Future Maritime Surveillance
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House of Commons Defence Committee Future Maritime Surveillance Fifth Report of Session 2012–13 Volume II Additional written evidence Ordered by the House of Commons to be published 26 March and 15 May 2012 Published on 19 September 2012 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £0.00 Defence Committee The Defence Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Ministry of Defence and its associated public bodies. Current membership Rt Hon James Arbuthnot MP (Conservative, North East Hampshire) (Chair) Mr Julian Brazier MP (Conservative, Canterbury) Thomas Docherty MP (Labour, Dunfermline and West Fife) Rt Hon Jeffrey M. Donaldson MP (Democratic Unionist, Lagan Valley) John Glen MP (Conservative, Salisbury) Mr Dai Havard MP (Labour, Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney) Mrs Madeleine Moon MP (Labour, Bridgend) Penny Mordaunt MP (Conservative, Portsmouth North) Sandra Osborne MP (Labour, Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock) Sir Bob Russell MP (Liberal Democrat, Colchester) Bob Stewart MP (Conservative, Beckenham) Ms Gisela Stuart MP (Labour, Birmingham, Edgbaston) Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk. Publications The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the internet at www.parliament.uk/parliament.uk/defcom. The Reports of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral evidence taken and some or all written evidence are available in a printed volume. Additional written evidence may be published on the internet only. Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Alda Barry (Clerk), Judith Boyce (Second Clerk), Karen Jackson (Audit Adviser), Ian Thomson (Inquiry Manager), Christine Randall (Senior Committee Assistant), Shane Pathmanathan (Committee Assistant), and Sumati Sowamber (Committee Support Assistant). Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Defence Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 5745; the Committee’s email address is [email protected]. Media inquiries should be addressed to Alex Paterson on 020 7219 1589. List of additional written evidence (published in Volume II on the Committee’s website www.parliament.uk/defcom) 1 Rear Admiral James Rapp CB Ev w1 2 Coastal Command and Maritime Air Association (CCMAA) Ev w2 3 Admiral Sir John Woodward GBE KCB and colleagues Ev w5 4 Air Vice-Marshal A L Roberts CB CBE AFC RAF (retd.) Ev w16 5 Squadron Leader R W Forbes Ev w20 6 Angus Robertson MP, Westminster SNP Leader and Defence Spokesman, Scottish National Party (SNP) Ev w24 7 Thales Ev w28 8 Raytheon UK Ev w29 9 Dr Sue Robertson Ev w31 10 Northrop Grumman Ev w39 11 Airbus Military Ev w43 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [SO] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml Defence Committee: Evidence Ev w1 Written evidence Written evidence from Rear Admiral James Rapp CB Summary — This submission seeks to bring the Committee’s attention to the way maritime aerial surveillance is delivered in Australia and the benefits this brings to 13 cross government agencies, including the Department of Defence. — Australia has a single agency responsible for the management and delivery of the total EEZ surveillance requirement. Aerial surveillance is conducted through a single asset-sharing contract. — Work is underway within Government to examine the merits of adopting a similar organisation to the Australian model here in the UK. Submission 1. This inquiry is examining the part played by MoD and UK Armed Forces in the provision of maritime surveillance capabilities. My submission concerns maritime aerial surveillance and draws on past operational experience and knowledge of arrangements across the various Government departments and agencies, not just the MoD. I am also a consultant to Cobham Aviation Services who provide aerial surveillance support to some Government departments and agencies. 2. I particularly wish to bring to the Committee’s attention how Australia conducts maritime aerial surveillance in its EEZ and the merits of following a similar model here in the UK. My comments therefore relate principally to bullet 5 in the Terms of Reference: “How does the MoD intend in future to coordinate its work with other Government departments and agencies, including its effectiveness, their interaction, the lines of demarcation and the consequences for, and impact on, UK Armed Forces?” The Australian“Coastwatch” Organisation 3. Prior to 1988, Australian government departments contracted their surveillance services independently, in a way similar to how we do it today in the UK. However, the Australian government recognised that this approach: — Did not provide an effective national wide area surveillance capability. — Did not promote tasking synergies or economies of management; resources, eg, planning and monitoring, data dissemination, physical infrastructure. — Led to uncoordinated tasking. — Resulted in generally ineffective sharing of surveillance outcomes, either through lack of awareness of cross-department requirements or poor systems and administration. 4. The Australian Government therefore decided a single agency should be responsible for the management and delivery of the total EEZ surveillance requirement. Aerial surveillance of the Australian maritime domain is now conducted through a single contract which has enabled: — Better coordination and execution of total surveillance requirement across the EEZ. — Economies of scale—no duplication of functional and management staffs. — Economy of facilities—no duplicated operations and management infrastructure. — Increased capability. — A cost effective and efficient maritime surveillance and response capability within the approved budget. — Scope to develop common threat assessment methodologies and responses. — National surveillance priorities to be determined against a common threat assessment. — A national maritime surveillance data base. — The sharing of data and intelligence between agencies. — Effective day-to-day management of the surveillance operation. 5. The lead agency is the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS). Cobham Aviation Services have the contract to ACBPS to provide aerial surveillance support throughout the Australian EEZ on behalf of 13 stakeholder departments and agencies, including the Department of Defence.1 ACBPS have a single operational and resource management process through which: — It engages all Government Departments monthly thereby taking account of all requirements. — Individual Department requirements are developed into a forward operations and tasking plan. 1 Unlike UK, Australia does still have maritime patrol aircraft (the RAAF’s AP-3C Orion) which contribute when available to the wider maritime picture. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml Ev w2 Defence Committee: Evidence — The planning process takes into consideration strategic and tactical objectives. — When requested level of surveillance exceeds the available resource there is a review of current priorities and threat assessments in conjunction with the customer agencies. — Participation by agencies in the process means they do not lose control. — Compromises have to be made occasionally but there are checks and balances to ensure that overall surveillance objectives are not compromised. — The process does deliver effective multi-agency outcomes. Lessons for the UK 6. The UK’s situation has many of the characteristics experienced by Australia prior to setting up their “Coastwatch” organisation. There is now some limited sharing of assets between UK departments and agencies but there is no single authority with knowledge of asset employment or availability, and the vast majority of tasking is still undertaken in isolation. There is also duplication of effort, gaps where coverage might have been achieved and valuable information is not being shared. Recognising these issues, the Government’s Maritime Security Oversight Group (MSOG), which is chaired by the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) and has wide cross-government representation, has been fully briefed on the Australian model and is currently examining the merits of adopting a similar organisation here in the UK. 7. With the National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) now in place to develop and monitor a coherent picture and shared understanding of maritime activity around the UK [and its overseas territories], I would urge the Committee to support moves to achieve as much coherence and efficiency as possible in how surveillance is undertaken and information presented to a central authority, for exploitation by the NMIC. 8. As the Committee knows, the disbandment of the Nimrod force has caused a major reduction in military surveillance capability. Some limited maritime aerial surveillance can be conducted by Royal Air Force E-3D Sentry and C-130 Hercules aircraft, but all have other primary tasking and none is equipped with specialist maritime surveillance role equipment. Royal Navy helicopters (Merlin and Sea