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Home , Semantic Analysis (book)

Gábor Györi

Semantic Change, Semantic Theory and

Series A: General & Theoretical Papers ISSN 1435-6473 Essen: LAUD 1998 (2., unveränderte Auflage 2006) Paper No. 444

Universität Duisburg-Essen

Gábor Györi

Jannus Pannonius University, Pecs (Hungary)

Semantic Change, Semantic Theory and Linguistic Relativity

Copyright by the author Reproduced by LAUD 1998 (2., unveränderte Auflage 2006) Linguistic Agency Series A University of Duisburg-Essen General and Theoretical FB Geisteswissenschaften Paper No. 444 Universitätsstr. 12 D- 45117 Essen

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Semantic Change, Semantic Theory and Linguistic Relativity

0. Abstract The most general cause usually given for semantic and lexical change is the arising of new communicative needs in a speech community. However, communication is also a cognitive activity: we communicate our mental states, the contents of our minds, etc. Communicative needs must go hand in hand with cognitive needs, since there is no linguistic communication without the underlying mental representations. Because of this, semantic change can only be accounted for by a semantic theory which takes into account human conceptualization as a product of our understanding of bodily experience, as does cognitive . Semantic change exploits and utilizes the common understanding and interpretation of experience which exists on the basis of conventionalized conceptual structures shared by the members of a speech community. However, while the semantic structure of a is the product of conceptualization processes, it is also true that the input for these conceptualization processes is at least partly the semantic structure of that language. Language is capable of influencing conceptualization and cognitive processes because it is always already existing words and expressions that serve as the basis for changing meanings and creating new expressions in order to express new thoughts. From the above it follows that the analysis of semantic change and lexicalization processes can give us a clear view of the interaction between language and thought. A cognitive semantic analysis will tell us about how the original expressions influence and constrain the possible directions of conceptual and semantic development and thus the way of expressing new ideas.

1 1. Introduction At the basis of the relationship between language and thought is the fact that language is an instrument for human cognition -- the larger part of our knowledge about the world has been and is continually mediated to us through language. Many things we know about are things we have never experienced and never will, so our knowledge about them will always take some kind of linguistic form. One of the most important questions that we have to ask if we want to analyze this relationship is whether it entails any kind of influence in one direction or the other. That language is influenced by thought seems to be quite obvious. Cognition is primary to language both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, and also logically, in the sense that cognition can and does exist without language but there is no language that does not involve cognition. It is not just cognition but even thought processes that can exist without language when such pre-linguistic cognitive contents are processed. When cognitive processing takes on a linguistic form, thought becomes propositional thought. Cognition starts with the perception of reality which is not a purely objective amassing of information about the world but involves an interpretation of reality in terms of the perceiver's biology at the minimum in order to be able to interact with the environment in a functional way. The cognitive processes based on the information supplied by perception involve even more interpretation of the outside world since they create a mental model of reality for the beholder. If we now ask what influences the way language is, reality seems to be an obvious candidate since language is about reality and thus it is no wonder that the latter shapes the former. But this influence can only come indirectly through our interpretation of reality, that is, our cognitive processes will obviously have the biggest influence. This is of course not to deny any eventually arbitrary structural features of language, which also leave their mark on the way language is. Thus, the way we see the world and think about it in non-propositional ways clearly influences language. But does the relationship between language and thought entail also an influence in the opposite direction? Comparing the semantic structures of

2 different , it becomes immediately obvious that different languages impose different categorizations on the world. Since meanings provide us with mental categories for ordering our experience into, it is very likely that the effect of categorical perception also operates at levels of cognition higher than perception (Harnad 1987). In the case of linguistic categories this should mean that speakers perceive the world in terms of the categories supplied to them by their native language. The logical underpinning of this conclusion is the fact that the task of cognition in general is to give an interpretation of the world which is functional for the cognizer and this is how cognition can become the basis for an appropriate interaction with the environment. Since language is an instrument for cognition for humans, the fact that each language involves a particular interpretation of the world in the form of different categorizations will acquire special relevance in the light of the above. Linguistic cognition appears thus to have the same general task, namely to provide the kind of interpretation of the environment that will be most useful for the interaction with it, which means that linguistic forms will necessarily influence the speakers' perception and thinking about the world. Just as the general aim of cognition is to adjust an organism's behavior to expected situations in the environment (but also to be capable of a certain degree of modifications of behavior in case of environmental changes), the interpretation of reality inherent in language reflects a speech communities cognitive adaptation to situations its members might encounter in their environment and which they have to handle by thinking, reasoning and communicating about them. This role of language is also suggested by the cognitive process that operates in semantic change. It is the analysis of this phenomenon that the paper will deal with. How the different semantic structures (or category systems) of different languages arose can well be seen when studying semantic change, but it is not in the origin of meanings (i.e. the etymology of words) that linguistic relativity shows itself because the origins get obscured with time anyway. Thus, any influence of this kind on the thought processes of speakers is blocked by the fact that speakers' semantic knowledge contains no information on how particular meanings emerged in their native language. The fact that for instance the English word cloud has its origin in the PIE root *gel- 'to form into a

3 ball' does not mean that English native speakers today conceptualize a cloud as something similar to or having been made into a ball. What is interesting and telling in semantic change from the point of view of linguistic relativity is not the results of semantic change but the process of emergence and development of meanings (including grammaticalization), a process which involves speakers' semantic knowledge and cognitive processes at the time of the ongoing changes. When analyzing semantic change from the point of view of linguistic relativity at least two of the three approaches to linguistic relativity that Lucy (1997) has described must be involved in our considerations. We take a structure-centered approach when examining how semantic change and its underlying cognitive processes contribute to the differences in the semantic structure of different languages. In line with the domain-centered approach it must also be considered how and why semantic change has caused the same reality to be encoded differently in different languages or even within one language in the case of synonyms. It can be claimed with confidence that in the vast majority of the cases semantic change cannot be adequately explained without reference to cognitive processes and to human cognition in general, that is, most changes clearly show some kind of cognitive motivation (Anttila 1992). Although semantic change takes place over long periods of historical time in the language system, the process cannot be separated from the cognitive mechanisms that operate in individual speakers' minds. Also many recent works on semantic change suggest its analysis as a cognitive phenomenon (e.g. Geeraerts 1985, Lichtenberk 1991, Sweetser 1990, Traugott 1985). It is trivial (if not tautological) to state that change of meaning occurs on the basis of the meanings that are already present in the language at a certain point in time. But it is important to emphasize this fact in order to show how linguistic relativity presents itself in semantic change. It is not by chance that a certain existent meaning is selected to be modified to convey a new sense. This seems to imply that the perception of something new is guided by the existent category system, which is materialized through the lexicon of a language. When the interaction with the environment requires the recognition of a new phenomenon or some kind of reinterpretation of an already familiar

4 one, it still must be recognized as belonging to a given category in the established system. Thus, the fact that the word hawk derives from PIE *kap- 'to grasp' suggests that referents of hawk were referred to and must also have been conceptualized initially as instances of something grasping. It is, among others, the role of the fuzzy boundaries of categories to make this kind of flexible possible but then again categories have fuzzy boundaries because this is how human cognition works. The future development of such a semantic modification depends on the fact that the distance of the phenomenon from the prototypical center of the category will be the function of its novelty for the speaker (and cognizer). Depending on the degree of its peripheralness to and also on its functional autonomy from that particular category, the new phenomenon might break away from that original category with time and create a new category of its own. Since referents of hawk are not simply grasping things but have a large degree of functional autonomy in our lives, they will be conceptually and semantically relegated to a different category and coded in the language accordingly. This is basically how semantic change takes effect in a large number of cases (Györi 1996). The meanings present in the language are actually the ones that are present in the semantic knowledge of the speakers at any point in time. These meanings provide the categories that cognitive mechanisms operate on when new information has to be grasped and communicated and so these categories are employed in metaphorical, metonymical and other figurative usages to describe the new experience in familiar terms. This indicates that in the case of the cognitive processes which underlies linguistic communication we think about and see the world with those categories. Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987), Johnson (1987), and others have concluded that our minds understand and interpret the world around us with the help of metaphorical and metonymical processes, image schematic projections, and idealized cognitive models. These all exist and operate for us in the form of language, but not language in a general sense but a particular language, mostly our native language. Thus, it is not simply language that affects these cognitive operations, but always the language that one speaks. At the basis of these cognitive operations and also of semantic transfer is one of the most basic and most useful cognitive mechanisms of the human mind, analogy

5 (Holyoak and Thagart 1997). We take existing forms of categorizations and other linguistically manifest structures and use them in analogical ways to describe new experience (or old experience in a new light) because this is the only way for us to make sense of them. Also, in the case of semantic modification (which might develop into real change with time) this means that any new meaning is cognitively motivated by an already familiar one (cf. Lakoff 1987: 345, Sweetser 1990: 9). And since this familiar knowledge exists in linguistically coded categories, the form of language influences and constrains the thought processes that operate when making sense of the new experience and that may even usher in a new meaning. In my analysis of the cognitive aspects of semantic change I will concentrate on the cognitive processes that go on in the minds of the speakers and how they make use of linguistically structured knowledge in their thinking when interpreting new experience in cases of semantic transfer. I will try to show that semantic change does not simply lead to linguistic variation but that the process of change involves variation in cognition and thus indicates effects of linguistic relativity.

2. Some general issues of semantic change Etymology can not only tell us about word histories but also a lot about the socio-cultural history of the speakers of a language. This can be illustrated with the example of the English word glass. The word is derived from the name of its material and hence the meaning 'a vessel made of glass for drinking'. Further on, Old English glæs derives its form and meaning from the Common-Germanic stem *glaza-, as found in *glazam, meaning 'amber'. The shift in meaning could be explained on the basis that glass (the material) is similar to amber with respect to being translucent and shining. Furthermore, the similarity to amber is also supported by the fact that the Germanic people got acquainted with glass in the form of jewelry as used by the Romans. The ultimate origin of these forms and meanings is the PIE root *ghel- meaning 'shine, glitter'. This information on socio-cultural history together with the semantic change that

6 can be studied with the help of such etymologies can reveal important aspects of the speakers' knowledge of language, in particular semantic knowledge. I will try to show below how this knowledge, and indirectly through it the form of language, might influence the speakers' interpretation of reality. Studying semantic change is traditionally the concern of historical and change from this perspective means change in the external system of language (as opposed to the linguistic knowledge in the speakers' minds). Before turning to the relationship between cognition and language as revealed by semantic change let me therefore describe some general issues of semantic change that indicate its cognitive nature. In spite of the long standing interest of historical linguistics in semantic change, far fewer generalizations have been described than in the case of any other type of language change, at least in the sense that no regularity comparable to e.g. sound change could be found. One reason lies surely in the fact that meanings are conceptual phenomena and their changes are much more dependent on general cognitive mechanisms, like e.g. associations, due to their open-ended and encyclopaedic nature (Langacker 1987, 1990). It is exactly this of meaning that makes change not only explicable in a plausible way but makes it also obvious that change is a necessary and natural characteristic of meaning, or, in Nerlich and Clarke's (1988: 73) even stronger formulation: "the nature of meaning is change." However, certain generalizations about semantic change can of course be made. The most important mechanisms of change that traditional works on language change distinguish are when meaning changes according to range (extension and restriction), and when similarity (metaphor) or contiguity (metonymy) of phenomena induces the meaning change (e.g. Anttila 1972, Hock 1986, McMahon 1994). These mechanisms are obviously connected to cognitive processes and so it has usually been common knowledge among historical linguists that individual semantic shifts and especially a generalization of semantic change must receive an explanation with reference to cognition. Thus, historical linguists have always appreciated a cognitive approach and viewed metaphor and other figurative language use as playing a cognitive role in the emergence of new

7 meanings (Anttila 1992). In the following I will examine the relationship between semantic change and cognitive processes and demonstrate how existent meanings in a language will influence the ways reality is interpreted and as a consequence of this how new meanings are created to express ideas about reality.

3. Semantic change as cognitive process As we have seen above, the terminology used to describe meaning changes in studies of historical linguistics refers to cognitive mechanisms of the human mind. However, speaking about semantic change involving cognitive mechanisms is realistic only if we think of the mind of the individual speaker where the cognitive processes actually operate. Thus, meaning extension and restriction must be seen as paralleling category extension and restriction, and work in cognitive semantics has shown that metaphor and metonymy are not just ways of linguistic expression but ways of thinking, understanding and making sense of the external world (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, Langacker 1987). This kind of making sense of the world can be the initiation of change, which may in time get manifest in the external system of language, that is, become a valid form of language with an implied perspective on the world for a whole speech community. Our interest here is in the mind of individual speakers, who employ the mechanisms of meaning extension and restriction as well as metaphor and metonymy relying in their thinking on established forms of language. As we will see below, speakers actively (though unconsciously) participate in implementing the change through their linguistic behavior (or in other words, usage of the language), which means that new variants of forms and meanings are produced. The first step toward understanding the cognitive aspects of semantic change is to be clear about the speakers' motivation to produce these new variants. The most outstanding causes for semantic change are external to the language, and these can be subsumed under the term communicative needs.

8 In general communicative needs arise when speakers feel the need, most of the time probably unconsciously, to refer to parts of reality for which no conventional name exists in the language or wish to express new ideas or views about their environment. Györi (1996) has distinguished three types of communicative needs as causes for semantic change when it occurs as a categorization process. These are: (1) referring to newly created entities, (2) making hitherto unknown ones known, or (3) making already known ones be seen in new lights. Though it is common place, it has to be emphasized for our purposes that language is not only a tool for communication but also for cognition. The general task of a brain is to create and operate a mental model of reality for the sake of its owner's general orientation in the environment. The human brain, possessing the capacity for language, is equipped with the most powerful tool for the creation of such a model of reality, be it physical, social, or cultural, or even psychological. The power of a linguistic model of reality comes among others from its social character, due to which it is qualitatively superior to individual models in range, accuracy, flexibility, etc. The significance of language in this respect is that all individuals sharing this system of will also be able to share the same model, thus benefiting from the experience of others through gaining knowledge without direct experience and personal interaction with many parts of reality. This means that the communicative and cognitive functions of language cannot be separated. Communication is also a cognitive activity: what we communicate about is different parts and aspects of this mental model, the contents of our minds, our mental states, etc. Because of this, communicative needs must go hand in hand with cognitive needs, since there is no linguistic communication without the underlying mental representations.

4. Familiar knowledge, motivation and analogy Due to the fact that the ultimate cause for semantic change is combined communicative

9 and cognitive needs, it is no wonder that the requirement of intelligibility between speaker and hearer in producing new variants of linguistic form (cf. Palmer 1978: 309) will necessarily put specific constraints on the way communicative needs may be fulfilled. These constraints will be shaped by the cognitive aspects of communication. Cognitive semanticists have not failed to point out the fact that new knowledge can only be acquired on the basis of old one. Lakoff (1987: 346) has shown that motivation is crucial to our understanding, learning and storing of new information, whereas both Langacker (1987: 105) and Johnson (1987: 174) have stressed the importance of familiar information in making sense of new experience. When we make inferences and create and learn new abstractions, we utilize familiar knowledge through analogical thinking. Analogy has been shown to be one of the most basic cognitive processes of the human mind, crucial in making sense of the world by recognizing similarities to already familiar phenomena, that is, by noticing that new experiences are similar to certain old ones in specific, mostly functional ways. "Analogy ... is structured similarity with functional import" (Holyoak 1984: 204). Holyoak and Thagart (1997) have identified three constraints in analogical reasoning, similarity, structure and goal, all of which are constraints that are determined by the reasoner's existent knowledge. Thus, it is no wonder that our analogical way of thinking is reflected in language as an instrument for cognition at all levels of linguistic structure. As Anttila (1977: 139) put it, "man has an innate capacity for analogy and language is only part of this." Since the crucial context for semantic change is speaker-hearer interaction, Keller (1985: 232) has rightfully emphasized the role of the maxims of communication, working in the interaction between speaker and hearer, for language change. However, language exists also as the ability to share knowledge about the world, i.e. build and operate a mental model of reality which is shared by a whole speech community because acting according the maxims is effective only if speakers' and hearers' minds share the same cognitive structures and are in addition activated in parallel. The maxims of communication must be based on the cognitive function of language in the sense that communication is the process of speakers exchanging parts of their models of reality. Proper communication can only arise when the right cognitive structures are activated

10 in both hearer and speaker. Thus, when the maxims of communication operate, underlying cognitive processes operate along with them. We do not communicate directly about the world but about our knowledge of the world and because of this the speaker must be able to transfer the meaning of a word on a motivational basis (i.e. analogically) and the hearer must be able to realize that a word is used in a different sense from the conventional one and to use this basis in order to recover this new sense and also store it for recognition on subsequent occasions. Nerlich (1989) has stressed that speakers and hearers will only be able to perform these tasks when existent world knowledge and semantic knowledge (both already familiar types of knowledge) interact. The most conspicuous techniques of guiding the hearer's understanding, not to mention the speaker's own representational process, can be found in cases of lexicalization. A certain degree of explicitness is achieved here in the reference by way of using the technique of description. This can be accomplished most economically, so that the necessary motivation is also realized, by depicting salient features of the phenomenon that needs to be referred to and represented. It is such a situation that can be reconstructed as the starting point of a particular case of semantic change. Thus, for instance referring to rain as something wet appears to be an evident solution and so it is hardly surprising that Eng. rain derives from PIE *reg- 'wet, moist'. When naming some phenomenon by description, it must be considered in terms of language, that is, our thinking of that phenomenon will be relative to the linguistic forms at our disposal and applicable to it. This also seems the most effective way of fulfilling communicative needs and at the same time the requirement of intelligibility.

5. Cognitive mechanisms in semantic change As mentioned above, the procedure by which intelligibility can easily be achieved in the case of non-conventional language use is the application of descriptive language, which allows expressing new information in terms of familiar knowledge. Since language

11 economy often requires descriptive language to be condensed, the naming of features of a referent appears to be an efficient method for this. This can be accomplished either through the metaphorical usage of a lexeme or some morphological operation like derivational affixation or compounding. Either way, whether the necessary referring and representative needs are fulfilled through metaphorization or morphological operation, the procedure amounts to categorization or even the formation of a category. These cognitive processes must rely on and will thus be guided by the categories that we have already coded in language. When referring and representing needs are met, it is always some existent linguistic material that undergoes semantic change often accompanied and supported by some morphological process, which will cause lexicalization to occur in the language. This process is parallel to and will result in the formation of a new category in the sense that a new meaning expresses a new category, and we should expect semantic change in such instances to show affinities with categorization processes (just as we have already mentioned in the case of meaning extension and restriction). More specifically, certain properties of human categorization should characterize many instances of semantic change. In the following I will examine the parallel aspects of lexicalization (or semantic change) and categorization in a bit more detail in order to look deeper into how motivation works and how the existent lexicalized categories influence new categorizations, that is, motivate thinking. When a speaker is about to use a new expression in reference to some new phenomenon, he will name some kind of perceptual, functional, spatial, temporal, or other relational attribute of that phenomenon. His choice of an expression will tend to be governed by the knowledge about the particular human interaction with that phenomenon. The interaction may range from the mere perception of real world attributes (if this is at all possible without functional considerations) through a particular kind of behavior for which certain attributes appear to be functionally relevant to the recognition of more abstract implications of that phenomenon for the life of the community or human life in general. Thus, even the recognition of temporal/causal

12 conjunctivity may serve referential needs, as in the etymology of German wissen 'to know', which goes back to PIE *weid- 'to see', since first hand knowledge is characterized by direct experience, that is, having seen things oneself. Because of the different potential ways of interaction there are always several alternate possibilities for the construal of any such interaction (cf. Langacker 1987: 138) and the description inherent in the expression applied will give us a hint concerning the construal. The English word hide derives from PIE *(s)keu- 'to cover', thus suggesting for the noun hide a conceptualization (or interpretation) as something that covers the body, while the etymology of skin (which arrived in English via Scandinavian), a synonym of hide, implies a different interaction with the same phenomenon as suggested by the fact that its origin is the PIE root *sken- 'to cut'. However, the array of construals, eventually forming new conceptual categories, will be constrained by the already available categories that the conventional expressions of the language provide. Since the new referring needs can hardly be separated from new representing needs, the underlying cognitive mechanisms involved in the coining of novel expressions should reflect the influence of the old expressions serving as bases for the analogical thought processes. Thus, etymology is particularly interesting for the opportunity to learn about these and about how speakers' thinking and perception of new experience was influenced by the categories available to them in their language. Meaning change at the linguistic level very often appears to be equivalent to category coding or category formation at the conceptual level. In language the basis for classification becomes explicit by marking only certain (i.e. one or two) definite features of the category while others stay implicit. E.g. as the etymology of Eng. thumb (from PIE *tum- 'swell') shows, SWOLLEN is the feature that served as the explicit basis for coding. But as a thumb is not the only thing in the world that can be characterized as swollen, there must be other features also participating in the categorization, though only implicitly, that is, at the conceptual level. While this may obscure the construal to some degree, it is probably due to a reflection of cognitive economy, one of the principles of category formation proposed by Rosch (1978). In many cases the high correlational

13 structure of attributes probably yields such a high level of feature integration in the category that when activating one feature, the totality of the connecting features is also activated (cf. also Langacker 1987: 385). In any case, the characteristic that is salient enough to be adopted to linguistically code the category must be one that is already coded in the language and this fact will bias the way the phenomenon in question will be perceived and conceptualized at least for referring if not for representing purposes. Apart from the constraints that the availability of linguistically coded categories (which may be utilized to characterize other categories) puts on the conceptualization of novel phenomena, there are also certain underlying cognitive processes involved in semantic change that determine or at least influence which attribute or attributes of the phenomenon are chosen by speakers to perform the reference and will thus activate the whole . I would like to suggest here that the cue validity of the features inherent in a category is very likely to play a crucial role in the choice. Rosch (1978: 30) defines cue- validity as "a probabilistic concept; the validity of a given cue x as a predictor of a given category y (the conditional probability y/x) increases as the frequency with which cue x is associated with category y increases and decreases as the frequency with which cue x is associated with categories other than y increases." The reason why the speaker's choice of an expression for a phenomenon that needs to be communicated about but lacks a conventional expression in the language is very likely to be influenced by the cue-validity of the features of the phenomenon is the following. Speaker will try to make their reference as precise and obvious as possible, in accordance with the maxim "Speak in such a way that the other person understands you" (Keller 1985 233). Pointing out a salient characteristic of that phenomenon should prove to be a very good strategy for this purpose. A feature with a high cue-validity will more likely call to mind the category in question and so it will be more suitable for reference because the hearer's attention will be more easily directed to the referent. Furthermore, the optimality of such a feature (or features) for mentally representing the category of the

14 referent for the speaker is self-evident. Also, a high cue-validity feature will be one in which the functional relevance of the phenomenon resides for members of that speech community in their every day interaction with it and so the way a phenomenon is perceived will influence the way it will be expressed in language. Obviously, a revolving motion is functionally relevant for a wheel and so it is now wonder that Eng. wheel comes from PIE *kwel- 'to revolve, move around'. But since the mental processing done in such acts of categorizing (and naming) must rely heavily on analogy, such processing could not be executed without invoking the familiar knowledge that has already been coded in the language in order for any new information supplied by the speaker to be properly motivated for the hearer.

6. Conclusion At the basis of semantic change is the speakers' need for new expressions in their language in order to be able to refer to new experience or to some familiar experience from a new perspective when adaptation to a changed environment requires it. Semantic change starts with speakers analogically modifying conventional meanings to express these new ideas. These operations involve cognitive processes during which the new experience is seen in terms of familiar experience. The familiar experience employed in meaning transfer exists, by virtue of the matter, in a linguistic form. Because of this, the way the new experience will be perceived, thought of and expressed will be influenced by the linguistic forms available. The influence of language will come as specific constraints which the semantic knowledge of the speakers together with the cognitive mechanisms that can operate on this knowledge will exert on the cognitive processes behind the modifications of meaning.

15 References Anttila, Raimo 1972, An Introduction to Historical and Comparative Linguistics. New York: MacMillan. Anttila, Raimo 1977, Analogy. The Hague: Mouton. Anttila, Raimo 1992, Field theory of meaning and semantic change. In: Günter Kellermann and Michael D. Morrissey (eds.) Diachrony within Synchrony: Language History and Cognition. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. pp. 23-83. Geeraerts, Dirk 1985, Cognitive restrictions on the structure of semantic change. In: Jacek Fisiak (ed.) Historical Semantics and Historical Word-Formation. The Hague: Mouton. pp. 127-153. Györi, Gábor 1996, Historical aspects of categorization. In: Eugene H. Casad (ed.) Cognitive Linguistics in the Redwoods. The Expansion of a New Paradigm in Linguistics. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. pp. 175-206. Harnad, Stevan 1987, Category induction and representation. In: Stevan Harnad (ed.) Categorical Perception: The Groundwork of Cognition. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 535-565. Hock, Hans H. 1986, Principles of Historical Linguistics. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Holyoak, Keith J. 1984, Analogical thinking and human intelligence. In: Robert J. Sternberg (ed.) Advances in the Psychology of Human Intelligence. Vol. 2. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers. pp. 199-230. Holyoak, Keith J. and Paul Thagard 1997, The analogical mind. American Psychologist 52/1: 35-44. Johnson, Mark 1987, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Reason and Imagination. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Keller, Rudi 1985, Towards a theory of linguistic change. In: Thomas T. Ballmer (ed.) Linguistic Dynamics: Discourses, Procedures and Evolution. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. pp. 211-237. Lakoff, George 1987, Women, Fire and Dangerous Things. What Categories Reveal about

16 the Mind. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson 1980, Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 1987, Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Volume 1: Theoretical Prerequisites. Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press. Lichtenberk, Frantisek 1991, Semantic change and heterosemy in grammaticalization. Language 67/3: 475-509. Lucy, John A. 1997, Linguistic relativity. Annual Reviews in Anthropology 26: 291-312. McMahon, April M.S. 1994, Understanding Language Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nerlich, Brigitte 1989, Elements for an integral theory of language change. Journal of Literary Semantics 18/3: 163-186. Nerlich, Brigitte and David D. Clarke 1988, A dynamic model of semantic change. Journal of Literary Semantics 17/2: 73-90. Palmer, Leonard R. 1978, Descriptive and Comparative Linguistics. London: Faber & Faber. (Second edition.) Rosch, Eleonor 1978, Principles of categorization. In: Eleonor Rosch and Barbara B. Lloyd (eds.) Cognition and Categorization. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. pp. 27-48. Sweetser, Eve 1990, From Etymology to : Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Traugott, Elizabeth C. 1985, On regularity in semantic change. Journal of Literary Semantics 14/3: 155-173.

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