Trade Dependency As an Impediment to Autonomous Foreign Policy of Small States? a Test of the Patron-Client Model

TRADE DEPENDENCY AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO AUTONOMOUS FOREIGN POLICY OF SMALL STATES? A TEST OF THE PATRON-CLIENT MODEL

HELENA LAUREYNS PROF W. VEENENDAAL PROF F. Bakker 17/07/2019 8076 Words

Introduction

On the 15th of September, 2009, the heads of state and government gather in the UN headquarters in New York for the 64th session of the UN General Assembly. That session, 4 countries had a voting coincidence with the U.S. of a 100% on important votes and consensus actions; Palau, Micronesia, Israel and the Marshall Islands (Bureau of International Organization Affairs, 2010). Some would note that Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands all have been former colonies of the U.S., hence, the voting alignment. However; the word former implies that these countries are now independent sovereign states. But are they really independent?

The relation between small and big states has often been described of as one of dependency and vulnerability (Elman, 1995; Armstrong & Read, 2003; Richardson & Kegley, 1980). Being aware of the weakness and dependency of these small states, big powerful states have often found themselves in a powerful bargaining position in which they commonly provided security and economic aid in return for a compensation; votes (Veenendaal, 2017; p. 565). This relation between the providing big state and the more vulnerable small state during the Cold War has often been coined as a patron-client relation (Ciorciari, 2015; Veenendaal, 2017; Roniger, 2015; Carney, 1989). By this is meant a reciprocal, voluntarily entered relation between two actors controlling unequal resources (Carney, 1989; p. 44). The relation is two sided; there is exchange between the two countries in which the client – the dyad with the fewer resources - complies to voting with the patron – the dyad with more resources - in return for the preservation of its security (Carney, 1989; p. 47). What sets the patron-client model apart from simple linkages of dependency are, according to Veenendaal, reciprocity and affectivity: ‘this generates a form of loyalty that enhances the stability of structural patron client linkages’ and ‘without reciprocity and loyalty there is merely a dependency relation’ (Veenendaal, 2017; p. 565). In short, the characteristics that define a patron-client relation are as follows; dependency, compliance, loyalty, reciprocity, asymmetry and affectivity

(Veenendaal, 2017; p. 565). A more complete elaboration on what exactly these characteristics entail will be provided later on.

The prediction was that the end of the Cold War would greatly reduce the bargaining position of weaker states, rendering the patron-client model irrelevant (Veenendaal, 2017, 564). This view is strengthened by Hey’s argument that in the aftermath of the Cold War, poor states were no longer able to play superpowers off to one another, resulting in fewer policy options (Hey, 3003; p. 1). If the patron-client model indeed suffers from a diminished relevance, then how can the persistent voting alignment observable today be explained? I argue that with the ending of the Cold War – which has most likely decreased ideological based voting as well as the high issue salience of Cold War questions – and the more recent critiques on the present irrelevance of security based theories and military gains (see for example Hay, 2003; Ingebritsen, 2005), it is worth looking at more subtle motivations behind voting alignment such as dependence. More specifically; dependence in the shape of trade dependence. Accordingly, the need to address two central questions arises; the question of whether trade dependence could possibly be a driving force behind voting alignment today, and whether this voting alignment is indicative of the possible continued presence of the patron-client model.

Existing theories on why countries engage in voting alignment are almost exclusively based on the Cold War years, and there is a strong need for a more recent assessment of what motivates countries’ voting behavior today. A more solid explanation of why countries do or do not engage in voting alignment can create new insights in the exact nature of dependency relations today.

Literature review

Researchers such as Hey, Ingebritsen, Veenendaal & Corbett and Armstrong & Read state that one of the most common assumptions about small states is that they are economically weak and thus dependent on the economic and security umbrella of their bigger neighbours or neighbour (Hey, 2003; Ingebritsen, 2006; Veenendaal & Corbett, 2015; Armstrong & Read, 2003). Many agree upon the fact that this economic weakness derives from a high level of external dependence and a relatively high exposure to exogenous shocks (Armstrong & Read, 2002; Thorhalsson, 2012; Veenendaal & Corbett,

2015; Bishop, 2012). Browning argued that small states are objects of IR, responding mainly to external policy while lacking the power to decide on its own foreign policy (Browning, 2006; pp. 58-64). It should however, not be overlooked that these states, despite their smallness, are also sovereign nations. It is this sovereignty, Drezner points out, that is the countries’ most valuable resource. Especially during the Cold War, Third World rulers did not shy away from trading various aspects of their sovereignty in exchange for military protection or foreign aid (Drezner, 2002; p. 76). It was broadly assumed that the ending of the Cold War would greatly reduce the leverage of weaker states, and would thus go along with the disappearance of the patron-client model (Veenendaal, 2007; p. 564). However, recent studies show a different reality. Over the year 2011, voting alignment between the Marshall Islands and the U.S. was 89.6 per cent, and even more so for Micronesia and Palau (Veenendaal, 2007; p. 561).

The logic behind assuming that small states are more prone to engage in voting alignment often stems from the fact that they are seen as vulnerable and weak (see for example Moon, 1988; Elman, 1995, Hey, 2003; East, 1973). According to Armstrong & Read does this vulnerability derive from the lack of a domestic critical mass (the needed labour force), an undiversified economy, a high degree of openness to trade, a limited resource base and in some cases higher transportation costs (Armstrong & Read, 2002; pp. 103-105). Vulnerability alone is not enough to yield dependence; it are the linkages between two countries in which the more powerful country establishes the domain of its dominance (military, economic), that eventually creates a relation of dependence (Ricardson & Kegley, 1980; p. 193). However, as stated before, the reciprocal element in patron-client relations entails that the client state also has something to offer to the patron: ideological support in the form of voting alignment (Carney, 1989; p. 47). The reasoning that voting alignment serves as a possible indicator for the presence of the patron-client relation is shared with Shoemakers and Spanier who argue that ideological convergence and a streamlining of foreign policy behaviour is what a patron is aiming for in a patron-client relation (Shoemaker & Spanier, 1984; p. 17-20).

On the other hand, Hey argues that small states today have an increasing international prestige, that they are physically secure and that their position is strengthened due to the rise of supranational organizations such as the European Union and the Atlantic

Treaty organization (Hey, 2003; p.1). Moreover, with the ending of the Cold War, poor and small states are no longer able to play one superpower off against the other (Hey, 2003; Veenendaal, 2007). As issue salience, the position of small states, and the structure of the global world in general have changed since the Cold War, is it likely that dependency relations have changed too. Therefore one should be careful to blindly assume the theories that were provided during the Cold War to still be entirely true.

Different theories

Most international voting behaviour takes place within the UN, in which the UN General Assembly serves as a platform for states to exert their influence in a variety of ways. Thorhalsson argues that small states join the UN because of their recognition of sovereignty, acceptance in the international community, the access to international bodies such as the World Bank and the IMF, and because if offers a venue for influence (Thorhalsson, 2012, p. 143). Some might argue that voting alignment in return for any kind of benefit is a way of selling a states’ sovereignty; the voluntary or forceful erosion of a states’ sovereignty (Drezner, 2002; p. 76). The following section will address what drives states to engage in voting alignment in the UN security council. Different theories have been drawn from the literature.

A first theory for why countries align themselves with the U.S. is because of similar government ideology. Potrafke finds that with voting behavior of 21 OECD countries during the period between 1984 and 2005, government ideology played a strong role in voting alignment with the U.S. He found that left wing governments were less prone to vote with the U.S., especially when the president was Republican (Potrafke, 2009; p. 263). Strüver, who examines the case of China as a patron country, finds that one factor fostering alliance, is the presence of like-minded countries in international affairs, and he thus proposes that these country relations are best described as interest-driven alignments (Strüver, 2017, p. 60). Richardson equally finds that during the Cold War years, U.S. dependencies showed the greatest political compliance (Richardson, 1967; p. 1109).

Another theory on why countries align themselves with the U.S. is based on the impact of the salience of certain issues on voting alignment in the UN General Assembly. Kim

5 and Russet have analyzed both Cold War and post Cold War voting behavior and concluded that voting blocs have shifted from an East-West split, to a North South-split. Voting alignment now thus reflects the preferences of states along development cleavages (Kim & Russett, 2009; pp. 650-651). East adds to this by stating that issues directly related to a small states’ development and economic growth will be deemed to be the most salient ones (East, 1973; p. 560). If this theory holds some truth, then developing small countries’ voting alignment would significantly differ from the developing countries’ voting alignment with the U.S.

A third theory on voting alignment - and probably the most prominent one - is material gains for the client country as a driving force behind voting alignment. Material gains are understood as any kind of aid, whether development or military aid. Dreher, Nunnekamp & Tiele find that U.S. aid has stimulated voting compliance, with grants and general budget supports being the most effective in vote-buying (Dreher, Nunnenkamp & Tiele, 2008; p. 157). Moreover; when leaders of the client state vote against U.S. interests on key votes, they are likely to be replaced by other leaders since the loss of development aid can be deemed as enough reason to do so (Dreher & Jensen, 2013; p. 193). Moon, focusing on less developed countries’ relation with the U.S., has equally found a relationship between aid receiving and voting (Moon, 1983; p. 326). Veenendaal also acknowledges the inherent link between material gains and voter alignment by arguing that the relations between all kinds of states (small, large, poor, wealthy, weak) are often linked through the exchange of material compensation in return for political support (Veenendaal, 2017; p. 562). On the other hand, Menkhaus & Kegley come to the contradictory conclusion that foreign aid and military assistance do not influence foreign policy behavior (Menkhaus & Kegley, 1988; p. 315). Based on this theory, small countries that are most in need of developmental aid or military aid would be most likely to engage in voting alignment.

A last theory on why countries engage in voting alignment focusses on trade dependence as a driver behind voting alignment. Richardson & Kegley identify a multitude of reasons why trade is lesser beneficial for the poor country, which in turn increases their sensitivity and vulnerability to exogenous shocks (Richardson & Kegley, 1980, pp. 195- 198). This serves as a critique on the liberal assumption that trade is mutually beneficial

6 for countries with very divergent economies. Richardson scrutinized voting alignment with the U.S. and a group of countries that were trade dependent on the U.S., with the export dependence index as measurement. He concludes that trade dependent states voted significantly more along U.S. lines than did other countries (Richardson, 1976; p.1106). An empirical study by Menkhaus & Kegley, focusing on the case of Somalia, equally found that export trade dependence was highly related to a states’ foreign policy behaviour (Menkhaus & Kegley, 1988; p. 315).

The above theories serve as different reasons for why countries are prompted to engage in voting alignment. This is important, as voting alignment is an indicator of a possible patron-client relation. Imagine a country votes in direct opposition to the patron over a wide arrange of issues, then this is a sign of noncompliant behavior, and noncompliant behavior can in turn be seen as a demise of the patron client relation, assuming one is existing already (Carney 1989; p.74). Accordingly, compliance – a characteristic of the patron-client model – will be measured by voting alignment. A lack of compliance of the client state would most likely mean that no patron-client relation is present. However, it needs to be taken into account that the mere existence of voting alignment alone does not yield a patron-client relation, as a high voting coincidence without any sign of reciprocity, affectivity and asymmetry could be merely the fruit of consensus between countries that think alike.

Relevance & research question

If the patron-client model is indeed still present, and by this is meant a relation between two countries that is strongly marked by affectivity and loyalty (Carney, 1989; p. 64), then it is very conceivable that the loyalty of the small client-state towards the big patron-state state would out itself in the form of voting loyalty in international decision- making processes. Carney enhances this view by saying that ‘by complying with the patronal goals of ideological convergence, solidarity and strategic cooperation, clients can afford their patrons certain advantages over adversaries’, such as access to their facilities and the establishment of military bases (Carney, 1989; p. 50). This leads to the suspicion that patron-client relations are no phenomenon of the past, as both the dependent and dominant entity have something to gain within this kind of relation.

When one wants to gain knowledge about how relations of dependence translate themselves into alignment in international decision-making procedures, hardly any literature focusing on small states or any sample of small states, can be found. In Armstrongs’ article, for example, the depicted dependent states are countries like Japan, France, England, and other relatively big powers (Armstrong, 1981; p. 401). Carney focusses on lesser developed countries, while Richardson & Kegley only focus on Third World countries (Carney, 1989; Richardson & Kegley, 1980). None of these focus groups can be equaled to small states as small states often come with an inherent set of characteristics related to their smallness, such as low level of military capabilities and limited resources for conducting foreign policy activities (East, 1973; p. 577). This neglect is rather surprising considering the general assumption that small states tend to be reliant on superpowers for resources, partnerships and protection (Hey, 2002; p. 5). Moreover, only very few of above mentioned articles focus on the patron-client relation, which can yield valuable insights due to its focus on loyalty and affectivity. Lastly, the dates of the above quoted articles indicate that most literature on the relation between dependence and loyalty is fairly outdated and that there is a high need for more recent research on the topic. This is especially so since much of the literature can said to be stuck in the Cold War area, in which patrons and clients had different motives for alignment, and many issues have since then variably lost and gained salience.

In light of these niches, the following research question is proposed ‘Why do small states engage in voting alignment and in how far does this alignment imply the presence of a patron-client relation?’ The outcome of this research will be able to provide further findings on the linkages between smallness, dependency and voting alignment, and will thus be able to strengthen or weaken the assumptions on these linkages that patron- client research often assumes to be self-evident.

Expectations

The first expectation relates to the quantitative research part in which the effect of trade dependency on voting alignment will be tested. Before the presence of a patron-client relation can be assessed, the dependency of small countries on the U.S. needs to be measured since dependency is one of the components of the patron-client model. This dependency is measured in terms of trade. The hypothesis is that small states that are

8 more trade dependent on the US, are more likely to align themselves with the US in terms of UN General Assembly votes than small states that are less dependent. This hypothesis stems from the fact that small states, due to physical smallness and the inherent economic characteristics and impediments that this brings (scarcity of natural resources, higher production costs, lack of competition, and so on) usually have a lesser diversified economy and are thus more economically dependent on external countries (Ingebritsen, 2006; p. 11). While this lack of economic diversity intensifies their dependence, the lack of export market diversity concentrates their dependency on one or very few big countries. Being aware of the weakness and dependency of these small states, these larger states find themselves in a powerful bargaining position, from which they can demand compensation in return. This is usually in the form of a vote (Veenendaal, 2017; p. 565).

The second expectation is formulated in relation to the qualitative research part, which will assess whether those nations that qualify as a U.S. dependency, are entangled in a patron-client relation. The expectation is that the dependency relation of small states with a bigger United States outs itself in a patron-client relationship, implying that this dependency relation is characterized by compliance, loyalty, affectivity, reciprocity and asymmetry. This departs from Veenendaals’ view that it is wrong to assume that small states only handle out of independence, small states also seek to reap benefits from the international system (Veenendaal, 2017; p. 652). Moreover, if it is true that small states’ bargaining position has increased (Veenendaal, 2017; p. 567), it is tempting to assume that these small states are aware of their bargaining power and will likely only enter in relations where they also have something to gain.

Conceptualization & operationalization

The focus of this research is small states; a state is conceptualized as a full member (so no observer-status) of the UN. This conceptualization makes sense since UN membership implies a recognition of sovereignty and an acceptance into the international community by other states and actors (Thorhalsson, 2011; p. 143). This research has opted for conceptualizing smallness in terms of population. Not only is this data easily available and comprehensive, but it also useful in economic terms, as population is a good indication of both the domestic labour force and the domestic

9 market (Read & Armstrong, 2003: pp. 100-101). The threshold will be put at 1.5 million, a benchmark that is fully arbitrary, but that is equally used by the Commonwealth (The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2014; p. 1).

For measuring trade dependency, it is useful to look at the trade-to-GDP ratio, which is the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP. The imports and exports of the small country to the patron country – in this case the U.S. - provide a combined insight in the dependence of the domestic economy on foreign markets for the small states’ export, as well as the small states’ reliance on these foreign markets to satisfy domestic demand of goods and services (UK department For Business Innovation and Skills, 2015). When this is divided by the GDP of the small country, this results in a measurement of the importance of trade with the chosen main patron country. The higher the obtained percentage, the higher the trade dependency.

The dependent variable, voting alignment, will be measured by looking at the average of voting coincidence of the plenary votes on a total of 3085 resolutions adopted from the 62nd session to the 72nd session in the UN General Assembly. The 71st session (the year 2006) has been left out since no data could be find on voting alignment with the U.S. for this session. The UN General Assembly has been chosen as the platform of international decision-making because of its ‘one state-one vote principle’ in which small states’ votes are weighed the same as any other states’ votes. Moon provides a satisfactory justification for scrutinizing UN voting patterns by arguing that they are the most prominent measure of compliant behavior as they are indicative of a more general foreign policy stance which is expected to be shaped towards U.S. preferences (Moon, 1983; p. 318). The higher the percentage of voting coincidence of the client-state with the patron-state, the higher the foreign policy alignment.

As this research is presented as a test of the patron-client model, it is useful to further elaborate the characteristics that separate the patron-client model from mere dependency. In addition to dependency, the patron-client model requires that the client-state complies with the patron country. This is seen as a finetuning of the clients’ foreign policy in aspects crucial to the patron (Carney, 1989; p. 45). However, in the operationalization, no distinction will be made between the salience or cruciality of the voting matter. As a high degree of voting alignment is seen as a good measurement for

10 compliance, there is no need to elaborate a measurement for compliance that differs from the measurement of voting alignment. The higher the average percentage of voting alignment derived from the years 2007 to 2017, the higher the compliance.

Loyalty then, is seen as an enhancing factor for the stability and the structural nature of the linkage (Veenendaal, 2017; p. 565) and will thus be measured by the presence or of voting coincidence with the patron higher than 50% over a 10-year term, from 2007 to 2017 (again omitting the year 2016). If for example, the small state fails to achieve a voting coincidence once or more over these 10 years, the requirement of loyalty has not been met.

Affectivity is hard to coin, especially in broad relationships between countries instead of say, family relations. Scott describes affectivity as a durable bond of genuine mutual devotion, that exceeds the simple link of mutual advantage (Scott, 1972; p. 94). Furthermore, Scott states that most of the time, the affection and obligation within this relation outs itself in the use of ‘terms of address between partners that are normally reserved for close kin’ (Scott, 1972; p. 94). The concept will therefore be operationalized through measuring the presence or absence of the use of words and salutations that go beyond the formal realm, such as; ‘my friend, our close neighbor…’ Those will be found by scrutinizing speeches of ambassadors and heads of states directed towards one another.

The characteristic of reciprocity assumes that both patron and client give something in return (usually material benefits in return for political support). The characteristic of asymmetry then, is a complex and broad one that can depict different things in different contexts. In light of this research, it is decided to see asymmetry as discrepancy between the economic capabilities of two states, that will be measured in terms of GDP as this serves as a good indicator of a states economic capabilities.

Methodology & Case selection

This paper will use a nested analysis (also called an embedded research design) to address both expectations (Lieberman, 2005). The first expectation will be tested in a quantitative manner using statistics, while the second expectation will be tested using qualitative measurements to assess the presence of the patron-client model. A nested

11 analysis is a research method that seeks to analyze a large sample of cases statistically, to then select one or more cases from the large N-group to analyze them more in depth (Lieberman, 2005; p. 436). The logic behind this method is that the initial statistical analysis yields valuable insights about the explanatory power of the explanatory variable(s), and it provides justification for the case selection (Lieberman, 2005; p. 436). This is important for this research, as an assessment of the patron-client model cannot be done by selecting various cases in a random manner, as it would be erroneous to assume that smallness alone is enough motivation to believe that these cases might be part of a patron-client relation. Instead, the statistical analysis will provide some information on the degree of compliance (voting alignment) as well as dependence (trade dependency) – of which a high level of both provide substantial motivation for suspecting a patron-client relation. A more in-depth qualitative analysis will then provide more insights on whether the case meets all the remaining requirements needed in order to speak of a patron-client relation, that is to say; loyalty, affectivity, reciprocity and asymmetry. An embedded research method is seen as the most adequate because some of these latter characteristics are rather hard to measure in a quantitative manner.

The first expectation will be tested using two distinct variables; ‘dependency’ is the independent variable, while ‘voting alignment’ is the dependent variable. The operationalization of these variables has been touched on before, but it is useful to make some extra notes.

The U.S. has been chosen as a possible patron-country mainly because much of the existent literature and theories are equally based on the U.S. as a patron-country. If this research would have opted for a different patron, it would be harder to deny or confirm these theories, because findings applying to one country, cannot always be recklessly applied to the other. Furthermore, during the examined timespan, the U.S. continued to have a higher GDP, and a higher military expenditure as percentage of the GDP, than any other country, including the possible emergence of China as a patron (The World Bank, 2007-2017). Although these numbers do no tell all, they do provide an indication of how capable the U.S. is to provide military and economic support to the client state.

The data that provided the components of the trade dependency variables are all derived from the U.S. Census Bureau (United States Census Bureau, 2017). The sum of the value

12 of import and export from and to the U.S. only applies to the import and export of goods from 2007 to 2017 (again omitting the year 2016). The gross year-related domestic products of the selected small countries are derived from World Bank Data (The World Bank, 2017). The value of the flow of imports and export to the U.S. divided by the gross domestic product of the small country is taken as the measurement of dependency, as stated before. A simple correlation will be conducted between dependency and voting alignment for all the 44 selected countries (the countries that meet the commonwealth requirement for small states). To visualize this, a scatterplot will be presented. The voting alignment data is taken from the ‘Voting practices in the United Nations’ Reports (U.S. Department of State, 2008-2018). Voting alignment is measured by the voting coincidence of each country with the U.S.. The voting coincidence percentage is already given and is derived by summing up the times that the country voted the same as the U.S. (1 point), the times it opposed the U.S. (0 points) and the times one of the two countries abstained (0.5 points). The sum of these points was then divided by the total amount of votes excluding absences, to become the voting coincidence percentage.

The statistical outcome will influence the case selection and thus the further proceedings of the research. A first possible outcome is that no statistically significant relation is found, meaning that a countries’ degree of voting alignment with the U.S. is not a product of trade dependence. This is no reason to completely abandon the research, as the scatterplot can provide new insights on the forces behind voting alignment and the possible presence of other explanatory powers at work. These might then serve as possible alternative explanations for voting alignment, as well as implications for future research conducted on this topic. This is what Lieberman calls ‘model-building small N-analysis’ (Lieberman, 2005; p. 437).

However, if the correlation between the two variables proves to be statistically significant, then most cases will be situated more or less on an upwards sloping line from the left bottom corner to the right upper corner on the scatterplot, indicating that the more trade dependent these cases are, the more they engage in voting alignment.

Whether the result is significant or not, the case that scores highest on both variables will be selected to test the second prediction, namely that the dependency relation on the U.S. outs itself in the form of a patron-client model. This is because both compliance

(measured by voting alignment) and dependency, are characteristics highly indicative of a patron-client model. Not selecting a case on the basis of the score on these variables, would mean that this case would simply not meet the requirements of compliance and dependence.

For the second qualitative part of the analysis, the possible existence of the patron-client model will be tested by measuring the presence of the remaining characteristics of this model (as compliance and dependence have already been measured in the quantitative part). These are; loyalty, affectivity, reciprocity and asymmetry. While the operationalization of these characteristics is generally straightforward, is this less the case for ‘affectivity’. Affectivity will be measured using content analysis. The use of informal language between the patron and client, in this case being language that might as well be directed to friends and family, is seen as indicative of affectivity. It is useful to provide some extra insights in the exact proceedings of this method. First of all, speeches and statements in which the patron addresses the client and vice versa, will not be selected on the basis of the mere presence of these informal terms, as this might result in a bias towards sources in which informal language is used. Second, the sources contain only official, written speeches, published on the official websites of both the government of the Marshall Islands and the U.S., including these countries’ embassy’s websites. Third, it should be clear that the speech or statement is addressed towards the patron or towards the client specifically, and not to a broader group of countries. Fourth, evidence must be found that the use of these informal terms is mutual. If both the patron and the client meet this requirement in multiple speeches, then the requirement of affectivity has been met.

Analysis Part I – explanatory variables for voting alignment

To test the first expectation, a correlation is conducted between the two variables ‘dependency on the U.S.’ and ‘Voting alignment with the U.S.’. The output of the correlation (see appendix 1.1) shows a Pearson’s R value of 0,053, pointing at a very weak positive correlation between voting alignment and dependence on the U.S. However, this is not statistically significant as the p-value of 0,267 is greater than the chosen significance level of 0,05.

To visualize the various positions of these cases, a scatterplot has been created with the dependent variable on the Y-axis and the independent variable on the X-axis. The dots represent the average trade dependency score on the U.S. for the 44 countries, as well as the average voting alignment for every country from 2007 to 2017 (see appendix 1.6 for the exact numbers).

Scatterplot with average voting alignment and average dependency as main variables

The scatterplot visualizes what the correlation output had already proven; that there is no significant relation between trade dependence on the U.S. and voting alignment with the U.S. If this would have been the case, then most cases would have been on or near the slanting line. Note that the Marshall Islands is not included in the scatterplot (it has been in the correlation). This is because an inclusion of the Marshall Island on the scatterplot would make the results less clear as its extreme position on the dependency scale would cluster all the other countries together. If the RMI would have been

15 included, then one would see that it has an average dependency score of 791 and a voting alignment coincidence with the U.S. of 76%. The position of the Marshall Islands as an outlier can be found on the scatterplot in the appendix, 1.3.

The outcome of the scatterplot does lead to some other interesting insights. Consider the group of clustered countries within the red circle. All these countries are part of the CARICOM, also known as the Caribbean Community. Despite the fact that this cluster has a high dependence on the U.S., with scores between 185 (Dominica) and 363 1 (Trinidad and Tobago), the countries within the Caribbean Community are well above the dependency mean of 103. However, their engagement in U.S. voting alignment is rather low, with scores between 24,32 (Dominica) and 38,54 (St. Lucia). This is below the voting alignment mean of 43,36. It is interesting to note here that the cases of the CARICOM are highly contradictive of existing theories and thus also to the expectations formulated in relation to the quantitative analysis. To name a few examples; Kuznets argued that when countries concentrate their trade on one larger country (as is the case with the CARICOM), this results in a “satellitic” position of this state towards the big state (Kuznets, 1960; pp. 22-23). Richardson concluded that trade dependencies voted with the United States more often than other UN members (Richardson, 1976). The expectations formulated in relation to this part of the research is thus not satisfied; the case of the CARICOM serves as proof for the fact that a small countries’ high dependence on the U.S. does not automatically yield a high voting alignment with the U.S. Not only does the case of the CARICOM contradict these theories, but does this suggest that there must be another explanation than dependency for the CARICOM’s low engagement in voting alignment with the U.S..

The second circle, the blue one, includes all the European small states. Only the non- European state Kiribati also falls within the circumference of this circle. Despite the fact that these countries have a very low dependency on the U.S., with scores ranging from 2,77 (Andorra) to 42,38 (Iceland), the countries on the European continent are considerably below the dependency mean of 103,27. On the other hand, their voting alignment is fairly high, with scores between 58,18 (Iceland) and 62,96 (Monaco). This

1 Dependence is measured as trade dependence, and trade dependence as measured by our formula has no scale maximum.

16 is well above the voting alignment average of 43,36. These findings suggest that voting alignment is not always the fruit of dependency, and just like the group of Caribbean Countries, does the position of the European countries on the scatterplot suggest that dependency on the U.S. does not serve as an explanatory variable in trying to predict voting alignment with the U.S..

If one considers that the countries of the Caribbean Community are very similar in the sense that most are island states, they all share more or less the same geographic features and they most likely also share the same economic hardships and environmental issues, then it is very tempting to take on the assumption that that these similarities lead to these countries according importance to the same issues. The same can be said for the group of European countries, as it is likely they also share a significant amount of characteristics on the basis of their relative geographical proximity. Here too, it is admissible that these similarities lead to shared attribution of importance to certain issues. It is not surprising then, that the similar positions of these countries on the scatterplot leads to the prediction that more ideology based factors are underlying voting alignment and that issue salience can possibly account for the differences in voting alignment. That countries sharing more or less the same ideology would exhibit a high coincidence in votes, does not come as a surprise. However; the case of the CARICOM shows that even when a country is highly dependent, a country might value other factors more in its assessment of how to vote. Future research might confirm or contradict in how far issue salience and ideology could indeed account for countries’ voting behavior. Both the correlation and the scatterplot have shown that dependency is not one of these factors that could explain voting alignment.

Analysis Part II - The testing of the presence of the patron-client model

The purpose of the qualitative method is to test our second expectation, namely whether the dependency relation of small states (those states that score high on the dependency scale) with the U.S outs itself in a patron-client relationship, implying that this dependency relation is characterized by compliance, loyalty, affectivity, reciprocity and asymmetry.

The selection of cases for the testing of the patron-client model should happen on the basis of both a high degree of dependency and a high degree of voting alignment for reasons mentioned in the methodology & case selection section. The statistical analysis has shown that selecting cases only on the basis of voting alignment is not sufficient since high voting alignment does not mean a high dependency, and selecting cases only on the basis of high dependency, does not automatically mean that this country also exhibits a high voting alignment. The case that scores the second highest on voting alignment and the highest on dependency is the RMI (Republic of the Marshall Islands). The RMI has an average dependency score of 791 of and a voting alignment coincidence with the U.S. of 76%, these high scores on both variables are the reason why the case of the Marshall Islands has been selected for this part of the research.

The requirement of compliance, the first characteristic of the patron-client model, has thus already been met. The RMI has a voting alignment of average of 76%, which is 26% higher than the 50% benchmark. Note that this rate does only include voting coincidence, and not consensus resolutions, by which is meant draft resolutions that are adopted without voting (United Nations, 1999). If consensus resolutions would have been included, the figure would have been even higher. The second characteristic, loyalty, is also fulfilled; over a time span of 10 years, 2008 to 2017 (the year 2016 included) the RMI has consistently voted in line with the U.S. as voting coincidence percentages exceeded the 50% benchmark for each year. The average voting alignment over these ten years was 74,7 %.

The third characteristic, asymmetry is measured by the difference in GDP, as GDP reflects the economic capacity of a state very well. In 2017, the U.S.’ GDP was 80.935 trillion, while the GDP of the RMI was slightly over 204 million. No critical benchmark has been set for assessing when asymmetry exactly occurs, but the huge discrepancy in GDP leaves no room for speculating that there is no asymmetry between these countries in terms of their economic capacity.

Another characteristic, reciprocity, implies that there is a process of giving and taking. Within a patron-client relation, this usually implies that the client seeks material benefits in return for political support (Veenendaal, 2017; p. 565). This characteristic requires some further elaboration.

After the RMI’s independence from the U.S in 1979, it entered into a ‘Compact of Free Association’ with the U.S, implying a voluntary and free association of their governments (US Department of State, 2003; p. 1). The Compact of Free Association document reveals the give-and-take mechanisms at work. The political support of the RMI for the U.S. has already been proven by the 74,7% average voting coincidence in the UN general assembly from 2007 until 2017, but it becomes even more obvious in the provisions named in the Compact. The RMI namely has to consult the government of the US in its conduct of foreign affairs, moreover, the U.S.’ government ‘may assist or act on behalf of the government of the RMI in the area of foreign affairs as may be requested and mutually agreed from time to time’ (2003; p. 3). The RMI is also expected to comply with U.S. standards in certain fields, such as environmental protection standards (2003; p. 10). When the RMI fails to comply with the terms and conditions attached to the assistance, such as the achievement of performance indicators, the U.S. may apply ‘appropriate remedies’ (2003; p. 20). Lastly, the RMI are also expected to grant availability of its lands at no cost for the conduct of U.S. programs and services, such as defense operations (2003; p. 25). The U.S. should be able to establish and use military areas, and is allowed to station military personnel of any third country (2003; p. 29). The reciprocal relation assumes that the U.S. also has benefits to offer to the RMI. The RMI receives a total annual amount of 3.1 million dollars as to strengthen the Marshall Islands resilience through financial assistance. This is meant to support health, education and infrastructure. Humanitarian assistance (HARMI program) and the Disaster assistance emergency fund (DAEF) are also deductible from this budget (2003; pp. 16-18). Furthermore, the U.S. also takes responsibility for the RMI’s security & defense matters (2003; p. 29). Another benefit the RMI enjoys is the U.S.’s provision of U.S.’ programs and services, such as the U.S. postal service, the U.S. department of transportation, the office of foreign disaster assistance, and so on (2003,p. 23). Lastly, the U.S. exempts products from the RMI from duty in international trade, although this also comes with exceptions on certain products (2003; p. 27). In conclusion; the requirement of reciprocity has widely been met. This conclusion is accurately captured in the following quote ‘Affirming the common interest of the United States of America and the Republic of the Marshall Islands in creating and maintaining their close and mutually beneficial

19 relationship through the free and voluntary associations of their perspective governments’ (U.S. Department of State,2003; p. 1).

The last characteristic of the patron-client model is affectivity (see appendix 1.4 & 1.5). Due to scarcity of available speeches and statements, not all the used documents fall within the time span of 2008 to 2017. A mutual relation of affectivity has been found as affective words are used in both directions. The reference to one another with the word ‘friend’ has been encountered in nearly all the directly addressed statements on both countries’ embassies websites. For example, the current U.S. ambassador to the RMI, Karen B. Stewart stated that ‘our countries demonstrate the deepest bonds of cooperation and friendship’ in her 4th of July speech (U.S. Embassy Marshall Islands, 2018). Rose Gottemoeller, the former Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security in Majuro, stated on the RMI’s Nuclear Remembrance Day that ‘I am so honored to be in the Marshall Islands, a nation that the United States sees as our strategic partner, our ally, and our friend’ (Rose Gottemoeller, 2014). Tony de Brum, the RMI’s Foreign Minister, states that they ‘have the same feeling towards the US’ (when referring to the U.S.’ denotation of the Marshall Islands as a ‘friend and ally’) in a speech delivered to the Marshallese parliament (Tony de Brum, 2015). On the U.S. independence day in 2018, Gerald Zackios, the current ambassador of the RMI in the U.S., announced that ‘We look forward to many more days of continued support and friendships as we work to make the world a safer place for future generations’ (Embassy of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, 2018).

Findings; the patron-client model test

All the required characteristics for the presence of a patron-client relation have been found in the relation between the RMI and the U.S.. The RMI has been selected on the basis of both a high voting alignment and a high dependency on the U.S., therefore, the careful assumption is made that other cases that have both a high dependence and a high voting alignment with the U.S., are most likely to be engaged in a patron-client relation with the U.S. The small states of Palau and Micronesia fulfill the high voting alignment requirement, however, generalizations cannot bluntly be applied considering their dependency on the U.S. is considerably lower than the RMI, with dependency scores of 80 and 157, still considerably lower than the RMI’s exceptionally high

20 dependence score of 791 (see scatterplot in appendix). For now, the presence of a patron- client relation between the RMI and the U.S., means that the patron-client model is still relevant, but that those countries that could be most expected to engage in a patron- client relation such as highly dependent countries, are not always those that are most likely to be part of such relation.

Conclusion

The analysis has provided some rather satisfying responses to the expectations. The first expectation was that the more small states are dependent on the U.S., the more likely it is that they align themselves with the U.S. in terms of UN General Assembly votes. The statistical analysis has not provided proof for this expectation. The obtained correlation was not statistically significant and therefore no relation can be assumed between dependency on the U.S. and voting alignment coincidence with the U.S.. This finding is interesting considering it contradicts previous literature on the topic (Richardson, 1976; Menkhaus & Kegley, 1988; Richardson & Kegley, 1980, Kuznets, 1960). Possible reasons for this discrepancy is that these studies focussed on the Cold War era, in addition to the fact that their sample of ‘dependencies’ often differs greatly from the focus group in this research.

The clustered positions of both the European countries and the Caribbean Community countries suggests that these countries share some motivational basis on why they vote like they do; it cannot be a coincidence that the CARICOM small countries all vote alike, and all the European small countries vote alike. The high dependency of the CARICOM on the U.S. and its low voting alignment with the U.S. has proven that other explanatory factors than trade dependency account for countries’ voting behavior. This leads to the conclusion that nor dependency, nor voting alignment alone, is a sufficient basis for a patron-client relation. Even more so, the case of the CARICOM proves that small states that are dependent cannot be equated with loyal puppets whose voting behavior is decided by a more powerful countries controlling the strings. The notion that small states lack the power to decide on its own foreign policy is thus not seen to be a true depiction of the reality (Browning, 2006; pp. 670, 671). Powerful countries that seek to

21 create dependencies in order to seek votes in international decision making, might think twice about the effectiveness of this tactic.

The second expectation then, was that the higher the voting alignment with the U.S. in the UN General Assembly, and the higher the dependency on the U.S., the more likely the country would be to engage in a patron-client relation with the U.S. The RMI scored very high on both variables, and the qualitative analysis has indeed proven that all the required characteristics of a patron-client model are met. This supports the assumption that the patron-client model is still in existence and relevant, and it provides considerable support for our second prediction. However, this research and future research should be very careful with generalizing the case of the RMI to other cases that score high on both variables. This is because the RMI scored considerably higher on dependency than any of the other cases, and is thus not entirely representative of any of the other cases. It would be very enriching if future research that tries to asses the presence of an international patron-client model - and selects cases on the basis of the same variables as this research - examines the case of Palau and Micronesia, considering that both countries also scored fairly high on both variables.

This research has shown that the international patron-client model is not dead, and it should thus be taken into account that dependency relations have not disappeared along with the Cold War, but that they’re still out there, although the motives for both the patron and client state may have developed and transformed. The findings in this research thus suggest that those authors who automatically equate dependency – especially trade dependency – with voting alignment, need to be very careful not to overlook other possible mechanisms at work; other mechanisms that are often neglected in the blindness that is created by focusing too much on dependency as a driving force behind small states’ international voting behaviour.

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Appendix

1.1 Correlation between Trade dependency and Voting alignment

Correlations Voting_alignmen Dependency t Dependency Pearson Correlation 1 ,053 Sig. (2-tailed) ,267 N 440 440 Voting_alignment Pearson Correlation ,053 1 Sig. (2-tailed) ,267 N 440 440

1.2 Mean of calculated dependency and voting alignment from 2007-2017.

Descriptive Statistics N Mean AV_DEP 44 103,2801 AV_VA 44 43,3748 Valid N (listwise) 44

1.3 Scatterplot; trade dependency & voting alignment including the RMI

1.4 US directed to the RMI – measuring affectivity

Ambassador Karen B. Stewart – July, 2018 ‘…our two countries demonstrate the deepest Remarks bonds of cooperation and friendship’ (U.S. Embassy Marshall Islands, 2018). Republic of Marshall Islands Nuclear ‘I am so honored to be in the Marshall Islands, Remembrance Day a nation that the United States sees as our strategic partner, our ally and our friend’ (U.S Embassy Marshall Islands, 2014). Republic of the Marshall Islands National Day ‘Our two countries share a deep friendship between our governments and our peoples’ (Secretary of State, 2019).

Meet Karen Stewart, U.S. Ambassador to the ‘The Marshall Islands have long been a special Republic of the Marshall Islands friend of the United States’ (U.S Embassy Marshall Islands, 2016). Ambassador Armbruster congratulations to The United States is proud to be a partner H.E. President Hilda Heine with the Marshall Islands on international issues in the United Nations…’

1.5 RMI directed to the US – measuring affectivity

United States Independence Day 2018 ‘We look forward to many more years of continued support and friendship as we work to make the world a safer place for future generations’ (Embassy of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, 2018). Speech delivered to the Marshall Islands ‘Also in its February 6th statement, the US Parliament. referred to the Marshall Islands as “our friend and ally”. We have the same feeling towards the US’ (Tony de Brum, 2015). State of the Nations Adress Part 1 ‘…and our friends visiting from United States Army Garrison Kwajalein Atoll’ (Hilda Heine, 2018).

1.6 Average trade dependency and voting alignment on the U.S per country

Country Voting Alignment Trade Dependency Nauru 69,58 96,76 Tuvalu 31,81 15,66 Palau 85,96 80,51 San Marino 55,38 4,82 Liechtenstein 54,79 53,35 Monaco 62,96 46,71 Rep. of the Marshall 76,14 791,87 Islands

Samoa 38,84 37,02 St. Kitts and Nevis 38,24 230,90 Dominica 24,32 185,96 Andorra 58,77 2,77 Seychelles 34,35 37,99 Antigua and Barbuda 32,53 202,21 Micronesia 87,59 157,91 Grenada 41,28 101,27 Tonga 42,66 51,99 St. Vincent and the 47,70 123,41 Grenadines Kiribati 52,08 43,07 St. Lucia 38,54 285,32 Sao Tome and Princip 38,54 23,49 Barbados 32,71 113,40 Vanuatu 37,52 44,35 Iceland 58,18 42,38 Belize 32,61 276,83 Bahamas 34,55 339,12 Malta 50,13 71,41 Brunei Darussalam 29,38 19,51 Maldives 32,46 13,02 Cabo Verde 321,57 6,10 Suriname 30,67 30,67 Luxembourg 59,39 33,86 Montenegro 55,08 6,66 Solomon Islands 32,94 10,62 Guyana 50,57 247,61 Bhutan 28,50 3,65 Comoros 26,48 3,40 Fiji 35,19 58,56

Djibouti 26,87 115,15 Cyprus 51,32 7,34 Mauritius 28,23 29,32 Estonia 60,82 32,90 Timor-Leste 33,61 2,05 Equatorial Guinea 26,27 100,41 Trinidad and Tobago 31,38 363,01