Trade Dependency As an Impediment to Autonomous Foreign Policy of Small States? a Test of the Patron-Client Model
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TRADE DEPENDENCY AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO AUTONOMOUS FOREIGN POLICY OF SMALL STATES? A TEST OF THE PATRON-CLIENT MODEL HELENA LAUREYNS PROF W. VEENENDAAL PROF F. Bakker 17/07/2019 8076 Words Introduction On the 15th of September, 2009, the heads of state and government gather in the UN headquarters in New York for the 64th session of the UN General Assembly. That session, 4 countries had a voting coincidence with the U.S. of a 100% on important votes and consensus actions; Palau, Micronesia, Israel and the Marshall Islands (Bureau of International Organization Affairs, 2010). Some would note that Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands all have been former colonies of the U.S., hence, the voting alignment. However; the word former implies that these countries are now independent sovereign states. But are they really independent? The relation between small and big states has often been described of as one of dependency and vulnerability (Elman, 1995; Armstrong & Read, 2003; Richardson & Kegley, 1980). Being aware of the weakness and dependency of these small states, big powerful states have often found themselves in a powerful bargaining position in which they commonly provided security and economic aid in return for a compensation; votes (Veenendaal, 2017; p. 565). This relation between the providing big state and the more vulnerable small state during the Cold War has often been coined as a patron-client relation (Ciorciari, 2015; Veenendaal, 2017; Roniger, 2015; Carney, 1989). By this is meant a reciprocal, voluntarily entered relation between two actors controlling unequal resources (Carney, 1989; p. 44). The relation is two sided; there is exchange between the two countries in which the client – the dyad with the fewer resources - complies to voting with the patron – the dyad with more resources - in return for the preservation of its security (Carney, 1989; p. 47). What sets the patron-client model apart from simple linkages of dependency are, according to Veenendaal, reciprocity and affectivity: ‘this generates a form of loyalty that enhances the stability of structural patron client linkages’ and ‘without reciprocity and loyalty there is merely a dependency relation’ (Veenendaal, 2017; p. 565). In short, the characteristics that define a patron-client relation are as follows; dependency, compliance, loyalty, reciprocity, asymmetry and affectivity 2 (Veenendaal, 2017; p. 565). A more complete elaboration on what exactly these characteristics entail will be provided later on. The prediction was that the end of the Cold War would greatly reduce the bargaining position of weaker states, rendering the patron-client model irrelevant (Veenendaal, 2017, 564). This view is strengthened by Hey’s argument that in the aftermath of the Cold War, poor states were no longer able to play superpowers off to one another, resulting in fewer policy options (Hey, 3003; p. 1). If the patron-client model indeed suffers from a diminished relevance, then how can the persistent voting alignment observable today be explained? I argue that with the ending of the Cold War – which has most likely decreased ideological based voting as well as the high issue salience of Cold War questions – and the more recent critiques on the present irrelevance of security based theories and military gains (see for example Hay, 2003; Ingebritsen, 2005), it is worth looking at more subtle motivations behind voting alignment such as dependence. More specifically; dependence in the shape of trade dependence. Accordingly, the need to address two central questions arises; the question of whether trade dependence could possibly be a driving force behind voting alignment today, and whether this voting alignment is indicative of the possible continued presence of the patron-client model. Existing theories on why countries engage in voting alignment are almost exclusively based on the Cold War years, and there is a strong need for a more recent assessment of what motivates countries’ voting behavior today. A more solid explanation of why countries do or do not engage in voting alignment can create new insights in the exact nature of dependency relations today. Literature review Researchers such as Hey, Ingebritsen, Veenendaal & Corbett and Armstrong & Read state that one of the most common assumptions about small states is that they are economically weak and thus dependent on the economic and security umbrella of their bigger neighbours or neighbour (Hey, 2003; Ingebritsen, 2006; Veenendaal & Corbett, 2015; Armstrong & Read, 2003). Many agree upon the fact that this economic weakness derives from a high level of external dependence and a relatively high exposure to exogenous shocks (Armstrong & Read, 2002; Thorhalsson, 2012; Veenendaal & Corbett, 3 2015; Bishop, 2012). Browning argued that small states are objects of IR, responding mainly to external policy while lacking the power to decide on its own foreign policy (Browning, 2006; pp. 58-64). It should however, not be overlooked that these states, despite their smallness, are also sovereign nations. It is this sovereignty, Drezner points out, that is the countries’ most valuable resource. Especially during the Cold War, Third World rulers did not shy away from trading various aspects of their sovereignty in exchange for military protection or foreign aid (Drezner, 2002; p. 76). It was broadly assumed that the ending of the Cold War would greatly reduce the leverage of weaker states, and would thus go along with the disappearance of the patron-client model (Veenendaal, 2007; p. 564). However, recent studies show a different reality. Over the year 2011, voting alignment between the Marshall Islands and the U.S. was 89.6 per cent, and even more so for Micronesia and Palau (Veenendaal, 2007; p. 561). The logic behind assuming that small states are more prone to engage in voting alignment often stems from the fact that they are seen as vulnerable and weak (see for example Moon, 1988; Elman, 1995, Hey, 2003; East, 1973). According to Armstrong & Read does this vulnerability derive from the lack of a domestic critical mass (the needed labour force), an undiversified economy, a high degree of openness to trade, a limited resource base and in some cases higher transportation costs (Armstrong & Read, 2002; pp. 103-105). Vulnerability alone is not enough to yield dependence; it are the linkages between two countries in which the more powerful country establishes the domain of its dominance (military, economic), that eventually creates a relation of dependence (Ricardson & Kegley, 1980; p. 193). However, as stated before, the reciprocal element in patron-client relations entails that the client state also has something to offer to the patron: ideological support in the form of voting alignment (Carney, 1989; p. 47). The reasoning that voting alignment serves as a possible indicator for the presence of the patron-client relation is shared with Shoemakers and Spanier who argue that ideological convergence and a streamlining of foreign policy behaviour is what a patron is aiming for in a patron-client relation (Shoemaker & Spanier, 1984; p. 17-20). On the other hand, Hey argues that small states today have an increasing international prestige, that they are physically secure and that their position is strengthened due to the rise of supranational organizations such as the European Union and the Atlantic 4 Treaty organization (Hey, 2003; p.1). Moreover, with the ending of the Cold War, poor and small states are no longer able to play one superpower off against the other (Hey, 2003; Veenendaal, 2007). As issue salience, the position of small states, and the structure of the global world in general have changed since the Cold War, is it likely that dependency relations have changed too. Therefore one should be careful to blindly assume the theories that were provided during the Cold War to still be entirely true. Different theories Most international voting behaviour takes place within the UN, in which the UN General Assembly serves as a platform for states to exert their influence in a variety of ways. Thorhalsson argues that small states join the UN because of their recognition of sovereignty, acceptance in the international community, the access to international bodies such as the World Bank and the IMF, and because if offers a venue for influence (Thorhalsson, 2012, p. 143). Some might argue that voting alignment in return for any kind of benefit is a way of selling a states’ sovereignty; the voluntary or forceful erosion of a states’ sovereignty (Drezner, 2002; p. 76). The following section will address what drives states to engage in voting alignment in the UN security council. Different theories have been drawn from the literature. A first theory for why countries align themselves with the U.S. is because of similar government ideology. Potrafke finds that with voting behavior of 21 OECD countries during the period between 1984 and 2005, government ideology played a strong role in voting alignment with the U.S. He found that left wing governments were less prone to vote with the U.S., especially when the president was Republican (Potrafke, 2009; p. 263). Strüver, who examines the case of China as a patron country, finds that one factor fostering alliance, is the presence of like-minded countries in international affairs, and he thus proposes that these country relations are best described as interest-driven alignments (Strüver, 2017, p. 60). Richardson equally finds that during the Cold War years, U.S. dependencies showed the greatest political compliance (Richardson, 1967; p. 1109). Another theory on why countries align themselves with the U.S. is based on the impact of the salience of certain issues on voting alignment in the UN General Assembly. Kim 5 and Russet have analyzed both Cold War and post Cold War voting behavior and concluded that voting blocs have shifted from an East-West split, to a North South-split.