Vertical integration in sports

Bachelor Thesis Organization & Strategy, 2010 Paul Tips S469657 Eric Dooms 7.914 words

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Introdution ...... 3 1.1 Introduction...... 3 1.2 Problem Indication ...... 3 1.3 Problem statement ...... 3 1.4 Research Questions ...... 4 1.5 Research Design and Data Collection ...... 5 1.6 Structure of the thesis ...... 5 2. Competitive advantage through vertical integration ...... 6 2.1 Introduction...... 6 2.2 Reasons ...... 6 2.3 Transaction costs ...... 6 2.4 Competitive advantage ...... 8 2.5 Conclusion...... 9 3. Vertical integration and competitive advantage in sports ...... 10 3.1 Introduction...... 10 3.2 The sport business ...... 10 3.3 Owner behaviour ...... 11 3.4 Winnig as competitive advantage ...... 11 3.5 Business results as competitive advantage ...... 12 3.6 Conclusion...... 15 4. Consequences of vertical integration on the competitive balance of MLB ...... 16 4.1 Introduction...... 16 4.2 Winning percentages 2000 – 2009 ...... 17 4.3 Postseason 2000 – 2009 ...... 18 4.4 Championships 2000 – 2009 ...... 19 4.5 Historic perspective ...... 20 4.6 Financial performance ...... 22 4.7 Conclusions ...... 23 Chapter 5 Conclusion, discussion and recommendations ...... 24 5.1 Introduction...... 24 5.2 Conclusion...... 24 5.3 Discussion ...... 24 5.4 Recommendations ...... 25 References ...... 26 Appendix A Major League Baseball Division ...... 30 Appendix B Wins / losses 2000 – 2009 ...... 31

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Appendix C SPSS Output...... 32 Appendix D Major League Baseball playoff format ...... 33 Appendix E Postseason appearances ...... 34 Appendix F Historic overview ...... 35 Appendix G Franchise values ...... 36 Appendix H Profit / loss values ...... 37

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Chapter 1 Introdution

1.1 Introduction In this first chapter the problem that this thesis is going to address is introduced and the questions this thesis will try to answer to come to a conclusion and suggestions about how the problem can be handled are clarified.

1.2 Problem Indication Apart from many publicly listed companies the trend of multiple business and multinational operations is also emerging in other kinds of organizations. While we have seen vertical integration in the industrial business world since the beginning of the twentieth century (Coase, 1937) this development took long to gain ground in the sports world. The first good example of this development are the 1980s the Major League Baseballs (MLB) Chicago Cubs which their owners the Tribune Corporation used to extend the national market for the Tribunes World's Greatest Network (WGN). The trend of vertical integration really took a flight in the mid-1990s though when News Corp. bought the Los Angeles Dodgers, Walt Disney purchased the Anaheim Angels and the Mighty Ducks of Anaheim, and Time Warner took over the Atlanta Braves, Hawks and Trashers (Bellamy & Walker, 2005). Then, starting in 2002 Yankees Global Enterprises LLC (YGE) started operating the Major League Baseball (MLB) team New York Yankees and its Minor League affiliates but also the broadcasts of the team‟s games through its Yes Network. Ever since these first starters this tradition has been followed by numerous organizations, both clubs and governing bodies, in both the United States and Europe (Hoehn & Lancefield, 2003). As shown this trend is only a very recent one, not more than 30 years old. It is strange that it took sports organizations so long to get involved in vertical integration, but more important to me is why they are doing it now. This thesis will try to find out whether or not vertical integration has lead to a competitive advantage for sport teams involved.

1.3 Problem statement Can sustainable competitive advantage be achieved through vertical integration in the sports industry? In the industrial world one of the reasons to get involved in vertical integration is to gain a sustainable competitive advantage over competitors. Extensive research has been done into this (Stucky& White, 1993). Not so much attention has been paid to

3 vertical integration in the sports world though. I will try to find out how a sustainable competitive advantage can be gained by sports organizations by vertically integrating. (A firm can be described as vertically integrated if it encompasses two single-output production processes in which either (1) the entire output of the "upstream" process is employed as part or all of the quantity of one intermediate input into the "downstream" process, or (2) the entire quantity of one intermediate input into the "downstream" process is obtained from part or all of the output of the "upstream" process (Perry, 1990).)

1.4 Research Questions

 How can sustainable competitive advantage be achieved through vertical integration?

To research if competitive advantage can be achieved through vertical integration we first need to research how competitive advantage can be achieved using vertical integration. Because there is not a lot of scientific study on the way this is done in the sports world I will study the industrial business world, look at how it‟s done there and then try to link that to the world of sports.

 How can competitive advantage be measured in sports? After I have established that vertical integration can lead to a competitive advantage it is important to know how competitive advantage can be measured in sports. Apart from financial results there are of course also the results, winning or losing, on the playing field and probably these two results are related. How do stakeholders look at these advantages and which do they find most important.

 What are the consequences of vertical integration on the competitive balance in MLB? After we have established how competitive advantage can be measured in sports I will single out Major League Baseball and try to establish whether or not baseball organisations that have gotten vertically integrated have gained a competitive edge over their competitors that have not moved in that direction.

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1.5 Research Design and Data Collection This research will be an exploratory research. The method that will be used is a literature review but financial data and results of sports organizations will also be reviewed. The focus will be on the Major League Baseball, with literature in the field of sport management, strategic management and organizational behaviour being studied. This study will primarily use secondary data sources. These secondary data will be gathered by using the services of the library of the University of Tilburg and the University of Utrecht, in particular the search engines; ABI-inform, the NCC and JSTOR. Validation whether or not an article is reliable can be done by checking if the source is a reliable business journal. A list of reliable business journals is presented in the course „business research‟. A problem with this can be that sports management has only recently attracted vast scientific interest and its journals have not really made it to the lists of top journals yet. The first research question of this thesis gives me the change though to first study established articles on vertical integration and competitive advantage which I can than link to the sports world. To answer the third research question I also looked at sites that keep baseball statistics such as baseball-reference.com and at Forbes‟ valuation of MLB franchises.

1.6 Structure of the thesis This thesis will consist of five chapters with this one being the first. Chapter 2 till 4 will subsequently answer one of the research questions. In chapter 5 than the conclusions and recommendations based on the findings in the previous chapters will be given.

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2. Competitive advantage through vertical integration

2.1 Introduction Before I take a look at how competitive advantage can be achieved through vertical integration we first need to define these two concepts. According to Porter (1985) a firm's relative position within its industry determines whether a firm's profitability is above or below the industry average. The fundamental basis of above average profitability in the long run is sustainable competitive advantage.

2.2 Reasons Vertical integration can be defined as integrating two or more adjacent economic stages under its ownership control. The outputs of earlier stages are then used all, or in part as inputs for subsequent stages (Perry, 1978). The existence of vertically integrated enterprises is evident throughout history and although it can generate significant administrative and strategic costs through greater complexity and commitment escalation (Mahoney, 1992) it continues to be a popular (Pitta, 1993) and important strategy (Stuckey & White, 1993). According to Mahoney (1992) reasons to vertically integrate can be divided into four different motives. These motives are transaction costs incentives, strategic rationales, uncertainties regarding price, and incentives related to output and/or input conditions. However, according to Philips and Mahoney (1985) when we abstract transaction costs from these four reasons there are no real motives for vertical integration left and it has no more advantages then vertical contracting (i.e. exclusive dealings, resale price maintenance, exclusive territories, etc.). In other words vertical integration for other reasons then the transaction cost incentive will not lead to a clear competitive advantage. Therefore, in this chapter we will focus on the transaction cost reason to engage in vertical integration.

2.3 Transaction costs The term transaction cost has caused much friction in the economic lexicon. Its ambiguity comes from the problem that there are two literatures simultaneously claiming ownership over the term (Allen, 1991). While sceptics claim that currently the term “transaction costs” can include any cost that is convenient and elusive enough to avoid critical examination (Niehans, 1987) advocates have compare the

6 words and its meaning to economic important words such as marginalism and substitution (Cheung, 1983). I will use the definition first stated by Arrow (1969). He defines transaction costs as „the costs of organizing the economic system‟. Following Coase, transactions are sorted according to whether they take place within a firm or on the open market. Market alternatives become dangerous when exchanges that are repeated regularly involve transaction-specific capital and information processing. Within firm transactions then provide a suitable alternative. Ownership of physical capital limits the possibilities of opportunism that might be possible when capital is owned by different owners. The structural entity of the firm also provides a basis for more efficient information transfers. In terms of vertically related production processes, the firm will integrate when the costs of transacting over markets outweighs internal costs of management (Levy, 1985). The transaction costs theory of vertical integration thus leads to specific competitive advantage. These five, amongst others, are identified by Mahoney (1992): 1. Profit: The profit incentive is probably the clearest source of competitive advantage. Due to the fact that all profits falls under one company there are no claims on them by other stakeholders so there is no need to negotiate over how to divide these profits. 2. Coordination and control: A vertically integrated firm has better control of opportunistic behaviour due to the authority relationship within the firm (Dow, 1987). Divisional managers can more easily be required to cooperate with the general behaviour of the company because they can be steered by promotions or financial benefits. It usually is also more efficient to settle disputes within a company than through court with a contractual stakeholder. 3. Audit and Resource allocation: According to Williamson (1975) the auditing powers of the firm are superior to the auditing capabilities of contracting parties. Although this is disputed by Grossman and Hart (1986) research done by Chandler (1977) into the auditing improvements of merged railroad firms compared to railroad cartels empirically proves Williamsons claim is very likely to be true. A firm has the legal right to audit its own divisions but the right to audit outside contractors always has to be contractual arranged which involves transaction costs (Mahoney, 1992). Also the superior information on which a firm can base resource allocation to their divisions prevents these divisions from strategically using their information and thus the risk of detriment of profit through misinformation is eliminated (Crocker, 1983). 4. Communication: The standardization of language in between divisions of an integrated company increases communication efficiencies and provides stability in

7 operations. While these advantages could be obtained through recurrent contracting in that situation there is always the risk of opportunistic behaviour (Malmgren, 1961). Firms are arguably better than markets in communicating because the incentives for opportunism are reduced through much better auditing opportunities (also see point 3). Integrated firms thus have an information processing advantage over its non integrated competitors and that advantage is even larger because it complements its superior auditing capabilities (Sandler and Cauley, 1980). 5. Tax advantages: Coase (1937) was the first to link vertical integration to the avoidance of sales taxes with respect to arms length contracting. More recently Bolch and Damon (1978) found that petroleum firms in the United States found it profitable to increase the price of crude oil relative to the price of final products in order to shift as much of their reported earnings as possible to the raw material extraction stage, which enjoys tax preferences associated with resource depletion. Similar results were found by Scherer and Ross (1990) in their study of the copper, aluminium and steel industries.

2.4 Competitive advantage In this chapter, and also in the introduction the words competitive advantage have been mentioned multiple times. But what exactly does competitive advantage entail? According to Barney (2000) a competitive advantage is a value creating strategy, not simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential competitors. A sustainable competitive advantage is the same as the above mentioned definition with the addition that these competitors are unable to duplicate the benefits of this strategy. There are however some points to take into account considering this definition. That a competitive advantage is sustained does not imply that it will "last forever." It only suggests that it will not be competed away through the duplication efforts of other firms. Unanticipated changes in the economic structure of an industry may make what was, at one lime, a source of sustained competitive advantage, no longer valuable for a firm, and thus not a source of any competitive advantage. These structural revolutions in an industry culled "Schumpeterian Shocks" by for example Rumelt & Wensley (1981), redefine which of a firm's attributes are resources and which are not. Some of these resources, in turn, may be sources of sustained competitive advantage in the newly defined industry structure (Barney, 1986). However, what were resources in a previous industry selling may be weaknesses, or simply irrelevant, in a new industry setting. A firm enjoying a sustained competitive advantage may experience these major shifts in the structure

8 of competition, and may see its competitive advantages nullified by such changes. However, a sustained competitive advantage is not nullified through competing firms duplicating the benefits of that competitive advantage. This definition, combined with the resource based view, which assumes that firms within an industry can be heterogeneous with respect to the strategic resources they control and that resources may not be perfectly mobile within an industry can be translated to the baseball strategy. This topic will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3

2.5 Conclusion According to D‟Aveni and Ravenscraft (1994) vertical integration results in economies of integration, regardless of industry effects and economies of scope and scale. Furthermore they find that both forward and backward integration contribute to greatly reduced general and administrative expenditures. This suggests that that integration does not increase the costs of hierarchy despite the need for greater internal coordination with upstream and/or downstream lines of business. D‟Aveni and Ravenscraft also found that the cost savings from general and administrative expenses are most clearly linked to increased profitability and thus I think I can conclude that vertical integration can lead to cost reduction and in that way can lead to a sustainable competitive advantage.

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3. Vertical integration and competitive advantage in sports

3.1 Introduction

This chapter of the thesis will discuss how competitive advantage can be measured in sports. In the previous chapter the concepts of competitive advantage and vertical integration have been explained and now it is time to translate this into sports.

3.2 The sport business Unlike businesses in other industries professional sport teams in any given league not only compete against each other but also have to cooperate with these same competitors to keep their right of existence. As noted by Neale (1964) and El- Hodiri and Quirk (1974), the elimination of competition in professional sports effectively eliminates the industry. Suppose the New York Yankees used their wealth to buy up not only all the good players but also all of the teams in the American League: no games, no gate receipts, no New York Yankees. The success of a league is, at least to some extent, affected by the degree of uncertainty of outcome of its contests and its seasonal competitions, or, in other words, by the degree of balance among its teams. (Zimbalist, 2003). Fans tend to prefer contests between equally matched sporting competitors. Again it is a peculiarity of the professional team sports industry that, unlike other industries, increased monopolisation tends to reduce profitability. This is variously known as the Louis-Schmelling or New York Yankees paradox (Neale, 1964). Just as heavyweight boxing champions such as Joe Louis need credible contenders to maximise their earnings, so too with top teams. As is oft quoted, after a long period of dominating the American League in the 1950s, the New York Yankees suffered a falloff in their gate attendances, only for this decline to be reversed when they lost the championship. Fans lose interest in contests that are a foregone conclusion. Professional sports leagues also are different from „regular‟ industries in the degree of public exposure they receive. Daily the results of games are reported extensively by newspapers, radio, television, and on the internet. These results are then discussed by millions of fans, which is a lot different from the quarterly numbers of reported by companies in other industries.

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3.3 Owner behaviour The question is of course whether or not these unique features of sports leagues lead the owners of these businesses to behave differently from owners of other businesses. In other words to they seek other competitive advantages then owners of businesses in other industries. In 1973 a sportswriter for the New York Times Magazine, Leonard Koppett suggested they do: “Club owners are not ordinary businessmen. To begin with, profit in itself is not the owner‟s primary motive. Any man with the resources to acquire a major league team can find ways to make better dollar-for-dollar investments. His payoff is in terms of social prestige… A man who runs a $100m-a-year business is usually anonymous to the general public; a man who owns even a piece of a ball club that grosses $5m a year is a celebrity… This does not mean, of course, that ball clubs don‟t seek profits… but the driving force is to be identified with a popular and successful team… and that motivation leads to important variations from „normal‟ business behaviour.” Economists agree with this perspective. Peter Sloane (1971) states in his article on English soccer that ownership of a soccer team had more to do with maximizing utility than with maximizing profit. In 1999 however Kesenne and Jeanrenaud concluded that one of the most important differences between sports clubs in the USA and Europe was that American clubs are business-type companies seeking to make profits whereas the only aim of most European clubs so far is to be successful on the field. As this thesis is focusing in Major League Baseball, an American Sport, the rest of this chapter will focus on the view at competitive advantage of American team owners.

3.4 Winnig as competitive advantage In interviews owners of sports organisations usually do try to emphasise that they are motivated strictly and mostly by civic pride and have non-selfish motives while operating a sports team. As Joe Maloof, owner of the National Basketball Associations Sacramento Kings put it in an interview in 2003: „We have one goal in mind and that is to win a title. We‟re not going to rest until we have that for the city of Sacramento and for our franchise. We‟ve never had a title and that‟s what we need to get‟. Because what people say in interviews and how they really behave sometimes has some discrepancies there have been economists that have studied empirical data to find whether they tell the truth and are really utility-maximizers or also trying to maximise their profits. The difference between these two is that if club owners are indeed profit maximizers they would invest in their teams success until the expected marginal revenue from an additional win is equal to the marginal cost, while utility

11 maximizers might invest beyond this point (Zimbalist, 2005). This implies that utility maximising will put individual success above the success of the league and that owners will spend as aggressively on players as possible even if this leads to the creation of dynasties, teams winning championship after championship, possibly leading to the before mentioned Louis-Schmelling or New York Yankees paradox. Rottenberg (1956) suggests that a league with profit maximizing owners will lead to greater competitive balance, El Hodiri and Quirk (1971) however argue that there will always be differences based on market size and revenue potential of teams. There findings are confirmed in a study that concludes that in the period between 1995 and 1999 profit maximizing teams in Major League Baseballs big markets pay free agents, players without a contract, six times more than teams small markets. There is however one problem with dividing owners in profit or utility maximising and that is that one cannot exist without the other. If we assume that owners maximize profit they are supposed to maximize earnings from fan attendance and other endorsement deals. Fan attendance however is largely based on the relative quality of the owners team (Vrooman, 1995). This means that he has to make sure that he fields a competitive team, in other words, a team that wins a lot of matches and has a yearly chance to compete for a championship. Thus, he also has to be some kind of a utility maximizer to be able to be a profit maximizer. This also goes the other way around; if the owner wants to win as many games as possible this means he has to invest in the best, and thus most expensive, players available. To be able to do that he has to make a profit otherwise he will be unable to do so and thus unable to compete.

3.5 Business results as competitive advantage According to Zimbalist (2005) owners take their returns on sports franchises in a number of different ways which I will discuss below. He suggests that owners see their sport franchise as some kind of consumption good and therefore try to maximize their total return, both consumption and investment, not just their financial profit. Owners, for example use their sport franchises to develop new business relationships and gain influence, thereby benefiting the owners other investments. When Anheuser-Busch bought the Saint Louis Cardinals in 1953 August Busch Jr. stated that “development of the Cardinals will have untold value for our company (…) This is one of the finest moves in the history of Anheuser-Busch” (Bellamy Jr. & Walker, 2001). Busch proofed to be right because only four years after the purchase

12 of the Cardinals Anheuser-Busch became the largest producer of beer in the United States. Another way owners can gain money through their sport franchise is through the substantial capital gains sport franchises seem to generate. Using Forbes‟ valuation of baseball franchises I calculated that the average annual rate of appreciation for franchises in Major League Baseball in the period between 2002 and 2009 was 9.79 percent. This puts it well above the return on the ownership of common stock in this period which equals a depreciation of 2.59 percent for the Standard & Poor‟s 500 Index through June 5th, 2009. These are however, all long term returns and will not show up on the income statement of the sport franchise. There are also a lot of ways for owners of franchise to obtain short term gains. They might for example lend money to a partnership and then have that partnership buy the team. The owner then in return receives interest payments over the loan. An advantage of this is that these interest payments enter the team‟s income statement as costs, lowering its book profits and thereby the amount of taxes it has to pay. It is also common for owners to receive financial returns by benefiting from salary, consulting fees and by hiring family members (Zimbalist, 2003). The practice that is becoming more and more custom these days, and that is most interesting for this thesis is how owners boost the performance of other companies in their business empire through making favoured deals with the sport franchises they own. When the owner makes a deal with own of his own companies he can off course charge whatever price he wants, the money goes from one pocket into another. In itself this does off course not give any gains because money put in the sport franchise comes back through the other companies but there is no real money made. Using an example shown in the book The Bottom Line by Andrew Zimbalist this thesis will try to show you a couple of ways owners can try to use to make money through this inter-business cooperation. In 2001 the Chicago Cubs reported an income from local TV, radio and cable fees of 23.6 million dollars. The other Chicago team, the White Sox, reported revenue of 30.1 million dollars. This in itself does not seem strange but it is if you take into account that the Cubs are by far the most popular team in the greater Chicago area. This is clearly shown by the average viewer rating they received during the 2001 season. The Cubs ratings were 3.8 and the White Sox‟s only 1.9. This means that on average two times as many people watched a Cubs game as compared to a White Sox game. In general this would off course lead to higher incomes from commercials and fees paid by broadcasters (Gabszewicz et al, 2004). These figures make more sense though if you know that the Cubs are owned by the

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Tribune Cooperation, which also owns WGN, the company that broadcasts most of the Cubs‟ games. According to website Broadcast & Cable the real value of the Cubs‟ local media fees if sold on the open market would have been some 59 million dollars. The Tribune Company is thus, transferring revenue away from the Cubs by using so called transfer pricing. There is nothing illegal to this and it is often used in the sports business, but why? The first reason is that in a lot of professional American sports, such as baseball, basketball and American football there is a so called revenue sharing system. This system issues a tax on the all local media earnings a team receives. This is done to compensate small market teams for the revenues they miss compared to large market teams. It would take to many time to go to deep into this scheme of revenue sharing but to give an impression, cities such as New York, Chicago and Los Angeles are considered large markets, where as cities such as Kansas City, Cincinnati and Milwaukee are considered small markets. Every league has its own system to compensate these small market teams but in Major League Baseball for example the large market teams, in 2001, had to pay 20 percent of their reported income and in 2008 this percentage was up to 40 percent. For every dollar not reported on the Cubs‟ income statement the owner thus saves anywhere up to 40 cents because broadcasting companies, off course, do not have to pay luxury tax to Major League Baseball. The second reason is that players in American sports leagues play under a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA). Every so many years this collective bargaining agreement has to be renegotiated and naturally owners want to keep salaries as low as possible where players unions are off course always trying to get the best deal for there players. By showing that there teams are hardly making any profits owners try to persuade the unions to lower their demands. Whether or not this works remains to be seen but when negotiating a new CBA in 2006 MLB reported only an operating income of on average 12 million dollars per team, with large market teams such as the New York Yankees and Chicago Cubs reporting a combined loss of 42.1 million dollars. Furthermore keeping profits of sporting franchise low might be useful when baseball teams seek public funding when to improve their facilities as the New York Yankees and the New York Mets recently did to build their new Yankee Stadium and Citi Field ball parks and it also helps to justify higher ticket and concession prices.

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3.6 Conclusion Competitive advantage in sports is thus not only calculated in wins but at least as important is economic gain Owners thus treat their sports team as a part of their entire investment portfolio, which implies that competitive balance may be more elusive to sporting leagues than they want because it is not the main motive of owners. When the New York Yankees signed Alex Rodriguez to a 10-year 300 million deal in 2008 they were thinking not only about what he might bring to the Yankees but also about his potential to attract interest for their Yes Network. Zimbalist (2004) argues that team synergies with related business interest may exacerbate inequalities and what might appear as utility-maximizing behaviour by owners really is portfolio-wide profit-maximizing behaviour. In other words, owners may find that the best way to profit globally is to win maximize at the team level. In the next chapter this thesis will take a look at whether or not this is true for baseball teams that have vertically integrated with their broadcasting network.

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4. Consequences of vertical integration on the competitive balance of MLB

4.1 Introduction In this chapter this thesis will discuss whether or not vertical integration has affected the competitive balance in Major League Baseball over the last ten years. This period has been chosen because during that time vertical integration with broadcasting companies has taken a real flight. One important distinction that is made here is that baseball organisations and broadcasting companies are considered vertically integrated here when they are owner of their broadcasting network or are in the same holding. We do not consider franchises that have exclusive broadcasting deals with a regional sports network to be vertically integrated. First this thesis will give some more details about the set up of Major League Baseball. The Major Leagues consist of 30 teams divided in two leagues, the National League and the American League. The National League consists of 16 teams while the American League hosts the remaining 14 teams. Both leagues are divided in three divisions which are aligned through geographical position in the country. Both leagues have an Eastern, Central and Western division. More details can be found in appendix A. Within this environment there are seven franchises that can be considered vertically integrated when using the before mentioned definition. These franchises are: The Boston Red Sox, which broadcasts it games through the New England Sports Network (NESN) started in 1984, but integrated, with the Red Sox since 1999. Both are owned by New England Sports Ventures LLC. Another team from a big city that is vertically integrated are the New York Yankees, owned, just like their since 2000 operating broadcasting partner the Yes Network, by Yankee Global Enterprise LLC also from New York are the New York Mets, who own their own SportsNet New York network since 2006. Another vertically integrated team from the East coast are the Philadelphia Phillies, who own a stake in their network Comcast SportsNet Philadelphia, founded in 1997. The Kansas City Royals, who own a majority stake in their broadcasting partner the Royals Sports Television Network which started in 2003 and ceased to exist in 2008 are a team from a smaller city just like the Cleveland Indians, which are owned by the Dolan family, who also own the SportsTime Ohio network that broadcasts the Indians games. The network started broadcasting in 2006. The last team on the list are the Baltimore Orioles who own a

16 majority stake of 90 percent in the Mid-Atlantic Sports Network that was launched in 2005. (Walker & Bellamy, 2008)

4.2 Winning percentages 2000 – 2009 As established in the previous chapter the competitive advantage of a franchise is not only measured in its competitive results but also in its financial results. First the competitive results will be discussed. To do that an analysis will be made of the teams‟ winning percentages, postseason appearances and championships over the past ten years, and these results will be compared with the league average and also with the results of the seven before mentioned teams in the last two decades of the twentieth century. The data sheets on which these charts are based can be found in appendices B.

With data obtained from www.baseball-references.com we can determine the winning percentages over the past ten years for the 7 franchises. Winning percentages can be defined as the number of games a team wins divided by the total number of games played. As American baseball does not acknowledge any draws matches are always concluded by one team winning and thus the other team losing. The league average thus always comes to an even 0,500. The winning percentages of the seven before mentioned teams are shown in the chart below. This chart includes the years 2000 – 2009 and the percentages from the starting year the teams were first vertically integrated. For the Yankees, Phillies and Red Sox these percentage are the same because they have been vertically integrated the whole decade.

Chart 1 Winning percentages 2000 - 2009 and since vertical integration

As the chart shows the winning percentages of 5 of the 7 franchises are above the league average, with the Yankees, Red Sox and Phillies winning 5 – 20 percent more

17 games than the average. If we take a closer look at the winning percentages after the franchises got vertically integrated we can see that for the New York Mets the percentages go up even more. Where the Mets had a 0,504 percentage over the entire decade it has a 0,531 winning percentage after vertical integration, thus after 2006. For the Cleveland Indians and the Baltimore Orioles though the winning percentages have gone down since vertical integration. For the thesis there was also an t-test performed on the data. Two datasets, one containing the average number of wins per year for vertically integrated teams and one containing the same data for not vertically integrated teams were tested against each other. Tested was whether or not the average wins of vertically integrated teams were higher than that of not vertically integrated team. This was done by testing the hypothesis H0 = Win VI > Wins NVI, where VI stands for vertically integrated and NVI stands for Not Vertically Integrated. The first test, done over the whole decade gave a t value of 1,422 which makes us reject H0 at a 0,050 significance level. Testing shows that H0 can be accepted at a 0,094 significance level. If data starting from 2005 is tested for the same hypothesis it returns a t value of 1,793, which is also makes H0 rejected at a

0,050 significance level, but comes close because H0 can be accepted at 0,053 significance level. The SPSS output containing this data can be found in appendix C

4.3 Postseason 2000 – 2009 If we take a closer look at postseason appearances we see an even clearer distinction. The post season is being played after all 162 matches of the regular season have been played. Three division winners from both leagues and the team with the best record not being a division winner from each league play is a playoff format to determine the overall champion. An example of Major League Baseball‟s postseason format is given in appendix D Getting into the postseason is very lucrative to owner because it generates additional gate revenue and more exposure because the team gets to play extra matches after the regular season has ended. In the first chart below the postseason appearances for our seven integrated franchises are given, as well as the league average and in the second chart we can see the number of post season appearances for every team that made it to the post season.

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10 9 9 8 7 6 6 5 4 3 2,66 3 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 2000s

Chart 2 Postseason appearances per team 2000 - 2009

9 New York Yankees Boston Red Sox 6 3 Philadelphia Phillies

2 Cleveland Indians 2 New York Mets 0 Baltimore Orioles 58 0 Kansas City Royals Other teams

Chart 3 Division of all postseason appearances per team 2000 - 2009

These charts indicate that more than 25 percent of all postseason appearances of the last decade have been made by these seven teams, with the Baltimore Orioles and Kansas City Royals making none at all and thus bringing the actual number down to 5 teams taking these places. This may not seem much but 8 places per year have to be divided over 32 teams, which thus should give every team a 25 percent chance to make the postseason. This chance is down to 23 percent because of these teams taking this much places. The top three is taking even 18 of all places available, making their chance to get to the postseason 60 percent, and bringing the chances for the other teams down to 21 percent. The data used for this paragraph and the next can be found in appendix E

4.4 Championships 2000 – 2009 The final statistic that has been researched concerning the last decade is the number of championships won by the vertical integrated teams as compared to the rest of the league. Chart 4, below, shows 5 of the 10 possible championships have been won by

19 vertically integrated teams, with only three winning one or more actually and with the other 5 going to the remaining 25 teams in the league.

New York Yankees 2 Boston Red Sox Philadelphia Phillies 5 Cleveland Indians 2 New York Mets Baltimore Orioles 1 Kansas City Royals 0 0 0 0

Chart 4 Championships per team 2000 - 2009

To emphasise the difference even more, two of the three teams that were voted Major Leagues Baseballs teams of the decade for the 2000‟s were vertically integrated, these being the New York Yankees and the Boston Red Sox. The above statistics also give you a good indication why. The Yankees finished first in winning percentage that decade with the Red Sox coming in second and both finished first or tied for first in postseason appearances and championships.

4.5 Historic perspective The earlier data alone however doesn‟t yet prove that these vertically integrated teams had gained a competitive advantage by vertically integrating, maybe all other teams in the league just god worse at the same time leaving the door open for these teams to step in. That is why this thesis also looks at how the performance of these seven teams compares to their performance in the previous decades. The graph below shows the winning percentages of the teams per decade and also the league average (0,500).

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0,650 0,600 0,550 0,500 1970s 0,450 1980s 0,400 1990s 2000s

Chart 5 Winning percentages per team per decade

As the graph shows the winning percentages of 4 of the 7 teams that have vertically integrated have increased over the last decade. The Yankees have increased their percentage by 0.049 percentage points and the Phillies even by .054. Only two teams have over a period of 40 years seen their winning percentage dropped. Also if we look at the number of postseason appearances we can see an increase in the number of places taken by the seven teams over the last decade. Because the number of postseason places has changed through the introduction of the wild card the following chart shows the percentage of positions taken by the seven teams instead of absolute numbers because that would create a distorted picture.

0,140 0,120 0,100 0,080 0,060 1970s 0,040 0,020 0,000 1980s 1990s 2000s

Chart 6 Postseason appearances per decade (percentages)

This chart also shows that some teams, for example the Yankees and Red Sox and Phillies have made an improvement over their situation in previous decade. However, the conclusion also has to be drawn that for some franchises, the Orioles and Royals, being vertically integrated has not improved their situation on the playing field. But, as we already concluded in the previous chapter competitive advantage is not only measured by performance of the field, but also by the financial performance of the franchise. This is where the next part of this chapter will focus on. An overview of this data can be found in appendix F

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4.6 Financial performance To analyse the financial performance of the franchises and the owners it would be ideal if this thesis could study both the financial performance of the franchise itself and that of the owner as well. Financial details about the owners are unfortunately hard to obtain and despite several tries this study has been unable to determine how much the owners of the seven integrated baseball teams have increased in value since their franchises became vertically integrated. The values of the franchises on the other hand are very easy to obtain because Forbes magazine does a yearly ranking of the values of the MLB franchises. These values can be found in appendix G. In the graph below you can see how the value of the seven franchises has risen over the past few years.

2000 New York Yankees 1500 Boston Red Sox New York Mets 1000 Philadelphia Phillies 500 Cleveland Indians Baltimore Orioles 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Kansas City Royals

Chart 7 Team values per year 2002 - 2010 (million $)

On average the value of a Major League Baseball franchise rose more than 70 percent. The value of the seven integrated franchises rose with more than 80 percent. This is though mainly due to the fact that the value of the top 4 franchises rose with over 105 percent. The value of the bottom three franchises only rose with a little over 30 percent. Another financial effect we looked at was that vertical integration allowed franchises to substitute profits for losses by pricing products at favourable rates to other entities within the chain. We would thus expect franchises that are vertically integrated to have lower profits than other franchises in the league. The chart below shows the seven teams operating income before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. As the chart shows the profits of the vertically integrated teams are not really consistent with the theory presented in the second chapter. Especially the Orioles, Indians and Royals seem to have reported a normal operating income. When we look at the four other franchises though their profits seem to be a little low considering

22 their value as presented in the graph above, especially the fact that the Yankees, Red Sox and Mets have reported several losses over the years while being in the biggest markets in the US.

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2002 40 2003

20 2004 2005 0 2006 2007 -20 2008 2009 -40 2010 -60

Chart 8 Profit/loss per year 2002 - 2010

It can be assumed that profits of these teams have somehow been diversified to other divisions in the organisation. The Yes Network, affiliated with the Yankees, has been reporting healthy profits since the day it started Fortune reported that the six- year-old YES Network took in revenues of $340,5 million in 2006 and since then network‟s revenues top a quarter billion and its profit margin is 60 percent.

4.7 Conclusions It is hard to draw conclusions on the data provided in this chapter. As far as the numbers obtained tell us four franchises, being the New York Yankees, Boston Red Sox, New York Mets and Philadelphia Phillies have created or developed their competitive advantage during the last decade both on the playing field as well as financially. The Cleveland Indians have not shown real improvement but have still fared much better than the Baltimore Orioles and the Kansas City Royals who have been declining their play on the field during the last decade, and even before that and have not been able to outperform the market financially either. The balance of power in Major League Baseball has shifted, with fewer teams having a bigger impact on the game in terms of winning as well as financially. Whether or not this is because of the fact that they have vertically integrated with their broadcasting partner or due to other circumstances needs further research.

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Chapter 5 Conclusion, discussion and recommendations

5.1 Introduction This final chapter of the thesis will give a conclusion, discussion and recommendations based on the information presented to you in the previous chapters.

5.2 Conclusion This thesis can come to a conclusion regarding its problem statement. The potential sources for competitive advantage through vertical integration are certainly there, as shown in chapter 2. These sources can be directly linked to the sports world as is shown in chapter 3. Financial gains can be made by vertically integrating a sports team with its broadcasting partner. For the seven teams studied up until this point the vertical integration has had different effects though. Some have fared very well, increasing in value and winning championships each year while other have either not been able to improve performance or have even declined when compared to historic results. It is true that three of the teams vertically integrated have dominated Major League Basball over the past decade but given the data obtained and the research done it is impossible to say whether or not this is the result of vertical integration. Vertical integration thus can lead to a sustainable competitive advantage, also in sports, but it is impossible to say whether or not it actually does.

5.3 Discussion What made coming to a conclusive conclusion about the problem statement of the thesis hard is that in sports gaining a competitive advantage is influenced by a lot of factors. Apart from the ability to earn money, there are a lot of other factors that have to be taken into consideration. The ability and availability of players to the teams is one that cannot be influenced by vertical integration but has a great effect on the performance of the franchise. And even the ability to earn money is not solely determined by the ability and willingness of franchises to integrate vertically. Market size for example is also very important but was not taken into account in this research. Another difficulty is that the concept of vertical integration as it is research here, with teams owning their broadcasting partner is a rather new concept. It has only been around for the last decade, so it is difficult to measure its influence. The three teams

24 that have been vertically integrated for the whole decade have been outperforming the market, while the teams that are not have been lagging behind. Is that because it takes time to reap the benefits of vertical integration or does that have nothing to do with it. What also needs to be taken into account is that all these factors influence each other. If teams earn more money they can hire better players, which will make them win more, which will lead to more people watching the teams matches, which will lead to higher revenue, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera. The final challenge for this research was that it is very hard to obtain financial information about both the teams and their owners, which limits the research on the influence vertical integration could have had on the financial positions of these stakeholders. Whether vertical integration in sports affects the competitive balance thus remains to be seen. This research focused on Major League Baseball and found no conclusive evidence. Fact is though that recently the „virus of vertical integration‟ has been spreading to other sports, with European soccer being the newest development. Teams like Real Madrid, Manchester United and FC Barcelona have recently started their own TV networks. While these networks are still under development and for example do not own the television broadcasting rights of the teams they are being aired and it is not unlikely that eventually they will also obtain these rights.

5.4 Recommendations So why do these teams do this if it is not clear if it has a positive effect on the teams‟ competitive advantage. That is one of the questions this thesis leaves unanswered. Also this thesis focused on Major League Baseball but how do the findings relate to other sports and what factors are of influence in that specific market. It would be good to extend research into more branches of sports and into taking into account more factors such as market size to really be able to determine whether or not vertical integration does influence the competitive balance. It will also be interesting to see how things have developed in 10 years. Has it developed further, are more teams doing it, are other sports doing it or has it been abandoned all together? Is it true that it takes time to gain from it, or will the Cleveland Indians and Kansas City Royals never have any benefits from it and are there thus other reasons that the New York Yankees, Boston Red Sox and Philadelphia Phillies have been so dominant lately? Finally being able to gain more insight into the financial position of the teams and there owners might uncover other, not before thought of benefits, or drawbacks of vertical integration.

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Appendix A Major League Baseball Division

Figure 1 MLB Divisional alignment

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Appendix B Wins / losses 2000 – 2009

Year Boston Red Sox New York Yankees W L % PS W L % PS 2000 85 77 0,525 87 74 0,540 D, WSC 2001 82 79 0,509 95 65 0,594 D, WS 2002 93 69 0,574 103 58 0,640 D 2003 95 67 0,586 WC, LS 101 61 0,623 D, WS 2004 98 64 0,605 WC, WSC 101 61 0,623 D, LS 2005 95 67 0,586 WC* 95 67 0,586 D* 2006 86 76 0,531 97 65 0,599 D 2007 96 66 0,593 D, WSC 94 68 0,580 WC 2008 95 67 0,586 WC, LS 89 73 0,549 2009 95 67 0,586 WC 103 59 0,636 D, WSC Decade 920 699 0,568 965 651 0,597

Year New York Mets Philidelphia Phillies W L % PS W L % PS 2000 94 68 0,580 WC, WS 65 97 0,401 2001 82 80 0,506 86 76 0,531 2002 75 86 0,466 80 81 0,497 2003 66 95 0,410 86 76 0,531 2004 71 91 0,438 86 76 0,531 2005 83 79 0,512 88 74 0,543 2006 97 65 0,599 D, LS 85 77 0,525 2007 88 74 0,543 89 73 0,549 D 2008 89 73 0,549 92 70 0,568 D, WSC 2009 70 92 0,432 93 69 0,574 D, WS Decade 815 803 0,504 850 769 0,525

Year Baltimore Orioles Kansas City Royals W L % PS W L % PS 2000 74 88 0,457 77 85 0,475 2001 63 98 0,391 65 97 0,401 2002 67 95 0,414 62 100 0,383 2003 71 91 0,438 83 79 0,512 2004 78 84 0,481 58 104 0,358 2005 74 88 0,457 56 106 0,346 2006 70 92 0,432 62 100 0,383 2007 69 93 0,426 69 93 0,426 2008 68 93 0,422 75 87 0,463 2009 64 98 0,395 65 97 0,401 Decade 698 920 0,431 672 948 0,415

Year Cleveland Indians Rest of the league (average) W L % PS W L % PS 2000 90 72 0,556 80 82 0,494 2001 91 71 0,562 D 81 81 0,500 WSC 2002 74 88 0,457 83 79 0,512 WSC 2003 68 94 0,420 81 81 0,500 WSC 2004 80 82 0,494 80 82 0,494 2005 93 69 0,574 79 83 0,488 WSC 2006 78 84 0,481 82 80 0,506 WSC 2007 96 66 0,593 D, LS 76 86 0,469 2008 81 81 0,500 79 83 0,488 2009 65 97 0,401 83 79 0,512 Decade 816 804 0,504 804 816 0,496

D = Division winner WC = Wild card winner LS = League Series WS = World Series WSC = World Series Champion

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Appendix C SPSS Output

Paired Samples Statistics

Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean Paired Samples Correlations

Pair 1 VI 81,9429 10 2,09654 ,66298 N Correlation Sig.

NVI 80,0571 10 2,09654 ,66298 Pair 1 VI & NVI 10 -1,000 ,000

Pair 2 VI > 2004 82,9714 5 2,45864 1,09954 Pair 2 VI > 2004 & NVI > 2004 5 -1,000 ,000 NVI > 2004 79,0286 5 2,45864 1,09954

Paired Samples Test

Paired Differences 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference

Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean Lower Upper t df Sig. (2-tailed)

Pair 1 VI - NVI 1,88571 4,19307 1,32597 -1,11383 4,88526 1,422 9 ,189

Pair 2 VI > 2004 – NVI > 2004 3,94286 4,91727 2,19907 -2,16275 10,04846 1,793 4 ,147

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Appendix D Major League Baseball playoff format

Figure 2 MLB playoff format

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Appendix E Postseason appearances

Postseason apperances per decade 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s New York Yankees 9 5 2 3 Boston Red Sox 6 4 2 1 Philadelphia Phillies 3 1 3 3 Cleveland Indians 2 5 0 0 New York Mets 2 1 2 1 Baltimore Orioles 0 2 1 5 Kansas City Royals 0 0 4 3 Other teams 58 38 30 24

Post season apperances (percentages) 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s New York Yankees 0,113 0,089 0,045 0,075 Boston Red Sox 0,075 0,071 0,045 0,025 Philadelphia Phillies 0,038 0,018 0,068 0,075 Cleveland Indians 0,025 0,089 0,000 0,000 New York Mets 0,025 0,018 0,045 0,025 Baltimore Orioles 0,000 0,036 0,023 0,125 Kansas City Royals 0,000 0,000 0,091 0,075 Other teams 0,725 0,679 0,682 0,600

World Series Wins per decade 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s New York Yankees 2 3 0 2 Boston Red Sox 2 0 0 0 Philadelphia Phillies 1 0 1 0 Cleveland Indians 0 0 0 0 New York Mets 0 0 1 0 Baltimore Orioles 0 0 1 1 Kansas City Royals 0 0 1 0 Other teams 5

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Appendix F Historic overview

Teams 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s WP WSC WS POA WP WSC WS POA WP WSC WS POA WP WSC WS POA Arizona Diamondbacks 0,497 1 1 3 0,509 0 0 1 Not available Not available Atlanta Braves 0,551 0 0 6 0,595 1 5 8 0,457 0 0 1 0,451 0 0 0 Baltimore Orioles 0,431 0 0 0 0,512 0 0 2 0,512 1 1 1 0,590 1 3 5 Boston Red Sox 0,568 2 2 6 0,523 0 0 4 0,525 0 1 2 0,556 0 1 1 Chicago Cubs 0,499 0 0 3 0,476 0 0 1 0,472 0 0 2 0,487 0 0 0 Chicago White Sox 0,529 1 1 3 0,526 0 0 1 0,486 0 0 1 0,469 0 0 0 Cincinnati Reds 0,464 0 0 0 0,521 1 1 2 0,499 0 0 0 0,592 2 4 6 Cleveland Indians 0,504 0 0 2 0,529 0 2 5 0,455 0 0 0 0,460 0 0 0 Colorado Rockies 0,474 0 1 2 0,478 0 0 1 Not available Not available Detroit Tigers 0,450 0 1 1 0,452 0 0 0 0,536 1 1 2 0,490 0 0 1 Florida Marlins 0,501 1 1 1 0,442 1 1 1 Not available Not available Houston Astros 0,514 0 1 3 0,529 0 0 3 0,522 0 0 3 0,495 0 0 0 Kansas City Royals 0,415 0 0 0 0,467 0 0 0 0,529 1 2 4 0,528 0 0 3 Los Angeles Angels 0,556 1 1 6 0,475 0 0 0 0,500 0 0 2 0,484 0 0 1 Los Angeles Dodgers 0,532 0 0 4 0,513 0 0 2 0,527 2 2 4 0,565 0 3 3 Milwaukee Brewers 0,458 0 0 1 0,478 0 0 0 0,514 0 1 2 0,458 0 0 0 Minnesota Twins 0,532 0 0 5 0,463 1 1 1 0,468 1 1 1 0,506 0 0 1 New York Mets 0,504 0 1 2 0,494 0 0 1 0,523 1 1 2 0,473 0 1 1 New York Yankees 0,597 2 4 9 0,548 3 3 5 0,547 0 1 2 0,555 2 3 3 Oakland Athletics 0,550 0 0 5 0,501 0 1 2 0,512 1 2 3 0,527 3 3 5 Philadelphia Phillies 0,525 1 2 3 0,471 0 1 1 0,501 1 2 3 0,509 0 0 3 Pittsburgh Pirates 0,421 0 0 0 0,498 0 0 3 0,470 0 0 0 0,569 2 2 6 San Diego Padres 0,474 0 0 2 0,487 0 1 2 0,486 0 1 1 0,415 0 0 0 San Francisco Giants 0,529 0 1 3 0,508 0 0 1 0,493 0 1 2 0,493 0 0 1 Seattle Mariners 0,517 0 0 2 0,493 0 0 2 0,430 0 0 0 0,386 0 0 0 St. Louis Cardinals 0,557 1 2 7 0,488 0 0 1 0,529 1 3 3 0,496 0 0 0 Tampa Bay Rays 0,429 0 1 1 0,407 0 0 0 Not available Not available Texas Rangers 0,479 0 0 0 0,519 0 0 3 0,462 0 0 0 0,465 0 0 0 Toronto Blue Jays 0,497 0 0 0 0,515 2 2 3 0,523 0 0 2 0,343 0 0 0 Washington Nationals 0,439 0 0 0 0,500 0 0 0 0,519 0 0 1 0,465 0 0 0

WP = Winning percentage WSC = World series champions WS = World series appearance POA = Playoff appearances

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Appendix G Franchise values

Values in million $ 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 New York Yankees 730 849 832 950 1.026 1.200 1.306 1.500 1.600 Boston Red Sox 426 488 533 563 617 724 816 833 870 New York Mets 482 498 442 505 604 736 824 912 858 Los Angeles Dodgers 435 449 399 424 482 632 694 722 727 Chicago Cubs 287 335 358 398 448 592 642 700 726 Philadelphia Phillies 231 239 281 392 424 457 481 496 537 Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim 195 225 241 294 368 431 500 509 521 St Louis Cardinals 271 308 314 370 429 460 484 486 488 San Francisco Giants 355 382 368 381 410 459 494 471 483 Chicago White Sox 223 233 248 262 315 381 443 450 466 Houston Astros 337 327 320 357 416 442 463 445 453 Texas Rangers 356 332 306 326 353 365 412 405 451 Atlanta Braves 424 423 374 382 405 458 497 446 450 Seattle Mariners 373 385 396 415 428 436 466 426 439 San Diego Padres 207 226 265 329 354 367 385 401 408 Minnesota Twins 127 148 168 178 216 288 328 356 405 Cleveland Indians 360 331 292 319 352 364 417 399 391 Washington Nationals 108 113 145 310 440 447 460 406 387 Colorado Rockies 347 304 285 290 298 317 371 373 384 Arizona Diamondbacks 280 269 276 286 305 339 379 390 379 Baltimore Orioles 319 310 296 341 359 395 398 400 376 Detroit Tigers 262 237 235 239 292 357 407 371 375 Milwaukee Brewers 238 206 174 208 235 287 331 347 351 Kansas City Royals 152 153 171 187 239 282 301 314 341 Cincinnati Reds 204 223 245 255 274 307 337 342 331 Toronto Blue Jays 182 166 169 214 286 344 352 353 326 Florida Marlins 137 136 172 206 226 244 256 277 317 Tampa Bay Rays 142 145 152 176 209 267 290 320 316 Oakland Athletics 157 172 186 185 234 292 323 319 295 Pittsburgh Pirates 242 224 217 218 250 274 292 288 289

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Appendix H Profit / loss values

Revenue in million $ 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 New York Yankees 18,7 16,1 -26,3 -37,1 -50 -25,2 -47,3 -3,7 24,9 Boston Red Sox -11,4 -2,1 11,4 -11,3 -18,5 19,5 -19,1 25,7 40 New York Mets 14,3 11,6 -19,3 -11,2 -16,1 24,4 32,9 23,5 26,2 Los Angeles Dodgers -29,6 -25 -19,1 -7,4 13,4 27,5 20 16,5 33,1 Chicago Cubs 7,9 11,9 8,3 11,4 7,9 22,2 21,4 29,7 25,5 Philadelphia Phillies 2,6 -11,9 -12,5 6,1 14,8 11,3 14,3 17 14,5 Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim 5,7 -3,7 -5,5 -30 -2,6 11,5 15,2 10,3 12 St Louis Cardinals -5,1 -2 -11,1 -3,9 7,9 14 21,5 16,3 12,8 San Francisco Giants 16,8 13,9 0,7 6,9 11,2 18,5 19,9 6,6 23,5 Chicago White Sox -3,8 1,2 12,8 8,1 21,7 19,5 30,6 27,2 26,4 Houston Astros 4,1 -0,8 -1,9 9,6 30,2 18,4 20,4 3,8 7,1 Texas Rangers -6,5 -24,5 -28,5 2,9 24,7 11,2 17,2 24,5 4,7 Atlanta Braves 9,5 9,5 -0,3 15,4 27,6 14,8 28,1 13,8 1,5 Seattle Mariners 14,1 23,3 17 10,8 7,3 21,5 10,1 4,7 10,5 San Diego Padres 5,7 4,6 4,9 17,1 13 5,2 23,6 19,5 32,1 Minnesota Twins 3,6 0,4 -7,1 -0,5 7 14,8 23,8 29,4 25 Cleveland Indians -3,6 -1 10,4 27,2 34,6 24,9 29,2 42,6 10,1 Washington Nationals -3,4 -9,1 -8,3 -3 27,9 19,5 43,7 22,4 33,5 Colorado Rockies 6,7 7,1 -6,3 -7,8 16,3 23,9 26,2 26,8 20,1 Arizona Diamondbacks -3,9 -22,2 -15,2 -18,7 21,8 6,4 5,9 3,9 -0,6 Baltimore Orioles 3,2 12,4 9,1 34 21 17,1 7,7 17,4 19,4 Detroit Tigers 12,3 -5,3 0,3 7,9 3,5 8,7 4,6 22,9 -29,5 Milwaukee Brewers 18,8 -6,1 5,1 24,2 22,4 20,8 19,2 -26,3 10,2 Kansas City Royals 2,2 -11,2 6,6 3 20,8 8,4 7,4 9 8,9 Cincinnati Reds 4,3 4,9 11,7 22,6 17,9 22,4 19,3 3 17,8 Toronto Blue Jays -20,6 -23,9 0 7,8 29,7 11 -1,8 11,8 13,1 Florida Marlins 1,4 -14 -11,6 3 -11,9 43,3 35,6 43,7 46,1 Tampa Bay Rays -6,1 1,4 7,5 27,2 20,3 20,2 29,7 15,9 15,7 Oakland Athletics 6,8 6,6 11,2 5,9 16 14,5 15,4 26,2 22,1 Pittsburgh Pirates 9,5 -1,6 -0,3 12,2 21,9 25,3 17,6 17 15,6 League average 2,5 -1,3 -1,9 4,4 12,1 16,5 16,4 16,7 17,4

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