Interim Report IR-05-079 Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity
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Strong Reciprocity and the Roots of Human Morality
Soc Just Res DOI 10.1007/s11211-008-0067-y Strong Reciprocity and the Roots of Human Morality Herbert Gintis Æ Joseph Henrich Æ Samuel Bowles Æ Robert Boyd Æ Ernst Fehr Ó Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008 Abstract Human morality is a key evolutionary adaptation on which human social behavior has been based since the Pleistocene era. Ethical behavior is constitutive of human nature, we argue, and human morality is as important an adaptation as human cognition and speech. Ethical behavior, we assert, need not be a means toward personal gain. Because of our nature as moral beings, humans take pleasure in acting ethically and are pained when acting unethically. From an evolutionary viewpoint, we argue that ethical behavior was fitness-enhancing in the years marking the emergence of Homo sapiens because human groups with many altruists fared better than groups of selfish individuals, and the fitness losses sustained by altruists were more than compensated by the superior performance of the groups in which they congregated. Keywords Morality Á Human nature Á Evolution Á Reciprocity Á Sociobiology Á Altruism H. Gintis (&) Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, New Mexico and, The Central European University, Budapest, Hungary e-mail: [email protected] J. Henrich University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada S. Bowles Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM, USA R. Boyd University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA E. Fehr University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland 123 Soc Just Res The Nature of Human Morality The two volumes under review summarize a body of research suggesting that human morality is a key evolutionary adaptation on which human social behavior has been based since the Pleistocene era. -
Evolution of Direct Reciprocity Under Uncertainty Can Explain Human Generosity in One-Shot Encounters
Evolution of direct reciprocity under uncertainty can explain human generosity in one-shot encounters Andrew W. Deltona,b,1,2, Max M. Krasnowa,b,1,2, Leda Cosmidesa,b, and John Toobya,c aCenter for Evolutionary Psychology and Departments of bPsychology and cAnthropology, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 Edited by Kenneth Binmore, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom and accepted by the Editorial Board May 27, 2011 (received for review February 9, 2011) Are humans too generous? The discovery that subjects choose to proven equally challenging to biologists, because they seem to incur costs to allocate benefits to others in anonymous, one-shot violate the expectations of widely accepted models of fitness economic games has posed an unsolved challenge to models of maximization that predict selfishness in the absence of either economic and evolutionary rationality. Using agent-based simu- (i) genetic relatedness, (ii) conditions favoring reciprocity, or lations, we show that such generosity is the necessary byproduct (iii) reputation enhancement (22). of selection on decision systems for regulating dyadic reciprocity The most glaring anomaly stems from the fact that, according to under conditions of uncertainty. In deciding whether to engage in both evolutionary and economic theories of cooperation, whether dyadic reciprocity, these systems must balance (i) the costs of mis- an interaction is repeated or one-shot should make a crucial dif- taking a one-shot interaction for a repeated interaction (hence, ference in how agents act. The chance of repeated interactions risking a single chance of being exploited) with (ii) the far greater offers the only possibility of repayment for forgoing immediate costs of mistaking a repeated interaction for a one-shot interaction selfish gains when the interactants are not relatives and the situ- (thereby precluding benefits from multiple future cooperative ation precludes reputation enhancement in the eyes of third par- interactions). -
Evolutionary Biology: a Basic Science for Psychiatry?
Review article Evolutionary biology: a basic science for psychiatry? McGuire MT, Marks I, Nesse RM, Troisi A. Evolutionary biology: a M. T. McGuire’, I, Marks’, R. M. Nesse3, basic science for psychiatry? A. Troisi4 Acta Psychiatr Scand 1992: 86: 89-96. ’ Department of Psychiatry-Biobehavioral Sciences, School of Medicine, University of California at Los Angeles, USA, Institute of Psychiatry, DeCrispigny Park, London, United Kingdom, Department of Psychiatry, School of Medicine, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA, Clinica Psychiatrica, Universita di Roma, Italy Evolutionary biology has much to offer psychiatry. It distinguishes between Key words: evolutionary biology: psfchiatric ultimate and proximate explanations of behavior and addresses the theory; psychiatric research functional significance of behavior. Subtheories, frequently voiced Michael T. McGuire, Department of misconceptions, specific applications, testable hypotheses and limitations Psychiatry-Biobehavioral Sciences, School of of evolutionary theory are reviewed. An evolutionary perspective is likely to Medicine, University of California at Los Angeles, improve understanding of psychopathology, refocus some clinical 760 Westwood Plaza, Los Angeles, CA research, influence treatment and help integrate seemingly unrelated 90024, USA findings and theoretical explanations. Accepted for publication February 29, 1992 ory can be found in Williams (l), Wilson (2) and Introduction Alexander (3). Recent advances in evolutionary biology have im- plications for psychiatric -
Competition Among Cooperators: Altruism and Reciprocity
Colloquium Competition among cooperators: Altruism and reciprocity Peter Danielson* Centre for Applied Ethics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2 Levine argues that neither self-interest nor altruism explains ex- quite widely, to include sometimes counterintuitive possibilities. perimental results in bargaining and public goods games. Subjects’ [This is the critical justification for Binmore’s (6) harsh criticism preferences appear also to be sensitive to their opponents’ per- of Axelrod (2, 7).] In particular, when we specify the mechanisms ceived altruism. Sethi and Somanathan provide a general account of reciprocity, we shall see that they have surprises in store for of reciprocal preferences that survive under evolutionary pressure. us (8). Although a wide variety of reciprocal strategies pass this evolu- The present paper runs a similar line of inquiry with a new tionary test, Sethi and Somanthan conjecture that fewer are likely starting point. We begin with Levine’s account of human coop- to survive when reciprocal strategies compete with each other. erative behavior in experiments using bargaining and public This paper develops evolutionary agent-based models to test their goods games. Although it is commonly agreed that self-interest conjecture in cases where reciprocal preferences can differ in a will not account for these experimental results, Levine goes variety of games. We confirm that reciprocity is necessary but not further and argues that simple altruism is also inadequate. A sufficient for optimal cooperation. We explore the theme of better fit is obtained from preferences that are sensitive to one’s competition among reciprocal cooperators and display three in- opponents’ perceived altruism. -
The Reciprocity Controversy Gerald Carter1*
Sciknow Publications Ltd. ABC 2014, 1(3):368-386 Animal Behavior and Cognition DOI: 10.12966/abc.08.11.2014 ©Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0) The Reciprocity Controversy Gerald Carter1* 1University of Maryland *Corresponding author (Email:[email protected]) Citation – Carter, G. (2014). The reciprocity controversy. Animal Behavior and Cognition, 1(3), 368-386. doi: 10.12966/abc.08.11.2014 Abstract - Reciprocity (or ―reciprocal altruism‖) was once considered an important and widespread evolutionary explanation for cooperation, yet many reviews now conclude that it is rare or absent outside of humans. Here, I show that nonhuman reciprocity seems rare mainly because its meaning has changed over time. The original broad concept of reciprocity is well supported by evidence, but subsequent divergent uses of the term have relied on various translations of the strategy ‗tit-for-tat‘ in the repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma game. This model has resulted in four problematic approaches to defining and testing reciprocity. Authors that deny evidence of nonhuman reciprocity tend to (1) assume that it requires sophisticated cognition, (2) focus exclusively on short-term contingency with a single partner, (3) require paradoxical evidence for a temporary lifetime fitness cost, and (4) assume that responses to investments are fixed. While these restrictions basically define reciprocity out of existence, evidence shows that fungi, plants, fish, birds, rats, and primates enforce mutual benefit by contingently altering their cooperative investments based on the cooperative returns, just as predicted by the original reciprocity theory. Keywords – Cooperation, Prisoner‘s Dilemma, Pseudoreciprocity, Reciprocity, Reciprocal altruism Comparative psychologists, evolutionary psychologists, and behavioral ecologists often study cooperation using different theories and methods, asking questions at different levels of analysis. -
The Psychology of Reciprocal Altruism Jeffrey R. Stevens and Juan F
The psychology of reciprocal altruism Jeffrey R. Stevens and Juan F. Duque Author information Jeffrey R. Stevens University of Nebraska-Lincoln Lincoln, Nebraska, USA [email protected] Juan F. Duque University of Nebraska-Lincoln Lincoln, Nebraska, USA [email protected] Synonyms Reciprocity Definition Different forms of reciprocal altruism—taking turns offering altruistic help—require different psychological building blocks. Stevens, J.R. and Duque, J.F. (2016). The psychology of reciprocal altruism. In T.K. Shackelford & V.A. Weekes-Shackelford (Eds.), Encyclopedia of evolutionary psychological science. New York: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_3051-1 1 Introduction A pair of pied flycatchers busily snatch insects to bring back to their nest and feed to their young. Suddenly, an owl appears close to the nest, posing a serious predation threat to their offspring. The pair fly straight to the owl, shrieking and dive bombing it to chase it away. A nearby pair of flycatchers detects the ruckus and also arrives to attack the predator. Another nearby pair, however, fails to help. An hour later, two owls appear, one at each of the neighboring nests. What should the original pair do? Krams, Krama, Igaune, and Mänd (2008) conducted this experiment and found that, out of 32 pairs of flycatchers, 2 stayed at the nest, 30 attacked the owl near the pair who helped them previously, and none attacked the owl near the pair who did not help them before. This willingness to pay a cost to cooperate or help another who has helped you before is called reciprocal altruism or reciprocity. -
The Normative Source of Modern Tort Law
HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE NORMATIVE SOURCE OF MODERN TORT LAW MARK A. GEISTFELD* According to conventional wisdom, the normative source of modern tort law is mysterious. The reasons trace back to the state of nature. In a world without cen- tralized government, individuals protected themselves by exacting talionic revenge—“an eye for an eye”—on their injurers. These customary norms of behavior were the source of the early common law, but tort scholars have assumed that they were merely a barbaric punitive practice without any relevance to the modern tort system. This field of the common law had to be normatively recreated, making it “modern.” The resultant body of tort law depends, as Oliver Wendell Holmes famously concluded, on “more or less definitely understood matters of policy.” The policies in question, however, have never been clearly identified. Courts and scholars continue to disagree about the norms that generate the behav- ioral obligations of modern tort law. The normative source of modern tort law has been hidden in plain sight because of this widely held but mistaken understanding of legal history. Contrary to conven- tional wisdom, the state of nature was governed by a reciprocity norm of equitable balance that has survived the evolving demands of the modern tort system. In cases of accidental harm, the reciprocity norm often took the form of a compensatory obligation requiring “the value of an eye for an eye.” This norm was initially adopted and then further developed by the early common law. Courts subsequently invoked the reciprocity norm in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to justify rules of negligence and strict liability. -
The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence
68 The Scholar “Blunt Not the Heart, Enrage It” The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence Rose McDermott, PhD | Anthony C. Lopez, PhD | Peter K. Hatemi, PhD Texas National Security Review: Volume 1, Issue 1 (December 2017) Print: ISSN 2576-1021 Online: ISSN 2576-1153 69 Malcolm Dispute it like a man. Macduff I shall do so; But I must also feel it as a man: I cannot but remember such things were, That were most precious to me. — Did heaven look on, And would not take their part? Sinful Macduff, They were all struck for thee! naught that I am, Not for their own demerits, but for mine, Fell slaughter on their souls: heaven rest them now! Malcolm Be this the whetstone of your sword. Let grief Convert to anger; blunt not the heart, enrage it. - Macbeth, William Shakespeare Why is the instinct for vengeance so strong the threat of future exploitation. even when it is clear that widespread death and As long as humans have lived and competed destruction would be a much more likely outcome in groups, the question of deterring threats from than any kind of “victory”? In the event of a nuclear one’s adversaries has been of central importance. war, why is second-strike retaliation so certain Humanity’s progression from living in small hunter- when it may gain nothing of social or material value? gatherer tribes where everyone knew one another We believe these things because humans share a to nation-states with millions of people has, in universal thirst for retaliation in the face of threat many cases, magnified the stakes of the challenge and in the wake of loss, no matter what classical rather than altered its fundamental dynamics.