Unhealthy Politics Drives Misalignments 10

Unhealthy politics drives misalignments 10 Politics can intensify misalignments in education systems, when the vested interests of stakeholders divert systems away from learning. This can happen at various stages, from setting policy goals to designing, implementing, evaluating, and sustaining reforms. Even when many individual actors are committed to learning, a system can remain stuck in a low-learning trap. Education systems are complex. Aligning an educa- even when there is consensus on technical design, tion system’s goals, financing, and incentives with students may not benefit. For example, in 1996–97 student learning is difficult for technical reasons. But the superintendent of New York City’s District there are also political reasons systems do not prior- 29 rigged a $6 million contract, awarding it to a itize student learning. Political impetus to fix mis- computer company affiliated with a politically con- alignments can help achieve important educational nected property developer. In return, the company objectives—as it has in Chile, England, and India (see gave the superintendent expensive gifts, while chapter 11)—but unhealthy politics can make things delivering archaic or nonfunctioning computers worse. Too often, education interventions, whether to students. Teachers had been counting on decent big reforms or day-to-day implementation steps, are computers to help their students in math; without compromised because powerful individuals or groups the computers, the students lost out.2 can make others act in ways that serve private inter- • In 2009 Mexico’s federal government introduced ests rather than the collective good.1 Powerful actors a plan for competitive recruitment of teachers, frequently benefit from the status quo and devise whereby all candidates were required to take a test mechanisms to preserve it, regardless of the impact covering content knowledge, pedagogical mastery, on system performance. These mechanisms result in and ethics. Designing the tests was technically dif- actors being trapped in low-learning equilibriums. ficult. But the technical challenges paled next to the political impediments created by local affiliates of Unhealthy politics can Mexico’s teachers’ union, the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación (SNTE), which has 1.4 intensify misalignments in million members. The policy change meant that the education systems opportunity for patronage-driven hiring would van- Many education systems encounter political imped- ish. Because of strong opposition from the SNTE, iments and rent-seeking, making alignment much the reform was diluted, making it applicable only harder to achieve. Consider these examples: to a small pool of vacancies. Estimates suggest that up to 85 percent of hiring in 2010 was discretionary • Using computers to educate students requires dif- rather than competitive. Recent evidence indicates ficult technical decisions on program design. But that the teachers hired through discretionary Unhealthy politics drives misalignments | 189 methods were much less effective at improving interventions threaten interests, whether they be a student learning than those hired competitively.3 person’s financial, ideological, or status-related inter- • Vyapam (http://www.vyapam.nic.in) is the ests, resistance from different parts of the system can government-run professional examination board be expected. The net effect: the system is pulled away in Madhya Pradesh, India. It conducts large-scale from a focus on learning (figure 10.1). entrance tests for admission into courses such as Education systems are vulnerable to political inter- medicine and for recruitment into state government ference because they are opaque and because teachers jobs such as the police. Designing entrance tests constitute a large base of government employees. The and ranking candidates are technically challenging opacity of education systems, coupled with uncer- when there can be more than 100,000 candidates. But tainty about how a specific education policy will affect political economy factors intrude as well: recently, learning, is fertile ground for contestation of reforms. rent-seeking is alleged to have undermined the goal Teachers—the most important factor in learning— of fair, transparent admissions. In 2013 an indepen- have traditionally been important grassroots political dent probe exposed a potential multibillion-dollar actors, because of their geographic spread and regular scheme in which senior politicians and government interaction with parents. Two characteristics make officials had allegedly set up a system allowing teachers especially attractive as patronage appointees. unqualified candidates to pay bribes, often to middle- First, entry costs to the profession are often low. Sec- men, to receive high rankings in entrance tests.4 In ond, the impact of incompetent patronage appointees 2015, the Supreme Court of India transferred the case on learning is not immediately visible, so it has few from the state government to the country’s premier reputational consequences for politicians, especially investigative agency, the Central Bureau of Investiga- if they are already operating on a short time horizon.6 tion, which is currently pursuing the investigation. Because of the size of the teaching force, teachers’ unions can be politically important. The political Education systems involve many stakeholders with power of a union depends on how effectively its leader- multiple, often contradictory, interests.5 These systems ship can mobilize teachers, which varies widely within are not just about students, teachers, or principals. and across countries. In many countries, not all teach- They also involve politicians, bureaucrats, the judi- ers are union members or engaged in union activity.7 ciary, private players, and more. Participants linked to Whether union activity helps or hinders education these institutions have a vested interest in how the sys- reform ultimately depends on several factors (box 10.1). tem works, including its structure and funding. A text- book supplier may want to provide a quality product, Multiple actors and interests: but it also cares about profits. A politician may want to make teachers accountable for student learning, but Pulling the system out of also realizes the electoral risks of teacher opposition. alignment at each A bureaucrat may support meritocratic admissions, step of the policy cycle but also accepts a “token of appreciation” for ensuring the admission of an acquaintance’s child to a desirable Personal interests influence reform at every step. school. A parent may want to complain about a teacher, Vested interests—of teachers, principals, bureaucrats, but worries that her child could suffer retaliation. politicians, parents, students, the judiciary, civil soci- Vested interests are not confined to private or ety organizations, the private sector—are influential rent-seeking interests. Actors in education systems at every step of the education policy cycle. Broadly, are often driven by their values or ideology, especially these steps are setting policy goals, designing poli- when the consequences of education policies are not cies, implementing policies, evaluating policies, and readily apparent. Examples include a commitment to sustaining policy reforms. The forces that detract public schools versus public-private choice, secular from alignment tend to be magnified in conflict set- education versus religious, and accountability for tings (box 10.2). test scores versus a focus on teacher qualifications. In addition, education systems can be used by dominant Setting policy goals ethnic groups—especially in multilingual or multi- In many cases, policies are not chosen for their religious societies—to promote their positions while effectiveness in improving learning. Often, they are suppressing minorities. guided instead by the vested interests of powerful Multiple interests jeopardize learning goals. Bal- actors. Policies to hire teachers tend to be popular ancing multiple interests is difficult. When education with politicians, teachers, and parents because they 190 | World Development Report 2018 Figure 10.1 Contradictory interests detract from learning objectives C Ci s ivil Svil s ian or oci oc itic gan et iet ol iza y Oy P tio r n g s s . P e e r L r e s o s a t r r / c e n c h o e c e s r m a s e e m t T a u v n i i r t i P e s LEARNING S B c u h s r o t e y o r a u l a u p i m c n c i i r a l d a n o t a u s o J g e h c m S e n t In te r na rs tio to na ac l ac her tors Ot Source: WDR 2018 team. Box 10.1 How do teachers’ unions affect learning? Teachers’ unions are important institutions for protecting the It is impossible to say that unions always help or harm rights of teachers, but do they matter for student learning? student learning; it depends on their characteristics and The quantitative literature identifies situations in which behaviors, as well as the context in which they operate. All unions may have undermined high-quality teaching and countries have unions, but they vary in membership and learning. By fighting for higher salaries while protecting number. Figure B10.1.1 shows the wide variation in teacher incumbent teachers from outside competition, unions some- unionization across countries. Some countries, such as times stifle the formation of an effective teaching cadre.a Finland and Mexico, have one dominant teachers’ union, A study in India finds that union membership is negatively whereas others, such as India and South Africa, have several. correlated with student achievement.b However, hidden There are also institutional variations in teachers’ unions, behind large-scale correlations is evidence of union behavior such as differences in internal organization, stability, and that has been beneficial for education reform efforts, includ- party affiliation. In the United States, some have argued ing efforts by the Zambia National Education Coalition, the that teachers’ unions resist education reforms because Uganda National Teachers’ Union, and the Confederación union leaders represent the median teacher, and if leaders Nacional de Maestros de Educación Rural de Bolivia.

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