Will the Dollar Remain the Reserve Currency?
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A SYMPOSIUM OF VIEWS Will the Dollar Remain the Reserve Currency? Is the rising global chorus to replace the dollar a reflection of far deeper problems in the world financial system? Two dozen noted observers share their outlook. THE MAGAZINE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 220 I Street, N.E., Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20002 Phone: 202-861-0791 • Fax: 202-861-0790 www.international-economy.com [email protected] 16 THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY FALL 2014 Third, reactions against the widespread U.S. use of sanctions against any institution that clears in dollars and offends U.S. foreign policy have been dramatic. A rush into A tectonic shift Hong Kong dollar transactions, to avoid U.S. clearing, has strained Hong Kong monetary authorities’ ability to man- is beginning. age the huge surges. Major institutions now avoid SWIFT and CLS because clearing through U.S. firms entails risk of future sanctions. If the stampede continues, this will weak- en U.S.-based clearing institutions and evolve away from U.S. dollar proxies to unlinked substitutes. U.S. refusal to reform and expand the International Monetary Fund and World Bank has backfired. China Development Bank is now more important than the World WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT Bank. Together with originally small initiatives like the President, Fung Global Institute BRICS bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, this may create a rapidly expanding RMB-based or the foreseeable future, the dollar will be the world’s sub-system. largest reserve currency holding and the most impor- The dollar is secure against challenges from the yen Ftant currency for financial security. Only the dollar and euro. The RMB currently lacks characteristics of a provides the deep pool of liquidity necessary for massive global currency, including deep, open capital markets, a crisis trades. Only the U.S. Federal Reserve is trusted to trusted legal system, and market-determined currency and act decisively in crises. The euro is a collection of puddles interest rates. But these weaknesses may fade quickly. The of liquidity and the ECB is not seen as decisive. While RMB has already surged past the euro as the second cur- U.S. economic policy and stability are questioned, rela- rency of international trade. A quarter-century from now, tive to the European Union and Japan the U.S. position the global monetary system may have two major curren- continually strengthens. cies, the dollar and the RMB, and highly diversified swaps Beneath that position, however, a tectonic shift is and foreign exchange reserves rather than dollar hege- beginning. mony. Only if Europe unifies politically could the euro The rise of the rest, particularly China, steadily become a co-leader. dilutes the importance of the United States. Countries gradually diversify their reserves. Asian swap agree- ments gradually dilute the importance of dollar liquidity. Denomination of trade in euros grows steadily, in RMB spectacularly. China’s ¥2.4 trillion of active swap agree- ments promote local currency trade and investment. Triffin’s prediction Second, the Fed is mobilizing resistance to the dollar. The first big decline in the role of the dollar followed the was wrong, but his 1971 dollar devaluation, which helped stimulate the subse- quent emergence of the euro. Then-Treasury Secretary John concerns were valid. Connally dismissed foreign pain with “It’s our currency, it’s your problem,” and other countries reacted. In today’s more globalized world, Fed policies are spreading much more pain—property and debt bubbles, inflated prices of staple foods, resultant political instability—over a much longer period of time. While Germany belatedly modified WILLIAM R. WHITE its inward-looking approach to monetary policy just enough Chairman, Economic Development and Review to save Europe, the United States has failed to modify Fed Committee, OECD norms to befit its hegemonic global role. While Connally’s bluntness has been replaced by bureaucratic professorial- he dollar remains the world’s main international re- ism, the message is still “It’s our currency, it’s your prob- serve currency. This dominance has been maintained lem,” supplemented in foreign eyes by “Let the Egyptians Tin spite of a sharp fall in the share of global GDP eat cake.” In a world out of balance, with unusual, aggres- produced by the United States and a continuous rise in sive, and distortive monetary policies, there is a vacuum in the net external liabilities of the United States. Decades the international monetary system. The debilitating conse- ago, economist Robert Triffin predicted the latter would quences for the dollar’s role will dwarf 1971. eventually undermine confidence in the dollar, potentially FALL 2014 THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 17 leading to a crisis that would cause great harm to every- There are no one—including the United States. Why has this not happened? One reason is that core plausible candidates factors supporting the international use of the dollar re- main in place. To this first mover argument must be added to dethrone the simple inertia and the fact that there is no obvious candi- date to replace the dollar. True, in some areas other cur- dollar. That is rencies are being used along with the dollar, but the pace of change has been slow and this seems likely to continue. bad news for the A variety of fears and institutional shortcomings still limit the international usefulness of other currencies. In sum, U.S. economy. the future of the dollar’s reserve currency status seems quite certain. JOSEPH E. GAGNON Yet to say something could happen is very different Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics from saying something should happen. Triffin’s initial concerns remain valid. Albeit interrupted by sharp upward othing should ever be taken for granted. Research spikes, the effective value of the dollar has been declining shows that inertia matters for a reserve currency, but since the breakup of the Bretton Woods system. Holders Nit is not everything. Also important are economic of dollar-denominated assets have thus for years been suf- size and openness, macroeconomic stability, and financial fering steady losses, or at least relatively low rates of re- policies that encourage or discourage a currency’s use by turn. Nevertheless, the decline in the dollar has not led to a foreigners. On these criteria, there are no plausible candi- current account adjustment sufficient to stop the rise in net dates to dethrone the dollar in the foreseeable future. That foreign debt. At some point, perhaps sparked by political is bad news for the U.S. economy. deadlock and fiscal dominance in the United States, the Once upon a time, in a world of scarce capital, the so- long-awaited crisis could yet materialize. called “exorbitant privilege” of the United States—that is, However, this failure of the external adjustment the ability to borrow cheaply from the rest of the world— mechanism is only one of many reasons for suggesting we may have been a worthwhile benefit of the dollar’s role need to revisit urgently the issue of the international mon- as the world’s premier reserve currency. In today’s world etary system. First, a wide body of evidence now indicates of currency wars and zero interest rates, governments that “spillovers” from the monetary policies of the large want to lend abroad rather than borrow. They send capi- advanced economies, not least the United States, affect tal abroad to push down the values of their currencies other countries. Moreover, the cocktail of suggested pro- in order to boost exports and economic growth. Official tective measures, including “free floating,” seems wholly purchases of foreign exchange reserves and other foreign inadequate. Second, global credit and monetary expansion assets—mainly U.S. dollars—have exploded since 2000 is dangerously unanchored. Whether to push a currency to unprecedented levels as a share of global GDP. Some down or to prevent it from going up, central banks around countries go further and actively discourage or prohibit the world have expanded the size of their balance sheets foreign purchases of their currencies, most notably China by unprecedented amounts. Given the complexity of cross and, intermittently, Brazil. border interactions, we simply have no idea how all this Unfortunately for the U.S. economy, the U.S. gov- might end. Third, in the event of a crisis calling for sig- ernment has been unwilling to take effective measures nificant international liquidity support, the source of that to level the playing field. Such measures could include support is by no means obvious. selling comparable quantities of dollars in exchange for Since the breakdown of Bretton Woods, we have had foreign currency reserves, taxing foreign purchases of dol- a non-system, devoid of rules, in which every country acts lars, and eliminating some of the many exemptions on the in pursuit of its own short-term interests. It needs to be re- U.S. withholding tax on income earned by foreign holders placed with a cooperatively agreed system that will avoid of U.S. assets. None of these measures contravenes inter- the dangerous shortcomings described above. In this way, national law. All of them would offset the recent upward the longer-term interests of all countries, including the pressure on the dollar that is threatening the gathering United States, will be better served. U.S. economic recovery. By the way, the currency in which oil or other interna- tional commodities are priced has no economically mean- ingful implications. Commodity prices are highly volatile regardless of the currency in which they are quoted. Deep global foreign exchange markets make it equally easy to 18 THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY FALL 2014 pay in dollars, euros, yen, or any other currency whose system.