Towards an Initiative for a Human Future- Outline Draft 1.8
Towards an Initiative for a Human Future
Expanded Whitepaper Outline and Supporting Materials
Richard Hayes October 2015
DRAFT 1.8- NOT FOR CITATION OR CIRCULATION
1 Towards an Initiative for a Human Future- Outline Draft 1.8
Towards an Initiative for a Human Future is the working title of a white paper that addresses selected major challenges facing the human community over the coming century and beyond. The whitepaper gives special attention to the ways in which these challenges bear upon one another and to a range of possible responses.
A final draft of the whitepaper will be used as a reference document for a series of invitational working sessions in~ended to explore the topics addressed in more detail and from different perspectives. Following these sessions the final whitepaper will be prepared, published and distributed.
The present document, Draft 1.8, is an expanded outline of topics to be addressed in the whitepaper, along with discussion notes, attachments providing background and supporting material, and bibliography. Material in the discussion notes and attachments will be incorporated into the main text of the whitepaper, kept as notes or attachments, used in other documents, or deleted. The final whitepaper will not necessarily follow the order of topics presented in this draft.
Richard Hayes 329 Irving St. San Francisco, CA 94122 [email protected] land: 415-566-0849 mobile: 510-332-1769
2 Towards an Initiative for a Human Future- Outline Draft 1.8
Towards an Initiative for a Human Future
Richard Hayes - October 2015
EXPANDED OUTLINE OF TOPICS
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW II. KEY CHALLENGES Economic Justice Ecological Integrity Technological Responsibility Ill. ARCHETYPAL SCENARIOS Techno-Progressive World Balanced Equitable World Green Sustainability World I Discussion I Selected Topics I Fundamental Conundra A Framework for Evaluating the Scenarios IV. POLITICAL ECONOMY, GEOPOLITICS, CIVILIZATIONS, IDEOLOGY, FOUNDATIONAL WORLDVIEWS Political Economy: Alternatives for the. Long Run Geopolitical Structure: Power and Allegiance over Space and Time Civilizational Communities and Identities: Who are we? Ideology: Beyond the Left-Right Divide Foundational Worldviews: God, Nature, History V. SUMMARY DISPLAY AND COMMENTS VI. CONCLUDING NOTE: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
DISCUSSION NOTES
ATIACHMENTS A. Definitions of Growth, Well-Being and Related Key Concepts B. Scenarios of Global Development B.1- Review of Past Quantitative Scenarios B.2- Model A and the Archetypal Scenarios B.3- Review of Past Narrative Scenarios C. Economic Justice C.1- Ideology, Wealth and Income C.2- Proposals to Reduce Economic Inequality: Review and Assessment C.3- How Much is Enough and What is Fair? D. Ecological Integrity D.1- Climate Change D.2- Energy Regimes D.3- Assessing Global Catastrophic Risk E. Steady-State Political Economy: Review and Assessment F. Geopolitical Structures G. Ideology: Beyond the Left-Right Divide H. Acknowledgments
BIBLIOGRAPHY
3 Towards an Initiative for a Human Future- Outline Draft 1.8
Towards an Exploratory Initiative on the Human Future
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Humanity is facing three inter-related challenges that together constitute an unprecedented civilizational crisis. These are the growth of economic inequality, the continuing threats to global ecological integrity, and the development of profoundly powerful and destabilizing new technologies. These challenges reinforce one another in ways that undermine the conditions necessary for human life to flourish. The good news is that we likely have at least a century, and perhaps as long as two centuries, during which to effect a transition to a new mode of sustainable civilization. The bad news is that given the magnitude of the transition required, 100-200 years is not a long period of time. Further, at present we have no credible, compelling vision of what a truly equitable, sustainable and technologically responsible human future could look like. The absence of such a vision leaves us with no good guidelines as to how we should lead our lives today and how we should best prepare our children to lead their own lives tomorrow. Further still, it will be difficult for us to develop such a vision. The mentality that we bring to the task of confronting the contradictions of our current trajectory developed over the past 300 years in part as a function of those same contradictions. It is imperative that we come to an honest understanding of the nature and magnitude of the challenges we face; that we begin laying the groundwork for a shared understanding of the human future that addresses those challenges; and that we begin taking collective action and leading our personal lives in ways that we believe are consistent with that understanding. An important part of this work will need to focus on minimizing or transcending social, political and ideological divides, and tensions among foundational worldviews, that have characterized human societies for decades, centuries and millennia. We will also need to focus on achieving a new understanding of the relation between material wealth and human well-being. None of this will be easy. We need a new story of the human past, present and future compelling enough to guide us in new directions both individually and collectively, yet patient and generous enough to accommodate uncertainties, disagreements and mistakes along the way.
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II. KEY CHALLENGES
Economic justice, ecological integrity and the responsible use of powerful new technologies are widely regarded as important and even necessary features of a desirable human future. However, the challenges we face in seeking to realize these are greater than is commonly acknowledged.
Economic Justice
• Economic inequality within countries is growing and is socially and politically destabilizing. The growth of economic inequality is an inherent property of industrial economies that depend heavily upon technological innovation, free markets and globalization. Policies intended to address growing within country inequality are unlikely to make a significant difference so long as people aspire to having greater income and wealth than others have. 1 2
• Economic inequality between countries is decreasing, as developing countries acquire levels of technological, human and institutional capital comparable to those of developed countries. However, at projected rates the wealth and income gap between developed and developing countries won't close for 300-400 years. During this period global economic output and energy use will have grown well beyond sustainable levels, even given optimistic estimates regarding improvements in resource productivity and energy intensity. But developing countries can't be expected to reduce growth rates so long as wealth and income gaps remain. 3
• Since 2008 economic growth rates worldwide have been slower than they were during the previous half-century. Most analysts believe that technological innovation will eventually allow a return to pre- 2008 growth rates. Some analysts believe that at least developed economies have entered an era of permanently much slower rates of economic growth. Many environmentalists advocate policies and practices whose outcomes would entail permanently much slower rates of economic growth. Permanently much slower rates of economic growth would be a political hydrogen bomb. For 200 years the implicit bargain of both capitalist and socialist industrial societies has been that so long as most people are experiencing some level of absolute income growth, economic and/or political disparities would be tolerated. If such growth can no longer be expected, and especially if at the same time disparities are growing, modern political economies will likely suffer crises of legitimacy.4 5
[We include a side box on definitions of economic output, growth, well-being and other key terms. See ATTACHMENT A for preliminary notes.]
Ecological Integrity
• Continued economic growth inevitably threatens the integrity of natural ecological systems. It's true that environmentalists have underestimated the ability of technological innovation to significantly help address many conventional environmental concerns over the short and middle term. It's true as well that environmentalists have overstated the likelihood of "catastrophic" impacts of continued economic growth over this same time period. And it's true that wealthier countries can better avoid or remediate many local and particular environmental disamenities than can poor countries. But if we extend our period of focal concern from, say, the next 20-40 years to the next 100-150 years, and if our concern is global rather than strictly local, the environmentalist critique of economic growth becomes more robust, and if we extend our concern to the next 200-300 years it becomes effectively irrefutable.6 7
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• Continued economic growth threatens ecological integrity primarily because it requires continual and continually more profound technological modification of the fundamental processes and properties of the natural world. As such modification continues, nature becomes predominantly, and eventually fully, artifactual. Although a fully artifactual environment may at least in theory allow economic growth to continue indefinitely, ecological integrity will have been forfeited. The new fully artifactual environment will be driven primarily by human agency and will thus be radically unstable. 8 9 10
• It is now highly unlikely that humanity will be able to prevent anthropogenic global warming (AGW) from exceeding 2°C over pre-industrial levels. We face the unpleasant prospect of having to accept and adapt to a level of AGW we had hoped to avoid, while working all the more assertively to prevent AGW from becoming significantly worse. Plausible strategies have AGW peaking just below 4°C near the end of this century and declining to 2oC over the following century or two. Even these strategies, however, rely upon technologies whose feasibility has not yet been demonstrated and/or on socio-political change of unprecedented scope and scale. 11 12 13 14
Technological Responsibility 15
• Considered from an economic perspective, technology focuses on questions of efficiency and productivity. Although these may experience periods of acceleration and stagnation, and although hard ultimate limits to efficiency and productivity can be presumed to exist, it is difficult to identify any such limits that would be determinative over the course of the next 100-200 years or so. 16
• Considered from an engineering perspective, technology might be defined as the purposeful manipulation of matter and energy, and technological progress might be defined as the purposeful manipulation of matter and energy over increasingly more precise dimensions of space and time. The engineering perspective includes attention to productivity and efficiency but gives far greater attention to the overarching qualitative, purposive and visionary aspects of technology. 17 18
• The past two decades have seen the refinement of a visionary understanding of technology as the core of a profound transformation of the human condition. On this view, emerging and converging technologies will allow us to generate a continually greater quality of life on earth and beyond, forever. Leading technology visionaries foresee a world transformed by nanotechnology, picotechnology and femtotechnology; robotics, androids and cyborgs; smart dust, smart water, smart factories, smart cities and smart asteroids; geo-engineering, climate engineering, safe fast-breeder reactors and deuterium fusion reactors; synthetic biology, artificial life, artificial consciousness and artificial intelligence; cellular automata, neural chips and deep bionics; DNA and quantum computing, big data and bioinformatics; genetic algorithms, neural networks and distributed intelligence; genetic engineering, human cloning, designer babies, human-animal chimeras, body/mind enhancement, delayed senescence, cryonics and immortality; facultative anagorobes, morphological freedom, transbiomorphosis and ectogenesis; Dyson Spheres, O'Neill colonies, Kardaschev types, Boltzman Brains and Loftstrom loops; and solar electric ion rockets, hydrogen ramjet fusion engines, terraforming, stellar husbandry and galactic and inter-galactic colonization. 19
• On purely technical grounds, how credible is this vision? Many particular proposals may be fanciful, and the claim that exotic technologies will allow economic growth to continue indefinitely almost certainly is. But there remains more than enough potential for the development of technologies that could profoundly transform the natural world and the experience of being human. Many capable and resourceful individuals are passionately motivated by this vision. Multiple developmental pathways
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typically exist along which any given technological capability might be realized. The diffuse nature of technological innovation and development could seriously constrain any attempts to restrict, much less prohibit, technologies desired by even a small number of resourceful individuals. 20
• The emergence of this hyper-technological vision of the human future has been accompanied by the emergence of a fully realized new socio-political ideology. It differs from liberal-progressive ideologies in its rejection of egalitarian values and social well-being as a public purpose, from conservative ideologies in its antipathy towards religion and traditional social values, and from Green ideologies in its enthusiastic advocacy of a technologically reconfigured and transformed natural world. It embraces commitments to science and technology as autonomous endeavors properly exempt from social control, to the priority of market outcomes, and to a political philosophy grounded in evolutionary psychology and social Darwinism. It celebrates the enhancement of human capabilities, attributes and lifespan through genetic modification, followed by the emergence of human genetic castes and eventually human sub-species. In a remarkably short period of time it has become the implicit default vision of the human future among a majority of the scientific and technological community and their colleagues in industry, finance, academia, government, media and the arts. 21 22
Ill. ARCHETYPAL SCENARIOS
Scenarios are used to help understand complex dynamic systems subject to uncertainty over extended periods of time. Three archetypal scenarios are constructed to help us consider implications of our 23 three major challenges. See BOX A for schematic display. See DN 24 for selected quantitative values. 24 See ATTACHMENT 8 for background, full quantitative display and discussion. 25 26 27
• TECHNO-PROGRESSIVE WORLD- This is the business-as-usual or reference scenario. High rates of economic growth sustained via technological innovation and globalization bring prosperity to all. Steady growth of household incomes obviates concern over the continuing growth of economic inequality. Science, technology, free markets, individualism, liberal democracy, secularism and tolerance are embraced world-wide. Nation-states and collective governance in general play reduced roles. Powerful new emerging technologies are increasingly integrated into natural systems. Plant and animal species, including the human species, are technologically modified and enhanced. Biogeophysical constraints on economic growth are permanently transcended as we transition to extraterrestrial and/or nanoscale civilizational platforms. 28 29 30 31
• BALANCED EQUITABLE WORLD- In this scenario economic output in the developed world peaks in mid-22nd century and stabilizes at that relatively high level indefinitely. The developing world grows strongly over this period and eventually stabilizes at the same level of per capita output as does the developed world. Strong policies and practices domestically and worldwide are adopted to constrain economic inequality and ecological degradation. Maintenance of a high, stable and equitable level of economic output requires robust institutions of national and international commerce and governance, and a dynamic technological sector. Destabilizing technologies, however, are proscribed. Values and beliefs supportive of the complex features of the Balanced Equitable World are deeply internalized and nearly universally shared.32 33
• GREEN SUSTAINABILITY WORLD- In this radical scenario per capita economic output in the developed world peaks in mid-21st century, declines steadily after that, and stabilizes in mid-22nd century at a level lower than had obtained in 2000. The developing world grows slowly over this period and eventually stabilizes at the same level of per capita output as the developed world, with no period
7 BOX A. THREE ARCHETYPAL SCENARIOS- SCHEMATIC DISPLAY [See Attachment 8.2 for quantitative display and discussion]
A. TECHNO-PROGRESSIVE WORLD (Reference Scenario)
Per Capita Economic Output
Developed World
Developing World
2000 ~ 2100-2200
C. BALANCED EQUITABLE WORLD
B. GREEN SUSTAINABILITY WORLD
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of absolute decline. Social, economic and political life is more localized and decentralized than at present, thus reducing the need for extensive international commerce, travel, regulation and governance. Strong policies and practices are adopted to constrain economic inequality, ecological degradation and destabilizing technological innovation. Values and beliefs supportive of Green Sustainability World are deeply internalized. Diverse local cultures co-exist within a minimal but strongly affirmed set of global norms.34 35
DISCUSSION
TECHNO-PROGRESSIVE WORLD
• Proponents argue: This scenario is the natural extension of the best features of modernity and indeed of the Enlightenment Project. In any event it's inevitable and you can't stop it. Humans evolved to maximize inclusive reproductive fitness. Competition for wealth and status is deeply embedded in our nature, and we cooperate with some only in order to compete more effectively against others. Rather than trying to suppress competition we should channel it in ways that promote better lives for all and that help r~alize the human potential. Once we transition to extraterrestrial and/or nanoscale civilizational platforms we can leave the Earth as a pristine eco-garden, perhaps with portions reserved for de-extincted species such as the Wooly Mammoth and Homo neanderthalensis. 36 37 38
• Opponents/skeptics argue: Continued economic growth is objectively unrealizable beyond another century or two. The notion of transforming the biosphere into a technological artifact is pragmatically foolhardy and for most people intrinsically repugnant. Proposals to create new, genetically engineered human beings with "enhanced" features and functions are pernicious. Unconstrained growth of economic inequality and the spread of nee-eugenic practices and ideologies will inevitably result in strife, violent conflict and, eventually, attempts at genocidal solutions. Placing our hope for the survival of humanity in extraterrestrial colonization and/or nanoscale civilizational platforms is evidence not of creative human vision but of pathology. This is a scenario of crash-and-burn.39 40 41 42 43 44
BALANCED EQUITABLE WORLD
• Proponents argue: This scenario represents our last best chance of ensuring a just, sustainable and technologically responsible human future. It affirms the best features of modernity and industrial civilization yet respects the imperatives of biogeophysical constraints, thus standing distinct from futures of either simplistic technological nihilism or simplistic devolutionary regression. Although the growth of material economic output does eventually have to come to an end, it does so, and sustains indefinitelY., at a level dramatically higher than at present. By any account it is a world of material abundance, shared equitably by all.
• Opponents/skeptics argue: Techno-progressives charge that this scenario is barely less Luddite than Green Sustainability, as it similarly calls for an impracticable steady-state economy, albeit at a higher level of output, and for similarly untenable and ethically unacceptable constraints on human ingenuity, wealth and freedom. Greens charge that its proposed high level of economic output is likely unrealizable and certainly unsu3tainable. Others claim that by seeking to couple the best of industrial global modernity with a dream of communitarian ecological and material simplicity and restraint, administered via some sort of de facto World Government, the Balanced Equitable World scenario is a Rube Goldberg contraption with too many moving parts incongruously patched together, and thus set up to fail. 45
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GREEN SUSTAINAB/LITY WORLD
• Proponents argue: This is the only objectively sustainable scenario. The dramatically curtailed scope and scale of human economic activity directly helps ensure ecological integrity, directly constrains the growth of economic inequality and of destabilizing technologies, and greatly reduces the need for unwieldy and ultimately unaccountable institutions of global governance. Well-being can flourish through social and cultural innovation. Life will be slower and more simple, but need not be primitivist or regressive. We can have a world that is materially frugal yet rich, textured and complex in experience and meaning. The practicability of this scenario is supported by an existence proof that the two other scenarios cannot claim: modest, largely self-sufficient communities have sustained themselves on this planet for thousands of years. 46 47 48 49 50 51
• Opponents/skeptics argue: This scenario is unrealistic, romantic, escapist and self-indulgent. In truth it would condemn the vast bulk of humanity to lives that are poor, nasty, brutish and short. Throughout human history modest, largely self-sufficient communities have tended to be xenophobic, racist and patriarchal. The proposed steady-state economy is only practicable under institutions of authoritarian command-and-control. A century of absolute economic decline would more likely be one of survivalist and military violence than of eco-communitarian renewal. Grow up and get real. 52 53
SELECTED TOPICS
• Hybrid Scenarios: We briefly review three possible hybrid scenarios: Techno-Progressive Green Sustainability World, Techno-Progressive Balanced Equitable World and Balanced Equitable Green Sustainability World. The first two hold as many contradictions as their parent scenarios and thus offer no obvious quick conceptual fixes. Balanced Equitable Green Sustainability suggests that the two parent scenarios might represent poles along a continuum. 54 55
• Rhetoric: The debates over growth, the environment, inequality, technology, governance, values and the other topics addressed in this whitepaper have drawn on standard sets of rhetorical moves that have changed little over the past half century. If we want to open a space for fresh thinking we will need to identify these rhetorical moves and hold one another accountable when they are used inauthentically. In the white paper we consider in detail one such move, characterized as "Inevitability or Desirability?," as an example. We note that advocates of both Techno-Progressive World and Green Sustainability World are often ambivalent as to whether they are grounding their case in its objective inevitability, at least in basic contour, or in its normative desirability. Advocates of Balanced Equitable World, on the other hand, explicitly argue that that scenario is not inevitable, and that those who desire it will need to work diligently to realize and sustain it. The whitepaper also considers rhetorical moves associated with current debates over limits-to-growth, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, Progress and The Anthropocene. 56 57 58 59 60 61
• Assessing Global Catastrophic Risk: The prospect of global catastrophic risk is commonly invoked in discussions of the human future, but the term "catastrophic" can used by different authors to mean very different things. In the whitepaper we compare ways in which experts, advocates, the press and the lay public use "catastrophic" and related terms, and we try to define these in ways appropriate for our purposes. See Attachment D.3 and the Discussion Notes for more. 62 63 64 65 66
• Windows of Imperative: We develop our assessment that humanity has at least a century, and perhaps as long as two centuries, to transition to a just, sustainable, technologically responsible mode of
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civilization before objectively catastrophic outcomes become highly likely. This assessment should not be taken as cause for complacency. On the contrary, we argue that given the magnitude of the transition called for, 100-200 years is not a long period of time. The transition will involve fundamental change in our understanding of what it means to lead a meaningful and fulfilling human life. Development along our present trajectory has been underway for 300 years and despite selective shocks is still gathering momentum. To bring this course of development to a successful conclusion, to achieve effective consensus around an alternative world system and then to implement it, all within 100-200 years, will require unprecedented resolve. 67 68 69
FUNDAMENTALCONUNDRA
Here we reiterate and expand upon several especially challenging dilemmas facing those seeking to articulate a vision of a just, sustainable, technologically responsible human future.
• The future of economic growth: It is difficult to put forth a credible, compelling vision of a world in which economic growth continues forever, yet it is equally difficult to put forth a credible, compelling vision of a world in which economic growth has forever come to an end. What do we do with this?70 71 72 73
• Distributive Justice: While political and economic conservatives and libertarians tend to discount the extent to which growing economic inequality is likely to be radically destabilizing, political and economic liberals, left-liberals and social democrats tend to discount how objectively difficult the challenge of significantly reducing economic inequality is likely to be. Although many proposals have been offered to address growing economic inequality, a review suggests that none are likely to have more than minor, localized and short-term impacts so long as people aspire to greater income and wealth than others have. The Implications ofthis conclusion are profoundly challenging. See ATTACHMENT Cfor more.74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
• Climate Change: As noted, none of our three scenarios can prevent anthropocentric global warming (AGW) from exceeding 2°C. However, all three do seek to eventually return AGW to 2oC after an excursion that peaks just below 4°C. They do this using different combinations of technologies, policies and socio-political change. Techno-Progressive World relies on highly speculative technological innovations. Balanced Equitable World relies on speculative innovations, complex global policies and dramatic changes in socio-political values and behaviors. Green Sustainability World relies on even more dramatic changes in socio-political values and behaviors. All three scenarios entail historically unprecedented changes of different sorts. ·The time lag between agreement on any meaningful course of action and any significant change in AGW is several to many decades. What do we do with all this? See the discussion notes and ATTACHMENT D for more. 82 83
• The Practicability of a Steady-State Economy: Balanced Equitable World and Green Sustainability World call for steady-state economies with world per capita GDP stabilized and indefinitely sustainable at $75,000 and $25,000 {1990 US$) per annum, respectively. But steady-state economies require strong constraints on the level of global throughput, on the levels of savings and investment, and on the uses to which savings and investment are put. In pre-industrial times these constraints were imposed in large part by lack of technological and human capital. It's difficult to imagine how they would be imposed in even moderately industrialized societies other than through systems of highly centralized command and-control, most likely in tandem with systems of strong behavioral socialization. See ATTACHMENT E (in preparation; not included in this outline) for discussion.84
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• Governance of Technological Innovation, Development and Use: In Techno-Progressive World technology is a driving force and is subject to little governance other than in response to first-order health and safety concerns. Green Sustainability World affirms appropriate technology but sharply proscribes technologies that generate greater resource use or economic inequality, or that alter the fundamental processes of the natural world. In Balanced Equitable World a robust technological sector is necessary to sustain a high, albeit non-increasing, level of economic output, yet simultaneously poses major, even existential, risks and must be tightly regulated. Over the past century the developed world has gained experience governing technology to address first-order health and safety concerns, but has had little experience that bears on governance of the sort needed under Balanced Equitable World and Green Sustainability World. 85
• The Contradictions of the Enlightenment Project: The Enlightenment gave rise to or significantly propelled the development of much of what we value about modernity, including science, technology, free markets, individualism, religious tolerance, liberal democracy and economic growth. But these same fruits of the Enlightenment are now generating unprecedented economic inequality, threats to ecological integrity and dangerously destabilizing technologies. Importantly, the Enlightenment Project does not appear to possess within and of itself the wherewithal to effectively constrain itself. Proposals for even moderate constraints are experienced by many as regressive infringements on individual freedom, scientific inquiry and economic progress. What do we do with this? 86 87 88 89 90
• The Limits of Our Vision: Our ability to envision a just, sustainable and technologically responsible world is deeply and inherently limited. Over the past 300 years the Enlightenment Project has transformed not only our economic, social and political worlds but our cognitive and psycho-emotive worlds as well. Satisfaction of our strongest desires- for survival, companionship, procreation and respect, among others- is now deeply dependent upon a world in which economic growth continues indefinitely. Many people respond with incredulity, and even anger, at the suggestion that economic growth may eventually come to an end. What do we do with this? 91
• New Values for a New World: Concerns about economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility are today conventionally associated with liberal, left-liberal and social democratic social and political values. But a future world in which these concerns are being successfully addressed, and especially one in which the growth of material output has effectively come to an end, will likely need to draw upon what today would be considered a mix of both liberal and conservative values, and on values that don't fit easily within either category. Such nominally conservative or ideologically ambiguous values and sensibilities might include, for example, frugality, modesty, simplicity, sufficiency, temperance, reverence, traditionalism, conformity, humility, fidelity, filial piety, deference, discipline, honor, fortitude, recognition of communal and hierarchical obligations and respect for legitimate authority. 92 93 94 95 96
• The Meta-Conundrum of Communalist Sensibilities vs. Individualist Sensibilities: Underlying most of the conundra noted above is the deep and general tension between communalist and individualist sensibilities. Societies grounded in liberal democratic capitalism, technological innovation and economic growth celebrate individual initiative, self-reliance, competition and personal achievement as necessary and desirable qualities. A world marked by strong limits on economic inequality, strong constraints on ecologically damaging behaviors and strong restrictions on the development and use of powerfully transformative technologies will celebrate very different qualities, and will require far greater societal consensus concerning the specifics of major economic, ecological and technological outcomes, than has ever before been necessary on a global scale. How such communalist qualities are to be built into our
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personal, familial and social fabrics, and how such a global consensus on outcomes is to be achieved, sustained and enforced, all within just a century or two, is perhaps the greatest overarching challenge facing the human community. 97 98
A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING THE SCENARIOS
We conclude this section with a framework for evaluating the three archetypal scenarios, as displayed in BOX B. We begin with Techno-Progressive World as the current default scenario. If it is judged to be impracticable or undesirable, Balanced Equitable World would appear to be the preferred next choice. If this scenario, in turn, is judged impracticable or undesirable, Green Sustainability World becomes the preferred choice. If Green Sustainability proves impracticable, the default scenario is a world of chaos and conflict.99 100
IV. POLITICAL ECONOMY, GEOPOLITICS, CIVILIZATIONS, IDEOLOGY, FOUNDATIONAL WORLDVIEWS
Any credible, compelling visions of a human future of economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility will need to give attention to the political-economic systems, the geopolitical structures, the civilizational identities, the ideologies and the foundational worldviews necessary to support those visions. In particular, we need to ask what sets of these would best help us transcend or sufficiently minimize long-standing societal divides that would otherwise prevent us from achieving the high degree of consensus necessary for these visions to be realized. We now turn to these topics.
POLITICAL ECONOMY: ALTERNATIVES FOR THE LONG RUN
We discuss ten conventional political-economic systems distinguished by the extent to which political decision-making tends to be more democratic or more authoritarian, and by the extent to which economic decision-making tends to be more market dominant or more state dominant. See BOX C. These conventional political-economic systems have generally been associated with the presumption that indefinitely continued economic growth is desirable, and they evolved in major part to encourage and support such growth. Some but not all of these systems might plausibly support conditions of zero or negative growth. 101 102 103
We next discuss twenty unconventional political-economic systems, or elements of or approaches to such systems, as shown in BOX D. Many ofthese might be compatible with conditions of zero or negative economic growth. Most are highly speculative. 104
GEOPOLITICAL STRUCTURE: POWER AND ALLEGIANCE OVER SPACE AND TIME
We use geopolitical structure to mean the ways in which the world community structures itself across and between local, national, regional and global levels of engagement. Two important and related variables bearing on geopolitical structure are 1) the relative intensity with which economic and political decision-making is conducted primarily at one geopolitical level or another; and 2) the relative intensity with which people associate their identity and allegiance with one geopolitical level or another. These and other variables determine the degree of power, legitimacy, authority and sovereignty vested in one geopolitical level or another. A multitude of geopolitical structures can be imagined. We discuss ways in which these structures might or might not be compatible with the achievement and maintenance of a
13 BOX B. ASSESSING THE ARCHETYPAL SCENARIOS
Is the scenario of Techno-Progressive World technologically feasible, and able to prevent destabilizing inequalities and avoid destabilizing ecological damages?
A Techno-Progressive World Is the scenario of a Balanced Equitable World technologically feasible, and able to prevent destabilizing inequalities, avoid destabilizing ecological damages, establish effective institutions of global governance, prohibit destabilizing technologies, and secure deep and broad acceptance of common norms, values and beliefs? /~ A Balanced Equitable World Is the scenario of Green Sustainability World able to prevent destabilizing inequalities, prohibit destabilizing technologies, secure broad acceptance of minimal necessary global norms, values and beliefs, and manage absolute economic decline in a peaceful and orderly manner?
Yes
A World of Green Sustainability A World of Chaos and Conflict
14 BOX C. CONVENTIONAL POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
Democratic
POLITICAL DECISION MAKING
Authoritarian
State-Dominant ECONOMIC Market-Dominant DECISION-MAKING
KEY VARIABLES: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS:
Economic Decision-Making Capitalism Market-Dominant Democratic Capitalism State-Dominant Nee-Liberalism Political Decision-Making State Capitalism Democratic Social Democracy Authoritarian Socialism Authoritarian Socialism Democratic Socialism Market Socialism Corporatism State Corporatism Social Corporatism Fascism
See Discussion Notes 102-103 for brief descriptions. Further discussion in preparation.
15 BOX D. UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, ELEMENTS AND APPROACHES
These unconventional political- economic systems, and elements of and approaches to such systems, might be suited, at least in some regards, for a world in which economic output has slowed, stabilized or declined absolutely, and in which the focus of political and economic activity is more local than it is national, regional or global.
Green Civic Republicanism
Ecological Discursive Democracy
Ecological Constitutionalism
Ecological Authoritarianism
Juridical Democracy Thick Cosmopolitanism I Cosmopolitan Social Democracy Constitutional Patriotism
Pluralistic Commonwealth I Cooperative Commonwealth I Guild Socialism Confederations of City-States
Agrarian BioRegionalism
Gandhian Rural Communalism
Obshchina Rural Communalism
Orthodox Church-State Symphonia
The Benedict Option
Imperial/Tribal Caliphate/Emirate systems Nee-Feudalism I Nee-Medievalism I The New Dark Age I The Dark Enlightenment Enlightened Constitutional Aristocracy
Meritocratic Authoritarianism
Theocratic Popular Authoritarianism
Ethno-Nationalist Authoritarianism
See Discussion Note 104 for brief descriptions. Further discussion in preparation.
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just, sustainable, technologically responsible world. BOX E shows a limited but representative selection 105 107 108 109 110 of geopolitical structures. See also ATTACHMENT F and the Discussion Notes. 106
CIVILIZA TIONAL IDENTITIES AND COMMUNITIES: WHO ARE WE?
Political-economic systems and geopolitical structures are supported and powerfully shaped by deeply embedded social, cultural and historical factors. These typically include language, religion, ethnicity, art forms, family structure and socialization practices. Unique combinations of these factors that have persisted across wide geographic regions for long spans oftime have been regarded by many scholars as constituting civilizational identities. People who share a civilizational identity and who interact on the basis of that identity constitute a civi/izational community. Some scholars see cosmopolitan identity as an alternative to civilizational identities. On this view, cosmopolitan identity is less associated with a particular history, language, religion, ethnicity or other particularity and is grounded in humanistic, secular, tolerant, multicultural and multiethnic sensibilities. Other scholars argue that cosmopolitan identity is in fact a variant of Western civilizational Identity; that its adoption is promoted by Westerners and by Westernized elites; and that its spread furthers Western commercial, social and political interests. Still others argue that some aspects of Western civilization are essential for modernization and development, and that developing countries can "learn from the West" without having to sacrifice their own civilizational identifies.
In the whitepaper we review extant civilizational identities and communities that might remain coherent over the coming 100-200 years and would thus figure importantly in the shape of the human future over that period. We also review theories of cosmopolitan identity, both as a possible variant of Western identity and as a unique trans- or post-civilizational identity. We also discuss the suggestion that a leading dynamic of the coming decades will be the growth and development of "The World without the West," as non-Western civilizational communities develop their own identities while simultaneously bonding with one another to build a new international order independent of the now 70-year old order established by the West after World War II. We also consider the complicating fact that several large civilizational communities, including but not limited to the West, believe themselves to have universalist missions and destinies. Finally, we briefly note the unlikely but possible emergence of new civilizational identities and communities over the coming 100-200 years. Throughout this review we give special attention to the ways in which the dynamics of civilizational identities and communities bear on the prospects for a just, sustainable, technologically responsible human future. See BOX F and the Discussion Notes for more.111112 113 114 11s 116 117 11s 119 120 121
IDEOLOGY: BEYOND THE LEFT-RIGHT DIVIDE
We use the long-standing ideological divide commonly understood as a contest between Left and Right or Liberal and Conservative as an example of the sort of divide we need to minimize or transcend if we are to achieve the unity necessary to realize a just, sustainable and technologically responsible world. We note that the conventional one-dimensional Left/Right continuum inadequately maps the present ideological terrain. We offer a two-dimensional map that generates four ideological categories: Libertarian Left, Libertarian Right, Communitarian Left and Communitarian Right. These are shown in BOX G. This taxonomy applies to the United States and perhaps several other Anglophone countries, but not necessarily to other countries. 122
For the past half century the Communitarian Right has aligned with the Libertarian Right under the banner of ~he Republican Party, while the Communitarian Left has aligned with the Libertarian Left
17 BOX E. GEOPOLITICAL STRUCTURE
Selected ways in which the world community might structure itself across and between local, national, regional and global levels of engagement are summarized here.
(MOSTLY) ONE WORLD - A single, global, unified political system recognized by most people as legitimate. Minimal but sufficient core values, norms and beliefs are held in common worldwide. Effective consensus has been reached on many formerly deeply divisive issues. Remaining differences are accommodated. New disputes are resolved before they become deeply divisive.
CIVILIZATIONAL COMMUNITIES- Some 7-9 continental-size civilizational communities are large enough to support thriving societies yet internally cohesive enough to support strong restraints on inequality, ecological harm and dangerous technology. Global commons concerns are addressed through inter-civilizational agreements.
NED-WESTPHALIAN INTERNATIONALISM- Some 200 sovereign nation-states enter into numerous agreements with one another, including regional and global agreements, as enlightened national interest suggests. Agreements_frequently cross civilizational and geographic lines. This is roughly today's world geopolitical structure.
DEVOLVED/LOCALIST STRUCTURES- Some 2000-5000 independent small states, city-states, fiefdoms, rural communes, ecclesial domains, tribal territories and other polities, presumably after protracted and deep global crisis. Localities develop a common aversion to materialist striving and militarist competition, but otherwise develop their own cultural norms, values and beliefs.
CHURN- In this default category world geopolitical structures are in continual flux, with different locales featuring different structures at different times. If the churn is very slow or frozen the structure might be called Patchwork; if churn is very rapid it might be called Pandemonium.
See the text, Discussion Notes 105-110 and ATTACHMENT F for more.
18 BOX F. CIVILIZATIONAL IDENTITIES AND COMMUNITIES
Unique combinations of deeply embedded social, cultural and historical factors that persist across broad geographical areas for long periods of time are considered by many scholars to constitute particular civi/izational identities. People who share these identities constitute civilizational communities.
Major Extant Civilizationalldentities: Confucian Islamic Western African Hindu Orthodox Japanese [Buddhist?]
Cosmopolitan Identity: A trans- or post-civilizational identity grounded in humanistic, secular, tolerant, multicultural and multiethnic sensibilities? OR ... A variant of Western Civilizationalldentity, the adoption and spread of which serves the interests of Westerners and Westernized elites? OR ... Both? Neither?
"The World without The West": Do rising civilizational communities have a common interest in cooperating with one another to resist Westernization while building their economies and nurturing their own particularities?
Universalist Dreams and Destinies? Strongly so: Western/Cosmopolitan Islamic Partially so: Orthodox Confucian [Tribute Model?] Ambiguous: African Hindu Japanese
New Civilizationalldentities? Speculative possibilities over 100-200 years: Afro-Chinese? Mormon?
See the text and Discussion Notes 111-121 for more.
19 BOX G. BEYOND THE LEFT-RIGHT DIVIDE: A TWO-AXIS IDEOLOGICAL MAP
The figure shows a two-axis map using a horizontal Left/Right axis and a vertical Libertarian/Communitarian axis to generate the four ideological categories of Communitarian Left, Communitarian Right, Libertarian Left and Libertarian Right. The focal value that defines the Left/Right axis is equality (i.e., of condition). The focal value that defines the Libertarian/Communitarian axis is solidarity.
A SOLIDARITY/EQUALITY IDEOLOGICAL MAP
COMMUNJTARJAN
Communitarian Communitarian Left Right
------' , , -- ' ' I ' r ' \ I \ I I I I SOLIDARITY I I I \ I \ I ' , I ' ' , ' ' - - Libertarian -- -- Libertarian 1 Left Right LIBERTARIAN
LEFT ,._.__ EQUALITY ___. RIGHT
The Libertarian Left took form in the late 1960s/early 1970s: free sex, free dope, no draft. Proponents tend to affirmatively reject traditionalist social mores. The libertarian left includes many civil liberties, pro-choice and gender rights activists, many creative artists and much of the entertainment industry, and assorted post-modernists and anarchists.
The Libertarian Right exalts ideological capitalism: free markets, free trade, no taxes. Proponents tend to be indifferent to social mores, traditionalist or otherwise, but oppose government policies that seek to shape them, one way or the other. Everyone is best off when profit-maximizing firms and welfare-maximizing consumers can do pretty much as they wish. Think Ayn Rand, Milton Friedman, the Koch brothers, Rand Paul, Reason magazine and the Cato Institute.
The Communitarian Left runs the spectrum from mainstream U.S. liberalism (near the center of the map) moving diagonally north-west through European social democracy to democratic socialism to authoritarian socialism (at the top left corner). Proponents hold varied opinions concerning traditionalist social mores. Think AI Gore=> Elizabeth Warren =>Michael Harrington=> Gus Hall. Also think religious social justice activists, the US civil rights movement, the trade union movement, many environmentalists, and Tikkun.
The Communitarian Right runs the spectrum from U.S. mainstreet conservativism (near the center) moving diagonally north east through neo-conservativism to paleoconservativism to authoritarian conservativism (at the top right corner). Proponents tend to affirm traditionalist social mores. Think Focus on the Family, Promise Keepers, First Things, Commentary and Front Porch Republic.
The circle at the center is porously occupied by those who don't have considered opinions of a political ideological nature, principled centrists with well-considered opinions that just happen to map near the middle; and "Jacksonians," those largely white working and middle class Americans who tend to be strongly suspicious of both big business and big government. Jacksonians typically support social security and medicare; honor traditionalist social mores, although sometimes in the breach; and identify as rugged individualists but can be fiercely patriotic when they believe their country is threatened by outsiders. Historically they have been mostly Democrats but since the 1960s have become mostly Republicans.
20 Towards an Initiative for a Human Future- Outline Draft 1.8
under that of the Democrats. Observers have speculated that developing social and economic tensions might create incentives for a realignment in which the sectors of the Libertarian Left align with sectors of the Libertarian Right and sectors of the Communitarian Left align with sectors of the Communitarian Right. We review the prospects for such realignment, noting that fundamental ideological reconfigurations, as distinguished from temporary strategic alliances, don't happen quickly or easily. We note further that an ideological reconfiguration that leaves us still deeply polarized doesn't get us the unity we need for a just, equitable and technologically responsible world. We review prospects for more profound reconfigurations in which 70-80% or more of a population might find a common ideological home. It is difficult to imagine this happening in most Western countries except under crisis conditions. We note finally that numerous other divides throughout the world would need to be similarly minimized or transcended. See ATTACHMENTG for more.123124125126127
As an illustration of the opportunities and challenges presented by a potential ideological realignment along Communitarian/Libertarian lines, we review the mounting controversies concerning new technologies of human genetic manipulation: cloning, designer babies, sex-selection, embryonic stem cell research, neo-eugenic applications of genetic testing, cognitive enhancement, extreme life extension and others. Our analysis suggests that there is broad support for restraints on such technologies, that this support crosses conventional ideological lines in significant ways, and that success in mobilizing such support around concrete policy goals, both domestically and internationally, could set precedents for other initiatives. 128 129 130
FOUNDATIONAL WORLDVIEWS: GOD, NATURE, HISTORY
It is unlikely that we will be able to transcend or significantly minimize deeply rooted ideological and similar divides unless we also reduce the perceived antagonisms that obtain among foundational worldviews, used here to mean the most fundamental set of cognitive categories, beliefs, postulates, values and psycho-emotive dispositions that individuals and societies use to make sense of the world and their places in it. We identify three such worldviews:
• A Religious foundational worldview that places the ultimate source of its understandings in a transcendent or non-dual order;
• A Scientific/Materialist foundational worldview that places the ultimate source of its understandings in empirical knowledge acquired through the logical processing of sensory data;
• A Humanistic/Historical/Phenomenological foundational worldview that places the ultimate source of its understandings in the subjective and inter-subjective lived experience of human beings.
We discuss salient features of each of these, the nature of the perceived antagonisms among them, attempts to work from within two or all three simultaneously, and the prospects and challenges of reducing core antagonisms on a global scale within the desired time frame. We briefly consider how these three worldviews differently address questions that bear importantly on the prospects for a just, sustainable, technologically responsible world. 131 132 133 These questions include:
21 Towards an Initiative for a Human Future- Outline Draft 1.8
• What accounts for the patterns of cooperation, competition, rivalry, reciprocity, domination, submission, conflict, reconciliation and other features that characterize human communities? • What obligations do we have to one another, as family members, members of smaller and larger communities, and as members of the human community as a whole? What obligations do we have to our descendents and to our ancestors? • What does it mean to be a good person and to live a good life? • What is the cause of suffering, and how can suffering be minimized? What is the source of joy, and how can joy best be realized? • What is the source, nature and fate of consciousness, the mind, agency and self? • How did the universe come to be, and what is its fate? Why is there something rather than nothing? • What is the purpose and meaning of human life, and of creation as a whole?
Addressing such questions is neither an idle exercise nor a strictly personal inquiry. The numerous conflicts we encounter throughout our individual and collective lives usually ultimately involve differing answers to questions such as these.
We defer a fuller discussion of the bearing of the three foundational worldviews on the human future. For now we make and partially justify several claims:
• We will need to draw on all three foundational worldviews if we are to realize a world of economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility. At this time we can't say what form this coming-together will eventually take. For now, our responsibility is to engage all three with equal respect and in good faith. 134 135
• Those who identify with the left/liberal/social democratic tradition, and who reject religious worldviews in favor of scientific/materialist worldviews, should be open to reassessing this stance. Religious worldviews may uniquely allow groups of people to act in a manner consistent with economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility. Further, a full understanding of the scientific/materialist worldview shows its legitimate domain to be quite limited. Further still, the ideological expression of the scientific/materialist worldview known as scientism is acutely at odds with many of the core values of the left/liberal/social democratic tradition. 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145
• Over the coming century the faith traditions should be open to reassessing how they understand and interpret their relationships with one another. 146 147
• The humanistic/historical/phenomenological worldview is in a unique position to serve as a bridge between the religious and the scientific/materialist worldviews. 148 149 150 151
V. SUMMARY DISPLAY AND COMMENTS
BOX H shows a summary display of elements of the scenarios discussed in this whitepaper outline. We've identified three archetypal scenarios, ten conventional political-economic systems, twenty-one unconventional political-economic systems/elements/approaches, five geopolitical structures, eight or more civilizational identities, four ideological orientations and three foundational worldviews. From these it's possible to mechanically construct tens of thousands of speculative archetypal- civilizational geopolitical-ideological-philosophical-political-economic systems. The great majority of these constructs are implausible, but several hundred, perhaps, remain as serious contenders. As we begin to consider scenarios of the human future meant to inform real-world initiatives, we could find that it becomes
22 BOX H. SUMMARY DISPLAY
This box shows the major categories of scenarios, political-economic systems/approaches/elements, geopolitical structures, civilizational identities, ideological orientations and foundational worldviews discussed in this whitepaper outline. See Discussion Note 152 for more.
ARCHETYPAL POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS GEOPOLITICAL CIVILIZATIONAL IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONAL WORLDVIEWS SCENARIOS / ELEMENTS/ APPROACHES STRUCTURE IDENTITIES ORIENTATIONS
Techno-Progressive World Democratic Capitalism (Mostly) One World Historic/Currently Major Communitarian Left Religious Balanced Equitable World Social Democracy Civilizational Communities Civilizationalldentities: Libertarian Left Scientific/Materialist Green Sustainability World Democratic Socialism Nee-Westphalian Confucian Communitarian Right Humanistic/Historical/Phenomenological Nee-Liberalism Internationalism Islamic Libertarian Right Market Socialism Devo lved/Loca Iist Hindu "Centrist" Social and State Corporatism State Capitalism Churn Western Authoritarian Socialism African Fascism Orthodox Green Civic Republicanism Japanese Ecological Discursive Democracy [Buddhist?] Ecological Constitutionalism Cosmopolitan Identities Ecological Authoritarianism The World Without The West Juridical Democracy New Civilizationalldentities? Thick Cosmopolitanism Constitutional Patriotism Pluralistic Commonwealth Confederations of City-States Agrarian BioRegionalism Gandhian Rural Communalism Obshchina Rural Communalism Orthodox Church-State Symphonia The Benedict Option Imperial/Tribal Caliphate/Emirate Neo-Feudalism eta/ Enlightened Constitutional Aristocracy Meritocratic Authoritarianism Theocratic Popular Authoritarianism Ethno-Nationalist Authoritarianism ------
23 Towards an Initiative for a Human Future- Outline Draft 1.8
important to be able to differentiate, compare and assess such a diverse array of potential systems. We defer a full discussion along these lines but consider a limited number of cases as examples. 152
VI. CONCLUDING NOTE: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
If we desire a world of economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility, what is to be done? We conclude this whitepaper outline by suggesting four substantive initiatives and an enabling initiative. These are partial and preliminary steps that would help set the stage for the more difficult work to follow. These initiatives are ambitious but practical, and steps to establish them could begin at any time. The Discussion Notes conclude with suggestions for a number of additional, more narrowly focused initiatives. 153
• Acknowledgement- We need to acknowledge that the challenges we face are far greater than most of us currently acknowledge; that none of us have a truly compelling, credible vision of what a world of economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility might look like or how it would actually work; that new policies and institutions, while necessary, are insufficient and will need to be accompanied by a profound socio-cultural transformation on a global scale; that a protracted clash of ideologies and foundational worldviews is counterproductive to the task at hand; and that while attention to immediate challenges is always necessary we will need to develop the ability to think, plan and act on timescales of centuries as well. 154
• Engagement- If we are to transcend or sufficiently minimize deeply embedded societal divides we need to understand the nature of these divides more deeply. Towards this end we need a program of engagement, inquiry and discernment across these divides on national and global scales. Those who identify with the political Left need to engage those on the Right, and vice-versa. Religious believers need to engage non-believers, and vice-versa. Social liberals need to engage social conservatives, and vice-versa. Such engagement would be intended to generate understandings that would facilitate subsequent rethinking. 155
• Integrity -The desire for great material wealth and income, and for greater material wealth and income than others have, is incompatible with a just, sustainable, technologically responsible world.
lndividuals1 families and communities will need to transcend or sufficiently minimize the desire for such wealth and income and begin taking steps towards living accordingly. Although the full transition to a new and lived understanding of material well-being will take generations, the first steps can and should be taken now. Those who do so will be able to consider what might be done subsequently, over short, middle and longer periods, with a clarity, integrity and legitimacy that would not be possible otherwise. 156
*Community-The social, cultural, economic and political transformations we need require strong communal foundations if they are to succeed. The precise nature of these communal foundations can't be foreseen at this time; rather, we need an extended period during which different approaches from different traditions are pursued, lessons are learned, and promising approaches are refined. Further, the three initiatives suggested above, focused on acknowledgement, engagement and integrity, should be conducted in ways that contribute to the exploration of such new communal institutions. 157 158
These four substantive initiatives might begin with the support of an enabling initiative that mobilizes the necessary funding, personnel and other resources, and that helps ensure that the four initiatives are seen as parts of a unified larger endeavor. Such an enabling initiative would at the same time work to
24 Towards an Initiative for a Human Future- Outline Draft 1.8
encourage deeper understanding of the challenges we face and what needs to be done, and to expand the network of those who share these concerns and wish to collaborate in addressing them. 159 160 161
Even if all these initiatives were made to happen successfully, they would still only be preliminary to and preparatory for the sort of transformative global transition that is called for. Something in addition will need to happen. What this is remains to be discerned, understood, articulated and taken into the world. 162
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Towards an Initiative for a Human Future- Outline Draft 1.8
DISCUSSION NOTES
The Discussion Notes follow the main outline of the text copied here:
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW II. KEY CHALLENGES Economic Justice Ecologi~allntegrity Technological Responsibility Ill. ARCHETYPAL SCENARIOS Techno-Progressive World Balanced Equitable World Green Sustainability World Discussion I Selected Topics I Fundamental Conundra A Framework for Evaluating the Scenarios IV. POLITICAL ECONOMY, GEOPOLITICS, CIVILIZATIONS, IDEOLOGY, FOUNDATIONAL WORLDVIEWS Political Economy: Alternatives for the Long Run Geopolitical Structure: Power and Allegiance over Space and Time Civilization a I Communities and Identities: Who are we? Ideology: Beyond the Left-Right Divide Foundational Worldviews: God, Nature, History V. SUMMARY DISPLAY AND COMMENTS VI. CONCLUDING NOTE: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
27 Towards an Initiative for a Human Future- Outline Draft 1.8
DISCUSSION NOTES (DN}
Selected, draft and partial notes are shown. These notes may later be edited and incorporated into the white paper main text, kept as Discussion Notes or deleted.
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
II. KEY CHAllENGES
Economic Justice
1 Factors implicated in the growth of economic inequality include demographic changes (changes in age distribution, family size, marital status, migration and immigration, and assertive mating); greater returns to higher education and skills (technological skills, "symbolic analyst" skills and interpersonal skills); globalization, free trade, and increased international competition; the financialization of the economy; economic restructuring, de-industrialization, and down-sizing; declining union membership and strength; governmental policies (including erosion of the minimum wage, social service cuts, and tax cuts favoring high income brackets); growth of winner-take-all markets for many goods and services; and changes in cultural norms regarding acceptable levels of compensation and of income differentials more generally. For recent comprehensive reviews of the causes of growing inequalities of income and wealth see Milanovic (2012, 2010), Galbraith {2012) and Piketty (2014). For a review of analysis through 2002 see Hayes {2004; II.B.2). Piketty {2014) argues that inequality is increasing because the rate of return on assets (r) is in general greater than the overall rate of economic growth (g). This argument appears to build on earlier arguments regarding the relative importance of capital-saving and labor-saving technological innovation, as suggested in reviews by Solow {2014), Krugman {2014) and others, and points to labor-saving technological innovation as an important driver of inequality. For discussion regarding the ways in which economic growth and economic inequality bear upon one another see Jaumotte (2013), Autor et al. (2008), Benabou {2005), Murphy and Welch (1995), Bound and Johnson {1992), Berman et al. (1993), Karni and Zilcha (1994), Bessant and Cole {1985), Zuboff {1988), Krugman (1994), Pan {1996), Danziger and Gottschalk (1995), Von Weizsaecker (1993) and Ravallion and Chen (1996); see also the early analysis by Kuznets (1955).
2 Comprehensive proposals to reduce inequality of income and wealth have been offered by, among many others, Stiglitz (2012, 2006),Collins (2012), Noah (2012), Sachs (2011, 2008), Reich (2010, 1991), Cavanaugh {2009), Danziger and Gottschalk (1995), Schor {1995), Frank and Cook (1995), Krugman (1994), Kaus (1992), Makhijani (1992), Daly and Cobb {1989) and Harrison and Bluestone (1988). Some proposals focus on reducing or eliminating impoverishment, others seek to trim the sails of the most affluent, and still others attempt to do both. Policy measures most commonly proposed involve taxation and direct cash transfers (progressive taxes, earned income tax credits, social insurance); in-kind transfers and services (health care, housing assistance, social services); education and training (public and private education, pre-K programs, financial assistance, job training); economic policy measures (macroeconomic policy, trade policy, minimum wages); and institutional mechanisms and regulations (unionization, affirmative action, worker ownership). In addition, many analysts make a strong case for policies that directly impact social and behavioral factors, including patterns of marriage, family stability and immigration. For discussion of the efficacy of proposals to reduce economic inequality see DN 74.
3 For discussion of changes in per capita income among countries see Milanovic (2011, 2012), and Hayes (2004, II.B.I). Cline {1992) projected that under conventional assumptions regarding economic growth, incomes in the developing and the developed worlds would equalize after 650 years, with global per capita
28 Towards an Initiative for a Human Future- Outline Draft 1.8
income at about $390,000 {'90 US$). For the implications of continued economic growth on energy demand, see Hayes (2004, II.A.2.a and II.A.2.b). An analysis of energy regime scenarios will be included in the final whitepaper; preliminary notes are shown in Attachment D.2.
4 For discussion of the possibility of a major secular slowdown in economic growth see Gordon (2010, 2012, 2013), Cowen (2010, 2013), Piketty (2014) and earlier speculation by Krugman (1994). It's suggested that many technological innovations have an initial latency phase with little impact on productivity, followed by a rapid phase of productivity-enhancing applications and diffusion, followed in turn by saturation and little new productivity enhancement. It's suggested as well that there exist "low hanging fruit" innovations that can happen only once in historical time and that most of these have already happened. Together, it's suggested that the low hanging fruit innovations of the 2nd industrial revolution (1880-1940), including electrification, stream engines, indoor plumbing, refrigeration, the internal combustion engine, precision metallurgy, air travel and integrated road and transport systems, have exhausted their high-impact phase potential. It's further suggested that although the computer and internet revolutions have enhanced the quantity and quality of communications, they are unlikely to have as great an impact on real economic growth. Analysts also note the end of the educational dividend in the West: between 1940 and 1980 the percent of Americans (for example) under thirty with high school diplomas increased from 38% to 85%, contributing to an enormous growth in productivity. But since 1980 this share has not increased and is unlikely to. The proportion of college graduates is still increasing but at some point in the next decade or two will likely stabilize and thus no longer provide this added increment of productivity enhancement. Other authors, including Mokyr (2014, 2013), Denning (2011) and Noah (2011), disagree with predictions of a secular growth slowdown and assert that we can expect a revival of productivity-enhancing technological innovation. Cowen (2013) concurs but thinks it will take significantly longer for this to happen and suggests that an important contribution to reviving economic growth would be to enhance the social status of scientists. The Economist (2011) suggests that we can expect a revival of economic growth as a result of "cognition-augmenting innovations."
5 Gordon (2012) reports that in the United Kingdom per capita output grew at 0.2% annually during the period 1300-1700, dramatically increased after the industrial revolution to 2.5% annually by the mid 20th century, is slowly declining now and will return to pre-industrial levels of 0.2% annually by end of the 21st century. Piketty (2014) shows global per capita output increasing at 0.8% annually between 1700 and 2012, peaking at 2.5% during the period 1950-1980, and declining to 1.7% between 1980 and 2012. He demurs on specific projections beyond 2012 but discusses a range of scenarios, including a median scenario showing long-range per capita output growing at 1.2% per year. Note that for both authors these declines in growth rates are independent of any deliberate societal intention, whether for ecological, egalitarian or other reasons. M.eanwhile Kudlow and Moore (2014) criticize mainstream economists, including former U.S. chief economist Larry Summers and current U.S. Federal Reserve Vice-Chair Stanley Fischer, who propose that we accept a "new normal" rate of economic growth of 2%, and urge instead that we adopt pro-growth policies that could return us to 4%.
Ecological Integrity
6 We define a natural ecological system as a community of living organisms and the non-living components of their environment that maintains itself primarily through interactions not directed by human agency. We define ecological integrity as the condition that allows a natural ecological system to continue indefinitely. Under these definitions a natural ecological system can include human agency, but it loses ecological integrity as the scope and scale of human manipulation of its elements increases.
7 A Discussion Note on the environmentalist track-record is in preparation.
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8 An artifact is any object designed by human beings. Native oat seedlings growing in the wild are not artifacts, but a cultivated patch of oat seedlings is an artifact, albeit only minimally so. Oats selected over many generations to more prominently express qualities found in nature are even more artifactual. Oats genetically modified to express traits not found in nature are more artifactual still. An oat plant modified to both secrete novel substances for use in cosmetic manufacture and to process carbon dioxide into bricks for deep-earth burial is heavily artifactual. Our definition of artifactual is closely related to our definitions of loss of ecological integrity and of technological progress.
9 This critique of the impact of economic growth on ecological integrity, emphasizing technological artifactualization, differs somewhat from the conventionally understood environmentalist critique of economic growth. That critique, introduced to a wide audience with the publication of The Limits to Growth (1972), foregrounds the seemingly incontrovertible argument that since natural resources are objectively finite, economic activity which consumes these resources [i.e., transforms them from states of low entropy to states of high entropy] can continue for only a finite period; and further, that economic growth, which consumes these resources at increasing rates, can continue for only a much shorter finite period. The conventional critique recognizes that technological innovation can extend the time during which economic activity and economic growth can continue, but only to a point, as technology is subject both to diminishing returns and to ultimate limits grounded in the laws of physics. Pro-growth advocates reply that we are immeasurably far from exhausting the potential of technological innovation to allow economic growth to continue in the face of resource constraints. Which account is closer to the truth? Both camps claim to have been vindicated by the historical experience of the four decades since the publication of Limits, and both camps cherry-pick data to support this claim. Note that the entire debate reduces to differing judgments regarding the efficacy and acceptability of technological intervention in the workings of the natural world. Note also that neither camp has produced analytic structures that allow useful predictions regarding technological innovation. The entire debate has been waged based on hunches. My own hunch is that technological innovation should allow us to overcome configuration-dependent limits for another 100-200 years or so before ultimate limits begin to be felt. However, as discussed in DN 17, the technologies that allow us to avoid these configuration-dependent limits do so because they allow us to manipulate the fundamental processes and properties of the natural world at increasingly finer scales of space and time. At a certain point this power becomes radically destabilizing, because it is necessarily subject to inherently fallible and unpredictable human agency. This radical instability is dramatically reinforced by a second dynamic of technologically-driven economic growth, namely, the inherent growth of economic inequality, including both "conventional" economic inequality and profoundly disruptive biological inequalities that can be expected to follow if we allow heritable human genetic modification. A proper understanding of the limits to economic growth thus needs to go beyond the germane but inconclusive arguments grounded in the exhaustion of finite natural resources, and include a sophisticated understanding of the dynamics of both technological innovation and of economic and biotechnological inequality as well.
10 See also DNs 62-63 regarding suggested hard limits to economic growth based on "Peak Oil,""planetary boundary" and "state shift" assessments.
11 This assessment carries with it a judgment that although an AGW trajectory that peaks just below 4°C in~ 2100 and declines to rc over the next century or two will cause great ecological harm and great economic hardship, it is unlikely to be objectively globally catastrophic. However, as AGW rises above 3S- 4°C the risk of global catastrophic harm becomes much greater. Further, none of this is to say that constraining AGW to significantly lower levels wouldn't be preferable. See DNs 62-66 and 82-83, and Attachment 0.3, for more on global catastrophic risk.
12 For the case that we can no longer avoid exceeding 2°( AGW see Victor (2014), New (2011), Nichols et al. (2011), Plummer (2013), Jordon et al. (2013), Mora et al. (2013), PricewaterhouseCoopers (2012), Anderson
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and Bows (2011), and Betts (2011). For contrary views see United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network (2014). Some who urge renewed commitment to avoiding 2°C acknowledge that such action will require a "World War II- type mobilization." On this see Del ina and Diesendorf (2013(a), 2013(b)). Mobilization for World War II lasted for four years, while keeping AGW below 2°C would require mobilization for perhaps many decades.
13 The sorts of impacts and damages that might be expected in the run-up to a 4°C warming over the period 2080-2110 have been outlined by the World Bank (2012), New (2011), Parry et al. (2009) and Stern (2007). These include 1-3 billion people under severe water stress; major amphibian extinctions; widespread coral reef mortality; pronounced stress on cereal crops; 30% loss of coastal wetlands; loss of~ SO% of the Arctic tundra; substantial die back of Amazon Rainforest; sea level rise of 0.5 to 1 meter, with 2-15 million people at strong risk of coastal flooding; increased malnutrition, diarrhea and infectious disease, notably in tropical countries; up to 80 million malarial exposures in Africa; greater heat and flood mortality; and greater risk of abrupt large-scale impacts of the sort noted in DN 64.
14 Political leaders and advocates commonly claim that the 2°C AGW threshold is "based on science," or is "what the scientists have determined is needed to avoid potentially catastrophic ecological risks," but this is not accurate. The 2°C figure initially arose among German scientists in the early 1990s as a benchmark for harmonizing research on the impacts of climate change. Projections suggested that under BAU conditions a 2"C AGW world would be reached in the mid-21st century, a time near enough to elicit motivating concern yet far enough off to allow some confidence that meaningful policy action could be taken. As discussion of policy action spread internationally, the existence of research results pegged to the 2°C level allowed policy proponents to reference that particular figure with enhanced authority and legitimacy. As policy proponents increasingly referenced the 2°C figure researchers increasingly converged on that figure for their research. The European Union formally adopted a ceiling of 2°C as a policy goal in the mid-1990s and began urging that that level be agreed upon as a universal policy goal. In 2010 the 2°C target was officially affirmed at COP-16 in Cancun. Note that other constituencies and academic studies have called for other AGW target levels. At Copenhagen 2009 over half the UN member states supported the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) proposal for a l.SOC limit. Nordhaus' (1994) DICE model generates an optimal trajectory showing AGW of 3.5"C by 2120, 4.0°C by 2150, and further increases beyond that. More recently Nordhaus (2013) argues for a 2.5" C limit. See Geden (2013) and Plummer (2013) for more on the history of the 2°C policy target.
[New Discussion Note] At this writing (Oct 2015) the prospects for agreement on a climate change treaty at the Nov-Dec United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) COPS-21 are considered to be good. However, much depends on the specifics of the Nationally Determined Contributions (INDUs) being developed and submitted by individual countries, and on the final provisions of the treaty. An analysis of the first 63 INDUs submitted, which include the major GHG emitting countries, suggests that if all were successfully implemented AGW would reach 3.5"C (2°- 4.5" C) by 2100, a reduction of 1oc from BAU estimates of 4SC (2.5-5.9° C). See Climate Interactive (2015). Environmentalists want the treaty to include provisions that encourage or mandate further stronger emissions reductions in subsequent years. Optimists point to the fact that the current INDUs generate a significant, if still inadequate, AGW reduction, and that continued citizen pressure and technological innovation should enable us to close the remaining gap over the coming 85 years. Pessimists are wary of the intent or ability of countries to follow through on their INDU pledges, much less to agree and successfully carry out significantly stronger pledges. Pending further analysis, I'll assume for these notes that a climate treaty is agreed upon, and that INDU implementation, efforts to secure stronger emissions reduction pledges, and future technological innovation are all moderately, but only moderately, successful over the coming decades, resulting in AGW of 3°C by 2100 and peaking at somewhat below 4.0 oc by 2150.
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Technological Responsibility
15 As used here, a society is technologically responsible if it has established institutions that allow proposed technological innovations to be assessed across a wide range of societal values, prior to their development and use, through a process involving the full range of social constituencies, and to be forgone if judged to be on balance undesirable.
16 Many authors have asked whether there exist hard limits to productivity-enhancing technological innovation, but answers have been elusive. Some have constructed "barrier/breakthrough" models in which innovation successively overcomes "configuration-dependent" limits while remaining constrained by "ultimate" limits in the far future; see e.g. DeVore (1980}, Thirring (1958) and Brinkman (1980). Feynman (1960) famously argued that there is "plenty of room at the bottom" for molecular, atomic and sub-atomic technological innovation. Kaufman (1995) argues from complexity theory that there exists a horizon involving technological diversity above which innovation becomes "supercritical," i.e., explodes combinatorially. Models of endogenous technological innovation have posited increasing returns to technological innovation that similarly lead to explosions; see D. Romer (1994), P. Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Becker and Murphy {1993). However, the empirical foundations of these models are thin and the general case for increasing returns remains speculative. Horgan (1996) argued that the production of scientific knowledge is approaching absolute limits, but allowed that the existing store of scientific knowledge still affords considerable opportunity for technological innovation. Woit {2013) argues that new knowledge of the fundamental nature ofthe physical world may be reaching limits. Once the current experiments using the Large Hadron Collider confirm the existence of the Higgs Boson, further important new knowledge of the physical world will require devices generating energies at levels many orders of magnitude beyond anything currently conceivable. See the citations in DN 4 for additional recent discussion of limits to technological innovation.
17 Our definition of technology and technological progress largely follows that of Ayers (1992), whose insights have relevance for both economic and engineering perspectives on technology, as well as for the question of technological limits. He defines technology as "knowledge, combined with appropriate means, to transform materials, carriers of energy, or types of information from less desirable to more desirable states" (p 35). He observes that "Every transformation initiated by man depends upon either the deliberate enhancement or acceleration of some localized natural equilibrium process, or the creation of a temporary disequilibrium by means of one or more artificial'drivers."' He cites the combustion of fossil fuels as an example of equilibrium-rate enhancement, and metal ore reduction as an example of artificial disequilibrium. He continues, "Most modern technologies require artificial environmental conditions to stimulate reactions (or suppress competing reactions) ... [These] are created by means of high or low temperatures, high or low pressures or densities (evacuation), chemical potentials, electric or magnetic fields or potentials, electromagnetic radiation, and electron, ion, proton or neutron fluxes. Technological progress, in a very fundamental sense, results from the increasing ability to create these conditions on demand, i.e., when and where they are desired." (p 36) For more see Hayes (2004; II.A.3.b).
18 I'm using the term "technological progress" to foreground the directionality that characterizes much technological innovation, as described above by Ayers, but don't mean to imply a normative judgment that this "progress" is desirable or good. The terminology is awkward because as most commonly used the word "progress" is heavily normative. Suggestions for alternative terminology are welcome. Norgaard {2014) helpfully suggests that "technological advance" is less norm-laden.
19 The vision of a hyper-technological human future was sketched by Francis Bacon {1627, 1620), elaborated upon by philosophers of the Continental and the Scottish Enlightenments, given a political ideological context by the early 20th century Futurist and Technocracy movements, and is now motivating. the Transhumanist and
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Singularitarian movements. Recent authors who celebrate this vision in one manner or another include Kurzweil (2013, 2006, 1999), Drexler (2013, 1992, 1986), Church (2012), Diamandis and Kotler (2012), Kelly (2010, 1994), Savalescu and Bostrom (2009), Garreau (2004), Stock (2003, 1993), Vinge (1993, 1981), Silver (1998), Finney and Jones (1985), Criswell (1985), Minsky (1986), Dyson (1997, 1988), Moravex (1993, 1988), Merkle (1989), Calvin (1993), Tipler (1994), Paul and Cox (1996), Yudkowsky (1996), Coates et al. (1997), Porter (1997) and Kaku (1997). Similar visions from just a few decades earlier include those of O'Neill (1977), Kahn and Weiner (1967) and Ettinger (1964). Although these authors differ on many particulars, their overall themes and tone, and a great many specific elements of their visions, and stunningly uniform. For a review see Hayes (2004, II.E.l).
2°Critical assessments of technology and of technological hubris date from at least the time of the Greek 1 legend of Icarus(~ 6 h C. BCE). With the scientific and industrial revolutions and the general celebration of these came new doubts and fears as well. Noted 19th century authors who raised questions about technology included Shelly (1818), Thoreau (1854), Emerson (1899) and Butler (1872). Noted 20th century skeptics included Huxley (1932), Mumford (1934), Ellul (1965), Weizenbaum (1976), Winner (1977), Roszak (1979), Heidegger (1977), Sale (1995, 1990, 1985), Mander (1992), Postman (1993) and Sclove (1995). Skepticism regarding the value of many new technologies was a central theme of the counter-cultural movements of the late 1960s and 1970s. This skeptical stance began to fade in the early 1980s as the worst fears of technological harm did not come to pass, as the difficulty and inconvenience of seeking to forgo the use of particular new technologies became evident, and as the personal computer became a welcome appliance in the workplace and at home. By the mid-late 1990s "technology" had come to assume a near mythic status as a source of economic, societal and personal transformation. For the millennia! generation born after~ 1985, participation in the continual evolution of on-line and digital experiences and enabling gadgets occupies much the same psychic space as did participation in politics and new forms of personal and social relationships for their Baby-Boomer parents and grandparents. Only very recently has a new and sustained sharply critical view of technology appeared. [Cites in preparation; see several in the Discussion Notes below.] See DNs 28-31 and 36-44 for comments on particular technological innovations.
21 The emergence of this new techno-libertarian ideology, its adoption by such a large and influential constituency and its beginning impact on real-world affairs has been among the least reported important socio-political phenomena of the past half-century. Adherents include the principals of major technology industry firms, including Google, Facebook, Oracle, Amazon and PayPal, and of major academic centers at leading universities, including Oxford, Harvard, Stanford and Princeton. Many of the texts cited in DN 19 affirm and elaborate upon the tenets of this techno-libertarian ideology. Other texts that focus on ideology and political strategy include Hughes (2004) and More & Vita-More (2013). Although several authors have written critically of the new techno-libertarian sensibility, few have noted its ideological coherence and its full significance. Eggers (2013), Packer (2013) and Morozov (2013) have cast light on the self-servingly solipsistic techno-libertarian worldview and culture. McKibben (2004), Fukuyama (2003) and Shanks (2005) have critically addressed the new techno-eugenic sensibility. Kotkin (2014a) has documented the growing corporate and financial control by techno-futurist leaders across diverse sectors of manufacturing, services and finance. Reynolds (2014) notes that the techno-elites of Silicon Valley, once universally lauded and glorified, are increasingly viewed by many Americans with distrust and resentment. The Economist, the Atlantic, Huffington Post, Newsweek, the Guardian, the New York Times and many other journals have run detailed accounts of the sexism and "Bra culture" that pervade the tech industry. Giannella (2015) traces the Silicon Valley ideology back to the Enlightenment claim that rationalistic science and technology is the necessary and nearly-sufficient source of "Progress". The techno-progressive ideology and movement known as Transhumanism is of key significance; further notes on transhumanism are in preparation.
22 My assertion that the techno-progressive vision has become the "default vision ... among a majority of the scientific and technological community ... " is a subjective judgment based on interaction with science and
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technology leaders and their colleagues over many years. It would be unfair to say that a majority of scientists unreservedly welcome such a future, although a significant minority certainly do. A larger group typically express concern about such a future, but then go on to assert, confidently and even forcefully, that it is inevitable and that resistance is futile. In my experience only a small number of scientists are willing to publically call for legislative and other measures that would limit the prerogative of scientists to do most anything they wish, other than for narrowly construed reasons of safety and efficacy. I believe, however, that a strong show of societal opposition to a techno-progressive human future, motivated by concerns beyond those associated primarily with fundamentalist or literalist religious belief, would in turn motivate a large number of these concerned-but-fatalistic scientists and others to play more active public roles.
Ill. ARCHETYPAL SCENARIOS
23 A scenario is a story about how things could turn out in the future. Scenarios typically consider a collection of factors that are judged to be important, that are expected to change over time and that have some bearing upon one another. For a scenario to be credible changes over time in the important factors must be internally consistent. The three archetypal scenarios discussed in this whitepaper outline are advocated scenarios, that is, scenarios that a particular constituency would like to see happen, believes can happen, and is working or would be willing to work to help make happen. Advocated scenarios differ from dystopian scenarios, which are not desired by anyone, and from utopian scenarios, which no-one believes to be credible. The three archetypal scenarios discussed here are based on scenarios developed by Hayes (2004) following a review of 35 scenario exercises involving over 200 discrete scenarios. The three archetypal scenarios were developed independently of but are comparable to scenarios prepared by Raskin et al. (2002, 2006, 2010) as part of a major collaborate initiative, and to scenarios developed by Hunt et al. (2012) following a review of~ 450 previously published scenarios.
24 Selected quantitative values of key variables for the three archetypal scenarios are shown in Box DN-1 below. A full display is shown in BOX B2-3 of ATTACHMENT B. The values shown for Techno-Progressive World are intended to grow beyond 2150. The values shown for Balanced Equitable World and Green Sustainability World are fixed and sustainable at those levels indefinitely beyond 2150.
BOX DN-1 ARCHETYPAL SCENARIOS- SELECTED VALUES AS OF 2150 Historical values- Techno-Progressive Balanced Equitable Green 5ustainability 2000 World (BAU) World World Population billions 6.2 11+ 9 7 GOP/capita '90 US$ 4,900 127,000+ 75,000 25,000 Total GOP 1012 '90 US$ 30 1,402 676 170 GOP/capita growth %/year 1.2 2+ 0 0 World Energy Use TW (1012 watts) 13.6 115+ 60 18 GOP/capita, by income sector {'90 US$) Low income countries 346 66,000+ 75,000 25,000 China 628 93,000+ 75,000 25,000 Middle income countries 2,752 143,000+ 75,000 25,000 High income countries 26,689 466,000+ 75,000 25,000
25 The quantitative scenarios used in this whitepaper outline were developed using Model A, first prepared for use in Hayes (2004). I hope to construct a new quantitative model, Model B, for use in the final whitepaper. Model B will likely display 7-9 geopolitical sectors rather than 4 income sectors and will include more developed population, energy and income distribution modules as well as a new climate change module. Parameter and historical values will likely follow those used in one of the established Integrated Assessment Models (lAMs) referenced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Dollar amounts will display using Purchasing Power Parity values rather than nominal values, and in 2000 or 2010
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US$ rather than 1990 US$. I don't expect these modifications and updates to change the overall thrust of the arguments presented in this whitepaper outline, although that remains to be seen.
26 The population projections used in the three archetypal scenarios roughly follow recent United Nations high, median and low range estimates, as discussed in Attachment B.2. In all three scenarios world population stabilizes by 2100 with an average fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman. However, the possibility of secular population decline deserves more attention. Development, education and urbanization dramatically reduce fertility rates and generate asymmetry regarding family size. While a majority of women may indeed come to have 2 children over their lifetimes, the number having one or no children could be significantly greater than those having three or four children, giving a total fertility rate well below 2.1. This is the case today in Europe, which with a fertility rate of 1.5 appears set to decline from today's 460 million to 350 million·by 2100, a drop of 24%. If over the coming century global fertility stabilizes at the European rate of 1.5, world population would fall to half its current level of 7 billion by 2200 and to just 1 billion by 2300, an 85% decline. The implications for our archetypal scenarios of such a massive decline are many and complex, and will be considered further in the final whitepaper. See Wise {2013), Last (2013) and Lutz and Scherbov {2008) for discussion of the possibility of secular population decline.
27 The demographic future may be further complicated by the rise of new pro-nata list preferences and movements. High income professional couples in the United States, and perhaps elsewhere, are increasingly choosing to have three or four children rather than the two or fewer that professional couples have preferred since the late 1970s. See Zeveloff (2015), Seligson {2014) and Baskin (2014). Meanwhile, the Quiverfu/1 movement is encouraging conservative Christian families in the Anglosphere to aspire to families of 10, 12, 15 and more children. See Joyce (2009) and Hess et al. {1990). The long-run significance of these is yet to be understood.
Techno-Progressive World
28 We refer to "nanoscale civilizational platforms" as the key structural component allowing the precise fabrication of complex operational nanoscale (1-100 nm) artifacts. As initially envisioned by Drexler {1987, 1986), such platforms would allow all life on earth to be emulated in a volume perhaps no larger than a soccer ball. The minds and identities of current humans could be uploaded onto these platforms and our biological bodies discarded. Billions upon billions of such minds could organize themselves into a multitude of new, higher-level civilizational communities. They would be able to experience the equivalent of all possible human brain states, including brain states associated with technological innovation and economic growth.
29 It should be noted that Drexler, who in the early 1980s first brought the concept of nanotechnology to wide popular attention, has disavowed use of the term in favor of the phrase "molecular manufacturing." He argues that during the 1990s the term "nanotechnology" was hijacked by large and influential corporations, investor groups and government agencies to rebrand and glamorize a suite of interesting and useful but otherwise mostly conventional fields of research, including materials processing and micro-electronics, while Drexler's far more radical proposals for nanoscale assemblers, intelligent computers and civilizational platforms were dismissed as impractical and left unfunded. See Drexler {2013).
30 Economic growth, understood in the limit as the reworking of a constant mass into increasingly complex forms, would be powered by photovoltaic cells on the surface ofthe home sphere and could continue uninterrupted until the sun approaches red giant stage and the Earth incinerates, about 2.8 billion years from now. Economic growth could continue even longer if civilization transitions before that time to extraterrestrial nanoscale civilizational platforms, as many proponents of Techno-Progressive World believe will be the case after another 200-300 years, if not much sooner. They argue that it will be far easier to
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colonize the galaxies as intelligent, immortal nanobots than as archaic meatbots lugging around copious quantities of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen. Elaborate scenarios of humanity transitioning to nanoscale civilizational platforms, and eventually to extraterrestrial and ultimately extragalactic platforms, have been proposed by Moravex (1988), Bostrom (2014), Kurzweil (2013), Bainbridge (2012), Koene (2009), Tipler (1994), Rothblatt (2014), Porter (1997), Yudkowsky (1996) Vinge (1993) and many others. These authors almost invariably draw on a common narrative featuring nanotechnology, space travel, the Singularity, mind uploading and immortality.
31 Reich (1991) presciently warned that those in the top 20% of the American income distribution were in the process of seceding from the rest of society and building a parallel social universe with its own systems of education, communication, transportation, health care, public safety and all the rest. The new Techno Progressives are extending this trajectory and are seeking to secede from the human species. The Sea stead Foundation plans to build cities on platforms in international waters, or perhaps closer to shores controlled by friendly micro-states, where they will be free to pursue human genetic modification, cognitive enhancement and other human experimentation free of meddling by religious conservatives and others. A new school of hyper-libertarianism calls for creation of an "opt out society" in which individuals could legally dissociate themselves from obligations, regulations and constraints, as well as purported benefits, pertaining to taxation, education, health care, life-style restrictions, military service and more; see Greenblatt (2014). Stanford University lecturer and entrepreneur Balaji Srinivasan (2013), co-founder of the genomics company Counsyl, goes further and seriously proposes that Silicon Valley as a whole secede from the United States.
Balanced Equitable World
32 Balanced Equitable World projects 9 billion people and per capita GOP of $75,000 ('90 US$) by 2150, giving a steady-state level of output twenty times that produced and consumed in 2000. For this level of output to be attained, sustained and equitably distributed will be a massively complex undertaking. It would require greatly strengthened and expanded institutions of national, regional and global coordination, regulation and governance. This would include expanded equivalents of the many existing global institutions (e.g., United Nations, World Bank, IMF, WTO, WHO, International Criminal Court); strengthened equivalents of existing regional structures (e.g., the European Union, the African Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asian-Pacific Economic Coordination (APEC), East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA), Mercosur, the Arab League, and the recently established Eurasian Union); an array of multilateral agreements, treaties and conventions addressing climate change, energy production and use, other ecological commons concerns, technology oversight, human and civil rights, global trade and financial policies, migration, immigration, and much more. It would require institutions to ensure representation, participation and accountability at all levels of decision-making; global social compacts ensuring that education, literacy, health care, sanitation and other basic needs are universally accessible; strengthened security and peace-keeping institutions, including enforcement of prohibitions on nuclear, chemical, biological and synthetic biological weaponry; measures to ensure distributional equity, including a Tobin Tax on foreign exchange transactions, a global wealth tax a Ia Piketty, a global energy tax and/or carbon tax, and harmonization of tax, fiscal, and budgetary policies at the national and regional levels; policies and institutions to ensure the gradual convergence of per capita incomes among the developed and developing countries, i.e., that allow developing countries to grow after growth has come to an end in the developed countries; and much more. Recent comprehensive proposals along these lines have been offered by Sachs (2011, 2008) and Stiglitz (2012, 2006). Earlier comprehensive proposals h.ave been offered by Rodrik (1997), Berlin and Lang (1996), Hirst and Thompson (1996), Bello (1998), Waters (1995), UNDP (1994) and Luard (1990). See Hayes (200411.0.2) for review and discussion. The great majority of proposals of this sort assume that economic growth can and should continue indefinitely, and that a prime responsibility of global governance would be to ensure that it does so. A world in which economic growth has come to an end makes the task of global governance easier in some regards but far more difficult in others.
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33 ON 32 describes what might be called a unitary or globalist Balanced Equitable World. ON 113 describes an alternative regionalist or civilizational Balanced Equitable World, featuring perhaps seven to nine or so continental-scale civilizational communities. In the former a high degree of harmonization and uniformity regarding social, political, economic and other conditions worldwide is desired and achieved; in the latter harmonization is sought for only a limited number of critically important global commons conditions, while other conditions can vary among regional civilizational communities.
Green Sustainabi/ity World
34 What might Green Sustainability World actually look like? There is an extensive literature. See Shi (1985) for a comprehensive historical review. Foundational texts include Thoreau (1854), Gregg (1936), Nearing and Nearing (1954) and Elgin (1981). For continuing interest during the 1990s see Saltzman (1991), Dacyczyn (1993), Andrews (1997) and Segal (1999). Recent notable contributions include Dietz and O'Neill (2013), Randers (2ql2), Speth (2012), Skidelsky and Skidelsky (2012), Schor (2010), Leonard (2010}, McKibben (2010, 2007), Holmgren (2009), Jackson (2009) and Victor (2008). For a review of contributions spanning the half century 1949-1998 see Hayes (2004, II.C). Many authors proposing versions of Green Sustainability World are of Northern European backgrounds. These accounts are remarkably uniform. They call for low levels of material consumption; reliance on renewable energy (largely solar, wind and biomass); urban farmers markets offering local, organic and fair-trade foods; bicycles and public transportation replacing private automobiles; cooperative, communal and multi-family housing; community recycling centers; localized and decentralized political structures grounded in grassroots participatory democracy; an iconic landscape of small towns, rural communities, and re-purposed downtown urban neighborhoods; holistic health and healing; mindfulness meditation and other contemplative practices; cooperative, non-profit and worker owned enterprises; barter and local currency; shorter workweeks and longer vacations; a lively culture of tolerance, diversity and artistic creativity; guaranteed annual incomes; and free health care and education. Accounts of Green Sustainability World written in the 2010s often appear lifted with only minor updates from the pages of Brand's The Whole Earth Catalogue (1967), Reich's The Greening of America (1970) and Callen bach's Ecotopia (1979), published four or five decades ago. Although this widely-held vision of Green Sustainability World includes many important communitarian and cooperative elements, it draws heavily on a Western Protestant ethos of individualism, autonomy and self-reliance. For that reason, among others, it is unlikely to be easily universalizable. It might, however, play a role in the development of a specifically Western future, and particular elements might have wider appeal.
35 Green Sustainability World as depicted here might appear to many as irresponsibly and impractically draconian qnd thus unworthy of serious consideration. To others, however, this account might appear insufficiently draconian. From one perspective this account barely qualifies as economically constrained at all. World per capita GOP increases dramatically between 2000 and 2150, from $4,876 to $25,000, an increase of 500%. The only sectors whose incomes in 2150 would be absolutely less than they were in 2000 are the top 40% of households in the twenty-five highest income countries, or about 8% of households worldwide [cites in process]. Green Sustainability World, and Balanced Equitable World as well, are seen by many as draconian constraints on consumption because their rates of economic growth slow to zero. And if, in fact, modernity requires unending economic growth if our lives are to have purpose and meaning, then both scenarios are clearly radical, even if only ambiguously draconian.
DISCUSSION
TECHNO-PROGRESSIVE WORLD
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36 The tech billionaires and visionaries committed to making extraterrestrial colonization a reality understand that modest but successful initial efforts are necessary to pave the way for more ambitious next steps. Initiatives now underway include Space X, founded by PayPal billionaire Elon Musk and focused on low-cost, heavy payload launch vehicles, with an eventual goal of Mars colonization; Blue Origin, founded by Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos and focused on vertical-takeoff-and-landing (VTOL) systems; Virgin Galactic, founded by Richard Branson and focused on suborbital space tourism; Inspiration Mars, founded by multimillionaire entrepreneur Dennis Tito and planning a manned fly-by mission to Mars in 2018 or 2021; Bigelow Aerospace, focused on expandable modular orbital hotels for space tourism; Orbital Technologies, focused on space stations for commercial manufacturing; Planetary Resources, focused on asteroid mining to "expand Earth's natural resource base;" the 100 Year Starship project, a DARPA/NASA-funded study of business plans to support long-term research on interstellar travel; and the Tau Zero Foundation and Icarus Interstellar, non profit initiatives seeking to promote interest in interstellar space travel. Mars One has announced plans to begin colonizing Mars in 2024 with settlers committed to permanent (no return) habitation, but its plans are widely considered to be impractical. [cites in progress.]
37 Tipler (1994) argues that natural resource constraints and the eventual death of the sun require that "Life, if it is to continue, must leave the Earth and colonize space." Colonization would employ self-reproducing universal constructors with human-level intelligence, each weighing no more than 100 grams. These would be accelerated to 90% of light speed and reach Proxima Centauri in 10 years. Colonies would require 100- 300 years to grow from 100 grams to full civilizational status, after which they would launch new constructors towards the next star. At these rates the Milky Way galaxy would be colonized within 600,000 years, the Andromeda galaxy within 3 million years and the Virgo Cluster within 70 million years. Within 1018 years life will have engulfed the Universe.
38 Re cloning H. neanderthalensis see Caplan (2013), Smith (2013) and Hughes (2013). Re cloning the Woolly Mammoth see Brand (2009), Cotroneo (2014) and Rich (2014).
39 Mainstream scientists have been cautious about publically critiquing techno-progressive proposals for nanoscale civilizational platforms and mind uploading, but it's likely that most believe these to be fantasies. Jones (in Stix, 1996) charges that Drexler and others have overlooked crucial engineering design requirements. He suggests that quantum uncertainties, thermal vibration, and ambient high-energy radiation preclude development of the ubiquitous nanotech "assemblers" proposed by Drexler. Without assemblers there are no nanoscale platforms onto which human minds, much less civilizations, can be uploaded. Other authors have characterized Drexlerian nanotechnology as "cargo cult science," i.e., a discipline with much of the trappings of real science but founded on a gross illusion; see Stix (1996). Cowen (2013) rejects Kurzweil's vision of the Singularity but believes that advanced human-machine interface technologies, combined with network technologies, are practicable and will be able to endow humans with extraordinarily expanded powers. Sterling (2014), while sympathetic to a technology-driven human future, also rejects the notion of a technological Singularity. See Smalley (2001), Hopkins (2012) and Hayes (2004, Box IIE-16) for further critical assessments of Drexlerian nanotechnology, mind uploading and the Singularity.
40 To my knowledge no comprehensive, authoritative analysis of extraterrestrial colonization as a serious strategy for the human future, addressing technical, economic, socio-political and other considerations, has been prepared. My strong sense is that such an analysis would conclude that extraterrestrial colonization is impracticable, now and forever. For strongly skeptical critiques of human space colonization see Conway (2015) and KolbNt (2015); also see Lind (2011) and Morton (2009).
41 DNs 36-40 were prepared just prior to the October 21, 2014 explosion and crash of Virgin Galactic's SpaceShip Two (the "VSS Enterprise") on its fourth powered test flight, killing the co-pilot and seriously injuring the pilot. In the wake of the crash many criticisms of the project that had been voiced earlier, but
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were largely ignored by the scientific, aerospace industrial and popular press, now attracted much attention. Criticisms had been made concerning the testing and safety certification process, the design of the spacecraft and in particular of its engines, the exuberant promotion of the enterprise by Virgin Galactic founder Richard Branson and others, the fawning complicity in this promotion by the media and the foolishness and foolhardiness of space tourism in general. For examples and discussion of pre-crash critique see Mendick et al. (2014), Fernholz (2014), Associated Press (2014), and Bland (2012).
42 The strong case against heritable human genetic modification might be summarized in this excerpt from Hayes (2008a): "Our common human nature evolved over millions of years but has been stable over the few thousand years during which modern human values, behaviors and institutions have developed. When we look into the eyes of another person, we know something about that person - indeed, an enormous amount, far more than we realize- no matter how dissimilar we may otherwise be. Manipulating the foundations of human nature would change all this. If human minds start modifying the basic structures of the human mind that is, if the agent of change becomes the object of change- there will no longer be a "there" there. We will have destabilized both the biological and social foundations of the human world."
43 The bright red line on human genetic modification that must not be crossed is heritable nuclear genetic modification (HNGM), i.e., modification of the genes found in the nuclei of human eggs, sperm and zygotes. Such modified genes would be present not only in any child that resulted from the initially altered cells, but in that child's offspring as well, and so on through all subsequent generations. The development and use of HNGM would be the beginning of a new techno-eugenics and the true end of our common evolved human nature. HNGM is banned in over forty countries and is explicitly permitted in none. The problem is that the remaining~ 160 countries, including the United States, have as yet adopted no binding policies regarding HNGM at all. Meanwhile an influential network of scientists, bioethicists, biotech industry leaders, journalists, "transhumanists" and others are working to persuade the general public and political leaders that HNGM is the key to a safe, healthy and "enhanced" human future. Other HNGM proponents argue that its development and use is inevitable, like it or not, and that prohibitions will only create black markets. HNGM opponents, who include scientists, bioethicists, biotech industry leaders, journalists and public interest advocates, reply that human societies prohibit hundreds of unacceptable medical procedures and successfully deal with violators through police and legal institutions; that prohibition of HNGM is warranted given the stakes; and that prohibitions on HNGM are supported by great majorities worldwide.
44 The campaign to build support for HNGM began in the late 1990s in the United States and Europe, when the development of cloning technologies and anticipated completion of the human genome project appeared to make some forms of HNGM clinically feasible. These expectations proved premature. In 2012, however, new "gene editing" techniques involving clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR), developed by scientists at the University of California at Berkeley and MIT, appeared to offer a way to modify multiple genetic loci simultaneously, and in a manner potentially able to keep errors within background levels. In early 2015 researchers at Harvard Medical School acknowledged that they had used CRISPR gene editing techniques to experimentally modify genes in human eggs. Shortly afterwards, researchers at Sun Vat sen University in Guangzhou, China reported using CRISPR to modify human embryos. The modified embryos contained numerous genetic errors, but researchers expressed confidence that over time these could be reduced to acceptable levels. The modified embryos were destroyed following the experiments, but the researchers were candid about their hopes to eventually initiate human pregnancies using modified embryos. In response, many authoritative voices worldwide are now calling for national and international bans or moratoria on HNGM. For background on the current controversy involving HNGM and CRISPR see Puping et al. (2015), Cyranoksi and Reardon (2015), Regalato (2015), Shanks (2015) and Cussins (2015). For arguments supporting HNGM see Savalescu et al. (2015), Bailey (2015) and Hughes (2015). For arguments against HNGM see Lamphier et al. (2015) and Center for Genetics and Society (2015). For the U.S. National Institutes
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of Health (NIH) and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) statement reaffirming their prohibition of HNGM, see Collins (2015).
BALANCED EQUITABLE WORLD
45 Notes on Balanced Equitable World are in preparation.
GREEN SUSTAINABILITY WORLD
46 As constructed here the scenario of Green Sustainability World draws in part on the experience and sensibilities of simple living and voluntary simplicity. Initiatives and movements involving versions of these have arisen frequently in the West from medieval times to the present. In the late 1960s and early 1970s a voluntary simplicity movement arose in close association with the counterculture and environmental movements of that time. It valued moderation over excess, spiritual growth over material consumption, cooperation over competition, and nature over artifice. The movement peaked in the mid-1970s, declined, was quiescent through the 1980s, experienced a positive blip during the early-90s recession and receded again. A revival of sorts is now underway among some young people in the wake of concern over climate change, natural resource "peaks," the post-2008 Great Recession and growing income inequality. At the same time, however, surveys show many young people aspiring after higher incomes and wealth than ever before, while seeming to disaffiliate from those institutions- notably family, religion, patriotism and political parties- that historically supported the bedrock civil society of Western democratic capitalism in the United States. [cites in preparation.]
47 Although simple living values are commonly assumed to align with liberal/left socio-political values, survey data shows only a diffuse correlation (cite pending). For affirmation of simple living values by socio political conservatives see Dreher {2006) and Scruton (2012). See also related comments in ON 34.
48 Simple living is often associated with religious, religio-philosophical and/or ethno-communal movements. The 250,000 Amish in the United States support families averaging about seven children each on household incomes averaging about $37,500. The largely secular Jewish Israeli Kibbutz movement flourished in the first half of the 20th century and inspired analogous movements in other communities worldwide, but lost much of its visionary impetus by the mid-1960s. Today many Ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities are flourishing, in both Israel and among the Diaspora, supporting large families on household incomes typically of about $15- 20,000. Many Islamic communities throughout the world adhere to Zakat, one of the five pillars of Islam, requiring householders to give a portion oftheir wealth annually to help the poor. Although rates and practices vary, a typical rate is 2.5% of the value of non-essential assets. [cites/discussion in process]
49 Etzioni {1998) distinguished three varieties of voluntary simplicity in the United States and Europe: "downshifters" who voluntarily reduce their income by some generally moderate amount in order to reflect new priorities; "strong simplifiers" who give up high income careers and live at markedly reduced levels of consumption, but who do not necessarily see themselves as part of a social movement and who may hold divergent social and political views; and "simple living movement activists" who likewise live on low incomes, but who see voluntary simplicity as part of a wider, alternative vision of planetary sustainability and justice. He cites a Merck Family Fund survey (1995) stating that 28% of Americans reported "downshifting." Other surveys, however, suggest a wide discrepancy between respondent self-reports and actual behavior regarding voluntary simplicity practices; see e.g. Hayes (2004; II.C.3).
50 Well-meaning authors who advise on the minutiae of what constitutes a "green" or "sustainable" way of life often risk missing the forest for the trees. The overriding measure of the extent to which a particular household is degrading ecological integrity is household consumption. The more a household consumes, the
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greater the ecological degradation. Granted, a household consuming, say, $80,000 of goods and services each year may be "greener" than one consuming, say, $70,000/year, through conscientious purchase, use and disposal practices. But a household consuming $40,000/year will be far more "green" than a household consuming $140,000/year can ever hope to be, and so on up the consumption ladder. I've yet to see a detailed exercise that documents this, and hope to include one in the final whitepaper.
51 Several current initiatives share much of the analysis and sensibility that motivate Green Sustainability, and all have their strengths and weaknesses. The Transition Towns Movement has developed a model for encouraging citizens in mostly UK and US municipalities to adopt lower-consumption lifestyles and to encourage ecologically sensitive public policies. It appeals largely to educated baby-boomers already living in this manner and active on these issues. See Hopkins (2011). The Slow Movement is an outgrowth of the slow food movement, which began as a critique of modern food production and consumption. The "slow" meme has since been adopted by activists promoting slow work, slow leisure, slow parenting, slow money, slow technology, slow fashion, slow education and more. It foregrounds important insights and has attracted new audiences, but has difficulty appearing as more than a set of life-style choices available to educated elites. See Honore (2004). The DeGrowth Movement calls for a dramatically reduced but equitably distributed level of global material output. It appears to be rooted in the protest cultures of lbero-Gallic anarchism and emotive individualism. See Latouche (2004) and DeMaria et al. (2013). The Preparedness Movement is a network of moderate survivalists developing structures of self-reliance and self-sufficiency in anticipation of catastrophic economic, social and ecological breakdown. In contrast to the other initiatives listed here, the Preppers have attracted a large number of African-American participants. See Feuer (2013) and AmericanPreppersNetwork.com. The Dark Mountain Project is a literary movement anticipating near-term catastrophic ecological collapse and the need for artistic imagery to sustain long-term recovery. Its aesthetic is heavily Anglo-Celtic and mildly misanthropic. See Kingsnorth and Hine (2009). Deep Green Resistance shares an abiding passion for a world of ecological integrity and social justice but its endorsement of violent tactics in pursuit of such a world is misguided. See McBay et al. (2011).
52 Notes on authors who have been critical of Green Sustainability World are in preparation.
53 The extent of conflict and violence in day-to-day life during pre-industrial times is a matter of debate. Some say it was pervasive; see Pinker (2011) and Mortimer (2008). Others say it was rare or at least ceteris paribus no worse than today; see Gray (2011) and Corry (2011). But as noted, the transition to Green Sustainability World necessitates a ~ 100-year absolute decline in economic output in the developed world and a dramatic slowdown in economic growth in the rest of the world. It is unclear how intense conflict could be avoided under those circumstances in the absence of strong external control (military, authoritarian or commun"al) and/or strong behavioral socialization.
SELECTED TOPICS
Hybrid Scenarios
54 Notes on hybrid scenarios are in preparation.
55 Recent proposals for what has been called "ecomodernism," "ecopragmatism," or "the good Anthropocene" might be thought of as variants of Techno-Progressive World. As described in a widely circulated paper prepared by authors convened by The Breakthrough Institute (2015), ecomodernism offers an analysis of both the challenges to ecological integrity and proposals for addressing these. The manifesto calls mainstream environmentalism to account for exaggerating near-term ecological threats and overlooking possible technological approaches to prevention and remediation. It asserts that continuing technological innovation should be able to allow economic growth to continue indefinitely without endangering vital or
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desirable ecological conditions. It posits a time when economic output will be fully "decoupled" from resource use and will thus be able to grow without limit. Although the document tries to appear balanced, sober and hopeful, it is in fact mostly a collection of evocative sound-bites and anecdotes. There are no references to the sorts of serious analyses necessary to support its major claims. It doesn't consider questions of distributional equity, nor the many ways in which powerful emerging and converging technologies are likely to impact human life and society, other than as means to enhance productivity. It doesn't discuss the sorts of political economic systems, geopolitical structures, civilizational identities, ideologies or foundational worldviews that would be compatible with its vision of transformative technological innovation and indefinite economic growth. For background on ecomodernism see Lynas (2011) and www.ecomodernism. org. For critical assessments see Nijhuis (2015), Hamilton (2015) and Carabonna et al. (2015). See also DN 73 regarding "decoupling."
Rhetoric
56 A note on the "desirability vs. inevitability" move is in preparation. When advocates are appealing to known sympathizers they commonly presume desirability and use inevitability (or necessity) mostly to boost confidence and solidarity. When advocates appeal to mixed or indeterminate audiences they often lean more heavily on inevitability. A combined rhetorical strategy is common: the advocate's world is inevitable and it will be a better world in any event. Many advocates of Techno-Progressive World are inconsistent, arguing that the techno-progressive future is inevitable but that fearful Luddites could sabotage it. Advocates of Green Sustainability World often use a more nuanced argument, claiming that a steady-state world of lower economic output is inevitable, but whether it is a desirable or an undesirable world is a matter of collective human action. The important point is that when advocates communicate with general audiences about topics of great consequence it is imperative that they be rigorously honest at all times. They should take the initiative to acknowledge weaknesses in their own arguments. If an audience suspects that an advocate is using the appeal to inevitability to foreclose a good faith discussion of desirability, credibility can be irrevocably compromised.
57 A note on the rhetoric of the "limits-to-growth" debate is in preparation. Since the publication of Limits in 1972 assessments have appeared on or near the decadal anniversaries of 1982, 1992, 2002 and 2012, and on other occasions as well. With few exceptions, authors sympathetic to Limits declare that historical experience is vindicating its analysis while those unsympathetic to Limits declare that historical experience is conclusively refuting it. Partisans on both sides occasionally offer minor concessions, but these are largely tactical feints that on balance serve to strengthen the credibility of the advocate's original core claim. See most recently the exchange between Lomborg (2012) and Beinecke et al. (2012), and other updates and assessments by Randers (2012), Bardi (2011), Meadows et al. (2004), Lomborg (2002), Bailey (1993), Nordhaus (1992) and Meadows et al. (1992). See also the related account by Sabin (2013) ofthe 1980 wager between Julian Simon and Paul Ehrlich and colleagues, concerning projected changes in resource prices over time.
58 A note on the rhetoric of "artificial intelligence" is in preparation. This term is used by different people in different ways, and often strategically so. Some hold that a household thermostat is "intelligent" because it "reacts" appropriately to variable stimuli. But as commonly understood, "intelligence" implies at least some rudimentary sorts of consciousness, self-awareness, thoughtfulness and volition. Computer scientists know full well that their devices are no more conscious, self-aware, thoughtful or volitional than is a door-knob. Yet the use of anthropomorphic language when describing how these devices work is pervasive. The degree to which the lay public understands that "artificial intelligence" is only a figure of speech (and a misleading one at that) is uncertain. For the most part the scientific community does little to disabuse the lay public of the false belief that scientists have created or may soon create conscious, self-aware, thoughtful and volitional machines. Meanwhile, many of these same scientists are simultaneously instructing the lay public
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that human consciousness, self-awareness, thought and volition are at best illusory epiphenomena generated by DNA software running on organic hardware. The structure and effect of these repeated assertions has all the appearance of a deliberate campaign by those holding privileged technical knowledge to create and reinforce unequal social status and relations of power between themselves and the lay public. See Carrier (1990) and DNs 140-141.
59 A note on the rhetoric of the debates over human genetic technology and other biotechnology topics is in preparation. Over the past two decades these debates have typically pit "lifesaving cures" and "the genie is out ofthe bottle" against "tampering with nature" and "playing God." Those wary of powerful new human biotechnologies invoke Frankenstein, Brave New World and GA TTACA. Supporters of such biotechnologies appeal to the widespread desire to be healthy and to help the sick; to nationalism and parochialism ("If we don't do it China will;" "If we don't do it Stanford will"); and to the belief that attempts to restrict controversial technologies are futile because "someone will do it anyway" and because "You can't stop Progress." These arguments have impact because they usually contain at least a germ of truth.
60 A note on the rhetoric of "Progress" is in preparation. Although many types of progress can be distinguished, progress is most generally and commonly understood to refer to greater control over the properties and processes of the natural world, together with the growth of social institutions that support this growing control. Progress is commonly associated with an increase in human well-being, but not always. Consider Tipler, who says, "Our species is an intermediate step in the infinitely long temporal Chain of Being ... It is a logically necessary consequence of eternal progress that our species become extinct!" [quoted in Regis (1990, p 147)]. See also DN 159.
61 A note on the rhetoric of the neologism "The Anthropocene" is in preparation. The term translates as "The Epoch of Man" and was used informally beginning in the 1980s to suggest that human activity was now transforming terrestrial, oceanic and atmospheric systems to a degree comparable to that of past transformations now used to define biogeostratigraphical epochs: the Holocene, Pleistocene, Pliocene, Miocene, Oligocene and Pliocene. In 2000 members of the International Commission on Stratigraphy (ICS) proposed that that body officially adopt the term as the name of a new and current geologic epoch. The early supporters of this move imagined that adoption of the term would help alert people to the true scope and scale of human impact on the earth's environment. Others objected, saying that designation of a new stratigraphic epoch and adoption of the new name was scientifically unjustifiable and was being proposed for ideological and political purposes. Supporters of an official new stratigraphic epoch have different opinions as to when exactly it began. In 3000 BCE, with the rise of the first agricultural civilizations? In 1610, when Europeans began colonization of North America? In 1712, when the Industrial Revolution began? In 1945, with the detonation of the first atomic bomb? Or at some other time? The rhetorical use of the term has been in flux. Although initially promoted by environmentalists, "The Anthropocene" is now being promoted most enthusiastically by techno-progressives and others mostly at odds with left-liberal and mainstream environmentalism. Now that we are officially in the "Epoch of Man," they argue, and can no longer return to pristine ecological conditions even if we wanted to, we should get used to the earth as a human artifact and seek to manipulate and transform it to further humanity's best interests. A decision by the ICS is expected in 2016; as of 2015 the outcome is uncertain. See Lewis and Maslin (2015), Monastersky (2015), Hamilton (2015}, Nordhaus et al. (2015) and Crutzen and Stoermer (2000}.
Assessing Global Catastrophic Risk
62 Those who argue that economic growth cannot continue for more than another generation or two, i.e., ~ 30-60 years, most commonly appeal to the logic of limited natural resource stocks and sinks. In the early 2000s much attention was given to the suggestion that "Peak Oil" would compel or motivate a near-term end to economic growth. But fossil fuel resources are prodigiously abundant, not scarce. Conventional
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technological innovations such as hydraulic fracturing could allow their recovery, if we choose to permit this, and further technological innovation most likely has quite a way to go before encountering ultimate limits. Climate change has been suggested as a second possible limit on continued economic growth. As suggested in DNs 11-14 and 82-83, an early 22nd century near-4°C AGW is likely to be economically costly and ecologically damaging, but does not appear likely to compel or motivate an end to economic growth. Finally, the transgression of presumed {/planetary boundaries" has been interpreted as compelling or motivating an end to economic growth, perhaps within the next two or three decades. Rockstrom, Steffen et al. (2009) posited nine such boundaries associated with climate change, ocean acidification, stratospheric ozone depletion, global phosphorus and nitrogen cycle interference, biodiversity loss, global freshwater use, land system changes, aerosol loading and chemical pollution. But only a few of the nine presumed boundaries including those associated with climate change, ozone depletion and ocean acidification - appear likely, if crossed, to trigger significant self-reinforcing ecologically destructive processes. The other posited boundaries are subjective judgments regarding desirable ecological states. We've already discussed climate change; ozone depletion and ocean acidification can likely be successfully addressed without having to bring global economic growth to an end.
63 An extensive review by Barnovsky et al. {2012) of the literature on the dynamics of planetary-scale {/state shifts" leads them to suggest that humanity may be at risk of triggering a massively catastrophic state shift at some point in the possibly near-term future. They identify several planetary-scale state shifts in the Earth's geologic history: 1) The last glacial-interglacial transition, occurring between 14,300 yr and 11,000 yr ago, during which~ 50% of large-bodied mammalian species became extinct; 2) The Big Five mass extinctions of 443,000,000 to 2,000,000 yr ago, during which 74% of earth's species became extinct; and 3) the Cambrian Explosion of~ 540,000,000 to 510,000,000 yr ago, during which all phyla known today came into being. The authors propose a process by which local human activity might generate {/critical transitions" that could subsequently cause catastrophic planetary state shifts: 1) Humans locally transform and fragment natural landscapes; 2) Adjacent natural landscapes are indirectly impacted by these initial local transformations; 3) Direct and indirect transformations accumulate; from which 4) Global-scale forcings emerge. The authors give several examples that they believe illustrate this process, including: 1) local fossil fuel use releases greenhouse gases that accumulate and change atmospheric and oceanic chemistry; 2) global climate change causes changes in local temperature and precipitation, leading to extinction of species in biodiversity reservoirs such as tropical rainforests; 3) global climate change causes glaciers such as those on Mt. Kilimanjaro to melt rapidly, threatening water supplies of many population centers. The authors note that driving forces appear to be more intense today than they had been during the periods preceding past planetary state shifts. They conclude that if we want to avoid such state shifts, we should work to 1) reduce world population growth and per capita resource use; 2) rapidly reduce the proportion of the world energy budget supplied by fossil fuels; 3) increase efficiency of food production and convert fewer natural areas to agriculture use; and 4) enhance management of marine and terrestrial realms as biodiversity reservoirs and for ecosystem services. The argument advanced in this paper is likely to seem intuitively obvious to many readers and insufficiently motivated to many others. The paper is similar in its narrative arc and rhetorical tone to hundreds of comparable papers prepared over the past half century calling for limits on human activities that impact the earth's environment. The paper offers plausible circumstantial evidence for its claims, but describes no causal chains that start with present circumstances and end in a planetary-scale state shift. The paper offers no new proposals for policy or action, although those it does suggest are certainly worthy for reasons other than prevention of state-shifts. Importantly, it gives no estimate of the rate of reduction of per capita resource use necessary to avert the catastrophic state shifts that it describes. See Keim (2012) and Brook (in press) for more.
64 The risk posed by anthropogenic global warming (AGW) demands careful attention. If economic growth continues at a steady rate of, say,~ 1-2% annually for the next 100-200 years or so, and if AGW damages increase no greater than linearly with GOP, a case can be made that we would have time and resources
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enough to ~meliorate, compensate and adapt, and thus continue to grow in material well-being (albeit at some slightly slower annual rate), even if greenhouse gas emissions continue unabated. The case for strong action to avert AGW beyond 2° C rests on presumed large-scale, irreversible, abrupt-onset impacts, and in particular on self-reinforcing impacts, triggered when AGW crosses discrete thresholds. Candidates for such impacts include destabilization of the methane clathrates; melting of permafrost and revival of metabolism of sub-surface organic deposits; shutdown of major greenhouse gas sinks (e.g., due to decreased planktonic activity, slowdown in forest growth or forest die-back); disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS); collapse of the North Atlantic thermohaline circulation; major shifts in atmospheric circulation and/or chemistry; and unknown mechanisms. While it is reasonable to presume that one or more of these mechanisms might pose real and increasingly likely threats as we successively exceed 2°, 4°, 6°C AGW and beyond, at this time the evidence for their existence, magnitude and triggering thresholds is inconclusive. See Nordhaus (2013), Stern (2007), IPPC (1996), Lempert et al. (1994), Manabe and Stouffer (1993), Cline (1992) and Kvenholden (1988). [NB: a review of additional recent research is in process.]
65 Further notes on potential global catastrophic events and situations identified by various authors are in preparation. Also see Attachment 0.3.
66 I once asked a university biomedical scientist if he could imagine and describe a genetically-modified pathogen that, if it were created and released, would be capable of destroying all life on earth. He thought for perhaps ten seconds before beginning to muse on the possibilities. I don't remember the specifics, but I believe his proposal involved a viral agent that could invade a cell, make many copies of itself and exit, and in the process. of exiting trigger the dissolution of the host cell membrane.
Windows of Imperative
67 The argument that sweeping policy measures and/or transformational socio-political change are necessary within two or three decades in order to avoid catastrophe or collapse has been a commonplace of the growth and environment debate for at least the past half-century [cites pending]. In the whitepaper I argue that transformational changes and measures are indeed necessary but that calls for their realization within time horizons of two or three decades or so is misguided. Although motivated by an understandable desire to motivate others to act, positing near-term deadlines that are analytically unjustifiable and very likely unrealizable generates either cynicism or resignation, neither of which motivate action. The 100-200 year time horizon repeatedly cited in this whitepaper outline is at this point an intuitive place-marker informed by but not the direct result of analysis. It's intended to be taken seriously and to help guide thinking, planning and action, but for now it's a ballpark estimate. In the final whitepaper I want to ground this estimate in analysis more than I have in this outline, and to modify it as appropriate.
68 Activists in their mid-twenties typically perceive 20-30 years as an immense span oftime bursting with transformative potential, while activists in their mid-sixties know that even 40-50 years is but a brief instant. We will be extraordinarily fortunate if we can effect a transition to a new mode of civilization, worldwide, within 100-200 years.
69 A further sense of how short a period 100 years really is can be had by an exercise. Children born over the next twenty years- 2015-2035- will be running the world in 2080-2100. The great majority of these world leaders will be the children of, and will have been raised, socialized and educated by, today's 15-30 year olds, i.e., the millennials and their younger siblings. In the United States this cohort is more materialistic, individualistic, libertarian, non-religious and otherwise unaffiliated than any generation has been since such survey research began. See Pew (2012). Our two alternative scenarios- Balanced Equitable World and Green Sustainability World- suggest that by 2080-2100 we will need to be well into the new eras of either strongly slowing or absolutely contracting economic output, importantly shaped by values of economic
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equality, communitarian solidarity, technological responsibility and the rest. This, in turn, seems to imply a massive revolt of the young against the values of their parents sometime in the period 2030-2060, when the new generation is in its late teens-mid 20s. This would be a generational revolt far more intense than those of the 1960s-70s counterculture in the West, the 1966-76 Chinese Great Cultural Revolution, or the Revolutionary ferment of late 18th century Europe. Analogous patterns of decadal change can be sketched for other major world regions. My point is that in order for us to realize truly transformational change by 2100, truly radical first steps would need to begin almost immediately. They might, but right now there's little sign of this. My conclusion is that transformational change of the necessary scope and scale will be difficult to achieve within 100 years, and that we should hope to be so fortunate as to have 200 years available for what needs to be done.
FUNDAMENTAL CONUNDRA
The Future of Economic Growth
70 We note six common responses to this conundrum and discuss them further in the whitepaper. 1) Techno Progressive: We can grow forever once we transition to extraterrestrial and/or nanoscale platforms. As discussed in DNs 39-40, I don't believe this is a credible response. I also don't believe that most people find it compelling, although as noted in DN 100 it could come to be accepted by default. 2) Techno-Green: We can have a constant level of throughout (zero throughput growth) continuously transformed via technology into increasingly complex and less material- and energy-intensive artifacts (infinite output growth). But over the course of another century or two this generates the true End of Nature and the Abolition of Man, and is radically unstable. 3} Subjective-Green: Social and cultural innovation can generate improvements in well being even if throughput is constant and technological innovation has ceased. This is true, but it hardly corresponds to what the vast majority of people alive today understand as improvements in well-being, much less as improvements in economic well-being. 4) Journey and Return: We oscillate forever between long periods of growth and long periods of decline, perhaps on a scale of several millennia per cycle. For some people this may appear to be a stoically compelling vision, but over time the cycles would likely damper and fade. 5) De Minimus: We can have a world of very, very slow output growth, at a rate slow enough that risks can be anticipated and damages avoided, yet sufficient to defuse distributional tensions. But what rate would that be? See DN 71 following for comment. 6} [TBD]: Eventually we will have a world in which the growth of material output has in fact come to an end, and we will be able to experience this world as a rich and fulfilling one, but at this time we have no idea, and can have no idea, what this world might otherwise be like. It is ul')likely to be a world in which most of us alive today would be fully at ease, yet we have both the opportunity and responsibility to begin laying the groundwork for its realization. This is my personal response at this time.
71 What is a rapid rate of per capita economic growth and what is a slow rate? Developing countries in catch up mode have realized annual per capita growth rates of 5.Q-10.0% for several decades running. The developed world sustained rates of 2.5-3.5% during most of the 195Q-1980 postwar era, and many today regard growth within that range as the definition of prosperity and thus the level needed to ensure political stability. The OECD (2014) says that world GOP will grow by 3% annually between 2010-2060, and that this represents an unfortunately slower rate than the~ 3.4% annual rate realized during the preceding 14 years. The central case scenarios used by the IPCC to evaluate AGW impacts project global per capita economic growth of 2-3% annually throughout the 21st century. As discussed in DN 4, some economists now believe that 2% per capita may be the best we can do, indefinitely. Piketty (2014) is even more cautious, suggesting 1.2% as the likely secular sustainable rate. Gordon (2012) is more cautious yet, suggesting that after mid century the best we can hope for will be 0.2% (i.e., one-fifth of one percent). And assorted environmentalists and others urge rates of 0% and less. The doubling time of a 2% growth rate is just 35 years; as Piketty emphasizes, this represents an extraordinarily rapid material transformation of our world. But his 1.2%
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world doubles output in 58 years, which isn't that much different; just three or four such doublings likely puts us in the Techno-Progressive/Post-Human future. By contrast, Gordon's 0.2% world doubles only after 346 years. It may be that the values, worldviews and institutions needed for a 0.2% world are not very different from those needed for a 0.0% world. The suggestion in item #5 of ON 70 that we can aspire to a world of very, very siow output growth may be a distinction without a difference, in which case we might be better off acknowledging that economic growth will be coming to an end sometime in the next 100-200 years, and begin thinking about what sort of world we want to help make happen given that circumstance.
72 The argument that well-being can increase while personal income and/or consumption remains stable or declines is trivially true for any individual considered alone but more complex when individuals are considered as members of societies. Many people might be willing to accept or even welcome lower levels of income or consumption if others do likewise, but not otherwise. They have no great desire to be superior to others, but they certainly don't want to be considered inferior to others. Many environmentalists use the ambiguous links between income, consumption and well-being to encourage people to aspire to lower levels of income or consumption; see e.g. lnglehard and Abramson (1995). Some conservatives use the same ambiguity to encourage people not to feel badly about economic inequality; see e.g. Cowen (2013) and Brooks (201la). But for social animals justice is an inherent component of well-being. See further discussion in ATTACHMENT A.
73 Some authors, including T. Nordhaus et al. (2015), Ausubel and Waggoner (2001), and Bailey (2001), argue that economic output can continue to increase while throughput remains stable or even declines, through the process of "dematerialization" or "decoupling." This is simply a restatement of the argument for technological innovation as a deus ex machina. Daly (date) correctly characterized dematerialization/ decoupling as a search for "angelic GOP" (angels have existence but no mass). It is worrisome that the head of the Unit~d Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Christiana Figueres, appears to put much of her faith in "decoupling" as the eventual final solution to climate change; see Kolbert (2015b). See ATTACHMENT A for more.
Distributive Justice
74 See ON 2 and Attachment C.2 for descriptions of policies included in recent comprehensive proposals to reduce economic inequality. The great majority of such proposals do not include quantitative estimates of their efficacy. When such estimates are shown they are generally found to be small. See e.g. Braconier et al. (2014), Blank (2011), Doerrenberg and Peichi (2012}, Duncan and Peter (2012), Young (1994), Gramlich et al. (1993) and a summary review in Hayes (2004; II.B.3). Why is this? A major reason is that the absolute magnitude of economic inequality is now so great that any policies intended to significantly reduce inequality would need to significantly impact the top 20% of households, not merely the top 1%, 2% or even 5%. Tax policies, for example, would need to be effectively confiscatory within the top income decile, and all the more so if progressivity is to be maintained. Many policies (e.g., higher minimum wages) affect only a relatively small proportion of households and thus have relatively small impact on society-wide economic inequality, even given ripple effects. Tax and fiscal measures invariably generate changes in economic behavior such that the eventual impact is less than the initial incidence. The very wealthiest households, in particular, are usually able to modify their economic behavior in ways that minimize redistributive impacts faster than policy makers can respond in turn. Some significant contributors to inequality (e.g., marriage instability among poor and working class couples) are resistant to policy, and others (e.g. assortive mating) are immune to policy. Some policies (e.g., improved education for historically underserved populations) can be expected to have major enduring systemic impacts only over the course of two, three or more generations, i.e., 60-100+ years. The fact that such policies, both individually and in the aggregate, are less efficacious than might be hoped for is hardly reason to argue that they not be adopted. Rather, it argues that something more will be needed if we wish to reduce economic inequality to an acceptable level. In the
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whitepaper we propose, among other things, that individuals will need to refrain from aspiring to great inequalities of income and wealth in the first place.
75 Noted economist Branko Milanovic says, " ... it may surprise the reader that there are few theories or theoretical insights into the formation and evolution in time of income distribution among individuals." (2010, p 83). He is correct. Few economic studies have sought to model changes in the distribution of wealth and income within countries over conventionally long periods of time, e.g., 100-200 years or so, and even fewer have addressed the impacts of comprehensive distributive equity policies over such periods. Presumably such studies would start with a dynamic computable general equilibrium model (CGEM), including a detailed Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). The model would need to show how changes in tax progressivity, the minimum wage, educational subsidies and all the other options listed in ON 2 would affect prices, wages, interest rates, trade, consumer spending, savings, labor supply and more, all over spans of a century and longer. It would have to embody a theory of income distribution as well, including model sectors for multi-generational family and household formation, long run impact of technological innovation, assumptions regarding the decision to pursue varying levels of education, the impact of each level of education on productivity, migration and immigration dynamics and more. [cites pending]
76 Having said that in order to reduce economic inequality we would likely need to adopt many of the sorts of policies noted in ON 2, insufficient as they are, we need to add an important qualifier. Beyond some point, a purely redistributive approach to economic justice undermines itself, and along with it the prospects for a just, egalitarian, communitarian economy. In the United States today the top 5% of families, with incomes of ~ $200,000/yr and more and ~50% of national income, provide 42% of the revenues received by all levels of government. [cites.] Suppose the top 5% paid 100% of the cost of government, along with large cash transfers to, say, the bottom 65% of households. Would that be more equitable? The Gini coefficient would certainly drop. But consider: under this arrangement a majority of the nation's households, and the viability of the entire public sector, would be directly dependent upon the continued economic well-being of the top 5%. Inordinate power and influence of a new sort would be vested in the economic elite. In a world of true economic justice earned incomes would be far more equal in the first place. Towards this end we will need, among other things, a cultural transformation such that individuals no longer aspire to great inequalities of income and wealth.
77 The flip side of the challenge of significantly reducing economic inequality is the challenge of affirmatively justifying the economic inequality that remains. If we're uncomfortable with income levels set by the market presumably we'll look to some mix of market, administrative and cultural mechanisms as the alternative. Once we introduce administrative and cultural mechanisms we'll need justifications for both the levels themselves and for the process of deciding upon and administering them. Both Balanced Equitable World and Green Sustainability World show ratios between the highest and lowest household income quintiles in 2150 of 3:1: This is somewhat less than the lowest ratios that had been realized in advanced industrial 1 democracies in the mid-20 h century. Spain, for example, had a quintile ratio of 4.2:1 and Canada was at 4.5:1. In 2150 Balanced Equitable World households in the top quintile receive $270,000/year and those in the bottom quintile receive $90,000/year. In Green Sustainability World the top quintile receives $90,000 and the bottom quintile receives $30,000. While this ratio of 3:1 is far more egalitarian than the ratio of 13:1 that obtains in the United States today, or even than the 7:1 ratio that obtains in the high-income countries overall, the absolute differences are hardly trivial. Who gets to be in the top quintile, who in the bottom quintile, and how is this determined? What sort of political-economic system would we need for any of this to actually work in any conceivable real world? We have no fully satisfying answers to these questions at this time. I make these points not to question the necessity and desirability of a far more economically equal world, but to help ensure that we are fully aware of the nature and magnitude of the task before us.
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78 Advocates of proposals to reduce economic inequality need to take into account the nuanced texture of public opinion. Consider the situation in the United States. An analysis of over 200 survey results from 44 opinion surveys conducted between 1992 and 1997 indicated that at that time large majorities (~80%) of Americans were concerned about growing income disparities. Lesser but still significant majorities (~60%) agreed that the distribution of income in the United States was unfair. Pluralities (~45%) said government should take steps to reduce income inequality. However, specific policy measures that might actually reduce inequality were only supported by minorities (~25%-35%) of those surveyed. Respondents showed far more support (~80%) for measures to ensure equality of opportunity than for measures to directly ensure more equitable outcomes(~ 25%-35%). A preliminary review of similar survey results suggested that Europeans were more supportive of measures to ensure greater equality of incomes than were Americans. For the full analysis see Hayes (2004, II.B.4.e). A review of results from surveys conducted between 2004 and 2015 is in process and should be instructive, given the continued increase of economic inequality over that period and the greater attention given this topic in the media and by public figures.
79 Further indication of the magnitude of the challenge we face in seeking to significantly reduce inequalities of wealth and income can be seen in Attachment C.l. The conservatives and libertarians shown in Panel A justify their great wealth as a marker of their great contributions to society (in a market economy factors receive their marginal product), or at least of great personal or familial initiative. But how do the liberals, left liberals and social democrats shown in Panel B, most of whom have been vocal about the need to reduce inequalities of wealth and income, justify their own wealth and income status? If any of them believe that everyone in the world can realistically expect to amass household wealth in the tens and hundreds of millions -not immediately, but perhaps over several generations- then only minor justification is needed. But if they don't believe this is possible, some accountability is appropriate. Some might commit much of their wealth to philanthropic causes. Some might live modestly despite their great wealth and income. Some might devote their wealth, income and talents to activities explicitly intended to reduce present and future economic inequality. These can be principled and sincere stances. But these remain private decisions by individuals. The reality often falls short of the pledge. Great wealth and income confers status and privilege no matter how it is used, and the greater the wealth and income the greater the status and privilege. So long as these conditions obtain, the great majority of the world's people will be motivated to seek increasingly greater levels of wealth and income, with all the consequences we've noted.
80 Many wealthy people give away large shares of their wealth but most do not. Stern (2000) says that in 2011 Americans in the top income quintile donated 1.3% of their income to good causes, while those in the bottom quintile donated fully 3.2%. A number of organizations are working to change this pattern. Bolder Giving was established in 2007 by Christopher and Anne Ellinger to encourage wealthy individuals to give away much more of their wealth. Bolder Giving inspired Bill and Melinda Gates to establish The Giving Pledge, which asks billionaires to commit to giving away 50% or more oftheir wealth to charitable purposes. As of January 2015 The Giving Pledge had secured pledges from 128 billionaires. Critics say that such programs serve mostly as public relations projects ultimately intended to discourage more strongly redistributive public policies; that the level of pledged funds given away may not be greatly more than would have happened even in the absence of the pledge; and that much of the money donated goes to outlets patronized largely by wealthy individuals in any event, such as music, the arts and elite universities.
81 Authors who write about the need to reduce inequalities of wealth and income should be transparent concerning their own wealth and income status. My wife and I are retired and live on a yearly after-tax income of about $42,000 from social security, part-time work and the rental of two spare rooms. We have about $350,000 in savings and the house we've owned since 1980 is now worth about $1 million. These figures put i.Js well within the top 1% of households worldwide.
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Climate Change
82 World energy use in 2000 was 13.6 TW. Under our scenarios of Techno-Progressive World, Balanced Equitable World and Green Sustainability World it grows to 115 TW, 60 TW and 18 TW, respectively, by 2150. Under Techno-Progressive World it continues to grow indefinitely; under the others it stabilizes at 2150 levels indefinitely. How would these levels of energy production be realized? Attachment 0.2 [in preparation] reviews energy regimes and scenarios in detail; we offer preliminary sketches here. Techno-Progressive World relies on a mix of exotic technologies, including nuclear fusion and breeder technologies, microwave transmission from massive orbiting solar power plants, synthetic biology-based fuels, carbon-capture-and storage (CCS) and geoengineering (stratospheric sulfate aerosols, ocean fertilization and more), at least until human civilization has gone nanoscale and/or extraterrestrial. At present most of these proposed major energy sources are highly problematic. Much of the 60 TW required by Balanced Equitable World relies on massive solar hydrogen and wind installations, CCS, limited 3'd generation nuclear as a bridge technology, and stable levels of economic output, while eschewing geoengineering, nuclear fusion and breeder systems and synthetic biological applications. The core solar hydrogen and wind systems would require construction of a global infrastructure of generating stations, transmission structures, fuel depots and the like, covering perhaps 2% of continental land surface, over the course of a century or so. The 18 TW required for Green Sustainability World is a comparatively modest 50% more than world energy production today, but would still require construction of a massive new solar hydrogen and wind infrastructure, perhaps with help from biomass, and depends finally on a dramatically reduced and stable level of world economic output, which in turn requires an unprecedented transformation in civilizational values regarding the relation of material consumption to human well-being. As noted, under all three scenarios AGW peaks just below 4°( in the early 22nd century. Under Techno-Progressive World AGW declines to 2°( by mid-23nd century, while under Green Sustainability World and Balanced Equitable World it declines to that level by late-23'd-mid-24th century.
83 A pattern similar to that noted in ON 78 is seen when comparing opinion surveys addressing policies to protect the environment: respondents are in general very supportive in the abstract, but increasingly less supportive as policy proposals become more specific and more likely to make a difference. See Hayes (2004, II.C.2). This pattern might in part reflect the fact that the respondents are responding as individuals. It would be useful to compare such results with those of exercises involving groups that discuss policy options and then decide upon a collective position.
The Practicability of a Steady-State Economy
84 Since the early 1970s economist Herman Daly (2003, 1989, 1977, 1972) has argued for the necessity, desirability and practicability of a global steady-state economy. He has attracted a loyal following among ecological economists, deep green environmentalists and advocates of simple living. But the theory and proposed practice of steady-state economics remain controversial. We can imagine relatively free-market steady-state economies operating at slightly above subsistence level, e.g., the level that Europeans enjoyed in the early 1700s, just prior to the industrial revolution, where throughput, savings and investment were directly constrained by lack of human and technological capital. And we can imagine high-output steady state economies operating under conditions of authoritarian command-and-control. But what would it take to maintain a steady-state mixed economy, with global per capita GOP of $25-$75K/yr, in a world of 7-9 billion, and including some degree of democratic political accountability, as proposed under Balanced Equitable World and Green Sustainability World? See ATTACHMENT E [in preparation] for review and discussion.
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Governance of Technological Innovation, Development and Use
85 Comprehensive oversight of powerful emerging and converging technologies is today effectively nil, at both national and international levels. Many countries have established at least nominal procedures to help ensure that technological innovations involving medical care, food and various consumer products do not create first-order health and safety risks. Consideration of deeper societal consequences of any proposed technological innovation is rare. European Union regulations allow countries to invoke "public order" (ordre public) as a ground for restricting the development and use of particular technologies, but this provision is being chall~nged. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration is explicitly prohibited from basing regulatory decisions on grounds other than safety and efficacy. In 1972 the U.S. Congress established an Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to review controversial new technological innovations, a move motivated by the growing general unease at that time with science, technology and corporate power. The office was abolished in 1996 as part of the subsequent move towards deregulation. Proposals to re-establish some form of technology assessment are regularly floated but have not gained traction. International conventions addressing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, biotechnology and synthetic biology, genetically modified organisms and other controversial technologies have been agreed to, but they vary widely in their efficacy. Among those calling most vocally for regulatory policy regarding new technologies are many with an interest in making sure that these technologies are not prohibited outright or closely regulated. A visionary proposal for comprehensive international governance of consequential emerging technologies has been offered by the ETC Group (2003). In 2015 the United Nations announced plans to establish a Technology Facilitation Mechanism that would include civil society stakeholder participation in some sort of technology assessment process.
The Contradictions of the Enlightenment Project
86 It's helpful for our purposes to distinguish several overlapping and complexly inter-related historical episodes: The scientific revolution from mid-16th c through mid-18th c (~ 200 yrs); the Enlightenment from mid-1ih c through late 18th c (~140 yrs); and the Industrial Revolution, of which two stages can be distinguished, the first industrial revolution from mid-18th c through mid-19th c (~ 100 yrs); and the second industrial revolution of mid/late-19th c through early/mid-20th c (~ 80 yrs). The developments characteristic of these periods generally reached critical mass in Europe and spread first to North America and then to the rest of the world. It's obvious that the industrial revolutions could not have happened without the earlier scientific revolution. Although the European Enlightenment drew heavily upon the scientific revolution, and in turn contributed heavily to the industrial revolutions, it's not obvious that these relationships were necessary. It's quite possible for societies to be simultaneously scientific, industrial and illiberal.
87 The earliest critics of the Enlightenment were members of the aristocracy and the Catholic hierarchy whose interests were threatened and whose beliefs were challenged. The Romantic movement that began in the late 18th century saw the rise of thinkers and artists who were no less critical of aristocratic privilege and religious dogma than were the philosophes, but who found the Enlightenment reliance on rationalism, scientific materialism and mechanistic reductionism chillingly abstract and blind to the realities of human experience, emotion, passion and history. These and related philosophical perspectives interwove in complex ways throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. Both socialism and fascism were interpreted by some as the highest expression of the Enlightenment Project and by others as its negation. The early 20th century saw the rise of a diverse group of thinkers, many of Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox backgrounds, who questioned the Enlightenment Project and who were simultaneously anti-capitalist, anti materialist, anti-communist, socially conservative and dispositionally communitarian/collectivist/statist. Some tended towards nationalism but others were non- or even anti-nationalist. Later in the 20th century the artistic avant-garde, Critical Theory, the environmental movement, elements of post-modernism, and the
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Sixties' counterculture drew on the Romantic reaction to the Enlightenment, albeit in different ways and to different degrees.
88 The most recent sustained philosophical critique of the Enlightenment Project is that proposed by those identified with the Frankfurt School and Critical Theory. Importantly, this critique pit allies against one another. Its proponents were thinkers of the Left who drew attention to the ways in which enlightened, rational, scientific and secular culture, as embraced by both Marxist and conventional social democratic thought and practice, left something missing that was important for human flourishing. Christian scholars had no trouble identifying this missing element as religious belief and practice, and Conservative scholars had no trouble identifying it with traditionalist and ethno-nationalist commitments. Frankfurt School thinkers and those inspired by them have variously sought to replace what was missing with existentialism, with Freudian and other schools of psychologism, with humanistic/historical/phenomenological approaches, and with radical political commitment grounded in social justice and human rights. See Horkheimer and Andorno (1947) for source text. [Further discussion in preparation].
89 Members of societies grounded in Enlightenment values of individualism, freedom of thought and speech, free markets and a desire for increasingly greater quantities of material goods and services have tended to be energetic, creative and industrious. Some authors have argued that this energy, creativity and industry might best be understood as a frenetic, desperate and misguided attempt to fill the spiritual void left by a secular/materialist/alienated market-dominant world, a doomed quest to "immanentize the eschaton." See Voegelin et. al. (1989). For those alive in the West today, however, it's almost impossible to even imagine what a true alternative world could possibly look or feel like. [Further notes in preparation].
90 Voegelin also provocatively suggests that the important differences between what most people have taken to be the major contending ideological forces of the past century- Capitalism and Socialism- are relatively few. Both are grounded in science, technology, materialism, secularism and economic growth. They differ in the relationship they propose between the state and the individual, and in other regards, but are surprisingly alike in their visions of the material structures of a good society and the material aspirations of good citizens. Capitalism and Socialism have been at odds largely over the question of which system can realize these structures and aspirations most rapidly for the most people. Voegelin contrasts these ideologies with ones deeply grounded in community, faith, mystery and the common good, in which science, technology and economic growth are more deeply understood as means rather than ends.
The Limits of Our Vision
91 Discussion Notes are in preparation.
New Values for a New World
92 The suggestion that a world of economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility will need to draw on both conventionally liberal and conventionally conservative values, and on other values that don't fit easily within these categories, builds on the work of liberal, left-liberal and centrist communitarian thinkers such as Etzioni (2004, 1998a), Taylor (1992a, 1992b), Sandel (2012, 2010, 2007, 1998), Walzer (1990, 1983), Galston (1998), Bellah et al. (1985), Blankenhorn (2009, 2008), Purdy (2014, 1998), Lasch (1991, 1979) and Daly and Cobb (1989). It is grounded in largely social democratic values but is not inconsistent with many insights of social conservatives such as Douthat (2014a, 2014b, 2012), Bruenig (2015), Deneen (2012, 2011, 2008), Dreher (2006), Kass (1997), Glendon (2006), Scruton (2012), Stafford (2011), Elshtain (2000) and Bloom (1987) and of earlier authors such as Nisbett (1975, 1953), Guardini (1956), Kirk (1953) and Weaver (1948).
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[New Discussion Note] Of relevance is the recent work by Haidt (2013), who investigates the moral foundations of liberal and conservative values, beliefs and attitudes. He claims that in the United States conservatives rely on a broad set of moral and ethical foundations, including caring for others, fair play and justice, loyalty to and identification with valued groups, respect for legitimate authority, and sanctity. Haidt claims that liberals, in contrast, rely upon a smaller set of moral foundations, limited mostly to caring for victims of oppression, individual freedom, and fairness. Haidt also says that in interview studies conservatives were generally able to accurately state what liberals believe, and the justifications that liberals give for their beliefs, whereas liberals were less able to accurately describe what conservatives believe, and appeared flummoxed as to how anyone might justify such beliefs. Haidt says that for most of this adult life he has identified as conventionally liberal, but that in the course of this research he realized that his own moral sense draws on both liberal and conservative foundations, and that he no longer identifies as at least conventionally liberal.
[New Discussion Note] Also of relevance is the work of the late community organizer Saul Alinsky (1971, 1946). Alinsky had roots in the late 1930s labor movement, including work with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, key leaders of which were at that time Communist Party members. Alinsky went on to develop a form of community organizing that took lessons from the labor movement, and other movements, and adapted them for use by a wide range of constituencies seeking economic and social justice. His approach began with the observation that if a community wants to change policy or practice it needs power; that power accrues either to those who have lots of money or those who can mobilize lots of people; and that since the poor and working classes did not have much money, they needed to band together, and seek allies, to build people-power. The "Aiinsky model" also includes a wide range of practices regarding strategy, tactics, leadership development, coalition building, organizational structure and more. Alinsky is widely identified as part of the radical left, but much of his thinking and practice would not fit easily under that label today. He sought to downplay differences of race, ethnicity, religious belief and partisan affiliation in the interest of building larger and stronger organizations capable of wielding power in a community. He appealed to the values and aspirations of ordinary Americans. Many of his organizing projects were headed by clergy and labor leaders. He was caustic in his criticism of much of the New Left of the 1960s, saying that by espousing a life-style politics identified with drugs, sex, violence and flag-burning, the youth of the 'sixties had forfeited the opportunity they had to build a true mass movement of the poor, working and middle classes in support of democracy and economic justice. For insight into Alinsky's thinking see his extensive personal correspondence (1945-1972) with Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain, in Doering (1994).
93 The role of hierarchy and authority in society is a question of great importance and great difficulty. In the United States and much of the West liberals and conservatives alike are reflexively distrustful of both hierarchy and authority. They both believe that unrepresentative, self-interested elites have secured inordinate power and influence, and that greater empowerment of unrepresented mass constituencies is among the central political organizational imperatives of our time. Ophuls (1998, 1977) and Heilbroner (1974 rev. 1994) argue somewhat differently, saying that a just, sustainable world will need to rely heavily upon hierarchy and authority in order to achieve and maintain these conditions. Heilbroner, who identifies as a democratic socialist, speculates that both charismatic leadership and nationalist emotional identification may be necessary as well. He acknowledges his discomfort with his own conclusion. Jennings (2012, 2010) recognizes "ecological authoritarianism" as a possibly necessary response to the challenge of steady-state governance but holds out hope that "ecological constitutionalism" and/or "ecological discursive democracy" can suffice.
94 Inquiry into new configurations of values appropriate to a world of economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility might benefit from review of the work of authors who sought to apply pre Enlightenment traditions to modern circumstances in unconventional ways. Many of these thinkers were unsatisfied with the calm, empirical, reductive methods of Hume, Kant, Locke and other Enlightenment
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thinkers, and looked to other sources. Philosopher Alasdair Macintyre (1981) began as a Marxist but in mid career sou§ht new foundations in Thomism and Aristotelianism. Eric Voegelin (1989) saw fascism, communism and market capitalism as similarly Gnostic attempts to command exclusive and complete knowledge and power. He also sought to construct a way in which Western Civilization could reaffirm transcendence, as part of a move to restore a sense of unity and order that had been lost. Nikolai Berdyaev (1956) was a Russian aristocrat who became a Bolshevik activist and scholar but was deported after reaffirming Orthodoxy. Gilbert (2012) looks at the relevance of Orthodoxy in a post-capitalist, post materialist world. The tradition of Natural Law has long been regarded by secular philosophers as a stealth attempt to smuggle theism into the public square, but George (1999) argues that it is a sophisticated system of thought that is immediately relevant to contemporary life.
95 From the mid-1980s to the present time, the precautionary principle has been central to many efforts to ensure ecological integrity. Although it has been criticized by some as meaningless and by others as draconian, I believe it will be increasingly germane as the challenges of economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility become increasingly evident. Harremoes and Gee (2001) argue for precaution because "The growing innovative powers of-science seem to be outstripping its ability to predict the consequences of its applications, whilst the scale of human interventions in nature increases the chances that any hazardous impacts may be serious and global." Precaution is all the more important at a time when recklessness is being actively promoted, notably within the technology industry, as a social value. "Move Fast and Break Things" was until recently Facebook's corporate motto, and "Disruption" has become a pervasive positive cultural meme. The message being conveyed is that tech entrepreneurs are justified in ignoring wider societal concerns about the potential harmful impacts of the technologies they are developing and marketing. ·See LePore (2014) and Carr (2012) for more.
96 Throughout this whitepaper I argue that over the next century or two the inherent contradictions of liberal democratic techno-capitalism will render it radically and dangerously unstable, and I point to the need to develop stronger communal values, sensibilities and institutions as part of a transition to a world of economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility, under conditions of little or no economic growth. For many readers this language evokes images of either Stalinist authoritarianism or naive pastoral utopianism. We should be clear that as part of the transition called for we'll need more than ever to ensure the necessary commitments to basic human rights, personal autonomy, freedom of expression and association and so much more that so many have struggled for over at least the past quarter millennium. I recognize as well the many ways in which liberal democratic techno-capitalism has created precisely the conditions that have allowed and encouraged greater equality, dignity, health and general well-being, on scales literally unimaginable for most of human history. I don't believe that those who today experience liberal democratic techno-capitalism as on balance more benign and beneficent than present alternatives are being manipulated or are afflicted with false consciousness. On the contrary, I believe they are extraordinarily fortunate. All of this comes with huge caveats, however. I also believe that liberal democratic techno-capitalism can neither distribute its benefits fairly, nor prevent the development and use of massively lethal technologies, nor otherwise sustain itself for more than another century or two; and that for these reasons we need to begin working towards a transition to something else.
[New Discussion Note] Throughout this whitepaper I further argue that over the next century or two liberal democratic"techno-capitalism will be unable to prevent destabilizing levels of economic inequality and technological modification of natural systems, and that institutions and practices in part derived from older, communal, less individualistic, perhaps more authoritative traditions might be better able to give us a world of economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility. But such a political system would be more capable of advancing pernicious goals as well. For example, liberal democratic techno-capitalist societies will find it difficult to prohibit the rise of a high-tech free-market eugenics, while authoritarian systems could far more easily prevent this from happening. But such systems could promote or impose such
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practices more swiftly and thoroughly as well. This reality speaks once more to the need for deeply internalized understandings, and effective external mechanisms of enforcement, regarding core global commons concerns, under most of the geopolitical structures and political-economic systems we've considered. We will need a new balancing of individualist and communal values, behaviors and institutions. Both are essential; either can be absolute.
The Meta-Conundrum of Communal Values vs. Individualist Values
97 The question of how the necessary level of agreement concerning desirable social and economic outcomes can ever be achieved and successfully acted upon hangs over all thought of our human future. It's not obvious how individual autonomy, freedom of expression, personal creativity, alternative lifestyles, free markets and so much more that so many in the West and elsewhere value greatly fit into a world deeply committed to economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility. Western liberal democratic capitalism has succeeded in major part because it has mostly set aside the need for agreement, much less consensus, on social and economic outcomes, and has focused on ensuring procedural democracy and equality of rights and liberties. As noted, it's not clear if this arrangement can continue over the coming 100-200 years; nor is it clear what replaces it. For many, the implicit default solution is a Great Social Movement that sweeps away everything in its path and somehow leaves all of us freshly outfitted with new values, norms, beliefs, institutions and expectations suited to the new conditions in which we live. Many episodes of this sort, though of more limited scope and scale, have occurred throughout human history. Some have been peaceful but most have not been. Our unenviable task over the next two centuries is to move towards far greater consensus concerning material outcomes under conditions of material constraint. [Further comments in preparation.]
[New Discussion Note] Burke (cite needed) and many others recognized that Liberte and Egalite work against one another as much as or more than they support one another. Fraternite (or So/idarite) is the necessary link that allows a desirable balance to be achieved. But upon what foundations does Fraternite/Solidarite rest?
98 Game theory can be used to show that in a society of individualists ("non-cooperators") a group whose members agree to work together ("co-operators") can secure an advantage, while in a society of cooperators any individuals who covertly do not cooperate can secure an advantage (so long as they don't get caught and punished). Evolutionary game theory can show that a population whose members can choose either to cooperate or not cooperate will evolve to the point where the proportion of cooperators to non-cooperators is such that the advantage gained by switching from one behavior to the other is close to zero (subject to many conditions and caveats). See Axelrod (1984) and [additional cites]. Applied to humans, this is a fancy way of saying that we are deeply and inherently disposed towards feeling conflicted regarding our obligations to ourselves and to and between the many groups of which we are members.
A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE SCENARIOS
99 Survey and focus group research might usefully cast light on the ways in which people assess these scenarios. Informal discussions among colleagues suggest a range of responses.
100 A sobering possible response is as follows: The respondent prefers Balanced Equitable World but believes that it is too fine a balancing act to succeed, that we will therefore pursue Techno-Progressive World until it does in fact crash-and-burn, and that whoever is left afterwards will pick up the pieces as best they can and create some form of less-than-ideal but serviceable Green Sustainability World. [Further discussion in preparation.]
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IV. POLITICAL ECONOMY, GEOPOLITICS, CIVILIZATIONS, IDEOLOGY, FOUNDATIONAL WORLDVIEWS
POLITICAL ECONOMY: ALTERNATIVES FOR THE LONG RUN
101 The political economic systems mapped in BOX Care mostly familiar ones. As used here, in Capitalism the means of production are privately owned and economic decisions are made via market exchange. DemocratiC Capitalism is the prevailing norm, with political decisions made via representative legislatures, free elections, an independent judiciary and the like. Neo-Liberalism is consistent with Democratic Capitalism but prioritizes the needs of major corporate sectors, both domestically and globally, as the best means of ensuring full employment, stable prices and economic growth. State Capitalism is an ambiguous designation. Currently it is most commonly used to describe systems such as those in China and the USSR in which the state plays a major role, including direct and/or de facto ownership roles, in an otherwise nominally market economy. In Socialism the means of production are owned collectively, either by the state or other collective bodies, and economic decisions are made fully and directly, or partially and indirectly, by the state. Authoritarian Socialism refers to the strongest possible role of the state in economic ownership and decision-making, and implies an authoritarian political system as well. Market Socialism has most frequently been used to describe socialist economies in which some share of small to medium size enterprises are privately or worker-owned and participate in a market sector, but where the state remains a guiding presence. Example: Yugoslavia in the 1960s-70s. Democratic Socialism attempts to balance public and private ownership and market and state economic decision-making, along with legitimately democratic political institutions but in a context of political solidarity. Social Democracy might be regarded either as a form of capitalism with a strong welfare state sector or as a mild form of socialism that allows wide latitude for private ownership and markets. Fascism is not so much a unique political-economic system as it is an historic form of state capitalism or authoritarian socialism that stressed nationalism, militarism and dictatorial rule.
102 The two systems labeled in BOX Cas Corporatism are less familiar than the others. Corporatism was proposed in the late 19th century by the Roman Catholic Church and elements of the labor movement and the aristocracy as an alternative to both market-dominant capitalism and state-dominant socialism. It proposed that a just society could best be ensured through the institutionalization of continuous and fine grained consultation and negotiation among the major organic, or "corporate," societal collectivities, including labor, industry, the landed aristocracy, municipalities, village communes, and religious and other civil institutions, with a high premium placed on achieving consensus. Corporatism did not flourish as an independent political economic ideology. However, elements of corporatism informed subsequent socialist, social democratic, Christian democratic and fascist systems. Corporatism is of interest because historically it put less emphasis on the necessity and desirability of rapid and continual economic growth than did either capitalism or socialism, and was grounded in an explicit moral commitment to the "common good." Some forms of corporatism draw heavily on principles of subsidiarity, solidarism and distributivism. For more see Daly {2009), Maritain (1973 {1936)), and Pope Leo XIII {1891). See also Lind's {2014) suggestion that the term "corporatism" is obsolete and confusing and should be retired.
103 The difference between Social Corporatism and State Corporatism is germane. Social corporatism might be thought of as more "bottom up" and organic/collaborative, and state corporatism as more "top down" and instrumental/directive. In the former existing autonomous institutions (e.g., labor unions, merchant guilds, professional associations, churches) would represent the interests of their members in councils at the several levels of governance. In the later the structures representing members of the various collectivities would be established at the initiative of the state. The former would presumably have more legitimacy; the later would. presumably be more administratively rational. In post-World War II Scandinavia social corporatism was seen as the economic philosophy counterpart to the political philosophy of social democracy. See Baccaro {2003).
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104 Green Civic Republicanism joins classical liberal institutions of free markets, private property and representative democracy with a strong obligation of civic participation, a commitment to serve the common good, and a return to smaller-scale communities and moderation of accumulation and consumption to help ensure ecological integrity; see Barry and Smith (2008). Ecological Discursive Democracy is grounded in faith that an ongoing process of intensely participatory, grassroots, decentralized debate and consensus-building will generate strong support for practices and policies consistent with ecological integrity; see Jennings (2012, 2010) and Dryzek (2000). Ecological Constitutionalism looks to democratically-legitimated constitutional authority to carry out strong measures to ensure ecological integrity; see Jennings (2012). Under Ecological Authoritarianism measures to ensure ecological integrity under crisis conditions are enforced through authoritarian institutions and practices; see Jennings (2012) and M. Beeson (2010). Juridical Democracy establishes a new institutional layer of "citizen juries," co-equal with existing legislative bodies, to resolve difficult questions and legitimate subsequent policies; see Baber & Bartlett (2015). Thick Cosmopolitanism I Cosmopolitan Social Democracy seeks to ensure collective well-being while retaining the strengths of cosmopolitan diversity and freedom by adding new layers of social and ecological obligation; see Dobson (2006) and Martell (2011). Also see Held (1995) for discussion of the related but importantly different Cosmopolitan Democracy. Under Constitutional Patriotism loyalty to a united multi-national constitutional order supplants competitive nationalism; see Muller (2007). In a Pluralistic Commonwealth markets are used to ensure efficient resource allocation but productive assets are owned or administered by a diverse array of collectivities; see Alperovitz and Dubb (2013). Confederations of City-States is a speculative proposal for ensuring some level of material well-being and social order under conditions of national-level dysfunction or collapse. Agrarian BioRegionalism joins pastoral back-to-the-land simplicity with 205t-century ecological awareness; see Sale (1985). Gandhian Rural Communalism and Obshchina Rural Communalism are based on traditional forms of South Asian and Russian communal land ownership and use; see Pani (2002) and Grant (1976). With Orthodox Church-State Symphonia the church and state are equal, mutually respectful partners, with neither institution presuming to dominate the other; see Harakas (1993). The Benedict Option refers to radical proposals to establish communities apart from the dominant secular, materialist, consumerist culture, able to affirm traditional religious and social values, in expectation of flourishing as the dominant culture collapses; see Dreher (2009) and Douthat (2012). Imperial/Tribal Caliphate/Emirate systems adapt gth_19th century Islamic Abbasid and Ottoman political economic systems to 21 5t-22nd century conditions; see Karsh (2007). Neo-Feudalism and Neo-Medievalism are speculative visions of a world in which the modern nation-state has been supplanted by an overlapping patchwork of smaller scale, semi-autonomous political structures. The New Dark Age refers to a suggestion that Orthodox Christianity might be uniquely suited to support modern but anti-materialist and small-scale forms of community; see Gilbert (2012). The Dark Enlightenment is a nee-reactionary intellectual tendency that rejects egalitarian and democratic values in favor of hierarchical and authoritarian ones; some proponents reject technology and industrial civilization but others embrace these. Under Enlightened Constitutional Aristocracy a revived hereditary governing stratum bound by constitutional law and shared eco-philosophical understanding administers a slow and peaceful decline to a sustainable steady-state. Meritocratic Authoritarianism is modeled loosely on Confucian principles: positions of authoritarian leadership are open to all through a rigorously merit-based selective process; leaders and lay citizens alike are bound by a deeply internalized system of rights, obligations and duties. Under Theocratic Popular Authoritarianism power is vested in a democratically chosen priestly elite bound by vows of poverty, chastity and service. Ethno Nationalist Authoritarianism is the default option to which people in crisis will have recourse if efforts to create something better fail.
GEOPOLITICAL STRUCTURE
105 Box E shows broad categories of geopolitical structure and levels that might conceivably develop over the coming 100-200 years. The major distinguishing feature of these categories is the relative importance of
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larger and smaller geographically-bounded political units. In (MOSTLY) ONE WORLD some sort of formal or de facto authoritative global structure, with at least minimal accountability, is widely recognized as legitimate and important. A limited but real sense of identity as part of a global human community is shared worldwide. At least some minimal set of values, norms and beliefs are held in common worldwide. Effective consensus has been reached on many formerly deeply divisive issues. The appeal of One World reoccurs throughout history. Following the logic of the tragedy of the commons and the prisoners' dilemma, the institutions and values needed to ensure a just, sustainable and technologically responsible world will need to be established nearly universally if they are to be effective at all. In pre-modern times universalism took the form of military empires, typically associated with a dominant 'religion. The Enlightenment was celebrated by its enthusiasts as an inherently universal revolution in human consciousness. Napoleon envisioned a Universal Republic and Kant (1795) proposed a World Federation of Republics. The world socialist movement saw itself as inherently universalist, with a series of Socialist and Communist Internationals (1864-1876; 1889-1916; 1919-1943; 1923-1940; 1951-present) established to lead the way. Proponents of Western Liberal Democratic Capitalism celebrated its victory over fascism in 1945 and over communism in 1989, and now have difficulty imagining any desirable alternative other than its universal adoption. The World Federalist Movement sought for many years to establish the credibility of its proposal for a formal world federation, but with little success. A recent effort to establish a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly has generated interest among think-tank internationalists but has otherwise made little progress. [Further notes and cites are in preparation].
106 A major dissent from visions of manifest universalism has been that of Huntington (1996), as described in DNs 112-114 following. A geopolitical structure based on CIVIliZATIONAl COMMUNITIES could develop if the stresses and strains of globalization motivate current nation-states to reaffirm traditional religious, cultural, social and other features, and to identify with and build strong economic and political ties with those neighboring states and communities who share many of these features. This could generate perhaps 7-9 continental-sized civilizational communities providing primary identity for~ 90% of the world population, and large enough to sustain prosperity yet culturally cohesive enough to sustain economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility. A minimal apparatus would need to be established to facilitate inter-civilizational relationships and to resolve global commons issues. Civilizational communities would pledge not to interfere in one another's internal affairs. See DNs 111-121 for more.
107 Under NED-WESTPHAliAN INTERNATIONAliSM the world order continues to evolve much as it has over the past two centuries. Some 200 sovereign nation-states are recognized as the primary loci of power and allegiance in the world. Alliances among nation-states are formed and dissolved on the basis of national interest. Contra Huntington, these alliances frequently cross ethnic, religious, cultural and geographic lines. Regional and global commons problems are addressed through a dense network of conventions, treaties and institutions. Although nation-states may sign bits of sovereignty over to higher-level entities on a provisional basis, they can take these back when so desired. It remains to be seen if 200 sovereign states, even if led by influential Groups of 2, 10 or 20, can ever agree upon the sorts of short- and middle-run sacrifices needed to successfully deal over the long run with great and growing economic inequality, threats to ecological integrity, and dangers posed by powerful new technologies.
108 A world of perhaps 2000-5000 DEVOlVED/lOCAliST geopolitical communities might conceivably arise in the wake of a catastrophic collapse of the world socio-political-economic order. Alternatively, some advocates of Green Sustainability World argue for a deliberately chosen and thus more peaceful and orderly devolution. Some apparatus to facilitate necessary inter-communal coordination would be needed, but it might be spare, perhaps of the "night watchman" sort favored by libertarians, given the inherently less massively disruptive nature of our newly devolved socio-political-economic world. On the other hand, the more spare it is structurally, the more powerful it might have to be in some other regard: ideologically, philosophically, mythopoetically or such. As noted throughout this white paper outline, I'm
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skeptical ofthe practicability of devolutionary scenarios. But I'm unable to dismiss them entirely given the many challenges that all other scenarios present. See BOX DN-2 in DN 110 for more.
109 CHURN denotes an unstable global geopolitical order marked by continual and uneven shifts and transitions among the many sorts of structures we've noted thus far. If the churn is very slow it might be called Patchwork; see Norgaard {1994). If it is rapid it might be called Pandemonium; see Moynihan (1993). We might imagine a situation 150 years hence in which, for example, China, Russia and Africa are prospering as continent-sized high-income/steady-state civilizational communities maintaining cordial relations with one another, while Europe, the Americas and the Islamic World have messily devolved into failed civilizational junkyards struggling to regain some semblance of order and meaning. Or we might imagine just the opposite, with Europe, the Americas and the Islamic World successfully transitioned to stable, peaceful versions of Green Sustainability World, perhaps grounded in religious revival, while China, Russia and Africa are picking up the pieces after having crashed-and-burned following a fanatical failed pursuit of techno progressive scientific-materialist dominance and conquest. Bottom line, of course, is that neither of these speculative·future geopolitical orders would be stable.
110 BOX DN-2 (below) is a first attempt to get a crude sense of the number of small, localized, independent socio-economic polities that a successful transition to a devolved/localist world over the next 200 years might generate. Counting existing countries and active secessionist movements suggests~ 500 such communities. The 3000 medium-size+ cities, the ~ 4500 widely spoken languages and the ~ 5000 ethnic/indigenous/tribal groups suggest that conditions might exist supportive of 2000-5000 communities. It's not clear how useful such speculation might be. Any truly global devolutionary transition would be so unprecedented as to make speculation based on current situations questionable. It's possible to imagine the rise of fanatical global movements that could transform 2000-year-old civilizational communities in the course of two generations.
BOX DN-2. INDICATORS OF DEVOLUTIONARY POTENTIAL [Cites & sources in progress]
Numbers as of 2013-15 Examples
Countries I Nation-states 196 Brazil, Russia, Canada, Nigeria, Iran, Vietnam, Iceland, Mongolia Active secessionist movements 300 Catalonia (Spain); East Turkestan (China); Zanzibar (Tanzania) Cities w/ populations> 150,000 · 3000 Chicago, Mumbai, Riyadh, Nairobi, Strasbourg, Reno, Guangzhou Languages spoken by> 1000 people 4500 Mandarin, Arabic, Turkish, Czech, Punjabi, Xhosa, Hebrew, Hmong Ethnic/indigenous/tribal groups 5000 Gujaratis, Kurds, Norwegians, Assyrians, Sinhalese, Navajo, Japanese
C/VILIZAT/ONAL IDENTITIES AND COMMUNITIES
111 We use the phrases "civilizational identities" and 11 Civilizational communities" to soften the impression of immutable, sharply bound entities that the more commonly used 11 Civilizations" suggests.
112 BOX F identifies seven or eight major civilizational communities, loosely following Huntington {1996). CONFUCIAN: The common culture of China and the Chinese communities of Southeast Asia and elsewhere outside of China as well as the related cultures of Vietnam and Korea. Chinese civilization has existed since perhaps 2500 BCE. ISLAMIC: Includes all the followers of Islam. There are many distinct cultures or sub civilizations within Islam, including Arab, Turkic, Persian, and Malay. Islam arose in 7th century Arabia. HINDU: Includes India and portions of some surrounding regions, e.g. in Nepal, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Hindu civilization has existed since at least 1500 BCE. WESTERN: [Alternatively: Christian, Western Christian or Judeo-Christian]lncludes Europe, North America and Latin America plus other
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European settler countries such as Australia and New Zealand and many Caribbean countries. Israel might be considered part of Western civilization, or as an allied civilization. Most of the distinct features of Western Civilization were evident by 700 CE. AFRICAN: All of Africa other than the Islamic north and east coast. Sub Saharan Africa might be considered as having a special relation with Western civilization, given its ties with the West and the role of Christianity. ORTHODOX: The Christian lands that broke from Rome in the lOth century. The border between Orthodox and Western civilization stretches from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, with the Baltic countries in the West and most of Ukraine and the Balkans in the East. JAPANESE: Evolved from Chinese civilization but between 100-400 CE developed as a distinctly separate civilization of its own. Huntington considers several smaller or less well-defined civilizational communities. He says there is no single Buddhist civilization but rather a Theravada Buddhist civilization that includes Sri Lanka, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia, and a significantly different Lamaist Mahayana Buddhist civilization that includes Tibet, Mongolia and Bhutan. He says that Ethiopia has historically maintained a civilizational identity separate from the rest of Africa. He also proposes that Latin American and the rest of the West are sufficiently different as to be given separate civilizational status, but I disagree.
113 Huntington argues that 21 51 century geopolitics will more likely revolve around discrete civilizational communities that share common social, cultural, political, religious and other institutions than around universal cosmopolitan secular liberal democratic capitalism, or any other universal system. He situates future identity, allegiance, accountability, economic activity, governance and sovereignty primarily within continent-sized communities having a generally accepted geographic home. Huntington suggests two rules that all civilizational communities would agree to abide by: Don't interfere with each others' internal affairs, and move quickly and decisively to contain and resolve border disputes. The internal structures of civilizational communities could vary dramatically- some might be federations of nation-states, others might have a single dominant power plus satellite or tributary states, others might be comprised of radically localized tribes and city-states, and so on. An intriguing possibility for our purposes is that these geographic regions could be large enough to allow vibrant and diverse economies, yet unified enough to allow the cohesion needed to ensure equity and stability under conditions of little or no economic growth. Commerce and travel among major civilizational communities would continue, but at greatly reduced numbers and frequency. A world structured around 7-9 such civilizational communities might be able to agree more easily on important global commons m~atters than would today's world of~ 200 independent nation-states. Further, such a consortium of civilizational communities seems easier to imagine than does, on the one hand, a single unified World State or World Federation, and on the other hand, a devolved world community of several thousand independent polities.
114 Huntington has been criticized for his definition of civilizations, his characterization of many of them and of Islamic civilization in particular, policy positions that he believes are supported by his civilizational model, and more. Critics say he inaccurately essentializes the complex, textured and mutable diversity of lifeways practiced within each of his identified civilizations, and that modern trade and communications, and in particular the internet and social media, will quickly erode defining civilizational features that have stood for centuries- and that this is liberatory and progressive and should be applauded. In the years since the publication of Clash major civilizational communities, including Russia, China, India and the Islamic world, have responded to globalization and modernization not by embracing Western liberal democratic capitalism but by working to update and reaffirm their own political, cultural, historical and religious traditions and practices in ways that better support economic modernization and growth. These countries and regions include just under 60% of the world's population. It can be argued that the rejection of liberal democracy is a last gasp attempt by old guard traditionalists and opportunistic oligarchs to hold onto power, and that another decade or two of Twitter, Face book and Alibaba will finally consign them to history's dustbin. But if we factor in the dynamics which we've discussed in this whitepaper outline- the growth of economic inequality, threats to ecological integrity and dangers posed by disruptive technological innovation, all in a context of slower per capita output growth- it's at least as plausible that the desire for cultural, social and
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political cohesion could prevail over the cosmopolitanizing forces of modern technology, communications and trade. On this view the West will face a special challenge because its foundational values are more deeply individualistic and its populations are more culturally diverse. For critical assessments of Clash see Berman (2003), Brooks (2011b) and Said (2001). For at least partially sympathetic assessments see Sajjad (2013) and J. Hayes (2013).
115 Discussion notes on cosmopolitanism are in preparation.
116 An alternative to both the civilizational communities scenario and the universal cosmopolitan scenario is the scenario of "The World Without the West." As described by Barma, Ratner and Weber (2014, 2007L in this scenario the emerging non-Western powers n.either assimilate into the dominant US/Western (cosmopolitan) international order, which they don't want to do, nor challenge it head-on, which they are unable to do. Rather, they cooperate with one another to bypass the current US/Western international order. They establish their own global institutions and agreements, grounded in social and political norms of their own. They continue to engage with the Western powers when they judge this to be necessary or beneficial, but their preferential option is to work with their fellow non-Western counterparts. Barma et al. point to such new institutions as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIBL the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCOL the various new BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) mechanisms, China's New Silk Road initiative, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as examples. This alternative new international order provides mutual economic development assistance, with an explicit agreement that the internal affairs of participating countries are not to be meddled in. This stands in contrast to the current US/ Western-led international order, which has put strong emphasis, albeit selectively applied, on encouraging liberal economic and political reforms. Like Huntington's civilizational thesis, the thesis of The World Without The West seeks to disabuse Westerners of their belief that There Is No Alternative to the US/Western model. However, its leading forces are conventional developing nation-states acting in their perceived best interests, rather than continental civilizational communities acting in line with their perceived grand civilizational destinies.
117A further·alternative to the US/Western international order goes beyond the calculating but cordial disengagement proposed by The World Without The West and seeks active, even military, confrontation with the West, or at least with the United States. Among these new and explicitly anti-Western ideologues is the increasingly influential Russian academic Alexander Dugin (2012). He argues that Western liberal democratic capitalism is generating a tidal wave of economic inequality, ecological destruction and technological menace, and that its promotion of democracy, human rights and liberal values is intended to undermine the organic solidarity and independence of non-Western peoples, appropriate their natural resources and corrupt the minds and souls of their populations, all in the interests of the masters of the global market place. Dugin argues that Russia should align itself not with the decadent hyper-individualist West but with its Eurasian neighbors, including China, the Islamic World, and parts of Eastern Europe, all of whom also appreciate the hypocrisy and dysfunction of liberal democracy, and form a Eurasian Union powerful enough to resist the United States/Western European plan for global dominance. Dugin speaks approvingly of many, although not all, of the Rightist and nee-fascist movements now growing in Europe. In July 2014 prime minister Viktor Orban of Hungary (a NATO member state) called for "building an illiberal new state based on national foundations/' and cited Russia, China, India, Turkey and Singapore as models. For those in the West who desire a world of economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility this authoritarian, militaristic, nationalist communitarian vision poses a serious challenge. For insightful analyses see Lilla (2014) and Kotkin (2014b).
118 Many Western analysts see the rise of nationalist and traditionalist ideologues as plain and simple reaction: authoritarian leaders scheming to hold onto their power, backwards peoples' seeking the security oftradition"over the bracing opportunities of modernism, and religious fanatics fomenting brutality and
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terror rather than acknowledging fundamental human rights. But many of those now attracted to nee nationalism and nee-traditionalism are responding to objective precarity in their lives and are turning to whoever seems aware of this and has a seemingly credible plan to address it. Are there forms of nationalism that can promote a sense of community and solidarity without promoting division, exclusion and worse? Are there forms of traditionalism that can connect people and place across generations without denigrating or demonizing other traditions? My guess is that nee-nationalism is more dangerous than nee-traditionalism, because it puts the power of the state behind the new potentially exclusionary forces. But the true answer to the two questions posed is that I don't know. We confront once more the meta-conundrum called out in the outline text and in DN 97. [Further notes are in preparation.]
119 The prospect of 7 to 9 continental-scale civilizational communities amicably and efficiently working in concert to address global commons concerns while agreeing not to interfere in each other's internal affairs is difficult to reconcile with the existence of universalist aspirations. Western and Islamic civilizational communities clearly understand themselves as universal and through missionary work, active evangelization, military force and other means have built co-civilizational communities throughout the world. As of 2010 35% of Christians lived in Asia and Africa, and 65% of Muslims lived outside the Middle East and Africa (mostly in Indonesia, India and Pakistan). See Pew Research Center (2011). But the geopolitical scenario grounded in civilizational communities clearly intends that each civilizational community is characterized by a single dominant tradition, typically including a dominant religious tradition. What happens to Christians or Muslims living in, say, India, if and when Hindu beliefs, values and institutions are increasingly relied upon there to motivate and sustain policies and practices necessary to ensure economic justice, ecological integrity and technologic"al responsibility? A major difficulty with Huntington's thesis is that it would appear to justify or condone forms of "civilizational cleansing" in the interests of harmony and solidarity.
[New Discussion Note] What civilizational communities other than Islam and Western liberal democratic capitalism/Cosmopolitanism have universalist aspirations? Orthodoxy has its own less-well known universalist narrative. The Eastern Orthodox Churches broke with the West in the Great Schism of 1054 when (say the Orthodox) Roman Catholicism forfeited its true spiritual mission in exchange for secular power and wealth. After that time the Orthodox began looking to Russian Othodoxy and the Russian Patriarch as the first among equals of the national churches and church leaders, and to the Russian Tsar as the first among equals of the rulers of the secular world. They looked forward to the day when Moscow would be hailed as the "Third Rome," with the Russian Patriarch and the Russian Tsar convening the universal Orthodox-Imperial symphonia. The Confucian civilizational community hasn't been identified with universalist drives in the same way that Christianity and Islam have. Rather, Confucian China has understood itself as the Middle Kingdom, the center of authority and righteousness under the Mandate of Heaven, to which all other kingdoms owe tribute. Indications of universalist drives within African, Hindu and Japanese civilization are more obscure or limited. Hinduism has long affirmed that its extraordinarily rich and flexible spiritual tradition can accommodate the religious beliefs and traditions of diverse cultures throughout the world, but has only rarely sought to actively promote Hindu civilization much beyond its historic homelands. Japan has sought to dominate its neighbors militarily, with no intention that their peoples be incorporated into the Japanese civilizational community. [Further discussion and cites in preparation.]
120 Insight into the contradictions of universalism can be explored by discussing three scenarios long proclaimed by their supporters to be universally applicable. One is Western Techno-Progressive Liberal Democratic Capitalism. It has famously been characterized by Fukuyama (1992) as "The End of History," by Margaret Thatcher (c. 1980) as "T.I.N.A." ("There Is No Alternative"), and more recently by Hillary Rod ham Clinton (2014) as 'T.R.I.N.V.A." ("There Really is No Viable Alternative"). The economic and military power that the West amassed and used to dominate other civilizational communities over the quarter-millennium following 1750 lent credence to its claims of inherent superiority and manifest destiny. The specifically democratic capitalist expression of Western civilization was given further legitimacy following the collapse of
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socialism in the late 1980s. But as DNs 116-117 recount, over the past decade, and especially since the 2008 global financial crisis, major civilizational communities have begun a search for alternatives. A second scenario often seen as universal by its advocates is Western Civic Republican Green Sustainability [See DN 34]. And a third is Balanced Equitable Global islamic Caliphate. [Further notes in preparation.]
121 New civilizational communities have arisen only rarely in historical time, and typically involve simultaneously strongly expansionist and strongly isolating dynamics. Given today's dense webs of global exchange it's difficult to imagine how a new civilizational identity might develop. Two speculative possibilities are noted here. Afro-Chinese: Since 2000 the Chinese government and private Chinese firms have invested hundreds of millions of renminbi in massive infrastructure and commercial projects in Angola, Ghana, Congo, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Zambia, and other African countries. Over 1 million Chinese have immigrated. to work on these projects and to support the growing Chinese community with services, schools and more. Economic growth in China has slowed from its double-digit pace of two decades ago, and arable land is scarce. It is not as easy as it was even recently for large numbers of homeland Chinese to become quickly wealthy. In Africa, however, land is easy to obtain and commercial opportunities are many. Chinese settlers are marrying Africans and raising large families, as the one-child rule does not apply to Chinese in Africa. These large families will inherit their parent's new wealth (Chinese and African inheritance traditions are in many regions similar). It is unlikely though not impossible that a new and prosperous Afro-Chinese community could grow to civilizational status over the coming century or two. [See French (2014); other cites pending]. Mormon: Devout Mormons tend to be honest, educated, hard-working, disciplined, endogamous, fecund and evangelical. Although Mormonism regards itself as Christian, it might more accurately be considered a fourth Abrahamic religion, along with Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Mormon family and community institutions are markedly different from those of other American communities. Mormonism is one of the world's most rapidly growing religious faiths. If this growth were to continue for another century or two, and if an appropriate geographic center were established, it's conceivable that a Mormon civilizational community could bud off from Western civilization and attain independent civilizational status. [References and cites in progress.]
IDEOLOGY: BEYOND THE LEFT-RIGHT DIVIDE
122 This mapping isn't unique. Libertarian Party leader David Nolan (1971) used the values of "personal freedom" and "economic freedom" to generate four ideological categories: Liberal (high personal freedom, low economic freedom), Conservative (low personal freedom, high economic freedom), Libertarian (high in both freedoms) and Statist (low in both freedoms). The popular Political Compass website replaces Nolan's "Statist" with "Authoritarian" and uses a similar formula to generate the four categories of Libertarian Left, Libertarian Right, Authoritarian Left and Authoritarian Right. The surveys shown in Box G-1 of ATTACHMENT G show additional variants. Scores of such two-axis ideological maps have been proposed and can be accessed via the web. The most common mapping uses differing preferences regarding "economic" issues and "social" issues. My use of "solidarity" and "equality" is an attempt to identify somewhat deeper and more general sources of ideological differences.
123 The Communitarian Left is the ideology most closely aligned with values that would support both Balanced Equitable World and Green Sustainability World. But segments of the Communitarian Right, and in particular many religious conservatives, subscribe to anti-materialist values, are uncomfortable with many aspects of consumer culture, are not necessarily opposed to an active public sector operating to ensure the common good, hold the natural world in special reverence, and are uneasy about the vision of a hyper technological human future. Much of the Libertarian Left would be uncomfortable with the constraints on individual autonomy necessary under steady-state economic conditions, but an important sector of the Libertarian Left is historically grounded in justice and environmental commitments and might trade some amount of autonomy for a significant realization of justice and ecological integrity.
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124 A quantitative thought-exercise raises questions about a realignment of the sort just described. Let's assume tha:t an equal 20% of the public fall within each of the five ideological categories shown in Box G. This is roughly consistent with survey data shown in ATTACHMENT G, Box G-1. Now suppose, following the strategy sketched above, that a new social movement arises and wins the support of 100% of the Communitarian Left, 45% of the Communitarian Right, 45% ofthe Libertarian Left, 70% of the Center, and 0% of the Libertarian Right. This gives us just 52% support for the new movement. While this may be enough to win close electoral contests, it falls dramatically short of the numbers needed to implement transformational policies and practices of the sort we've been considering. If we run the exercise again, this time heroically assuming 100% ofthe Communitarian Left, 65% ofthe Communitarian Right, 75% of the Libertarian Left, 90% of the Center, and 0% of the Libertarian Right, we end up with 66% support. This may be a large enough margin to achieve many legislative policy wins, but is it sufficient to move assertively on long-range systemic changes in institutions, life-styles, vocations, family socialization practices and more? It is possible that changes of this sort and magnitude could require agreement or consensus in the range of 70%-80%.
125 If it's true that a world of economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility would require agreement or consensus on the part of 70-80% of the population in order to successfully undertake the sorts of radical transformations needed, our task will be difficult. Even many who care deeply about these matters are uneasy with the notion of being part of something that commands 70-80% support, and for understandable reasons. In much of the West we have become so accustomed to closely-fought legislative and electoral contests, with 54-46% victories considered to be near-landslide wins, that we question whether much beyond such tallies is possible, or even desirable, on any major set of issues. Even if we could secure 70-80% victories, would that be a good thing? W~at happens to the other 20-30%? Again, our reflexive disposition towards personal autonomy, the rights of individuals and the rights of minority constituencies may be at odds with the sorts of collective consensus required for a fully just, sustainable, and technologically responsible human future.
126 Any initiatives towards a new ideological alignment grounded in Communitarian values would need to confront the danger of exclusionary tendencies. At their best, Communitarian movements throughout history have espoused values of social justice, human rights and human dignity. But more than a few Communitarian movements have been grounded in ethno-nationalism, religious extremism and racism. Initiatives exploring a Left-Right Communitarian alignment will need at the outset to foreclose the possibility of such exclusionary tendencies gaining a foothold.
127 Efforts in support of an ideological realignment of the sort sketched above can be expected to generate their own new counter-realignments. Initiatives to bring the Libertarian Left and the Libertarian Right together under a single tent have been underway for some time, proclaiming "free markets, free minds, free bodies," and appealing explicitly to educated, professional, politically liberal, techno-libertarian and ethnically and sexually diverse constituencies. Postrel (1998) suggests that future politics will realign along "statist" and "dynamist" divides. Self-described "transhumanists" foresee a realignment pitting "technoprogressives" against "technoconservatives." According to sci-tech writer Steve Fuller (2012), "The right is currently divided into traditionalists and libertarians; the left into communitarians and technocrats. In the future, I suggest, the traditionalists and the communitarians will form the precautionary pole of the political spectrum, while the libertarians and technocrats will form the proactionary pole." See also Kotkin (2015) on the concerted move by libertarian-leaning Silicon Valley tech oligarchs to "tighten their grip" on the Democratic Party.
128 A critically important set of issues around which common ground has been sought among those identifying with both liberal and conservative perspectives concern the new human genetic technologies. Many of these technologies involve the destruction of early-stage human embryos, and when they first came
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to public attention in the late 1990s, religious conservatives played the most vocal roles in opposing them. As a consequence, discussion of these issues became framed in the United States as an extension of the abortion wars, and in short order more generally of the red-blue/right-left culture wars. But in fact the issues raised by the new human genetic technologies transcend conventional ideological divides. Many pro-choice women's health advocates oppose such technologies that put women's health at risk and commodify reproduction. Human and civil rights leaders are wary of a new free-market eugenics that could stoke the fires of racial and ethnic hatred. Disability rights activists charge that a society obsessed with genetic perfection could come to regard people with disabilities as "mistakes" whose existence should have been prevented. Many environmentalists see human genetic modification, as they do genetic modification of plants and animals, as another hubristic technology being promoted with little regard for long-range consequences. Similarly, it is misleading to try to categorize countries as either "liberal" or "conservative" based on their positions on human genetic technology. Western European countries widely regarded as bastions of secular liberalism have adopted some of the strictest regulations over human genetic technology in the world. This derives from their generally social democratic political culture, and from their first-hand experience·in the 20th century with eugenics, euthanasia and the Holocaust. Europeans know all too well what can happen when ideologies and policies that valorize the creation of "genetically superior" human beings come to the fore. For different but related reasons, developing countries such as South Africa, Vietnam, India, and Brazil have likewise adopted strong policies of social oversight and control over the new human genetic technologies. Still, the majority of countries have not adopted any policies at all regarding these practices. We have a rare window of opportunity available for international leaders to build a consensus on these issues that crosses conventional ideological lines; and from there to conclude a comprehensive global treaty that brings a current set of high-risk technologies under responsible global governance and sets a precedent for future similar agreements on other challenging issues.
129 Organizations identified with liberal, left-liberal and social democratic political perspectives that have called for policies to prevent the development of neo-eugenic technologies of human genetic modification include the Center for Genetics and Society, Council for Responsible Genetics, Center for Technology Assessment, Our Bodies Ourselves, GeneWatch UK, GenEthiks Netwerk DE, Human Genetics Alert, Alliance for Humane Biotechnology, ETC Group, Friends of the Earth and the American Civil Liberties Union. Selected key authors include Darnovsky {2013), Obasogie {2014), Cussins (2014), Shanks {2005), Roberts {2011), Winickoff (2003), Habermas (2003), McKibben {2003), Newman (2003), Kimbrell {1993), Dickenson (2013), Sandel (2007), Hansen (2001), Maranto (1996), Lindee (2005), Norsigian (2002), Pet (2012), Beitiks (2011), Jennings (2003), Banchoff (2011) Simoncelli (2006), Krimsky {2003, 1991), Capron (2002, 1991), Duster (2003), Darling (2008), Beeson (2010), Reynolds (2009), Rifkin {1999), Andrews (2001, 1999), Callahan (2012, 1990), Annas (1998) and Hayes (2008a, 2008b). Many other authors can be seen on the website of The Tarrytown Meetings, a series of invitational convenings held in 2010, 2011 and 2012 that brought together over 200 scholars, advocates, scientists, policymakers, creative artists and philanthropists to address the challenges of the new human biotechnologies.
130 Many conservative authors have played leading roles in opposition to human genetic modification. For many this opposition is grounded in religious teachings; for others in foundational commitments to human dignity; and for others in concern over human hubris and fallibility. Among those who have acknowledged the value of bridging ideological divides in order to secure policy wins are Meilaender (2013), Keiper {2007), Schulman (2009), Kass (2002), Levin (2008), Rosen {2004), Cohen (2008), and Colson and Cameron (2004).
FOUNDATIONAL WORLDVIEWS: GOD, NATURE, HISTORY
131 The descriptor "religious/spiritual/transcendental/non-dual" would be more technically correct and inclusive than simply "religious," but it's awkward, and the specifically religious expression of this worldview is central. The descriptor "scientific/materialist" might more accurately be shown as "scientific/materialist-
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reductionist" but the longer term is clumsy and doesn't add much. The descriptor {{humanistic/ historical/phenomenological" is awkward, but each of the three terms is central. These descriptors are provisional and suggestions are welcome.
132 The term"humanism" is used in different and sometimes conflicting ways. The founding humanists of the 16th century sought to enrich the arid methods and narrow focal interests of the scholastics with a richer appreciation of the historical, artistic and psychological dimensions of human life. Most of the early humanists were believers, and the tradition of religious humanism continues today (but see DN 133 below for a clarification). With the continued spread of the scientific revolution the term humanism came to mean a specifically non-religious philosophical stance, and by the late 19th century it had evolved further to demarcate an explicitly anti-religious and "pro-science" philosophical movement, often and more appropriately called secular humanism. A third strand of humanism traces from the late 18th_century Romantics and many other intellectual and philosophical currents, including historicism and phenomenology, as noted in DNs 87-88. This third school of humanism, while non-religious, is critical of the scientific/materialist worldview, of ideological scientism, and of the claims by scientists that all human experience can be reduced to and understood through statements generated by scientific inquiry.
133 We understand the tradition of religious humanism to include early humanists such as Erasmus and Thomas More, 19th-20th century religious thinkers such as Chesterton, J. H. Newman, Buber, Maritain, lllich and many more, perhaps including several of the modern Catholic popes. The term religious humanism is also used in an antithetically different sense, referring to attempts by explicitly atheistic schools of thought to establish social institutions that draw on conventions associated with religious practice, including liturgies, officiators, moral and ethical codes, ritual displays and the like. Some of these efforts are easily caricatured, e.g., the attempts during the French Revolution to establish a "Church of Reason" complete with weekly services and Notre Dame Cathedral secularized and repurposed as the "Temple of Reason." Others, such as the Ethical Culture movement begun in 1870s New York, were more serious.
134 During the 19th and 20th centuries noted philosophers, spiritual leaders, scientists and others in the West and elsewhere proposed scores of schemes intended to unite, harmonize, syncretize or reconcile everything known or believed: the teachings of all the world's religions and schools of philosophy, all we know from science, the lessons of human history, the direct apprehension of Being by human consciousness, and more. Although elements of these efforts have been enormously influential, few of these schemes as such have taken root. The general population has seemed more comfortable with either mildly demanding conventional religion or casually agnostic pragmatism, both of which are compatible with a world of science, technology, individualism, economic growth and material acquisition. Our argument that our current trajectory will be unsustainable after another century or two invites a search for something radically deeper. Three iconic syncretic thinkers, noted here only as illustration, are Hegel (1817, 1807), Huxley (1944) and Wilber (2006, 1996, 1983, 1981, 1979). For a more spare approach see Schroedinger (1983, 1944), who draws on Western physics and Eastern philosophy (Vedanta) in an insightful manner.
135 A number of notable attempts at integrating religious, scientific and humanistic worldviews have independently used the descriptor {{integral." As earlier as 1914 Indian nationalist and later religious philosopher Sri Aurobindo described his practice as integral yoga. Western psychologists influenced by Aurobindo call their work integral psychology. Jacques Maritain's first important work was his 1936 Integral Humanism. Wilber has written on Integra/Spirituality and calls his overall framework Integral Theory. Pope Francis' 20~5 encyclical grounded its comments on the environment in an integral ecology. Reference has been made to an Integral Movement. The framework of integralism has been used both by serious thinkers and by quasi-legitimate New Age, spiritualist and esotericist authors; its future utility is uncertain. See Aurobinda (1993), Maritain (1973), Wilber (2006), and Francis (2015).
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136 A recent example of the special ability of religion to speak to concerns regarding economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility, to do so from within an overarching social, political and philosophical framework that includes scientific and humanist as well as religious worldviews, and to speak in language that includes but goes beyond that of instrumental reason, is the June 2015 encyclical authored by Pope Francis, Laudato Si' ("Praised Be ... "). The encyclical is long {32,000 words) and not an easy read. The Vatican had earlier announced that its mid-2015 release date was in part motivated by a desire that the encyclical might help inform the United Nations climate treaty negotiations set for the end of that year in Paris. As a consequence many assumed that the encyclical would focus largely on climate change concerns. This is not the case; only 5 of its 248 sections deal explicitly with climate change, and less than a third of the text directly addresses ecological topics. Laudato Si' might better be understood as an extended critique of modernity in the light of new and growing concerns regarding ecological integrity, economic justice and technological responsibility. In seeking to deny our limitations and to become as God, as recounted in Genesis and as demonstrated in earnest over the quarter-millennium since the Enlightenment, we have disrupted deep and abiding relationships among Humanity, Nature and God. We've attempted to relieve the tensions caused by this disruption by doubling down on all that we had left: science, technology, materialism, atomized individualism, competition and the accumulation of material wealth through unending technological innovation and economic growth. This tension and our misguided efforts to relieve it have led directly to the disregard and exploitation of both other humans and of the natural world. Francis says that any solution to growing inequality, ecological degradation and technological dehumanization will require a renewed understanding ofthe proper relation of all of humanity to God, to Nature and to one another. He calls for a dialogue, involving all sectors of the human community, that points towards new, more simple, materially modest lifestyles and a new, just, responsible and sustainable basis for human civilization. Francis included strong and welcome language about the need to address climate change and other ecological concerns, but taken as a whole Laudato Si' has a far broader and deeper intent.
137 Response to Laudato Si' has been instructive. In the first few days after its release most accounts reported it as a climate change story. In the United States, Republican candidates and think tank authors, including former Governor Jeb Bush, said the Pope was wrong on the science and policy of climate change and wrong about free-market economic growth. See Lavender {2015) and Thorner {2015). Environmentalists, including Brune {2015), Tanden (2015) and Pope (2015), praised Francis' strong call to action in support of climate controls and economic justice. Subsequent commentators drew attention to the broader, deeply radical and challenging content of the encyclical's critique of modernity. These included voices associated both with the Left, such as vanden Heuvel (2015) and Lanuza (2015), and with the Right, including Weigel {2015), Reno (2015), White (2015), Douthat (2015) and Lu {2015). It remains to be seen if other secularist liberals and progressives will take a more critical stance, stating that while they welcome the Pope's support on climate change and the environment, it's important to call out the Vatican's anti-modern nostalgia for the days of pre-Enlightenment throne-and-alter Catholic triumphalism. Many mainstream Catholic academics and writers, accurately noted that Laudato Si' does not fit comfortably within conventional Republican/ conservative and Democratic/liberal-progressive ideological boxes. See e.g. Reese (2015) and Rieley (2015).
138 It's long been debated whether people must be religious in order to lead good lives. The short answer is "no," as many non-religious people do indeed lead good lives. A more difficult question is whether societies need religion in order for their members to lead good lives. The attempts by 20th century communists to build avowedly atheistic societies in the Soviet Union, Maoist China, Communist Cambodia, Communist Cuba and elsewhere appear to have failed. On the other hand, over the past century Western Europeans have voluntarily abandoned religious belief and practice in large numbers, while building what by some measures are the best societies the world has ever seen. A case can be made that Europeans are living off religious capital amassed over many centuries, and that it remains to be seem what happens after another generation or two draws this capital down further. However that might be, people won't adopt a religious foundational
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worldview simply because of its perceived social utility; they'll do so only if they believe it offers true and compelling understandings of the nature of the world and of our place in it.
139 Are there forms of "secular spirituality" that might attract large numbers of adherents desirous of the benefits that religious belief and practice confer yet who in good conscience are unable to acknowledge a transcendent or non-dual order, much less a theistic one? Some maintain that certain traditions within Buddhism, ?nd even more so within Confucianism, offer forms of secular spirituality. Mindfulness meditation, a popular form of Buddhist vipassana meditation, might be considered a form of secular spirituality. Atheist authors such as Sam Harris (2014) and Alain de Botton (2012) advocate the creation of new forms of secular spirituality. Many, believers and non-believers alike, are skeptical of proposals for the development of a secular spirituality. Martin (2010), for example, suggests that attempts at secular spirituality will falter because they so often reinforce individualist and even egoistic self-identities rather than truly communal and transcendent or non-dual identities. [Further notes in preparation]
140 Lay people are intimidated by the fact that scientists have special access to knowledge of the workings of the natural world, and scientists use this two-fold power imbalance to advance their professional and social interests. It's imperative that a full understanding ofthe nature of scientific knowledge, and importantly of the nature of its limits, be shared far more widely. I offer three observations about the limits of scientific inquiry that are generally accepted by the most sophisticated scientific thinkers but are rarely acknowledged in the current public debate over the role of science in society. One is that scientific inquiry cannot tell us how the natural world came to be. See Nagel (2012) and Barnes (2013). A second is that scientific inquiry cannot tell us how consciousness comes to be. See Chalmers (1996), Jackson (1982), Flanagan (1992) and McGinn (1991). And a third is that scientific inquiry cannot generate moral, ethical or for that matter any normative statements of any sort. See Hume (1783). To point out these limits is not to deny the immense body of empirical knowledge that scientific inquiry can generate within its own domain. But I do believe that the question of the legitimate domain of science and its proper role in society is far more open than most scientists, and many others, have been willing to acknowledge. For a humanist critique of the scientific worldview see White (2014). Berry (2000) offers a similar critique, including an extended discussion of E.O. Wilson's materialist-reductionist Consilience (1999). Also see the related claim by Gardener (2014) that the question ofthe existence of free will is inaccessible to scientific inquiry.
141 Gelerntner (2014), White (2014) and Tudge (2014) go further and say that scientists are consciously and strategically using their privileged status to inculcate among the lay masses the erroneous and disempowering belief that human beings are mindless automata. Gelerntner calls for a social initiative to counter this effort. Along similar lines, Wieseltier (2014) says that "there is no task more urgent ... than to offer some resistance to the twin imperialisms of science and technology, and to recover the old distinction ... between the study of nature and the study of man." For more see the sharp exchange on this topic between Weiseltier (2013) and Pinker (2013).
142 The scientific/materialist worldview presents a universe without purpose or meaning, and it presents human experience as a function of evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology: we act, and can only act, in ways that tend to increase inclusive fitness. We cooperate in groups in order to, and ultimately only in order to, compete with other groups. On this view ours is indeed a world of competition red-in-tooth-and claw, a struggle for existence in which over time the fittest tend to survive. This is a worldview profoundly at odds with a world of economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility, and with the deepest tenets of the left/liberal/social democratic tradition. The most honest scientists acknowledge this while others deny it, sugar-coat it, or avoid comment. [Cites in progress]
143 In the immediately preceding DN 142 I characterized the universe and human nature as they appear when studied with tools and assumptions grounded in the scientific/materialist worldview. But I dodged the
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question: however unsettling it might be for many, isn't this description of the universe and of human nature in some sense ... true? I believe an honest answer is: yes and no. It's true enough as far as it goes: when the universe and human nature are premised as the result of particles in motion, they appear to be the result of ... particles in motion (or perhaps more correctly, asfields influx). But human consciousness and agency cannot be reduced to particles in motion; no matter how finely the correlates of consciousness might be teased out, there remains an explanatory gap. And when human consciousness and agency are brought into the discussion right up front and given at least the same ontological status as the myriad fields in flux, the universe and human nature begin to be understood differently. The presumed na·ive understanding of consciousness and agency held by the untutored is in many ways closer to what's so than is the sophisticated understanding of those working solely from within a scientific-materialist worldview. The responsibility of our physicists, cognitive scientists, philosophers of science, philosophers of mind and others isn't to explain away consciousness and agency; rather, it's to accept them as irreducible givens and integrate them along with our extant incomplete 3rd-party understanding of the universe into a new, fuller and truer understanding.
144 The partisan science wars of recent years, in which leaders from contending political parties charge one another with being "anti-science," hinders the serious inquiry we need regarding the ways in which scientific, religious and humanistic understandings, as well as understandings developed by those holding the full range of partisan ideological orientations, can contribute to building a future of economic justice, ecological integrity an.d technological responsibility. Mooney's The Republican War on Science (2006) and The Republican Brain (2012) were countered by Berezov and Campbell's Science Left Behind: Feel-Good Fallacies and the Rise of the Anti-Scientific Left (2012). Both camps blur the difference between policy positions informed by the results of scientific inquiry and policy positions informed by the normative preferences of people who happen to be scientists. [Examples/cites in preparation].
145 Any critique of science, scientists and scientism must be rigorous rather than rhetorical, and intended to invite good-faith exchange and eventually reconciliation. Critique by post-modernist science studies academics beginning in the mid-1970s offered some useful if unoriginal insights but lost its way in obscurantism. The instructive episode is the 1996 "Sakal Hoax." See Sakal (1996a}, the reply by Robbins and Ross (1996), and assorted commentary by Sakal et al. in Lingua Franca (1996b).
146 Discussion Note in preparation.
147 Although religious affiliation and practice has been declining steadily in Europe and the United States for many decades it has been increasing most everywhere else. Further discussion in preparation.
148 The humanistic/historical/phenomenological foundational worldview offers many of those who reject religious worldviews a way to engage transcendence and Mystery, and it offers many of those working from within religious worldviews a way to engage the foul rag and bone shop of the heart.
149 Discussion Note in preparation.
15° Foundational worldviews other than these three can be identified. They include Via Negativa: The true nature of reality is approached by patiently and gently sloughing off all experience and understanding as partial and illusory. Neti, neti. "Not this, not this". Stoic/Existential: we can't really ever know the true nature of anything - "das Ding an sich," Kant (1781)- much less Reality as a whole, and attempts to cobble together any sort of unified ultimate understanding will likely do more harm than good. We are born into a particular place and time, and we should do our best to act as honestly and honorably as we can under the circumstances.
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151 The late 17th century scientific revolution and the 18th century Enlightenment together opened a path to a new understanding of the material world. This opening employed a major simplifying strategy: natural philosophers would henceforth focus their attention on phenomena that could be measured, and would use these measurements to identify repeated and thus predictable patterns in the interaction of these ph~nomena. As this strategy began generating knowledge that had practical applications, the world it posited for investigative purposes was taken as an accurate description of the world in toto. If a proposed causal agent couldn't be measured, it most likely didn't exist. This shift demoted human consciousness, awareness, will and agency to at best shadowy epiphenomena lacking causal force. This severing of the mind from the body, followed shortly by the assertion that only the latter was real, resulted in an alienation of ourselves fr.om ourselves that has continued and deepened to the present day. Such alienation creates tensions that demand resolution, and we've attempted to provide this by doubling down on all that we now believe we have left: scientific materialism, the manipulation and domination of the natural world, and the production and consumption of increasing quantities of material goods and services.
V. SUMMARY DISPLAY AND COMMENTS
152 As an exercise, here are examples of conceivably plausible systems that could develop over the next 100- 200 years, based on the archetypal scenarios, political-economic systems/elements/approaches, geopolitical structures, civilizational identities, ideological orientations and foundational worldviews included in Box H:
1. Cosmopolitan techno-progressive nee-liberalism, grounded in libertarian-left ideologies and humanistic/historical worldviews, as a single dominant world system; 2. Islamic green sustainable authoritarian socialism, grounded in communitarian-left ideologies and religious worldviews, as a single dominant world system; 3. Confucian balanced equitable ecological authoritarianism, grounded in communitarian-right ideologies and scientific materialism, as a single dominant world system; 4. Orthodox balanced equitable state corporatism, grounded in communitarian-right ideologies and religious worldviews, as one of 7-9 discrete large civilizational communities; 5. Cosmopolitan green sustainable market socialism, grounded in communitarian-left ideologies and scientific materialism, as one of 7-9 discrete large civilizational communities; 6. Confucian balanced equitable social democracy, grounded in communitarian-left ideologies and humanistic/historical worldviews, common to several-to-many of~ 200 nation-states; 7. Hindu techno-progressive democratic capitalism, grounded in communitarian-left ideologies and religious worldviews, common to several-to-many of~ 200 nation-states. 8. African techno-progressive thick cosmopolitanism, grounded in libertarian-left ideologies and humanistic/historical worldviews, common to many of several thousand localist polities; 9. Western green sustainable agrarian bioregionalism, grounded in libertarian-right ideologies and scientific/materialism, common to many of several thousand localist polities;
Entries 1-3 involve the geopolitical structure of "(Mostly) One World." The remaining entries 4-9 are examples of possible geopolitical units that would co-exist with others. The more features that any two systems have in common, the easier it should be for them to co-exist. It's likely that the archetypal scenario of Techno-Progressive World could only function over time as a solitary global system. A more carefully analytic survey of the coexistence among scenarios is to be included in the final whitepaper.
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VI. CONCLUDING NOTE: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
153 The organizational form of the four suggested initiatives and of the enabling vehicle is left open for now. Many options would need to be considered by any who might gather to consider undertaking this work. Each initiative should operate in a context that includes or at least acknowledges the other three. If successful, these four initiatives would give rise to a multitude of other initiatives whose focus and form we cannot predict. At some point these would be sorted out, with some emerging as more robust than others.
154 This list is a summary restatement of selected key points made in this white paper outline. Extended comments are in preparation.
155 The suggestion that we undertake initiatives to engage across polarized and polarizing identities may strike many as na"ive or even counterproductive. If, however, this initiative takes place in a context that acknowledges the other three initiatives, and if our planning horizon covers many decades, or preferably a century or two, the value and even necessity of such engagement may be more evident.
156 Selected past and current initiatives in support of such intentional, freely-chosen limits on income, consumption and wealth are noted in DNs 46-51. What I have in mind would need to go beyond these in scope and scale. As noted in ON 138, I'm not sure that such an initiative- a movement, really- would succeed unless associated with a religious or religio-philosophical worldview. It would be counter-cultural, but welcoming rather than confrontational and mass rather than elite.
157 The problematic impact of markets and technology on any organic sense of community, and thus on our ability to cooperate towards common ends on a mass basis, has been a recurrent theme noted by social critics from de Tocqueville (1835) to Marx (1849) to Tennies (1887) to Durkheim (1893) to Nisbet (1953) to Putnam (2000) and many more. The whitepaper argues that over the coming 100-200 years we'll need to evolve societal structures more deeply communitarian than any that those of us in the West know from experience. It's not obvious how we best reconcile our deep-seated needs for community with our modern desires for autonomy, liberty and recognition of our achievements as individuals; to date we've mostly cobbled together compromises of varying success and duration. Options for the core grounding of communal identification appear limited: family/tribe; nation/religion/ethnie; and ideology. Further notes are in preparation.
158 Any deeply communal mass social structures would likely require even more deeply communal and disciplined leading elements. In past and elsewhere these have included armies, priesthoods, parties and social movements. But who guards the guardians? Further notes are in preparation.
159 Several topics referenced only briefly in this outline may receive more attention in the final whitepaper. They include 1) The history and significance of the idea of Progress. The idea of Progress is among the most significant, fundamental and deeply and widely embedded understandings born of the Enlightenment Project. In a world of no or very slow economic growth "Progress" will need to be redefined or superseded entirely. See Nisbet (1980), Lasch (1991), Bury (1920) and Alexander (1990) for important background. 2) Culture and the arts, including music, literature, drama and the many visual arts, in both their popular and elite expressions. Innovations in the arts reflect, promote and sustain innovations in values, behaviors, institutions, ideologies and worldviews. Significant movement towards a world of economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility could entail major changes in artistic form and content, and in the roles that the arts play in society as a whole.
160 These four initiatives share the features of being necessary, ambitious and doable. Acknowledgement is intended to help clear the deck of conventional and cliched ways of thinking about the profound challenges
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we face. This is a task in which scholars, analysts, writers, and the like can play key roles. Note that "conventional" now includes many formerly oppositional, counter-cultural and avant-garde social and artistic tendencies that arose in the 1960s-1970s and have since been embraced and fully appropriated by current social and economic elites. Engagement and Integrity propose two simple but very challenging shifts in the way we conduct our lives. Both call on people to act in ways in which they have not been accustomed and which might put them at some social risk. To be effective, both would need participation on a very large level. Community as intended here goes beyond neighborliness and civic responsibility and includes support and accountability regarding a much fuller measure of our lives. The enabling initiative is the organizational vehicle that would get the other four initiatives off the ground. It could also critique and develop the analysis presented in this whitepaper and in similar ones presented by others.
161 The four. substantive initiatives and the enabling initiative suggested above hardly exhaust the useful initiatives that might be undertaken. Many important initiatives are already underway in support of economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility, and deserve to be supported. Fourteen initiatives that draw in particular on the analysis offered in this whitepaper outline are noted below. These are meant as examples only; many others could easily be added. Many of the initiatives suggested below are already underway in one manner or another and in whole or in part; others are speculative. Some of the initiatives below are straight-forward advocacy initiatives that typically involve mobilization of affected interest constituencies to strategically exert pressure on the appropriate sites of institutional power. Others listed are initiatives of ideas that would likely involve influential thought-leaders at symposia and conferences, books, whitepapers, media and press. Still others directly invite people to change their manner of living. We might call these lifeways initiatives; they focus on aspirations, livelihoods, consumption practices, community roles, communal affiliation, family and child-rearing and much more. Any of the initiatives below might involve two or all three of these types. The initiatives are not shown in any rank order. 1. Initiatives to inform and alert mass publics concerning the nature and limits of, and the potential benefits of and dangers posed by, the development and use of powerful emerging and converging technologies, including nanotechnology, synthetic biology, neurotechnology, human genetic modification and geoengineering. These would accompany or be followed by advocacy campaigns in support of needed regulatory and control policies domestically and internationally.
2. Initiatives to promote a fuller and deeper understanding of the nature of consciousness, free will, agency and the mind, intended to correct misleading and disempowering understandings of these essential human qualities. T.hese initiatives would likewise inform public understanding of "artificial intelligence/' "smart robots" and the like, and critique anthropomorphic naming conventions in general.
3. Initiatives to support significant reductions in economic inequality using the widest range of approaches, including policy measures, institutional change, training and education, and more. It can be expected that these efforts, although helpful, will on balance prove to be of limited final impact. If interpreted correctly this experience could help set the stage for more deeply transformative initiatives to address economic inequalities.
4. Initiatives to address climate change and the myriad other threats to global ecological integrity. As with initiatives intended to address economic inequality, the sum of these initiatives will likely be of limited final impact but could help motivate more deeply transformative initiatives.
5. Initiatives in support of simple, modest and responsible lifeways, involving lowered aspirations regarding income and wealth, less material consumption, less use of problematic technologies, and renewed emphasis on the fullness of human relationships, notably at familial and communal levels.
6. Initiatives intended to explore avenues towards local, national and international cease-fires in the many battles of the culture wars in the West and elsewhere. Agreement on limited confidence-building measures,
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and their successful implementation, could help prepare the way for the development of new and non divisive ideological understandings. 7. Initiatives to develop new hyper-interdisciplinary curricula, as part of both formal and informal educational programs, to help prepare students, young adults and others for leadership roles in the work of building a just, sustainable and technologically responsible world for themselves and for succeeding generations.
8. Preparation and promotion of professional assessments documenting the gross impracticability of extraterrestrial colonization as a solution to human problems over short, medium and much longer time horizons. 9. Major national and international interfaith initiatives to introduce young people to the nature and variety of religious and religio-philosophical experience, belief, tradition and community, under the broadest possible tents. 10. Initiatives exploring ways in which communitarian perspectives might bring together individuals of seemingly disparate ideological orientations, in ways that might generate new understandings and collaborative activities. A short-to-mid-range objective might be the establishment of "communitarianism" (or whatever naming convention is agreed upon) as a recognized, attractive and thriving ideological perspective and practice.
11. Responsible exploration, at both academic and popular levels, of ways in which political systems can most effectively balance individualist and communal needs and desires, as expressed in law, policy, governance, institutional structures, social norms, education, commerce, science and technology policy and more, with particular attention to the nature of political systems that can fulfill desires for economic justice, ecological integrity and technological responsibility, under conditions of little of no economic growth.
12. Initiatives supportive of dignity, maturity, respect and moderation in all aspects of popular culture. 13. An initiative in opposition to the formal adoption of "Anthropocene" as a professionally-recognized new geostratigraphical epoch. 14. Initiatives exploring ways in which the meaningful time-horizons for personal, national and global reflection, planning and action can be expanded beyond years and decades and come to include centuries.
162 I repeat for emphasis: Even if the initiatives sketched in the main text and in DN 161 were made to happen successfully, they would still only be preliminary to and preparatory for the sort of transformative global transition that is called for. Something in addition will need to happen. What this is remains to be discerned, understood, articulated and taken into the world.
73 Towards an Initiative for a Human Future- Outline Draft 1.8
ATTACHMENTS
The attachments are in preparation; selected materials are included in this outline.
A. Definitions of Growth, Well-Being and Related Key Concepts B. Scenarios of Global Development B.l- Review of Past Quantitative Scenarios B.2- Model A and the Archetypal Scenarios B.3- Review of Past Narrative Scenarios C. Economic Justice C.l-ldeology, Wealth and Income C.2- Proposals to Reduce Economic Inequality: Review and Assessment C.3- How Much is Enough and What is Fair? D. Ecological Integrity D.l- Climate Change D.2- Energy Regimes D.3- Assessing Global Catastrophic Risk E. Steady-State Political Economy: Review and Assessment F. Geopolitical Structures G. Ideology: Beyond the Left-Right Divide H. Acknowledgments
BIBLIOGRAPHY
74 ATTACHMENT A. DEFINITIONS OF GROWTH, WELL-BEING AND RELATED KEY CONCEPTS
[This Attachment is from Hayes {2004; Appendix 5) and will be revised and updated for the whitepaper.}
As most commonly used, the word "growth" simply means an increase. In many contexts "growth" applies more generally to any change over time, and thus includes negative growth. In these notes we might be interested in the growth, or change over time, of output, consumption, utility (or welfare, well-being or happiness), throughput (or resource use), population, pollution, the stock of natural or human-made capital, information, complexity or any of many other things.
For our purposes it is particularly important to have clear definitions of well-being, throughput and output. There is a large literature on how these might be defined and measured, but the rough definitions below will suffice for now.
"Well-being" refers to the most general, inclusive sense of human satisfaction and contentment. The question "what determines well-being?" is among the most important questions there are. .·
"Throughput" is the flow of natural resources used to generate output. Some throughput generates output directly, but most becomes output only after a series of manipulations. During these manipulations some of the throughput becomes waste. Particular flows of resources can be easily measured but there is no practical common unit with which to measure throughput in the aggregate.
"Output" is throughput manipulated by human activities intended to increase well-being. It can equivalently be defined as all final goods and services produced by an economy during a time period. To the extent that prices reflect value, output can be measured as the sum of the prices of these goods and services, or gross domestic product (GOP). The proper measurement of output, or GOP, should include imputed prices for both positive and negative non-market goods. While any particular act of producing output is intended to increase well-being, it may not. As defined here output has an important bearing on well-being but is not synonymous with it. In these notes the term "economic growth" is used to mean the growth of output.
Well-being, throughput and output can each increase, decrease or remain constant. We can imagine 311 3 = 27 scenarios, some more plausible than others, showing how these three variables might change with respect to one another over time. Three scenarios are shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3 in Box A-1.
Figure 1 illustrates a conventional interpretation of the historical experience of the industrial world over the past three centuries or so. Greater throughput enables production of more output, which increases well-being.
Figure 2 is a "green" scenario. Technological innovation allows a constant level of output to be produced with less throughput, while skillful craftwork changes qualities of that output in such a way that well-being increases.
Figure 3 is a mixed bag. A constant level ofthroughput is maintained, perhaps because a transition to a renewables:based economy has been successfully completed. And technological innovation is robust enough to generate a steady increase in output. But well-being declines nonetheless, perhaps because this materially sustainable, technologically productive world is being run as an increasingly authoritarian police state.
As defined, output represents a link between the fundamentally more significant variables of well-being and throughput. Output is of interest to us primarily because it contributes to well-being and uses throughput.
The five scenarios shown in Figures 1 through 5 in Box A-2 dispense with "output" and illustrate different sorts of relationships that may obtain more directly between the level of well-being and the level of throughput.
1 BOX A-1. WHAT GROWS? (1)
The figures show well-being, output and throughput increasing, decreasing and remaining constant over time.
well-being
1. output
throughput
time
2.
well-being
output
throughput
3.
well-being
output
2 BOXA-2. WHAT GROWS? (2)
The figures show different ways in which trajectories of throughput might bear upon trajectories of well-being, as discussed in the text.
well-being throughput
time L_------~----
1. "the metal eaters" 2. "gloomy Sunday"
well-being well-being
~technological ~ubjective change change
throughput throughput
3. "techno-green" 4. "subjective green"
5. "green minimal claim"
3 Figure 1 illustrates, once more, the conventional account.1
Figure 2 shows the unhappy case in which throughput continues to grow but well-being declines.
Figures 3 and 4 are both green scenarios and show the same formal relationship between throughput and well being, but they are driven by very different processes and represent very different outcomes. Figure 3 shows the 11techno-green11 scenario. Human technological skill allows a constant level of throughput to be manipulated in increasingly efficient and innovative ways. As a result, human well-being can increase without endangering the environment.
Figure 4 is the 11Subjective-green11 scenario. It shows a constant level of throughput, but this time there are no technological improvements. The same stuff is made in the same way, century after century. However, the quality of the services provided by the output improves. The design and construction of a saxophone may not change over the course of a century, but the beauty and variety of the compositions written for it, and of the performances given with it, can grow indefinitely.
There is a second, more subtle interpretation of the scenario shown in Figure 4. Neither the saxophone, the compositions, nor the performances change over the course of time, but the listeners develop an increasingly keener appreciation for the music. Throughput remains constant but well-being grows.
Figure 5 is the /I green minimal claim" scenario. The minimal claim is simply that a constant level of throughput can indefinitely support some constant, fulfilling level of well-being.
Limits and constraints on the rates and levels of growth
The phrase 111imits to growth11 is ambiguous because the thing whose growth is limited is unspecified. It is also
ambiguous because /I growth" can refer either to the rate of growth or to the level to which something can grow. We can say that output (for example) is limited to a growth rate of 2% per year, or that output is limited to an absolute level of $30 trillion. Note that a limit to the level of growth implies an eventual limit to the rate of growth, i.e., 0%.
The term 11 limits" can be used to mean either an absolute level that cannot be exceeded, or a softer set of constraints short of an absolute limit. In this exercise we try to use "limits" when speaking of values that cannot
be exceeded, and /I constraints" for the more general set of impediments. As used here, "constraints" is the inclusive term: a limit is a very strong constraint, but a constraint need not, although it might, impose a limit.
Thus we can speak, hopefully unambiguously, of limits to the level to which something can grow, limits to the rate at which something can growth, constraints on the level to which something can grow, and constraints on the rate at which something can grow.
The Rhetoric of Growth
President Ronald Reagan once offered the opinion that "there are no limits to growth, because there are no limits to the human imagination." Put less succinctly but more precisely, he might have been expressing the opinion that there are no limits to the ability of technology to manipulate any given level of throughput such that human well-being continues to increase.
Some environmentalists say, 11Th ere are limits to growth, but not to well-being. 11 One interpretation of this statement might be that technology will allow us to manipulate an environmentally sustainable, constant level of throughput in a way that can allow human well-being to increase indefinitely.
1 "The metal eaters" is a translation of "MeTaJIJIH4eCKHe e)lOKH," used by Russian environmentalists to describe the institutions of industrial civilization.
4 Other environmentalists say, "There are limits to throughput, but there are no limits to growth." In the previous statement "growth" referred to throughput, but here it could refer to well-being, or to output, or to both well being and output.
Can We Measure Well-Being?
The Standard National Accounts were developed in the 1940's in order to track the flows of economic variables, including output, consumption, savings, investment, the supply of money and public spending, that were needed to help develop policies intended to ensure steady output growth, low inflation and low unemployment. Especially n the wake of the Great Depression and the Second World War, a steady growth in output was experienced by most persons as a major contribution to well-being. The availability of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as an analytically convenient measure of output led to its identification among economists, political leaders and the public as a measure of well-being.
The inadequacies of conventional GDP as a measure of both output and well-being are well known. Its major inadequacy as a measure of output is that it doesn't account for goods or bads external to the market.
Attempts to address the shortcomings of the GDP have gone in two directions. One is to improve its usefulness as a measure of output, while disclaiming any role for it as a measure of well-being. This entails converting as many non-market goods and bads as possible into dollar terms and incorporating these into the national income accounts, and other reforms.
A second direction seeks to devise genuine measures of well-being which over time could supplement or supplant GDP in that role. One approach involves the use of (fully inclusive) GDP in association with satellite accounts of variables that are judged to have a bearing on well-being, such as longevity, infant mortality, literacy or stocks and flows of natural resources. A second approach is to combine these measures into a single statistic by means of an indexing formula. The choice set of satellite accounts, and any indexing weights they might be given, are of course strongly normative statements.
Some examples of efforts along the lines described are shown in Box A-3. Figure 1 shows the measure that Nordhaus and Tobin {1989) call Net Economic Welfare {NEW). NEW takes Net National Product, which is GNP less depreciation, and adds the value of leisure time, domestic activities, "underground" transactions, and other non market goods. It subtracts non-market bads such as economic damages resulting from pollution and urban congestion. Nordhaus defines NEW as "an adjusted measure of total national output that includes only consumption and investment items that contribute directly to economic well-being." In general, the growth rate of NEW has paralleled the growth rate of conventional GDP.
Figure 2 displays the Genuine Progress Indicator {GPI) developed by the organization Redefining Progress (1995), based on work by Daly and Cobb {1989). Like NEW, the GPI adds the value of domestic activities to GDP. However, the GPI shows a decrease in leisure time rather than an increase. In the GPI environmental pollution and resource depletion reduce GDP by larger amounts than they do in the NEW. In addition, GPI incorporates an indexing factor that records the growth of economic inequality as a decrease in well-being. These plus other modifications of the GDP accounts generate a path over time very different from that displayed by NEW.
Figure 3 shows the Human Development Index developed by the United Nations Development Program {1996). This relatively simple index has three components: life expectancy, educational attainment {based on adult literacy rates and mean years of schooling), and adjusted income. Income is GDP per capita computed on a Purchasing Power Parity basis, subject to a strongly diminishing marginal index value.
Easterlin {1995) doubts that any set of objective measures can accurately model all the determinants of well-being, and suggests that surveys of how people assess their own well-being can provide a better guide. Figure 4 shows how people in the United States responded to a question asking them how happy they are. The slight trend shown
5 BOX A-3. MEASURING WELL-BEING
These figures illustrate how differing measures of well-being have changed in recent years.
Figure 1. Net Economic Welfare (Reprinted from Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1989, p 119)
Net National Produc1 (pet capita, 1982 prices) ~
Net f:conumit: WcH:lt<· (per c01pit:t, I •)~2 pricc~l
Year
Figure 2. GPI versus GDP (Reprinted from Redefining Progress, 1995)
0 0 ... (::; .... 0 ... 6 BOX A-3. MEASURING WELL-BEING (cont.) Figure 3. Human Development Index, 1960-1993 (United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report, 1996) 1960 1970 1980 1993 --World -+- Industrial Countries ...... Developing Countries __ Least Developed Countries Figure 4. Happiness (Reprinted from Easterlin, 1995) 100r------~ 60 -· ...... ' ...... eo-· · · · · · · · · · ...... 40 -· ...... • • • • • • • 20 r-· ...... "' .,. ••••.• ,. II- o~~~~~~-L-·~·~~·-L-·~~~-~·~ 1972 1975 1879 1984 1988 1001 Year The vertical axis shows the "percent very happy," based on National Opinion Research Center for Genetics and Society surveys through 1991. 7 by the regression line is not statistically significant. Reported happiness in the United States over the past twenty years has been constant, despite a major increase in output during that time. Applied to the United States, these alternatives to conventional GDP move in different ways over time. The NEW and HDI increase, the GPI decreases, and the proportion of people stating that they are happy remains unchanged. # # # 8 ATTACHMENT B. SCENARIOS OF GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT B.l. REVIEW OF PAST QUANTITATIVE SCENARIOS [Section 8.1 is from Hayes (2004} and will be revised and updated for the whitepaper.] Box IA-1 shows projections of total world output associated with five noted models of world development. The scenarios are described in IA-2. How do the authors of these models motivate these scenarios? Meadows, Nordhaus and Kahn all show economic growth coming to an end, but at different final levels and for different reasons. Meadows believes that biogeophysicallimits to economic growth will compel us to live within them. Nordhaus believes that productivity-enhancing technological innovation will become increasingly subject to diminishing returns. Kahn believed that as wealth increases people will become satiated and jaded and lose their entrepreneurial and acquisitive desires. Romer's scenario does not show limits to growth. He believes that increasing returns to technology and knowledge should allow growth to continue indefinitely. Cline's growth projections are extensions of projections made by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and are not further motivated. Different assumptions concerning population growth are not an important reason for the differences among the scenarios. Other than Meadows, all the authors use standard projections prepared by the United Nations. In these, population stabilizes at about 11 billion by the middle of the 2151 century. Meadows uses a lower stabilization value of 7. 7 billion. These globally aggregated projections are a useful initial reference, but if we wish to consider questions regarding income inequality we need regionally disaggregated models. IA-3 shows projections of economic growth for six scenarios ending in 2100, four of which-by Holdren, Nordhaus, Kahn, Greenpeace--are disaggregated on a regional basis. 1 These scenarios are described in IA-2. Readers familiar with the global futures debate might suspect that I've mislabeled the projections in IA-3. Nordhaus and Kahn present "business-as-usual" scenarios in which world GDP reaches $211 and $274 trillion, respectively, by 2105. Greenpeace and Holdren present "preferred" scenarios in which world GDP reaches $282 and $460 trillion by that date. How can it be that the preferred scenarios recommended by two noted environmental advocates show greater economic growth than do the business-as-usual scenarios presented by two noted pro-growth neo-classical economists? The answer is that the Green peace and Holdren scenarios incorporate a normative desire that the economic disparities between the rich and the poor countries of the world be significantly reduced, while the 1 Box IA-3 includes the scenarios shown in IA-1 except for Cline's, and adds new ones by Holdren and Green peace. Cline's scenario was not included to avoid crowding. Termination of the time horizon at 2105 allows the main points of this section to be illustrated more conveniently. 1 BOX IA-1. WORLD OUTPUT TRAJECTORIES 1965-2305 1965 1985 2005 2025 2045 2065 2085 2105 2125 2145 2165 2185 2205 2225 2245 2265 2285 2305 -+--William Nordhaus ( 1996) ---+---Paul Romer (1996) ---+---Donella Meadows et al (1992) -a- William Cline ( 1992) ~Herman Kahn (1979) 2 BOX IA-2. WORLD OUTPUT TRAJECTORIES- DESCRIPTIONS 1. World Output Trajectories, 1965-2305 (Box IA-1) Box IA-1 shows projections of total world output made by noted economists and other analysts for the period 1965-2305. All figures are in 1990 U.S. dollars. Nordhaus: This is the reference case output trajectory used by Nordhaus for his RICE model (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996). He uses United Nations mid-range population forecasts, which show stabilization at 10.6 billion. World per capita output reaches $20,500 by 2100 and stabilizes near $42,000 shortly after 2200. Romer: At the July 1996 Western Economic Association annual convention in San Francisco Paul Romer estimated that the global economy should be able to sustain a per capita output growth rate of about 2 to 3 percent for the indefinite future. The trajectory shown in the chart uses a value of 2.5%, along with the United Nations population projections used by Nordhaus. Per capita output in 2100 is about $60,000. Meadows: This is the path of global output that Meadows et al., in Beyond the Limits to Growth (1992), suggest should be followed in order to avoid the catastrophic reduction in output that would otherwise result as biogeophysicallimits are exceeded. Population is limited to 7.7 billion and per capita output is estimated to stabilize at about $5,400. Cline: This is the reference case output trajectory used by Cline in The Economics of Global Warming (1992). It is based on extrapolations of mid-range projections used by the World Bank and the United Nations for the coming century, tempered by Cline's judgment that these rates will slow in later decades. In 2100 population is stable at 10.5 billion and per capita output is about $15,200. Kahn: This is the output trajectory offered by Kahn in World Economic Development (1979) as an alternative to that offered by the authors of The Limits to Growth. Population stabilizes at 10 billion. In 2100 per capita output is about $26,000 and it stabilizes a century later at about $40,000. 2. World Output Trajectories, 1965-2105 (Box IA-3) Box IA-3 shows output trajectories for the period 1965-2105. Four of the trajectories {Nordhaus, Romer, Meadows and Kahn) are the same as those shown in Box IA-1 but here cover only the period through 2105. Cline's trajectory has been deleted and new ones by Holdren and Green peace have been added. Holdren: John Holdren (1996) presented his "best plausible" scenario for reducing reliance on fossil fuels and achieving distributional equity among nations at an April U.C. Berkeley symposium. The trajectory shown in IA-3 is the output trajectory used in this best plausible scenario. In 2100 population has stabilized at 9 billion and per capita output is about $47,700. Greenpeace: This is the growth path used in the study Towards a Fossil Free Energy Future (1993) prepared for Green peace by Lazarus et al. of the Stockholm Environmental Institute. It uses the same population and total world output assumptions adopted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), but modifies per capita output growth rates among regions to reduce inequities. In 2100 population has stabilized at 11.3 billion and per capita output is about $22,400. 3 BOX IA-3. WORLD OUTPUT TRAJECTORIES 1965- 2105 600 a::- 500 g..,.0 "5 ~ 400 .9-o ::la> 0~ :g g 300 s:S0 ·- :§ ~ 200 100 1965 1985 2005 2025 2045 2065 2085 2105 ----William Nordhaus (1996} -+-Paul Romer(1996} --+-Donella Meadows et al. (1992} -B- Greenpeace(1993} --<>--Herman Kahn (1979} --o-- John Holdren (1996} 4 scenarios of Nordhaus and Kahn do not. Because income inequality between the rich and the poor countries is in fact so large, Greenpeace and Holdren must show strong, continuous economic growth by poor countries if they are to offer any hope that economic disparities can be reduced by more than a trivial amount within any time less than several centuries. 2 The Greenpeace and Holdren scenarios also incorporate a desire that total world output does not grow so large that important environmental values are threatened. Holdren sets a limit of 30 terawatts (TW) on the growth of world energy use, which he estimates is the maximum desirable level that can be provided with renewable sources alone. For Greenpeace the limit is set by the desire to eliminate the use of fossil fuels by 2100. In order to live within these limits, while simultaneously reducing income inequality among countries, economic growth in the highest income nations must slow over the coming decades. This can be seen clearly in IA-4 and IA-5. In the Nordhaus and Kahn scenarios the growth rates of low income countries exceed those of the richer countries by little more than 1-1.5%. The result is that only minimal progress is made in reducing economic inequality among countries by 2100. The Nordhaus regional projections are shown in IA-6. Further inspection of the Nordhaus and Kahn scenarios shows that economic growth in all regions slows to zero while substantial economic inequalities still exist. This condition is problematic, to say the least. The distribution of income between countries has rightly received great attention among global scenario 3 modelers over the past thirty years, but the distribution of income within countries has received much less. This is a remarkable omission. Income inequality is arguably the single greatest source of social conflict throughout history and at the present time. Scenarios of global development that are intended to help inform broad world-views of the human prospect cannot do this unless they include projections of income distribution within countries, and describe how these might be expected to change under different conditions and policies. The topic of income inequality within countries is discussed at length in Section II.B. As we'll see, empirical studies and analytic models suggest that the distribution of income tends to change only slowly over time, and is resistant to policy. This brief review suggests that there are important ways in which economic growth, environmental protection and distributional equity between and within countries either conflict with or help support one another. In the next section we present a simple regionalized world model that can help us study these relations in more detail. 2 Appendix 1 (in www.torahumanfuture.org) shows that under the conventional business-as-usual assumptions used by Cline, the gap between the developed and the developing countries would be eliminated sometime between 2600 and 2700, at which time mean GDP would be about $2,000,000 per household (1990 US$). 3 Authors who have sought to model within-country income distributions over time include Chenery, Ahluwalia, et al {1974), Adelman and Robinson {1978), Taylor and Lysy {1979), Chichilnisky and Cole {1978), Moreland {1984), and Bessant and Cole {1985). In general their projections do not show results for periods much longer than several decades. 5 BOX IA-4. HOLDREN'S SCENARIO [Holdren 1996] Figure 1. World Per Capita GDP under Business-As-Usual Scenario 80~------, 70 60 c..~ 0 (.9:::)t5so roo ~~40 a...... rJ.._o _en 30 1990 2010 2030 2050 2070 2090 ---Industrialized Countries --+-Developing Countries Figure 2. World Per Capita GDP under "Best Plausible" Scenario 8QT------~ 70 60 c..~ otj so (.9:::) roo ~~40 a...- rJ~ 30 '-0 10 oL±~~~~_.~--~._~~~ 1990 2010 2030 2050 2070 2090 ---Industrialized Countries ~Developing Countries 6 BOX IA-5. GREENPEACE SCENARIOS OF PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH [Lazarus eta!., 1993] Figure I shows reference scenario per capita GOP growth for six world regions from 1990 to 2100 adopted by the IPCC ( 1990). Green peace modified this trajectory to give the "Equity Scenario" shown in Figure 2. Under the Equity Scenario: "[W]e propose an assumption for regional income equity wherein the ratio of highest to lowest average income drops to 2:1by 2100, compared with the current ratio of over 14:1. We maintain the IPCC90 projected regional growth rates over the next 20 years, and then gradually adjust them over the 2010-21 00 period to achieve this increased equity objective." (p 23) Figure 1. Per Capita GDP under the IPCC 1990 Reference Scenario (1985 US$) -+- Africa __ Central Plan Asia ,..._Eastern Europe ....- US/W.Europe!Japan _..Latin America _,_ Middle East Figure 2. Per Capita GDP under the Greenpeace "Equity Scenario" (1985 US$) 10 it,.~ 60 ~;l.ro J! 30 --Africa __ Central Plan Asia ...... Eastern Europe --US!W.Europe/Japan --Latin America _,_ Middle East 7 BOX IA-6. RICE REFERENCE SCENARIO PROJECTIONS OF PER CAPUTA INCOME [Nordhaus 1996] 120 100 ii} (/) 80 => 0 O'l O'l 60 Cll "0 c ro Cll ::J 0 40 .r::. :!::- 20 1990 2010 2030 2050 2070 2090 2110 2130 2150 2170 2190 2210 -USA -+-Japan __._ EEC ---<>---China -+-Former Soviet Union ----6---- Rest ofthe World 8 ATTACHMENT 8.2. MODEL A AND THE ARCHETYPAL SCENARIOS In this attachment we present a model of world development and use it to construct quantitative developmental scenarios. The name of this model is "Model A." Model A shows changes in population, economic output, energy use and income distribution over the period 2000- 2150. Model A aggregates the countries of the world into four sectors: low-income countries, China, middle income countries, and high-income countries. 1 Decadal rates of change of population, per capita GDP, energy intensity and income distribution are specified exogenously. Below we construct and describe quantitative elements of the three archetypal scenarios presented in the main text: Techno-Progressivism, Balanced Equitable World and Green Sustainability. We start with Techno-Progressivism as the business-as-usual or reference case scenario, as motivated in the main text. We'll use this scenario to introduce the major structural elements and assumptions of the model, and modify these to generate the other two scenarios. The equations of Model A are shown in Box B2-1 and Box B2-2. Derivation of initial values and growth rate projections can be seen in Hayes (2004; Appendix 2). A display of key variables, their initial values, and their values as of 2150 under the three archetypal scenarios is shown in Box B2-3. Supplemental discussion of the income distribution dynamics of Model A can be seen in the Addendum. Graphic displays of the three archetypal scenarios can be seen in Box B2-4 through Box B2-9. A complete print-out of the reference case scenario (Techno Progressivism) appears as Box B2-10. A. TECHNO-PROGRESSIVISM *Population growth: World population growth slows gradually and stabilizes at 11 billion by 2100. This is slightly above the median population projection of 10 billion prepared by the United Nations, but markedly lower than its high projection in which population appears to stabilize at about 18 billion by 2150. The techno-progressive vision is actually rather agnostic concerning population. Some advocates see no reason that advanced technologies cannot support populations of 30 or 40 billion or more. Many believe that the human future will be largely either extra-terrestrial or downloaded to silicon-based nano-scale platforms, or both, such that population size is effectively unlimited and could grow to many trillions over the coming two or three centuries. Still other techno progressives advocate a minimal terrestrial population, perhaps only a few hundred million, of super-empowered post-human entities. The stable population of 11 billion chosen here for the Techno-progressive scenario is consistent with moderate versions of Techno-progressivism, and serves as a convenient reference level for the two other archtypcal scenarios, both of which call for lower populations. 1 These sectors follow the classification used by the World Bank in its World Development Report (1996), with the exception that we show China as a separate sector rather than included as one of the low income countries. See Hayes (2004; Appendix 2) for the list of countries included in each sector. 1 BOX B2-1. MODEL A Equations of the Model population growth 10 (2) Yi I = Yi 0 ( 1 + g i 0) per capita income growth changes in energy intensity 10 (4) Yi.i 1 = Yi.iO ( 1 + gio) + Sj j fj 0 (Yi 4 0 + Yi 50 - 2 Yi 0 ); j = 1' 2, 3 10 Yi .i o ( 1 + g i o) rio(Yi.iO- Yio); j =4, 5 changes in income distribution [see Box B2-2 and Addendum for discussion] 5 2 (5) Gio= 1.2- [ [ L j= 1 ( 6-j) Yi.iO] I 12.5 (Yio) ] Gini coefficient [see Hayes (2004; Appendix A4) for discussion] Variables and Parameters of the Model P =population (billions) y =per capita income (1990 US$) e =energy intensity (total terawatts/total GOP) G = Gini coefficient n = population growth rate (%/year) g =per capita income growth rate (%/year) q = energy intensity growth rate [<0] (%/year) i =sectoral index: I, 4 [low income, China, middle income, high income] j = income quintile: 1, 5 [Q 1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5] time subscript= 0, 1, 2 ... = 2000, 20 I 0, 2020 ... S;j =redistributive proportionality factor= (y; - Yii) I [3 y; - (y; 1 + y; 2 + y; 3)] r = rate of redistribution (%) Initial and Reference Scenario values are shown in Box B2-1 0. 2 BOX B2-2. MODELING CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME The equations below model changes in the distribution of income within an income sector. The per capita income of sector i grows at annual rate gi, compounded decadally. In the absence of redistributive pressure (r = 0) all quintiles share equally in this growth. At the end of each decade income can be redistributed from those quintiles in which income is above the sector mean to those quintiles in which income is below the mean. The proportion of the total income above the mean that is redistributed in any period is given by the redistributive variable r, with 0 < r :::; I. The value of r can be varied by time period. Meanwhile, the proportionality factor s ensures that the amount which a quintile whose income is below the mean receives from the total amount to be distributed is proportional to the amount by which that quintile is below the mean. If a constant r is maintained over decades the incomes of all quintiles converge. The larger the value of r, the faster the convergence. We can also show r < 0, in which case incomes will be redistributed from those quintiles below the mean to those above the mean. The Addendum illustrates the derivation and interpretation of the model in more detail. The model is a calculatory convenience that allows scenarios to be generated showing changes in the level and distribution of income. It does not embody a theory of income distribution. This would require that r be made a function of other variables in the model, such as the growth rate g or per capita income, rather than standing as an exogenous variable. 10 (4.1) Yin YiiO (1 + gi0) + sii no ( Yi4o + Yiso - 2yi0) (4.2) Yi21 Yi2o (I + giO )10 + si2 rio ( Yi40 + Yiso - 2yio) 10 (4.3) Yi31 Yi30 (1 + gio) + si3 riO ( Yi40 + Yiso - 2yio) 10 (4.4) Yi4I Yi40 (1 + gi0) - riO ( Yi40 - YiO ) 10 (4.5) Yisi Yiso (1 + gio) - riO ( Yiso - Yio) where (6) Sij = (Yi - Yii ) I [3yi- ( Yil + Yi2 + Yi3 )] (7) Yi = I /5 2:yii definitions: Yiit =per capita income of quintile j of income sector i in year t Yit = per capita income of the full income sector i in year t git = growth rate of per capita income in income sector i in year t Sij = redistributive proportionality factor for each quintile j of income sector i rit =rate of redistribution for income sector i in year t 3 * Economic Growth: Under Techno-Progressivism per capita GOP growth in the high income countries recovers from its current Great Recession slump, reaches a slightly-better-than-historic-average rate of 2% annually after 2030, and stays at that level indefinitely. The other regions maintain their current catch-up rates of 4-5% for some time before slowing to sustained rates of 2%. The middle income countries, China and the low income countries stabilize at this 2% annual rate of per capita CGP growth at about the time that each of them reach per capita output levels near $25,000. By 2150 per capita GOP worldwide has reached $127,000, a level 26 times its 2000 level of $4,900. The low income countries have grown faster than the high income countries, reaching levels of GOP fully 181 times greater than their levels in 2000. However, the per capita income of $466,000 in the high income countries remains absolutely higher than the low income country level of $66,000, a ratio of 7:1. Note that the sustained rate of 2% per capita growth is barely the level most mainstream economists and political leaders appear to believe is necessary to maintain social cohesion and political stability in advanced societies. However, it is significantly above the 0.5- 1.2% percent that some analysts foresee as the new normal following the end of the one-time long-term technological boom of the late 19th through mid-20th centuries. Still, an annual growth rate of even just 0.5% represents a 136-year doubling time. * Energy use: Energy intensity is the measure of how much energy it takes to generate a dollar of output. It is measured in units of TW/$1000 GOP. Under Techno-Progressivism energy intensity declines (i.e., production becomes more energy efficient) along the historically aggressive path described in Appendix Box A2-6 and Box A2- 7 of Hayes (2004). Initially it declines most rapidly in China and least rapidly in the low and middle income countries. Meanwhile the rate of decline decreases in the developed countries in the late 21st century, reflecting technological constraints in the face of very high, and continually increasing, absolute levels of energy production. By 2100 energy intensity is declining in all sectors at the same moderate rate of 0.5% annually. By 2150 $1000 of GOP requires 80 KW of energy, compared with 450 KW in 2000, a 560% improvement in energy intensity. Total energy production reaches 115 TW by 2150, over eight times the level of 13.6 TW generated in 2000. As noted in the main text of the white paper outline, proposals to generate energy at this level rely on technologies that have not yet been shown to be feasible, much less practicable. * Income distribution within countries: Under Techno-Progressivism everyone is doing absolutely better indefinitely, and as a consequence concern about economic inequality is minimal. We show inequality in the high income countries increasing at 6% per decade, roughly the rate that the top/bottom {20/20) quintile ratio in the United States increased over the three decades 1980-2010. Under this assumption, the 20/20 ratio in the high income countries increases from 6.5:1 in 2000 to 15.6:1 in 2150. This is equivalent to the 20/20 ratios that obtained in, for example, Thailand, Columbia and Zimbabwe in the late 1990s. The other three income sectors begin in 2000 with 20/20 ratios higher than in the high-income countries. As a simplifying assumption we show them experiencing greater economic inequality as per capita income approaches the levels of the high-income countries, and increasing at the same rate of 6% per decade. By 2150 the 20/20 ratios in all four income sectors have converged to the same value of about 15:1. Both per capita GOP and economic inequality continue to increase after that point, at rates of 2% annually and 6% per decade respectively. 4 BOX 82-3. MODEL A- Preliminary Results, 6/2/14 Historical ARCHETYPAL SCENARIOS- values as of 2150 Values- Techno-Progressive Balanced Equitable Green Variable Units 2000 (BAU) World Sustainability 1 World population billions 6.2 11 9 7 2 World GOP trillions ('90 US$) 30 1,402 676 178 3 World GOP/capita $/person ('90 US$) 4,876 127,000 75,000 25,000 4 World population growth rate %/yr 1.3 0 0 0 5 World GOP/capita growth rate %/yr 1.2 2 0 0 6 World energy use TW 13.6 115 60 18 7 World energy use/capita KW/person 2.2 10.4 6.7 2.6 8 Energy intensity W/$1000 ('90 US$) 450 80 90 100 GOP/capita {by income sector) ('90 US$) 9 low-income countries 366 66,000 75,000 25,000 10 China 628 93,000 75,000 25,000 11 middle-income countries 2,752 143,000 75,000 25,000 12 high-income countries 26,689 466,000 75,000 25,000 Ratio af per capita GOP of high-come countries to others 13 low-income countries 73 7 1 1 14 China 43 5 1 1 15 middle-income countries 10 3 1 1 16 high-income countries 1 1 1 1 Ratio of top income quintile to bottom income quintile, in each sector 17 low-income countries 7.8 1S.7 3.0 3.0 18 China 7.1 15.7 3.0 3.0 19 middle-income countries 7.4 15.7 3.0 3.0 20 high-income countries 6.5 15.7 3.0 3.0 Gini Coefficients 21 low-income countries 0.38 0.52 0.27 0.27 22 China 0.36 0.51 0.27 0.27 23 middle-income countries 0.37 0.49 0.27 0.27 24 high-income countries 0.32 0.42 0.27 0.27 Mean Household Income (by quintiles} ('90 US$) Low-Income Countries (n=51} 25 1st 248 23,000 90,000 30,000 26 2nd 411 55,000 111,000 39,000 27 3rd 586 89,000 134,000 46,000 28 4th 850 141,000 166,000 57,000 29 5th 1,931 354,000 270,000 90,000 China (n=1} 30 1st 424 29,000 90,000 30,000 31 2nd 718 78,000 111,000 39,000 32 3rd 1,080 137,000 134,000 46,000 33 4th 1,613 226,000 166,000 57,000 34 5th 3,002 455,000 270,000 90,000 Middle-Income Countires (n=57} 35 1st 1,934 51,000 90,000 30,000 36 2nd 3,157 124,000 111,000 39,000 37 3rd 4,463 202,000 134,000 46,000 38 4th 6,387 317,000 166,000 57,000 39 Sth 14,327 793,000 270,000 90,000 High-Income Countries (n=25} 40 1st 18,267 145,000 90,000 30,000 41 2nd 34,983 498,000 111,000 39,000 42 3rd 50,728 830,000 134,000 46,000 43 4th 69,979 1,235,000 166,000 57,000 44 5th 119,257 2,274,000 270,000 90,000 45 Ratio of high income top quintile/low income bottom quintile 481:1 99:1 3:1 3:1 NB: For Techno-Progressive {BAU), values of per capita GDP, energy use and inequality continue to increase after 2150. For Better Equitable World and Green Sustainability, these values are constant after 2150. 5 BOX 82-4. TECHNO-PROGRESSIVISM (BAU) POPULATION AND ECONOMIC TRAJECTORIES Population 6000 i 5000 ...... ·•- .. --·•--·· ! 4000 _...... ·---· .-~ 3000 ...... ---- -... ·-- -· • --:6--- -· ·~ ·- .--- --6 :~_ .....- ....-· .. -~·k'' 2000 •... - ---··-·-· ·- ---· -- -- -· •· .... ---· --·- ---·--- -·- ··-· ·--- -·-- --+ . 1000 0• 0 0 0 13 0· 0 0---0 0 0 -0 ---8--- B-- 0 ---0 0 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 • -- low·income countries -• China • -middle-income -o high-income countries Per capita GOP 140000 120000 100000 80000 60000 40000 0 .-0 0 20000 0 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 • low-income countries + China • middle-income countries a high-income countries Total GOP 500000 450000 400000 350000 300000 250000 200000 150000 100000 50000 0 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 • low-income countries • China • middle-income countries -e- high-income countries Per Capita GOP Growth Rates 4.5 4 / .'!! ·-- .... !!! 3.5 • ~ 3 0> 2.5 0.. g 2 - -·-- --·----. ~ 1.5 0 ··---· a. 0 "'() 1 ~ 0.5 ' 0 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 • low-income countries •- China - •-- middle-income countries - o high-income countries 6 BOX B2-5. TECHNO-PROGRE [All values 1990 US$; all axes t~;!~~~~a~~~E DISTRIBUTION TRAJECTORIES LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES ~ean per capita income by quintile mean per capita income by quintile ! 90000 80000 70000 60000 50000 40000 30000 300000 20000 10000 2100 2120 2140 250000 CHINA m'ean per capita income by quintile 90000 80000 70000 200000 60000 I 50000 40000 -• • I 150000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES mean per capita income by quintile 100000 9oooo I 8oooo 1 7oooo I 1 0 i 50000 ::130000 0 2oooo I 10000 i 0 j i ' 2000 2020 2040 2060 2100 2120 2140 2080 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 7 B. BALANCED EQUITABLE WORLD Balanced Equitable World (BEW) seeks to maintain the best features of modernity and global industrial civilization while respecting the imperatives of biogeophysicallimits, ensuring an equitable distribution of wealth and income, and avoiding the use of technologies that destabilize ecological systems and the nature of human life. * Population growth- Population growth rates follow the Techno-Progressive business-as-usual trajectory and decline slowly to 2020. After 2020 population growth slows more rapidly than under Techno-Progressivism, reflecting a stronger expressed preference for a smaller global population. Global population reaches 9 billion by 2050 and remains at that level indefinitely. * Economic growth- Per capita GDP growth follows the business-as-usual scenario through 2030. After that time growth rates in high-income countries begin to decline, reach zero in 2150, and remain stable at zero after that. Middle-income countries grow strongly until 2050 but increasingly more slowly after that. Growth rates in lower come countries and China don't begin to decline until later in the 21st century, as they have larger gaps to close. By 2150, however, the per capita income gap among all four income sectors has closed and economic output no longer increases. Note that at no point over this 150-year period did the level of economic output decline. In 2150 per capita GDP worldwide is $75,000, a 15-fold increase over its level of $4,900 in 2000. By any measure this is a world of extraordinary material abundance, shared equitably by all. * Energy use: - Total energy production in 2150 is 60 TW, nearly 50% lower than the business-as-usual Techno Progressive level of 115 TW. Importantly, energy production is kept at this level indefinitely. The lower level of global energy production is attributable to the 41% lower level of per capita GDP and the 18% lower level of world population. (This lower level of energy demand is offset slightly by the somewhat arbitrary 12% higher level of energy intensity used in this scenario, reflecting constraints on technological innovation.) Still, 60 TW is 4.4 times the level of 13.6 TW produced in 2000. Establishing an indefinitely sustainable, carbon-free global energy regime of that scope and scale, over the next 150 years, represents a major challenge for the Balanced Equitable World scenario. At present there are no good proposals showing how this might be accomplished. * Income distribution within countries: Under Balanced Equitable World income inequality in all sectors follows the business-as-usual pattern of increasing inequality until 2020. At that point the inequality growth rate begins to decline. It reaches zero by 2030 and by 2040 inequality begins to decline absolutley. This pattern reflects institutional, behavioral, political and other changes of a transformative nature worldwide over the two decades 2020-2040. Inequality continues to decline absolutely through the second half of the 21st century and beyond, resulting in a 20/20 quintile ratio of 3:1 in all sectors by 2150. At that time the top quintile of households worldwide have a mean annual income of $270,000, while the bottom quintile receives $90,000. These represent increases since 2000 of 230% for the top quintile and 360% for the bottom quintile. Note that these quintile figures are consistent with both a perfectly static income distribution, in which households stay within a given quintile throughout the income-receiving years of their members, and with a perfectly mobile distribution, in which all households begin at $90K and end at $270K. An important feature of the Balanced Equitable World scenario is that although the overall rate of economic growth is slower than most economists and political leaders would accept today, it is sufficient to allow economic inequality to be dramatically reduced without any income quintile in any income sector needing to undergo any absolute reduction in income at any time. 8 C. GREEN SUSTAINABILITY The scenario of Green Sustainability is based on the assumption that Balanced Equitable World is most likely unrealizable and in any event unsustainable. It calls for an eventual steady-state global economy in which the annual incomes received by households in the highest income quintiles are lower than they are today, and in which those in today's lowest income quinitiles are significantly better off than they are today. Under Green Sustainability the world of 2150 is one of frugality but hardly one of poverty. * Population growth-The population trajectory follows that of Balanced Equitable World through 2050, at which point the growth rate reaches zero and world population is 9 billion. Rather than stabilizing indefinitely at that level, however, after 2060 population begins a slow absolute decline and stabilizes at 7 billion by 2150. * Economic growth - Per capita GDP growth rates follow the Balanced Equitable World scenario through 2030. After that growth rates in the high income countries begin to decline steadily, reaching zero by 2050. In 2060 output begins to decline absolutely. This decline continues through the 21 51 century but begins to moderate in the early 22"d century and by 2150 output stabilizes at a new steady-state level. Over this period the developing countries have grown slowly but continuously, and the historic per capita income gap between the developed and the developing world is now closed. Global per capita output is now $25,000, a 680% increase for the low income countries. For the high income countries it represents effectively no change from their per capita level of output in 2000, but it is a 46% decline from the $47,000 peak level realized in 2050-2060. * Energy use:- Under Green Sustainability world energy production in 2150 is 18 TW, 32% greater than the 13.6 TW level of 2000 but dramatically lower than the 60 TW of Balanced Equitable World and the 115 TW of Techno Progressivism. The difference is largely due to the combined effects of lower population and the lower levels of per capita GDP. Note, however, that energy use goes through a rise-and-decline trajectory, with levels above 30 TW throughout the half century between 2040 and 2090 and peaking at over 38 TWin 2060. As a consequence, interim sources will be needed to provide another 20 TW of energy above the sustainable level of 18 TW. Somewhat arbitrarily, energy intensity for Green Sustainability is shown to be 100 W/$1000 GDP, somewhat greater than the levels in the other two scenarios. This is meant to reflect the generally lower level of technological innovation and efficiency that might be expected under this scenario. * Income distribution within countries: Under Green Sustainability economic inequality within countries follows a pattern similar to that of Balanced Equitable World. It continues to increase until 2020, stabilizes during the 2030s, and then declines to a 20/20 quintile ratio of 3:1 by 2150. However, the challenge of reducing economic inequality is much greater in this scenario because the overall level of economic output is declining as well. In order to achieve both reduced output and reduced inequity, the upper quintile of households in the high-income countries must undergo a significant absolute decline in income. In 2000 the mean household income in this quintile was $119,000; it rises to $203,000 by 2060 but over the subsequent century declines to $90,000, a decrease of 24% from its 2000 level and 56% from that of 2060. Note, of course, that $90,000 in annual household income is a 470% increase for those initially in the top quintile of the lowest income countries. Even given the markedly reduced rates of growth under Green Sustainability, nearly 95% of the world's population is doing absolutely better economically in 2150 than it was in 2000. This is a consequence of the dynamics of exponential change: even very low rates of annual change generate large absolute changes if sustained over a long enough period. 9 BOX B2-6. BALANCED EQUITABLE WORLD POPULATION AND ECONOMIC TRAJECTORIES Population 6000 5000 4000 • • • • • • ~------·- -· ·- -·---·- --· 3000 /~ _,._ ---·--- -- 2000 • ---·------· ----·- -·------· ----·------·- ----·-- -· - -· ... - ·- •·· •· • ·• • - • -··--- ·----· -· ---· -·-- -· --· ·---··- -- 1000 0 0 --0 -0- 0 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0- ·0 -0 -0----0 0 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 Per capita GOP 140000 120000 100000 80000 60000 o---· D 0 40000 -0 0 0 _,._- 20000 __ ,.. ·- __ ,.. , 0 ~; a ·- .- 2000 2020 ·- 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 Total GOP 350000 300000 • 250000 200000 -- ...... 150000 100000 ___.k'~_ ...... -· ___ __. . ·---· --·· -· .--·---- ·-- -- 0 0- 0 0- 0 0 50000 _./~/ o-A · 0 -0 ·~> ~ 0~"--~'-~' ' 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 Per Capita GOP Growth Rates 4.5 • 4 ./...... - 2 3.5 ~ • ~ 3 "' 2.5 "- g 2 ,g_ 1.5 0 "'0 l;; a_ 0.5 0 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 10 BOX B2-7. BALANCED EQUITABLE WORLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION TRAJECTORIES [All values 1990 US$; all axes to same scale] LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES mean per capita income by quintile mean per capita income by quintile 300000 CHINA 250000 mean per capita income by quintile I ------ 90000 80000 D D 70000 60000 ..• .. 200000 50000 • 40000 -··• • 30000 20000 10000 150000 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES mean per capita income by quinlile 100000 90000 80000 1 70000 60000 50000 50000 40000 30000 D 20000 • 10000 o-- • ~- 0 . ·- --·- Iii lil li • ·- ·•· -··- 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 11 BOX 82-8. GREEN SUSTAINABILITY POPULATION AND ECONOMIC TRAJECTORIES Population 6000 5000 4000 __..- ---·- ·-- .. --· ---· .- ·-·------· 3000 .------·----~------·--·--·---· • -&· ·- --·-- -·- ... ·--·- .. 2000 ..----- .... ---· ------··-·- ···- ---·----&------·- --· i : - .-----·-----·-·· --·- ---· ---· ----·- --·-- ·--·-----· ··--·-- ·--·-- --· ---·-- --· 1000 o-- o -- o o o- o -o o ---o -- o- -o ---o- ______0 0 0 0 0 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 Per capita GOP 140000 r I 120000 i I 100000 I 80000 60000 o-- -0 0 0 -o --o 40000 o __ .o---- -o ---o- 0 - _:jc 0 .... - ... .,. cji 20000 .... - .... _: - - J ..__..._._, ...... I· ·--·-· --~-- - . ~a-r -·· 0 :a•; • -·-·· 2000 2020 "*' 2040 • 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 Total GOP 90000 80000 • 70000 --· ·--·--. 60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 0 Per Capita GOP Growth Rates 4.5 4 J!l 3.5 [lJ • .<:: 7~.~ 3 ~ 0> 2.5 0.. 0 \ 2 ~ (!) ~ 1.5 0 rl "o iD c. ' 0.5 ~\_\~ 0 ' •··' 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140-· 12 BOX B2-9. GREEN SUSTAINABILITYINCOME DISTRIBUTION TRAJECTORIES [All values 1990 US$; all axes to same scale] LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES mean per capita income by quintile mean per capita income by quintile ------ 90000 80000 70000 soaoo I 50000 40000 30000 20000 j 300000 1000~ I 2000• CHINA 250000 mean per capita income by quintile 90000 80000 70000 60000 200000 50000 40000 30000 0- 0 0 0 20000 • • .• - • 10000 .. --· -·- --·· ' 150000 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES mean per capita income by quintile 100000 90000 80000 70000 60000 50000 50000 40000 30000 0 0 20000 l i 10000 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 13 ADDENDUM: SUPPLEMENTAL NOTE ON MODELING CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME The equations shown in Boxes B2-1 and B2-2 above allow us to model changes in the distribution of income among quintiles over time. The Addendum Box 1 below illustrates how this works. Addendum Box 1. Model A Income Distribution Procedure ·········· "L.········· ········ Ys X4 X5 y 01 02 03 - - Y3 Y2 Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 QS At the end of each period proportion "r" of the total income above the mean income y [r (X4 + XS) ] is redistributed to the three quintiles below the mean in the same proportion "s" that each of them is below the mean. For example, for the bottom quintile, Ql, this proportion is: s1 = 011(01 + 02 + 03). We call "s" the redistributive proportionality factor. This value can be expressed in terms of the mean income of the quintile (yj) and the mean income of the sector as a whole (y), as: S1 = (y-yl) I [(y-yl)+( y-yz)+( Y -y3)] = (y- Y1l I [ 3y- (Yl + Yz + Y3 ) ], which is equivalent to equation (6) shown in Box B2-2 (without the income sector subscript i). If a positive "r" is maintained over time the incomes for all quintiles will converge. A negative "r" will redistribute income from the three quintiles below the mean to the two above the mean. The model allows a growth rate "g" to be exogenously specified for the economy as a whole. Thus the model can show how the per capita incomes of any quintile, and of the income sector as a whole, will change given assumptions about the aggregate growth rates of income and rates of change in the distribution of income. 14 The figures in Addendum Box 2 illustrate Model A's income distribution dynamics. Figure A shows the quintile distribution of income for the United States in 1990, in 1990 dollars, and illustrates the trivial scenario in which there is no change in the level of total income (g = 0}, and no change in the distribution of income (r =0}, over the period between 1990 and 2100. Figure B illustrates a scenario in which the economy grows at a constant rate of 1% per year (g = .01} but the distribution of income is unchanged (r = 0}. Both the 20/20 quintile ratio and the Gini coefficient remain constant over time. However, the absolute difference between the incomes received by each quintile becomes greater. Figure C shows total income growing at the same rate of 1% as in Figure B, but now shows redistributive pressure of 1% (r = .01}. This means that 1% of the income of the top two quintiles that is above the mean of all five quintiles is redistributed to the bottom three quintiles, at the end of each period. Now the 20/20 ratio and Gini coefficients decline over time, while the absolute difference among quintiles remains constant. Figures D and E show the results of progressively stronger redistributive efforts, r = .0175 and r = .04, respectively. For any given rate of aggregate growth (in this example, 1%} there is a threshold level of redistributive effort above which the top quintile will be forced to undergo an absolute reduction in its income, rather than simply a reduction in its relative income share. In Figure D (r = .0175} incomes converge rapidly but at no point need the top income quintile forsake further income growth entirely. In Figure E however (r = .04}, the incomes of the top quintile must decline until 2025, at which time they can begin to grow once more. Note that .as the average incomes of the quintiles converge, their rates of growth do so as well. Figure F illustrates a scenario in which there is no aggregate economic growth (g = 0} but the distribution of income becomes more equal. In this situation there is no choice but that the top quintiles undergo an absolute decline in their average incomes. It is instructive to compare Figure F with Figure C. Both show a redistributive pressure of 1% (r = .01} and thus show the same 20/20 ratios and Gini coefficients at every point in time. But inC this takes place while aggregate income is growing at 1%, while in F there is no growth of aggregate income. Interpretation of "r" As noted in the text, the term /I redistributive pressure" is used here in a very general sense. It might refer to policies that take from the rich and give directly to the poor. It might refer to policies that tax the rich to provide educational services that increase the earnings abilities of the poor. It might refer to market mechanisms that generate greater income equality, perhaps by creating incentives for hard work. Its use in Model A is heuristic, not analytic. 15 Addendum Box 2. Model A Income Distribution Dynamics A. 0% Growth, 0% Redistributionaf effort B. 1% Growth. 0% Redistributional effort 0 9" 0 0 g= 0.01 ~ ~ J__ _ .~~---- C. 1% Growth, 1% Redistribulional effort 0. 1% Growth, 1.75% Redistributionaf effort g: O.ot 0.0175 g"' O.ot .. .. E. 1% Growth, 4% Redistribulional el'fort F. 0% Growth, 1% Redlslribulional effort 0.04 g= O.ot 0.01 9"' 0 otl 00 lO 16 A I 8 CD E F G H I J K L M N 0 p Q R s T u v 1 2 BOX 82-10 3 J 4 MODEL A- REFERENCE SCENARIO (TECHNO-PROGRESSIVISM) 5 Richard Hayes - 9/30/14 6 I 7 I 1990 1994 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 2110 2120 2130 2140 2150 8 I 9 POPULATION GROWTH %/yr) 10 low-income countries I 2.17 2.2 1.9 1.6 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 China 1.2 1.2 1 1 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 middle-income countries 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 hiQh-income countries 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 I 15 world 1.541568 1.5722 1.329689 1.168263 0.969477 0.790845 0.600003 0.424947 0.282328 0.192798 0.045388 0.045636 0 0 0 0 0 16 I 17 POPULATION (10A6) 18 low-income countries 1826 1991 2271.947 2747.351 3224.046 3635.101 4017.408 4352.007 4621.12 4809.711 4956.189 5005.999 5056.31 5056.31 5056.31 5056.31 5056.31 5056.31 19 China I 1135 1191 1279.915 1414.524 1563.291 1693.493 1798.213 1852.977 1871.599 1890.409 1890.409 1890.409 1890.409 1890.409 1890.409 1890.409 1890.409 1890.409 20 middle-income countries 1479 1570 1717.854 1956.34 . 2183.82 2437.75 2667.324 2860.727 3007.399 3098.988 3161.592 3161.592 3161.592 3161.592 3161.592 3161.592 3161.592 3161.592 21 high-income countries 827 850 886.4603 913.457 931.9101 941.276 941.276 941.276 941.276 941.276 941.276 841.276 941.276 941.276 941.276 941.276 941.276 941.276 22 I 23 world 5267 5602 6156.175 7031.672 7903.067 8707.621 9424.221 10006.99 10441.39 10740.38 10949.47 10999.28 11049.59 11049.59 11049.59 11049.59 11049.59 11049.591 24 I 25 PER CAPITA GOP I 26 GROWTH RATE (%/yr) I 27 low-income countries -0.08 1 3.5 4 4.5 5 5 5 5 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 28 China I I 11.7 6 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2' 29 middle-income countries -1.3 1 3.5 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 f-' '-I 30 high-income countries 1 2 1.4 1.6 1.6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 31 I 32 world I 0.106173 1.215774 1.177115 1.714593 2.13061 2.710628 2.563696 2.769366 2.577126 2.428499 2.312635 2.20691 2 2 2 2 2 33 34 PER CAPITA GOP $/k 35 low-income countries 346 345 366.3336 519.8521 775.5283 1216.27 2005.291 3306.166 5450.946 8987.09 13407.16 18097.78 24429.44 29838.19 36444.45 44513.35 54368.73 66406.11 36 China I 275 438 627.7983 1035.064 1706.533 2813.597 4638.837 6920.331 10323.92 15401.48 20789.82 28063.33 34276.62 41865.56 51134.72 62456.08 76284.03 93173.53 37 middle-income countries 2731 2592 2752.28 3905.672 5826.578 8692.232 12967.29 17504.01 23627.94 28859.23 35248.74 43052.91 52584.94 64227.39 78447.51 95816.01 117029.9 142940.7 38 hioh-income countries 22742 23671 26688.98 30699.63 36026.35 42277.32 51637.63 63070.34 77034.29 94089.9 114921.7 140365.6 171443 209400.9 255762.9 312389.5 381553.3 466030.3 39 40 world I 4514.524 4533.738 4876.819 5486.029 6512.113 8058.48 10567.55 13655.7 18013 23308.23 29715.13 37446.75 46693.78 57031.91 69658.93 85081.61 103918.9 126926.8 41 I 42 GOP GROWTH RATE(%/ r 43 low-income countries 2.09 3.2 5.4 5.6 5.7 6 5.8 5.6 5.4 4.3 3.1 3.1 2 2 2 2 2 2 44 China I 12.9 7.2 6 6 5.8 5.6 4.3 4.1 4.1 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 45 middle-income countries 0.2 2.5 4.8 5.1 5.1 4.9 3.7 3.5 2.3 2.2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 46 high-income countries 1.7 2.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 47 48 world 1.647741 2.787974 2.506804 2.882856 3.100087 3.501473 3.1637 3.194313 2.859454 2.621296 2.358023 2.252546 2 2 2 2 2 49 50 GOP 10A9 $ 51 low-income countries 631 686 832.2904 1428.216 2500.339 4421.266 8056.073 14388.46 25189.47 43225.31 66448.43 90597.46 123522.9 150871.2 184274.4 225073.3 274905.2 335769.9 52 China 312 522 803.5281 1464.124 2667.807 4764.806 8341.616 12823.21 19322.24 29115.1 39301.27 53051.17 64796.85 79143.05 96665.53 118067.6 144208 176136.1 53 middle-income countries 4038 4070 4728.015 7640.824 12724.2 21189.49 34587.95 50074.17 71058.64 89434.4 111442.1 136115.7 166252.1 203060.8 248019 302931.1 370000.9 451920.1 54 hiQh-income countries 18797 20120 23658.72 28042.8 33573.32 39794.62 48605.26 59366.6 72510.53 88564.56 108173 132122.8 161375.1 197104 240743.4 294044.7 359147 438663.1 55 56 world 23778 25398 30022.55 38575.96 51465.66 70170.19 99590.9 136652.4 188080.9 250339.4 325364.8 411887.1 515947 630179 769702.4 940116.6 1148261 1402489 57 58 RATIO OF HIGH-INCOME PER CAPITA 59 GOP TO THAT OF OTHER COUNTRIES 60 low-income countries 65.72832 68.61159 72.8543 59.05455 46.45395 34.7598 25.75069 19.07658 14.13228 10.46945 8.571661 7.75596 7.017882 7.017882 7.017882 7.017882 7.017882 7.017882 61 China 82.69818 54.04338 42.51203 29.65964 21.11085 15.02608 11.13159 9.113775 7.461728 6.109146 5.527784 5.001746 5.001746 5.001746 5.001746 5.001746 5.001746 5.001746 62 middle-income countries 8.327353 9.13233 9.697042 7.860269 6.183107 4.863804 3.982146 3.603195 3.260305 3.260305 3.260305 3.260305 3.260305 3.260305 3.260305 3.260305 3.260305 3.260305 63 hioh-income countries 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 A T 8 CD E T F T G T H T I T J T K T L T M T N T 0 T p T 0 T R- T s T T T u T v M'i' I T 65T T 1990 1994 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 20801 20901 210Qj_ 2110_j_ 2120_j_ 2130_j_ 2140_j_ 2150 66TREFERENCE CASE DISTRIBUTIONAL CHANGE % w-income countries 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.25 ,0.25 -0.26 -0.26 -0.22 -0.14 -0.134 -0.127 -0.118 -0 China 0 0 -0.08 -0.23 -0.23 -0.19 -0.17 -0.16 -0.154 -0.15 -0.135 -0.13 -0.123 -0.116 -0.109 "fimiddle-income countries 0 0 0 0 0 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.22 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.133 -0.127 -0.118 -0 hi-income countries 0 -0.21 -0.2 -0.19 -0.18 -0.17 -0.16 -0.15 -0.14 -0.135 -0.126 -0.12 -0.115 -0.107 -0.102 __:Q.C 73 REFERENCE CASE QUINTILES (mean $/person) 74 low-income countries 7§ 1.94761 364.86641 594.3291 968.09931 1491.4351 2286.7731 3157.862U!g7,8f!21 4910.8481 5692.9091 6592.6781 7630.4341 8836.041 10246.02 76 1.10171 605.8161 986.81041 1607.411 2557.8671 4065.6841_5857.6621 7648.8241 10019.331 12006.121 14390.151 17254.521 20704.171 24867.1: 1.33821 863.97621 1407.3261 2292.3861 3700.4721 5971.661 8750.3031 11635.541 15492.691 18770.261 22744.561 27566.021 33420.011 40532.5~ 806.80121 1252.9381 2040.9031 3324.4161 5421.9981 8843.331 13108.551 17642.21 23739.231 28961.571 35331.891 43102.021 52578.541 64135.1" 1238.3321 1833.0351 2846.6471 4636.8871 7553.0011 _!247§,681 _20609.551 30965.791 42253.561 57528.131 70718.891 86906.511 106758.41 131077.71 160843: China 1361 192.91861 314.24411 503.17481 778.31971 1199.0411 1688.2491 2382.2.§.l:336L111I 4297.9271 5484.9521 6359.0961 7362.7941 8521.0461 9858.831 11406.021 13212.56 2301 326.25941 531.44221 859.6724l_1:37t8_6:3.L_2187.248I 3177,9821 4623.7611 6730.451 8894.1971 11752.51 14100.931 16921.021 20313.731 24398.371 29319.951 35264.5E 3461 490.80761 799.47391 1299.6061 2104.321 L34.Q!J.7_38l_5o16.376l 7389.8451 10888.361 14566.191 19486.931 23654.681 28716.271 34866.411 42340.781 51426.511 624 l9' _?1lL7'33,3744J 1194.591 1948.1281 3184.0641 5204.4341 7726.4221 11467.431 17017.691 22927.491 30888.541 37738.231 46104.11 56319.061 68790.371 84014.621 102: l9.§_ ~364.615J 2222.8151 3635.8031 5993.9231 9882.651 14778.881 22078.71 32968.291 44686.431 60559.391 7438if.41"91353.13l 112146.11 137621.21 168819.91 206! t countires lQ1_ 8281 878.93871_ 1239.831 1835.2511 2716.621 4021.2611 5133.1041 6525.5021 7484.5961 8586.5361 9859.2621.11262.981" 12790.451 14817.491 17149.941 19859.6( LQ£ 13521 1435.1751 2024.4561 2996.691 4435.8331 6566.1171 8633.711 11340.81 134941 16071.511 19163.891 22829.641 271"69.071 32574.841 39067.071 46887. LQ:3_ 19111 2028.5651 2861.4911 4235.7061 6269.881 9280.9541 12368.131 16477.731 19904.81 24056.431 29090.021 35168.891 42508.091 51518.271 62448.141 75720.0' lJ1Q_ 04 27351 2903.2581__4095.3321 6062.0911 8973.3761 13282.791 17872.91 24049.881 29354.71 35826.71 43721.731 53357.691 65118.741 79442.031 969~ l..Q!_ !05 61351 6512.4261 9186.421 13598.151 20128.581 29795.211 40586.761 55294.171 68347.031 84393.321 104095.31 128408.61 158415.11 194661.51 239123.71 293591 ..... cg: tcOuntries 00 ~ 101 73731 8303.1961 9100.811 10165.211 11345.041 13163.171 15265.351 17698.311 20518.151 23792.831 27551.351 31911.66 l3.93 l5.15l 5i LM_ 102 141201 15901.411 18014.881 20820.221 24068.51 28948.881 34831.171 41925.721 50488.421 60830.971 73301.771 88373.93 ~ 103 204751 23058.181 26411.051 30856.181 36052.731 43817.441 53260.221 64745.521 78717.421 95717.21 116394.11 14 rw 104 282451 31808.461 36676.71 431:26.741 50705.35161996.631 75792.671 92646.351 113231.91 138371.21 169081.31 206579 19' 105 481351 54207.831 62955.191 74537.481 88213.811 1bs532.51 133472.31 164068.21 201583.51 247558.81 303952.51 37, CASE 80/20 ratios ~countries 1.81 1.76 11. 12.42 13.18 13.99 14.83 15.70 China 10.40 11.04 11.70 12.41 13.16 13.96 14.80 15.67 ! countrie~ 1.83 10.56 11.40 12.39 13.14 13.94 14.78 15.64 ~countries 10.40 11.03 11.69 12.39 13.15 13.94 14.78 15.65 CASEGI ! countries 0.378667 0.523665 China 0.353607 0.507331 ~countries 0.370185 0.492207 ~countries 1.3233321 0.324371 0.3319631 0.3395931 0.3471 0.3547411 0.3622181 0.3694171 0.3763251 0.3829281 0.3893961 0.3955771 0.4015721 0.4074121 0.412981 0.4183811 0.423459 A B ICIDI E F G H I J K L M N 0 p Q R s T u v ;7, 1990 19941 2000 2011 2020 2030 2o4o I 2o5o I 2o6o 1 2o7o 2080 2090 2100 2111 2120 21301 2140 2150 1§: ' cha11ge_(%/yr) ~countries 0.00 0.00 -1 -2.50 -2.40 -2.00 -2.00 -1.20 -1.00 -1.00 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 1..1§11 China ---==r -1.00 -1.00 ~ -2.50 -2.40 -2.00 -2.00 -1.20 -1.00 -1.00 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 IJ]]] ~ countries -0.12 -0.12 -=1 -2.50 -2.40 -2.00 -2.00 -1.20 -1.00 -1.00 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 ~ ~countries -0.50 -0.50 -1. -2.50 -2.20 -2.00 -2.00 -1.20 -1.00 -1.00 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 ~ 16 .. (W/$) [I67J 'countries 1.937 0.10 China 2.094 0.19: ~ countrie~ 0.873 0.09: ~countries o.31l o.3oo838l o.28616&_Q~<\639?L o.191823l o.1479o5l o.1129o81 o.o86192l o.o67126l o.o5387l o.o441o5l o.o3611l o.o32027l o.o28979l o.o26221l o.o2, Iworld 0.4538221 0.4523221 0.4800731 0.4771441 0.4338671 0.3892071 0.3313271 0.2753571 0.2251 1821631 0.1522211 0.1251941 0.1110371 0.100471 0.0909091 0.0864j .082258 I_U I AL ENERGY USE ITW) ~countries 0.6427821 0.7798561 1.3382381 2.1198691 3.0690071 4.5764211 6.5623851 9.0372431 12.077621 14.604861 16.303081 18.198771 19.71451 21.787891 24.07934jm_27,9762l 32.50371 [f!6J China I 1.0930681 1.5846021 32.47053 '-inr:nm~ countrie~ 39.98425 • countries 961 8.2692911 7.6335181 7.1889761 6.7029571 6.2497961 5.9449891 5.8272711 5.8272711 5.8272711 6.3126071 6Jl_765_1 L 7.7102361 8.9580161 1o.4o773 Iworld 11.526161 13.579851 18.519291 24.556551 30.444531 38.76151 45.276621 51.789331 56.354121 59.269371 62.6976'71 _64.593_36[ 69,973151 77.332291 85.46541 99.296631 115.3662 TAL ENERGY USE CHANGE (%/yr) ~countries 3.2 5.4 4.6 3.' 4 3.6 3.2 2.9 1.9 1.1 1.1 0.8 1 1 1.5 1.5 I-" China 6.2 5 5 3.8 3.6 2.1 1.7 1.6 0.6 1 0 0.8 1 1 1.5 1.5 1.0 ! countries 2.38 4.68 4:1 3.1 2.9 "'1.5 "'1.1 -0.2 -0.2 0 0 o:a 1 1 "'1.5 "'1.5 :! countries 2.2 1.2 0.3 -0.8 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.5 -0.2 _Q 0 0.8 1 1 1.5 1.5 )world 2.7327941 3.102261 2.8216571 2.1492761 2.41521_31 1.553634[ 1.3439321 0.8447131 0.5043731 0.5623161 0.297873 0.8 1 1 1.5 1.5 J ENERGY/CAPITA (kW) ----~countries 0.3228441 0.3432551 0.4871011 0.6575181 0.844271 1.1396451 1.5078991 1.9556391 2.5110911 2.9467921 3.2567091 3.599221 3.8989881 4.3090491 4.7622351 5.5329281 6.428345 China 0.917773 17.17646 ----~countries 2.263127 12.64687 ~countries ---- 7.3378821 8.0290621 8.785193[_1).8734861 8.1097551 7.637481 7.1211391 6.6397061 6.3158641 6.1908211 6.1908211 6.1908211 6.7064361 7.4117581 8.191261 9.5168861 11.05704 11! ~WI)_rld 2.0575081 2.205891 2.6336961 3.1072181 3.4963081 4.1129661 4.5245021 4.9600011 5.2469371 5.4129921 5.7001631 5.6457711 6.3326491 6.9986591 7.7347141 8.9864561 10.440 Lm 198 ENERGY/CAPITA CHANGE (%/yr) 199 low-income countries 3. 2. )200)China ~ couritries l.8! 3.3! ~countries 1. -0 -0 lwortd .1605951 1.7725711 1.6533941 1.1797991 1.6243681 0.953631 0.9189851 0.5623851 0.3115751 0.5169281 0.25223i 1 1.5 1.5 ATTACHMENT 8.3. REVIEW OF PAST NARRATIVE SCENARIOS [This Attachment is from Hayes (2004} and will be revised and updated for the whitepaper.] In this section we review several sets of scenarios that are presented largely in narrative form. First we look at five sets of scenarios prepared during the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's that focused on the period up to 2000. We assess how well these captured important aspects of the relevant history that actually came to pass, and what lessons we can l-earn from these efforts. Next we review 26 sets of scenarios constructed after 1990 that look beyond the year 2000. The purpose is to identify those driving forces or trends, and critical topics, that have appeared most frequently when analysts have attempted to project developments over the coming decades. We use these to identify topics for further and more detailed consideration. 8.3.1. SCENARIOS OF THE 1960's, 1970's AND 1980's, LOOKING TO 2000 Box IB-1 shows the scenarios presented by Kahn and Weiner in their 1967 book, The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years. This book introduced scenario planning to a wide audience and was very influential. The authors claimed that the trends listed in their Standard World Scenario had been underway for several centuries, largely in the West, and could be expected to continue and to spread to the rest of the world in the coming decades. A set of Alternative Scenarios was presented that had the standard scenario trends in common but reflected different geo-political possibilities, largely turning on the relative dynamism of the Communist world and the West, and on the prospects for war and peace. Box IB-2 shows projections of economic growth for the period 1965-2000 made by Kahn and Weiner. Their preferred estimates were mostly based on extrapolations of high growth rates following World War II. They also prepared estimates for several major economies based on the longest time series data available, beginning as far back as 1900. Notably absent in The Year 2000 was any consideration of environmental issues. The years immediately following its publication saw an explosion of environmental concerns, and in Kahn's 1976 book, The Next 200 Years, these figured prominently. He identified four scenarios, shown in Box IB-3, that reflected different empirical judgments and normative preferences concerning economic growth, the environment, and technology. Kahn's work inspired new efforts in the field of future studies. Among the most influential were studies done at the Stanford Research Institute (SRI). Whereas Kahn was aligned with military and generally conservative interests, the analysts at SRI were aligned with the liberal movements of the time, in particular the environmental movement. In 1975 SRI analysts prepared a set of scenarios for the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that captured 1 BOX ill-1. KAHN AND WEINER (1967) - THE YEAR 2000 I. STANDARD WORLD SCENARIO: * increasingly empirical, secular, humanistic, pragmatic, utilitarian, contractual, hedonistic * bourgeois, bureaucratic, meritocratic, democratic (and nationalist?) elites * accumulation of scientific and technological knowledge * institutionalization of research, development, innovation and diffusion * worldwide industrialization and modernization * increasing affluence and (recently) leisure * population growth *urbanization and (soon) the growth of megalopolises * literacy and education * increasing capacity for mass destruction II. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS: 1. More integrated world: relatively peaceful, prosperous, arms-controlled worlds with relatively high consultation and coordination among nations a. status-quo oriented: coordination exists among the advanced powers, with little concern for developing nations b. development oriented: coordination is inclusive of developing nations 2. More inward-looking: almost as peaceful and prosperous as above, but with little arms control or coordination a. with an eroded Communist movement b. with eroded democratic morale and some Communist dynamism c. with a dynamic Europe and/or Japan 3. Greater disarray: relatively troubled and violent worlds, but in which no large central wars have occurred. a. with an eroded Communist movement b. with eroded democratic morale and some Communist dynamism c. with a dynamic Europe and/or Japan Note: the "Alternative Scenarios" are alternatives to one another, not to the "Standard World Scenario." The trends shown as the "Standard World Scenario" are common to all of the "Alternative Scenarios." 2 BOX IB-2. KAHN AND WEINER- PROJECTIONS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1965-2000 [sources: Kahn and Weiner (1967); United Nations Development Program ( 1997)] Kahn & Weiner's 1967 Actual per capita Diffurence Kahn & Weiner's 1967 Table 1. By Country forecasts for per capita GDP growth, (furecast growth rate projections GDP growth, 1965-2000 1965-1993 (UNDP) less actual) for 1965-2000, based based largely on trends largely on trends of the since 1945 I preceding 40-60 years Japan 6.8 4.3 2.5 3.7 Israel 4.2 2.9 1.3 W. Germany 4.1 2.6 1.5 1.8 Italy 4.1 2.7 1.4 2.4 OECD 3.7 2.3 1.4 UK 3.7 2.1 1.6 1.5 France 3.7 2.7 1.0 1.6 China 3.5 6.0 -2.5 3.1 Thailand 3.3 5.3 -2.0 Canada 3.1 2.4 0.7 1.6 us 3.0 1.8 1.2 1.8 India 2.9 2.2 0.7 2.1 WORLD 2.9 1.5 1.4 Argentina 2.8 0.7 2.1 Australia 2.4 1.9 0.5 Pakistan 2.2 2.4 -0.2 Mid East/No Afr. 2.2 1.9 0.3 Sub-Sahara 1.8 0.0 1.8 So Africa 1.7 1.6 0.1 Southeast Asia 1.7 3.9 -2.2 Brazil 1.7 3.5 -1.8 Latin America 1.6 1.3 0.3 Niaeria 1.2 2.2 -1.0 Mexico 1.1 1.7 -0.6 Indonesia 0.6 4.7 -4.1 Figure 1. Regression of Forecast and Actual Per Capita GOP Growth Rates, 1965-2000 (thrccasts: Kahn & Weiner, 1967; actual: UNEP, 1997. p(.95)= .216; R"'2 = .0251 8.0 7.0 ~ 6.0 ~ 8. 5.0 'tl ~ 4.0 1 3.0 i 2.0 ~ 1.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 pc GCP growth rate, 1965-2000, forcast by Kahn & Weiner '67 Kahn & Weiner's 1967 Actual per capita Diffurence Table 2. By Region forecasts for per capita GDP growth, (furecast GDP growth, 1965-2000 1965-1993 (UNDP) less actual) So.& EastAsia w/o China 4.3 nla nla OECD 3.7 2.3 1.4 WORLD 2.9 1.5 1.4 Middle East &No. Africa 2.2 1.9 0.3 Sub-Saharan Africa 1.8 0 1.8 Southeast Asia 1.7 3.9 -2.2 Latin America 1.6 1.3 0.3 3 BOX ffi-3. HERMAN KAHN (1976)- THE NEXT 200 YEARS FOUR WORLDVIEWS I. Convinced Neo-Malthusian: Finite resources will reach limits within 50 years; the complexity of natural systems will overwhelm our attempts to manage them; techno-fixes won't work or will backfire; continued growth benefits the rich more than the poor. Wisdom cails for a rapid transition to a no-growth world. If we don't do this billions may die from starvation, poilution and wars over scarce resources. 2. Guarded Pessimism: Resource limits are uncertain but we are better off being cautious. Techno-fixes at best may delay the inevitable. Wisdom cails for a slow but steady transition to a no-growth world. Policies to ensure an equitable income distribution are imperative to avoid class warfare. The LDC's should avoid the mistakes of the developed world and emphasize community-oriented enterprises. The developed world should emphasize Quality of Life rather than further growth in GOP. 3. Guarded Optimism: Technology and wise management should ailow growth to continue. Policies to internalize environmental externalities should be adopted. Industrial development is the only real hope for aileviating poverty. Absolute incomes will increase for ail but isolated populations. The world economy will need to be carefully monitored so that policies can be adopted to ensure steady, even growth, if necessary. 4. Technology and Growth Enthusiast: There is no need for worry, the faster the rate of technological innovation and growth, the more benefit to humankind. A rising tide lifts ail boats. At the high levels of material prosperity available to all, distributive differentials are not a major source of social tension. Policies to "soften" the impacts of a dynamic growth economy will do more harm than good. 4 much of the sense of crisis and opportunity of that period. In 1982 a modified version of this set of scenarios was published as Seven Tomorrows. The set of driving trends used to construct the EPA scenarios are shown in IB-4. Summaries of the scenarios from both efforts are shown in IB-5. Quantitative projections from Seven Tomorrows are shown in IB-6. Although the analysts at SRI were sympathetic to liberal and environmental values they were by no means anti-capitalist, and their studies tended not to address issues of political economy. Students of future studies in Europe and the Third World, by contrast, gave political economy much attention. IB-7 shows a set of scenarios prepared in 1984 by British analysts aligned with the European labor-left. Assessment A review of these five sets of scenarios prompts these observations: *The core trends identified in Kahn and Weiner's 1967 Standard World Scenario have indeed continued over the past 33 years, as they predicted. Further, although none of their Alternative Scenarios exactly capture the politico-economic conditions of 2000, Alternative 1b and condition "a" of Alternative 2 can be combined to aptly summarize it: "A more integrated, development-oriented world with an eroded Communist movement." * Kahn and Weiner's forecasts for economic growth between 1965 and 2000 were in general too high. They believed that the 3% world per capita income growth rates of the post-war period could be sustained, but after the turbulence of the 1970's and 1980's the average for the period was closer to 1.5%. With the end of ideological contention in the 1990's, analysts envision long term average per capita growth rates of about 2%. * Kahn's four "worldviews" shown in IB-3 succinctly characterize the range of opinions people hold regarding the growth/environment/technology debate, even today, nearly three decades after they were proposed. * Of the 1975 Elgin eta/. scenarios the one that best described the course that events in the United States actually took over the following 25 years is Scenario #1, "Hitting the Jackpot." *Of the 1982 Hawkins et al. scenarios the narrative description that best characterized the subsequent events is Scenario #1, "The Official Future," tempered by elements from Scenario #3, "Mature Calm," and Scenario #2, "The Center Holds." Per capita GNP growth rates for the U.S. over the period 1980-2000 were projected at 2% and 1.8%, respectively, for "The Official Future" and "Mature Calm," very close to the historical rate of 2.1%. All the other scenarios projected rates of growth near or below zero. World per capita GDP growth rates for the first three scenarios, which assumed less profound economic 5 BOX ffi-4. DRIVING TRENDS OF THE SRI SCENARIOS FOR 1975-2000 Source: Alternative Futures for Environmental Policy Planning, 1975-2000. Duane S. Elgin, David C. MacMichael, and Peter Schwartz. Stanford Research Institute, 1975. A. Energy Use: 1. continued high growth: 4%/yr 2. controlled growth: 1-3%/yr 3 unsuccessful high growth: energy growth begins high but collapses by 2000. 4. zero or declining growth: 0 to -1% B. Climate: I. favorable: as usual 2. variable: sometimes good, some bad, unpredictably 3. worsening climate: global cooling leads to drought, floods, shortened growing season C. Food: I. high prices/no shortage 2. moderate prices/no shortage 3. high prices/food shortage D. Values: I. achievement values: population emphasizes material things: status, fame, affluence, on the personal level and growth, bigness, competition on the system level. Mechanistic, materialistic, individualistic, secular, centralized, scientific empirical. 2. survival values: achievement values are held but material circumstances prevent them from being readily realized. The consequences are frustration, dogged endurance, emphasis on security and survival aspects of achievement values. 3. (rugal values: voluntary simplicity of the exterior aspects of life in order to attain greater riches of inner aspects. Includes a self-realization ethic and an ecological ethic, or combinations of these (survival/frugal split; achievement/survival split; three way split; etc.) The four key variables and the thirteen alternative ways they may change over time define a four valued matrix of 108 potential scenarios (4x3x3x3=108). Ofthese the authors chose 10 for elaboration into full narrative scenarios. In Box 18-5 we show nine of these (two are very similar). 6 BOX ffi-5. THE EPA/SEVEN TOMORROWS SCENARIOS I. Alternative Futures for Environmental Policy Planning, 1975-2000 (1975) 1. Hitting the Jackpot: "The Kahnian future: growing prosperity for all through markets and technology." 2. Not-So-Great Expectations: "Energy and environmental stresses motivate moderately frugal life styles and business efficiencies that successfully allow growth to continue." 3. Apocalyptic Transformation: "Overconfidence in markets and technology, and rapid climate change, leads to economic collapse in the mid-1980's. From the ruins arises a transformed society based on simple living." 4. Journey to Transcendence: "Awareness of pending limits to growth motivates a spiritual evolution that gradually replaces acquisitive values with holistic, frugal values." 5. The Center Holds: "Energy and environmental crises nearly topple the established institutions. However, in the late '80's new technological breakthroughs win the day for the estab Iishment." 6. The Boom Years: "A protracted recession leads to evolution of a large frugal living population, but by the late 1990's new technological breakthroughs restore prosperity." 7. The Industrial Renaissance: "Clumsy attempts to impose energy conservation lead to an extended recession. The technological elite rally and develop techniques that allow both conservation and growth." 8. The Dark at the Top ofthe Stairs: "Clumsy attempts to impose energy conservation lead to an extended recession. Social cohesion is weakened and despair spreads, leading to a depressed, authoritarian world by 2000." 9. Toward the Jeffersonian Ideal: "Large numbers of people realize that the desire for affluence must be tempered if the earth and society are to survive. The transition to a sustainable, frugal world begins in the late '70's, builds through the '80's, and is largely complete by 2000." II. Seven Tomorrows (1982) Scenarios for 1980-2000. 1. The Official Future: "Technological triumph. Soviet power is checked. More people more affluent than ever. More personal computers and world trade. The environment deteriorates and crime rises, but people accept these as tradeoffs." 2. The Center Holds: "The '80's begin strong but run into problems of energy supply, recession, food shortages. Survivalist movements flourish but are suppressed. A corporate/state commitment to technology manages to restart the economy by 2000." 3. Chronic Breakdown: "The energy crisis of 1983 triggers a cascade of dominos: food shortages, economic recession, international conflict, domestic turmoil. The social fabric is frayed and people withdraw into escapist pursuits. Cults and communes flourish. " 4. Mature Calm: "In the face of growing resource constraints conservative Republicans adopt much of the philosophy of the environmental left. Ecological catastrophe is avoided, small town values are revived, children stay in school and stop using drugs. By 2000 everyone wonders what the big scare in the late '70's was all about." 5. Apocalyptic Transformation: "By the early 90's both the US and USSR have nuclear-armed space shuttles in orbit. A series of miscalculations brings the world to the brink of nuclear holocaust. The narrow escape sparks a world spiritual revival that leads to disarmament and a commitment to build a peaceful world." 6. The Beginning ofSorrow: "After a decade of mounting energy shortages and economic turmoil a catastrophically frigid winter of '87 leads to breakdown of authority. Survivalist militias control large parts ofthe country and the economy spirals down, with no end in sight." 7. Living Within Our Means: "Climate change, soil depletion and mismanagement lead to severe food shortages in the early '80's, which, on top ofhigher energy prices, leads to a deep recession. People are forced to begin growing their own food, traveling less, buying less consumer goods. A frugal, de-centralized, sustainable rural society and culture evolves." 7 BOX 18-6. QUANTITATIVE PROJECTIONS FROM SEVEN TOMORROWS [Hawken, Ogilvy and Schwarz, I 982] SCENARIOS for 2000* OF CH MC CB AT BS LWM Actual values 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1980 2000 (1995 US$) (1995 US$) World Population (millions) 4430 6051 6797 6800 6350 5921 5900 5000 6300 U.S. Population (millions) 227 282 268 268 268 253 253 226 268 World per capita GDP 4,384 5,654 7,195 6,631 7,101 4,760 5,254 3,664 4,473 Qrowth rate, WpcGDP, 80-00 (%/yr) - 1.3 2.5 2.1 2.4 0.4 0.9 -0.9 0.1 US per capita GDP 21,000 31,730 31,345 20,897 29,942 21,111 21,284 9,531 14,780 growth rate, USpcGDP,80-00 (%/yr) - 2.1 2.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.1 -3.9 -1.8 Average World Energy Prices** 65 25 50 80 60 40 100 100 100 US EnerQyConsumption (quads) 78 99 123 86 100 78 80 40 70 US Energy Supply (quads): oil 35 38 48 30 36 23 26 16 22 gas 20 24 19 16 19 14 16 10 14 coal 17 22 40 23 25 32 20 11 18 nuclear 3 8 11 9 10 4 8 0 3 renewables 3 6 5 8 10 5 10 3 13 Energy Supply (% of total) oil 0.45 0.38 0.39 0.35 0.36 0.29 0.33 0.40 0.31 Qas 0.26 0.24 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.25 0.20 coal 0.22 0.22 0.33 0.27 0.25 0.41 0.25 0.28 0.26 nuclear 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.04 renewables 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.19 Variance betw. enerQY supply actual and scenario values*** 37 20 16 40 26 58 42 Variance betw. economic actual and scenario values**** 0.18 0.28 0.16 0.25 0.28 0.93 0.44 *codes: 1 = OF= "The Official Future" 2 = CH = "The Center Holds" 3 = MC = "Mature Calm" 4 = CB = "Chronic Breakdown" 5 = AT= "Apocalytic Transformation" 6 = BS = "The Beginnings of Sorrow" 7 = LWM = "Living Within Our Means" **prices shown are for 1 bbl crude ***values shown are the sums of the absolute differences between actual and scenario values for each energy source in 2000. ****values shown are the averages of the absolute percentage differences between actual and scenario values for world and U.S. population and per capita GDP, and for energy prices and consumption, in 2000. Sources: World and U.S. population and economic growth values for 1980 and 2000 are from World Development Indicators-Online (http://publications.worldbank.org/WDQ. Scenario values have been normalized using the WDI tables to 1995 US$ from their original presentation in 1980 US$. World energy prices in 2000 are from the Energy Administration Administration's World Oil Market and Oil Price Chronologies, WVvW.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/chron.html. Energy consumption and supply figures for 2000 are from the Energy Information Administration at WVvW.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/tsUptb01 03.html. 8 BOX ffi-7. COLE AND MILLER- GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SCENARIOS TO 2000 [S. Cole and I. Miller (1984)] I. GLOBAL SCENARIOS 1. Liberal International Order: free markets, multinational corporate dominance. 2. Reformed International Order: market economy, social contracts between and within countries. 3. Collective Self-Reliance: developing nations disengage from inequitable global structures and cooperate for mutual development. II. REGIONAL SCENARIOS A. High & Middle Income OECD 1. Corporate Society 2. State Capitalism 3. Democratic Socialism 4. Decentralism B. Centrally-Planned Industrial Economies 1. Scientific-Technological Revolution 2. Stagnation 3. Reform 4. Democratization C. Newly Industrializing Countries, Semi-Peripheral 1. Military-Authoritarian 2. Developmentalism 3. Populism 4. Socialism D. Lower Middle Income and Poor Countries 1. Neo-Colonialism 2. Liberal Developmentalism 3. State Capitalism 4. Bureaucratic Planning 5. Socialist Construction E. OPEC 1. Western-Oriented Development 2. State Capitalism 3. Neo-Traditionalism 4. Endogenous Socialism Note: Cole and Miller's presentation suggests a dynamic relation between global and regional scenarios. If all or most ofthe regions adopt, say, a more or less socialist political economy, or a more or less liberal capitalist one, then the global scenario would be of that same type and might be thought of as the sum of the regional scenarios. On the other hand, if all but one or two regions have adopted a particular political-economic orientation, the non-conforming regions may experience pressure to adopt that orientation as well. In that instance some regional scenarios may be thought of as being influenced by the global scenarios. 9 disruption over the period 1980-2000, averaged 2.3%, while the final four scenarios, which envisioned various forms of breakdown, averaged close to zero. The historical rate for the period was right between these values, at 1.3%. * None of the Hawkins et al. scenarios foresaw the dramatic drop in energy prices and the counterintuitive increase in energy efficiency that occurred during the 1980's and 1990's in the wake of the oil crises of the 1970's. In the higher growth scenarios energy prices varied up or down by about 20% from 1980 prices, and in most of the lower growth scenarios energy prices increased by 53%. In actuality, real world energy prices declined by 60% over this period. *The Hawkins et al. "Mature Calm" scenario pegged United States energy consumption in 2000 at 100 quads, almost precisely the value of 99 quads that actually occurred, and came close to estimating the correct shares of energy supply provided by different sources. However, it underestimated the growing role of natural gas and somewhat overestimated the growth of renewables. * In the two decades since the Cole and Miller scenarios were developed, neoliberal economics and politics (Cole and Miller's liberal international order) have prevailed over Third World socialism (roughly their collective self reliance), over social democracy (their reformed international order), and over most of the more particular systems described on a regional basis. Neoliberalism is today partially contested in regions with a tradition of Confucianism, and more strongly so in Islamic regions. Neoliberalism is subject to a large set of reformist demands from working class constituencies in the developed countries, Latin America, and elsewhere. For the most part, however, the set of viably contending political-economic systems sketched in the Cole and Miller scenarios has been dramatically reduced. Further discussion To some extent the history of the past 30 years vindicates the judgment of those analysts, such as Kahn and Weiner, who believed that the institutions of Western democratic capitalism would be able to successfully accommodate or repulse various challenges to its ascendancy and dominance. During this period neither the worst fears nor the heartfelt dreams of the left or of the Greens-or for that matter, of the authoritarian right- came to pass. Capitalism did not immiserate the workers, start a nuclear war or trigger an ecological holocaust. The world of 2000 did not find new socialist men and woman collectively managing bustling factories and farms. Neither did it find ecotopian communities living in self-sufficient harmony with the flora and fauna of their bioregion. Of course, it's a mistake to conclude that the success of neoliberal capitalism over the past thirty years necessarily entails its continued success for another thirty years, much less for 150 years. Without an explicit analysis of the causes and dynamics of stability and change, no firm judgments in this regard are possible. In the next section we review scenarios that reveal the hopes and fears of various authors regarding political, social and cultural concerns, as well as environmental and equity concerns, for the decades following 2000. This review will help us select topics for further analysis that might cast light on the prospects for global stability and global change during this period. 10 8.3.2. SCENARIOS OF THE 1990's, LOOKING BEYOND 2000 Box IB-8 shows a general set of scenarios that address many of the critical topics that are commonly evoked when people speculate about the early decades of the 21 51 century. IB-9 summarizes three additional sets of scenarios of this sort. IB-10 shows four sets of scenarios mostly focused on geo-political concerns. IB-11 shows four sets of scenarios focused on economic systems. The four sets of scenarios in IB-12 give special attention to culture and gender issues. IB-13 shows ten sets of scenarios that address a wide range of issues concerning particular nations and regions. In all we show 26 sets of scenarios containing a total of 130 individual scenarios. What are the major themes that these scenarios address? Some important recurring themes are shown in IB-14. We see that to a large extent a scenario of continued economic growth, technological innovation, and global economic integration is taken to be the reference or business-as-usual scenario. Other scenarios are distinguished largely by the extent to which one or another element of this reference scenario falters. 11 BOX ffi-8. HYPERFORUM SCENARIOS ON SUSTAINABILITY Between 1995 and 1997 the California Institute ofTechnology, RAND, and World Resources Institute sponsored a collaborative project to develop global scenarios for the period 2000 to 2050 focused on the topic of"sustainability." Fifty experts from thirty-four think tanks, universities and other organizations were involved. Most of the collaboration was done using new Internet technologies. The complete record of the project can be found at www.hf.caltech.edu/HF. Here is a summary of the major scenarios they developed: I. CONVENTIONAL WORLDS: Industrial development is gradual and steady. The world becomes more integrated economically and culturally. Technology allows productivity to grow and environmental and equity problems to be addressed satisfactorily. a) Reference Case: Few policy interventions are needed to keep things on track. Consumerism and possessive individualism endure as the primary human motives. Inequality increases and the environment deteriorates, but not enough to motivate people to seek alternative systems. b) Balanced Growth: comprehensive and vigorous public policies developed by the techno-managerial elite successfully steer the system away from destabilizing social and environmental problems. 2. BARBARIZATION: Conflicts present in the Conventional Worlds scenarios overwhelm the coping capacity of markets and management institutions. Rich/poor tensions dominate national and global affairs. Technological change works to the advantage of the privileged and marginalizes the rest. a) Social Breakdown: unregulated global competition leads to increased inequality, mass migrations, global crime waves. Instability, xenophobia and police state mentalities follow, causing economic growth and trade to slow and then decline, leading to a general collapse social, cultural and political institutions. b) Fortress World: Wealthy sectors cooperate to keep the international system functioning for themselves but seek to abandon the rest of the world to poverty. 3. GRAND TRANSITIONS: global society matures to a higher stage of social development, neither stuck in its present adolescent, competitive phase nor descending into anarchic chaos. a) Global Governance: a growing collective realization of the mutual benefits of cooperation leads to strengthening of global governance institutions and a strengthening of civil society. Leadership is provided by multinational corporations and a dense network ofNGO's. b) New Sustainability Paradigm: the rapid spread of technology and capitalism benefits only a few, but with widespread communications resources the masses are able to inspire and coordinate with one another to work out collective response. A disenchantment with the ethos of competition and materialism is nurtured and matures into a new sustainability paradigm for the planet. Several participants in the project felt the final scenarios underplayed the positive contribution that technological innovation could make in the decades to come and overestimated the likely severity of environmental degradation. Jesse Ausubel of Cal Tech prepared this additional scenario: Technology Spares the Environment: " ... accelerating technological advances, driven in part by market competition, boost industrial efficiencies, prosperity, and environmental sustainability through most of the world. The world economy meets human needs with less land, pollution and natural resources. Dire warnings of food shortages, pollution, overpopulation and environmental depletion never materialize." 12 BOX IB-9. THREE SETS OF GENERAL GLOBAL SCENARIOS Peter Schwartz. Art of the Long View (1991) Three Global Scenarios through 2005. I. New Empires: "Nations protect their threatened cultural identities by regionalizing their interests ... they create bureaucratic but decentralized multinational power blocs that dominate world politics." 2. Market World: "a free market, entrepreneurial, multi-cultural world run not by governments but by 'associations:' international rule-making, standard-setting, conflict resolution and system management groups that collectively form an informal 'global commons' ... " 3. Change Without Progress: "the dark side of Market World: fast-paced economic activity, ruthless self-interest runs rampant, environment decays, inequality grows." Lawrence Wilkinson, Global Business Network. Four Global scenarios to 2020 (1995) Wilkinson and his clients focused on two critical uncertainties to develop the four global scenarios for the year 2020 shown below: will people be more individual or more community oriented? and will society provide coherence or will it be fragment eel? I./ Will [individual/fragmented]: The world fragments into a working pandemonium of individuals, organized by jobs rather than geography. Physical infrastructure stagnates, personal spaces and the Net thrive. Technology is the global culture. Ethnic and group differences dissolve into a patchwork of individual variety. Europe is wracked with civil strife as its socialistic civilization unravels. 2. Consumer/and [individual/coherent]: The world is populated by consumers rather than citizens ... served by highly evolved companies conscious of the market's whims. Leisure increases, dissent withers. Governments are virtual corporations, with their heavy lifting privatized. The have-nots get spending vouchers. The US and Europe become large theme parks. Russia exports neo-religious cults and mafioso. 3. Ecotopia [community/fragmented]: Communitarian values triumph. Slim, digitized governments win popular trust. Corporations show civic responsibility. High-tech makes urban living very resource-friendly. Europe becomes a moral beacon. Asia and Latin America become lifeboats for the young and restless of the developed world who find the environmentalism and communitarianism too dogmatic and stifling. 4. New Civics [community/coherent]: A world of small, powerful city-states. Rural areas are second-class but are heavily wired. Europe breaks into 57 countries. Gangs in developing countries and old inner cities transform into law-and-order machines. General health improves. Civic pride blossoms. Corporations are reigned in by civic regulations. Conglomerates fund most UN-type activities. Jerome Glenn and Theodore Gordon 1997 State of the Future (1997) I. Cybertopia: "Free markets, technology and globalization generate unprecedented economic abundance. Individuals act like holding companies, investing their time in diverse activities, inventing careers, granting access to others as nations used to grant visas. A majority of human waking hours are spent in cyberspace." 2. A Mean World: "Education and training could not keep up with technology, and joblessness became endemic the world over. Economies tottered, nations formed trading blocs, people turned to fundamentalist ideologies, and economic warfare gave way to lethal warfare. Nineteenth century geopolitics, twentieth century ideological passions, and twenty-first century technology." 3. The Aftermath: "The globalized, high-tech economy collapsed in 2010 due to over-confidence, sheer greed, sabotage by a techno-criminal elite, and a weak global regulatory structure. Developing nations that had just begun to grow were reduced to subsistence. In the wealthier nations many reverted to rural, self-sufficient modes of production." 13 BOX ffi-10. FOUR SETS OF GEO-POLITICAL SCENARIOS Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations (1996) I. One Harmonious World 2. Two Worlds: Us and Them 3. 184 States, More or Less 4. Sheer Chaos 5. The Clash of Civilizations a) peaceful coexistence; respect for civilizational boundaries; self-affirming, unified cultures b) conflict; universalist and imperialist pretensions; internal stresses due to multiculturalism Robert Z. Lawrence et at. A Vision for the World Economy (1996) 1. Invisible Hand: the market suffices 2. Global Fragmentation: the market does not suffice, and nations pull up the drawbridges to survive 3. Imperial Harmony: a hegemonic Triad of the US/Europe/Japan agrees on rules for the global economy 4. Community ofNations: gradual evolution of multilateral structures for coordination and accountability Ann-Marie Slaughter. "The Real New World Order" (1997) 1. Liberal Internationalism: straight translation of structures of representative governance from national to international levels, and eventually to some type of world federalism. 2. The New Medievalism: hollowing-out of the nation state as its functions, sovereignty and authority are replaced by a patchwork of overlapping private, quasi-private, national, supranational and transnational formal and informal structures. 3. Transgovernmentalism: informal but structured cooperation among bureaucrats, technicians and officials of different countries allows necessary coordination in an interdependent world but maintains accountability through the nation-state. Hugh de Santis. Beyond Progress (1996) 1. communitarian socialism: "the self-contained cosmopolitan order of premodern times" 2. perpetual anarchy/new Dark Age 3. ordered chaos: Huntington's clash of civilizations 4. perpetual peace and harmony: a. Fukuyama: via liberal democratic techno-capitalism b. norm-based transnationalists: i. Richard Falk: supranational state, complete with parliament, judiciary, police powers. ii. Ervin Laszlo: "resolution of common problems will foster a self-regulating order of peace and international harmony" iii. Rajni Kothari: third world unity as prerequisite for world federalism. iv. Peace-Studies types: a. Johan Galtung: international communitarianism b. Richard Smoke: similar to Laszlo. c. Harry Hollins 5. mutualism: "a community of interests in which diverse peoples and states bounded by geographical, historical and cultural affinities productively commingle in localized social, political and economic associations reinforced by the acceptance of shared risks and rewards." 14 BOX ffi-11. FOUR SETS OF ECONOMIC SCENARIOS Robert Heilbroner. 21st Century Capitalism (1993) Five scenarios grounded in economic theory, named after their founding analysts. 1. Adam Smith: "a world of economic growth, resource restraints, economic decline from a growing population and shrinking resources." 2. Karl Marx: "a world of growth with periods of economic crisis and restructuring, with labor ultimately gaining control of the economy." 3. John M Keynes: "a world of market driven societies creating lasting underemployment and the need for social investment." 4. Joseph Schumpeter: "capitalism grows through creative destruction but will decline from moral decay." 5. Robert Heilbroner: "capitalism can grow with right social investment, if it overcomes tax phobia and reduces the deficit" A "slightly imaginary Sweden." John Roemer. A Future for Socialism (1994) Four feasible market socialisms. 1. An economy of revenue-maximizing labor-managed firms. 2. "Keiretsu" socialism: groups of profit-maximizing firms ally with a single large bank and hold shares of each others' stock. Dividends from other firms are distributed to workers. 3. capitalism without class power (Fred Block): restrictions on large capital movements across borders; quasi nationalized banking system; employee/consumer representation on boards. 4. associative socialism (Joel Rogers): representative constituency groups (consumer, neighborhood, environmental, union, etc.) have bargaining and quasi-veto rights regarding corporate decisions. S.P. Udayakumar. The Futures of the Poor (1995) 1. Hand-outs but no Help-outs: "donors lack political will or sense of justice to remedy the situation permanently." 2. Waiting for Godot: "the poor long for consumerism and comfort; the fittest survive, the rest perish." 3. Preach the Gospel to the Poor: "the rich reinvigorate their patronizing policies; states become economies, societies become markets and the poor become more miserable." 4. Viva Zapata: "rebels with nothing to lose demand justice" (but gains are few and temporary). 5. View from the Mountain Top: "the rich embrace a simple and less selfish lifestyle" (but subtly retain their class prerogatives). 6. To Be or Not To Be: "the poor renounce modernity, recognize their cultural roots, and return to former ways of life, with traditional technology." 7. One Species, One Destiny: "both the rich and poor realize that the well-being of the poor demands cooperation of the rich, and the safety of the rich relies on justice for the poor." Fredrick Pryor. Economic Evolution and Structure (1996) Scenarios of alternative capitalisms. Business as usual: 1. Steady maintenance 2. Stagnation Scenarios of change in the organization and control of production: 3. Remodeled Capitalism: very highly skilled workers are the source of economic dynamism. 4. Atomistic Capitalism: most economic dynamism is provided by smaller, entrepreneurial corporations. 5. Third Party Capitalism: institutions, rather than individuals, effectively control most capital i) Finance Capitalism: Financial intermediaries take over and control corporate policy. ii) Corporatism: management, government and labor set policy for individual corporations. iii) Nonprofit Dominance: economic dynamism relies human capital, i.e., on services provided by non-profit education, health, and welfare institutions. 15 BOX IB-12. FOUR SETS OF SOCIO-CULTURAL SCENARIOS Benjamin Barber. Jihad vs McWorld (1996) 1. Jihad: people find strength and community through intense adherence to the values, norms and life styles of a particular region, ethnicity, or religion. Outsiders are seen as infidels. 2. McWorld: People the world over share a common set of modern, technological, and consumerist values, norms and life-styles. Others are seen as backward. 3. Both Jihad and McWorld: an elite trans-national caste lives in McWorld; the rest live in Jihad. 4. Civil Society: Global norms of mutual respect allow both modernist and traditional values to co-exist and support one another. Eleonora Masin (UNESCO). The Future of Cultures (1994) 1. Pessimistic: "All cultures becomes bastardized, or reduced to a museum role." 2. Dual-track Scenario: "Core elements of cultures remain strong" while societies modernize. 3. Resistance: "The many cultures fend off the dominant one." 4. The Gaia Scenario: "all cultures recognize that no culture is complete in itself' 5. Babel: "fostered by communications and biotechnologies, people will move among cultures." Walter Truitt Anderson. Reality Isn't What It Used To Be (1990) Seven stories for the future. 1. The Western story: steady progress through technology and economic growth. 2. The Marxist story: an egalitarian world in which workers control the means of production. 3. The Christian fundamentalist story: a society governed by biblical belief and faith in God's love. 4. The Islamic fundamentalist story: a society governed by Koranic belief and faith in God's wisdom. 5. The Green story: a society grounded in ecological values and a rejection of industrialism. 6. The New Paradigm story: a sudden, deep, holistic transformation of human values & ways of living. 7. The Post-Modern story: a recognition that stories that justify human endeavor are social constructs; none are objectively privileged over any of the others. Pamela McCorduck and Nancy Ramsey. The Futures of Women: Scenarios for the 21 81 Century, (1996). four scenarios to 2015. 1. Backlash: In a depressed, no-growth global economy discrimination against women increases, in both developed and developing countries. The religious right champions back-to-the-home. 2. Golden Age ofEquality: "Western notions of individual rights, rule oflaw and personal privacy take hold and prevail in a globally integrated growth economy. A profound shift in consciousness permits both women and men to begin to think of women as different from, but not less than, men. The search for equality in the workplace brings about a new balance between family and work." 3. Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back: "Western notions of individual rights prevail but the world economy is depressed, with huge international migrations as people search for jobs and food. Basic needs of the world's women, including nutrition, child spacing, protection from domestic violence, and workplace safety, are hard-pressed to be addressed. 4. Separate-and Doing Fine, Thanks: The global economy booms but in order to maintain stability the developing world adopts the Singapore model and imposes authoritarian social controls, including controls on women's work opportunities and on personal and public behavior. In the West the continuing boom allows affirmative action, training and placement programs to be implemented without resistance. 16 BOX ffi-13. TEN SETS OF REGIONAL AND NATIONAL SCENARIOS Sohail Inayatullah. The Futures of South Asia !summary) (1992) 1. continued chaos and collapse: ethnic violence and breakup into small nations 2. hegemony by one or more of the following: a. India b. market industrialism c. bureaucracy-led governance 3. return to communitarian life: spiritual values, local knowledge, enviro [basic needs approach] 4. transformation/rupture: a. new South Asia confederation of autonomous provinces b. new identity c. new theory of growth/distribution d. new theory of knowledge/science 5. nuclear war scenario 6. village high-tech: by-passing modernity via computers, genetic engineering, etc. So hail Inayatullah. The Futures of South Asia (1992) Five scenarios for Pakistan: 1. Disciplined capitalist society: "military and strong centrist civil service create conditions for development of a national bourgeois" 2. Islamic Socialism: "basic needs met through state control of economy, but cultural and religious needs remain syncretist and personal" 3. Return ofthe I deal: "return to original intention of Pakistan as the land of the pure and the search for the ideal Islamic polity that existed at the time of the Prophet." 4. End ofSovereignty: "military intervention by India, cultural intervention by USA, breakdown into many states." 5. No Change: "continuation of the grand disillusionment, grand malaise." Hans van Zon. Alternative Scenarios for Eastern Europe (1992) I. Laissez-Faire/Capitalist Path: "driving force is the wish to create favorable conditions for free enterprise." 2. Populist-Authoritarian Path: "a weak nationalist bourgeois supported by the army pushes market institutions but keeps them protected from the world economy." 3. Leaning-Upon-The-West: "weak governments follow the lead ofthe EC, IMF, other western institutions." 4. Sustainable Development: "environmental clean up gets high priority, serves to build national solidarity." 5. Muddling On: "market and political reforms are half-hearted; old bureaucracies remain powerful." Godwin Sogolo. AFRICA: Three Scenarios (1992) 1. Giving Up: poverty, war, ethnic struggle continue, and Africans just give up. · 2. Retracing the past: traditional precolonial institutions are revived, particularly the extended family. 3. Continuity with Change: technology is grafted on to local culture. "Core traditional cultures continue but Africa adapts to external cultures. Both traditional and modern medicine coexist." [More ... ] 17 BOX ffi-13. Regional/National Scenarios (cont.) Herbert Adam and Kogila Moodley. Forecasting Scenarios for South Africa (1993) 1. Another Zimbabwe: "authoritarian populism, high corruption, pseudo-patronage system where white minority retains economic privilege while a black bourgeois dominates the political scene." 2. Another Yugoslavia: "black youths tum away from the liberal, compromising ANC, right-wing whites declare an independent Boerstaat, Natal secedes as Zulu nationalist state." 3. Another Germany: "social-democratic pact between business, labor and key state bureaucracies; co determination with a wage pact to increase exports; in return for increased education, health, and housing, the unions abandon antagonistic labor relations and class warfare. " William C. Smith. Democracy, Markets. and Structural Reform in Latin America (1993) 1. Organic Crisis Revisited: "government failure, stagnant income base, threat of authoritarian regression." 2. Fragmented and Exclusionary Democracy with Neoliberal Economics: "majoritarian political coalitions hold, debt renegotiated, state enterprises become private monopolies." 3. Inclusionary Democracy: "democratic deepening, state reform, strengthening of collective actors, expansion of citizen rights, more equitable outcomes." 4. Dual Democratic Regimes: "state elites establish alliance with a strategic minority of the opposition so as to exclude the majority of remaining social actors. Economy grows but very slowly." J. H. El-Issawy. The Future of the Arab Nation (1993) 1. Division: continuation of current trends 2. Co-ordination and Cooperation: regional groupings and agencies 3. Unity: one currency, one foreign policy, one army, one school system Michael Lind. The Next American Nation (1995) 1. US evolves away from status as nation-state, becomes either: a) multi-cultural state b) democratic universalist state 2. US evolves to enhance its status as a nation-state, becomes either: a) nativist state b) liberal nationalist state Hugh DeSantis. Beyond Progress (1996) --regional scenarios East Asia: conflation of market economics and Confucian authoritarianism (China becomes like Singapore) Middle East: democracy circumscribed by the laws of sharia and power of oligarchies and autocrats Africa: collectivist, consensual rule of village elders rather than adversarial forms of government Latin America: democracy will probably be a hybrid of liberalism and statism Maggie Powell. WRI Hyperforum Scenarios (1997)- Five Scenarios of China to 2030 1. Revolt ofthe Urban Masses: "urban turmoil as growth rate slows 2. The Famine Returns: "turmoil as global warming changes rainfall patterns, agriculture collapses." 3. Loss ofControl: "continuing economic growth leads to loss of central control and ability to enforce one-child policy. Population explodes, civil war narrowly averted but growth stagnates" 4. The Siberian Excursion: "Military assumes control of China, invades Siberia, after a long struggle they retreat but economy is in shambles." 5. Solar China: "China invests heavy in solar research following oil price hikes and global warming. Genetic engineering allows China to feed its population." 18 ADDENDUM: BOX IB-14. GREAT TRANSITIONS INITIATIVE In 1995 the Telius Institute and Stockholm Environmental Institute began a global scenarios project that in 2002 proposed a set of six scenarios to inform discussion and research. In 2012 the Telius Institute formed the Great Transitions Initiative to actively promote scenario III.B, the New Sustainability Paradigm. Recent short descriptions·ofthe scenarios are shown below. I. CONVENTIONAL WORLDS A. MARKET FORCES- "[P]owerful global actors advance the priority of free markets and economic expansion, relying heavily on technological innovation to reconcile growth with ecological limits. The problem of resolving the social and environmental stress arising from global population and economic growth relies heavily on faith in the self-correcting logic of competitive markets." B. POLICY REFORM - "[G]ovemments are able to forge comprehensive initiatives to align the economy with environmental and social goals. Incremental change is achieved; fundamental change is absent. The critical uncertainty is how, within a Conventional Worlds cultural and institutional framework, sufficient political wili can emerge for such a coordinated and sustained global effort." II. BARBARIZATION A. FORTRESS WORLD- "[A]s the systemic global crisis deepens, powerful international forces are able to impose order in the form of an authoritarian system of global apartheid with elites in protected enclaves and an impoverished majority outside." B. BREAKDOWN-"[T]he authoritarian forces of Fortress World are unable to counter spreading chaos as environmental and social crises spiral out of control, conflict spreads, and institutions disintegrate." Ill. GREAT TRANSITIONS A. ECO-COMMUNALISM- "[I]ncorporates the green vision ofbio-regionalism, localism, face-to-face democracy, smali technology, and economic autarky. Although a strong current in some environmental and anarchist subcultures, the emergence of a patchwork of self-sustaining communities from our increasingly interdependent world seems implausible, except in recovery from coliapse." B. NEW SUST AINABILITY PARADIGM- "[T]he variant embraced by GTI, sees globalization not only as a threat but also an opportunity to construct a planetary civilization rather than rely on the incremental forms of Conventional Worlds or retreat into localism. It envisions the ascendance of new categories of consciousness global citizenship, humanity-as-whole, the wider web oflife, and the well-being of future generations- alongside democratic institutions of global governance." See the Telius Institute website, www.telius.org, for fuli descriptions and more. 19 BOX IB-15. CRITICAL CONCERNS AND TRENDS ADDRESSED IN THE 26 SETS OF SCENARIOS I. Economic and Political Economic Concerns 1. Economic growth continues steadily Economic growth falters, could crash 2. Global economic integration continues Global economic integration smoothly and is generally welcomed generates conflict, and stalls 3. The power of multinational corporations Multinationals accumulate immense is satisfactorily regulated by institutions powers and subvert attempts at of global governance. regulation 4. Inequalities of income and wealth are Inequalities of income and wealth kept within socially acceptable bounds explode 5. The poorest countries and the transition The integration of poor and transition countries successfully integrate into the countries stalls and they are left growing global political economy behind. II. Concerns about Social Structure, Social Relations and Values I. Diverse social groups successfully Diverse social groups see one another cooperate in civil society as adversaries 2. The world becomes increasingly Communitarian and post-materialist individual-centered and materialist values flourish 3. The world becomes increasingly The world becomes increasingly secular/scientific religious/spiritual III. Concerns about Technology I. Technological innovation continues steadily Technological innovation stagnates and fuels continued economic growth 2. The new technologies are generally safe The new technologies are dangerous and ·and socially benign, and when necessary socially divisive, and resist regulation can be successfully regulated IV. Environmental Concerns I. Environmental problems are successfully Environmental problems explode addressed through technology, markets and beyond our ability to contain them public policies 20 ATTACHMENT C.l-IDEOLOGY, WEALTH AND INCOME This display is in preparation. Wealth values are estimates as of a selected year in the period 2010-2014. Income values are for a selected year during the same period. Income can vary significantly from year-to-year. Sources of the values shown, and clarifying details concerning their interpretation, will be included in the display included in the final white paper. I. CONSERVATIVES/LIBERTARIANS Estimated Net Wealth Estimated Annual Income/Salary Koch Brothers 100,000,000,000 12,000,000,000 Clint Eastwood 375,000,000 Darryllssa 355,000,000 60,000,000 Arnold Schwartznegger 350,000,000 Rush Limbaugh 350,000,000 66,000,000 Glen Beck 85,000,000 90,000,000 Bill O'Reilly 70,000,000 32,000,000 John McCain 21,000,000 George W. Bush 20,000,000 Sarah Palin 12,000,000 Mitch McConnell 10,000,000 Ann Coulter 8,500,000 Charles Krauthammer 8,000,000 Karl Rove 7,000,000 Newt Gingrich 7,000,000 3,100,000 Paul Ryan 4,900,000 323,000 John Boehner 3,600,000 256,000 Ted Cruz 3,500,000 1,200,000 Rick Perry 3,000,000 Bobby Jindal 2,100,000 Rand Paul 1,100,000 250,000 II. LIBERALS/PROGRESSIVES Estimated Net Wealth Estimated Annual Salary/income George Soros 20,000,000,000 4,000,000,000 Oprah Winfrey 2,900,000,000 77,000,000 Tom Steyer 1,400,000,000 AI Gore 300,000,000 Ellen DeGeneris 250,000,000 56,000,000 John Kerry 200,000,000 2,400,000 Jane Fonda 120,000,000 Bill & Hillary Clinton 101,000,000 13,000,000 Nancy Pelosi 100,000,000 635,000 Jon Stewart 80,000,000 25,000,000 Arianna Huffington 50,000,000 6,000,000 Michael Moore 50,000,000 Dianne Feinstein 46,000,000 Spike Lee 40,000,000 Terry McAulliffe 30,000,000 Bill Maher 23,000,000 Chris Matthews 16,000,000 Chelsea Clinton & Marc Mezvinsky 15,000,000 2,000,000 Elizabeth Warren 14,500,000 950,000 Rahm Emmanuel 14,000,000 Rachel Maddow 13,000,000 Barack & Michele Obahla 12,000,000 495,000 Jesse Jackson 10,000,000 1 BOX C.l -Sources and Explanatory Notes [In progress] NB: The display in Box C.l is preliminary and very selective, showing individuals associated with politics and the media and entertainment industries. The grouping by conservatives/libertarians and liberals/progressives is meant to show that individuals of great wealth and income can be found within both ideological categories, and not to suggest that one or the other political orientation prevails among the very well-off. It's reasonable to suspect that in the aggregate those who identify as conservatives/libertarians will tend to be better-off than those who identify as liberals/progressives. But there may also be reason to suspect that the very highest wealth and income percentile, e.g., those associated with the top 1% and above, may skew somewhat towards liberals/progressives. A fuller account of levels of wealth and income associated with ideological identification and other factors is in progress. 2 ATTACHMENT C.2 PROPOSALS TO REDUCE ECONOMIC INEQUALITY: REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT This attachment is in process. We show brief outline summaries of ten proposals intended to reduce inequality of wealth and income. We'll discuss these and others in more detail in the whitepaper. There are few analytic studies of the efficacy and full impact of comprehensive proposals of sort shown here. The authors and the texts reviewed are: 1. Anthony Atkinson -Inequality: What Can Be Done? (2015) 2. Mayor Willian deBiasio eta/. -The Progressive Agenda to Combat Income Inequality (2015) 3. Thomas Piketty- Capital in the 21st Century (2014) 4. Robert Creamer -It's the It's Economic Inequality Stupid-- What to Do About the Biggest Crisis Facing America (2013) 5. Joseph Stiglitz- The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future (2012) 6. Timothy Noah- The Great Divergence: America's Growing inequality Crisis and What We Can Do About It (2012) 7. Robert Reich- Aftershock: The Next Economy and America's Future (2010) 8. Howard Gardner- An Embarrassment of Riches (2007) 9. John Cavanaugh- Reversing the Great Tax Shift (2008) 10. Juliet Schor- A Sustainable Economy for the 21st Century (1995) 1. ANTHONY ATKINSON {2015} 1. Policies to encourage technological innovation that creates rather than eliminates jobs. 2. Policies to redress stakeholder power imbalances: a) include distributional concerns in competition policies; b) adopt policies that increase.the bargaining power of unions; and c) establish a Social and Economic Council representing all private and public stakeholders, including NGOs, to oversee major macroeconomic and other policy decisions. 3. Set a maximum target for unemployment and provide public employment if necessary to achieve it. 4. Establish both a statutory minimum (living) wage and a "code of practice" for pay above the minimum. 5. A national savings bond program that guarantees a positive real rate of interest on savings. 6. A capital endowment (minimum inheritance) paid to all at adulthood. 7. Establish a public Investment Authority to manage a sovereign wealth fund that invests in companies and property. 8. A more progressive, and broader, personal income tax structure, with top marginal rates of 65%. 9. A progressive lifetime gift and inheritance tax. 10. An Earned Income Discount limited to the first band of earnings. 11. A progressive property tax based on up-to-date property assessments. 12. A substantial Child Benefit should be paid for all children. 13. A "participation income" paid to all making "a social contribution". 14. A major increase in levels and coverage of social insurance (as an alternative to 13). 15. Wealthy countries should increase Official Development Assistance for poor countries to 1% of Gross National Income. 2. PROGRESSIVE AGENDA TO COMBAT INCOME INEQUALITY- Mayor Bill DeBlasio eta/. {2015} A. Lift the Floor for Working People 1. Raise the federal minimum wage, so that it reaches $15/hour, while indexing it to inflation. 2. Reform the National Labor Relations Act, to enhance workers' right to organize and rebuild the middle class. 3. Pass comprehensive immigration reform to grow the economy and protect against exploitation of low-wage workers. 4. Oppose trade deals that hand more power to corporations at the expense of jobs, workers' rights, and the environment. 5. Invest in sc.hools, not jails-- and give a second chance to those coming home from prison. B. Support Working Families 1. Pass national paid sick leave. 2. Pass national paid family leave. 3. Make Pre-K, after-school programs and childcare universal. 4. Expand the Earned Income Tax Credit and protect and expand Social Security. 5. Allow students to refinance student loan debt to take advantage of lower interest rates, and support debt-free college. C. Tax Fairness 1. Close the carried interest loophole. 2. End tax breaks for companies that ship jobs overseas. 3. Implement the "Buffett Rule" so millionaires pay their fair share. 4. Close the CEO tax loophole that allows corporations to take advantage of "performance pay" write-offs. 1 2. THOMAS PIKETTY (2014) 1. A global tax on net household wealth, coupled with repeal of property taxes: [€ 1 = US$ 1.26] a. below € 200,000: 0.1% b. € 200,001- 1,000,000: 0.5% c. € 1,000,001-5,000,000: 2.0% d. € 5,000,001- 1,000,000,000: 5.0% e. above € 1,000,000,000 10.0% or greater 2. Maintain tax progressivity: a. On incomes above € 200,000, rates of 50-60%; b. On incomes above € 500,000 (or perhaps 1,000,000}, rates of 80%. 3.Ensure that the Social State remains effective: a. provide universal free university education b. ensure the integrity of retirement systems under challenging demographic and economic conditions. 3. ROBERT CREAMER (2013) 1. Break up the giant financial monopolies and install regulatory oversight on their practices. 2. Increase the minimum wage (from current $7.24 to $10.10) 3. Have fair trade agreements that require workers overseas to have strong pay, benefits, unions, etc. 4. Make it easier to organize unions, eg, card check. 5. Prevent cuts in Medicare, food stamps, social security benefits. 6. Raise the cap on social security taxes (FICA) paid by the wealthy (current cap is $113,700). 7. Make sure the Affordable Care Act is implemented and works well. 8. Make the tax system more progressive by a) creating a new tax bracket for incomes above $1 million; b) close tax loopholdes that benefit the wealthy; and c) increase the estate tax. 4. JOSEPH STIGLITZ (2012) I. CURBING THE EXCESSES AT THE TOP A. Reducing rent seeking and leveling the playing field 1. Curbing the financial sector. Extend Dodd-Frank to: a) curb excessive risk taking by too-big-to-fail financial institutions. Restrict leverage and liquidity. b) make banks more transparent; stop underwriting them by government-insured financial institutions. c) make banks and credit card companies more competitive, by developing efficient electronics payment mechanisms. d) prohibit banks from predatory lending and abusive credit card practices, by restricting high interest rates. e) Curb bonuses that encourage excessive risk taking f) Close down offshore banking centers- they exist only to circumvent taxes. 2. Stronger and more effectively enforced competition laws. Break up monopolies and oligopolies. 3. Stop CEOs from diverting corporate resources for personal benefit. Pass laws that give shareholders a say on pay. 4. Reform of bankruptcy laws so that lenders bear the brunt of a mistake, not the borrower. 5. End government giveaways in the disposition of public assets (eg, oil auctions, TV/radio spectrum) and procurement. 6. End corporate welfare: hidden subsidies, loopholes, exemptions in the tax code, etc. 7. End cheap corporate credit and government loan guarantees (eg, limited liability for nuclear power plants). B. Tax Reform 1. More progressive income and corporate taxes, with top brackets of 50-70% or more. 2. Reform the estate tax system to prevent the creation of a new oligarchy. II. HELPING THE REST 1. Improve access to education (eg, no government financial assistance to for-profit schools). 2. Help ordinary Americans save (eg, first-time homeowner assistance). 3. Health Care For All (eg, expand Obamacare; consider single-payer). 4. Strengthen other social protection programs (eg, EITC, Medicaid, food stamps,social security). 5. Temper Globalization: a) regulate short-term, speculative cross-border capital flows b) resist race to the bottom on regulations, workers rights, environmental protection c) tax profits of corporations operating in the US on the full basis of their US sales, regardless of where production occurs 2 6. Restore and maintain full employment: a) Fiscal policy: (eg, budget and tax powers used to achieve faster growth, more employment, lower debts/deficits) b) Monetary policy: (eg, more accountable central bank; focus on employment, growth, stability rather than solely inflation) c) Correcting trade imbalances d) Active labor market policy: (eg, job training and retraining, guaranteed jobs). 7. A New Social Compact a) Supporting workers' and citizens' collective action (eg, strengthen unions). b) Affirmative action to eliminate the legacy of discrimination 8. Restore Sustainable and Equitable Growth a) A growth agenda based on public investment (eg, peg corporate taxes to rates of investment and job creation) b) Redirect investment and innovation to preserve jobs and the environment (eg, via investment tax credits) Ill. POLITICAL REFORM SO THAT POLICIES LISTED IN I AND II CAN BE ADOPTED 1. Campaign finance reform (eg, public campaign funding, broadcaster mandate to provide free airtime). 2. Public funding of independent think tanks to ensure balanced policy debate. 3. Mandatory voting, with financial penalties for not complying 4. Reduce scope for gerrymandering 5. Reduce use of the filibuster 5. TIMOTHY NOAH (2012) A. Soak the Rich: Make Taxes More Progressive 1. raise marginal rates on income above $250,000 from 35% to 39.6% (Obama's proposal- done) 2. add additional marginal brackets: 50% of income above $1,000,000; 60% above $5,000,000; 70% above $20,000,000 3. tax capital gains at same rate as regular income 4. curtailS-corporations 5. phase out deductions and shelters, including the mortgage interest deduction 6. eliminate. payroll tax (FICA) that funds social security and medicare B. Fatten Government Payrolls 1. Provide time limited work for lower and middle income people a Ia 1936 Works Progress Administration C. Import More Skilled Labor 1. remove current restrictions/barriers, thus reducing the wage premium paid to U.S. college and professional school grads D. Universalize Preschool E. Impose Price Controls on Colleges and Universities 1. Use government student loan and research grant leverage to force colleges to accept austerity measures F. Reregulate Wall Street 1. Keep Dodd-Frank intact, resist repeal 2. Break up the too-big-to-fail banks G. Elect Democratic Presidents H. Revive the Labor Movement 1. Repeal Taft-Hartley 2. Allow card-check and/or include labor organizing under civil rights act 3. Expand worker stock owenership plans 4. Negotiate wages industry-wide 6. ROBERT REICH (2010) 1. Reverse income tax for low-income workers: "full-time workers earning $20,000 or less (2009 US$) would receive a wage supplement of $15,000. This supplement would decline incrementally up the income scale, to $10,000 for full-time workers earning $30,QOO; to $5,000 for full-time workers earning $40,000; and then to zero for full-time workers earning $50,000. 2. Reduced tax for middle-income workers: "The tax rate of full-time workers with incomes between $50,000 and $90,000- whether the source of those incomes are wages, salaries, or capital gains- would be cut to 10 percent of earnings." 3. Progressive tax for high-income workers: "The taxes for people with income of between $90,000 and $160,000 would be 20 percent, whatever the income source." Income above $160,000 would be taxed at 40%, above $260,000 at 50%, and above $410,000 at 55%. 3 7. HOWARD GARDNER (2007) 1. Maximum income disparity: "No single person should be allowed annually to take home more than 100 times as much money as the average worker in a society earns in a year. If the average worker makes $40,000, the top compensated individual may keep $4 million a year. Any income in excess of that amount must be contributed to a charity or returned to the government, either as a general gift, or targeted to a specific line item (ranging from the Department of Veterans Affairs to the National Endowment for the Arts." 2. Maximum income transfer: "No individual can pass more than $200 million to his or her heirs, and any excess must be contributed to charity." 8. JOHN CAVANAUGH (2008) 1. Repeal tax breaks for households with annual incomes over $250,000: $43 billion/yr. 2. Tax financial transactions: $100 billion/yr. 3. Eliminate tax preferences for capital gains and dividends: $80 billion/yr. 4. Progressive estate tax on large fortunes: $40-60 billion/yr. 5. A new higher rate on extremely high incomes: $60-70 billion/yr 6. End overseas tax havens: $100 billion/yr 7. Eliminate subsidies for excessive executive compensation: $18 billion/yr. 9. JULIET SCHOR (1995) 1. Basic Income Grant (BIG): A guaranteed minimum income from the government for all citizens. It would "allow people to opt out of the labor market for a while, to raise their children or pursue activities that are not lucrative (the arts, community work, or social services). It would enable them to retire when they feel ready, or to pursue schooling or retraining. Eligibility would be tied to a work requirement: the length of eligibility for receiving BIG would be tied to past work, and participation in unpaid community service, as well as child and elder care." 2. comparable worth: To be phased in over a three year period in all institutions. 3. minimum wage: A phased-in increase to $7.00 an hour for adults, with subsequent pegging to the median wage. 4. progressive taxes: expansion of lower income exemptions, higher marginal rates for higher incomes, removal of the income cap on payroll taxes, higher corporate income taxes. 5. green tax: A national value-added tax on retail commodities such as gasoline, air conditioners, meat, furniture, jet travel, etc. 6. Corporate Democracy Act: a) Boards of Directors to include workers, consumers and other stakeholders, in addition to stockholders; b) " ... erode the legal fiction of the corporation as person, thereby creating increased civil and criminal liability for individual managers." c) " ... transfer corporate chartering to the Federal government and set minimum standards for tax subsidies, pollution and unfair labor practices ... " 7. socially responsible firms: "Government should provide significant incentives for democratically controlled enterprises, such as consumer cooperatives, employee-owned firms, and municipally and community-owned enterprises. These include tax incentives, regulatory encouragement, financial schemes, preferential buying, and technical aid." ATTACHMENT C.3. HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH AND WHAT IS FAIR? [In preparation]] 4 ATTACHMENT D. ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY Attachment D.l on Climate Change is in preparation and not included in this outline. Attachment 0.2 is based on Hayes {2004; II.A.2) and is included in this outline for reference. A more extensive analysis of proposed energy regimes under the three archetypal scenarios is in preparation and will be used in the final white paper. ATTACHMENT 0.2. ENERGY REGIMES In this exercise we estimate the length of time over which world energy use can continue to grow, and the length of time over which a constant level of energy use can thereafter be sustained, under several scenarios. We use annual rates of 0.5%, 1.0% and 1.5% for scenarios of slow, medium and rapid energy growth.1 Procedure Our first step is to estimate the total stock of non-renewable energy resources and the maximum practicable flows of renewable energy resources. Our second step is to quantify the biogeophysicallimits on the growth of energy use. For this exercise we focus on two important biogeophysicallimits. One is atmospheric warming, which can result from either growing concentrations of greenhouse gases or from thermal pollution. The other is the availability of land. Our third step is to use these estimates to construct credible scenarios of energy use over time. Stocks and Flows of Energy Resources Tables 1, 2 and 3 in Box IIA-14 show the availability of stocks and flows of various energy resources as estimated in studies by different authors. Details of these studies are shown in Hayes (2004; Appendix 6}. I used the results of these studies to choose the stock and flow values used in this exercise, shown in Table 4. Biogeophysical constraints The important biogeophysical constraint on the use of fossil and nuclear fuels, other than stock constraints, is global atmospheric warming. The important biogeo physical constraint on photovoltaic hydrogen and biomass is the availability of land.2 1. Atmospheric warming: Most current estimates of the cost of damages that might follow a 2.5°( warming range from 1 to 4 percent of GDP. No mechanisms have yet been identified which suggest that a 2.5°C warming might precipitate a catastrophe that would bring economic growth to an end. However, as temperatures rise above 2.5°C the possibility of catastrophe does also, as discussed in Hayes (2004; II.A.2.b). In the absence of firmer data I choose a figure of 4° Cas the level of atmospheric warming that would likely produce impacts severe enough to bring economic growth to an end. If we add a precautionary margin of 10% we get a final value of 3.6°C as the level of atmospheric warming that humankind would probably agree with near unanimity should be avoided. Atmospheric warming above pre-industrial levels can be caused by increased concentrations of greenhouse gases or by thermal pollution. a. Warming due to increased concentrations of greenhouse gases: A variety of greenhouse gas emissions scenarios exist that prevent warming from exceeding 3.6°C, as shown in Box IIA-15. One might be for 1 These values approximate the range of forecasts of the growth rate of energy use over the coming century used in many studies (e.g., IPCC I 994.) 2 Nuclear reactions and fossil fuel combustion liberate energy tied up in nuclear and chemical bonds, and thus add heat to the atmosphere. Solar energy systems collect and change the radiant energy of sunlight into new forms, but add no new heat to the atmosphere. However, solar energy systems require large land areas in order to usefully concentrate diffuse radiant energy. 1 BOX IIA-14. STOCKS AND FLOWS OF ENERGY RESOURCES TABLE 1. ESTIMATES OF STOCKS OF FOSSIL FUELS (Terawatt years) Kahn 1 Kahn 2 Freeman Holdren IIASAIWEC IPCC EMF Hinrichs (1976) (1976) (1978) (1995) (1995) (1995) (1996) (1996) OIL 2564 451 198 conventional 124 482 500 284 270 unconventional 500 785 511 Shale Oil 636 66980 1115 30000 29 Tar Sands 60 60 209 57 NATURAL GAS 33 529 1394 519 167 conventional 500 312 292 unconventional 1000 854 COAL 3182 5693 7153 5000 4828 3985 9525 1675 TOTAL 4036 73745 12435 37500 6182 5912 10495 2126 wlo shale oil 3400 6765 11320 7500 6182 5912 10495 2097 notes: Kahn 1 "proven reserves" Kahn 2 "long term potential resources" Freeman "ultimately recoverable resources" Holdren "estimated remaining recoverable resources" IIASAIWEC "ultimately recoverable energy resources" IPCC "resource base" EMF "ultimately recoverable resources" Hinrich "proven reserves" sources: see Table 3 TABLE 2. ESTIMATES OF STOCKS OF NUCLEAR FUELS (Terawatt Years) Kahn Freeman Hafele Holdren IIASAIWEC IPCC (1976) (1978) (1981) (1995) (1995) (1995) Uranium in LWR's 502 ? ? 3 X 1011 3 369 451 Uranium in Breeders >3x 10"6 8351 3 X 10115 3 X 10116 22067 DT-Fusion 10717 "virtually 3 X 10115 140 X 10116 DO-Fusion 34 X 10119 unlimited" 3 X 10 119 250 X 1011 9 notes: a) IIASAIWEC estimates that 12,000+ TwY of LWR uranium is "ultimately recoverable" b) Kahn's estimate of 502 TwY of LWR Uranium applies to the "free world." Kahn estimates that 100,470 TwY of LWR Uranium is available in the oceans sources: see Table 3 [more ... ) 2 BOX IIA-14. STOCKS AND FLOWS OF ENERGY RESOURCES (cont'd.) TABLE 3. ESTIMATES OF PRACTICABLE FLOWS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY (Terawatts) Kahn Hafele Holdren IPCC (1976) (1981) (1995) (1995) Solar Electric 1005 20-200 50 82 Biomass 40 6 25 41.3 Hydropower 3.3 3 2 4.1 OTEC 670 1 9 0.63 Wind 3 1 4.1 Geothermal 2 other all< 1 0.63 total 1718 35-235 109 133 "best plausible" flow: 30 notes: a) Holdren's estimate of 50 TW of Solar Electric assumes using 1% of land area at 20% efficiency b) Holdren's estimate of 25 TW of Biomass assumes using 10% of land area at 1% efficiency c) Hafele's upper estimate of 200 TW of Solar Electric assumes using 7% of land area sources for Tables 1, 2 and 3: Kahn Herman Kahn (1976). The Next 200 Years Freeman Christopher Freeman and Marie Jahoda (1978). World Futures: The Great Debate Holdren John Holdren (1995). Course handout for Energy and Resources 200, UC Berkeley IIASAIWEC International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis/World Energy Council (1995). Global Energy Perspectives to 2050 and Beyond IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1996). Climate Change 1995: Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation: Scientific-Technical Analyses EMF Energy Modeling Forum (1996). Demographic, Economic and Energy Assumptions for EMF 14 Hinrichs Roger Hinrichs (1996). Energy: It's Use and the Environment (2nd Edition) Hafele Wolf Hafele (1981 ). Energy in a Finite World: Paths to a Sustainable Future TABLE 4. ENERGY RESOURCE STOCK AND FLOW ESTIMATES USED FOR THIS EXERCISE [sources: Tables 1, 2, 3. See Appendix A-6 for estimation procedure] A. Remaining recoverable stock resources: (Terawatt Years) Fossil Fuels: 7,500 Uranium in LWR's: 1,000 Uranium in Breeders 60,000 Fusion: 10118-10119 B. Maximum practicable energy flows from renewables: (Terawatts) PV Hydrogen: low 33.8 using 2% of land = 2.7 x10116 km112@ 12.6 TW/10116 km 112 high 203.0 using 12% of land= 16.1 x10 116 km 112@ 12.6 TW/10116km 112 Biomass: 26.8 usiJ!g_10% of land- 13.4 x10 116 km 112@ 2 TW/10116 km 112 Hydro, wind, etc.: 6.0 3 BOX IIA-15. Avoiding a 3.6 degree warming Figure 1. Emissions Scenarios That Avoid A 3.6 Degree Warming 40 35 30 -;::: >. (3 25 (5 ';;;' 20 c 0 -~ 15 .E UJ 10 5 0 l_- L I_ ___ I I _j __ ! __ I _!___ L_ !__ !___ L _[. __ I !_ I : _ 1 j_ J ._!. 1.. I 1990 2020 2050 2080 2110 2140 2170 2200 2230 • Business-As-Usual Emissions • Policy A " Policy B -o Policy C Figure 2. Global Warming < 3.6 Degrees 10 9 8 07 en ~6 Ol Q) 5 ~ g'4 "§ 3 co ;:2 1 • 0 L I _) _I_ 1 1 l L __ I _ I _ _l ~ _ __I __ I _i I I 1990 2020 2050 2080 2110 2140 2170 2200 2230 - • -warming under BAU emissions •-- warming under Policy A ... warming under Policy B o warming under Policy C Emissions Policy Descriptions: Business-As-Usual: This follows the BAU scenario of Cline (1992) - Policy A: Global emissions begin declining in 2000 and stabilize at 6 GtC by 2025 Policy B: Emissions follow BAU projections until they reach 11 GtC in 2025, then begin declining until they reach and stabilize at 5.5 GtC Policy C: Emissions follow BAU projections until the reach 11 GtC in 2025, stabilize at that level for 25 years, then decline and stabilize at 4.5 GtC by 2075 4 emissions to decline and stabilize at 6 GtC by 2025. Another would allow emissions to increase to 11 GtC by 2025, but decline within the next quarter century to 5.5 GtC. A third would stabilize emissions at 11 GtC from 2025 to 2050, but require reduction to 4.5 GtC by 2075. 3 The amount of coal that produces emissions of 6 GtC can produce about 9 TW of energy. For the remainder of this exercise we'll regard 9 TWas the biogeophysicallimit on the production of energy from fossil fuels. b. Warming due to thermal pollution: Box IIA-16 shows that a global warming of 3.6°C could be produced by thermal pollution if total energy use grew to 5400 TW. This is 490 times the current level of 11 TW. 2. Available Land: For purposes of this exercise we assume that 2% of ice-free land is currently suitable and available for the production of photovoltaic hydrogen. In addition we suggest that over periods of a century or longer 12% of ice-free land could be used. SCENARIOS Given the available stocks and flows of energy resources that we're calculated, and the limited ability of the earth's ecosystems to sustain global warming or conversion of land to energy production, how long can energy use continue to grow at 0.5, 1.0, and 1.5 percent?4 1. Fossil fuels If global warming were not a concern then the available 7500 TWy of fossil fuels would allow energy use to grow at 0.5%, 1.0% and 1.5% for another 271, 191 and 151 years, respectively. At those times total energy use would have grown to 50 TW, 87 TW, or 123 TW, which represent levels of use 3.9, 6.7 and 9.5 times the year 2000 rate of 13 TW. After these dates new energy sources would need to be available in order to avoid a global crash of the sort forecast by the World 3 reference scenario. However, we've seen that fossil fuels cannot supply more than 9 TW on a long term basis without causing global warming to exceed our 3.6°C limit. If we take 9 TWas the effective sustainable level of fossil fuel use, we see that the stock of 7500 TWy would last for 833 years. 2. Fossil fuels plus light water reactor fission If we chose to rely heavily on LWR fission, energy use could grow at 0.5, 1.0 and 1.5 percents beyond 2000 for another 162, 125 and 104 years. Together with the 9 TW of sustainable fossil fuel energy, total energy use at these dates would be 18, 23 and 28 TW. However, all uranium fuel would have been exhausted, and new energy sources would need to have been developed if we wish to avoid a return to a 9 TW world. 3. Fossil fuels plus breeder reactors If we use the available supply of uranium for breeders rather than for fission we would have a total of 67,500 TWy of power available. At rates of 0.5%, 1.0% and 1.5% energy use could grow for 659, 397 and 294 3 These scenarios were generated using an extended version of the global warming model developed by Cline (1992) as modified by Hayes (1996). Note that the sooner that emissions begin to be curtailed, the higher the stable level of acceptable carbon emissions allowable afterwards will be. 4 The formulas used to construct the scenarios are: rl I. To calculate the level of energy use E if it grew at rater fort years: = E 1 E 0e 2. To calculate the total amount Q of a depletable energy resource consumed if its use E grew at rate r fort years: Q = J~ E0e" = Eo (e'' -1) r 3. To calculate the timeT it would take to exhaust a depletable energy resources stock Q if its initial rate of use is E0 and it grew at rate r: T = ..!_ ln( rQ + 1] r E 0 5 BOX IIA-16. THERMAL POLLUTION When energy is used to do work it generates heat. The more energy that people use, the more heat is released into the earth's atmosphere. The earth's atmosphere absorbs heat from a variety of sources and releases heat into empty space, as shown in the basic energy balance equation, 2 2 4 (1) -1tRE S + (M + Mm) nRiSA + 4nRE !>oT where: S solar constant 0.135 watts/cm2 RE radius ofthe earth 6.37x108 em A albedo 0.37 g emissivity 0.55 cr Stephan-Boltzman constant 5.67x10-12 watts/cm2 °K4 M misc. natural energy inputs 27x1 012 watts (volcanoes, etc.) Mm anthropogenic energy inputs 11x1012 watts (1995; fossil & nuclear fuel use) This equation can be used to calculate the amount by which the atmosphere will warm as a result of any level of human energy use (Mn). We manipulate ( 1) to get: (2) T1 = [ ((1-A) 1t Ri S + M) I (4nRig cr) ] 114 where T 1 is the temperature of the atmosphere in the absence of anthropogenic energy inputs (i.e., when Mm = 0). Using the constant and parameter values given above we find that T 1 = 288° K = 15° C = 59° F. Following Holdren (1971) we note that for small changes in M,n, (3) Tr T1 ~ L1T << T1 = 288° K We can manipulate the equations and apply given values to get: (4) L1T = .25Mm T1 [(1-A) 4nRi sr1 = 6.67x10-16 Mm This expression allows us to generate the table below showing the atmospheric warming generated by higher levels of human energy use: human energy use anthroQogenic warming date reached; or years until it is reached with 1% and 5% energy use (TW) (OC) growth rates 5 .0033 1970 - historical 10 .0067 1992 - historical 30 .0200 2035 - reference scenario 100 .0670 2108 - reference scenario 500 .3300 380 yrs (1%) 760 yrs (.5%) 1000 .6670 450 yrs (1%) 900 yrs (.5%) 2000 1.33 520 yrs (1%) 1030 yrs (.5%) 3750 2.5 580 yrs (1%) 1160 yrs (.5%) 5400 3.6 620 yrs (1%) 1230 yrs (.5%) 6 years, reaching total use levels of 351, 689 and 1069 TW, which are 27, 53 and 82 times the 2000 level of 13 TW. At the end of these growth periods alternative sources would be needed if catastrophic collapse is to be avoided. 4. Fusion If fusion turns out to be a feasible and practicable energy source within the next 50 years or so then the lower estimate of 1QA8 TWy of available power would allow growth at 0.5% 1.0% and 1.5% for 1958 years, 1048 years and 756 years, reaching total use levels of .5 million, 1 million and 1.5 million TW. (Here we assume that fusion begins as a commercial power source in 2050, after total energy use has grown at 1.5% per year to 28 TW.) Of course, these levels are orders of magnitude above the limit of 5400 TW that we determined earlier would be necessary to avoid a global warming greater than 3.6 °( due to thermal pollution. If we begin in 2050 at 28 TW, energy use supplied by fusion power can increase at 0.5%, 1.0% and 1.5% for 1052, 526, and 351 years before reaching the 5400 TW limit. After the 5400 TW limit is reached energy use growth will have to end. However, the stock of fusion energy resources would not be exhausted at that time. 5 Using the middle scenario in which an energy use level of 28 TW increases at 1% for 526 years beyond 2050, we find that 537,000 TWy of fusion resources will have been used over that period, with 1QA8- 5.37x1QA5 =99.5x1QA6 TWy remaining. At a constant annual rate of use of 5400 TW this stock will last for about 184,000 years. If the higher 1QA9 TWy estimate of fusion resources is used a 5400 TW level of energy use can be sustained for 1.8 million years. 5. Photovoltaic Hydrogen_ What if we find out that fusion is not a practicable energy source? Photovoltaic hydrogen is an alternative. Thermal pollution is not a constraint on the increasing use of photovoltaic hydrogen, but land use is. If energy use grows at 0.5%, 1.0% or 1.5% between 2000 and 2050 total energy use will have grown to 17, 21 or 28 TW over that time. For the following exercise we assume that these levels can be supplied at a constant level for a certain period thereafter (see below) by fossil fuels (9 TW), other renewables (5 TW), and nuclear power (3, 7 or 14 TW). 6 If photovoltaic hydrogen becomes available by 2050, how much longer will energy use be able to continue to grow? If we use the lower limit of 2% land availability for photovoltaic hydrogen, we see that energy use can grow at 0.5%, 1.0% or 1.5% for 269, 146 or 103 years beyond 2000. At these times total energy use will be between 51, 55 or 62 TW. If we use the upper limit of 12% land availability for photovoltaic hydrogen we see that energy use can grow at 0.5%, 1.0%, or 1.5% for 562, 287, or 191 years beyond 2000. At these times total energy use will be 220, 224 or 231 TW. If fossil fuel use is limited to 9 TW, the 7500 TWy of available fossil fuels would last for about 833 years. If nuclear fuel is limited to 3, 7 or 14 TW it would last for 333, 143 or 71 years if used in conventional fission reactors, or for 20,000, 8,600 or 4,300 years if used in breeders. If land use for photovoltaic hydrogen is limited to 2%, total energy use is limited to about 60TW, and some alternative energy source will need to be found for the 3, 7 or 14 TW produced by nuclear fuel, if it is used for conventional reactors, after 333, 143 or 71 years. If no alternatives are available then total energy use would have to be reduced to about 57, 53, or 46 TW. After another 800 years additional energy sources would need to be available for the 9 TW supplied by fossil fuels. If no alternatives are available then total energy use would have to be reduced further, to 48, 44 or 37 TW. If the nuclear fuel is used for breeders no alternative sources would be needed before 4300 years at the earliest. 5 Fossil and nuclear fuels, by contrast, reach their limits by exhaustion. 6 These values are typical of the low, medium and high values of nuclear power use projected for 2050 by many analysts. 7 If land use for photovoltaic hydrogen is limited to 12% total energy use will be limited to about 220 TW, and if no alternative is found for the portion supplied by (conventional) nuclear power, total energy use will have to be reduced to about 217, 213 or 206 TW after 333, 143 or 71 years. After another 800 years these levels would need to be reduced to 208, 204, or 197 TW if no substitute for the 9 TW supplied by fossil fuels is found. If we are comfortable using the nuclear fuel in breeder reactors no alternative sources would be needed before less than 4300 years. Summary 1. If fusion is practicable, there appears to be no reason that energy use cannot continue to grow until it reaches the 5400 TW limit imposed by thermal pollution. This is about 415 times the level of energy use today. This level will be reached in about 300 years if energy use grows rapidly (1.5% per year), and 1000 years if it grows slowly (0.5%). It would be sustainable for perhaps 20,000 to 200,000 years after that. 2. If fusion is not practicable then photovoltaic hydrogen is an alternative. If we are able to use 12% of land surface for photovoltaic hydrogen then energy use will be able to grow until it reaches 220 TW, about 17 times today's level. This level will be reached in about 200 years if we grow rapidly and 500 years if we grow slowly. If we can only use 2% of the land for photovoltaic hydrogen we will be limited to about 60 TW, which is 4.6 times today's level, and would be reached in about 100 years if we grow rapidly and 270 years if we grow slowly. 3. In the two scenarios above fossil and nuclear fuels serve as transitional sources of energy. If neither fusion nor photovoltaic hydrogen are practicable then heavy reliance on breeders would allow us to grow slowly for perhaps 600 years (to a level of 300 TW), or rapidly for 300 years (to 1000 TW). But by the end of these periods we would need to have found substitutes or face catastrophic collapse. Available substitutes such as biomass and other renewables have practicable limits that total in the neighborhood of 33 TW. If we are willing to employ breeder technology we could grow at slow or moderate rates for 200 or 300 years and see if some exotic energy sources might be made practicable; if this does not happen we would have another 200 to 300 years to make a transition to a 33 TW world based on biomass and other renewables. 4. If neither fusion nor photovoltaic. hydrogen are practicable and we are not willing to employ breeders then we can grow until we reach the 33 TW level that is sustainable with biomass and other renewables. This will happen in about 60 years if we grow rapidly or 180 years if we grow slowly. The fossil fuel share of total energy use is limited to 9 TW, so in the near term most new energy would be supplied by nuclear fission. Fission sources could be phased out as biomass sources are established. A 33 TW biomass/renewables world would be sustainable as long as the sun shines. Assessment What are we to make of these scenarios? A person who expects fusion and large-scale photovoltaic hydrogen to be practicable and socially acceptable might note that combinations of these could comfortably allow energy use to grow at moderate rates for another 400 to 600 years before any biogeophysicallimits are encountered; that at a minimum these limits would still represent a 20-fold increase over today's level of energy use; and that these levels would be sustainable for at least tens of thousands of years (if we relied mostly on fusion) and perhaps for as long as the sun shines (if we relied mostly on photovoltaic hydrogen). A person inclined to be cautious about these matters might judge that since the practicability of fusion is unknown, and since the full impacts of covering 12% of the earth's land area with photocells are likely to entail unacceptable social costs, and since breeder technologies should be rejected from the start, the only scenario about which we can feel reasonably confident is the one in which global energy use reaches its highest practicable, sustainable level at about 60 TW of mostly photovoltaic hydrogen power, using 2% of the land area, sometime within the next 100 to 270 years. This scenario would likely employ biomass and other renewables as well. Thus a "moderate techno-optimist" might judge that energy use can continue to grow for perhaps 400 to 600 years, until it reaches a sustainable level 20 times today's level, while a "moderate techno-skeptic" might judge that energy use can grow for maybe 100 to 270 years, until it reaches a sustainable level perhaps 5 times as high as today's. 8 ATTACHMENT 0.3. ASSESSING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC RISK Notes concerning global catastrophic risk are in preparation. See Panels A and B, and brief comments, below. PANAL A: POTENTIAL GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC EVENTS AND SITUATIONS I. EVENTS AND SITUATIONS DRIVEN BY NATURAL EXTRATERRESTRIAL PHENOMENA a. Lethal gamma radiation discharge from massive supernovae or explosions of micro-black holes. b. Collision with large mass and/or high velocity comet or asteroid that crosses earth's orbit. II. EVENTS AND SITUATIONS DRIVEN BY NATURAL TERRESTRIAL PHENOMENA a. Geophysical: -Super-volcanism: a) massive release of continental scale flood basalts; b) massive release of sulfate particles into the stratosphere causing volcanic cooling. -Collapse of large coastal volcanoes and resulting mega-tsunamis. -Reversal of the polarity of Earth's magnetic field. b. Biological: massive pandemics of great virulence and contagion. Ill. ANTHROPOGENIC EVENTS AND SITUATIONS a. Intentional harm: warfare/terrorism/psychopathy - Extensive military use of nuclear weapons; nuclear terrorism - Extensive military use of biological weaponry using synthetic biology/nanoscale elements; bioterrorism - Sustained global mass violence driven by religious or secular fanaticism b. Uninten"tional harm: -Accidental escape or release of massively harmful agents using synthetic biology/nanoscale elements - Unanticipated massively harmful impacts of intentional use of agents using synthetic biology/nanoscale elements c. Civilizational collapse from: - Exhaustion of natural resource stocks or sinks -Climate change/global warming of 2°, 4°, 6°, go C. .. [See DN 13 for detail on the impact of a 4oC warming] -Thermal pollution [see Attachment 0.2, Box IIA-16.] -Inherent instability of large complex systems [See Hayes (2004; Section II.A.4)] -Massively destabilizing growth of inequality; genetically engineered human speciation -"Perfect storm" of random destabilizing economic situations and events, including random poor policy responses -Mass cultural/spiritual error or exhaustion IV. HIGHLY UNLIKELY EXOTIC EVENTS AND SITUATIONS a. The Singularity b. Engulphment by a micro- or other black hole c. Very high-energy particle accelerator catastrophe that -collapses a metastable vacuum -ignites the atmosphere -creates a new "Big Bang" -creates "strangelets" that transform common matter into strange matter d. Extermination/Enslavement by robots and/or artificial intelligence e. Invasion or other lethal violence by hostile aliens V. EVENTS AND SITUATIONS THAT ARE HIGHLY LIKELY BUT ARE VERY DISTANCE IN TIME a. Holocene interglacial concludes and glaciation resumes. (3K-30K years before onset of impact on human civilization) b. Expansion of the Sun to red giant status, followed by collapse (2-3 billion years before onset of impact on earth) c. Entropic heat-death of the universe (40-100 billion years?) VI. UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS- ?? SOURCES: IPCC (2014), Brockman (2014), Bostrom & Crickovic (2008}, Smil (2008), Martin (2006}, lkle (2006), Hayes (2004), Rees (2003), Trainer (1996), Leslie (1996}, Garrett (1994), Asimov (1979). 9 PANEL B: CHARACTERIZATION OF LEVELS OF GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC IMPACT For this exercise imagine that global development proceeds along our business-as-usual scenario, roughly as described in Attachment B.2. By 2100 population is 10 billion, per capita output is $50,000 (1990 US$) and AGW is just under 4• C. In 2100 a catastrophic event or situation is triggered. Types and degrees of global impacts that might follow include: I. Life on earth is extinguished over not more than 1-2 human generations (30-60 years): a. All life is extinguished, with no possibility of re-emergence b. All life is extinguished, but re-emergence is a possibility c. All human life on earth is extinguished, with no possibility of re-emergence d. All human life on earth is extinguished, but re-emergence is a possibility II. A large portion of the human population is extinguished over not more than 1-2 generations: a. 99.99% of humans are extinguished: 1,000,000 survive b. 99.90% of humans are extinguished: 10,000,000 survive c. 99.00% of humans are extinguished: 100,000,000 survive d. 90.00 %of humans are extinguished: 1,000,000,000 survive e. 50.00% of humans are extinguished: 5,000,000,000 survive f. 20.00% of humans are extinguished: 8,000,000,000 survive Ill. Collapse of advanced industrial civilization over not more than 1-2 generations: a. 90% collapse of per capita output: $ 5,000 I yr per capita output remains b. 70% collapse of per capita output: $ 15,000 I yr per capita output remains c. 50% collapse of per capita output: $ 25,000 I yr per capita output remains d. 30% collapse of per capita output: $ 35,000 I yr per capita output remains e 20% collapse of per capita output: $ 40,000 I yr per capita output remains IV. After a period of contraction to one of the levels shown in Ill above, per capita GDP, which grew over the second half of the 20th century at a rate of about 2% per year, now grows at: a. 0.0%; b. 0.5%; c. 1.0%; d. 1.5% For this exercise, suppose we define as globally catastrophic any situation or event that: *causes the premature death of 20% or more of the human population over 30-60 years; or *causes global economic output to decline by 20% or more over 30-60 years; or *causes per capita economic growth to slow to below 0.0% over 30-60 years with no possibility of recovery. PRELIMINARY COMMENTS- Analysis, discussion and justification are in preparation 1. Although the harm generated by any of the events and situations listed in Panel A would clearly be immense, only a few of them appear likely to rise to the level of globally catastrophic as defined at the bottom on Panel B. 2. Note that even under conditions of extreme economic collapse (e.g., of 90% of per capita GDP, which takes us from $50,000 to $5,000 in 1-2 generations) humanity is still economically better off than we were in 2000, when per capita GDP was $4, 876. Questions involving relative well-being over time remain germane and difficult. 3. It is not obvious that AGW of 4•c or less would pose a high risk of generating global catastrophic events as here defined. Of course, with every increment of increased warming the likelihood of such events increases as well. 4. A case can be made that the likelihood of global catastrophic events resulting from the unintended release of unintentionally lethal and virulent forms of synthetic biology/nanotechnology is low. However, see note 4. 5. A case can be made that the single greatest danger of globally catastrophic scope and scale facing humanity involves the design, engineering and use of synthetic biology/nanoscale agents to cause intended catastrophic harm. 6. Techno-Progressive World is the scenario most at risk of catastrophic events, and it lacks the collective institutions needed for effective prevention or amelioration. Balanced Equitable World avoids many but not all catastrophic risks; it is, however, the most well-positioned to take pro-active steps towards prevention and amelioration. Green Sustainability World is the least likely to run risks of catastrophic events but is not well positioned to address those that might happen nonetheless (eg, large asteroid collision). 10 ATTACHMENT E. STEADY-STATE POLITICAL ECONOMY: REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT [In process; not included in this outline] 1 ATTACHMENT F. GEOPOLITICAl STRUCTURES Text in preparation. BOX F-1 illustrates several of the points to be discussed. BOX F-1. GEOPOLITICAL STRUCTURES: LEVELS AND INTENSITY OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT The schematic figures show three geopolitical structures that differ in the density of political and economic engagement within different levels of engagement. Thick borders suggest a high density of political and economic engagement unique to that level. Thin borders suggest a low degree of political and economic engagement unique to that level. A 8 c GLOBAL thin THICK thin REGIONAL THICK thin thin NATIONAL thin THICK thin LOCAL THICK thin THICK Figure A suggests a world of strong continental/regional empires and strong local tribes or city-states Figure B suggests a world of strong nation-states and strong global institutions. Figure C suggests a version of Green Sustainability World, with political and economic engagement at the local level but only thin engagement beyond those. Our archetypal scenario of Techno-Progressive World might display thin lines at all levels. Our archetypal scenario of Balanced Equitable World might display thick lines at all levels. Mixed systems can be imagined. For example, the world might have thin global structures and think regional ones, with the regional structures differing in the relative importance and prominence of national vs. local structures. 1 ATTACHMENT G. BEYOND THE LEFT-RIGHT DIVIDE [These are preliminary notes; revised text will be included in the whitepaper.] Over the decades many initiatives have sought to build bridges between existing political ideologies or to generate new ones, and to institutionalize the results of these efforts. Most of these efforts have been directed at relatively short-term advantage, either electorally or in pursuit of a set of policy objectives. Several initiatives focused mostly on politics in the United States are noted below. In the 1950s William Buckley and Frank Meyer proposed a strategy of bringing the libertarian right and the communitarian right together under the big tent of the Republican Party. The election of Ronald Reagan three decades later has been seen as a vindication of this strategy. From the 1930s to the 1960s the base of the Democratic Party was the communitarian left. From the 1960s through 2008 the Democrats struggled to accommodate both the communitarian left and a growing libertarian left. Many see the 2012 re-election of President Barak Obama as evidence that they've now successfully done so. Some foresee a decline in the communitarian left and predict an emerging "center-libertarian" Democratic Party base. 1 The success of the two major parties at incorporating differing ideological constituencies has made it difficult for more ideologically pure third or fourth parties to form and sustain themselves. A minor exception is the U.S. Libertarian party, formed in 1971, which fields candidates in about a thousand state, local and national races each election cycle, including the presidential race. At the beginning of 2013 Libertarians held 135 elected offices, all in state and local positions. The Libertarian candidate in the 2012 presidential race received 1.2 million votes, just under 1% of the total vote cast. 2 More significantly, libertarians have succeeded in building support for their positions among voters at large and within both the Republican and Democratic parties. Communitarianism enjoyed a boom among academics, pundits and centrist Democrats during the 1990s as a response to the ascendant movement conservativism of the Republicans. In 1990 sociologist Amitai Etzioni established the Communitarian Network to serve as a base for communitarian thinking, writing and advocacy. The following year over 100 noted public intellectuals and others signed and promulgated the Responsive Communitarian Platform. In 1995 President Clinton held a two-day White House conference dedicated to communitarian ideas. But the concept and the term didn't gain traction, and by the early 2000s had largely faded from public view.3 However, communitarian values remain widely shared. See Box G-1 for comparisons with other ideological tendencies. During this same period an analogous school of political thought, commonly dubbed The Third Way, developed in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. It called for a reformed social democracy in which state ownership of production and other statist policies were abandoned but strong government action to ensure equal opportunity and economic growth and equity was maintained. Prominent figures identified with The Third Way included UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and sociologist Anthony Giddens. By the early 2000s it too had faded from view.4 In 2002 former US Senate majority leaders Howard Baker (R-TN), Tom Daschle (D-SD}, Bob Dole (R-KS) and George Mitchell (D-ME) founded the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC} to develop and advocate for centrist policies addressing energy, the economy, national security, health and other issues that in principle could gain support from both Republican and Democratic constituencies. The BPC has a staff of about 80 and a budget of close to $20 million. In 2005 the DC think-tank Third Way was established to support centrist positions within the Democratic Party. It addresses issues of economics, national security, clean energy, and social policy and politics and has a staff of about 30. Both the Bipartisan Policy Center and Third Way receive significant corporate funding and have been charged with being hawkish on defence policy and beholden to Wall Street financiers. 5 The efforts noted above were largely initiated by and involve high-level elites and influentials. A number of grassroots-oriented initiatives have also sought to bridge ideological differences around controversial issues. These include Public Agenda, Everyday Democracy, Public Conversations Project, America Speaks, the National Issues Forum and LivingRoomConversations.org. They vary in method and style but in general seek to organize face-to-face discussions among average citizens in local communities, including advocates from opposing sides of issues. Some involve elected officials and issue experts as well. Topics that one or more of these initiatives have addressed include the US budget deficit, energy/climate/sustainability, racial justice, early childhood development, police-community 1 relations, Israeli-Palestinian relations, religion and gay rights, pro-life and pro-choice perspectives, post-genocide reconciliation, affordable higher education, post-Katrina rebuilding and food justice. These initiatives differ, of course, from the many grass-roots activist organizing projects throughout the country whose strategy calls for mobilizing aggrieved constituencies against a targeted adversary. The Tea Party movement that began in 2009 draws heavily from Jacksonians and from both the libertarian and communitarian right. A 2010 survey suggested that of the 17% of Americans who described themselves as being "part of the Tea Party movement," 57% were Republicans, 28% were Independents and 13% were Democrats.6 The Tea Party movement was successful in mobilizing electorally during the 2010 elections, and to a lesser extent during the 2012 elections. The Occupy movement that began in 2011 drew heavily on both the libertarian and communitarian left. It has not been successful in sustaining itself organizationally, but can be credited with having placed the issue of income and wealth inequality on the public agenda in a way that had not been the case earlier. 7 In response to the perceived growth of political polarization and policy gridlock, in 2011 several DC-based political operatives began an initiative called Americans Elect, with the intent of organizing a bipartisan presidential and vice presidential third-party campaign. Some $35 million in funds were raised and ballot access was secured in 45 states, but serious candidates were not forthcoming and the effort was disbanded.8 In recent years two significant efforts were made involving bridge-building to address challenges involving the new human biotechnologies. One was an initiative in the early 2000s by leaders from both the political pro-life "right" and the political pro-choice "left" to find common ground on controversial new technologies of human genetic manipulation. There was a shared understanding that people could differ in good faith about abortion and still agree that reproductive human cloning, inheritable genetic modification and related procedures should be prohibited. Unfortunately, these discussions were taking place at precisely the time that the "stem cell wars" were elevating any discussion of new human reproductive technologies to front-line markers of red/blue, liberal/conservative, Democrat/Republican partisan identity, and no traction could be gained for any sort of common ground public position. A more successful though ultimately inconclusive initiative involved President George W. Bush's Council on Bioethics and its deliberations on human cloning and related topics. The President's early moves on these issues were taken with advice from bioethicists Leon Kass and Daniel Callahan, respectively representing the moderate communitarian right and the moderate communitarian left. The 17-member Council on Bioethics subsequently appointed by President Bush, and chaired by Kass, was widely assumed by the political commentariat to be stacked with pro-lifers, but this was not the case: the Council included pro-life partisans, to be sure, but also leading biomedical researchers and pro-choice liberal and centrist scholars. (Two of these, Harvard professor Michael Sandel and Johns Hopkins professor Francis Fukuyama, had signed the aforementioned 1991 Communitarian Platform). On the important issue of the creation of clonal human embryos for research, Council members voted 7-3-7 respectively in favor of permitting it, establishing a moratorium pending further deliberation, and banning it completely; President Bush responded by establishing a moratorium. Following this effort the Council began a process to identify the most comprehensive set of policies that they could agree upon unanimously. Their report on this process, Reproduction and Responsibility: The Regulation of New Biotechnologies {2004}, was a sophisticated document that could have informed a wide-ranging national dialogue. But, again unfortunately, partisan polarization on all issues nationwide had reached a stage that precluded such a dialogue.9 Concluding comment This cursory review illustrates the diversity of approaches used by those seeking to cross, combine, collaborate among or transcend conventional ideological categories. Some work in the world of ideas, others in the world of community engagement, others on policy proposals, and others in electoral politics. Some seek to build coalitions of the center while others seek to bring together constituencies strongly alienated from the center. As of yet none of these efforts have risen to the level, scale and intensity necessary to spark major social, political and cultural realignment, innovation or transcendence of the sort referenced in the whitepaper outline text. The polarizations and tensions that have brought us to this moment are deep and have been building for some time, and are unlikely to resolve themselves easily or quickly. 2 ATTACHMENT BOX G-1: FOUR-QUADRANT CLASSIFICATIONS OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY See below the results of several surveys that have attempted to measure the extent to which Americans subscribe to ideological perspectives of the sort described in Box F. Percents 2006 2010 2011 2006- Average Correspondence to Political Ideology Gallup 10 USA Reason- 2012 (excluding categories shown in Box H Today 11 Rupe 12 ANES 13 Reason- Rupe) Conservative 27 17 28 27 24 Communitarian Right Liberal 24 24 28 23 24 Libertarian Left Libertarian 20 22 24 17 20 Libertarian Right Populist/Communitarian 20 20 20 15 18 Communitarian Left Middle/Moderate/other 9 17 na 18 15 "Centrist" The results of the surveys are not strictly comparable because the questions used to identify the particular ideologies differed. Also, the Gallup, USA Today and Reason-Rupert poll surveyed general population samples, whereas the American National Election Survey polled those who voters in the four US federal elections held in 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012. The figures shown above for the ANES is the average for each ideological category over 2006-12. The sixth column shows the average of the 2006, 2010 and 2006-2012 surveys. The 2011 survey did not include a "moderate" category and so is not included in the averages shown in the sixth column. 1 See Ross Douthat's commentary on President Obama as the "liberal Reagan," who has prevailed by uniting and mobilizing the libertarian left and communitarian left rather than by moving towards the center. 2 See the Libertarian Party website and the Wikipedia page. 3 For background on communitarianism see the Wikipedia entry and The Communitarian Network website. See the account of the varieties of communitarian thought and politics by scholar Gary Dorrien, in which he classifies President Obama as a "liberal leaning, moderate, pragmatic communitarian." See this account by Will Marshall, president of the Progressive Policy Institute, on the rise and decline of communitarian initiatives during the Clinton administration and the relevance of communitarian thinking today. 4 For an overview of the Anglo-American "Third Way" movement see the Wikipedia entry, this account by Tony Blair, and Gidden's account of what he originally meant by the term "Third Way" and why he stopped using it. 5 See the website and Wikipedia page of the Bipartisan Policy Center, and this critical assessment. See the website and Wikipedia page of The Third Way, this critical assessment, and this one as well. 6 The 2010 Winston poll also suggested that two-thirds of those identifying with the Tea Party movement described themselves as conservative, 26% as moderate and 8% as liberal. 7 See their respective Wikipedia pages for information and analyses concerning the Tea Party and the Occupy movements, and for links to many related sites. 8 See the Americans Elect website and Wikipedia entrv, as well as this critical assessment. 9 See the archives of President Bush's Bioethics Council, including members and texts of reports. 10 Wall Street Journal, January 1, 2006. 11 USA Today, October 11, 2010. 12 Ekings, Emily. 2011. "Reason-Rupe Poll Finds 24 Percent of Americans are Economically Conservative and Socially Liberal, 28 Percent Liberal, 28 Percent Conservative, and 20 Percent Communitarian." Reason.com, 29 August. 13 Carmines et al. (2013). 3 ATTACHMENT H. 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