid erat esse, id est hoc per quod aliquid habet esse quid." De Principiis Naturae, ch. -
Matter and Form, Body and Soul, in De Anima • Follow-Up on Final Argument in Plato’S Phaedo
24.01: Classics of Western Philosophy Matter and Form, Body and Soul, in De Anima • Follow-up on Final argument in Plato’s Phaedo. • Introduction to Aristotle (see additional biographical handout). 1. Hylomorphism Unlike Plato, Aristotle was fascinated by the natural world. Instead of Plato’s division between two vastly different realms, Aristotle distinguishes two aspects of ordinary things – form and matter. Form only exists when it enforms matter; moreover, matter is just potential to be enformed. Aristotle identifies matter with potentiality, form with actuality. Think of a carved statue: the wood is the matter, the potential statue; the shape is the form, which makes it an actual statue; the matter/form complex is the individual thing, the statue. In the case of artifacts like statues, we impose form on the matter. But the form/matter in statues is just an analogy to help us understand the basic idea. Aristotle was mainly interested in explaining the characteristic changes in and growth and development of natural things. Why does water boil when heated and freeze when cold? Why do some trees produce apples and others oranges? Why do human embryos develop into adult humans and dog embryos develop into adult dogs? This can’t be explained simply by their matter (which is basically the same stuff), but by the form that makes something water, or an apple tree, or a human, i.e., in virtue of which the things are what they are. In ‘On the Soul’ we find Aristotle applying his wider metaphysical views to the topic of living things. -
The Unity of Science in Early-Modern Philosophy: Subalternation, Metaphysics and the Geometrical Manner in Scholasticism, Galileo and Descartes
The Unity of Science in Early-Modern Philosophy: Subalternation, Metaphysics and the Geometrical Manner in Scholasticism, Galileo and Descartes by Zvi Biener M.A. in Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 2004 B.A. in Physics, Rutgers University, 1995 B.A. in Philosophy, Rutgers University, 1995 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2008 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Zvi Biener It was defended on April 3, 2008 and approved by Peter Machamer J.E. McGuire Daniel Garber James G. Lennox Paolo Palmieri Dissertation Advisors: Peter Machamer, J.E. McGuire ii Copyright c by Zvi Biener 2008 iii The Unity of Science in Early-Modern Philosophy: Subalternation, Metaphysics and the Geometrical Manner in Scholasticism, Galileo and Descartes Zvi Biener, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2008 The project of constructing a complete system of knowledge—a system capable of integrating all that is and could possibly be known—was common to many early-modern philosophers and was championed with particular alacrity by Ren´eDescartes. The inspiration for this project often came from mathematics in general and from geometry in particular: Just as propositions were ordered in a geometrical demonstration, the argument went, so should propositions be ordered in an overall system of knowledge. Science, it was thought, had to proceed more geometrico. I offer a new interpretation of ‘science more geometrico’ based on an analysis of the explanatory forms used in certain branches of geometry. These branches were optics, as- tronomy, and mechanics; the so-called subalternate, subordinate, or mixed-mathematical sciences. -
An Argument for Substantial Form
An Argument for Substantial Form Steven Baldner St. Francis Xavier University I provide an argument, based on Thomistic principles, for substantial form, understood as the single principle of substantial actuality for any natural substance. To make this argument, I distinguish between substance and accident, between the natural and the artificial, and between ontological and methodological reduction. I respond to two objections to the Thomistic doctrine of substantial form raised by Benjamin Hill: I explain how it is possible for Thomas to account for the presence of elements in compounds and also to account for the fact of natural instances that fail to realize the full reality of the substantial form (“monsters”). I begin by offering my sincere gratitude and appreciation for the excellent paper we have heard from Professor Hill.1 I am going to attempt to argue against some of the conclusions reached by Prof. Hill, but I do so with humility, for, however much I might be convinced of the truth of Thomistic monism, I am even more certain of my own inadequacy to the task of competing with the metaphysical analysis we have already seen. My goal here is not so much to give you better arguments, for I don’t think that I can, as to give you some reason to try to find better arguments yourselves. And perhaps you will do just that in the question period. I shall attempt to do two things in this paper: first, to give an argument for substantial form and second to give replies to some of the objections raised so well by Prof. -
Angelic Metaphysics
Angelic Metaphysics Angelic Nature Nature of Spirits Psalm 104:4 you make the winds your messengers, fire and flame your ministers. Hebrews 1:14 14 Are not all angels spirits in the divine service, sent to serve for the sake of those who are to inherit salvation? Scripture states that angels are spirits, but does not precisely define the concept of "spirit". The Hebrew word is “ x;Wr ” and can mean physical wind, (Gen 8:1, Job 15:2) a persons’ inner self in some sense, (Ps 31:5, Isa 19:3, Ezek 13:3) the idea of life, (Gen 6:17, Ezek 37:10) and separate entities. (an intelligent “lying spirit” in 1 Kings 22:22) The Greek uses “ pneu/ma ” and this carries the same range of meanings. (Luke 1:80, Luke 8:55, John 3:8, John 11:33, John 19:30, Acts 23:8) What are spirits made of? There are a couple of instances where Scripture contrasts spirit to physical bodies. In one instance, after the resurrection, to assure the disciples he is not a ghost, ( pneu/ma ) Jesus states that “spirits/ghosts do not have flesh and bones as I have”. (Luke 24:39) Jesus also contrasted spirit with flesh in Matt 26:41, although sees them as part of the whole person. James 2:26 says that the body without the spirit is dead. In that verse “spirit” is being used to mean “inner life”, but is still being contrasted with the physical body. It is important to remember that the same word does not have to mean the same thing in every context. -
Substance and Artifact in Thomas Aquinas Michael W
University of St. Thomas, Minnesota UST Research Online Philosophy Faculty Publications Philosophy 2004 Substance and artifact in Thomas Aquinas Michael W. Rota University of St. Thomas, Minnesota, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.stthomas.edu/cas_phil_pub Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Rota, Michael W., "Substance and artifact in Thomas Aquinas" (2004). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 19. http://ir.stthomas.edu/cas_phil_pub/19 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at UST Research Online. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UST Research Online. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY Volume 21, Number 3, July 2004 SUBSTANCE AND ARTIFACT IN THOMAS AQUINAS Michael Rota Introduction urrent interpretations of Aquinas often attribute to him the claim Cthat no artifact is a substance, or, more precisely, the claim that, (A1) No artifact is a substance in virtue of its form. Robert Pasnau, for example, tells us that “Aquinas is committed to the view that all artifacts are nonsubstances with respect to their form.”1 And Eleonore Stump writes: An artifact is thus a composite of things confi gured together into a whole but not by a substantial form. Since only something confi gured by a substantial form is a substance, no artifact is a substance.2 In fact, however, Aquinas’s position on the metaphysical status of ar- tifacts is more nuanced than these standard interpretations suppose. This paper will examine three hitherto overlooked passages in Aquinas’s writings in an attempt to clarify his position, and to show how it (his actual position) can overcome some of the philosophical problems which pose diffi culties for the stronger claims often attributed to him. -
Aristotle's Theory of Powers
Aristotle’s Theory of Powers by Umer Shaikh A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Philosophy) in the University of Michigan 2019 Doctoral Committee: Professor Victor Caston, chair Professor Sara Abhel-Rappe Professor David Manley Professor Tad Schmaltz Umer Shaikh [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0002-8062-7932 © Umer Shaikh 2019 TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ....................................... v Chapter 1 Introduction ................................... 1 1.1 The Question ............................... 1 1.2 Powers and Dispositions ......................... 2 1.3 Remark on Translation and Texts .................... 3 1.4 Preliminary Answers ........................... 3 1.4.1 Powers are Efficient Causes ................... 4 1.4.2 Powers and Change ....................... 5 1.4.3 Being in Potentiality and Possibility .............. 6 1.4.4 The Foundation of Modality .................. 8 1.4.5 Possibilities from Powers .................... 9 1.4.6 Conclusion ............................ 11 1.5 Remarks About Scope of Discussion and About the Development of the δύναμις Concept ........................... 12 1.5.1 Scope ............................... 12 1.5.2 Δύναμις in Various Texts .................... 12 1.5.3 Previous Attempts to Find Consistency ............ 18 1.5.3.1 Kenny .......................... 18 1.5.3.2 Hintikka ......................... 21 1.5.4 Drawing Some Morals ..................... 22 2 Powers and Efficient Causation ......................... 24 2.1 -
Aquinas, Hylomorphism and the Human Soul
Aquinas, Hylomorphism and the Human Soul Aquinas asks, What is a human being? A body? A soul? A composite of the two? 1. You Are Not Merely A Body: Like Avicenna, Aquinas argues that you are not merely a body. For, you are a LIVING body. So there needs to be something that ANIMATES it; i.e., some “first principle of life”. If BODY was itself the first principle of life, then (Aquinas thinks) it follows that ALL bodies would be alive. Consider a living human moments before death, and a corpse moments after death. The material body has not changed. Yet, the thing goes from alive to dead. So, there must be some immaterial, non-bodily thing that animates the body. [You might be thinking, “Sure, it’s not MERE matter that is alive—but matter ARRANGED in certain ways always gives rise to life. So, we needn’t accept that life (or consciousness) comes from something immaterial.” Here it will help to remember the distinction between the material and formal causes. What you’ve really said is that matter by itself isn’t automatically alive. Rather, it needs a certain FORM in order to be alive. But, keep in mind that Aquinas thinks matter and form are distinct. The matter is the material cause of life. But, the arrangement that you are appealing to is the FORMAL cause. In that case, we DO need something in addition to mere matter in order to get life. Namely, we need a FORM. Well… That’s really close to what Aquinas is saying.