Japan and Germany in International Relations, 1950-2000: Parallels and Differences

266 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS

Hanns W. Maul1

Japan and Germany show remarkable similarities in their postwar foreign policies. Both have relied on security guarantees by the United States, and have thus accepted dependence on others, rather than trying to assert their autonomy. The new, distinctive approach to foreign policy built around the central element of security interdependence-imposed by the US, but also accepted by the elites and the peoples of Japan and Germany-was highly successful. Now with the end of the Cold War there are question marks about whether the two countries should and could pursue their postwar policies as “civilian powers.” Those questions turn around (a) the desirability of a continuation of the “civilian power” approach by Japan and Germany, which is often perceived as “free riding,” (b) the willingness of elites and the public to stick with the postwar foreign policy consensus, and (c) the ability of the two countries to continue their distinctive foreign policy approach under new, possibly less favorable international circumstances. The author concludes that the civilian power approach basically still seems to provide the best possible course for both countries, but also that Germany and in particular Japan need to do more to keep this approach viable. HANNS W. MAULL 177

Japan and Germany in International Relations, 1950-2000: Parallels and Differences

Hanns W. Maul1

Japan and Germany as “Civilian Powers”: 1950-1 990

Divided by the vast land mass of Eurasia, two countries at the periphery of this huge continent have since the last quarter of the nineteenth century had a remarkably similar history. Both were latecomers to the industrial revolution and nineteenth-century imperial- ism, both engaged on a trajectory of state-led modernization at home and military expansionism abroad. Both sought to rise to great-power status and secure their own colonial empires, emulating the older European powers. Both ultimately failed in this effort, bringing down a mayhem of destruction on their neighbors, as well as on themselves. At the end of World War 11, both countries were exhausted, defeated and had to face occupation and reeducation. The parallels in Japan’s and Germany’s history continued after the end of the occupation. Again, the similarities in the postwar foreign policy experiences of Germany and Japan are probably more important than the many differences. In particular, both countries share a particular, and unusual, foreign policy orientation-something that we might define as a distinctive foreign policy culture for which I propose the term “civilian power.”

An earlier version of this article was presented at a symposium of Japanese and German international relations specialists in Kyoto in September 1995. The author would like to thank participants at that meeting for helpful comments and suggestions. 178 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS

Constraints on Sovereignty The first and most fundamental parallel between the two countries in their postwar history has been their willingness to accept dependence on others to ensure that most important objective of any state: national security. To be sure, smaller states have long had to look to others (and hope for a favorable international environment) for their national security, but for actors of the size and importance of Japan and Germany, this has been a major innovation. It seems highly doubtful whether it would have been possible to sustain an open and rules-based international economy and the degree of tension, but also of cohesion and order that US-Soviet rivalry imposed on world politics had Germany and Japan regained their old, prewar status as independent great powers. They did not, and they could not, take such a path. Whether this was by force or by design (and as we shall see, in reality it was both), it made a very important difference to post-war world politics. They could and did not do so for at least four major reasons, which were essentially the same for both countries, though with important differences in detail: America’s Strategy of Double Containment In the first instance, neither Japan nor Germany had a choice: America pushed them. As the Cold War contours of the post-war world began to take shape, Washington needed to have both Germany and Japan firmly on the Western side in the global competition between the two blocs. But it also had to make sure that neither would ever again mount a challenge to the new status quo. The strategy that elegantly ensured both objectives simultaneously has been felicitously labeled “double containment”’-it aimed at containing the Soviet Union through a worldwide alliance system anchored (after the fall of China) on Japan in East Asia and Germany in Europe, yet also at containing any resurgence of military expansionism and nationalism through tying both Japan and Germany so closely into this US-led alliance system that their margin for independent action was closely circumscribed.

1 Wolfram Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe, Forty Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale UP, 1989). HANNS W. MAULL 179

Its status as the dominant occupation power allowed America to put in place important building blocks of this strategy, such first steps as the rearmament of Japan and international security arrangements pro- tecting and constraining both countries (the US-Japan Security Treaty in the case of Japan, German membership in NATO in the case of Germany). Although America’s strategy of double containment reflected necessities, it was not only a product of realpolitik. It also incorporated America’s profound belief in the possibility to shape a new international order around democratic principles-both in the sense of a “democratic peace” between free and representative governments first discussed by Immanuel Kant, and through the organization of international relations along the lines of democratic norms. Basically, America believed that both Japan and Germany could be turned into solidly democratic countries, and that this in itself would ensure that they would no longer represent any threat to American interests, but rather become natural allies. In the case of Germany, of course, this strategy had to be im- plemented in the Western half of a country divided by the vicissitudes of the ideological confrontation between the blocs, while in Japan it could be applied for an undivided country. This was a very important difference. Another consisted in the fact that even in the Western parts of Germany, America had to share responsibility for the occupation with two other countries, Britain and France, while in Japan MacArthur and his masters in Washington practically ruled alone (neither the eleven- nation Far Eastern Commission nor the Allied Council for Japan had any real influence over occupation policies in Japan).* A third major difference of great importance was that the strategy of double containment was a purely bilateral affair between Washington and Tokyo, while Germany became both subject and object of what were in fact two closely intertwined yet separate tracks of “double containment,” both multilateral in nature. The first was the transatlantic track centered around Washington and embodied by NATO, the second was the Euro- pean effort fundamentally to transform relations between the West

2 Richard B. Finn, Winners in Peace, MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan, (Berkeley: 1992), 102f, 151ff. 180 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS

European states through European integration. This track ultimately centered around the Franco-German relationship, and although its security dimension ostensibly fell away with the demise of the European Defense Community in 1954, European integration continued to address both the objectives for which “double containment” was designed: strengthening Western resistance against communist pressures, and tying German power down. Learning from Defeat, Coping with a Hideous Past Germany’s and Japan’s fundamental postwar foreign policy choices were thus imposed by the United States. But those choices were accepted by leaders of the two countries not only as necessities, but also as opportunities. The key players, Shigeru Yoshida in Japan and Konrad Adenauer in Germany, shared many of the American assumptions behind its policies of double containment, and they were determined to anchor their countries firmly in the Western camp. Their assessments were based on the lessons they drew from the disastrous experiences of Germany and Japan with fascism and militarism. Their people by and large drew very similar conclusions. Eventually, both leaders were therefore able to build strong domestic support for their policies. Elites in both countries also sought rapid reintegration in their respective regions. For various reasons, however, including the particular patterns of Cold War confrontation in the two regions (bipolar and clear-cut in Europe, complex in Asia) and the characteristics of respective regional environments (greater proximity, greater political, economic and cultural affinity, several states of similar size in Europe, huge differences in Asia), but also because of policies pursued (atoning for the past, policies of deep integration in the case of Germany; reluctance to confront the past, policies of shallow integration in the case of Japan), the return to East Asia turned out to be much more difficult for Japan than was the integration into the European community for Germany. The burden of their past has weighed heavily on both countries, and will continue to do so for some time to come. Both have had to accept this as a constraint, and both have tried to learn from their past errors. But there are important differences in the way the burden of history has HANNS W. MAULL 181 been tackled in the post-war period by the two c~untries.~The kind of statements one sees depressingly regularly coming from Japanese government ministers about the origins of the war in the Pacific, about the occupation and colonial rule in Korea, and about the “liberation of Asians from Western colonialism” are simply not conceivable in germ an^.^

The Policies of Civilian Powers: 1950-1990 The leaders of Japan and Germany were thus pushed and pulled by circumstances and external influences, but also by their own convic- tions, into a rather unusual foreign and security policy posture, at least by the standards of their past orientations and the size and importance of the two countries in their respective regions. The strategies and policies that the two countries have evolved have been highly successful. Five elements of those policies seem particularly important in this context: close alignment with America and the West; dependent military security policies; domestic support for their security and foreign policy postures; an emphasis on foreign economic policies; and support for the formation of security communities. Close Alignment with America and the West Sticking to America and the West, come what may, was the perhaps the most important strategic guideline that the two countries pursued in parallel. For Japan, this was a return to an earlier strategic posture- pursued within the framework of the Anglo-Japanese alliance from 1902 onward. For West Germany, it was a decisive break with the past dithering “between East and West.” Following American leadership at almost any cost became of paramount importance to both Tokyo and Bonn. Bonn, however, had to reconcile this orientation with a second

3 Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt.: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (New York: 1994). 4 The one important German politician who recently fell over his statements about the Nazi period (the former Speaker of the Bundestag, Phillipp Jenninger) did so because he blundered so badly in conveying his politically entirely “correct” sense of disgust and horror about Nazi crimes that he caused an outcry over his bad taste and style. 182 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS of equal importance-that of closely aligning its own position with that of its European Community partners, and in particular with France. As we have seen already, Germany’s integration into the American-led alliance system was two-dimensional and multilateral, while that of Japan was one-dimensional and bilateral. The seeming disadvantage of Germany in this rather more complex and multifaceted framework of co-operation and integration with the West in fact turned out to be a huge advantage. While Japan’s alliance with the West was a partnership (and in many ways a highly asymmetrical one) with America, Germany’s ties with the West were fundamentally more diversified, and therefore more solid. European integration in principle provided an alternative, independent mooring for Germany’s foreign policy, and although this option fortunately so far never had to be put to the test, it did make Germany’s relationship with America more balanced. Through its two-layered and intensely multilateral structure, Germany’s anchorage in the West became more resilient, less accident- prone than that holding Japan. But neither was free of tensions, which were bound to arise once Japan and Germany had regained their sovereignty and their ability to articulate and pursue their own interests. Those tensions essentially revolved around an inherent characteristic of double containment: it implied that both Japan and Germany had to accept dependence on others for their most vital interests, raising issues about the compatibility of their interests with those of America, about the quality of policies pursued by the US, and about mechanisms for German and Japanese participation in joint decision-making. Military Security through Dependence on Others For both countries, the essence of postwar security was their dependence on the United States. Neither could or would muster the capabilities to defend itself credibly, or to deter any attacker, and both built their whole security posture around the assumption that it would be unnecessary. The basic framework for national defense for Japan was provided by the US-Japan Security Treaty, and for Germany, by NATO. Those arrangements gave the two countries crucial external security guarantees, including guarantees of extended nuclear deterrence. The other side of the coin was that they had to renounce formally any HANNS W. MAULL 183 autonomous nuclear defense options, and to accept constraints on their overall military capabilities. In practice, this meqnt that Japan and America, within the framework of the US-Japan Security Treaty and particularly on the basis of the 1978 “Guidelines for Defense Cooperation,” developed a close and increasingly symbiotic military cooperation, while Germany formally integrated almost all its armed forces into NATO, thus subjecting them to non-German command. This situation had huge advantages. It provided critical reassurance to Japan’s and Germany’s neighbors and thus helped stabilize their regional environments. It enabled the West to focus its energies on the Soviet threat. And it substantially lowered the costs of national security for both countries. Yet those security arrangements also had price tags. First, the United States demanded that Japan and Germany provide bases for American forces, pay for US military presence, and contribute to their own defense. This forced Japan and Germany into early rearmament, rather against the wishes of their people and many of their political leaders at the time (though Adenauer quickly realized that the rearmament card could be played as a quid-pro-quo to secure the restoration of West German sovereignty on favorable terms). Second, Japan and Germany in effect were sheltered to a large degree by US nuclear guarantees from the rough and tumble of international relations, and thus could afford to ignore some of the less agreeable aspects of international relations. While post-war Japan and Germany shared the essential feature of dependence on America for their military security, security policies and postures of the two countries in many ways developed quite differently. First, Japan opted for a minimum defense capability-something that divided Germany, with its different geostrategic position, simply could not afford. Thus, German rearmament was significantly more substan- tial, in terms of both resources and manpower devoted to the military, than that of Japan. One important consequence that flowed from this was that Germany had to rely on conscription to meet its military manpower targets, while Japan could afford the luxury of a professional military. Second, and related to this, Japan’s security establishment remained as in a closet-dissociated from society, little respected, much reviled-while by comparison the integration of the armed forces into German society was reasonably successful. Third, Germany went for 184 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS full-scale military integration into a collective defense arrangement, while Japan preferred to rely on informal military cooperation and integration on a strictly bilateral basis. Fourth, Japan initially hoped to entrust its national security to the United Nations, rather than to the US, and therefore for some time looked to collective security under UN auspices as a possible alternative source of security, while at least within the German government nobody was under any illusions about the ability of the UN to guarantee West German security. (Note, however, that the opposition Social Democrats, concerned about the detrimental impact of the Cold War on the division of Germany, long tried to promote solutions of regional collective security as an alternative to military alliance with the West). Tokyo did not, however, draw the conclusion from this that Japan should be able to participate militarily in efforts of collective security (such as PKO or peace enforcement under UN auspices). This brings us to a fifth and last difference: Japan’s military posture has been characterized by much more severe self- imposed constraints than Germany’s. While both countries have formally renounced weapons of mass destruction and imposed limits on the total size of their armed forces, Japan has also ruled out any participation in collective security or collective defense operations, it has imposed a rather low ceiling (one per cent of GNP) on defense expenditure, has officially prohibited (though informally tolerated) the introduction of US nuclear weapons onto Japanese soil or into Japanese ports, and has completely banned arms exports. Building Domestic Consensus The fundamental reorientation of post-war foreign and security policies domestically was far from easy to accomplish. The military dimensions of security dependence on America and its implications, in particular, were hotly contested for quite some time in both countries. Eventually, however, political leaders in both countries were able to persuade electorates about the benefits flowing from this course of action, and from the early 1960s onward the foreign and security postures of Japan and Germany rested on strong foundations of a broad domestic consensus. In Germany, this consensus included all major parties; in Japan, it excluded much of the political opposition which, however, found less and less support for its advocacy of “unarmed neutrality.” HANNS W. MAULL 185

Economic Strategies Part of the explanation for the development of a strong domestic consensus around respective foreign and security postures was, of course, the economic success that Japan and Germany started to enjoy from the early 1950s onward. The pursuit of national wealth and well-being through economic rather than through military strategies turned out to be critical for the success of the particular foreign policy role model pursued by Japan and Germany. Both managed to greatly strengthen social stability as a result, and both were able to translate economic strength into political influence. Again, however, there were also important differences between Japan’s and Germany’s postwar economic strategies. First, Japan based its strategy on trade-primarily on exports of manufactured goods, and imports of raw materials-and preferred to develop this strategy in a loose, global framework. Germany looked towards regional economic integration as an important element of its strategy. European economic integration, however, implied much higher (and more diversified) levels of economic interdependence than in the case of Japan. Second, Japan’s postwar economic strategy was considerably more merkantilist than that of Germany. Japan’s economic elite preferred not to depend on the outside world, and ensured that Japan’s economy became heavily regulated and sheltered from competitive pressures from abroad through a host of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Economic nationalism remained stronger and more effective in Japan than in Germany. This seems to contradict Japan’s overall postwar foreign policy orientation, but the contradiction may be more apparent than real: hidden dimensions of nationalism and the desire to retain or regain Japan’s full autonomy can also be found behind the foreign policy thinking of Yoshida Shigeru. The “civilian power” role model was accepted by Japan primarily for pragmatic reasons, rather than out of conviction, and it was applied rather more selectively than in the case of Germany. Germany’s elite, on the other hand, was convinced that only a fundamental reorientation of German foreign policy, away from nationalism and traditional sovereignty could secure Germany’s democratic transformation and peaceful integration in Europe. Germany’s application of the role model therefore tended to be more comprehensive, and more principled. This becomes most evident when we now turn to the last dimension of Japan’s and Germany’s 186 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS postwar strategies-a dimension that I would like to call “community- building.” Community Building Under conditions of today’s anarchic international relations, reliance on other states for vital national security interests at first glance seems a risky and somewhat naive policy (and it has been seen in this light often enough by its critics). The commitment that such a “civilian power” policy expects from its security partners is far-reaching. It must therefore, of course, rest on shared interests. But this alone would probably not suffice to make the strategy tenable over the long run: an interdependent security partnership must also build on shared values. Both Japan and Germany in their postwar foreign policies have followed the logic of this argument, albeit to different degrees. In‘a way, of course, their communities were defined for them-by the defeat of the old order, by the reforms of the occupation and the new constitutions formulated under their tutelage, and by the rise of the Cold War confrontation. This made it easier for both countries to find new international identities for themselves, as members of the community of Western democracies. Yet Germany did not have to rely on this identity alone. From the early 1950s onward, it turned to European integration, thus in effect helping to build a community within a community: the European Community as part of the broader transatlantic security community. Although European integration after the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954 retained little direct relevance for Germany’s military security, it had enormous indirect importance. For through European integration, Germany was able to help transform the character of interstate relations within Western Europe, and thus fundamentally to change Germany’s geostrategic position-a dramatic, by now probably permanent change for the better in Germany’s security environment. Moreover, this achievement in principle could be expanded towards the Eastern half of the European continent once political conditions there would allow it-as they did from 1989 onward. Japan did not, and probably could not, pursue such a course of regional integration. For one thing, circumstances in East Asia were very different. But it is also not clear whether Japan would have wanted, or been able, to take part in such a project of community-building. HANNS W. MAULL 187

Although Japan initially looked to the international community (as expressed through the UN) as a possibility for identification and security, it did not actively try to promote this community. And even in the case of the vital US-Japan relationship, the extent to which shared values really support this relationship seems open to q~estion.~Germany has Europe, as well as America, and belongs to two communities-the Atlantic security community and the European Union. Japan only has America, and only one community-that with the United States. And even that community may be built on tenuous foundations.

A Critical Precondition: Favorable International Environment Any weaknesses in the decisions and strategies chosen, however, were more than outweighed for Japan and Germany by favorable international circumstances, which greatly helped them to pursue the particular foreign policy of civilian powers. Among those circumstances, the following stand out: The US: Power and Benevolence The most important favorable external condition was, of course, the overwhelmingly powerful position occupied by the United States in the post-war world, and the purposes to which this power was put by Washington. America preferred to treat Japan and Germany as future partners, rather than defeated enemies. It also has persistently and energetically supported European integration, and it has long tolerated a highly asymmetrical distribution of economic gains from the US-Japan relationship. At the same time, American power was sufficient, and wielded sufficiently prudently, to provide essential stability in the global environment and in the regional environments of Japan and Germany.

5 At the heart of US-Japan economic frictions probably are differences in values: America’s complaints about “unfair” Japanese trade practices ultimately reflect a sense that Japan may not respect and practice what it pretends to believe (and Japan may be forgiven if it, too, now suspects that America may not practice what it preaches in its trade policies). 188 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS

Communist Strengths and Weaknesses The existence of the Soviet threat no doubt greatly helped to facilitate the re-integration of Japan and Germany into international society, and to cement the Western alliance system. At the same time, the weaknesses of the common enemy were important enough to give the West considerable leeway, and to provide opportunities for transforming the Cold War through economic interdependence and other transnational influences. Communism thus provided a convenient focus of attention and a common denominator, but after the successful post-war recon- struction never seriously threatened to overwhelm the West. A Favorable World Economic Environment Largely due to American stewardship, the postwar international economic order proved a veritable boon to both Japan and Germany. Rapid growth in the world economy was fuelled by quickly expanding trade, with Japan and Germany at the forefront. A stable international mone- tary system based on fixed (and for Japan and Germany highly favorable) exchange rates helped to underpin this highly beneficial situation, as did systematic efforts at trade liberalization through a series of GATT negotiation rounds. Vibrant International Institutions Particularly in the realm of international economics, but not only there, Japan and Germany also benefitted from the positive effects of vibrant international institutions. Those institutions greatly strengthened the fabric of international stability, and thus facilitated the evolution of economic interdependence. Not only the European Community, but also other institutions such as the GATT or NATO went through phases of widening (i.e., expanding their membership) and deepening (i.e., strengthening their ability to shape developments in specific segments of international relations). Europe-the Successful Transformation Lastly, the successful transformation of interstate relations enor- mously benefited Germany. Bonn, of course, had contributed to this development energetically, but it could not have secured the results without decisive support from others, in particular Paris (and Washing- ton). The net result of this transformation has been, as noted already, a HANNS W. MAULL 189 dramatic improvement of Germany’s geopolitical and economic position in almost every regard. Although Germany soon became the largest net contributor to the EC, this money has been well spent indeed.

Japan and Germany as “Active Civilian Powers”? 1990-2000 and Beyond

Japan and Germany fared well as “civilian powers” during the Cold War era. Indeed, those policies helped them to become its principal beneficiaries. Germany also benefitted tremendously from the end of the Cold War, which allowed it to achieve unification. Japan was less successful: the most important territorial legacy of the Cold War, the dispute with Russia over the Northern Territories, remains unresolved. Still, the end of the Cold War certainly in itself was beneficial to Japan, too. Now, however, international relations are undergoing profound changes-we live in a new world whose contours are still hardly understood. How relevant is the particular foreign policy culture that Germany and Japan have cultivated during the Cold War era for this new context? Will parallels between Japan and Germany continue to hold? We may conveniently discuss this from three different angles. Should Japan and Germany continue with their civilian power orientation? Is it desirable, in other words, to maintain the broad guidelines of postwar foreign policies in Japan and Germany? Will it be continued (i.e., will elites and the populations support this orientation)? And can it be continued (i.e., will circumstances allow Japan and Germany to continue along their civilian power lines)?

Should Japan and Germany Remain Civilian Powers? Many would reject this notion immediately and out of hand. They would argue that pursuing the role model of civilian power would prevent Japan and Germany from assuming their appropriate share of the burden for efforts to enhance international order and stability. In particular, they would say, the “civilian power” argument is really just a convenient cop-out: it allows the two to cultivate their reticence in anything involving military action and shedding of blood. Civilian power, in 190 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS other words, is a clever way to let others do the dirty work for Japan and Germany. Whether one accepts this argument or not depends on one’s definition of a civilian power. In my understanding, the term does not imply a rejection of military force per se. Rather, the threat and ultimately even the application of force may be needed to “civilize” international relations, just as order within a nation state ultimately depends on force. Civilian powers thus do have responsibilities in the realm of military security policies. But they should resort to force (for purposes other than self-defense) only with a clear international mandate, they should never act alone but always with partners, and should approach military power with a healthy diffidence.6 Nor does the term imply reluctance to accept international responsibilities. On the contrary, since civilian powers depend so heavily on an orderly and peaceful international environment, it is in their interest to ensure such an environment with all means at their disposal. In short, the status of civilian power is entirely compatible with international burden sharing, even in the military realm, but it does imply particular patterns of behavior. Civilian powers are incomplete powers: they accept limits on their autonomy and they accept a vital dependence on others. If we accept the definition of civilian power spelled out above, if (in other words) we use the term to describe an ideal type in the sense of the German sociologist Max Weber, then clearly the foreign policies of Germany and Japan until now, while basically those of civilian powers, fell at times short of the ideal. The principal deficiency was a reluctance to bear more of the burdens of maintaining “civilized” international relations. Both Japan and (arguably, to a lesser extent) Germany to some extent did enjoy free rides. But is it then desirable at all for Japan and Germany to stick to their old orientations as civilian powers? Should

6 Paradoxically, using force in the pursuit of international order under certain circumstances will argue for early and perhaps even rather massive use of military force-in analogy to domestic politics, where nobody would argue that the police should interfere only as a last resort, and with minimum strength. Civilian powers would, for example, ideally strongly favor international standing forces under UN auspices, and they would be willing to see them brought into a crisis such as, say, Yugoslavia, at an early time so as to maximize the deterrent effect. HANNS W. MAULL 191 they not rather discard this peculiar foreign policy orientation* and become “normal powers”? I think, not. On balance, the Civilian-Power foreign policy mode probably still offers both Japan and Germany the best chance to Secure peace, stability and prosperity. But this assessment clearly is somewhat speculative. In particular, it depends on the assumption that (1) the civilian-power foreign policy mode Will continue to be viable, and (2) it still offers the relatively best chances to minimize national security risks and maximize national prosperity compared to alternative approaches. This last assumption is particularly tricky-but anyone who argues against the civilian-power approach should also suggest what alternative exactly he or she has in mind. One obvious alternative is the much- discussed normal-power approach-a notoriously elusive term but one that generally seems to connote traditional great-power patterns of behavior-i.e., autonomous military capabilities to ensure one’s own security; emphasis on sovereignty and independence; and the pursuit of national interests through unilateral action, rather than the pursuit of interdependent interests through international cooperati~n.~The hall- marks of a traditional great power in today’s world would be an independent nuclear deterrent, autonomous capabilities for force projection over long distances, and the capability and will to use military force unilaterally for purposes other than self-defense under attack. I have tried to show elsewhere that such a traditional great-power approach clearly would not be in Japan’s or Germany’s interests.* Briefly, this is so because any attempt by either Japan or Germany to move in this direction is bound to raise suspicions and efforts to organize counter- vailing power among their neighbors. It would tend to shift basic patterns of regional and international relations away from the pursuit of absolute gains towards an emphasis on relative gains. National security concerns would loom ever larger, and states would seek to guard them through independent national means. The net result could easily be a

7 Philip H. Gordon, “The Normalization of German Foreign Policy,” Orbis, Spring 1994, pp. 225-43.

8 Hanns W. Maull, “L‘Allemagne et le Japon: Deux Pays ?iSuivre,” Politique Etrangkre, No. 211995, pp. 477-96. 192 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS much more dangerous world. At present and in the foreseeable future, the civilian power mode thus still offers the best chances for both Japan and Germany for security and prosperity.

Will Japan and Germany Want to Remain Civilian Powers? The second question to be discussed concerns intentions. will Germany and Japan want to continue their civilian power foreign policy orientations, or will they prefer to change this fundamentally? Public opinion data from both countries suggest that while the old foreign policy consensus certainly has changed and evolved, there has not (yet) been a fundamental departure from the old civilian-power consensus. It is true that the publics in both Japan and Germany have cautiously edged away from their traditional abstentionism in UN Peacekeeping Opera- tions.’ For example, in Japan, support for Japanese SDF participation in UN PKO has increased from 45.5 per cent in 1991 to 48.4 per cent in 1994, while opposition has gone down from 37.9 to 30.4 per cent.“’ In Germany, support for Bundeswehr participation in United Nations PKO has also edged up.” But there are still clear public opinion majorities against any participation of Japanese or German troops in war-type operations, and both governments have to handle participation in UN PKO with considerable care so as not to provoke a political crisis at home.” Recent examples of German and Japanese involvement in UN PKO (such as German participation in Somalia and Yugoslavia and Japanese participation in Africa and the Middle East) illustrate this clearly. It also seems that the publics in the two countries are unwilling to accept larger burdens of a non-military kind for the sake of international order. Taken together with the still-considerable reticence to

9 Mayumi Itoh, “Expanding Japan’s Role in the United Nations,” Pacific Review, Vol. 8:2, No. 2, 1995. 10 Mayumi Itoh, pp. 283-302. 11 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, “Oeffentliche Meinung und Aussenpolitik,” Inter- nationale Politik, No.8/1995, pp. 3-12 (6). 12 Aurelia George Muldan, “International Peacekeeping and Japan’s Role, Catalyst or Cautionary Tale?” Asian Survey, Vol. 35:12, Dec. 1995, pp. 1102-17. HANNS W. MAULL 193 accept the military responsibilities of civilian powers, this may suggest that present public opinion profiles place both Japan and Germany in the bracket of what I have called “reluctant” or “abstentionist” civilian power.I3 There is also virtually no support in either country for the acquisition of nuclear weapons or conventional force-projection capabilities. Public opinion, however only defines the broad parameters within which foreign policy decisions can take place, and even those parameters, as we just have seen, shift: for the time being, the publics in both countries firmly stand behind the civilian power consensus, but seem willing to be persuaded of the need for modifications. That persuasion, of course, will be done by the foreign policy establishments, notably by the politicians. How, then, do the foreign policy establishments see their countries’ future foreign policy roles? What policy modifications have they undertaken? Are they firmly behind the civilian power role model, or are they beginning to consider alternatives? For Germany, there is very little to suggest a departure of the foreign policy establishment from the civilian power model. For Japan, this may no longer be so clear. There, a rather fundamental debate about Japan’s role in the post-Cold War world seems to have begun.14 In this debate, a number of influential voices argue for a “normalization” of Japan’s foreign-policy posture, by which they often seem to mean a more autonomous foreign and security policy. Others are concerned about the reliability of US commitments to the security of Japan and East Asia, and are beginning to think about fall-back and hedging positions as alternatives to Japan’s traditional postwar foreign policy orientation^.'^ To substantiate this assessment, let us briefly look at three sets of issues of particular importance for this question: first, changes in military security policies and defense postures that might imply a shift towards autonomous power-projection capabilities; second, attitudes

13 Hanns W. Maull, “L‘Allemagne et le Japon.” 14 Young-sun Song, Prospects for US-Japan Security Cooperation, in Asian Survey, Vol. 35:12, Dec. 1995, pp. 1087-1101. 15 Eugene Brown, “Japanese Security in the Post-Cold War Era: Threat Perceptions and Strategic Options,” Asian Survey, Vol. 345, May 1994, pp. 43046. 194 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS towards an independent nuclear deterrent; and third, attitudes towards the legacy of the past. Changes in Defense Postures and Military Security Policies In the military realm, adherence to the civilian power mode for Japan and Germany implies a clearly definable set of policies, namely continued renunciation of (1) autonomous national power projection capabilities, (2) nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction capable of providing the country with an autonomous deterrence, and (3) any independent use of military force for purposes other than self-defense. If any of those positions would change, even for purely defensive reasons, they would very likely trigger deep suspicions and counterbalancing actions by Japan’s neighbors. This, in turn, could easily lead to a destabilization of the whole region. Are there any indications that this could happen? Both Japan and Germany have begun a fundamental restructuring of their military forces. The parameters of Japan’s post-Cold War defense posture have been set out by the report of an influential blue-ribbon commission, the Advisory Group on Defense Issues,I6 and Japan’s new defense posture has been officially laid out in November 1995 in the new National Defense Program Outline (Security Council and Cabinet of Japan, 1995). In the case of Germany, there are the new Defense Policy Guidelines and the 1994 defense white paper. The restructuring of the Bundeswehr, which initially was triggered by the need to absorb the East German armed forces, is already well under way; in Japan, it has only started. In both countries, the restructuring process is driven importantly by a desire to reduce overall defense spending-in itself hardly a sign that Japan or Germany may want to develop autonomous military capabilities. The new defense postures and armed forces restructuring in both countries put much more emphasis on PKO and other missions at long distances away from Japan/Germany. It therefore involves greater

16 Advisory Group on Defense Issues, The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan (Tokyo: 1994). HANNS W. MAULL 195 emphasis on mobility, flexibility, long-distance transportation and logis- tics, as well as on intelligence and communications. Yet there are no serious indications in either case of efforts to obtain autonomous military power projection capabilities. In the case of Ger- many, the Bundeswehr has traditionally been fully integrated into the military structure of NATO. This is no longer the case-for an interme- diate period, Bundeswehr units stationed in the Eastern parts remain outside NATO. But the bulk of Germany’s armed forces will remain firmly integrated in supranational military units, the Combined Joint Task Forces of NATO and the Eurocorps with France and some other European countries. NATO’s institutional structures are strong and well-established enough to carry forward the kind of detailed synchro- nization of military planning that is necessary to make integrated military units effective. Moreover, the European Union and the WEU are also moving towards a common defense policy, and although this will in practice mean a lot of “double-hatting” of existing NATO forces, it will create an additional and eventually perhaps also an alternative political framework for integrated military structures. Not all is well, of course, within NATO or the European Union in this regard, but basically the integrated military structures look set to remain-and with them, the containment of German military power. In the case of Japan, the new defense posture continues to put much emphasis on close security cooperation with the United States. The rationale of this cooperation, however, is now perceived more in terms of ensuring regional stability in the Far East against potential threats posed by North Korea or China, with Japan cautiously edging towards providing logistical support to the US in a Far East contingency beyond the territory of Japan. It is still unclear, however, to what extent Japan would be willing and able to become involved in collective defense efforts in East Asia-the prevailing interpretation of the constitution still rules this out officially. Nor are there any signs that Japan’s increasing willingness to consider participation in traditional UN PKO activities, or preparations to make such participation more effective, are designed to give Japan independent power projection capabilities. There is, however, among the defense and foreign policy establishment in Tokyo a scarcely hidden concern about the reliability of US security commitments. Japan’s new defense posture still depends vitally on America, 196 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS and Japan shows every intention to keep it that way. Doubts about America’s reliability, however, may translate into efforts to seek to influence US pulicies through the development of more independent capabilities, which may then be used as levers and bargaining chips against Washington.” Thus, defense planners in Japan have identified long-range air- and sea transport as will as independent means of intelligence gathering and communications as future priority areas; they also appear to be thinking about in-air refuelling. There may also be a temptation to develop fall-back options for the worst-case assumptions about future US policies.” Both tendencies could easily trigger suspicions among Japan’s neighbors, with a risk of a serious deteriora- tion of the security environment in Northeast Asia.” If this happened, it would be the result of political neglect, mutual misperceptions between the US and Japan, inertia, and worst-case planning (to which the military is prone). One need not hypothesize bad intentions on either side for a such an erosion of the US-Japan security relationship. It would be sufficient that each side distrust the other sufficiently to hedge its bets in the cooperation. Avoiding such a development would need firm political commitment to enhanced military cooperation, with the inevitable result that both sides would become more dependent on each other, hence less able to pursue their own interests and policies with disregard for those of the other. This has meanwhile been recognized by both governments. The East Asia Strategic Initiative document produced under the guidance of Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, Jr., by the US government in February 1995 constituted a major American effort to get the US-Japan Security Partnership back on track, and this was followed by the joint declaration issued during the visit of President Clinton to Japan in April 1996.

17 Michael J. Green, Arming Japan. Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy, (New York: 1995). 18 Eugene Brown, “Japanese Security in the Post-Cold War Era: Threat Perceptions and Strategic Options,” Asian Survey, Vol. 345, May 1994, pp. 430-46. 19 Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the US-Japan Alliance, Tokyo S National Defense Program, (Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies / National Defense University 1994). HANNS W. MAULL 197

Preceding this visit, the two governments also signed a new set of guidelines for closer defense cooperation. Nuclear Weapons Both Germany and Japan have ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and have voted for its indefinite extension. Germany has also confirmed its decision to renounce any weapons of mass destruction in the context of the two-plus-four agreements. Occasional arguments to the contrary, there can be no serious doubt that the polihcal establishment stands behind this commitment not to develop or aiquire nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, Germany’s civilian nuclear energy programs are not only closely supervised by the IAEA, but also firmly anchored in Euratom. The only politically conceivable nuclear option for Germany would be a European nuclear deterrent composed of French and British capabilities. But this is quite some time into the future-if ever. The situation seems more complicated in the case of Japan. The Japanese civilian nuclear program at least implicitly creates military options: the huge stockpile of plutonium that Japan will acquire- against commercial logic-could, given Japan’s technological capabilities, quickly be converted into a military program. Moreover, Japan is also aggressively pursuing a national civilian space missile program. None of this proves that Japan may deliberately be developing fall-back nuclear options “just in case” American extended deterrence loses its credibility.*’ Again, however, those facts may be read as indications that some people in the political establishment want to keep the doors open for such an option. This was the case within the LDPalready during the 1950s and 1960s’ and it surfaced briefly in the very first Defense White Paper of 1964. More recently, a worrying pointer has been the Yomiuri Constitution-a discussion proposal for a new constitution for Japan produced by a group of experts for the Yomiuri Shinbun. This proposal formulated Japan’s renunciation of nuclear weapons in such a

20 Christopher W. Hughes, “The North Korea Nuclear Crisis and Japanese Security,” Survival, Vol. 38:2, Summer 1996, pp. 79-103. 198 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS qualified way that it is easy to read it as an authorization for Japan to develop its own nuclear deterrent. In short, both in its military planning as well as in its nuclear posture there are elements which, left to their own momentum, Could shift Japan away from its postwar foreign policy orientation not SO much by design as by a lack of determination to prevent such a development. There are, moreover, apparently quite significant elements within Japan’s political and economic establishment that favor more independent and self-sus- tained policies in a whole range of areas, from arms industries and arms exports through foreign policy to defense planning. None of this seems likely, however, to produce a fundamental reorientation of Japan’s foreign policy and defense orientation, as long as the US-Japan security partnership remains intact.

Coming to Terms with History The third area to be considered here for clues about elite “intentions” in Germany and Japan is respective approaches to the legacies of the fascisthilitarist past. The way Germany and Japan deal with their past does not, of course, provide any direct evidence about intentions-the fact that official Japan has been much more reluctant to face up to its past does not suggest that militarist aspirations are still alive. Coming to terms with the past, however, may be important in firmly implanting attitudes and policies that differ fundamentally from how Germany and Japan behaved during the first half of the century. Again, the situation in Japan represents a somewhat less clear-cut picture than that in Germany. On the one hand, Japan’s most recent prime ministers, starting from Prime Minister Hosokawa, have taken important steps towards confronting Japan’s past more directly and constructively. On the other hand, Japanese nationalism seems to be on the rise. Thus, Social Democratic Prime Minister Murayama failed to get a clear-cut apology expressed in the Diet resolution commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Pacific War against the opposition of conservative members of parliament, and the insipid tone of the resolution showed how far official Japan still had to go. Moreover, Murayama himself later caused some stir when he called Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910 “legal,” and a member of his cabinet had to resign after praising the virtues of Japan’s colonial rule for its subjects. The present prime minster, Ryutaro Hashimoto, had also earlier expressed doubts about HANNS W. MAULL 199

Japan’s responsibility for the Pacific War, and previously headed the Association of Bereaved Families, which has turned into a powerful lobbying machine for nationalist policies. Those (and other) signs of neo-nationalism in Japan must be taken seriously. Overall, however, they do not yet add up to a serious departure from the Japanese elite’s postwar foreign policy course. The nationalists stilI are in the minority, and as long as the US-Japan security partnership works well, they will be relatively easy to contain.

The picture is even more clear-cut in the case Of Germany. There, exbemist nationalist forces have been soundly beaten back in the electoral process, and while they are still able to cause trouble, they are no more than a nuisance, albeit an ugly one, at the political level. Within the intelligentsia, there are some who hark back to Germany’s past glory as a European great power, but even at the level of intellectual debate there is very little that would provide the basis for an alternative foreign policy orientation. Though there may be things on which to keep a watchful eye (such as the desire by the military to justify its post-Cold War existence through eagerly preparing for rather obscure contingen- cies), by and large the foreign-policy elite in Germany seems firmly behind the civilian-power approach. Most available evidence from public opinion data and new defense policies thus suggests, at least for the time being, no more than a modification of the traditional postwar foreign policy consensus. Both Germany and Japan, it seems, have recast their traditional foreign policy preferences in ways that reflect the greater responsibilities the two countries have thrust upon them, but which are still entirely compatible with the civilian power mode and continue to involve elements of what the German foreign policy establishment likes to call the traditional “culture of restraint.’’ This consensus may have become more fragile, however, in the case of Japan, where an influential minority seems to favor a change of course towards “normalization,” or a return towards more traditional great-power policies. Whether those nationalist pressures can be contained will first and foremost depend on the future evolution of the US-Japan security partnership. 200 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS

Can Japan and Germany Remain Civilian Powers? But even if people and the foreign policy elites stood firmly behind the civilian-power foreign policy approach, there is still the question whether Japan and Germany would be able to sustain this course. This question goes back to an issue discussed earlier-the issue of viability. What external conditions will have to exist for Japan and Germany to continue to remain civilian powers? What kind of environment will the need to do so? Again, we can only sketch some of the issues arising in this context. For the sake of brevity, I shall concentrate on three very important-and closely interrelated-sets of circumstances: trends in international security and stability, the future of international institutions, and the role of America as a partner for Japan and Germany. Will Trends in International Security and Stability Remain Favorable? The great importance of a stable and secure international environment and the opportunity to create economic prosperity in the success of Japan and Germany as civilian powers in the postwar era is self-evident. Equally, it is obvious that both will continue to depend on a favorable international environment if they want to remain civilian powers. But thirdly, it is also clear that Japan and Germany will have considerable influence over the future of regional and global (dis-)order and (in-) stability-through what they do, but also through what they fail to do. It seems to me that Japan and Germany will have much better chances to influence their regional and international environment in a positive sense if they do so from the civilian-power vantage point. Efforts to create regional order under Japanese or German leadership exercised in traditional great-power style are bound to backfire-neither Japan nor Germany is powerful enough to dominate their respective regions. Both will thus have to depend on alternative approaches. Will International Institutions Retain (or Regain) Their Vitality? This question is obviously closely related to the previous one. A strong international order will need vibrant international institutions- and whether those institutions retain or regain their vitality will again depend much on Japan and Germany. Present trends seem contradictory: while international economic institutions appear set to weather the HANNS W. MAULL 201 turbulences of post-Cold War politics reasonably well, political and security institutions (such as the UN, NATO or the US-Japan Security Treaty) may have more trouble to adjust. Still, the rationale for international institutions (the need for cooperative solutions, rules, norms and procedures to realize benefits and avoid risks) will remain powerful, and probably become even more persuasive as global problems accu- mulate. On the other hand, it is also increasingly obvious that vibrant international organizations require determined member governments and a willingness to transfer some of their sovereignty, so as to endow institutions with real authority and the resources they need to do their job properly. Civilian powers are well placed in theory to do so, but Japan and Germany so far have done surprisingly little (other than paying large parts of the bill-an admittedly important contribution) to make international institutions, such as the UN, work better at the global level. Japan so far has also done little of this in its own region, while Germany has played a major role in building new security structures for Europe. In the future, both countries will have to undertake efforts to develop regional cooperation and integration as the only viable alternative to a decline into power politics. For the Asia Pacific Region in general and for Northeast Asia in particular this will imply efforts to strengthen multilateral security dialogue efforts such as the ASEAN Regional Forum or subregional initiatives such as the Korean Energy Develop- ment Organization (KEDO) or the recent initiative by Seoul and Wash- ington for a multilateral dialogue involving the two Koreas, the US and China. Japan has recently developed a more proactive policy towards multilateral security activities.*’ It will be critically important for Tokyo to redouble it efforts in this sense. Will the United States Remain as a Partner? Will There Be Other Partners? The last and most critical condition concerns the availability of partners. By definition civilian powers need partners, other civilian powers, to be able to flourish. Germany has such partners in Europe;

21 Hughes, “The North Korea Nuclear Crisis and Japanese Security.” 202 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS

Japan so far does not (yet) have them in East Asia. For Germany, too, and certainly for Japan, the most important partner, and probably the single most important defining factor of Japan’s and Germany’s future foreign policy orientation, will be the United States. In some ways, America itself shares many of the characteristics of a civilian power. Yet it so far has never had to face up to the full implications of this foreign policy orientation-a willingness to share decision-making powers, and to be bound by commonly defined rules. Again, Japan and Germany may have many opportunities to help influence America’s future foreign-policy orientation. Yet in the end it will be the Americans who will have to make up their minds-and it will be the Japanese and the Germans, among others, who will have to live with the consequences. What if the United States failed to be available as a partner for Japan and Germany? What if it continued to withdraw inward, and concen- trated its foreign policies on economics and the minimum of political and security commitments seemingly sufficient to sustain America’s place in the world, but in practice too little, too late? For Germany, its European foundations may in that case well turn out to be strong enough to sustain its civilian power orientation. If European integration, however, started to fall apart, too, then Germany could well be pushed, agonizingly, into an entirely new foreign policy direction. For Japan, such a scenario has even greater plausibility, for it is hard to see how multilateral cooperation in the Asia Pacific could soon replace the strong anchors of the US-Japan Security Treaty. A fundamental reorientation of foreign policy might in the case of Japan find considerable support among the present political establishment. Even so, it is hard to envisage such a foreign policy reversal without a very serious domestic political crisis. It could even be the end of Japan’s post-war democracy, as many Japanese observers fear. In Germany, too, such a change of track would be imaginable only in conjunction with a serious domestic political crisis. The dangers may be remote, but they seem to me real enough to worry about, and to make sure they will not materialize. One possibility to do so would be for other countries to assume the role of partners to the civilian powers Germany and Japan, to help them continue their security reliance on others, their willingness to deny HANNS W. MAULL 203 themselves unilateral military options, and their emphasis on “civiliz- ing” international relations through the development of international cooperation, integration and institutionalization. In Europe, Germany at present does have such partners who either see themselves as civilian powers (such as Italy or the smaller European countries), or are willing to move in this direction (such as France). For Japan, the situation is more difficult. It is clear, however, who Japan’s regional partners ought to be. There is, first and foremost, the Republic of Korea-another developed country and developed democracy. There is an urgent need for a much closer bilateral relationship between the two, a cooperation across the board with the objective to turn this into the core of a Northeast Asian community. To achieve this objective clearly will need time, but it is encouraging to see that both governments have recognized the need to move in this direction, and have taken steps to do so. From this perspective, the flare-up of tensions between Japan and South Korea over the Takeshimnokdo issue may be less significant than the quick diffusion of the issue as a barrier to closer Korean-Japanese relations. In the longer run, stability and peace in East Asia will require a fundamental transformation of relations between Japan and China, in analogy to the France-German rapprochement from the 1960s onward. Here, too, the objective must be community-building. The chances for such a transformation of interstate relations in Northeast Asia no doubt would be enhanced if bilateral relations between Tokyo and Seoul (as well as those of both countries with Washington) continued to grow. In the end, for Japan and Germany to remain civilian powers will require not only quite a bit of effort, resources, and statesmanship on the part of those two countries-it will also need more than a little help from their friends.