Trump's All Too Familiar Strategy and Its Future in The
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The Forum 2016; 14(3): 295–309 Zoltan Hajnal* and Marisa Abrajano* Trump’s All Too Familiar Strategy and Its Future in the GOP DOI 10.1515/for-2016-0023 Abstract: Although many observers have been surprised both by the racial explicit nature of Donald Trump’s campaign and the subsequent success of that cam- paign, we contend that Trump’s tactics and their success are far from new. We describe how for the past half century Republicans have used race and increas- ingly immigration to attract white voters – especially working class whites. All of this has led to an increasingly racially polarized polity and for the most part Republican electoral success. We conclude with some expectations about the future of race, immigration, and party politics. Introduction Donald Trump attacks Mexican immigrants. He disparages Muslims. He insults women. And what happens? Voters flock to him. Trump’s rapid rise to the top of the Republican polls and his enduring role as the Party’s nominee sparked all kinds of diverse reactions. The Republican establishment was scared. The Demo- cratic Party was appalled. And the media was enthralled. But the most common reaction of all was surprise. Many wondered how Trump could end up as the Republican nominee? How could a campaign prem- ised on prejudice and denigration be so successful? Trump may ultimately lose his presidential bid but not before capturing the Republican Party and the hearts of millions of Americans. How could it happen? Why did it happen? Even though many seemed surprised by the rise of Donald Trump, nobody should be. Trump’s strategy is tried and true. It has been developed over decades by the Republican Party and it has worked.1 1 The pattern is also not limited to recent decades in the American context. The anti-immigrant strategy has been employed successfully in many earlier periods in American history and indeed in many other countries around the world. Trump’s rise is analogous to the rise of extreme right in Europe and mirrors the success of the UK Independence Party in Britain, the Freedom Party in Austria, the National Front in France, and many others. *Corresponding authors: Zoltan Hajnal and Marisa Abrajano, University of California, San Diego, CA, USA, e-mail: [email protected] (Z. Hajnal); [email protected] (M. Abrajano) Brought to you by | University of California - San Diego Authenticated Download Date | 10/19/17 6:55 PM 296 Zoltan Hajnal and Marisa Abrajano Immigration and a White Backlash Well before Donald Trump arrived on the Presidential scene, we wrote a book documenting the widely successful Republican tactic of scapegoating immi- grants. By blaming immigrants for much of what ails America and by promising to stem the tide of immigration, Republican elites have been able to garner more of the White vote (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). The gains Republicans have made using immigration are impressive. In 1990, White voters were (almost) evenly divided between Democratic and Republican congressional candidates and there was almost no correlation between attitudes on immigration and White partisanship. In 2014, after years of Republican cam- paigning against immigrants, Whites who express fears about immigrants are much more likely to vote Republican than Whites who view immigrants posi- tively. In the 2014 midterms 75 percent of Americans who felt that most illegal immigrants should be deported voted Republican. In contrast, only 35 percent of those who favored a chance for undocumented immigrants to apply for legal status supported Republican candidates. Of those who saw immigration as the nation’s most important problem, 74 percent went Republican. And Whites overall have been shifting to the Republican Party. In 2014, 62 percent of White voters favored Republican candidates in Congressional contests.2 It is also important to note that the relationship between immigration and partisanship is not just a spurious one. The relationship between immigration attitudes and partisan choice holds when we control for a range of other issue positions, attitudes toward racial and ethnic minorities, perceptions of the economy, and just about everything else we think matters in Presidential or Con- gressional elections. There are other signs as well. We find that how an individual thinks about immigration at one point in time predicts how their partisanship will change in the future. To be sure, the effect is not large – but even small indi- vidual shifts in partisanship, if repeated over the course of decades, can become massive shifts over time. Variation across states also points to the centrality of immigration in American politics. White Americans who live in states with larger immigrant populations hold significant more negative views toward immigrants, all else equal. That pattern translates into policy outcomes as well. In states with larger Latino populations, less spending goes to education and welfare and more state money goes to criminal punishment. Tax policy also becomes more 2 That 62 percent figure highlights the fact that Whites are by no means unanimous in their views or their votes today. Many Whites have positive views of immigrants and are, in fact, turned off by the White backlash strategy. Racial and ethnic minorities are, by contrast, more unified on the question of immigration and on their partisan choices as we will document below. Brought to you by | University of California - San Diego Authenticated Download Date | 10/19/17 6:55 PM Trump’s All Too Familiar Strategy and Its Future in the GOP 297 regressive. In other words, when Latinos make up a larger share of the disadvan- taged population, states are less generous and more punitive. Finally, when we look at the media, we see yet more evidence of the power of immigration. Increases in negative coverage of immigration by the media are cor- related with shifts in aggregate White partisanship toward the Republican Party. Immigration policy, immigration views, and party politics have indeed become intricately intertwined. Trump is simply the apex of that White backlash strategy. He, almost more than any other national Republican figure, owes his success to anti-immigrant views. He was a relative non-entity in the Republican field – polling last or near last – until immigration became part of his equation. But then Trump made his now famous disparaging comments about Mexicans as rapists and criminals. Right after those comments, Trump garnered enormous media attention and he rapidly went from near last to first in the polls. Moreover, the support that he did garner was always closely tied to views on immigration. Data from early polls during the primary show that Republicans most opposed to immigration were about 50 percentage points more likely to support Trump than the small minority of the party who are strongly sympathetic to immigrants (Tesler 2015). And in the general election campaign views on immi- gration similarly predicted Trump support. Race and Party But the Trump phenomenon and the larger Republican story is not just about immigration. The anti-immigrant story is only part of the White backlash story. Race, more broadly speaking, has been part of the Republican play book for quite some time (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Edsall and Edsall 1991; Valentino and Sears 2005). A little over five decades ago, the Republican Party decided on its infamous Southern Strategy. Personified by George Wallace’s segregationist rhetoric, the strategy was to dismiss Black demands for ever greater government handouts and to highlight all of the failings of the Black community and in so doing attract racist White Southerners who had faithfully supported the Dem- ocratic Party. Through Goldwater, Nixon, Reagan and onto George H. W. Bush, the campaign tactics were sometimes subtle and sometimes not so subtle. While Wallace would proclaim, “Segregation now, segregation forever,” George H.W. Bush would more delicately run an ad about Willie Horton, an African American felon. Almost always there was a hint of race in the air and at least an implicit denigration of African Americans. Brought to you by | University of California - San Diego Authenticated Download Date | 10/19/17 6:55 PM 298 Zoltan Hajnal and Marisa Abrajano For White Southerners it was all too attractive. White Southerners went from overwhelmingly siding with the Democratic Party in 1960 to overwhelming voting for Republican candidates in 1990. And it is probably not just White Southerners. Since 1990, racial views and partisanship have only become more and more inter- twined at the national level. For much of this recent period, racial resentment has been one of the strongest predictors of party affiliation (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Valentino and Sears 2005). Barack Obama’s presidency only served to make racial views matters even more. As Michael Tesler has so aptly demonstrated, how people think about health care and a host of other ostensibly non-racial issues is now highly correlated with their racial views (Tesler 2012). All of this has also translated back into the Trump phenomenon. Research during the general election campaign showed that White independents and Republicans who think their identity as Whites is extremely important were more than 30 points more likely to support Trump than those who think their racial identity is not important (Tesler and Sides 2016). Another study found that racial resentment, more than populism or authoritarianism, determined who supported Trump and who did not (Enders and Smallpage 2016). In short, Trump’s rise is neither surprising nor unusual. It is a logical out- growth of decades of a conscious Republican strategy on immigration and race. A Broader Populist Backlash? The story of race and immigration that we have told is also not the entire account. The Trump phenomenon of today has other elements not least of which is a broader populist campaign targeting liberal intellectuals, insiders, and political elites.