chapter 2 Habitus in the Roman Catholic Tradition: Context and Challenges

Brian Patrick Green

St. defines habitus, following , Augustine, and Aver- roes, respectively, as “a disposition whereby someone is disposed, well or ill,” as “that whereby something is done when necessary,” and as “that whereby we act when we will.”1 Aquinas also defines habitus as “a disposition in re- lation to a thing’s nature, and to its operation or end, by reason of which ­disposition a thing is well or ill disposed thereto.”2 Contemporary commenta- tors have at­ tempted to help clarify this tangle of meanings, with Craig St­ even ­Titus saying that “Aquinas defines habitus as an acquired quality that we alter only with difficulty. It is a disposition to act which has become second ­nature (connaturalis),”3 and Anthony Kenny (quoted approvingly by Brian Davies) say- ing that “a habitus for Aquinas is ‘half-way between a capacity and an ­action, between pure potentiality and full actuality.’”4 Clearly, there is much complexity underlying the concept of habitus. The philosophical and theological concept represented by the Latin word habitus has its roots in both Aristotle and the Bible.5 Humans have known for a long time that what one does becomes who one is, and, when this is applied to morally relevant behavior, what we do makes us better or worse as persons. The medieval Scholastic phrase, “agere sequitur esse,” describes this linkage

1 Aquinas 1947, i–ii, 49.2–3. Bonnie Kent helpfully points out, however, that does not say exactly what Aquinas attributes to him (and Aquinas knew that, using the correct quotation of Averroes in the Summa Contra Gentiles), and so we ought to consider the defi- nition Aquinas attributes to Averroes as rather attributable to Aquinas himself (Kent 2013, 107–108). 2 Aquinas 1947, i–ii, 49.4. 3 Titus 2006, 119. 4 Davies 2014, 190, and Davies, 2002, 16, both quoting Kenny 1990, xxi, citing Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, i–ii, 50.4. See also the same quote in Kenny 2005, Ch. 6. 5 Aristotle 1999, and (for a few Biblical examples) Proverbs 3:1, 4:20–27 (attentiveness in inter- nalizing ); Jeremiah 13:23, Ezekiel 33:31, and 1 Corinthians 10:1–6 (difficulty in changing habitus); 1 Timothy 4:13–16 (practicing virtue); Hebrews 5:14 (moral practice).

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42 Green between doing and identity, stating that “action follows being.”6 This con- cept still forms the basis for most versions of natural law found among Roman Catholic theologians and . Plainly speaking, it means that, as humans with and rationality, we can, through our action and to a limited extent, adjust our “being.” Through our actions we dispose and predis- pose ourselves (recalling that habitual character is one’s “disposition”) towards future similar actions. We not only have a first nature, our genetic-biological selves, but also a second nature, our habitual-biological selves.7 In this chapter, I will examine some of the Catholic tradition that forms the context for discussion of the idea of habitus. I will then look at some main challenges to the network of ideas that form the context for the concept of habitus, and attempt to neutralize these challenges. My overall goal is to pro- vide a resource that gives a broad background for further investigations into the concept of habitus, whether from philosophical, theological, or scientific perspectives, so that as progress comes to this field, the implications of this progress might be more readily recognized.

Habitus in the Context of Catholic Moral

Catholicism has many philosophical and theological strands. I cannot address all of them, so I will here merely discuss some major ideas from one strand – – which is based on the ideas of the 13th century saint, Thomas Aquinas. St. Thomas managed a synthesis of Aristotle’s and Biblical ; thus, Thomism is a kind of informed by Judeo- Christian religious ideals such as the paradigmatic figure of Christ, human ­dignity and equality, the of work, and so on. At the largest scale, Thomistic relies on an understanding of human nature and what traits contribute to being an excellent person; in other words, it relies on an “is” and an “ought,” a description and a ­prescription,

6 See, for example, Aquinas, 1955–57, iii, 69.20 and 97.4. James Bretzke (1998, 10) calls this phrase an “Important metaphysical and moral in which one’s moral duties and pos- sibilities are grounded in one’s being. Thus the moral ‘ought’ is founded on the ‘is,’ the given reality of the individual. This principle indicates the inseparable connection among ontol- ogy, obligation, and ethics.” Dietrich Bonhoeffer (2009, 103) says of it “Agere sequitur esse: this ontological, fundamental thesis of Catholic and orthodox Protestant dogmatics….” 7 Aquinas 1947, i–ii, 58.1. These should not be thought of as dualistically non-interacting categories. Our behaviors and experiences embed into our neural biology and through epi- genetics can even influence future generations, while our genetics can predispose us towards certain behaviors, such as alcoholism or violence.