Economic Voting and the Great Recession in Europe
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Economic voting and the Great Recession in Europe A comparative study of twenty-five countries Troy Alexander Cruickshank August 2016 A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The Australian National University © Copyright by Troy Alexander Cruickshank 2016 Declaration This thesis is entirely my own work and has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text. Troy Cruickshank i Acknowledgements I would like to thank first and foremost my supervisor Ian McAllister. Your advice to me has always proven sound, whether relating to my thesis specifically or to academic life more generally. I much appreciate your willingness to meet with me or read my work on short notice throughout my candidature. I would also like to thank the other members of my advisory panel, Juliet Pietsch, who frequently made herself available to discuss my work and whose advice is also much appreciated, and Andrew Banfield, who stepped up at the last minute to fill a formal vacancy. I would also like to thank the other people who have taken the time to discuss my work with me at various points throughout my thesis. These include, in no particular order, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Jeffrey Karp, Jill Sheppard, Richard Johnston, Shawn Treier, Timothy Hellwig and Yusaku Horiuchi. Finally, I would like to thank my friends and family who have supported me in countless ways throughout this process. You know who you are. iii Abstract The Great Recession of 2007–09 was the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depres- sion of the 1930s. The effects were felt across most of the developed world and Europe was no exception. In many European countries, austerity programmes were implemented in re- sponse to the recession, which were often deeply unpopular. Many governments lost power in the years following the recession, with sometimes strikingly harsh swings against them. One notable example was the Irish election of 2011, in which the incumbent Fianna Fáil was reduced from 71 to 20 seats, by far its worst result at any general election since independence in 1922. This is congruent with the theory of economic voting, according to which voters will remove from office governments that fail to deliver economic prosperity. Although there is an enormous empirical literature supporting this theory, almost all of this evidence pertains to the typical boom and bust cycle of individual countries and little is known about economic voting during a severe global recession. The Irish result could have been indicative of the usual eco- nomic vote, a bolstered economic vote due to the unusual scale and severity of the crisis, or of dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of the crisis. This thesis investigates whether the usual economic vote in European countries was altered during the Great Recession. This thesis uses survey data from the 2004, 2009 and 2014 waves of the European Election Studies (EES) to compare the economic vote in 25 European countries before, during and after the Great Recession. Multilevel methods are used to model voters’ support for the parties they could vote for at general elections in their own countries. Using this method, the results show that the economic vote was weaker during the crisis than it was either before or after. In order to explain these results, I analyse which parties voters tended to prefer after the crisis and how attitudes towards the European Union evolved over time. The results find that there was a shift away from centrist and pro-European parties towards radical and Eurosceptic parties following the crisis. In addition, support for the EU fell over the same time period and voters were increasingly likely to hold the EU responsible for economic conditions. Given the timing v vi of these shifts as well as the association between European institutions and austerity policies, these findings suggest that the austerity programmes implemented in the wake of the crisis may have been a stronger catalyst for economic voting in Europe than the Great Recession itself. Contents Introduction 1 1 Theory of economic voting: how economic conditions shape the vote 9 1.1 What is economic voting? . 10 1.2 Perceptions or indicators: the link between the economy and the vote . 13 1.3 Sociotropic voting: do voters only care about themselves? . 16 1.4 Prospective and retrospective voting . 18 1.5 The vote choice process . 21 1.6 Reward and punishment: the logic of sanction . 24 1.7 Competent government: the logic of selection . 26 1.8 Political context and the instability problem . 29 1.9 The Great Recession . 31 1.10 Conclusion . 36 2 Measuring the economic vote 41 2.1 Data sources and timing . 42 2.2 Measurement and variables . 48 2.3 Method of analysis . 57 2.4 Conclusion . 62 3 Voting in a time of crisis: how the Great Recession affected the economic vote 63 3.1 Party support theory of economic voting . 65 3.2 Hypotheses . 67 3.3 Measuring the economic vote . 68 3.4 A spatial model of party support . 70 3.5 The prime minister’s party and the economic vote . 73 vii viii CONTENTS 3.6 A multiparty model of the economic vote . 78 3.7 Influence of the economy on mean party support . 84 3.8 Conclusion . 86 4 Clarity of responsibility during a global recession 89 4.1 Clarity of responsibility: economic voting in different contexts . 90 4.2 The dimensions of clarity of responsibility . 94 4.3 Hypotheses . 97 4.4 How clarity affects the prime minister’s party . 99 4.5 The effect of clarity on other parties . 105 4.6 Conclusion . 110 5 Extreme and Eurosceptic parties: the changing policy preferences of European voters 113 5.1 Hypotheses . 114 5.2 Classifying parties . 118 5.3 How party position relates to voter support . 124 5.4 The changing fortunes of pro-European integration parties . 127 5.5 Left–right position: a shift to the extremes . 131 5.6 Beyond left and right: social and economic dimensions . 134 5.7 Conclusion . 140 6 Economic abstention: turnout intention in the face of economic pessimism 143 6.1 Theory . 144 6.2 Hypotheses . 148 6.3 Measuring turnout intention . 149 6.4 An economic model of turnout . 153 6.5 Conclusion . 158 7 Attitudes towards European integration and institutions 161 7.1 Austerity and the European Union . 162 7.2 Measuring attitudes towards the European Union . 164 7.3 Hypotheses . 168 7.4 Attitudes towards further European integration . 170 7.5 Popular support for EU membership . 177 CONTENTS ix 7.6 Attribution of responsibility for the economy . 183 7.7 Conclusion . 187 8 Conclusion: revising theories of economic voting 191 A Countries and parties 199 B Coefficient tables 213 References 237 List of figures 1.1 Basic principle of economic voting . 10 1.2 Outline of economic voting theory . 37 1.3 Vote choice process . 37 2.1 GDP growth in the European Union, 2000–2015 . 43 2.2 Distribution of raw and centred party support . 50 2.3 Distribution of left–right distance . 52 2.4 Distribution of prospective and retrospective assessments . 54 2.5 Relationship between prospective and retrospective assessments . 55 2.6 Data stacking process . 58 3.1 Support for incumbent prime minister’s party by economic assessment . 69 3.2 Relationship between party support and left–distance . 71 3.3 Predicted support for prime minister’s party by left–right distance . 75 3.4 Predicted support for prime minister’s party by economic assessment . 77 3.5 Data classification structures . 79 3.6 Economic vote by year and incumbency status . 81 3.7 Predicted support by year and incumbency status . 82 4.1 Economic vote for dominant government party by time in office . 103 4.2 Economic vote for dominant government party by ideological cohesion . 104 4.3 Economic vote for dominant government party by institutional clarity . 105 4.4 Government and opposition economic vote by time in office . 107 4.5 Government and opposition economic vote by ideological cohesion . 108 4.6 Government and opposition economic vote by institutional clarity . 109 5.1 Relationship between party support and position . 124 5.2 Relationship between integration position and salience . 126 x List of figures xi 5.3 Party support by position on European integration . 129 5.4 Relative support for pro-integration parties . 130 5.5 Party support by general left–right position . 132 5.6 Party support by economic left–right position . 135 5.7 Party preference by social libertarian–authoritarian position . 138 6.1 Average turnout at national elections in EU countries . 151 6.2 Proportion intending to vote by year and economic assessment . 152 6.3 Predicted probability of voting by past behaviour . 155 6.4 Predicted probability of voting by economic assessment and party identification . 156 7.1 Support for European integration by prospective economic assessment . 173 7.2 Support for European integration by left–right position . 174 7.3 Evaluation of EU membership over time . 179 7.4 Positive evaluation of EU membership by prospective economic assessment . 180 7.5 Positive evaluation of EU membership by left–right position . 181 7.6 Attribution of economic responsibility by prospective economic assessment . 184 7.7 Attribution of economic responsibility by left–right position . 185 List of tables 2.1 Sample size and interview mode of EES surveys . 44 2.2 Key variables used to measure the economic vote . 48 3.1 Prime ministers’ parties model .