House of Commons Defence Committee

Future Maritime Surveillance

Fifth Report of Session 2012–13

Volume II

Additional written evidence

Ordered by the House of Commons to be published 26 March and 15 May 2012

Published on 19 September 2012 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £0.00

Defence Committee

The Defence Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Ministry of Defence and its associated public bodies.

Current membership Rt Hon James Arbuthnot MP (Conservative, North East Hampshire) (Chair) Mr Julian Brazier MP (Conservative, Canterbury) Thomas Docherty MP (Labour, Dunfermline and West Fife) Rt Hon Jeffrey M. Donaldson MP (Democratic Unionist, Lagan Valley) John Glen MP (Conservative, Salisbury) Mr Dai Havard MP (Labour, Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney) Mrs Madeleine Moon MP (Labour, Bridgend) Penny Mordaunt MP (Conservative, Portsmouth North) Sandra Osborne MP (Labour, Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock) Sir Bob Russell MP (Liberal Democrat, Colchester) Bob Stewart MP (Conservative, Beckenham) Ms Gisela Stuart MP (Labour, Birmingham, Edgbaston)

Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publications The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the internet at www.parliament.uk/parliament.uk/defcom.

The Reports of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral evidence taken and some or all written evidence are available in a printed volume. Additional written evidence may be published on the internet only.

Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are Alda Barry (Clerk), Judith Boyce (Second Clerk), Karen Jackson (Audit Adviser), Ian Thomson (Inquiry Manager), Christine Randall (Senior Committee Assistant), Shane Pathmanathan (Committee Assistant), and Sumati Sowamber (Committee Support Assistant).

Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Defence Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 5745; the Committee’s email address is [email protected]. Media inquiries should be addressed to Alex Paterson on 020 7219 1589.

List of additional written evidence

(published in Volume II on the Committee’s website www.parliament.uk/defcom)

1 Rear Admiral James Rapp CB Ev w1 2 Coastal Command and Maritime Air Association (CCMAA) Ev w2 3 Admiral Sir John Woodward GBE KCB and colleagues Ev w5 4 Air Vice-Marshal A L Roberts CB CBE AFC RAF (retd.) Ev w16 5 Squadron Leader R W Forbes Ev w20 6 Angus Robertson MP, Westminster SNP Leader and Defence Spokesman, Scottish National Party (SNP) Ev w24 7 Thales Ev w28 8 Raytheon UK Ev w29 9 Dr Sue Robertson Ev w31 10 Northrop Grumman Ev w39 11 Airbus Military Ev w43

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Written evidence

Written evidence from Rear Admiral James Rapp CB Summary — This submission seeks to bring the Committee’s attention to the way maritime aerial surveillance is delivered in Australia and the benefits this brings to 13 cross government agencies, including the Department of Defence. — Australia has a single agency responsible for the management and delivery of the total EEZ surveillance requirement. Aerial surveillance is conducted through a single asset-sharing contract. — Work is underway within Government to examine the merits of adopting a similar organisation to the Australian model here in the UK.

Submission 1. This inquiry is examining the part played by MoD and UK Armed Forces in the provision of maritime surveillance capabilities. My submission concerns maritime aerial surveillance and draws on past operational experience and knowledge of arrangements across the various Government departments and agencies, not just the MoD. I am also a consultant to Cobham Aviation Services who provide aerial surveillance support to some Government departments and agencies. 2. I particularly wish to bring to the Committee’s attention how Australia conducts maritime aerial surveillance in its EEZ and the merits of following a similar model here in the UK. My comments therefore relate principally to bullet 5 in the Terms of Reference: “How does the MoD intend in future to coordinate its work with other Government departments and agencies, including its effectiveness, their interaction, the lines of demarcation and the consequences for, and impact on, UK Armed Forces?”

The Australian“Coastwatch” Organisation 3. Prior to 1988, Australian government departments contracted their surveillance services independently, in a way similar to how we do it today in the UK. However, the Australian government recognised that this approach: — Did not provide an effective national wide area surveillance capability. — Did not promote tasking synergies or economies of management; resources, eg, planning and monitoring, data dissemination, physical infrastructure. — Led to uncoordinated tasking. — Resulted in generally ineffective sharing of surveillance outcomes, either through lack of awareness of cross-department requirements or poor systems and administration. 4. The Australian Government therefore decided a single agency should be responsible for the management and delivery of the total EEZ surveillance requirement. Aerial surveillance of the Australian maritime domain is now conducted through a single contract which has enabled: — Better coordination and execution of total surveillance requirement across the EEZ. — Economies of scale—no duplication of functional and management staffs. — Economy of facilities—no duplicated operations and management infrastructure. — Increased capability. — A cost effective and efficient maritime surveillance and response capability within the approved budget. — Scope to develop common threat assessment methodologies and responses. — National surveillance priorities to be determined against a common threat assessment. — A national maritime surveillance data base. — The sharing of data and intelligence between agencies. — Effective day-to-day management of the surveillance operation. 5. The lead agency is the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS). Cobham Aviation Services have the contract to ACBPS to provide aerial surveillance support throughout the Australian EEZ on behalf of 13 stakeholder departments and agencies, including the Department of Defence.1 ACBPS have a single operational and resource management process through which: — It engages all Government Departments monthly thereby taking account of all requirements. — Individual Department requirements are developed into a forward operations and tasking plan. 1 Unlike UK, Australia does still have maritime patrol aircraft (the RAAF’s AP-3C Orion) which contribute when available to the wider maritime picture. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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— The planning process takes into consideration strategic and tactical objectives. — When requested level of surveillance exceeds the available resource there is a review of current priorities and threat assessments in conjunction with the customer agencies. — Participation by agencies in the process means they do not lose control. — Compromises have to be made occasionally but there are checks and balances to ensure that overall surveillance objectives are not compromised. — The process does deliver effective multi-agency outcomes.

Lessons for the UK 6. The UK’s situation has many of the characteristics experienced by Australia prior to setting up their “Coastwatch” organisation. There is now some limited sharing of assets between UK departments and agencies but there is no single authority with knowledge of asset employment or availability, and the vast majority of tasking is still undertaken in isolation. There is also duplication of effort, gaps where coverage might have been achieved and valuable information is not being shared. Recognising these issues, the Government’s Maritime Security Oversight Group (MSOG), which is chaired by the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) and has wide cross-government representation, has been fully briefed on the Australian model and is currently examining the merits of adopting a similar organisation here in the UK. 7. With the National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) now in place to develop and monitor a coherent picture and shared understanding of maritime activity around the UK [and its overseas territories], I would urge the Committee to support moves to achieve as much coherence and efficiency as possible in how surveillance is undertaken and information presented to a central authority, for exploitation by the NMIC. 8. As the Committee knows, the disbandment of the Nimrod force has caused a major reduction in military surveillance capability. Some limited maritime aerial surveillance can be conducted by Royal Air Force E-3D Sentry and C-130 Hercules aircraft, but all have other primary tasking and none is equipped with specialist maritime surveillance role equipment. Royal Navy helicopters (Merlin and Sea King Mk7s) do have maritime search radars but also have other primary tasking, are few in number and have limited range and endurance. 9. Given the pressures on both defence and wider government spending, maximizing the effectiveness of the nation’s contracted maritime surveillance resources should therefore help to mitigate the reduced aerial surveillance capabilities of the UK Armed Forces. 12 March 2012

Written evidence from the Coastal Command and Maritime Air Association (CCMAA) Introduction The removal of long range Maritime Air Surveillance assets from the UK order of battle has a serious effect on our ability not only to fight the battle but to meet the demands of the SDSR both today and into the future. Thus, the CCMAA believes strongly that the inquiry initiated by the Defence Committee into the future requirements of the UK for maritime surveillance is both timely and important.

The CCMAA The majority of the members of the CCMAA are retired ex RAF personnel and collectively they possess a deep experience gained over many years in the role of maritime air surveillance. However, we appreciate that to be of use to the Committee our input has to focus on the future, but using relevant lessons, particularly from recent history. We also note that the Committee has quite specific questions, most of which can only be answered by the MoD, but feel that we can contribute to the overall discussion.

The Threat You are better briefed than us on the threat that faces the UK, so it is against the following more general assessment that we make our judgements on the necessary maritime surveillance requirements of the UK: (1) That the low existential threat to the UK and its nuclear deterrent is likely to rise substantially given President (elect) Putin’s declared intent to invest heavily in Russia’s nuclear deterrent and submarine capability. As a result: (2) That intelligence gathering against the UK’s deterrent will again become a reality (if it isn’t already). (3) That there is a growing threat from capable conventional submarines of many nations that are difficult to detect and attack and which can effectively block choke points. (4) That the UKs future imported energy requirements will continue to grow, with vulnerable under sea pipe lines and with LPG carried by sea in tankers that operate through dangerous choke points. The government will surely wish to possess the capability to maintain robust strategic and tactical awareness and, with its allies, to guarantee safe passage. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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(5) That ASW skills take a long time (years) to acquire/recover. (6) That requirements, some unexpected, will continue to arise that will demand a reliable, rapid response maritime surveillance capability combined with enforcement weapons. ie Drug running, Somali pirates, protection of off shore assets, rapid reinforcement (Falklands?).

Defence Committee Questions Given the above factors we believe that the substantial reduction in RN assets and the lack of a capable MPA in the UK military inventory leaves a serious and frightening gap in the maritime surveillance capability available to properly defend the UK and its interests worldwide. It is interesting to note that, since the Falklands conflict, the Argentineans have purchased P3 aircraft to provide a surveillance and ASW capability! We now offer comment on those of the specific questions you ask that our background allows.

Gaps and Deficiencies With the reduction in RN surface fleet assets and the loss of a capable UK MPA fleet, we believe that the following gaps are exposed without adequate alternative assets to compensate: (1) Reduced protection of the SSBN Deterrent, particularly in transit and if an emergency occurs. With the passing of the National Deterrent from the RAF V-Force to RN Polaris equipped nuclear submarines the prime task of the MPA became protection of the deterrent. To remain credible the Continuous at Sea Deterrent (CASD) has to remain undetected during transit and while on station. Counter-detection by hostile submarines presents the greatest risk during the transit phase and is therefore the period when greatest support is required from other ASW forces; once on station the SSBN is capable of ensuring its own security. In the event that support is required the reaction time required to place a surface or sub-surface unit in the area of interest is considerably greater than that required for an MPA. In addition surface activity may provide a clue to the position of the SSBN; covert airborne activity less so. (2) Seriously reduced capability to provide area ASW protection around the UK against a resurgent Soviet submarine threat and also in potentially vital areas of UK interest worldwide. The absence of the MPA together with a shortage of Towed Array fitted escorts, and the possible re-tasking of SSNs to land-strike targets (Tomahawk), results in a much reduced ASW capability. The Helicopter is an effective ASW platform when operating relatively close to their base/ship, but inevitably has limited range and acoustic processing capability as well as restricted weapon carrying capacity. Modern underwater detection systems using arrays fixed to the ocean bed and towed arrays on surface vessels (if one of these relatively few assets is available) can produce impressive results, but bad weather and noisy environments, both in the open sea and particularly at choke points, can totally disable these systems. (3) A substantial reduction to the UK Surface Surveillance and Attack capability. Of course, modern technology has also provided near real time satellite surveillance capabilities of amazing clarity in the right circumstances. However, they at present do not have an offensive capability and can be seriously degraded by weather and other forms of interference. In addition, Satellite information may not be released by the operating country. Drones with a surveillance capability are seen as a still somewhat limited asset, and aircraft such as the AWACS E3D have a limited surface surveillance capability and no offensive talent. (4) As a result of 2 and 3 above, a serious reduction in the capability of the UK to police and secure its maritime borders and overseas interests and to participate with allies in counter piracy, narcotics and terrorism operations. (5) A substantially reduced SAR capability, currently undertaken by the overstretched and far less capable Hercules. (6) A loss of a rapid reaction/reinforcement capability provided previously by the MPA fleet. We believe that the capability gaps listed above have reduced our overall surveillance capabilities to below an acceptable level.

Collaboration with Allies UK maritime air has always been to the fore in collaborating with allies in the provision of maritime surveillance. Indeed, NATO maritime force operate to common procedures and tasks are frequently shared between nations. This should surely be encouraged, but the loss of a unique UK maritime air capability must be of serious concern as reliance on allies at critical moments or for nationally sensitive tasks could be dangerous. It is of particular significance that the USN is already deploying the greatest proportion of its MPA assets to the Pacific theatre. The current Seed Corn Initiative has seen RAF Crews deployed with Commonwealth and Allied MPA forces to retain the hard won expertise in the role. This will provide us, in the immediate future, with a core of current and experienced operators able to regenerate a crew capability should the need arise and a platform become available. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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Required Future Capabilities

We believe that our overall maritime surveillance capability (including area surveillance, ASW, ASuW and SAR) has been eroded over the past few years despite the advances of technology. The gap created is potentially very dangerous and one that needs to be addressed. Clearly a capable MPA fleet would not eradicate all of the weaknesses we have identified, but given the mobility, multi role nature, flexibility, reach and additional offensive power offered by a capable MPA, it would appear to be a cost effective way of improving the current unhealthy situation. A modern MPA aircraft now possesses a massive wide area sea surface surveillance capability and compelling below water detection and localisation ability, combined with effective attack capabilities with ASMs and torpedoes. It also has sophisticated electronic intelligence gathering equipment.

For completeness, we summarise the unique portfolio of characteristics of a modern MPA that cannot be replicated in any other single platform: — High speed and long range/endurance which allow it to reach operational areas, both NATO and globally, quickly and remain on station for extended periods. — The ability to detect, locate, track and attack surface and sub-surface targets. A large airframe capacity which allows the carriage of a comprehensive suite of communications equipment, sensors and electronic warfare equipment for self-defence, together with sufficient crew to operate them over long periods. Such a range of equipment, together with the ability and space to install additional, role-specific equipment provides the MPA with unparalled operational flexibility. — The ability, in many circumstances, to operate covertly hence avoiding alerting the target, be it surface or sub-surface.

Summary

The UK is an island nation and now, as in the past, relies on freedom of the seas for its security and prosperity. Sadly the UK forces now have a much reduced capability to conduct maritime surveillance and protect our interests at sea. Although the Cold War has ended, many nations now possess very capable submarines and small surface units with the potential to inflict disproportionate damage on surface units. A resurgent Russian navy can now threaten our SSBN fleet and operate with confidence around our shores. Furthermore, the “conventional warfare” sub surface and surface threat is now amplified with the addition of terrorist attack, drug running and piracy. There is an undoubted capability gap which any potential enemy is certain to exploit.

A modest but capable MPA fleet would help substantially to reduce this gap, hopefully before we lose the experienced maritime aircrew that we still possess. 11 March 2012

Annex A

MPA—A BRIEF HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Maritime air operations are rarely exposed to public view and, we believe, that their value and importance are often not fully understood or appreciated. During WW11 the contribution of MPA in the critical Battle of the Atlantic was massive, although some 10,000 members of Coastal Command were lost during the campaign. It is worth noting that in 1939 British Forces were not well equipped for ocean surveillance and had very limited capability in ASW; it took until 1943 before the pendulum swung in favour of the Allies. Subsequently, during the Cold War, they were at the heart of the UK response to the very active Soviet SSN, SSBN and surface fleets deployments, as well as helping counter their electronic intelligence gathering fishing fleets. Maritime air also flew regularly in defence of the UK nuclear deterrent.

Maritime air is also a most flexible tool that can be deployed rapidly over great distances to operate unsupported in both passive and aggressive stances. For example, the Nimrod aircraft was a most important maritime surveillance asset during both Gulf wars, operating in defence of Allied shipping in a confined and dangerous area. It was the first operational asset to react following the invasion of the Falkland Islands and flew valuable maritime surveillance, Anti Submarine, and Search and Rescue operations throughout the campaign. Maritime air also played a major part in the protection of our fishing fleets during the Iceland Fishing dispute, and played a vital command and control role during the Piper Alpha oil rig disaster. In Afghanistan the Nimrod MR2 was used in an overland battlefield surveillance role, effectively closing a capability gap until the Sentinel R1 entered service. We could go on but it is potential future roles that are important. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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Written evidence from Admiral Sir John Woodward GBE KCB and colleagues ExecutiveSummary (i) The crucial importance of adequate surveillance to all forms of military operation cannot be overemphasised. History is studded with occasions when an inability to see “what is on the other side of the hill” has had undesirable outcomes, graduating from mild diplomatic embarrassment through misapplication of scarce resources to full-blown military disaster. (ii) This Memorandum addresses the specific strategic requirements for UK’s future maritime surveillance capability. (iii) It examines the perceived threat in the context of the four main providers of maritime surveillance; Air, Surface, Sub-surface and Satellite. An objective analysis of the need to protect our trade routes and interests East of Suez is made and takes into full account the SDSR 2010 conclusion that “we cannot rely on being granted basing rights and over-flight rights on a global basis in the future”. The resulting limited reach of land-based maritime surveillance aircraft East of Suez is demonstrated and directly compared with the reach and flexibility of warship-based maritime surveillance platforms. (iv) It then relates this information directly to the areas of interest given by the Committee. (iv) The efficacy and utility of land-based maritime surveillance aircraft for Homeland fishery protection and NATO deterrent deployment roles is not challenged. It is for the Committee to decide the relevant importance of this capability and, perhaps, to question whether future maritime patrol aircraft should not all be carrier capable—thus ensuring a truly joint approach to the strategic maritime surveillance need.

Submitters (v) This Submission has been prepared by Commander N D MacCartan-Ward DSC AFC—Air Warfare Instructor and has the strong support of the following senior experts in naval/joint operations and associated maritime surveillance: — Admiral Sir John Woodward GBE KCB—Commander Carrier Battle Group, Falklands, 1982. — Admiral Sir Michael Layard KCB CBE—formerly Flag Officer Naval air Command and later Second Sea Lord. — Admiral Sir Ian Garnett KCB—formerly Chief of Joint Operations and Chief of Staff, SHAPE. — Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham KCB—former Deputy C-in-C Fleet and Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Equipment Capability). — Rear Admiral Terry Loughran CB FRAeS—Command of HMS Ark Royal (Bosnia) and Flag Officer Naval Aviation. — Rear Admiral Guy Liardet CB CBE—Commandant Joint Services Defence College 1988–1990.

Introduction 1. The remit given for this inquiry is rather broad. If its findings are to present useful guidelines for Britain’s Future Maritime Surveillance capability it suggested that specific aspects of maritime surveillance should be addressed. These should include: (a) Air surveillance with fixed wing aircraft, unmanned air vehicles and/or airships. (b) Surface surveillance with helicopter-fitted2 warships. (c) Sub-surface surveillance with submarines and sonar fitted warships. (d) Satellite surveillance. (e) Covert surface surveillance and intelligence gathering by submarines. These are addressed below. 2. Specific threat areas are then discussed before the areas of interest given by the Committee are briefly addressed in relation to paragraph 1, above. 3. It is now recognised in many quarters that the government’s decision in SDSR 2010 to withdraw Harrier and HMS Ark Royal from service will have a serious impact on maritime capability in the round. It is hoped that the Committee will keep this in mind when addressing the important issue of maritime surveillance— particularly with respect to distant operations away from NATO’s borders. Such operations have in the past being very effectively conducted by the Naval Service and, arguably, it is the expertise and experience of the Royal Navy that should have a prime voice in ascertaining future maritime surveillance requirements. Sea- based maritime surveillance vehicles have the significant advantages that they can be used effectively in home waters as well as globally and in hostile environments. 4. For the purposes and context of this paper, “land-based air assets” are defined as those that are not capable of embarkation in her Majesty’s warships. 2 Manned or unmanned helicopters. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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Specific Strategic Requirements: Countering the Threat 5. The specific strategic requirements for maritime surveillance should be predicated on: (a) Current and future perceived threats. (b) Current and future operational commitments. (c) The need to deter the escalation of trouble-spots into fully fledged military action. (d) The need for the policing of the territorial waters of the Homeland base and of sovereign territories overseas. 6. In the light of paragraph 5, above, it is suggested that the principal issues for consideration should include: (a) The threat of interdiction of UK’s seaborne trade and energy supplies whether on the high seas or at shipping route choke-points.3 (b) The threat from military/militant forces to overseas dependencies and to British citizens abroad in littoral states. (c) Commitment to unilateral and/or international operations such as the anti-piracy patrols off the Horn of Africa or the enforcement action in Libya. (d) Fisheries protection.

TheThreat ofInterdiction of UK’sSeaborneTrade andEnergySupplies 7. This threat demands a reliable, rapid and sustainable global response capability. Further and as a deterrent to such interdiction, there is a requirement for a flexible and mobile “presence” on the high seas and on our trade routes that provides a visible demonstration of our will to protect our interests from harm.

Air Surveillance 8. SDSR 2010 firmly emphasised that “Basing Rights and Over-Flight Rights for UK military aircraft away from NATO’s boundaries could not be relied upon”. Further, in the context of (a) The extremely long global trade routes that need to be protected. (b) The geographically diverse trade route choke-points that need to be monitored. It should be firmly recognised that the “continuous patrol” reach of land-based maritime patrol aircraft from any specific airfield is limited. 9. The Submitters have extensive professional experience of blue water naval and joint operations and have found that when away from NATO’s immediate shores it is a matter of record that land-based maritime patrol aircraft have not been able to provide a 24/7 service to the fleet. Indeed, on many occasions and because of the distance from shore-based airfields, there has been no effective land-based air maritime surveillance capability available at all. Typical examples would include the Belize operation, Sierra Leone and the Falklands, 1982; indeed, in the last case, such range-limited information as was gathered by LRMPA was either negative of positively misleading.

Time on Task/Radius of Action 10. During the Falklands operation, Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft gave limited support to the Task Force out to a range of not more than 600 miles south of Ascension Island. Continuous surveillance of the task force area of interest was not available from the Nimrod at that range. For reliable 24/7 availability on task and comprehensive surveillance of the area of interest, it is suggested that a Sustained Radius of Action (SROA) of 400 miles from the land-base would be a sensible operational planning figure—giving a semi-circular area of responsibility of 250,000 sq. miles. 11. The task of a maritime surveillance aircraft is not just to detect contacts in the area of interest whether on the surface or submerged. It is to interrogate those contacts and to establish whether they represent friendly/ neutral platforms or threat platforms. The sophisticated modern aids available to LRMPA do make this task easier than it used to be but it still remains a significant and dangerous challenge which is also time-consuming. Submarines remain particularly difficult to detect from the air and even more difficult to locate and prosecute. 12. Detecting and identifying “pirate mother-ships” in an ocean area that contains thousands of surface contacts, most of which are plying their legal trade, approaches the level of difficulty of detecting and locating submarines. 13. For less than 24/7 availability on task, an Extended Radius of Action (EROA) of 600 miles is feasible. This represents a semi-circular area of interest of 565,000 sq. miles—more than double that of the suggested Sustained Radius of Action. 3 Ninety percent of global trade by volume travels by sea, and 25% of that, approximately 50,000 vessels a year, travels through a 1.7-mile-wide sliver of ocean at the Strait of Malacca. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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14. If we take these radii of action as workable figures for operations East of Suez (and take account of the expected lack of Basing Rights for UK military aircraft), it can be seen that land-based air maritime surveillance cannot provide the surveillance capability needed. 15. Even with basing rights being granted in, say, the Oman (at Salalah) and in Brunei—and such rights cannot be guaranteed—the majority of the ocean areas and choke-points through which important commercial shipping trade routes pass cannot be adequately patrolled and policed/sanitised. 16. Figures 1 and 2, below, illustrate this. The dark circles denote latent trouble-spots (a) where British citizens might need evacuation; or (b) from where anti-merchant shipping operations could be launched. The white circles represent the Sustained Radius of Action (SROA) and the Extended Radius of Action (EROA) of LRMPA. Figure 1 NEAR EAST-LRMPA COVERAGE. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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Figure 2 FAR EAST-LRMPA COVERAGE.

17. The reliable and effective form of maritime air surveillance that can reach all littoral trouble-spots and monitor and protect our trade routes and seaborne energy supplies is that based at sea in our warships. The latter are free to move at will without leaving any political footprint. 18. A strike carrier air group, for example, can survey vast areas of ocean surface with its embarked aircraft— whether fighter aircraft or airborne early warning aircraft. This area of coverage could be expanded substantially in the future with the embarkation of Unmanned Carrier Air Vehicles. It is important to note that a necessary component of a carrier air group capability is air to air refuelling. This facility is currently provided by the F- 18 aircraft in United States Navy carriers. Utilising their buddy-buddy air tanking facility they are able to provide air to air refuelling for all fixed wing aircraft types embarked. This allows for a significant increase in the operational radius of action of fighter and reconnaissance aircraft.

Surface Surveillance 19. Frigates and destroyers conduct reasonably long-range surveillance missions with their helicopters and their utility has been proven time and again in many parts of the world, including for example off the Horn of Africa and conducting anti-drug operations in the Caribbean. Submarines can provide covert surface surveillance—of particular relevance since it can be achieved in hostile waters. 20. The flexibility of warships being able to move rapidly and at will to areas of concern and to remain on task there for long periods cannot be over emphasised. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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Sub-surface Surveillance 21. Many nations are now developing or expanding their submarine fleets (eg Iran, India, China, North Korea). This is particularly evident in the Near East and the Far East. Such proliferation represents a significant capability for threatening or interdicting major shipping routes and we must have the capability to deter and/ or counter this threat whenever it is perceived to arise. 22. LRMP aircraft operating from airfields ashore cannot be relied upon to be available for monitoring, deterring or countering this threat (see effective range and geographical implications under Air Surveillance, above). 23. Bottom arrays, hunter killer submarines and surface warships equipped with hull-mounted and/or helicopter-mounted sonar and anti-submarine weapon systems are the main assets best suited for this task. At the same time, they are also good at tracking and identifying surface vessels that might pose a threat to our interests.

Satellite Surveillance 24. Satellite surveillance is a relatively recent capability that continues to be developed and improved. As such it can be extremely useful provided one has full access to the intelligence that it gathers. However, unlike air, surface and sub-surface surveillance systems: (a) It is “unarmed as well as unseen” and therefore. (b) It cannot take a pro-active part in deterring or combating the weapons platforms and systems that are perceived to be a threat to our interests.

TheThreatFromMilitary/MilitantForces 25. There are three levels of threat represented here: (a) A military threat from a nation over disputed territory (obviously, the Falklands). (b) Militant activity threatening the lives of British citizens abroad. (c) Militant activity threatening nearby trade routes.

Disputed Territory 26. Continuous visible maritime surveillance of the disputed Falkland Islands and associated territorial waters is the means by which any proposed military action by Argentina might be deterred/detected. 27. Air Surveillance plays a major part in policing these waters and in monitoring the safety and security of those who would ply their trade within those waters, whether merchant vessels or oil exploration rigs. Currently, the majority of this surveillance is conducted by surface warships and their embarked helicopters. (The Typhoon aircraft deployed to the Islands do not presently have air to surface radar that is capable of supporting the surveillance mission.) 28. LRMP aircraft based at Mount Pleasant airfield would provide an exceptional capability for policing these territorial waters but are not currently available. Further and for obvious reasons, LRMP aircraft are inhibited from going into areas where they may encounter hostile air power. This limits their utility at the time when they are most needed. 29. Sub-surface surveillance of these waters by hunter killer submarines also represents exceptional capability (and already provides considerable deterrence) but the limited number of “boats” that we have in service have equally important commitments elsewhere. Unlike LRMPA, the movement and deployment of hunter killer submarines is not controlled or limited by basing rights or over-flight rights. These submarines therefore constitute a significant, flexible and covert element of our global maritime surveillance capability. Furthermore, their deterrent effect can be achieved without actual presence since the opposition cannot know whether they are there or not until it is too late.

Commitment toUnilateral and/orInternationalOperations 30. There appears to be a clear need for the UK Armed Forces to enjoy a reliable maritime surveillance capability with global reach. For example, piracy is a growing problem that has long been evident in the Malacca Strait, is now a serious threat to maritime trade moving through the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea and is emerging as a threat off Western Africa. 31. As discussed at paragraphs 8 to 18, above, land-based maritime patrol aircraft do not enjoy the basing rights or the operational reach to provide the sustained surveillance required. Indeed, most of the sea areas at risk and many of the latent trouble-spots are well beyond the reach of these aircraft. 32. Mobile and flexible seaborne weapons platforms with embarked aircraft (frigates, destroyers, aircraft carriers) and submarines have the capability to move at will over these sea areas or to these trouble-spots and provide the necessary surveillance/deterrence. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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FisheriesProtection 33. The primary tasks that land-based maritime surveillance aircraft are well-suited to are that of Fisheries Protection and of the policing of territorial waters around the UK or around sovereign possessions/dependencies overseas (where basing rights are a given). Even here, the important capability to board and investigate/arrest suspect vessels is restricted to surface weapons platforms—thus sea-based surveillance aircraft should be the preferred option.

The Committee’s Given Areas of Interest How the MoD has determined the future strategic requirements for the UK Armed Forces’ maritime surveillance capabilities, including current and evolving threats? 34. It is for the MoD to answer this question formally in Committee. However, it is hoped that when investigating any MoD answer the Committee will take into account the expertise and logic behind the viewpoints expressed above.

What current maritime surveillance capabilities and assets will remain in service by 2020, including their specific roles, effectiveness, deployability, coordination, and interoperability; and what are the likely gaps and deficiencies? 35. Hopefully, an accurate audit of current capability and platforms will have been presented by MoD and, separately, by the three individual Services.

What are the future capabilities needed by the MoD and UK Armed Forces for maritime surveillance and what measures are being taken to address these, including applying lessons learned from recent operations? 36. If this audit (paragraph 35, above) is balanced against the perceived threats as discussed in the early part of this paper, a logical assessment might be made concerning the gaps that exist and the investment that will be required to fill those gaps. 37. In the conduct of any logical assessment it is considered critical that the Committee: (a) Compares the capability and applicability of the different types of surveillance platforms available. (b) Takes into account the versatility and flexibility of each platform, some of which provide for excellent maritime surveillance as well as other important capabilities (and some which don’t). (c) Compares the global in-service support cost factors involved with each platform—not just the procurement cost of an individual platform. (See Annex A to this Memorandum for more detail.) 38. Lessons learned from “recent” operations should, by virtue of the globally based threats to our national interests, include operations conducted away from NATO’s borders. These do for the most part indicate that land-based air does not have the reach for effective surveillance/intervention (eg Falklands 82, Sierra Leone, Armilla patrols, counter piracy East of Suez, etc.).

The costs of current and future maritime surveillance assets of UK Armed Forces 39. It is for consideration that future maritime surveillance aircraft should all be carrier capable, allowing either sea or land based operations, thereby satisfying the needs of Homeland and NATO based operations and, at the same time, preventing any need for basing rights/over-flight rights East of Suez. This could save the defence budget considerable sums of money—See Annex A.

How does the MoD intend in future to coordinate its work with other Government departments and agencies, including its effectiveness, their interaction, the lines of demarcation and the consequences for, and impact on, UK Armed Forces? 40. [No comment.]

To what extent the UK should collaborate and is collaborating with allies, including through NATO, in the provision of maritime surveillance capabilities 41. [No comment.]

What provision is the MoD making for the possibility that maritime surveillance forces might have to be regenerated at relatively short notice? 42. It is key here that the MoD should provide fair and balanced comment that recognises the impact of SDSR 2010. It is also critical that any suggestions emanating from MoD concerning the immediate procurement of non-carrier-capable LRMP aircraft should be scrutinised very closely on the grounds that such aircraft would cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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almost certainly not have the reach and capability necessary to provide effective maritime surveillance on a global basis and particularly East of Suez. 43. It would appear that the salami style, Draconian cuts to the Armed Services and particularly to the Naval Service have left Britain with few options for the rapid regeneration of a robust maritime surveillance capability. The withdrawal from service of surface warships and MPA, the gapping of Britain’s strike carrier capability and the delay in bringing new warships into service has had a particularly detrimental effect on this capability. 44. It is only reasonable to suggest therefore that the delay in the strike carrier introduction to service should be minimised and that an appropriate air group for the same is configured/procured/leased as soon as possible in order to make good the gap in a flexible and mobile wide-area maritime surveillance capability.

Discussion 45. This Memorandum has hopefully demonstrated that the principal effective elements of global maritime surveillance capability are the weapons platforms of the Royal Navy. These surface warships, submarines and aircraft enjoy flexibility and freedom of movement that can never be enjoyed by land-based air assets. 46. They provide for much more than just maritime surveillance. They project visible power and deterrence, aid to the civil power, long range search and rescue, and many more useful services. 22 February 2012

Annex A THE “VALUE FOR MONEY” OF ALTERNATE MARITIME SURVEILLANCE PLATFORMS. Introduction 1. In the course of its deliberations, the Committee may wish to take into account the global in-service support costs associated with each surveillance platform project and to balance that with the expected flexibility, mobility, availability and effectiveness of each platform for countering future global threats.

Global Costs 2. Investigations into the global costs of land-based offensive air support (rather than just maritime air surveillance) over Libya compared with carrier-based offensive air support suggest that such accountability/ comparison is entirely warranted.

Comparison One 3. The cost of our new carriers and their associated air power projection capability is likely to be of the order of £10 billion over the next 15 years—this figure includes the cost of Royal Fleet Auxiliary logistic support. In comparison, the expected cost of the Typhoon project over the next 15 years has been given as more than £35 billion.4 4. But to do its job over Libya, Typhoon needed the support of air refuelling tankers, AWACS, Sentinel and a major logistic support train from the UK to the Italian base, Gioia del Colle. The replacement tanker project alone is expected to cost up to £12 billion. None of these fighter support costs are incurred by carrier strike operations (the carrier carries its own tanker aircraft, for example). 5. Figure 1, below, demonstrates these costs.

4 Committee for Public Accounts Report on Typhoon. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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Figure 1 COSTS OVER 15 YEARS OF COMPARATIVE AIR POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITIES.

6. The comparison of (a) the “stand-alone” power projection capability provided by the carrier (approximately £10 billion); and (b) against the cumulative cost of land-based air power projection (nearly £70 billion) is given in Figure 2, below. Figure 2 CARRIER V LAND-BASED AIR POWER PROJECTION. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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ComparisonTwo 7. There is an extremely large and expensive infrastructure of RAF airfields and aircraft directly supporting Britain’s ability to deploy Land-Based Air for offshore contingency task force operations. The infrastructure for supporting the deployment of Sea-Based Air is very much smaller and less expensive—but delivers the same or better combat effectiveness. Of course, naval warships including carriers also need their home base and docking facilities as do the Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels. However, these naval facilities support the warships in all their roles and not just in the projection of air power. Their cost cannot therefore be arbitrarily/ directly attributed to the support of embarked air groups and helicopters which represent just one element of each warship’s integrated weapons system and capabilities. 8. Annual running costs for the principal airfields/platforms providing Sea-Based Air support for Operation Ellamy are given in Table 1, below: Table 1 ANNUAL AIRFIELD RUNNING COSTS 2010–11—SEA-BASED AIR Aircraft Total £ millions RAF Cottesmore/Culdrose Harrier GR9/AEW Helo £107 Army Air Corps Apache £30 Royal Fleet Auxiliary £10 Illustrious class carrier £25 Amphibious Assault Ship HMS Ocean Air Group £15 Total £187

9. Annual running costs for the principal airfields providing Land-Based Air support for Operation Ellamy are given in Table 2, below.5 Table 2 ANNUAL AIRFIELD RUNNING COSTS 2010–11—LAND-BASED AIR Aircraft Total £ millions RAF Akrotiri Support Base £200* RAF Brize Norton Logistics £220 RAF Coningsby Typhoon £101 RAF Kinloss Nimrod £76 RAF Lossiemouth Tornado GR4 £115 RAF Lyneham Logistics £121 RAF Marham Tornado GR4 £144 RAF Waddington E-3 Sentry AWACS £113 Total £1,091 * Estimate. 10. Figure 3, below, provides a graphical presentation of the comparison in cost terms between options for “the airfield requirements for the permanent basing of air assets that are deployed in support of offshore operations”.

5 Written response to Menzies Campbell (North East Fife, Liberal Democrat), 2 December 2010, Nick Harvey (Minister of State (Armed Forces), Defence; North Devon, Liberal Democrat) gave the detailed figures on how much was spent on running costs for each RAF base in the UK in the last five financial years and also gave equivalent figures for the financial year 201011. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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Figure 3 ANNUAL COST OF SUPPORTING AIRFIELDS/PLATFORMS.

11. It can be observed from the above examples that the global cost of land-based air operations overseas is nearly an order greater than that of sea-based air operations.

Global Effectiveness 12. When determining value for money, the global in-service costs of specific weapons platforms needs to be compared (as above) and then this comparison needs to be set against the operational effectiveness of the weapons platforms in the full context of intended operations—in this instance protecting our trade routes and/ or addressing latent trouble-spots beyond NATO waters and East of Suez in support of the national interest. 13. When addressing the future of maritime surveillance, for example, it should be remembered that sea based aircraft are just one part of an integrated naval weapons system. When a task group deploys it takes with it its entire operational capability and maritime surveillance is just one important part of that capability. It is self-sustaining with logistic support being provided by Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels in company. It does not depend upon diplomatic clearances or the establishment of basing rights at airfields on land close to the combat theatre for the conduct of its operations. 14. In sharp contrast, land-based air power including maritime surveillance aircraft can only conduct effective operations over a trouble-spot or combat zone if there is an airfield close enough from which to launch such operations. East of Suez it is likely that basing rights at such airfields will be hard if not impossible to acquire. 15. It is therefore important (a) To compare the global capabilities and effectiveness of a carrier battle group (sea-based air) with the global capabilities and effectiveness of land-based air. (b) To draw upon this comparison when ascertaining the wisdom of investing in a future maritime air surveillance capability that is not capable of deployment by sea. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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16. Table 3, below, iterates this comparison of global capability/effectiveness in a scenario where there is no land-based airfield available for use within 600 miles of trade routes under threat or of a future expeditionary force combat zone. Table 3 AIR POWER CAPABILITIES AND ROLES—BEYOND NATO WATERS. Air Power Capabilities and Roles—beyond NATO waters Sea-Based Land-Based Leaves undesirable political footprint No Yes Requires pre-positioning of support No Yes Requires Basing & Over-Flight Rights No Yes Aid to Civil Power √ No Disaster Relief √ Limited Evacuation of British Nationals √ Limited On site powerful Visible Deterrence √ No Combating Those That Would Do Us Harm Maritime air surveillance √ Limited Maritime surface surveillance √ Limited Maritime sub-surface surveillance √ Limited Suppression of enemy air defences √ Limited Air Space Denial √ No Rapid Offensive Air Support √ No Airborne Early Warning (AEW) √ Limited Defence Against Missile & Aircraft Attack √ No Over the Horizon Reconnaissance √ Very Limited Responsive Over the Horizon Strike √ No Responsive Intruder Identification √ No Command & Control √ Limited Combat Search & Rescue √ No Full Combat Medical Service √ No Full Amphibious Operation Support √ No

17. Table 3, above, demonstrates the flexibility, utility and capability of sea-based power for distant operations overseas and, at the same time, highlights the deficiencies in land-based air capability for such operations.

Summary 18. The analysis given above demonstrates that the employment of Land-Based Air for: (a) Policing our trade routes; (b) Protecting our overseas dependencies; and (c) Supporting task force operations offshore; is less flexible and effective and significantly more expensive than the employment of Sea-Based Air for such operations. 19. Even within the European NATO area, the deployment of Land-Based Air incurs major costs that are not felt when deploying Sea-Based Air. These major extra costs flow logically and naturally from the requirement for: (a) A major Logistic support operation by air and overland. (b) Air to air refuelling for practically all operational missions. (c) A major increase in flying time and therefore airframe cost for all operational missions. (d) Extraordinary accommodation and allowances cost for all deployed personnel. (e) The deployment of Command and Control platforms and personnel. 20. Sea-Based Air Operations offshore have proven to be extremely effective and highly successful over past decades.6 There appears to be no logical argument for ignoring this record and for expending taxpayers’ money on an alternative option that is significantly more expensive and has yet to prove to be as effective or successful.

Conclusion 21. Maritime surveillance by Sea-Based Air is almost an order cheaper and more flexible than by Land- Based Air and has always proven to be at least as effective. In the light of this, Britain’s limited defence budget 6 Indonesia, Kuwait, Belize, Falklands, Bosnia, Iraq, Sierra Leone, etc. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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resources should be channelled into meeting the requirement for this capability through existing and planned sea-based platforms rather than those that can operate only from large airfields. In order to capitalise on the planned investment in future carriers, any future land-based air assets should be carrier capable.

Written evidence from Air Vice-Marshal A L Roberts CB CBE AFC RAF (retd.) Introduction 1. This submission is made in response to the Committee’s invitation, published on 9 February 2012, for written evidence on the current and future provision of maritime surveillance capabilities. My primary concern is with the recent removal of the long range maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) from the UK’s maritime front line. 2. My background and experience in maritime surveillance is summarised at Appendix A. 3. The wisdom or otherwise of the decision to cancel the Nimrod MR4A lies outside the scope of this submission. However, it resulted in not just the cancellation of a specific aircraft project but in the removal of an entire capability—long range maritime air patrol—from the UK’s front line. In my view, this has resulted in a significant gap in the UK’s maritime surveillance capability and in an unacceptable risk for the UK’s defence interests. 4. This submission is made in full recognition of the financial challenge facing MoD—one which suggests that the likely Defence Budget will fall well short of the requirements of even the reduced front line of the three Services reflected in SDSR 2010.

Potential Threats in the Global Context 5. The Committee will be well-aware of the global context within which our maritime surveillance capability is likely to have to be effective. I offer here only the following thoughts: (a) The evident determination of the Russian government (particularly under President Putin) to restore that country’s military capability is likely to be reflected in a resurgent Russian Navy, which is known to be continuing with the development of the most advanced under-water technologies, presenting an increased threat to the UK and, in particular, to it’s strategic deterrent. (b) Arguably no less significant in the context of long range MPA is the evident determination of the Chinese to develop a full “blue water” naval capability. (c) In excess of 40 nations seem determined to maintain significant submarine forces, including some (eg India) with nuclear boats. A number are investing in new conventional submarines of considerable capability; Iran, for example, has the very capable KILO-class submarine. These represent potential threats not only to naval forces but also to oil tankers and other commercial shipping. (d) The UK will continue to rely on commercial shipping, much of which needs to pass through straits and other dangerous areas where, even in peacetime, it may be vulnerable to piracy and other threats. (e) Unexpected threats to UK interests, requiring a very rapid response and deployment of maritime surveillance assets (and possibly enforcement in the form of active military counter-measures), are bound to continue arise, as they have in the past. For example, the threat to the Falklands (and, potentially, to the exploitation of its oil reserves) could again require rapid reinforcement of the islands, requiring surveillance in advance and, during force transit, defence in depth against both surface and sub-surface threats.

Likely Gaps and Deficiencies Remaining in 2020 6. It is self-evident that, with the reduction in the size of the surface and submarine fleets and the removal of MPA from the front line, the UK’s surveillance (and, indeed, general maritime defence) capability will have been seriously eroded by SDSR 2010. In certain situations, this could be exacerbated by any diversion of SSNs to conventional cruise missile land-strike operations. 7. Clearly, the UK will still have a range of maritime surveillance resources available in 2020, operating in the audio, visual and electronic spectra. These will range from satellites through airborne and surface platforms (both afloat and ashore) to sensors on the ocean floor. However, a comprehensive picture on which potential threats can be properly assessed requires both the precise position and the identity of those threats to be accurately and quickly assessed if appropriate counter-measures are to be taken. 8. Arguably, the most difficult threat with which to deal is the submarine. While satellite and seabed sensors will be able to contribute to the intelligence picture, the detailed data available from surface and/or airborne sensors is likely to continue to be required if submarine threats are to be evaded and, if necessary, neutralised. The SDSR 2010 savings measures will have seriously reduced the UK’s anti-submarine surveillance capability, cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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not only in UK waters and the North Atlantic but also in the more distant areas of vital national and allied interest worldwide. 9. While helicopter surveillance, in lieu of that by MPA, in support of the deterrent is entirely practicable in the approaches to Faslane, the range of the helicopter, if it is to remain on station for long, is limited. Adequate cover for the deterrent therefore becomes more difficult further out along transit routes and may be impracticable in SSBN patrol areas. The amount of noise generated in the water by a helicopter, which can be counter-detected by any opposing submarine, is also a significant operational limitation. 10. The availability at short notice of towed-array frigates, and other ships with helicopter decks, will in future be very limited, making the absence of MPA of even greater concern. 11. An important task for MPA is to assist UK/NATO SSNs to get into the trail of potentially hostile submarines. With reduced acoustic advantage over the latest “enemy” submarines, achieving (and, when necessary, regaining) the trail covertly is often impossible to achieve without MPA help and, with the reduced number of UK SSNs likely to be available, lack of such MPA support must also be a matter for concern in this area of operations. 12. The UK’s surface surveillance (and, indeed, surface attack) capability has also been seriously reduced. In this area, the absence of the MPA-mounted UK maritime radar, with its unique ability to discriminate between different types of surface contact and to identify potential targets from ranges out to 200nm, even in a crowded environment and in high sea states (British industry is a world leader in this area), will no longer be available. Quite apart from its effect on our general surface surveillance capability, it has undermined the protection of naval forces , which would be in even greater danger from surface and subsurface-launched missiles in a threat environment without comprehensive defence in depth. It should also be noted that the UK no longer has the capability to survey the whole of the UK’s coastal areas rapidly at short notice. 13. Thus, our ability to police and secure our maritime borders and overseas interests, and to participate with allies in piracy, drug protection and counter-terrorism operations, has been greatly reduced. I have been told of a recent cross-Government initiative to integrate surveillance capability under the auspices of the Maritime Security Oversight Group. This is a welcome step forward in this area; however, the limited numbers of aircraft available will deliver only a very small portion of the overall surveillance requirement and the role of military fixed-wing surveillance platforms will remain key to our long-range capabilities. 14. Thus, I submit that the capability gaps in our maritime front line have reduced the UK’s surveillance capabilities to below an acceptable level. Quite apart from their own utility, the capability of even a small fleet of modern long range MPA (see paragraphs 34 and 35 below) could, to some extent, also compensate for the planned reduction in the size of the surface and submarine fleets. 15. It is significant that, shortly after the results of SDSR 2010 were announced, the First Sea Lord was reported in the press to have said publically that the Nimrod MR4A decision was the one aspect of the savings with which he was most uneasy.

Future Capabilities Needed by the UK and Lessons Learned from the Past 16. Tasks for which surveillance by MPA is required: (a) Protection of the UK’s strategic deterrent. (b) Protection of naval forces—in particular, the new aircraft carriers. (c) Protection against threats to commercial and other shipping, including counter-piracy. (d) Operations in such areas as the Caribbean in support of counter-drug operations. (e) Protection of oil rigs and shore facilities against potential threats, including assistance in counter-terrorism operations. (f) Protection of overseas territories, including the Falklands. (g) The gathering of ELINT, acoustic and photographic intelligence. (h) Search and rescue in aid of shipping and aircraft in distress.

Lessons Learned from Previous Operations 17. Maritime air in the past, and potentially in the future, has had a substantial but largely unrecognised impact across a wide variety of situations and emergencies across the world. Recent experience has been skewed by the diversion of MPA to other non-maritime tasks, followed by early withdrawal of the Nimrod MR2 in order to reduce the predicted overspend in FY 2010–11. The following paragraphs summarise a few of the lessons to be learned from selected earlier operations. 18. Because of the very highly classified nature of operations in support of the UK’s strategic deterrent few, even within the Services, have been aware of the past contribution of MPA in this important field. Indeed, I have authoritative reason to believe that ministers were not fully briefed on this aspect of MPA activities before the SDSR 2010 decision was made. The Committee, during its classified sessions, may wish to enquire into the successful operations undertaken in support of the deterrent against the latest Russian submarines shortly cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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before the grounding of the Nimrod force (from April 2010) when, because Royal Navy resources were unavailable, RAF Kinloss was tasked to undertake this task by itself. The lesson to be learned here is that, as the size of the surface and submarine fleets reduce, the need for MPA as a component of our surveillance capability increases. 19. During the operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the reduced Nimrod force was still able to conduct maritime surveillance operations from RAF Kinloss successfully, albeit at a reduced tempo. 20. The absence of MPA has resulted in a significant reduction in our ability to contribute to surveillance of the dangerous waters off Somalia or to give such support to operations in Libya. 21. Our ability to detect small drug-running boats in the Caribbean has been significantly reduced since the withdrawal of Nimrod’s radar capability—which was often the only available sensor capable of reliably detecting and tracking these vessels at long range. 22. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Nimrod fleet was able covertly to shadow, from a considerable distance, fishing vessels gun-running for the IRA from Libya and elsewhere to Ireland, operations that would now be much more difficult to undertake. 23. The coordination and tactical control of both ships and helicopters assisting in rescue operations following both the 1988 Piper Alpha oil rig and the earlier Fastnet yacht race disasters graphically illustrates the capabilities of MPA in such situations.

Particular Attributes of the Maritime Patrol Aircraft as a Maritime Surveillance Platform 24. It should be borne in mind that MPA have both a surveillance and an attack capability. By virtue of its considerable weapon and sensor carrying capabilities, the MPA is, by its nature, inherently flexible—arguably, a potentially more “multi-role” asset than any other type of aircraft in the military inventory. As was demonstrated during the Iraq and Afghanistan operations, it can be modified quickly to fulfil roles other than maritime surveillance. I am led to believe that the first Nimrods deployed to the Gulf after 9/11 were tasked in both overland and over-ocean surveillance and could be found over Iraq, Afghanistan and the Arabian Sea in the same week demonstrating the true ubiquity of the MPA and the ability quickly to switch roles when deployed overseas. 25. In arguing the case for MPA, this flexibility can work to its disadvantage in that the maritime surveillance specialist will be wary of supporting any project that could be diverted to other roles, as happened with the Nimrod in Iraq and Afghanistan. In my view, the colour of the uniform worn by those who would fly any new MPA is far less important than the need to reintroduce MPA into the UK’s front line. Nevertheless, the Committee should be cautious about taking advice only from naval specialists and those (civilian and military) responsible for the naval elements of the defence budget; it should take into account the roles other than maritime surveillance in which MPA can be used, regarding this inherent flexibility as an advantage from the wider defence viewpoint, rather than as a disadvantage. 26. Relative to surface vessels, MPA have the huge advantage of speed of deployability in reaction to threats in new or unexpected areas, speed of search on arrival, and the ability to discriminate at a distance between targets of differing types (both surface and sub-surface). Now that the size of the surface fleet is set to reduce, the need for MPA to “hold the ring” will increase still further. 27. Speed of reaction to fleeting detections and in reaching datums when contact on a target has been lost can be of critical importance in anti-submarine operations. Frequently, it is only the MPA that can take advantage of such intelligence in sufficient time, not only when operating independently but also when assisting naval forces and especially when assisting an SSN into the trail of another submarine.

Limitations of Alternative Platforms 28. Perhaps the most graphic representation of the relative capabilities of fixed wing MPA and other platforms can be taken from an analysis of their surface search capabilities. For radar-fitted submarines, ships, helicopters and aircraft the indicative search rates are shown below: Platform Op Altitude Radar Range Radar Speed Search Rate Footprint Submarine surface 12nm 38 nm2 10k 380 nm2/Hour Ship surface 18nm (100ft 57 nm2 30k 1,710 nm2/hour Mast) Helicopter 10,000 ft 130nm 408 nm2 120k 53,040 nm2/hour MPA 35,000 ft 250nm 785 nm2 420k 353,250 nm2/hour

29. It has been suggested that a combination of the Frigate, the Merlin helicopter, AWACS aircraft, Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) and the C130 Hercules can act as acceptable substitutes for MPA. I have touched on the limitations of frigates and helicopters (even if they are available) in earlier paragraphs but some points need to be made about the other platforms. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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30. AWACS. AWACS aircraft are fitted not only with very powerful radars but also with comprehensive tactical control, communications and electronic facilities. Undoubtedly, they can make a very real contribution to maritime surveillance. However, they do not carry anti-submarine sensors and, although their radars do have some maritime capability, their performance in this function is limited in all but relatively low sea states. These radars have little ability to discriminate between, and none to identify, the different types of maritime target. 31. The C130 Hercules. In addition to the armed forces’ military tasks, it should be borne in mind that the UK has an international obligation to provide search and rescue services over wide areas of ocean under the Chicago Convention. This is another area in which the loss of the long-range MPA with its maritime radar and other specialist facilities represents a significant reduction in capability. Qualitatively, the C-130 Hercules with its weather radar is not an adequate substitute in meeting our long-range search and rescue obligations and it would certainly not be able to coordinate multiple search activities in response to a major incident at sea in the same way as can the MPA. 32. UAVs. I understand that UAVs, as an alternative to MPA, have been examined in some depth by the MoD. Suffice it to say here that UAVs, as an alternative to MPA, would have a number of severe operational and technical limitations (some likely to be insurmountable, even in the long term). As has recently been illustrated by the USAF’s decision to ground its Block 30 Global Hawk in favour of extending the manned U- 2 aircraft, the combination of UAVs and their support system can be very expensive indeed. This would be even more the case were they to take on all the MPA’s tasks, especially if this included its attack capabilities. I can say with some certainty that, although the UAV may well have its place in our future spectrum of maritime surveillance capabilities, it would not be cost-effective or even practicable as an alternative to the MPA. The Committee may wish to look into this matter in some detail.

Cost-Effectiveness 33. MPA are intrinsically expensive in terms of both acquisition and running costs, the unit cost increasing as force size reduces. However, set against the cost of a frigate and given their particular attributes, MPA are relatively cheap and, it is argued, very cost-effective. 34. It is sometimes suggested that, given high support costs involved, acquisition of a very small MPA fleet would not be worthwhile. However, this is to ignore recent developments in aircraft performance and reliability. For example, in terms of our ability to maintain cover at a distance of, say, 1,000 nm from an operating base, the previously planned force of only nine Nimrod MR4As would have been the equivalent of a force of some 22–23 Nimrod MR2s or, to put it another way, even without air-to-air refuelling only 2.4 Nimrod MR4As would have been needed to maintain continuous cover at such a distance from base. 35. In inquiring into the likely costs of reintroducing MPA into the front line, the Committee will no doubt wish to take into account various options ranging, for example, from the relatively expensive P8 Poseidon (which can be AAR-equipped and is about to enter service with the US Navy) to the possibly cheaper but much shorter-range (and less capable) Airbus C295. Although, taking account of fixed support costs, the acquisition of a very few large long-range (and therefore relatively expensive) aircraft tends to involve presentational difficulties in terms of high unit cost, the Nimrod comparison above does illustrate that there can be a worthwhile trade-off between numbers and operational capability, and that acquisition of even a small number of MPA could be very cost-effective.

Collaboration with Allies 36. In order to economise in the use of assets for the surveillance of Russian/Soviet surface forces, it has long been the practice to collaborate with NATO allies (coordinated by the NATO Maritime Surveillance Coordination Centres). However, over recent years, platform availability has become more limited, a situation recently exacerbated by the loss of the UK’s MPA. 37. In the case of submarine surveillance, collaboration has tended to be limited by restrictions placed on the release of sensitive intelligence and by understandable reluctance to release details of the acoustic signatures of friendly submarines from which unfriendly targets need to be distinguished. However, cooperation and coordination with the US Navy’s MPA in exploiting especially sensitive intelligence has been particularly close, the RAF and USN often acting, in effect, as a single combined MPA Force. The recent request from the US Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations for the loan of RAF Nimrod aircrew to support the introduction to service of the P8 is a useful measure of the high degree of trust and understanding between the two Services and has resulted in a mutually beneficial agreement in maintaining the UK seed-corn for any future maritime air capability (see paragraph 39 below). 38. No doubt the Committee will be aware that the United States has warned its European allies that, following its decision to concentrate more on the Pacific at the expense of the Atlantic, maritime surveillance support in the Atlantic will in future be more limited than hitherto.

Regeneration 39. Essential elements in building up a maritime surveillance capability are operator expertise and experience, especially in the acoustics and electronic fields. Once lost, it can take years to regain. To guard cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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against loss of MPA experience, some experienced operators have been retained for use in non-maritime posts within the RAF and the Chief of the Air Staff has arranged for RAF maritime aircrew to continue to serve with allied air forces (Canada, New Zealand and Australia and the USN as described above). However, this cannot continue indefinitely and it is important that at least some UK MPA capability be reintroduced as soon as possible if this essential seed-corn of expertise is not to be lost. 40. Nor should the importance of industrial support be forgotten. The longer MPA are omitted from the front line, the less likely is it that adequate supporting expertise in keeping abreast of the latest technologies (especially those involved in airborne anti-submarine warfare) will be retained within British industry.

Conclusion 41. The reintroduction of a long-range maritime patrol aircraft into the front line should be regarded as essential to the maintenance of an acceptable UK maritime surveillance capability. Indeed, for an island nation such as Great Britain, with its world-wide interests and dependence on the sea, no longer to have such a maritime air capability in its front line is, I suggest, extraordinary. 12 March 2012

Appendix A

AIR VICE-MARSHAL ANDREW LYLE ROBERTS CB CBE AFC FRAES RAF (RTD) Andrew Roberts entered the Royal Air Force through the RAF College, Cranwell, as a flight cadet in 1956. Although, as a pilot, he has flown over 30 different types of aircraft, his operational experience has been largely in the maritime field, in which most of his flying has been on the Shackleton and Nimrod, although he also flown the Buccaneer and the Sea King/Wessex helicopters. Also relevant to this submission is the fact that over the years he has flown in, and exercised operational coordination of, maritime patrol aircraft of other NATO nations, as well as of US and NATO AWACS aircraft. His staff and command appointments in the maritime field included: — responsibility for all MPA operations and development of NATO AWACS concepts of operation at Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), a post which included responsibility for overseeing all Maritime Surveillance Coordination Centres throughout the NATO area [1975–77]; — command of RAF Kinloss (Nimrod MR1 and 2) [1977–79]; and — Chief of Staff at HQ No 18 [maritime] Group, at the same time acting as Chief of Staff (Air) to CINCHAN/CINCEASTLANT at the Northwood headquarters [1987–79].

Appointments within the Ministry of Defence include: — Personal Air Secretary to USofS (RAF), serving both Labour and Conservative ministers [1970–71]; — Director of Air Force Plans and Programmes [1984–87], responsible for the development and “Long-Term Costing” of the RAF programme and for its submission to form part of the overall Defence Programme; — Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff Concepts [1989–91], responsible for developing concepts on which the allocation of funding between the three Services and the centrally-funded equipment programmes over the following 25 years could be based; and — Leader of the RAF Manpower Strategic Studies Team [1992–94], responsible for developing new RAF manpower structures and supporting policies for the following 25 years.

He retired from the Royal Air Force in April 1994, to join the Lord Chancellor’s Panel of Independent Inspectors.

Written evidence from Squadron Leader R W Forbes

Introduction 1. The Defence Committee has announced a new enquiry into the contribution made by the MoD and UK Armed Forces for Maritime Surveillance (MS) and what the future requirements may be. On any map you care to look at the UK is an island. Homeland Security, overseas trade and power projection demand we maintain our free passage at sea. We should have the ability to legally operate worldwide unhindered alongside our allies in this environment. In this submission I intend to give an overview of recent and current MS capability, the need for this capability and what shape a future force would need to be to be politically and militarily viable. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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Non Military Surveillance 2. At this point I must stress that MS is not just about the military seeking out other military units in some sort of dated pre-World War 3 scenario. Post 9/11 the detection of terrorist activity, human trafficking and drug running are more important now than ever. The coverage of the current piracy related crimes in the Horn of Africa highlight that this is not just a warship v warship war-game. Realistically this is the new military and international front line for governments, politicians and their electorate. The upstream detection and prevention of illegal individuals or threatening actions by rogue nations is paramount for the safety and security of our citizens at home and abroad as well as out dependencies and overseas interests.

Previous Capability 3. Prior to the implementation of the decisions made in the Governments Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) the UK Maritime Surveillance Capability was covered by a triumvirate of mutually beneficial and complimentary forces. MS was carried out in three major areas which overlapped to provide a comprehensive and secure maritime environment. The main the forces involved were the RAF Nimrod Force alongside the Royal Navy Submarine Service and Surface Warship fleet with embarked Fleet Air Arm Helicopter Support. In simplistic terms the Nimrod force was responsible for long range detection and localisation of any threat or target, human or mechanical. Once localisation was achieved the RN surface force and its airborne assets would maintain tracking of any suspect vessel until a RN submarine could be established in close proximity when if necessary a long term trail of possible hostile or illegal vessels could be maintained. The final outcome could well involve handing over suspect individuals or vessels to civilian law enforcement agencies.

The Threat 4. Obviously there is no need for a capability if it has no adversary to counter so what is the threat. In old fashioned terms there are two types of maritime surveillance, those being Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Anti Surface Warfare (ASuW). Both of these competencies should fit seamlessly into the commanders Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) picture. 5. ASW is the art of localisation, tracking and if necessary destruction of subsurface forces in the shape of enemy submarines and even more recently drug running vessels. The enemy submarine is a significant threat to both other submarines and surface vessels as was so vividly demonstrated in the Battle of the Atlantic against the German U Boat threat. Whereas the numbers of submarines worldwide within foreign navies is dramatically reduced from the days of the U boat, there capability is significantly more potent and there detection equally manpower and technically demanding. Whilst the modern enemy submarine has been rarely used offensively in recent times it has a significant surveillance and intelligence collection capability and is potent symbol of sea power. This can be seen in the effect that an extremely small number of RN submarine units had in the South Atlantic during the Falklands Conflict almost single headedly nullified the Argentine Naval threat. Its ability to operate almost in total tactical freedom demonstrates the difficulty in detecting and destroying this impressive capability. 6. In many ways ASUW possess the same problem but is considered an easier threat to nullify. The fact that your adversary is on or above the surface makes them much more susceptible to radar and Electronic Surveillance Measures (ESM) detection. Technically this may be the case but it has its own unique problems that have to be countered. In ASW the perceived enemy spend much if not all of its time below the surface and hence has great difficult in creating its own maritime picture of what units, friendly or hostile, are in its vicinity. The ASUW unit has a much better ISTAR capability and as such your counter force has to have a range of overt and covert sensors.

Detection Sensors 7. To detect either the ASW or ASuW unit a range of sophisticated and integrated sensors are required. The detection of ASW forces is mainly done by the use of Passive and Active Sonar. Passive Sonar is the art of listening for the unique sounds produced by an opposing submarine or military force and then localising their position. Passive Sonar is considered a covert search system and you would hope to achieve detection and localisation with being detected yourself. Active Sonar is used primarily to accurately achieve an attack solution though this is not always your requirement. Active sonar can be used as a deterrent in order to advertise that you either know where the enemy force is or the fact you are proactively searching for it. It can be used to sanitise a chosen area of any subsurface threat. The exploitation of the inherent magnetic signature of a submarine can be achieved at long and short ranges with the use of a Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) system. 8. For ASUW the primary search tools are Radar and Electronic Surveillance Systems (ESM). The use of Radar loses any covertness you may wish to achieve but it can detect both large and small surface units at varying ranges from single to hundreds of miles depending on Radar cross section and environmental conditions. ESM can accurately position a source and its capability by correlation of radar type to weapon system. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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Previous Force Capability 9. Since the Battle of the Atlantic the UK has been at the forefront of Maritime Surveillance and maintained an enviable world-wide reputation for excellence. The UK has always possessed a Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft (LRMPA) capability. Laterally the RAF Nimrod force was fitted with all the sensors required for ASW and ASUW and could achieve blanket area coverage at a long distance from friendly or hostile shores. Its speed and endurance allowed it to quickly search at distance and to quickly react to the latest intelligence picture. For both ASW and ASuW it was the platform of choice at the beginning of any maritime operation. 10. The RN surface force is comparable to the LRMPA but at much shorter distances and with a significantly reduced reactive capability. As part of the continued post war military drawdown the paucity of assets often resulted in units being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Force generation is significantly longer but once established can maintain a significant and viable long term presence. The helicopter assets which can be embarked with these units have a relatively good sensor fit but are short on capability and endurance compared to their Nimrod counterpart. 11. The RN submarine is a potent offensive and defensive capability. It suffers from many of the constraints of the surface force. It has difficulties getting an accurate intelligence picture and positioning accordingly but once established in position its stealth, endurance and firepower make it a truly threatening adversary.

Independent Nuclear Deterrent (IND) 12. Before continuing there is more to maritime surveillance than seeking out potential enemy forces or criminal individuals. One of the primary tasks for our maritime forces is the protection of the UK Independent Nuclear Deterrent. This has been at the core of maritime surveillance since this weapon system became operational. Should an enemy force be allowed to establish itself in the vicinity of our IND then it is no longer a truly valid deterrent. With the debate on the next generation of SLBMs just beginning its own vulnerability to and protection from detection cannot be over stressed.

Post SDSRCurrentMaritimeCapability 13. With no apparent policy change in sight in 2012 we have no LRMPA capability. Due to ever reducing numbers RN assets will be sparse with poor regeneration times. This will be exacerbated should we wish to maintain assets east of Suez and in the South Atlantic. Due to a lack of assets and technical sophistication the UK Borders Agency can only maintain a very limited coastal surveillance suitable for fishery protection and/ or drug and human trafficking. 14. In its wisdom, driven by budgetary constraints, the UK government decided to cancel the replacement LRMPA (Nimrod MRA4) at the expense of maintaining an unbalanced air defence posture. The demise of the ageing and unfairly criticised Mk 2 Nimrod aircraft has left a strategic hole in our defensive and offensive military posture. I believe I speak with authority when I say we have no independent long range ASW or ASuW capability. This lack of capability applies across the whole spectrum I have previously outlined. Suggestions that the use of the RAF E3 platform, the C130 Hercules, Shadow, embarked or shore based helicopter assets can duplicate the LRMPA capability is false. There are no RAF military assets which have the necessary sensor fit or crew competency to carry out effective MS. For the same reason the provision of the UAV will not counter the ASW or ASUW threat. 15. Comparable reductions of the RN surface fleet have meant that whilst they maintain an ASW and ASuW capability force generation and positioning are woefully limited and protracted. The recent anchoring of a Russian Naval task force East of Shetland only highlights this problem with the RN apparently only able to intercept these units as they approached our shores. The RN intercepting vessel had to be dispatched from a base in Southern England. With no LRMPA and limited RN assets the ability to get eyes on these units at a strategically greater distance was impossible. 16. The RN submarine fleet has rightly been heavily involved in the conflicts of Iran and Afghanistan and if necessary could play a significant role in the current Straits of Hormuz tensions. If preparing a submarine to operate within the UK Area of Responsibility (UKAOR) is a logistic and cost effective nightmare, how difficult is it to maintain a 24/7 presence at the range the Middle East constraints. Proposed limited numbers of Astute Class submarines will only exacerbate this problem. 17. There are a number of other space and airborne based intelligence systems which can give Indications and Warnings (IAW) of a threatening maritime environment. These should not be necessarily be ignored but they cannot carry the sensor capability to cover the range of skill sets needed to meet the disparate demands of ASW and ASuW. 18. In the short term the MoD has instigated a Seed Corn programme whereby a small number of the Nimrod MS force have been sent to the US to maintain their skill sets in the off chance that we procure another LRMPA. This is a sensible initiative but without a LRMPA procurement initiative its long term commitment is questionable. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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Future Strategic Requirements 19. It has never been easy to accurately militarily look too far into the future. The relatively recent areas of conflict reflect this dilemma. The Falklands War, The Balkans, post 9/11 conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Somali Piracy problem and tensions in the Straits of Hormuz. A possibility of another Falklands conflict cannot be discounted. It is because of these disparate mainly maritime threats that we need to maintain an integrated and viable maritime force. 20. There is not one individual panacea that will meet all scenarios but the primary lynchpin of maritime surveillance is already missing. To be effective IAW should be achieved at the earliest opportunity so that an eyes-on situation can be rapidly established. Perhaps this is the modern equivalent of gunship diplomacy but it does get your message across. 21. The constant reduction of the RN surface and subsurface fleet will mean that the ability to operate in more than one theatre at any one time is impossible. Unless funding is found to maintain and even expand the RN capability future reductions may make it impossible to defend the homeland and operate overseas without significant and I believe unacceptable risk. 22. Whilst it would not by any means be the maritime panacea I believe that the procurement of a viable and capable LRMPA is a political and military necessity. This platform can be built to meet all current and future threat scenarios, operate at long range from the UK mainland and with ally support in a truly world- wide capacity. To achieve this the platform by necessity has to have the capability to carry a significant sensor, surveillance and weapons inventory. A coastal surveillance platform would not provide adequate endurance or the area search capability required. I do not believe that there is a realistic Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) which could remotely meet this challenge. Much of the skills of maritime surveillance involve what could be considered as the black arts which requires the timely consideration of the human interface with the detection sensor enhancing the ability to prosecute the probable and discount the impossible.

Ally Collaboration 23. Much has been made since SDSR of the coalition of military forces through our allies to achieve a beneficial political or military outcome. Firstly you cannot have a truly independent nuclear deterrent if you are dependent on another nation being involved in its defence. Nation building is only easy when everyone is searching for the same outcome. A combined force against terrorism seems obvious, but the support for such is patchy and uneven. If you look at any of the recent areas of conflict the UK always bats well above its pay grade and strives to meet its obligations. Apart from the US how any other countries can we say that about? The Libyan conflict proved that even within Europe there is a significant variation on what nations say they will support never mind actually put their money where their mouth is. 24. I accept that defence is expensive. I do not believe it is not the sort of process you can agree to just share with another nation in the hope that each party will do their little bit unless you are willing to accept huge risk to our national interest at home and abroad. Our own current political government shows just how hard any form of coalition is never mind one with international partners and such potential huge consequences if poorly managed.

Conclusion 25. Financial constraints have meant that the MoD has had to take its share of the pain in UK Government funding. From an RAF point of view SDSR has left the UK with an unbalanced air power capability which focuses on Air Defence against what threat? It is a homeland defence force which can only operate overseas as part of a coalition. UK PLC does not have the capability to carry out the suppression of an overseas hostile air force without Ally Support. 26. The provision of a capable LRMPA totally helps transform the UK’s military posture. It can provide IAW at the earliest possible point and follow up this intelligence by prosecuting unilaterally if required. It could possess a significant multi role weapons delivery package and would easily integrate within the overall UK military posture as well as those of our Allies. Whilst not within the remit of MS, if you look at the capabilities of the Nimrod MR2 force it is obvious that it was a truly multi role aircraft which provided much needed support to virtually all aspects of the MoD policy. 27. The Seed Corn initiative to maintain MS experience levels in the UK is a laudable attempt to protect our airborne maritime capability but it is a fragile programme which will wither on the vine unless there is the promise of regenerating our own MS capability. The destruction of the Nimrod MRA4 without the foresight to provide an alternate platform may have been politically necessary but was militarily short sighted in the extreme. 28. This paper has concentrated purely on the MS capability which I believe is now so very lacking. Provision of a capable LRMPA with well-trained crews would help re-balance and enhance our military capability at a stroke. March 2012 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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Written evidence from the Angus Robertson MP, Westminster SNP Leader and Defence Spokesman, Scottish National Party (SNP) Summary 1.1 As a result of the decisions taken in the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) the UK has been left with a much diminished maritime surveillance capability. Much of this was created by the decision of the previous government to remove the Nimrod MR2 from service and of the current government’s decision to cancel its replacement the Nimrod MRA4. The Scottish National Party (SNP) have asked a series of detailed questions regarding maritime surveillance as this decision has a particular importance for a maritime nation like Scotland and the challenges it faces. 1.2 The current combination of assets leaves a huge capability gap for the various nations of the UK. The ability to project power, conduct real time Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and maritime Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) operations, screen for undersea threats and conduct long range Search and Rescue (SAR) have all been drastically cut or no longer exist in a credible form. Recent events in Libya and Scotland have exposed this capability gap. 1.3 While we welcome some initiatives by the UK Government such as the Seedcorn Programme it is very limited in scope. We need only look at our near neighbours to see that they think a marine surveillance capability generated through Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) is vital. For example Ireland and Spain have Airbus CASA CN-235 Military Surveillance Aircraft,7 Iceland’s DHC-8–314Q,8 Netherland’s Dornier 228–212,9 Portugal’s EADS C-295M10 or Norway which has P-3 Orion Aircraft.11 1.4 At a time that neighbouring countries are focusing their attention on the growing importance of the High North, a resurgent Russia, and increasing concerns about energy security the UK is moving in the other direction. The dilution of the UK’s maritime surveillance capability stands in stark contrast to the importance that others place on it. This emphasises that Scotland needs to be able to take decisions about its defence and its priorities in Scotland. 1.5 This submission answers the broad questions as grouped by the terms of reference and possible questions suggested by the Committee.

2. “What current maritime surveillance capabilities and assets will remain in service by 2020, including their specific roles, effectiveness, deployability, coordination, and interoperability; and what are the likely gaps and deficiencies?” Military Capability 2.1 The mixture of scarce assets left to cover maritime surveillance has resulted in serious capability gaps and is taken at significant risk to the UK’s security. The absence of a long range fixed wing Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability has increased the risk to the entire naval fleet. Parliamentary Questions (PQs) show that helicopters operated from sea or shore have a much shorter range than Nimrod, they also lack the advanced type of radar that provides a crucial surface search capability for submarine detection.12 2.2 The only aircraft that is capable of deploying sonar buoys and torpedoes that are utilised in ASW warfare is the Merlin Helicopter.13 However, these have a greatly reduced endurance compared to that of a fixed wing ASW asset and also require a ship to enable them to work at reach within the UK’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This is less cost effective, time consuming and manpower intensive. 2.3 The UK’s ability to effectively conduct wide area above water and under water find, fix, prosecute in the absence of fixed wing ASW has become seriously degraded. It also means that when submarines leave and enter HMNB Clyde, Faslane their ability to “sanitise” against other nations’ submarines is now much more difficult with the removal of Nimrod. It was telling that with the scrapping of the Nimrod MRA4 and retirement of the Nimrod MR2 that they were stripped of useful electronics for use on other platforms.14 2.4 In the near future two aircraft carriers will be commissioned into the Royal Navy, given the level of importance that the UK government place on the projection of naval power with retirement of Nimrod there is a lack of assets that can provide deep field protection for a Carrier Strike Task Group. Unless action is taken to reverse the lack of capability in sanitising water space, we can expect it to affect littoral manoeuvre and the ability to maintain sea lines of communication in the medium to long term. 7 Ireland http://www.transport.ie/viewitem.asp?id=12242&lang=ENG&loc=2537 Spain http://www.salvamentomaritimo.es/wp-content/files_flutter/1331035410plan-nacional-salvamento2010–2018-ingles.pdf 8 Iceland http://www.lhg.is/english/search_and_rescue/ 9 Netherlands http://www.kustwacht.nl/en/aeronautical.html 10 Portugal http://www.emfa.pt/www/esquadrasdetalhe.php?lang=ing&cod=e501 11 Norway http://mil.no/organisation/about/norwegianmilitarybases/Pages/Andoya.aspx 12 PQ, Angus Robertson, 11/11/10, col ref [21442], [22138] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/ cm101111/text/101111w0002.htm#10111178000697 13 PQ, Angus Robertson, 04/11/10, col ref [21443] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101104/text/ 101104w0003.htm#10110464000289 14 PQ, Angus Robertson, 10/01/12, col ref [87596] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120110/text/ 120110w0001.htm#12011052001210 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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ELINT

2.5 The RAF currently lacks a significant ELINT platform. The current Sentinel aircraft which are tasked in Afghanistan on battlefield and ground surveillance duties are not ELINT platforms. Instead they provide a synthetic picture of the surface which can contribute to the overall understanding of the battlespace. Only limited trials have been conducted in terms of the aircraft’s ability to operate effectively in the maritime environment. In order to achieve this it would need many years of research and trials to develop a probability of detection sufficiently high enough to warrant its inclusion in the maritime surveillance role as a bespoke contributor to the recognised surface picture. In particular it has no identified capability in undersea detection. Also the UK Government stated in the SDSR that they would be withdrawn on completion of kinetic operations in Afghanistan.

SIGINT

2.6 The last UK Government purchased three RC-135W Rivet Joint aircraft & ground systems from the US Government to replace the capability of the Nimrod R1. These assets built in 1964 are the “youngest” of the modified USAF KC-135Rs. PQs show that all of the airframes that are due to enter service have over 22,000 air hours which is actually more flying hours than the retired Nimrod R1 that they replace.15 RAF personnel are currently being trained in America to operate these aircraft which are expected to remain in service until 2045. These aircraft will also be maintained in Texas, unlike the Nimrod that was maintained in the UK. Rivet Joint aircraft can be operated over ocean but are not suitably equipped to conduct the full gamut of MPA duties.

Anti-Crime Capability

2.7 The current assets that are available also limit the ability of the armed forces to support Other Government Departments in Counter Terrorism and Counter Drug Operations. In the event of a request from Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) to track an ocean going vessel suspected of drug trafficking, there is no on scene commander that can remain airborne at a suitable standoff distance. Nimrod provided the capability to remain on scene with the relevant communications suite, detection equipment and tracking to ensure a joint operation could be suitably conducted to a successful conclusion.

Search and Rescue

2.8 An often overlooked aspect of maritime surveillance is the ability to conduct and organize long range and complex search and rescue missions in all weather conditions. This is particularly acute if there was a major maritime incident.

2.9 The Nimrod MR2 and the now cancelled Nimrod MRA4 were the premier long distance work horse of the UK Search and Rescue Fleet. Its electronic suites were uniquely suited to provide “top-cover” to vessels in distress. It organised and co-ordinated other assets such as SAR helicopters, acting as an instant data link to the Aeronautical Rescue and Co-ordination Centre (ARCC) based in RAF Kinloss. It should be noted that this vital centre’s future remains uncertain some year and half after the SDSR as RAF Kinloss transfers to an Army base.16

2.10 The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) in their 2008 Search and Rescue Framework described the capability of the Nimrod: “The Nimrod can fly at high speed to a distance of approximately 800 nautical miles from base and then search for a period of five hours. Range can be extended at the expense of search time, or both may be extended by the use of in-flight refuelling…The aircraft has a comprehensive suite of search sensors, with radar optimised for over-water searches. A limited number of aircraft may also be fitted with an Infra Red (IR) capability. The Nimrod has a variety of communications equipment including UHF, VHF, HF and IMM VHF(FM) radios, and the combination of a powerful radar, long endurance and excellent communications, make the aircraft the platform of choice for directing activities at the scene. The aircraft itself can drop life rafts and survival equipment to persons in distress but is more frequently employed in vectoring shipping and helicopters to the scene.17“

2.11 After the previous government decided to retire the Nimrod MR2 they responded that in terms of Search and Rescue (SAR) a variety of assets would “replace” the capability of Nimrod. The only aircraft that has a similar, although shorter range, slower speed, and less loiter time on scene is the C-130 Hercules. It does not have the same advanced electronics such as Search Water 2000 radar nor the same high-skilled crews 15 PQ Angus Robertson 18/01/11 col ref [33448] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110118/text/ 110118w0004.htm#1101192000704 and PQ Angus Robertson 17/01/11 col ref [33449] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110117/text/110117w0004.htm#11011739000507 16 Angus Robertson PQ col ref 1/11/10 [20213] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101101/text/ 101101w0004.htm#1011026000611 17 http://www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/uksar.pdf —Page 31 Sec 2.6 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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trained in SAR. Also PQs which asked how active the Hercules was on search and Rescue missions have produced alarming results.18

2.12 There have only been two SAR flights flown by a Hercules and one by an ED-3 Sentry in the last three years.19 A PQ also revealed that no Hercules is on SAR level readiness.20 This can be compared to the Nimrod MR2 which has flown over 108 long distance search and rescue missions in the last five years spending over 473 hours in the air during that time doing search and rescue. On average they flew 22 missions a year, just under two a month responding to emergencies. They spend on average eight hours a month in the air doing search and rescue. Many missions are out of the range of helicopters with one mission was 29hrs long. Another two saw a Nimrod fly over 1,100 miles to reach the emergency and in the final month the Nimrod MR2 was in service it flew both longer and farther than the Hercules has in three years. It is vital that Scotland, like its neighbours has a dedicated fixed wing SAR MPA with a full range of capabilities.

3. “What are the future capabilities needed by the MoD and UK Armed Forces for maritime surveillance and what measures are being taken to address these, including applying lessons learned from recent operations?”

3.1 The future capabilities needed by the MoD were many that were available in the Nimrod MRA4. Two recent examples have shown these deficiencies. The first was the ability to scan the coast and shore and direct naval fire during OP Ellamy in Libya. PQ’s revealed that the UK had to, with its own personnel from the 148 Battery Royal Artillery onboard, rely on Canadian CF 140 Aurora and American P-3 Orion aircraft to direct naval fire from its Frigate on shore.21 Further they would have relied on these aircraft more generally in protecting its naval assets and providing ISTAR and ELNIT intelligence gathering. This real world combat scenario highlights the vital role that maritime surveillance MPA provides in the modern battlespace.

3.2 A second example was the recent visit to the Moray Firth by the Russian Aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and her accompanying group. It would not have been lost on the Russian Navy that they were parked just several miles offshore of the former home of the Nimrod at RAF Kinloss. The long 1,000 mile journey from Portsmouth of HMS York to intercept and monitor the group showed the woeful lack of significant conventional vessels based in Scotland that can conduct maritime surveillance. This is compounded by the removal and cancellation of the next generation of the UK’s MPA which would have provided crucial indicators and warnings capability. It would have been able to constantly shadow the group and direct other assets as required.

3.3 Looking to the future there are two areas that are of immediate concern. Both regard the UK’s ability to maintain its treaty obligations and good relations with its near neighbours. The first is regarding international obligations under the four main international treaties that states ratify governing search and rescue.22 They detail what states are obliged to provide in terms of resources, assets and control centres. The UK Search and Rescue area is massive covering some 1.25 million sq km and over 10.5 thousand nautical miles of Coastline.23 It reaches so far to the west that it actually borders Canada’s Eastern search limit, effectively dividing the North Atlantic Ocean in two.

3.4 Included in those obligations is to provide a list of assets available to undertake certain missions and also where the various co-ordination centres are located. However PQs that since the retirement of Nimrod show that only shorter range helicopters and light aircraft are listed as being available now.24 They do not list the C130 Hercules—which means that the UK has no long range military fixed wing SAR aircraft listed under section 2.1.11.4 of the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, raising serious questions about the UK’s ability to effectively meet this obligation. Indeed from 2005 until the retirement of the MR2 in early 2010 the aircraft provided help to neighbouring countries 23 times.25 It appears that since its retirement the UK has not provided fixed wing RAF top cover to any neighbouring states. 18 PQ, Angus Robertson, 25/02/10, col ref [318839] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmhansrd/cm100225/text/ 100225w0005.htm; PQ, Angus Robertson, 08/11/10, col ref [22037], [22038] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101108/text/101108w0001.htm#10110817000536 19 PQ, Angus Robertson, 07/02/12, col ref [93460] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120207/text/ 120207w0001.htm#12020789001137 20 PQ, Angus Robertson, 21/01/11, col ref [34223] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110121/text/ 110121w0002.htm#11012147001589 21 PQ, Angus Robertson, 24/12/12 col ref [91024] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120124/text/ 120124w0002.htm#12012469000589 22 The UK organisation for civil maritime and civil aviation search and rescue is derived from the UK Government’s adherence to the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) (1974), the Maritime Search and Rescue Convention (1979) and the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago 1944) (Annex 12). http://www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/uksar.pdf Pg 9 23 http://www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/mcga07-home/emergencyresponse/mcga-searchandrescue/mcga-hmcgsar-sarsystem/coastguard_ operations/area_of_operations.htm 24 PQ, Angus Robertson, 22/11/10, col ref [24404], [24405], [24408] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/ cmhansrd/cm101122/text/101122w0001.htm#1011229001129 And PQ, Angus Robertson 23/02/2012 col ref [96183] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120223/text/120223w0002.htm#12022343000285 25 PQ, Angus Robertson, 23/11/10, col ref [24410] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101123/text/ 101123w0003.htm#10112346002739 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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3.5 A fire two years ago on the fish factory ship Athena off of the Scilly Isles exposed the current state of UK capability as a French Falcon 50 provided a communication link because of the limitations of the Hercules: “An RAF C-130 Hercules from RAF Lyneham, which was later stood down because of the endurance available from the French aircraft”.26

3.6 The second area of concern is the ability of UK properly protect, monitor its EEZ and beyond, including the farthest reaches of Scotland’s continental shelf. The foreign policy directions of Norway, Iceland, Denmark and Russia all clearly highlight the importance that they put on the high-arctic. Scotland sits at the bottom of this triangle and that has many important implications, which in turn show how important a robust maritime surveillance capability is. The opening up of new energy fields further North, and maintaining security over existing infrastructure is essential. The environmental monitoring of increased shipping through the region with the receding icecaps poses another challenge. The ability to monitor above and below water assets from other countries and sharing that information with allies is essential. All of these things are growing in importance but are given a second tier rating by the current UK government, cumulating in the decision to scrap one of the most key assets in this area. A long range, long endurance MPA is the critical asset that is missing and that puts Scottish interests at risk and limits our ability to co-operate with our neighbours.

4. “How does the MoD intend in future to coordinate its work with other Government departments and agencies, including its effectiveness, their interaction, the lines of demarcation and the consequences for, and impact on, UK Armed Forces”

4.1 Exercise Joint Focus 2010 provided the first Cross-Whitehall Exercise where Government Departments from the MoD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DFID) and the Stabilisation Unit were able to practice the Comprehensive Approach within a carefully crafted realistic scenario and to experiment in best practice. This was done to better understand ways of working between civilian and Armed Forces personnel, which included Non Governmental Organisations(NGO) and resulted in their appraisal and renaming of business as the “Integrated Approach”. The success was due to the lengthy planning of the Exercise with the involvement of all Government Agencies from the outset, utilising the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) process which included the National Security Council (NSC).

4.2 In early 2011 when the Arab Spring came into being, Libya descended into a conflict zone. The work done through the Integrated Approach a few months earlier enabled contingent operations to be undertaken swiftly with all departments understanding what benefits were derived from the Exercise in December 2010. There is an appetite for further experimentation once the lessons have been fully identified from civilian and military operations and experiences in Libya. The outcome will be a more efficient process, an opportunity to consolidate on knowledge gained and appreciation of skills, strengths and abilities of Whitehall Departments.

4.3 The current Government established a National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) which was alleged to be the single point of contact for UK national maritime surveillance information data exchange with the EU and current partners.27 The MoD lead cross Whitehall, Government & Agencies co-ordinated initiative failed at the first hurdle when the Russian Federation Navy Kusnetsov Task Group entered UK Territorial Waters in December 2011 and anchored in the Moray Firth. The NMIC were unable to provide MPA coverage due to a lack of assets suitable for maritime surveillance out to the northern edge of the UK’s EEZ. While we support this EU wide initiative, unless it is funded and afforded the correct assets it will not be fit for purpose. It is pivotal that the NMIC has UK MPA assets to utilise in the pursuit of the EU Approach to Integrated Maritime Surveillance.

5. “To what extent the UK should collaborate and is collaborating with allies, including through NATO, in the provision of maritime surveillance capabilities;” and “what provision is the MoD making for the possibility that maritime surveillance forces might have to be regenerated at relatively short notice?”

5.1 It is absolutely vital that the UK collaborate, co-operate and consider joint procurement or pooling with its allies. The position of the UK on this issue is negative, confused and unclear. In response to PQs as far back as February and June 2011 the Government ruled out buying or leasing other aircraft with similar capabilities. However in November 2011 parliamentary questions showed that the government was discussing an exchange with the US Navy for fully qualified RAF air crew to support the US P-8 Poseidon programme.28

5.2 Pooling or sharing, whether through bilateral agreement, NATO Smart Defence or another multilateral arrangement could allow the UK to access a range of assets that other countries have. That is why we welcome the details of the Seedcorn initiative that revealed that 20 personnel from the RAF are training with NATO countries Canada and the United States and non-NATO allies Australia and New Zealand on a mixture of 26 PQ, Angus Robertson, 8/11/10, col ref [21386] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101108/text/ 101108w0004.htm#10110837001522 27 European Security Committee http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmeuleg/5-x/5x14.htm 28 PQ, Angus Robertson, 24/11/11, col ref [81670] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111124/text/ 111124w0003.htm#11112476001278 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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MPA. This will maintain some of the vital skills needed in this area and provide some ability to regenerate the capability quickly.29 5.3 The type of aircraft that the are involved in the Seedcorn could suggest that these would be the type of aircraft the UK would be interested in acquiring. However PQ’s suggest that they have no plans on purchasing or leasing the P-8 Poseidon30 in the future or other airframes like the P-3 that is in service with many countries.31 The Government does say however that it is keeping the requirement under review. 5.4 Given the co-operation in the Seedcorn initiative it seems to be a much missed opportunity to rule out participating in NATO’s Smart Defence Initiative in the area of MPA capability. This includes the possibility of pooling or joint procurement. However it was put on record in a recent PQ that the UK is, “not currently planning on participating in this project”.32 5.5 This would be an ideal interim solution to the UK’s current massive capability gap in this area. Just as NATO and PfP countries co-operate and share transport aircraft through the NATO Airlift Management Agency (NAMA) or how the European Defence Agency is exploring co-operation with its members around a pooled air-to-air refuelling capability, the UK must keep an open mind about working more closely with partners to provide an immediate capability in this area.33 In a time of increasing pressure on defence budgets these options should be even more palatable. 5.6 Finally the co-operation within the European Union must continue to be supported but it must be properly funded and provided with the right capability. The Maritime Surveillance Networking aims at improving the Recognised Maritime Picture is vital to the effective sharing of information between EU states and non-EU states and between NATO and non-NATO members.34 Also the UK should continue its participation in the European Unmanned Maritime Systems for MCM and other naval applications programme whose research and technology may lead to unmanned assets that can fill the large gap in this capability that currently confronts the UK armed forces.35

Conclusion 6. Recent UK Governments have shown by their decisions that they do not take maritime surveillance seriously. As a maritime nation Scotland requires appropriate MPA capability. If the UK government does not take this capability gap seriously a Scottish Government with defence decision making powers certainly should. This submission is also being forwarded to the Scottish Government as part of its preparations for the Independence Referendum planned for 2014. 12 March 2012

Written evidence from Thales Executive Summary 1. Thales provides state of the art equipment and services for a number of European military and civil surveillance customers. These include novel approaches to assisting national customers define their requirements and the provision of advanced surveillance systems, including “surveillance by the hour” services. Such a broad sweeping and novel approach to satisfying holistic national surveillance requirements requires a change in mind set of traditional capability procurers. Thales would encourage a structured and analytical approach by the UK in defining a cost-effective maritime surveillance capability mix for the future.

Thales Background 2. Thales is a global technology leader and a trusted provider of turnkey surveillance solutions to Governments around the world including the Hermes 450 Unmanned Air System for UK MoD, numerous optronic and sonar systems, a Maritime Patrol Aircraft solution for Turkey, EW surveillance solutions for the United Arab Emirates and recently an urban surveillance solution for Mexico City. Providing technologically advanced surveillance sensors and systems, Thales has a comprehensive understanding of the space, air, surface and sub-surface environments and of the technologies that provide state of the art surveillance capability. Of particular note, Thales has a long history in the provision of state of the art technology to UK MoD’s maritime surveillance systems—including sonar and radar—and recent experience of delivering service-based surveillance solutions germane to the Committee’s questions. 29 PQ, Angus Robertson, 24/11/11, col ref [81671], [81672], [81673] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/ cmhansrd/cm111124/text/111124w0003.htm#11112476001267 30 PQ, Angus Robertson, 28/06/11, col ref [62104] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110628/text/ 110628w0002.htm#11062868000717 31 PQ Angus Robertson, 1/02/12 col ref [37263] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110201/text/110201w0003.htm#11020168000629 32 PQ, Angus Robertson, 21/02/12, col ref [95362] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120221/text/ 120221w0002.htm#12022174001233 33 NAMA: http://www.nama.nato.int/Docs/NewComersGuide.pdf 34 EU MARSUR: http://www.eda.europa.eu/Otheractivities/Maritimesurveillance/MARSURnetworking 35 UMS http://www.eda.europa.eu/Capabilitiespriorities/matureactions/Maritimeminecountermeasures/Unmannedmaritimesystems cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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Factual Information 3. Thales is engaged in European initiatives where surveillance, potential solutions and relevant technologies are being evaluated that will enable novel and highly cost-effective approaches to meeting national maritime surveillance needs. The evaluations take a dispassionate and holistic view of extremely complex requirements matrices to arrive at real (rather than prejudiced) decision points. We would welcome similar UK initiatives in defining the UK’s future maritime surveillance capabilities. 4. For a maritime nation of global influence, such as the UK, maritime surveillance clearly requires a coherent set of disparate surveillance platforms, each with complementary, but some unique, qualities. In an ever changing world, achieving a future-proof balance of assets is a complex task and Thales has devised scenario-dependent models to help customers arrive at optimal investment decisions. Solutions may be based purely on technology choices, but increasingly the inclusion of novel service-based (surveillance by the hour) type solutions may be included—and Thales has already delivered such solutions. 5. A traditional UK procurement methodology may find it challenging to cope with such an approach across the whole of maritime surveillance. There are many reasons for this—eg the differing emphasis each Service puts on the requirement, but in reality, the question is profound and very difficult to answer without quite precise tools and rigorous methodologies. Therefore a new high level approach is needed where a holistic view of requirements may be captured and the sensitivities of assumptions may be tested across endorsed scenarios. Rather than proposing specific solutions at this stage, industry skills would be better used in making available to government the decision tools and methodologies needed to assist in coming to a robust, defendable and dispassionate decision. 6. Thales is not alone in this capability, and UK industry should be capable of jointly rising to a challenge to work with the MoD to arrive at a defendable view of viable and cost effective options for UK’s maritime surveillance future needs.

Recommendations 7. Thales recommends that the Government engages with the defence industry at the earliest opportunity to assist in the development of a maritime surveillance strategy that blends commercial innovation, technological advances and worldwide industrial experience into any future solution. 12 March 12

Written evidence from Raytheon UK Future UK Requirements for Maritime Surveillance Raytheon UK welcomes the invitation to provide an industry perspective in support of the Defence Committee inquiry into the contribution of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and UK Armed Forces to the UK’s future requirements for maritime surveillance. The Company’s insight is based upon development and operational experience gained as a key player in this industry in the UK for over 100 years. With approximately 1,000 people based across eight UK sites, Raytheon UK provides the MoD with mission critical systems spanning Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), weapons, Command and Control (C2), air traffic management and training. Raytheon is proud to have supported recent Operations Herrick and Ellamy through the performance of the Sentinel R Mk1 aircraft and its cutting edge air-to-ground advanced surveillance capability, which was successfully deployed and demonstrated its effectiveness during these operations. Fundamentally, Raytheon UK supports the “National Security Through Technology” White Paper’s recommendation to draw from existing technologies and exploit “off-the-shelf” where possible. The UK’s future requirements for maritime surveillance is just such an area where the MoD can draw upon existing proven capabilities, and further enhancements at minimal cost, to deliver against these requirements.

Background The UK MoD, in cooperation with other Government Departments and Agencies, provides a crucial and pivotal role in the provision of maritime surveillance for the protection of UK interests, both in home and international waters. This has typically been split into two key areas: Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), both in terms of warfare and maritime constabulary; and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). The latter being the detection, tracking and deterrence or destruction, of enemy submarines, primarily for force protection. ASuW, being focussed on the engagement of surface vessels, has increased in prominence over recent years with capability requirements including: — Counter terrorism. — Anti-piracy. — Anti-smuggling. — Intelligence gathering. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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— Oil rig protection. In considering the future UK maritime surveillance requirements in support of the Defence Committee inquiry, Raytheon UK has also included the following: — Airborne command and control. — Persistent overwatch of Search and Rescue (SAR) operations. — Airborne Early Warning (AEW—linked to adapted UK concept of operations). — Fisheries protection. Any potential airborne capability solutions meeting these future surveillance requirements must align with the “National Security Through Technology” White Paper, and offer broad Value for Defence and the UK taxpayer. Enhancing proven delivery solutions, against clearly articulated capability requirements, offers an affordable means of doing so.

Surveillance Utility of Sentinel R Mk1 1. The Airborne Standoff Radar (ASTOR) programme, embodied within the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) Sentinel R Mk1 aircraft, forms a critical component of the UK Armed Forces ISTAR capability. It has become recognised as a key enabler as part of the successful multi-national force supported by the UK MoD in recent military operations. ASTOR provides surveillance over a wide area, the ability to focus on a discreet area of interest, and the ability to identify moving targets, providing essential intelligence in support of NATO and UK-led operations to protect civilians on the ground below. 2. The Sentinel R Mk1 demonstrated greater than 97% availability on recent operations, which allowed the UK MoD the resilience and flexibility to support surveillance tasks in two separate theatres simultaneously. In addition, the Sentinel R Mk1 could contribute significantly to meeting the future NATO Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) requirement, which the UK committed to at the 2010 Lisbon Summit as part of NATO’s new “Strategic Concept”. The current Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) decision, to withdraw this proven capability on completion of the support to ongoing operations in Afghanistan circa April 2015, will leave the UK without a viable wide area ground surveillance capability, and also dismisses the potential greater exploitation of this established asset in a maritime role.

Exploiting Sentinel R Mk1 for Maritime Surveillance Operations 3. Through recent research, Raytheon UK has demonstrated that the Sentinel R Mk1 has untapped capability in the maritime surveillance environment, particularly in support of ASuW. Incremental investment by UK MoD could deliver significantly enhanced capabilities, and provide a low risk, cost effective alternative solution to procuring a similar capability through the introduction of a new platform and associated sensors. 4. The Dual Mode Radar Sensor (DMRS) fitted to the Sentinel R Mk1 is currently tuned for operation in the ground environment. However, with only minor changes to the mission system computing, a maritime mode could be introduced that would enable the detection of surface vessels, and potentially submarine periscopes. This supplementary mode would not degrade performance of the DMRS in the Land environment, where it has recently demonstrated such effective operational utility in both Libya and Afghanistan. A similar maritime radar mode has already been proven and fielded within the United States (US) Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) solution, the sister radar to the UK DMRS. Further capability enhancement of the Sentinel R Mk1 platform could be achieved through an incremental upgrade programme, adding additional sensors relevant to the maritime domain, such as Automatic Identification System, and Signals Intelligence. 5. Such an approach would combine a proven, highly capable wide area ground surveillance capability with a demonstrable wide area maritime surveillance capability. This would provide the UK MoD with a persistent, flexible and agile surveillance capability, which could span the maritime, littoral and land environments using a single cost effective platform. Sentinel R Mk1, as this potential platform, already has in place a comprehensive Main Operating Base (MOB) support and training infrastructure, employing a force-mix of both Industry and UK Armed Forces personnel, to grow and sustain future expanded capability if required.

Conclusion 6. In taking forward the tenets from the “National Security Through Technology” White Paper’s recommendation to draw from existing technologies and exploit “off-the-shelf” where possible, an enhanced Sentinel R Mk1 could provide a flexible, low risk, cost effective alternative solution to developing a new UK airborne maritime surveillance capability. 7. Such an enhanced Sentinel R Mk1, with high platform availability, long endurance, and interoperability, could address maritime surveillance capability requirements that include: — Counter terrorism. — Anti-piracy. — Anti-smuggling. — Intelligence gathering. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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— Airborne command and control. — Persistent overwatch of search and rescue (SAR) operations. — Airborne Early Warning (AEW—linked to adapted UK concept of operations). — Fisheries protection. — Oil rig protection. 8. In addition, with its potential to be exploited across maritime, littoral and land environments, the Sentinel R Mk1 will be key to meeting the future NATO Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) requirement, which the UK committed to at the 2010 Lisbon Summit as part of NATO’s new “Strategic Concept”. March 2012

Written evidence from Dr Sue Robertson 1. Introduction 1.1 I am an independent consultant working in the field of Electronic Warfare and ISTAR. I was until October 2010 the Subject Matter Expert on the Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system for the Nimrod MRA4. I worked, on behalf of the Ministry of Defence, on the evaluation of the equipment and advised on changes to the system. My previous role had been to carry out the same function on the Merlin Mk1 helicopter programme. 1.2 I have previously provided evidence to the Defence Select Committee Inquiry into the SDSR(March 2011) concerning the cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 and also to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (September 2011) describing the impact of the lack of maritime surveillance on the security of the UK. 1.3 With the 13th longest coastline of any country in the world, the lack of a maritime reconnaissance capability is a serious short-coming in the protection of our nation. The need for a maritime patrol capability is recognised worldwide with many countries buying maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) or upgrading existing fleets. Annex A to this document lists the countries with the 30 longest coastlines, together with the maritime patrol aircraft operated by each country. The UK is the only country in the top 20 that does not protect its borders in this way. 1.4 There are several levels of maritime reconnaissance from wide area surveillance to close-in fleet protection. In this document consideration is given to the roles that would have been carried out by a platform such as Nimrod MRA4. 1.5 The traditional roles of a maritime patrol aircraft include submarine and surface surveillance. Over 40 countries operate submarines and many, such as China, North Korea and Iran are still building them. The possibility that submarines may also be used for criminal activity should not be discounted. 1.6 The requirement for surface search is not limited to the waters surrounding the UK. Counter-piracy has been dominant in the maritime surveillance activities of many nations in recent years. The actions of pirates in the Gulf of Aden pose an increasing threat to world trade and could potentially have a great impact on the UK in terms of denying passage of essential resources. 1.7 During 2010 there were 104 pirate attacks resulting in the capture of 51 vessels, 39 of them were still being held on 1 January 2011, including 15 cargo vessels and six oil tankers. 1.8 In addition to the maritime surveillance roles, the UK has a requirement for an ISTAR/ELINT platform. The Nimrod MRA4 would have been excellent for this purpose, in addition to its maritime reconnaissance role. The UK is now to rely on Rivet Joint for its ISTAR/ELINT data gathering, but it is unlikely that this will provide sufficient capability in this area. In devising a maritime reconnaissance strategy consideration should be given to using platforms that can also carry out ISTAR tasks. 1.9 Section 2 of this document lists some options for providing a maritime reconnaissance capability. It is hoped that the Ministry of Defence will have considered the availability, technical specification and cost aspects of these options in detail, but a few thoughts on each of them are provided in Annex B. 1.10 The countries that are currently investing most heavily in maritime reconnaissance are the US, India and Australia. Both the US and India are planning to use dedicated manned MPA in the form of the new P-8 aircraft in conjunction with Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs). Australia is considering the same strategy, though a $1 billion Orion P-3 upgrade project is also underway there. 1.11 It seems reasonable that the UK should also consider using a mixture of different platforms for maritime surveillance. However, there are two major issues that need to be taken into account when devising a strategy for maritime reconnaissance and especially when considering the use of UAVs for this purpose. 1.12 The first is the way in which maritime patrol tasks are carried out and the second is the way in which the sensors are operated. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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1.13 Section 3 of this document describes the roles of the MPA and discusses whether UAVs are suitable for each of them. The reason for exploring the use of UAVs in this document is that it is my view that the Government may decide that it is going to use UAVs for maritime reconnaissance without properly considering the issues.

2.Possibilities forMaritimePatrol

2.1 Following the untimely destruction of the Nimrod MRA4 aircraft, the possibilities for the provision of a UK maritime patrol capability include: — Continued use of Merlin Helicopters and Type 23 Frigates. — Procurement of a new fleet of large manned aircraft, such as P-8 or CN-235. — Purchase of second-hand P-3s and upgrading them to an acceptable standard. — Procurement of smaller dedicated MPA aircraft that have been derived from commercial airframes such as DASH-8 or Gulfstream. — Use of UAVs, such as Heron or Global Hawk. — The installation of sensors on other aircraft such as A400 and A330 so that maritime reconnaissance can be carried out as a secondary role. — Use of Lighter than air (LTA) vehicles. — Satellite Surveillance. — Use of alternative sources of information such as Automatic Identification System (AIS) data received from ships coupled with data from land-based electronic surveillance systems. — Collaborative programmes with allies to make use of their platforms in our territorial waters.

2.2 Table 1 shows the various tasks that are carried out by a MPA capable of wide-area surveillance and the ability of each of the above options to perform the MPA roles.

Table 1

MPA ROLES AND POSSIBLE PLATFORM OPTIONS FOR THEIR FULFILMENT Asset Merlin New Long- Upgraded New Short- UAV A400 LTA Satellite Task range MPA P-3 range MPA /A330 Submarine Yes Yes Yes possibly No No No No Detection Shipping Limited Yes Yes Limited Limited Yes Yes Yes Surveillance Sensors Range Sensors Fleet Protection Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No ISTAR No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes ELINT data No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes gathering Counter-terrorism/ No Yes Yes Yes No Yes? No No Border Protection Weapons Yes Yes Yes No No Yes? No No deployment Search & Rescue Limited Yes Yes Limited No Search No No Range Range only Emergency Comms No Yes Yes No Possible Yes No No Overseas Maritime No Yes Yes No No No No No Patrol Counter-pirate No Yes Yes No No No No No operations Protection of Limited Yes Yes Limited Yes No No No Trident Submarines Range Range

2.3 As can be seen from Table 1, there are two options that will provide a “drop-in” replacement for the MRA4—the procurement of a fleet of new aircraft or the refurbishment of a fleet of second-hand P-3s. The other options can only provide limited maritime patrol cover.

2.4 Annex B provides some notes on each of the options and Table 2 gives examples of the time-scales and costs of some typical maritime reconnaissance procurements and the Watchkeeper UAV programme. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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Table 2

TIME-SCALES OF PLATFORM INTRODUCTION AND COST PER PLATFORM Platform Contract First Flight In-service Programme Cost Cost/Platform Award Date P-8 (US) 2004 2009 2013? $30 b £200 m P-8 (India) 2009 2013? ?? $2.1 b £167 m CN-235 (HC-144A)(US) 2010 2011 2012? $117 m £25 m CN-235 (South Korea) 2008 2012 $96 m £15 m P-3 (Australia) 2005 2012? A$1 b £37 m P-3 (New Zealand) 2004 2011 2012? NZ$360 m £31 m P-3 (Brazil) 2005 2011 2012? €320 m £30 m P-3 (Germany) 2003 2006 2006 €295 m £31 m P-3 (Taiwan) 2007 2012? 2012? $666 £35 m RQ4 Global Hawk (US) 2009 2014? £35 m Mahatz I (Israel) 2007 £3 m Watchkeeper (UK) 2005 2010 2012? £800 m £15 m

2.5 The first thing to note from Table 2 is that the time-scales for buying a well-established aircraft type such as CN-235 are at least four years and the development of the expensive P-8 is taking considerably longer.

2.6 P-3 upgrade programmes are typically taking more than five years and most of them will not be completed by the desired in-service date. The cost per platform for P-3 upgrade is consistently between £30 million and £37 million.

3. The use of UAVs for Maritime Patrol 3.1 There are a few UAV programmes for maritime reconnaissance in development, but all countries that are considering the use of such platforms also have continuing plans to use manned aircraft, due the unsuitability of unmanned aircraft for some of the key MPA roles.

3.2 UAVs have now been extensively and successfully used for IMINT (imagery intelligence) and for short range SIGINT (signals intelligence) overland in Afghanistan. However, many of the important maritime surveillance tasks cannot be carried out by UAVs.

3.3 The traditional role of the MPA is in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) using both “wet” (acoustic) sensors and “dry” (radar, Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and Electro-Optic (EO)) sensors. UAVs cannot use wet sensors and although they can gather ESM and radar data, the need for specialist operation of these sensors leads to onerous requirements for data transfer so that the information can be interpreted by expert operators located on the ground.

3.4 The interpretation of sensor data is complex and it takes years of practice to be able to extract the important features from complicated pictures—the possibility that UAVs would be able to operate autonomously in these areas is many years in the future.

3.5 As can be seen from Table 1 there are some maritime patrol roles of the MPA that can be undertaken by UAVs but there are also tasks that definitely require Operator intervention including “wet” sensor and ESM Operation.

3.6 Two of the major issues with using UAVs are the way in which maritime patrol sorties are carried out and the remote operation of the sensors. When deciding whether a UAV is a good option for maritime patrol, the mission profiles must be taken into account. Although a typical mission may encompass more than one of the roles, each of the significant roles is considered here in isolation in order to decide if a UAV would be suitable.

3.7 Submarine Detection (ASW)

3.7.1 A typical maritime patrol mission to monitor submarine activity will start with the aircraft following a pre-determined flight plan and the aircrew monitoring the dry sensor displays. The objective of the mission may be to locate a submarine that is known to be somewhere in vicinity of the aircraft flight-path. When the target is located the aircraft will alter its course and altitude to refine its location estimate and to find out more information, possibly circling the target at low level and using the Wet sensors.

3.7.2 This mission cannot be accomplished by a UAV because although it is being remotely piloted, the data transmission necessary to monitor the dry sensor output cannot be carried out using line-of-sight when the UAV is at low level. In any case, wet sensors are not available on a UAV, severely limiting the capability for submarine detection. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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3.8 Shipping Surveillance (ASuW) 3.8.1 In this role wide-area surveillance is carried out to build up a picture of surface vessels. The main sensors used are the radar and ESM. A UAV can fly a pre-determined route to gather data to build up a surface picture, but the data-gathering is only the first part of the process. 3.8.2 To make use of ESM data in real time requires constant manipulation of tracks (see figure 1) by the Operator in order to filter out the many spurious tracks that are produced and to direct the ESM search strategy. This is the case for all ESM systems in use world-wide. A massive amount of data would need to be transferred from the UAV for use by the remote Operator. Commands for the change in mode of the ESM would need to be sent back to the UAV in a timely manner. 3.8.3 An example of the picture that is typically seen by the ESM operator is shown in figure 1. There are just 3 radar targets, but there are many tracks and location fixes seen on the Operators screen. The experienced Operator can look at the parameters associated with each track to make sense of the situation.

Figure 1 TYPICAL PICTURE SEEN BY ESM OPERATOR

(DOA = Direction of Arrival)

3.9 Search & Rescue 3.9.1 This significant role involves the intensive use of sensors, including the eyes of the aircrew and decisions have to be taken about changes to the aircraft flight path in an extremely timely manner. UAVs are not suitable for this role. In any case, they cannot deploy dinghies for rescue purposes.

3.11 Counter-piracy 3.11.1 The use of manned maritime patrol aircraft provided by the international community has had a positive impact on the outcome of Somali pirate attacks. 3.11.2 Recently there have MPAs from many countries including Australia, France, Germany, Norway and Spain patrolling the Indian Ocean off the Horn of Africa. The sight of a large war-plane circling above a merchant ship has had the desired deterrent effect. The surface search task that must be carried out to find vulnerable merchant ships and the pirate vessels that are targeting them requires expert sensor operation and is not suitable for UAVs.

3.12 Weapon Deployment 3.12.1 There are no UAVs for maritime patrol that are armed. Reasons for this include the restrictions of operating UAVs in civilian airspace and payload weight limitations. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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3.13 ELINT Data Gathering 3.13.1 Although not a primary requirement for maritime reconnaissance, this role is one for which UAVs are suitable. Data can be stored in the UAV for download at the end of a mission for off-line analysis.

4. Conclusions 4.1 The current UK provisions for maritime patrol are inadequate; the borders of the UK are unmonitored and undefended; the rest of the world know this. 4.2 When considering providing a maritime patrol capability it is possible that the Government will choose the fashionable option for this purpose, namely the use of UAVs. Whilst there are some good reasons for using UAVs for some maritime patrol tasks, there are significant short-comings that mean that at best UAVs should only be part of the strategy for maritime patrol. Manned aircraft continue to be the only effective platforms to carry out all the roles of maritime surveillance. 4.3 With regard to acquiring a new fleet of MPAs, the P-8 is an expensive option, there are known short- comings with the mission system and the development of this aircraft type has already been subject to delays. The CN-235 is a cheaper option, but information about the performance of the mission system should be sought before a decision about the purchase of this aircraft type for maritime patrol were to be made. 4.4 The popular choice world-wide for maritime surveillance is still the Orion P-3, with several countries in the process of acquiring second-hand airframes and upgrade programmes in progress elsewhere. The use of a fleet of upgraded P-3 would probably not be the choice of the Government especially as they have wasted £3.6 billion by destroying aircraft of superior capability. 4.5 However, some of our closest allies are currently embarking on P-3 upgrade programmes, so it may be a good option to seek to make use of facilities that have been developed by them. For example, the Safe Air Ltd. facility at Blenheim in New Zealand is upgrading P-3s that will provide them with maritime reconnaissance for the next 15 years. A fleet of 10 aircraft with adequate maritime patrol capability could probably be acquired for £350 million, based on what other countries are paying for similar capability. 4.6 In addition to the use of MPAs, the development of land-based sensors using ESM and AIS data would be a cost-effective way of providing short-range maritime surveillance. March 2012

Annex A MPA PROGRAMMES WORLD-WIDE A.1 Table A ranks countries of the world by coastline length. The numbers and types of Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) operated by each country are also shown.

Table A LIST OF COUNTRIES RANKED BY COASTLINE LENGTH (SOURCE DATA = CIA WORLD FACTBOOK) AND MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT IN OPERATION AND ON ORDER. Rank Country Coastline No. of MPA in service No. of MPA on order (km) 1 Canada 202,080 4 CP-140 2 Indonesia 54,716 12 NC-212 6 CN-235 3 Denmark inc. Greenland 52,387 3 Challenger 604 4 Russia 37,653 >100 Su24MR Not Known >100 IL38 + many others 5 Philippines 36,289 2 F-27 ? CN-235 6 Japan 29,751 110 P-3 80 Kawasaki P-1 7 Australia 25,760 18 P-3 Considering P-8 + UAV 8 Norway 25,148 6 P-3 9 United States 19,924 154 P-3 108 P-8 + UAVs 10 New Zealand 15,134 6 P-3 11 China 14,500 4 Y-8 MPA, 2 Y-8J, 4 SH-5 Not Known 12 Greece 13,676 6 P-3 13 United Kingdom 12,429 0 0 14 Mexico 9,330 7 C212 10 N235 15 Italy 7,600 7 Atlantique 4 ATR 72 16 Brazil 7,491 16 EMB 110 9 P-3 17 Turkey 7,200 10 ATR 72, 9 CN 235 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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Rank Country Coastline No. of MPA in service No. of MPA on order (km) 18 India 7,000 8 TU-142, 5—IL38 16 P-8 19 Chile 6,435 3 C-295, 4 P-3 5 C-295 20 Micronesia 6,112 0 21 Croatia 5,835 5 AT802 22 Solomon Islands 5,313 0 23 Papua New Guinea 5,152 2 CN-235 24 Argentina 4,989 6 P-3, 2 P-95, 2 Beechcraft 25 Iceland 4,988 0 26 Spain 4,964 20 CN-235,7 P-3, 3 F-27 27 Madagascar 4,828 0 28 Malaysia 4,675 4 Beechcraft 4 CN-235 29 Estonia 3,794 0 34 France 3,427 27 Atlantique

A.2 The United Kingdom appears at number 13 in Table A and as can be seen, countries one to 20 all have maritime patrol capability. A.3 Two of our nearest neighbours, France and Spain, each have over 25 MPAs, and have coastline lengths one third of that of the UK. A.4 However, the UK is not the only country in the table that does not carry out airborne maritime surveillance. We share this short-coming with Micronesia, the Solomon Islands and Iceland—all of which have no military capability at all and have to rely on their neighbours and allies to provide for them. A.5 It is part of the UK Government stated strategy for maritime surveillance that we also rely on neighbours and allies, but the difference is that Micronesia and the Solomon Islands do not say that they have a “Full Spectrum Defence Capability” as the Prime Minister has claimed. A.6 Although our neighbours and allies may be prepared to help the UK out by providing some information on activities around the coast of the UK, it is unlikely that they would come to our aid in the defence of any of the 14 British overseas territories, especially the Falkland Islands. A.7 Madagascar appears at number 28 in table A and does not have maritime patrol aircraft, however it does have strategically important land-based maritime surveillance equipment, installed by India, to allow protection of the “country’s sea lanes of commerce”. Indonesia also has land-based maritime surveillance to protect the extremely busy shipping route through the straits of Malacca. A.8 The only other country in the table with no MPA capability is Estonia which has 20 coastal defence radars covering the entire length of its coastline. A.9 No such network of radars is in operation in defence of the UK coastline. A.10 There are orders for maritime patrol aircraft from many countries spanning the globe. Some of the nations which have either recently ordered MPA or are about to do so include Bangladesh, India, Iran, Italy, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, UAE and Vietnam. A.11 Shortly after the decision to scrap the Nimrod MRA4 the French Government announced an upgrade to their fleet of 27 Atlantique MPA, to ensure that the aircraft will remain in service past 2030. The Atlantiques are to receive a new digital sonobuoy acoustic processing system and upgrades to the mission computer and surveillance radar. The new equipment is designed to improve the ability to track threats, including submarine periscopes in high sea states. A.12 It is fortunate for the UK that France took this decision as a French MPA has already had to provide assistance when the factory fishing vessel Athena caught fire on 3 November 2010, 230 miles from the Scilty Isles, but inside the area for which the UK has responsibility for Search and Rescue. A.13 Another example of the gap in maritime patrol capability has meant that the UK had to borrow MPA from the USA to protect our naval ships during the Libya conflict. A.14 It is likely that the Olympics in London this year will require the good-will of our neighbours and allies to provide protection from possible ship-borne hazards.

Annex B SOME NOTES ON OPTIONS FOR MARITIME RECONNAISSANCE B.1 Use of Merlin Helicopter for Maritime Patrol The Merlin helicopter has an ESM system that is not capable of producing an accurate picture of the electromagnetic environment when operated in littoral waters, so it is of limited use for maritime surveillance other than for blue water fleet protection. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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The Search and Rescue region for which the UK is responsible extends from 45 to 61 degrees North and from three degrees East to 30 degrees West, the UK should be able to offer assistance to vessels which are up to 1,200 nautical miles from our coast. The Merlin has an effective search and rescue range of 300 nm (with one hour search) It cannot be effective for long-range search and rescue as the endurance of these aircraft is insufficient to allow for search patterns of useful duration to be carried out.

B.2 Procurement of a New Maritime Patrol Aircraft There are a few options for the purchase of a new aircraft type that has been produced specifically for maritime patrol; the P-8 Poseidon, the CN-235 MPA and A319 MPA are some of the possible candidates. The P-8 Poseidon is being developed in the US to replace its fleet of Orion P-3s.Following an order for P- 8 placed in July 2004 by the US Navy, the first flight of a P-8 took place in April 2009 with initial operational capability scheduled for 2013. The original order of 117 aircraft for the US Navy, has recently (February 2012) been reduced by 10, apparently saving $5.6 billion dollars. If this cost saving is taken literally it amounts to $560 (~£354) million per aircraft. However, other sources have indicated that the cost per aircraft is about £200 million. The first, and so far only, international customer of the P-8 is India. In January 2009 India placed an initial order for eight P8I MPA at a cost of $2.1 billion dollars. The first aircraft is expected to be delivered in 2013. Australia and Italy are potential customers so the procurement of a fleet of P-8 may allow opportunities for collaboration in the development and testing of the mission systems. This will lead to cost savings for these activities and more chance of getting the complex mission systems to work properly. This is an important consideration as part of the mission system on the P-8 is similar to that on the Wedgetail, (the AEW aircraft chosen by Australia), and that aircraft program is on the Australian Government “Projects of Concern” list due to issues with the mission system. A cheaper option for a fleet of new maritime patrol aircraft is the CN-235 (or the C-295, a bigger version) The CN-235 is in service with many countries (including Mexico, US, Brunei, UAE, Pakistan, Turkey) for medium range Maritime Patrol. There are two versions of the CN-235, one made in Spain by CASA and the other manufactured in Indonesia by IPTN. The cost of buying a CN-235 is estimated to be between £15 million and £25 million pounds. Apart from being considerably cheaper than the P-8, the CN-235 has an advantage in that it has already been in operation in several different countries. Of course, clarification should be sought on its actual performance before a decision to buy this type of aircraft is taken.

B.3 P-3 Upgrade Although the P-3 Orion first saw service in 1962, there are still many of this type of aircraft in operation world-wide The P-3 fleets of several countries are undergoing upgrade programmes to provide them with maritime patrol platforms that will continue in operation for at least another decade, in some cases with extra ELINT capability. Australia is upgrading 18 aircraft, at a cost in the region of A$1 billion and expects them to be in service until 2018. New Zealand is also upgrading its fleet of six aircraft, providing enhanced radar and electronic surveillance capability and projected to remain in service until 2025 at a cost of NZ$360, with operating costs of NZ$166 per annum. In June 2003 the Dutch Government announced its plans to sell its P-3C Orions. Germany bought eight of them, paying€271 million and Portugal bought the remaining five aircraft.. Germany paid another€24 million for training of German ground technicians and flight crews and took delivery of the first P-3C Orion on 28 February 2006. Brazil bought 12 former US Navy Orion P-3A aircraft 10 years ago and awarded a€320 million upgrade contract to Airbus Military in Madrid in 2005. The first of the upgraded aircraft was formally introduced into the Brazilian Air Force in October 2011, with the introduction of 2 more in 2011 and six more in 2012. The remaining three P-3As are to be used for spares. The Taiwan Navy obtained 12 P-3C aircraft under the U.S. Government’s Foreign Military Sales program in 2007. The aircraft are taken from desert storage at Davis Monthan AFB and will be completely overhauled and modernised by Lockheed Martin. Planned mission system upgrades include installation of electronic support measures, acoustics, communications, electro-optic and infrared systems, and new data management software and hardware, controls, displays and mission computers. The first modernised Taiwan Navy P-3C aircraft is planned to be delivered in 2012. So, acquiring and upgrading some P-3s seems to be a popular choice when it comes to fill the gap in capability, albeit with aged airframes. There are still plenty of P3s stored in the US desert! cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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B.4 Purchase of aShort-range MPA The advantage of purchasing short-range aircraft for maritime patrol are that they are relatively cheap to buy and maintain and a fleet could be built up fleet as funds allow. However, they cannot be configured to carry out all the roles of the larger dedicated MPA. For example, Bombardier have teamed up with the Elta Systems division of Israel Aerospace Industries to develop a maritime patrol aircraft based on Q400 twin-turboprop. Elta’s airborne systems and radars division are offering the Q400 as a direct replacement with low operating costs for the P-3 Orion. The main sensor is the Israeli company’s EL/M-2022 maritime surveillance radar, also used on the Heron UAV.

B.5 Lighter than Air (LTA) Vehicles for Maritime Patrol The US Navy LTA program, discontinued in 1961, was resurrected in March 2010 when with the introduction of the MZ-3A airship. This manned airship was used as a research platform until February 2012, four months after its acceptance by the US Navy, when it was “deflated and stored until future missions warrant its re- activation”. Not limited in payload, a LTA can fly/loiter for many hours and is cheap to operate. The main disadvantages are that it can only travel relatively slowly and cannot carry wet sensors.

B.6 The use of UAVs for Maritime Surveillance UAVs for Maritime Patrol fall into two categories—those for wide area surveillance (taking on some of the roles of long- and medium-range MPAs) and those for close-in support to maritime operations, carrying out tasks that may be accomplished by helicopters (such as Merlin). The UK has had research/trial programmes for the second category. The Joint UAV Experimentation Programme (JUEP) tested the use of a ScanEagle UAV and although these trials were deemed successful, in reality there were technical problems and weather issues that make this conclusion questionable. A programme for the use of UAVs for ship protection has recently been cancelled by the US Navy. The medium-range martime unmanned aircraft system (MRMUAS) was envisioned as a multi-intelligence platform operating from aircraft-capable ships and providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in the maritime and littoral domains. The US Navy had wanted to field a limited MRMUAS capability as early as 2016, but due to “changing priorities” the programme was cancelled in February 2012, saving $200 million in Fiscal Year 2013. World-wide there are two main UAV types that have been developed for wide-area maritime patrol. The Heron/Mahatz, manufactured in Israel and the RG4 Global Hawk is under development by Lockheed in the US. The Heron (or Mahatz) family of UAVs is used by Israel, India and Turkey for maritime reconnaissance. The latest version has Synthetic Aperture radar and ELINT capability. It has an endurance of 36 hours, can operate up to 45,000ft altitude and can carry a payload of 1,000kg. Each UAV costs $5 million and there would of course be additional costs for ground stations and satellite communication infrastructure. In 2008 Australia carried out a six week trial into using Heron for maritime reconnaissance. The results of that trial should be taken into account when deciding on the value of using UAVs for this purpose in the UK. The other UAV in development for maritime reconnaissance is the RQ4 Global Hawk. It is to form part of the US Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) capability. Trials have been carried out since at least 2009 with the Global Hawk being piloted remotely from the US. The demonstration phase of this project is due to conclude in September 2012. Other versions of the Global Hawk are in use for surveillance by the US military. In conclusion, UAVs do have some advantages for maritime patrol: — Endurance. — Low observability. — No on-board crew to get tired and hungry, though significant man-power is still needed to fly and operate the sensors from the ground. But, there are signification disadvantages: — Range limited by communications capability—if the UAV is further away than line-of-sight, then satellite communications must be used. Data transmission rates are limited by power requirements. — Payload weight considerations—a capable radar requires an appropriately-sized antenna, typical radar weights may be ~50kg and Optical sensor weights ~40 kg. — Operation in civilian air space is restricted. — Remote control of sensors is limited due to bandwidth required for communications. — Lack of Flexibility of Operation—UAVs are not autonomous, they are unable to automatically change flight course in order to investigate a self-identified target. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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B.7 Use of A400 and A330 These platforms would be ideal for ISTAR roles, with their patterns of deployment including loitering for re- fueling(A330) and carrying out routine flights for transport purposes along relatively repeatable routes (A400). They could be fitted with radar, Electronic Surveillance and even EO sensors that could be suitable for secondary roles as MPAs, to be used if an Urgent Requirement for Maritime Patrol were to emerge . Much of the sensor systems from the MRA4 has been destroyed, however, the skills to operate the kit are just about current, so if such a capability needed to be reconstituted in a hurry, this could be a good option.

B.8 Collaboration with Allies Annex A provides a table of the maritime aircraft operated by the countries with the 30 longest coastlines. Our close allies Australia and New Zealand appear in this table and both have very active maritime patrol upgrade programmes. Although it is extremely unlikely they would be able to commit aircraft for regular surveillance around the UK, it may be possible for them to fly occasional sorties in UK territorial waters. For our allies this would have an advantage of gaining experience of flying in a different, more dense shipping environment than they would normally encounter. For the UK the occasional operation of maritime patrol aircraft around the coast would have strategic importance as anyone with mal-intent would not know whether or not surveillance was being carried out at any particular time.

B.9 Use of Satellites I have made use of data downloaded from satellites for the verification of airborne equipment performance. Satellites cannot carry out the roles of the MPA.

B.10 Use of AIS/Land-based Electronic Surveillance The advent of Automatic Identification System (AIS) has meant that it is now possible to see a picture of ships located anywhere in the world from any computer attached to the internet—and it doesn’t cost anything. AIS (Automatic Identification System) data is transmitted by all ships over 300 tons and all passenger ships. This information can be used together with pulse data from a ship’s radars, received using a land-based electronic surveillance system to verify the identity of a ship. The pattern of pulses from an individual radar is unique, so can act as a “finger-print” for the ship. It is easy to try to disguise the identity of a ship by using false AIS data, but changing the characteristics of the radar to match that of another ship whose identity has been stolen is not possible. Such a system has been proposed to the MoD, but not taken up. It would be cheap to implement, could be introduced incrementally as funds allow and would give border protection to a range of about 30 miles.

Written evidence from Northrop Grumman

In response to the House of Commons Defence Select Committee’s request for evidence for the inquiry into the contribution of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and UK Armed Forces to the UK’s future requirements for maritime surveillance, announced on 9 February 2012, Northrop Grumman is pleased to submit the following information.

Maritime surveillance is a broad area, covering many different aspects. The MoD and UK Armed Forces play a crucial and pivotal role in the provision of maritime surveillance capabilities. Recognising that the Committee wishes to examine the current and future contribution to the provision of these capabilities, this submission is aimed at informing the Committee about industry capabilities available for future maritime surveillance.

ExecutiveSummary — This submission records the views and experience of Northrop Grumman on the contribution of maritime surveillance and ISTAR to current operations based on the company’s extensive experience in the United States in developing and supporting ISTAR capability, particularly UAVs for the US Air Force, US Army and the US Navy. The observations relate specifically to the experience and lessons learned in employing the Global Hawk and Fire Scout systems from their first days as, in the case of Global Hawk, an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator (ACTD) in Operation Enduring Freedom to its current and projected employment in combat operations and support to civil operations; and, Fire Scout, from its position as a “programme of record” engineering development programme to its current deployments on board USN ships and in Afghanistan. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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— Maritime surveillance and ISTAR is key military capability that generates and delivers specific information and intelligence to decision makers at all levels in support of the planning and conduct of military operations. UAVs play an important role in maritime surveillance and ISTAR in both the US and Europe, offering vital persistent capability for peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. UAVs have transformed the battlefield in Iraq and Afghanistan and at sea, and are becoming the key element in the inventories of the world’s best militaries. Future conflicts will see their roles expanded dramatically. In war-fighting situations, they offer near real-time target identification, engagement and assessment; timescales many times faster than for conventional platforms. While UAVs can fulfil their missions using a stand-alone approach, full exploitation of the operational benefits of UAVs is only possible in a joint integrated and network-enabled system. Within the US Armed Forces their use is already widespread, while, in the UK, the MoD has made ISTAR capability and UAVs a strategic priority. — Northrop Grumman has a 60-year history of providing more than 100,000 unmanned systems to military customers in the US and around the world. Its current portfolio spans a variety of different platforms: the high-altitude, long-endurance RQ-4 Global Hawk for the US Air Force and Navy; the MQ-8B Fire Scout helicopters for the US Navy (and Army through a joint operation) with the ability to take off and land autonomously on any aviation-capable warship and at prepared and unprepared landing zones; the MQ-5B Hunter medium-altitude UAV first fielded for the US Army in 1996 to provide dedicated reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition capability, relaying information real-time via video link to ground forces; the tail less, fighter-sized X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS) for the US Navy; and now the Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle (LEMV) demonstration capability for the US Army. The X-47, currently with many autonomous flights under its belt, will perform the first ever at-sea aircraft carrier launch and recovery for a fixed-wing unmanned air system. Autonomous refuelling in midair will further demonstrate and inform the US Navy of the potential capabilities of an autonomous, low-observable air vehicle. — The Global Hawk UAV developed for the US Air Force is a fully autonomous high altitude, long endurance unmanned aerial system. It can autonomously, taxi, take off, fly and remain on station while capturing imagery, return and land. It provides persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and is designed to fly above 60,000 feet for more than 35 hours. Global Hawk is commanded during its flight by ground-based pilots who can alter the system’s flight path and sensor operations with a mouse-click. — The US Navy’s MQ-4C Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) programme provides persistent maritime Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) data to the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force (MPRF). The MQ-4C BAMS UAS is a multi- mission system to support strike, signals intelligence, and communications relay for the Multi- Mission Maritime Aircraft community worldwide. The MQ-4C BAMS UAS will provide ISR persistence over large maritime distances for long periods of time in multiple simultaneous orbits worldwide. MQ-4C BAMS UAS missions include, but are not limited to, maritime surveillance, collection of enemy order of battle information, battle damage assessment, port surveillance, communication relay, and support of the following missions—maritime interdiction, surface warfare, battle-space management, and targeting for maritime and littoral strike missions. — The Fire Scout MQ-8B vertical take-off UAV developed for the US Navy is a fully autonomous medium altitude, medium endurance system providing unprecedented situation awareness and precision targeting support to the US Navy. The Fire Scout endurance upgrade (Bell 407 vehicle) is in development for the US Navy for Special Operations Forces applications, and builds on the MQ- 8B legacy but with the added capabilities of longer endurance, greater payloads, greater reliability, lower operating costs, easier logistics, plus other attributes. In 2011, the US Navy announced its intention to procure the Fire Scout endurance upgrade, with initial procurement of six units. — The Fire-X programme was developed to prove the concept of creating an autonomous vertical take- off UAV with greater capability than the MQ-8B by combining the proven MQ-8B unmanned systems architecture with a manned helicopter. In that programme Northrop Grumman converted a manned helicopter to an autonomous UAS in nine-months and the aircraft has had numerous autonomous envelope expansion flights since first flight in December 2010. The unmanning of a vehicle safely, quickly and at low cost was due to the maturity of the Fire Scout’s systems—both hardware and more specifically, software—and the maturity of the manned helicopter. The investment of hundreds of millions of dollars in the Fire Scout system has enabled a vertical take-off UAS to be militarily operable in a routine manner; the robust software to detect and accommodate known failure modes in every flight critical component has been written, tested and certified by the US Navy for shipboard operations. This hardware and software package can be transferred to other existing helicopters. Northrop Grumman has suggested a UK Gazelle helicopter as a low cost/low risk and sovereign system demonstrator, in accordance with the Technology Advantage Principal of the 1st February Defence White Paper. A helicopter of that size class has the capability to carry the combined radar, electro-optic/infra red (EO/IR), automatic identification system (AIS) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) payload simultaneously, necessary to be a valuable asset when operating with the vast expanses that make up the maritime operating environment. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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— Northrop Grumman was selected by the US Army to build a first-of-a-kind, Long Endurance Multi Intelligence Vehicle (LEMV) which will provide a revolutionary lighter-than-air (LTA) hybrid airship capability in long endurance, persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and maritime surveillance. LTA utilises an open-architecture design which ensures a flexible, reconfigurable multi- mission capability allowing the hybrid airship to be selectively configured to meet any mission need. The current payload was selected by the US Army based on high technology readiness levels to avoid schedule and cost risk to an already very aggressive development schedule. LTA has a payload capacity in excess of 2,500 pounds with an ability to remain airborne for weeks at a time. While burning only about 4.6 gallons per hour of fuel during normal flight operations, over a three-week period, LTA will only consume approximately $15,000 in fuel costs. ISR payloads are integrated efficiently through a Murphy Bay (modular payload bay) on the vehicle centre line. This multi- intelligence vehicle can carry any combination of radar, SIGINT, full motion video and line-of-sight/ beyond line of sight communications relay payloads simultaneously. Over a 24-hour period, it would take up to 24 Liberty aircraft to provide the same level of sensor capabilities on a persistent basis as LTA can provide to combat forces. LTA operates above 20,000 feet and can operate from unprepared surfaces so that traditional runways are not a requirement.

Background — Northrop Grumman is a leading global security company providing innovative systems, products and solutions in aerospace, electronics, information systems, and technical services to Government and commercial customers worldwide. With headquarters in Washington DC the company has annual sales of $26.4 billion (2011) and leading capabilities in Unmanned Systems, Cyber Security, C4ISR and Logistics. — In the UK, Northrop Grumman has a substantial footprint and is a key supplier in the defence, security, IT and public safety markets providing a range of capabilities and technologies in support of the Armed Forces and emergency services. These include a number of operationally important defence programmes namely the whole life support of the Sentry E-3D AWACS fleet of aircraft, the CUTLASS explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) vehicle and large aircraft infrared countermeasures systems (LAIRCM). — It is has strong experience and specialist resources in computer network operations and cyber security and is developing the next-generation of advanced cyber solutions. — The UK is an important market for the company as a supplier base and a source for technology partners, and Northrop Grumman’s UK entities represent the largest single component of the Corporation’s entire international business portfolio outside of the US. Exports from Northrop Grumman’s UK entities account for some 70% of sales from its UK businesses. — We have considerable ISTAR domain expertise that we wish to bring into the UK market and can contribute by providing systems integration and interoperability expertise. Northrop Grumman has been an active contributor to the recently concluded Air ISTAR Programme Investigation commissioned by the Head of Capability ISTAR in mid-2011. — We are committed to bringing advanced technology into the UK defence market to accelerate the fielding of next-generation military capability and are able and willing to participate fully in helping to meet the UK’s requirements in the Maritime Surveillance and ISTAR domain and to working with the MoD and the UK supply chain to achieve these objectives.

HighAltitudeLongEnduranceCapability

1. The Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Blocks 10, 20, 30 and 40 Global Hawk UAVs are currently supporting the US Air Force, US Navy, NASA, Germany and soon to be NATO. Global Hawk is deployed in support of US military operations in the Pacific, European and Middle East, logging more than 60,000 combat hours and 70,000 total flight hours conducting intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions with an over 95% mission effectiveness. Further missions have been flown to all corners of the globe and even in the Arctic. UAVs are commanded by pilots from mission control elements stationed at various locations in the USA. The Global Hawk has been outfitted with a variety of sensors including scientific, communication relay, electro- optical, signals intelligence, radar and maritime. The output of this variety of sensors paints a comprehensive picture of the maritime domain in the littoral or open ocean.

2. Northrop Grumman was awarded a contract for the US Navy’s MQ-4C BAMS programme on 22 April, 2008. The MQ-4C BAMS UAS uses a maritime derivative of the RQ-4 Global Hawk equipped with a 360 degree Multi-Function Active Sensor (MFAS) active electronically scanned array along with Navy-specific ground stations. Northrop Grumman offered the best value for the BAMS mission—it’s faster, travels farther, with longer time-on-station to provide more ISR information to more warfighters at a lower overall cost. Northrop Grumman MQ-4C BAMS UAS has a low total acquisition and system operating cost over the lifetime of the entire programme and can deliver unprecedented long range, persistent maritime ISR capability to the warfighter now. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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Persistent Organic Maritime Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) 3. The rotary wing, vertical take-off and landing UAS, Fire Scout, has a proven capability to detect, identify and target tactical threats at sea or ashore. It can conduct autonomous operations from all air-capable ships. The MQ-8B has endurance greater than seven hours, and is capable of continuous operations out to 110 nm (200 km) from its launch site, with a typical operating altitude greater than 12,000 ft and 115+ knots airspeed. The Fire Scout Endurance Upgrade is a fully autonomous expanded capability version of the MQ-8B with the extended range, payload and cargo capabilities of the commercially mature, FAA-certified manned helicopter. Its extended payload capability (2,600 lbs internal or external), and increased endurance (up to 15 hours) will deliver additional mission flexibility to commanders at sea. 4. The Fire Scout possesses the “safety case” to operate at sea, with three successful deployments and combat operations from two ships (both frigate-sized), and current operations in Afghanistan supporting the US Army. 5. The ability to carry multiple high fidelity sensors, acting in concert through a modular mission payloads architecture, including a baseline payload of electro optical/infrared sensors and a laser range finder/illuminator, and ship Automatic Identification System (AIS), signals intelligence (SIGINT) allows the Fire Scout to “find” as well as “fix” targets at range, unlike smaller single purpose systems that require a priori target location. The US Navy plans to incorporate maritime radar that will provide wide area surveillance. Fire Scout complements the manned helicopter; it frees the manned helicopter to concentrate on its prime job, while the vertical take- off UAS does the mundane surveillance and situational awareness task. The result is both savings in overall operating cost and longer life for the manned assets. 6. The conversion of an existing helicopter to a vertical take-off UAS has been proven by the success of the Fire-X demonstrator. The conversion of a UK helicopter is achievable with very low cost, low risk and a short schedule. Northrop Grumman has generated a concept and operational demonstration project opportunity based on a UK-owned Gazelle helicopter as a lowest cost option, although other UK-owned and operated helicopters could also be considered. The conversion would consist of the incorporation of the certified and NATO standards-compliant MQ-8B vehicle management system hardware and software, into a fully certified Gazelle airframe, followed by development test flying, all accomplished in the UK by a Northrop Grumman and UK engineering team. 7. The UK MoD procured a total of 190 Agusta Westland SA 341 Gazelle helicopters. Of these 60 are still in the British Army inventory and 27 are currently in service with 7 (Trg) Squadron, Army Air Corps. The Gazelle is a light observation helicopter, approximately 25% larger than the Fire Scout. The aircraft has a simple, proven airframe and engine, low operating and support costs, a strong support base (a total of 1,200 aircraft were built) and a very good reliability record. The Gazelle has a single turbine engine and a mechanical flight control system, akin the Fire Scout helicopter. Inherent to a helicopter, the airframe can be easily “zero- timed”, giving the capability for many more flight hours. It therefore makes a suitable helicopter for conversion to a vertical take-off UAS demonstrator, with the combination of the certified unmanned vehicle systems (Fire Scout-derived) and the certificated helicopter systems (basic manned Gazelle). 8. A typical payload combination would provide detection of large ships out to 100+ nautical miles (NM), while searching 6,000 sq NM per hour for small ships, and recognition of ships during day or night conditions at ranges greater than 20 NM. Accurate targeting is provided and wide area dissemination is inherent through a robust data link and a direct-process-disseminate (DPD) capability. SIGINT and automatic identification system (AIS) coverage is to the horizon, a considerable range from 12,000 ft altitude, and all this is achieved at stand-off from the ship. Other missions and capabilities are planned for US Navy operations and are made available by the inherent payload capacity. 9. The opportunity to own and operate a maritime UAS will enable the MoD to address the actual requirements for an effective persistent maritime surveillance and ISTAR capability in time to inform the design requirements of the next surface combatant programme. The concept of operations from the deck of a small ship under different conditions requires experimentation and is the key to the choices to be made for the next maritime capability. The Gazelle is sized to fit onto small ships such as the Type 23 frigate with the manned helicopter present, to allow critical manned/unmanned operations to be trialled, but other UK-owned and operated helicopters may also be suitable.

Conclusion 10. Northrop Grumman has a 60-year history of providing unmanned systems to military customers in the US and around the world, from the high-altitude, long-endurance fully autonomous Global Hawk and BAMS for the US Air Force and Navy to the Fire Scout helicopter for the US Navy and Army, to the Hunter medium- altitude UAV and the persistent Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle (LEMV) for the US Army and the X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS) for the US Navy, capable of at-sea aircraft carrier launches and recoveries. 11. Global Hawk was originally developed as a fully autonomous strategic collection platform. It was envisioned that the crew members would simply launch and recover the system while maintaining watch over the pre-programmed mission execution. By rushing the ACTD (prototype system) into combat and taking cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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advantage of the flexibility the system offers, concepts of employment were changed literally “on the fly” to make the system’s employment more effective. With more than 60,000 combat hours, the computer flown, and pilot commanded Global Hawk has proven that a strategic system can be tactically employed. The computer onboard while not a substitute for the pilot, removed the burden of flight control and allowed the pilot to focus on mission execution over a dynamically changing battlefield. Unlike manned aircraft, the mission commander now concentrates solely on optimising intelligence collection for the current task while planning for the next collection event. This combination of computer flown, pilot commanded high-altitude/long endurance UAV coupled with a full complement of advanced sensors in open system architecture provides the best capability to survey a battle space as rugged, vast and remote as Afghanistan or the open Ocean. 12. The MQ-4C Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAVs for the US Navy is designed to work in concert with the P-8 ASW aircraft, and with the lessons of years of USAF RQ-4 operations incorporated. The MQ-4C BAMS is based on the basic RQ-4 Global Hawk design with improvements. The wings are strengthened, anti-ice capability and communications improvements are added coupled with state-of-the-art advanced maritime sensors to give the MQ-4C unprecedented ability to cover the maritime domain. The US Navy has announced a BAMS acquisition programme of 68-aircraft with Initial Operating Capability to be achieved in 2015. 13. Fire Scout was built on the foundation of the Northrop Grumman autonomy experience, to provide robust shipboard surveillance and other mission capabilities that can be organic to a maritime task group. It is the only battle-tested, maritime ISTAR vertical rake-off UAS programme of record operating today; the costs to reach the required maturity are sufficiently large that it will retain that distinction for many years to come. Developing a UK sovereign capability in vertical take-off UAS is possible by leveraging the US investment within a UK-sourced helicopter. A demonstration followed by operational experimentation would inform MoD of the requirements for persistent maritime ISTAR and meet the timelines for Future Force 2020 decision making. 14. Lighter-than-air (LTA) vehicles will bring a revolutionary capability to persistent ISR with the capability to be truly multi-mission with the inherent flexible, reconfigurable mission payloads. In addition to being able to stay airborne for weeks at a time, LTA has very low fuel consumption, provides multi intelligence capabilities and has lower total ownership costs than traditional ISR systems. The UK can clearly leverage the US DoD’s investment in developing this innovative system and in addition to its persistent ISR, the LTA system can provide overland persistent ISR and also effectively support the UK’s maritime operational needs with offshore surveillance or fleet support as an airborne communications node along with the traditional fleet mission needs. LTA can be reconfigured to provide mission lift support and carry up to 40,000 pounds of payload to support resupply and recovery operations. The versatility and affordability features of LTA are clearly unmatched in today’s airborne assets. 12 March 2012

Written evidence from Airbus Military Introduction 1. EADS Airbus Military (hereafter referred to as Airbus Military) welcomes this opportunity to respond to the Defence Select Committee’s inquiry on maritime surveillance. 2. This response opens with an executive summary followed by background information on Airbus Military’s presence in the UK and its maritime capabilities. It then addresses some of the specific issues raised by Committee. 3. We would welcome the opportunity to contribute to any further work investigating a broader range of issues beyond the scope of this present inquiry. 4. It is important to note that maritime surveillance has a number of facets including surface and underwater detection and tracking, support to and coordination of search and rescue, protection of naval deployments (including the nuclear deterrent), strategic intelligence, attack of submarines and potentially surface ships. The decision to scrap the Nimrod means that the UK does not have the ability to carry out these roles at long range or from a fully integrated airborne system.

Executive Summary 5. The UK has a significant maritime surveillance capability gap following the deletion of the Nimrod MRA4 programme. This has raised serious concerns over the protection of naval capital ships, supporting merchant ships and the strategic deterrent. 6. All these assets (including the new Queen Elizabeth II Carriers) constitute large capital expenditures over the coming decades and they need adequate protective insurance policies. 7. The effort required in the future to track increasing submarine numbers around the UK will require constant effort using aircraft equipped to locate and track these potential threats. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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8. It is believed that MoD studies concluded that a medium sized turboprop Maritime Patrol Aircraft would be the most cost-effective means to ameliorate the MPA gap. Currently the Airbus Military C295 MPA is the only proven off-the-shelf solution in this category. 9. Other Government Departments (OGD) studies show that there is an opportunity to provide aerial surveillance for up to 6 separate Government agencies potentially using a single procurement source. These tasks could be satisfied with medium sized Airbus Military MPA/MSA like C295 MPA and CN 235 (MPA means Maritime Patrol Aircraft with an attack capability. MSA means an unarmed Maritime Surveillance Aircraft). 10. Although some of the former Nimrod crews have been loaned to other nations to retain skills, after five years these assets will no longer be available. Therefore, it is essential that a MPA capability is regenerated within this timescale. 11. Airbus Military recommends that the Government acknowledges the severity of the MPA and maritime aerial surveillance capability gaps. Further Airbus Military believes that, because of the time constraints on the availability of trained crews, it is necessary to start a new programme as soon as possible. All the key requirements for MoD and OGDs could be met by a medium sized MPA, as concluded by MoD studies.

About EADS 12. EADS is a global leader in aerospace, defence and related sectors. The EADS group of industries includes Airbus, the leading manufacturer of commercial aircraft, Eurocopter, the world’s largest helicopter supplier, Astrium, the European leader in space programmes from Ariane to Galileo, and Cassidian, a leading provider of cryptography and other security solutions. EADS is the second largest aerospace and defence company in the world and a major partner in many of Europe’s largest aerospace projects, including Eurofighter Typhoon. EADS has a major industrial presence in the UK. Over 17,000 highly-skilled jobs are directly employed at EADS’ 25 key UK sites, and a further 135,000 jobs are indirectly supported throughout the UK supply chain.

Airbus Military in the UK’s Maritime Surveillance Capabilities 13. Airbus Military is the only military and humanitarian transport aircraft manufacturer to develop, produce, sell and support a comprehensive family of military airlifters ranging from three to 37 tonnes of payload. 14. Airbus Military is responsible for delivering the FSTA and A400M programmes in the UK. 15. Airbus Military in the UK is based in London, Filton (Bristol) and Brize Norton where FSTA and A400M will be based and supported through life under service contracts. 16. The Airbus’ Filton facility in Bristol is responsible for the design and production of all A400M wings. 17. C295 is an Airbus Military family of medium sized configurable multifunction aircraft. One version is fitted for MPA operations and includes surface and underwater surveillance and anti-submarine weapons delivery. This aircraft can deliver a cost-effective capability. This aircraft is successfully in service in the MPA role in Portugal and Chile. Airbus Military recommends that the Committee obtains a briefing on the MOD MPA Capability Investigation/WAMUS study (Wide Area Maritime Surveillance Study). 18. Another smaller member of the same aircraft family is the CN 235 MSA used by the United States Coast Guard in the search-and-rescue and maritime patrol missions. Other operators are Spain, Turkey and the Republic of Ireland.

DetailedResponse The Defence Committee asked “how the MoD has determined the future strategic requirements for the UK Armed Forces’ maritime surveillance capabilities, including current and evolving threats” 19. The MoD has determined the future strategic requirements for the UK Armed Forces’ maritime surveillance capabilities through emerging policy guidance: Defence Strategic Direction 2011 and the Strategy for Defence. The Strategy for Defence sets out a new vision of how the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) will deliver Future Force 2020 (FF2020). Based on the National Security Strategy (NSS), SDSR has given Government an opportunity to balance policy, resources and world commitments for the first time in some 30 years. SDSR concluded that the UK should adopt an “Adaptable Strategic Posture” investing in programmes that provide flexibility and advanced capabilities, and that provides for the UK’s Armed Forces to fight and win across the spectrum of operations in seven Military Tasks.i Airbus Military considers that for this aspiration to be made possible one key requirement is to ensure security of the maritime environment across a wide range of potential operations including those that are strictly national and sovereign. 20. Airbus Military stresses that maritime surveillance requires an ability to establish a wide area recognised maritime picture both below and above the water rapidly at long range. Without the capability to conduct comprehensive underwater surveillance or even warfare, the efforts of above water surveillance could be easily undermined by an otherwise unseen submarine threat. Maritime surveillance capabilities should be developed cognisant of current and emerging threats, as summarised below: cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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— Torpedo attacks from nuclear powered or diesel electric hunter-killer submarines. — Long range anti ship missile attacks from submarines, warships and fast attack craft. — Enemy surveillance of key strategic UK facilities including the strategic deterrent. — Pirate attacks. — Maritime terrorism. — Trafficking in drugs, weapons, humans and contraband.

Below Water 21. There are growing concerns about the resurgence in the Russian submarine building and deployed operations programmes. Russian President Vladimir Putin sees submarines as critical to re-generating Russian strategic influence.ii This has caused the US to invest to tackle the increasingly quiet Russian submarines. It is believed that China intends to exercise its rights to defend its rapidly expanding global trade concerns with the use of deployed military naval vessels that will include submarines. 22. The original stealth weapons, submarines, may be second only to unmanned systems in the degree to which they have exploited new technology in the past two decades. Major advances have included air- independent propulsion (AIP) systems, increasing submerged endurance and mobility; automation, reducing crew size (and consequently, life-cycle costs) and improving habitability; electro-optical masts that can sweep the horizon with high-definition in seconds and drop out of sight; and new torpedoes and other weapons. Vigorous AIP and mini submarine building and export programmes are being conducted in Sweden, Germany, Russian, Korea and China. Operating worldwide in both littoral and blue oceanic waters they are emerging as the asymmetric weapon of choice for both state and non state actors since these types of submarines can be operated semi autonomously with reduced skill sets. The effort required in the future to track increasing submarine numbers around the UK will require constant effort using aircraft equipped to locate and track these potential threats. The Airbus Military C295 MPA has surface and underwater sensors comparable to Nimrod with a fully integrated tactical mission system and weapons carriage capability. The aircraft is capable of deploying and transiting rapidly out to long ranges and has an endurance of around 10 hours.

The Defence Committee asked: “what current maritime surveillance capabilities and assets will remain in service by 2020, including their specific roles, effectiveness, deployability, coordination, and interoperability; and what are the likely gaps and deficiencies?” 23. Developing an effective surveillance and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability requires several layers. The Sea King Airborne Early Warning (AEW) helicopters, the Lynx (Wildcat) maritime surveillance helicopters and the T22 frigates may have all have been retired or drawn down by 2020. The inner layer of defence will in future be dependent on a small fleet of ageing T23 frigates with embarked Merlin helicopters from a small pool of 30 aircraft. With tight maintenance schedules and extensive global commitments, the availability of these assets in the numbers required for standing and contingent tasks is a significant risk to maritime surveillance. Six DARING Class T45 air defence destroyers could also embark Merlin helicopters but, again, with global commitments their availability for dedicated ASW or maritime surveillance is dubious. The multi-purpose T26 Global Combat Ship is not planned to enter service until later in the 2020s (numbers are not yet known) and then only after export markets have been satisfied. 24. The missing key ingredient is the Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) capability that previously provided the outer layer, long-range indicators and warnings, and acted as the key node at the centre of the ASW web. It was able to monitor and provide effect with an impressive array of weapons in all environments simultaneously from a single platform. It was the glue that bound the layers together into cohesive ASW cover. Airbus Military believes that a C295 MPA would offer an affordable and cost-effective solution to providing the long range MPA cover necessary to protect naval deployments and routine surveillance operations. This layered structure is shown on the diagram. This is not to scale and the distance from the current limit of protection to the outer “MPA circle” is considerable. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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INDICATIVE LAYERED APPROACH TO MARITIME SURVEILLANCE

MPA

Undetected Approach & Protection from Submarines & Warships with Long Range Anti-ship Missiles

Merlin Merlin

Type 23 Type 23 Current Limit of Detection Carrier & Protection TG Carrier

MPA Option - C295 MPA

Type 23

MPA Option - P8 Merlin Not to Scale

Gaps andDeficiencies

25. The SDSR decision to cancel the Nimrod Maritime Reconnaissance and Attack (MRA4) aircraft was principally based on the austerity measure not to spend £2 billion allocated to the aircraft’s support costs over the next 10 years. The resultant capability gap is felt across many areas of Defence, Other Government Departments (OGDs), throughout NATO and allied communities, undermining many of the Military Tasks. MPA are the only assets that can provide rapid long range, persistent maritime surveillance and prosecution that is required around UK shores, within the whole Economic Exclusion Zone, throughout the North Atlantic and its approaches to the UK, as far afield as the Falkland Islands, and in support of any maritime operations worldwide. Coherent with the National Security Strategy’s Adaptable Strategic Posture, MPA can accomplish this adaptable and flexible maritime surveillance capability autonomously, and with a rapid response of just two hours representing a potent asset to politicians and commanders alike. MPA are invariably the platform of choice to deploy to a crisis area whether to oil rigs in distress (as in the Piper Alpha disaster) or to areas of conflict (as in the Gulf wars), anti-piracy or international terrorism. As the issues surrounding the Falkland Islands become more prominent, it is worth noting that an MPA does not incite the same hostile response from belligerents compared to a warship or troops on the ground. MPA is a potent tool and the eyes and ears of politicians and commanders alike. Specific impacts include the loss of the Military Task contributions.iii

The Defence Committee asked: “what are the future capabilities needed by the MoD and UK Armed Forces for maritime surveillance and what measures are being taken to address these, including applying lessons learned from recent operations?”

26. The SDSR noted that “we will depend on other maritime assets to contribute to the tasks previously planned for them”. The implication is that by doing nothing operational risks would inevitably be increased. To quantify the capability gap left by the deletion of the Nimrod MRA4 MoD commissioned a Capability Investigation to identify sustainable and cost-effective mitigations. This Capability Investigation (as stated at the Defence IQ Maritime Security Conference in Rome in 2011) examined over one hundred different ways, and combinations of ways, to mitigate the MPA gap within policy compliant analyses. After wide stakeholder engagement, unmanned air vehicles (UAV), hybrid air vehicles (HAV) and manned MPA were shortlisted as the most appropriate future maritime surveillance capabilities worthy of further detailed investigation. The large turbofan MPA (typified by the Boeing P8) and the medium turboprop MPA (typified by the Airbus Military C295 MPA) clearly emerged as the most effective methods to provide maritime surveillance and, if required, prosecution. From open sources the Committee will see that, the Airbus Military C295 MPA is likely to be the most cost-effective solution at around a third of the cost of Nimrod, to provide similar capabilities. It is also the only commercial/military off- the-shelf maritime patrol aircraft available in the near term that fulfils the key user requirements. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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27. A proposal to regenerate a “Future Long Range Maritime Air Capability” is expected from MoD around April 2012. This proposal marks the Government’s opportunity to deliver on the National Security Strategy’s (NSS) and SDSR’s Adaptive Strategic Posture with a cost-effective maritime surveillance capability so crucially needed by this island nation. As a pre-cursor, MoD has sent ex-Nimrod aircrew to allied MPA bases (Canada, New Zealand and Australia) to maintain otherwise perishable MPA skill-sets until a UK regenerative MPA programme has been established. Currently, these aircrews will remain with allies for between four and five years. After this the re-establishment of the capability in UK would take many years. Airbus Military agrees with MoD’s analysis that there is no satisfactory alternative to a manned MPA and believes that no alternative (eg unmanned systems) will be available until at least 2035 or beyond.

The Defence Committee asked: “what are the costs of current and future maritime surveillance assets of UK Armed Forces 28. This question is best left for MoD financial and planning staffs. However, as a rough order of magnitude comparator from open source material, it is believed that the purchase price of: — A Global Combat Ship is circa £300–£400 million. — A Boeing P8 is estimated to be circa £150 million. — A Nimrod MRA4 was circa £120 million. — An Offshore Patrol Vessel is circa £60–£80 million. — An Airbus C295 MPA is circa £50 million.

The Defence Committee asked: “how does the MoD intend in future to coordinate its work with other Government departments and agencies, including its effectiveness, their interaction, the lines of demarcation and the consequences for, and impact on, UK Armed Forces” 29. There has been a cross Government review of maritime security. There are a number of UK departments, agencies and other bodies (Marine Management Organisation, Maritime and Coastguard Agency, UK Border Agency, National Maritime Information Centre, Ministry of Defence, National Police Air Service) that have an interest in the UK’s territorial waters and beyond, and on how the UK responds to maritime security and safety issues. Each entity procures aerial maritime surveillance in virtual isolation and Government has sought that any procurement of aerial surveillance capability is conducted in the context of the national strategic need. The maritime security threats to the UK are at reference.iv The analysis of the OGDs maritime security needs are at reference.v 30. It is worth noting that the Nimrod MR1/MR2 maritime patrol aircraft fleets routinely conducted the majority of the tasks alongside its core Military Tasks before ministries decided to contract out various tasks to industry. Studies have shown the potential to satisfy all stakeholder needs with a single solution. However, it is important to recalibrate all the requirements and ensure that the force elements match the availability and capability requirements. Airbus Military has a well proven history of providing cost effective aerial surveillance solutions across the complete spectrum of the MoD’s and OGDs’ needs. For instance, Airbus Military has two medium sized maritime surveillance assets; the C295 turboprop MPA (as operated by the Portuguese and Chilean Air Forces) and the smaller CN235 (as used by the US, Spanish and Turkish Coastguards, the Irish Air Corps and the Spanish Air Force). Collectively these could deliver the UK’s needs cost-effectively.

The Defence Committee asked: “to what extent the UK should collaborate and is collaborating with allies, including through NATO, in the provision of maritime surveillance capabilities?” 31. The UK is engaged in several NATO, bi-lateral and multi-lateral MPA activities. Maritime Capability Group Number 4 (with MoD UK participation) has commissioned a NATO Industry Advisory Group study to determine the collective NATO requirements for MPA. Airbus Military is involved in this group and gives advice on possible solutions. This might lead to cooperative or collaborative MPA programmes or further MPA pooling recommendations. However, it must be noted that many UK MPA operations are very sensitive in nature and a discrete, sovereign UK MPA fleet would be an imperative. In addition, the availability of aircraft from a joint fleet for national operations would require a split fleet for core NATO and specific national operations (eg protection of the Deterrent and the Falkland Islands)

The Defence Committee asked: “what provision is the MoD making for the possibility that maritime surveillance forces might have to be regenerated at relatively short notice?” 32. The Olympics present an ideal opportunity to reintroduce an MPA capability through the leasing or loaning of MPA. There is an existing requirement to provide long range protection against maritime terrorism and Airbus Military believes that it could fill the gap in time with C295 MPA/CN235.

Conclusions — The UK is vulnerable in the maritime environment because of the loss of MPA. This limits the UK’s ability to protect national waters, naval deployments and operations, to protect properly the UK’s global interests and provide an effective contribution to coalition operations. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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— Because of funding limitations UK needs to acquire a cost-effective MPA capability which is affordable through whole life. — Currently Airbus Military offers the only off-the-shelf and affordable solution to meet both defence and the security needs of Other Government Departments. — Expert opinion is that manned MPA is the only cost-effective solution until at least 2035 or beyond. — Although the former Nimrod crews have been loaned to other nations to retain skills, after five years these assets will no longer be available. Therefore, it is recommended that a MPA capability is regenerated within this timescale. — Airbus Military recommends that the Government acknowledges the severity of the MPA and maritime aerial surveillance capability gaps. Because of the time constraints on human skills it is recommended that a MPA programme is started as soon as possible. Airbus Military is happy to contribute to any future work that requires to be undertaken on the Maritime Surveillance capability.

References i MT 1: Providing strategic intelligence, MT 2: Providing nuclear deterrence, MT 3: Defending the United Kingdom and its Overseas Territories, MT 4: Supporting the civil emergency organisations in times of crisis, MT 5: Providing a Defence contribution to UK influence, MT 6: Defending our interests by projecting power strategically and through expeditionary operations, MT 7: Providing security for stabilisation. ii In August 2009 a pair of AKULA Russian submarines was reportedly located 200 miles off the US Eastern Seaboard to the surprise of the Americans. The Daily Telegraph reported that, with Russian submarine activity around UK waters reaching levels not seen since 1987, AKULAs were attempting to track VANGUARD-class ballistic missile submarines which embark the UK’s nuclear deterrent and that, in one instance, an AKULA had attempted to station itself off the VANGUARDs’ home port of Faslane, intending to track a particular VANGUARD boat as it sailed. iii MT1 Strategic Maritime Intelligence—providing early warning and indicators to key UK strategic facilities, including the strategic deterrent.

MT2 Protection of the Strategic Deterrent—anti submarine warfare against a resurgent Russian submarine threat.

MT3 and MT6 Protection of deployed UK and Allied Naval Task Groups and the protection of merchant shipping during long sea transits to the Middle East, the Falkland Islands and maritime surveillance worldwide. This includes ASW and anti-surface unit warfare protection from hostile warships, Fast Attack Craft, Fast Inshore Attack Craft and submarines, including over the horizon missile attacks. Sanitisation of sea lanes and littoral waters for amphibious assaults would have been conducted during pre-cursor operations: — Queen Elizabeth Class/Joint Strike Fighter Carrier Strike Task Groups, — HMS Ocean class helicopter-carrying amphibious Task Groups, — RO-RO, large “Atlantic Conveyor” size container ships and other merchant resupply shipping.

The potential loss of a capital ship, escorts or significant support shipping poses significant risk.

MT4 Support to Special Forces in long range Maritime Counter Terrorism operations. The protection of key maritime assets and shipping in UK waters and in areas of strategic UK interest worldwide against maritime terrorism.

MT4 Long Range Search and Rescue for downed military aircrews and submarines in distress. A Long Range Search and Rescue service was also provided to the Department for Transport for civilian souls in distress at sea under the terms of the Chicago Convention.

MT7 Security Through Stabilisation. Counter narcotics operations, counter piracy. iv Illegal imports and exports, Unauthorised arrivals by sea, Criminal actions at sea, Maritime terrorism, Ensured sustainability of the Economic Zone, Marine pollution and accident. v All stakeholders have an on-going requirement for maritime aerial surveillance. Although up to 75% of the perceived requirements of the stakeholders were identified as “common”, it was acknowledged that a thorough requirements capture process was needed to ensure analytical rigour before any single aerial surveillance solution was contemplated. Another area of concern was the lack of a home-based and routinely available national surface vessel capability to quickly respond to the range of threats that would be initially identified by the aerial surveillance platform. The National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) is developing a capability to provide a collegiate response to the diverse threats to the UK maritime surveillance problem. However, there needs to be an agreed structure in place for governance, prioritisation, funding and command and control. The MSOG identified that further work is required in the areas of aerial surveillance, surface cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [17-09-2012 14:45] Job: 022974 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/022974/022974_w011_JB_FMS 012 Airbus Military.xml

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response, and governance. A framework paper, once agreed in principle with stakeholders, would need to be briefed to individual ministers. March 2012

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