CHAPTER IV

OFFICIAL LANGUAGE QUESTION

The Portuguese conquest and occupation of the

Sinhalese littoral and Tamil areas was followed by the

Dutch in 1656 and' the British in 1796. After initial control by the British East India Company from Madras, 1 these areas became a British Crown Colony in 1802. The , I Kandyan Sinhalese kingdom, which stood the Portuguese and early British attempts of conquest was ceded to the 2 British by the Kandyan convention of 1815. The four and a half centuries of European rule effected great changes in the political, econor.ic, religious and social structure, in the ethnic collective identities! and in the out look and life of both the Sinhalese and Tamil people. The colonial impact brought many changes. Despite of

European awareness of the ethnic and cultural identity of the Tami1sadministrative unification tended to integrate the Tamil areas into a united . The development of road and rail transport had the same effect. On the other hand local government institutions were slow to develop. Thus, at independence Sri Lanka's new rulers had a workable machinery for governing the country, while the majority Tamil had no institutional framework within which 85

to organize themselves even in the north, where they 3 formed a distinct majority. However, the effects of

colonial rule were not all unfavorable to the Tamils. For

instance, "the success of the Sinhalese of the high lands

in maintaining their independence up to 1815 created a

distincti^on between the Kandyans (up-country) Sinhalese

and the low-country Sinhalese. The latter being a more westernized group due to their long tutelage under the

Europeans were better placed to seize the economic opportunities available in the highlands after plantations were developed in those areas in the nineteenth century.

They moved to the highlands as traders, contractors and entrepreneurs and often encountered the hostility of the more traditional Kandyan Sinhalese who found themselves I ' outstripped in the changing environment. This enabled the Tamil community of the north to have some pretensions of being one of the three major ethnic groups of the 4 country."

Such pretensions were fostered by the influx of Tamil laborer from South India to work in the plantations and to undertake some of the ill-paid and unpleasant work in the urban sector. By 1931 this group of Indian Tamil immigrants outnumbered the descendants of the original

Tamil settlers and together the two groups made up 25% of the population of t^e, country. However, the fact that 86

the new immigrants were settled far from the areas where

the original Tamil settlers predominated and the caste

composition of the immigrant group precluded close links 5 between the two groups. Meanwhile, the settlement of a

large number of Ta mi i s in the highlands roused

1 considerable anti-Tamil feeling among the conservative

Kandyan Sinhalese. By the early twentieth century education in English had become a key factor in access to the higher posts in government service and to the professions. The establishment of a jiumber of Christian missionary schools in the north enabled the Ceylon Tamils

to gain an early lead in this respect. The presence of

Tamils in the civil service of Sri Lanka is a big percentage than the population aggregate has been of the big irritant in Sinhala-Tami1 relationship even after the independence. Together with the development occurred the sharpening of a sense of identity among both Sinhalese and

Tamils. Religious movements which emerged in the late nineteenth century among both groups were partly responsible for this development while the growth of newspapers and of literature in both Sinhala and Tamil 6 languages also re-enforced the trend. (These are discussed in detail in chapter 5)

The political and administrative developments which took place during the British rule in a broad way helped 87 to shape up the later events. The legislative council,

which lasted with various changes from 1833 to 1931, never

really reflected the numerical propositions of the various

ethnic groups in the population. The minority groups

generally obtained more than their proportionate share of

representation in the legislative council. This position

^ was radically changed with the introduction of universal

franchise in 1931. Of the fifty elected seats in the

, I legislature, thirty eight were won by the Sinhalese. This

resulted in fears of Sinhalese domination and the

minorities drew up a scheme where by the Sinhalese would

be restricted to half the seats in the legislature - a

scheme bitterly opposed by the Sinhalese leaders. T'^'us

even at the attainment of independence in 1948 some of the

ingredients of a possible Sinhalese-Tamil conflict were 7 present. There was a majority community which had access

to political power and which felt that it was not

obtaining its fair share of economic opportunities. In

contrast there was a minority community with a strong

sense of identity which feared that the economic

advantages it had gained by the efforts of its members

would be eroded by the use of political power on the part 8 of the majority Sinhalese.

Freedom came to Sri Lanka on February 4, 1948 after

'four and half centuries of subjugation to foreign rule. 88 9 without a shot being fired or a life being lost, the transfer of power by the British to a local ruling class without a concrete, negotiated agreement between the

Sinhala majority and the Tamil minority or without even creating the constitutional mechanism to promote co-^ ' . ■ i operation and compromise between the, two races is ; 1 described by sociologist Marshal Singer as follows:

"When the British made the decision to grant final complete political independence in 1948, they granted that power to those who most closely approximated themselves.

In terms of social back ground this meant the group to whom the British first began to transfer political power were broadly Ceylonese, largely Christian, mostly high- caste, highly urbanized, highly western eclucated, largely engaged in western-type occupations and of the highest economic and social class. More important for the operation of the political process in Ceylon, in terms of self-image and worId-outlook, those individuals possessed a strong sense of identification with the British values, 10 attitudes and perspectives."

However, unlike in the neighboring subcontinent of

India, independence in Sri Lanka was not accompanied by > internecine struggles and armed conflict. This was largely due to a political 'compromise' among the elite i leaders both Sinhalese and Tamil. It sllould be noted that 89 there was no mass movement of freedom in Sri Lanka and as such the general populace was not much involved in the change of power. The 'compromise' was based on the concept of a secular state in which all religious groups enjoyed equal rights----The English language was to be gradually replaced by both Sinhalese and Tamil as official languages, thus providing equal opportunities for both 11 communities. Moreover, the independent constitution laid down that "no disability or advantage should be conferred on persons any community or religion which were not conferred on person of other communities or religions."^

Then there was retreat from the 'equal electorates'

I formula which had prevailed from 1931-1947. Since 1947 twenty five seats in Parliament were distributed according to area. This was intended to benefit the minority groups who lived in more sparsely populated areas. Thus for instance the northern and eastern provinces largely populated by Tamils and Moors and having some 13% of the population obtained 8 seats out of the 25 seats distributed for area thus giving some weightage in representation to the minority communities living there.

Provision was also made in the constitution for the I representation of 'unrepresented intierests' in parliament by the nomination of six additional members. These arrangements satisfied most of the Tamil leadership at 90

independence and the leader of the largest Tamil

political organization, Mr. G G Ponnambal ani joined the

first government of independent Sri Lanka led by Mr D S 13 Senanayake.

Though it looked everything was amicably settled for

the satisfaction of all concerned, thee were snags from ! the beginning. "Firstly, this compromise was a considerable deviation from the idea prevalent among the , I Sinhalese that Sri Lanka was essentially the land of the

Sinhalese and of Buddhism. The efforts of the leadership of the day to promote a Ceylonese or Sri Lankan nationalism as against Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism did

I not succeed. The unwritten settlement thus dio not have 14 grass-rojots support among the Sinhalese.

Differences arose when the Sinhalese leadership refused to include the Indians in Sri Lanka in the

'Political Compromise'. The Indian group included some moors and other groups from all parts of India who had come to Sri Lanka as traders and money lenders. They also included names of Tamil urban laborers. The bulk of I them, however, were workers in the plantation sector.

Sananayake and the party he founded. The United National

Party (UNP) were determined to regard the bulk of the

Indians merely as temporary residents .^^his was partly because sfenanayake understood the fears of the Kandyan 91

Sinhalese who were apprehensive of becoming a minority in parts ofthe highlands. He was also alienated by f political opposition of the Indian Leadership first to the

Independence constitution and to his party at the General elections of 1947. Thus by a series of laws in 1948/49 ' - i . • the bulk ofi the Indians were removed from the electoral register. The disfranchisement of the Indians led to 16 three important results. In the first place it upset one aspect of the political compromise on which ethnic harmony was built in Sri Lanka. The change increased the I Sinhalese representation in the parliament to about 802 of total membership aft.^r 1952 elections. In the mean time there were serious differences among the All Ceylon Tamil I ' Congress formed by G G Ponnambalam in 1944 and a section of Tamil leadership broke away and formed the Federal party under S J Chelvanayagam. The Federal party provided an organization for the more uncompromising elements of the Tamils, and when ethnic tensions and conflicts worsened in mid-fifties, this was the party to which the

Tamils turned. , Moreover, the Indian Tamils felt that the bulk of Sri Lankan Tamil leadership has failed them. They found that the key demand of the Federal Party-autonoinous rule for the Tamils in the north had little relevance for them. They were unionized, but their lack of financial I, resources and poor educational background prevented them 92 from mounting an effective campaign against the

government. The Sri Lankan Tamils and the Tamil parties

also did not take up their plight as anything worth.^^

In the years up to 1955, various ethnic groups other

than the most important'“g'roup, the Sri Lankan Tamils, had 1 become the victims of attacks by Sinhala Buddhists of

different classes. In the 19th century Sinhala buddhist

bourgeois had challenged the Christian hegemony. The

trading and merchant elements had let loose violence

against the Muslims in 1915 and the Sinhala working class

with support from sections of the Sinhala urbanites and

intelligentsia had shown hostility to the Malayalis in the 18 1930s.

As discussed earlier, after independence, the

chauvinist attitudes became aggravated with the Sinhalese

leadership taking the lead in depriving the working class

of Indian origin of both citizenship and franchise 19 rights. However, one minority relatively untouched by

communal and religious violence had been the Sri Lankan

TAmils who in 1953 were almost 11% of the population of

10.6 million. It should be noted that there were strong ethnic sentiments between the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan

Tamils. The early propaganda of Sinhala Buddhists had been directed mainly against foreign religions and foreign ethnic groups; the attacks focussed on alien bureaucrats. 93

traders and workers said to be denying the Sinhalese their

just rights and opportunities for trade and employment.

The targets were therefore, not the Sri Lankan Tamils but

the Bohras, Sindhis, Moors, Malayalis and Christians, who

were directly pinpointed as enemies as well as the ' ^ . i missionaries whc| were accused of 'Christianising' the

country and thus endangering the Sinhala language and

Buddhist culture. iThis was to change in the next thirty years and the conflict turned out to be between the

Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils both, consider each other 20 as 'traditional en^my'.

The language rights of the Sinhalese and Tamils, a question that came to the front in the 1950s was the basic

issue around whiih antagonism manifested itself. "In Sri

Lanka in 1953 almost 60% of the people (over 3 years of age) spoke only Sinhala and just over 20% only Tamil.

However, the Sinhala population amounted to 70% and the

Tamil speaking population (Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian

Tamils, and Muslims) amounted to around 30% of the population. Apart from an % insignificant number who spoke English only the whole population was linguistically 21 divided ,into two groups - Sinhala and Tamil speaking.^

The anomaly of continuing to conduct the administration in

English which was understood only by a fraction of the i population led to campaigns for a more democratic language policy. Since knowledge of English was confined to those

who had gone to urban schools, the issue also was a class

question. The privileged segment of the population with

an English education, command the highest administrative

and professional jobs-and this group also dominated all

political movements. In this context the most aggrieved

section was the Sinhala and Tamil educated intel1egentia

who resented their exclusion even after the independence

from the prestigious occupations and became vociferous in

articulating their views on the language issue. In the

colonial context the agitation for Sinhala and Tamil

language rights had been put forward by both the left and

more nationalist elements of the intel1egentia. When the

Lanka Samaja party was formed in 1935 one of its

fundamental objectives included the demand for the use of

Sinhala and Tamil in the lower courts at police stations

and in government departments. With more demonstration of political life through universal franchise and the

expansion of education in Sinhala and Tamil, the language

issue was frequently discussed in the 1940s. The main

political leaders of the time were willing to expose the cause of both languages as official languages. For example, in 1944, J R Jayawardena had proposed that

Sinhala be made the official language with in a reasonable number of years, but he was willing to amend Tamil also as official language for school instructions, public service exam and legislative proceedings. It is interesting to note that S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike also remarked that he also had no objections for the proposal of two official languages and he saw no particular harm or danger or real 2 2 ------difficulty from this.

After independence, an official language commission was appointed to decide on procedures for making both

Sinhala and Tamil the official languages. In 1951, after

S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike broke away from the United National

Party to form the , he alleged that the UNP had delayed action on the language question and the first manifesto of the SLFP declared "It is most essential that Sinhalese and Tamil be adopted official languages immediately so that the people of this land may cease to be aliens in their own land; so that an end may be put to the iniquity of condemning those educated in 2 *, Sinhalese and Tamils to occupy the lowliest walks of life.

Although language was not the cause of any great agitation at the 1952 elections, during the period of Sir

John Kotelawala's premiership (1953-56), this question became the dominant issue of the day. Because of the build up of this agitation, there was a swift change from the progressive demand for the use of both Sinhala and

Tamil, to a chauvinist cry for Sinhala to be the only 96

official language, and political competition for the

support of the masses played a key role in this process.

Between 1953 and 1956, the 'Sinhala Only' cry swept the

country and arguments about being 'Swamped', this time

linguistically, were used in favor of Sinhala being

proclaimed the only official language to the exclusion of 24 ' ^ Tamil. Political parties felt obliged to take a stand on

this issue and in some cases change their policies. The

SLFP by 1955 had officially switched to a "Sinhala Only';

and the UNP also faced with mounting agitation, by 1956

had adopted a resolution that Sinhala alone should be 25 made the state language.

In the early 1950s Sri Lanka went through a new

upsurge of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism based not only on I the language question but also on religious fervor. The

two issues, language and religion, were combined in the

Sinhala mass consciousness not only by various mythic and

symbolic factors but also because Sinhala was the

linguistic medium by which Buddhism was 'reproduced' among

the Sinhalese. The Buddhist resurgence during this period, was inspired by the preparations for the commemoration of the 2500th anniversary of the Buddha's death. The feeling of dissatisfaction that buddhism was still not given its due place in independent Sri Lanka was frequently expressed and this discontent was expressed, in 97 the famous report of the All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress in 26 1956, entitled the "Betrayal of Buddhism." In this

document an open denunciation was made of political

leaders who were completely dominated by an alien out

look and values and estranged from their national history

and culture. 71 ~ I

Another publication reflecting this Buddhist revivalist trend was the Revolt In The Temple written by D

, I C Wijayawardane in 19 53 in which open chauvinistic sentiments were expressed. The main concern of the book' was the 'sacred rights' of the Sinhala, re-emphasizing

some of the pronouncements of forty years earlier: "the history of Lanka is the history of all Sinhala race. The were entrusted

2500 years ago, with a great and noble charge, the preservation of Buddhism... in 1956 will occur the unique three-fold event - the completion of 2500 years of

Ceylon's history, of the life of Sinhalese and of 28 Buddhism." In Sri Lanka language was mainly connected with certain class interests of the elite. Swabhasha or the use of one's own language for the elite was really not an important class issue and their leaders had no

\ ‘ particular reason to get agitated on the question. They were fluent in English and able to get by in Sinhala as well. The reactionsj to the language issue among the 98

various political leaders showed that while advocating

swabasha, they were not emotionally committed to the

exclusive slogan of 'Sinhala only'. As it is mentioned

earlier, in 1944 J R Jayawardene was quite prepared to

accept an amendment adding Tamil to his proposal to make

Sinhalese the official language, and up to 1954 S.W.R.D.

Bandaranaike as well as John Kotalawala had advocated the

parity of official languages. It was only when language

became a means of gaining political power that the 2S leadership changed its earlier position on the issue.

"For the working people of Sri Lanka too, language was

certainly not a crucial issue at that point. But

Swabasha policies were supported because of the need for

communicating officially and otherwise in their own

language, whether it be Sinhalese or Tamil and on some

expectations that recognition of the mother tongue would mean better educational and job opportunities for their

children. But the agitation exclusively for 'Sinhala

only' was neither the main pre-occupation nor a particular

demand of the Sinhalese peasantry and working class, who

had no reason to exclude the recognition of Tamil. In

fact in August 1953 the working class led a militant ; protest on an economic issue, protesting against the cut

in the rice subsidy, an event which united non-plantation workers of all ethnic groups and which spread to the 99 rural areas also." To the urban elite, however, language was an issue that aroused strong emoticns and had profound significance. This class included the rural and urban small proprietors and traders and those who were key opinion makers among the Sinhala intel 1 egc^ntia - monks, writers, novelists, poets, journalists - as well as other articulate sections - school teachers, students and minor employees in the government and private sectors. In a society dominated by the Christianized English-educated, it was these sections who felt economically, socially and politically deprived and excluded from he various material 31 privileges of society.

During the 150s, the two connected issues of employment and education became very strongly inuer linked td* emerge as basically an anti-Tamil issue. L’p to that point both the Sinhalese and Tamils have amicably studied together in universities, were colleagues in higher profession; and at lower levels they had worked alongside each other in the public service. This worked without too

Tiuch antagonism as long as the system had enough space for both communities in the educational institution and in 32 employment. During the 1950s the rapid expansion of secondary education in Sinhala and Tamil put a further itrain on the employment situation and eventually on the ligher education system. These factors aggravated the qo^o 100 tensions that were building up and language itself thus, came to be seen as an economic issue. Thus those who actively participated in the 'Sinhala Only' agitation were teachers, students and youth ayurvedic physicians and most 33 important the Buddhist monks.

The school teachers in Sri Lanka in 1956 numbered about 35000, who felt great resentment not only because they were not paid the salary that an English trained teacher obtained but also because they had low status in a situation where knowledge of English was linked to higher position in the social hierarchy. In addition, the facilities and conditions ■’'n the English schools were far superior to those in Sinhala schools and this distinction which affected the performance of students, further aggravated the hostility against the English-based education system. Howard Wi ggins, who interviewed many

Sinhala teachers during the agitations summarised their views: "Most of these disadvantages would disappear, it was argued if Sinhalese was made the sole official language. All the status that previously adhered to

English when it was the 'official language' would become associated with the Sinhalese language and thence to

Sinhalese teachers. They were, after all, the experts in

Sinhalese culture and language and if their proficiency received state recognition, naturally they themselves 101

would rise in status. If Sinhalese was made the state

language, differential pay, educational facilities and job

opportunities would no longer favor the English speaking

elite. And, as it was seen from the village, vast numbers

of government jobs would immediately be opened to ! their students if English were displaced and Sinhalese 34 promoted."

The students in Sinhala schools and the unemployed

youth educated in Sinhala, were also at the fore front of

the 'Sinhala only' agitation. The expansion in Swabasha

education in the 1940s had resulted in increasing numbers

studying in Sinhala an i Tamil. By the 1950s the problem

of unemployed educated youth had become a political issue.

The Sinhala students were particularly vociferous on the

language issue in the hope that a 'Sinhala only* policy 35 would lead to greater employment opportunities. This point was well exposed by Pieter Kenneman, a communist party member in the Parliament: "We had one argument from

the representative of the local Klu Klux Klan...he made a

statement that this is a bill to solve employment problems of the Sinhalese...Why do you think all these SSC students

and other are stirred to such an extent?...Many of them believe that immediately this bill is passed they will all 36 get job, that their economic problems will be solved."

This statement explains the high perhaps false hope 102

the Sinhalese students had developed and were in the fore

front and demanded that Sinhala only should be declared

official language. i

Another active group was that of the Ayurvedic

physicians who numbered - between seven to ten thousand.

They had occupied an important position in the traditiona'l i ' society but had been relegated to a marginal position by the governments medical services based on Wester^n medicine. This group was particularly active on the language issue, believing that raising Sinhala to the position of official language would automatically be associated with the restoration of traditional Sinhala culture, with in which the ayurvedic system of medicine f would receive its due place. Since the ayurve'dic physicians commanded respect in the rural areas and also had an important hold on the people in their capacity as healers, the involvement of this group in language 37 agitation served to bring the issue to the rural masses.

The most militant and articulate spokesmen on the language issue were the Buddhist monks, who in the early I 1950s had begun to prepare for the commemoration of t Buddhas 2500 death anniversary by organizing themselves into associations and then into federations of Bhikku organization. Two of these federations joined to form the , I ' Eksath Bhikku Peramuna designed to mobilise the monks to 103 defeat the ruling UNP at the 1956 general elections. The main issues included those raised in the Buddhist commission report: the restoration of Buddhism through state recognition and patronage, educational reforms and privileges to Buddhist properties as well as the promotion

I j of Buddhist values through censorship of obscene books and films, and banning of horse racing and consumption of 38 alcohol. In addition, the monks organised the agitation on language issue and were the main spokesman for the

'Sinhala only' campaign. The monks felt keenly on the issue. They were educated in Sinhala and its classics as well as in Pali and were accepted by the Buddhists as the protectors of Sinhala culture. But they could not yield neither recognition nor influence in areals dominated by the English speaking elite, namely the administration, 39 higher education and politics.

The resentment of all these sections of the Sinhalese against the English educated was particularly strong and their campaign which was focussed against the United

National Party as the party in power, included the charge I that its leaders were westernized and Christian in culture and much being made of allegations of degenerate habits, drinking, gambling and beef eating among the ruling class.

Such themes of 'immorality in high places' always evoked f immediate responses by playing on the resentment and envy 104

of those middle groups in society v/ho delighted in

exposing in the right, those vices they could not

themselves' indulge in, and which they defined as

unSinhala and unBuddhist. The Bhikkus were considered to

be not only holy but also knowledgeable men of the

religious doctrine and expounded! to the piety.^^The i Bhikkus became highly articu1 ate both in religious and political matters. During the early 1950s when news - I papers were very rare in Sinhala villages, it was the

Bhikku who conveyed the political events t^ the people.

Every village had its local Bhikku, the religious story teller, venerated for his knowledge* service to Buddhism 41 and ascetic life. The Sinhala people easily fell for the I fear raised that with equal statusj, Tamil as a language, spoken by a large number of people across the Palk straits and with a well developed grammar and classical history of its own, would eventually swamp the less developed Sinhala language. At the same time the acceptance of Sinhala as the only official language by the major political parties and the attempts for the enactment of this policy was I interpreted by most Tamils as the betrayal by the 42 Sinhalese leadership. The Tamils feared, not merely that they would eventually be shut out of the lucrative professions and from employment in government but also that their very language and ,cuht'ure were threatened. 105

Under these circumstances, came the elections of 1956.

By the time of the election held in May 1956, an

electoral front called the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna was

formed under Bhandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom Party. The

election manifest of J*1JP included 'Sinhala only with

reasonable uie of Tamil.' 1 However, Kotelawala went one I step further and the UNP resolution made no mention at all of Tamil. As the Campaign picked up, momentum ■ I Bandaranaike promised to make 'Sinhala only' a reality 43 H 'with in 24 hours', if elected to power. Smaller parties such as LSSP and Communist party (CP) continued to hold out for parity of Sinhala and Tamil and- many of their meetings organized in support of this policy were broken I by 'Sinhala only' hard-1 ifiers, the Eksath Bhikku Peramuna

(United Bhikku Front) presented a ten point programme to

Bandaranaike which included to make Sinhala the only official language, to implement Buddhist Commission report of 1954 and give Buddhism its rightful place among 44 other demands. Thus the Bhikkus, teachers, ayurvedic physicians and rural land lords with their supporters voted enblock to MEP with absolute majority and

Bandaranaike became the Prime Minister. Bandaranaike ' , f claimed that the election victory "A revolution by the ballot and that it heralded a new era for the common man 45 in the country." In ,the 'Tamil areas of the north the 106 'Sinhala only' policy made the Tamils vote for the Federal

Party, led by S.J.V. Chelvanayakam which with its call for a federation seemed to be the only party that could fight 46 for the preservation of the rights of Tamil people.

Since the election -campaign had been based mainly on 'I i the language issue^, the first legislation of the new government was the Bill to make Sinhala the sole official language. The short, bill with just three clauses, gave rise to the longest debate in the annals of Sri Lanka's legislature, Bandaranaike outlined the injustices that had arisen out of the continual use of English, and explained the basis for the change from parity for both Sinhala and

Tamil of Sinhala only. "People in the south saw the fact i staring them in thb face - parity of official language- and felt that it would be gravely detrimental to the continuance and progress of Sinhala language; that it would almost imply the extinction of the Sinhalese 47 language."

However, Bandaranaike went on to make some interesting remarks. Describing the 'Sinhala only' i agitation he said: "The vast majority of the Sinhalese felt that way very strongly. That at least is a fact, whether you consider them to have been absolutely justified is another question. . .The fact that in towns I and villages, in 'business houses and boutiques most of the 107

work is in the hands of the Tamil speaking people, will

invariably result in a fear, and I do not think an

unjustified' fear, if the inexplorable shrinkage of the 48 Sinhalese language."

The proposal to make 'Sinhala only' as the sole state

language received the strong support of Buddhist Sangha

who linked the issue with that of active state support,

for Buddhism.^ Soon the cry 'Sinhala only' reverbated all

over the Sinhalese predominant areas. Many have adopted different posture in favor of this in the Parliament.

Philip Gunavardana of VLSSP who earlier (in 1948) have said that( "his party will fight this communalism and will not in any’ circumstances succumb to racialism. We i have... taught to obtain for every person who lives in this 49 island the same rights," changed his position and argued that the Bill was necessary to redress historic grievances.

By. changing according to the tide sweeping the island he argued that 'Sinhala only' bill was necessary to redress historic grievances: "We are completing by this bill an important phase in our national struggle. The restoration of Sinhalese language to the position it occupied before the occupation of this country by foreign powers, marks an important stage in the history of the i 50 development of this island." 108

The 'Sinhala only' bill was bitterly contested by

both the Tamil and Leftist political parties. A brief

consideration of gome of their views can be quoted to

express their feelings which contained enough caution

about the out-come of_^this policy. Sivas ithaparam the

Tami1' congress predicted the government's language policy ; 1 • . thus: "one language, two countries; two languages one 51 ' country." G.G. Ponnambalam, the leader of the Tamil , I Congress said: "The imposition of Sinhalese as the sole

official language of this country must inevitably and

inexorably put an end, even if that is not your real

objective to day, to the Tamil nation and the Tamil people 52 ' as such."

Dr N.M. Pereira, the LSSP leader declared: the LSSP's demand for Sinhalese and Tamil as the state languages it

should be made very clear at the outset, flows from the very real concern for the interests of the people who speak these languages. We have been for Swabasha, that is

Sinhalese and Tamil, ever since we started in 1953. That was one of our items in our first programme issued by the I LSSP, that the administration of the country should be in

Sinhalese and Tamil. Our party has taken a consistent I attitude ever since. We have never faltered or wavered from that position, because we felt that, that was the correct line to take. That position we still adhere to 109 however unpopular that action might be. I am convinced

myself of the correctness of that attitude. It might mean

going into the folitical wilderness for sometime, but

still we the members of LSSP are prepared to face that. 53 Let there be no mi stake about this."

Another parliamentarian of that time Leslie

Gunavardana of LSSP attributed that lack of concern for

minority opinion to the lack of a developed national

consciousness in Sri Lanka:

"One of the reason why the state language question

has become so acute and apparently incapable of solution

is because of the low level of consciousness of a

Ceylonese nationality that exists among the people. We

did not have mass struggles against imperialism in order

to win independence. If the Sinhalese and the Tamils had

gone to jail in their thousands, a consciousness not of

Sinhalese and Tamil nationality but of a Ceylonese nationality would have been built up in that struggle.

With a definite foresight he also warned that the

consequences of forcing the Sinhala language on an unwilling minority would be ethnic division and violence added: "There is greater danger of the country, if those people feel that a grave irreparable injustice is done to them, there is. possibi1ity of their deciding even to break 55 away from the rest of the country." 110

Dr Ca]vin R De Silva, the noted historian of Sri

Lanka argued that while the acceptance of parity of language was the road to freedom of our nation and the unity of its components, Sinhala only would lead to unforeseen consequences:___"Two torn little bleeding states raay yet arise oiit of one little state... ready for the ! iaperialists to mop up that which imperialism has only 56 recently dislodged."

Pieter Keneman of the Communist Party declared "We believe that all nationals of this country have a natural and unfitted right to use their language, to govern themselves in their language, to build and develop their language and cultures. This is a right which in the case of any one linguistic group |is neither more or less than in the case of the other linguistic groups. No person or linguistic group should, because of his or its language, be placed in a position inferior or superior, in the exercise and enjoyment of the rights and obligations of 57 citizenship to another person or language group."

Anil Moonesinghe, another left party parliamentarian observed that while in the 1947 and 1952 elections, no slogans to 'Save the Sinhala language' were raised but

V with the 1956 it had become the main slogan: "How can one account for this except by the fact that certain people made this an election issue because they wanted to come to Ill power. For them socialism is confined to one section of the people to one community. I have never witnessed this type of socialism except the socialism of Pilsudski,

Hitler and Mussol ini .

The executive committee of the All Ceylon Union of

Teachers whose membership was over 8000,' perturbed ovel" : I the language policy and termed it as a bill' with destructive tendencies. In its annual session the . I following resolution was passed: "This union views with alarm the destructive tendencies leading to national disunity due to the present language policy of the government, and urges that the question be solved in consonance with the self-respect and fundamental rights of I all races that form the people of the country. The general opinion among members of the committee is that at some stage amending legislation should be passed by the government to give official recognition to both English 59 and Tamil also."

The Parliament witnessed unprecedented debates in which many cynical use of the language issue for gaining I political power. Many others have warned the new Prime

Minister surrendering to fanatics. However, as the new { ' government came to power mainly on the 'Sinhala only' platform, the 'Sinhala only' act was passed by the parliament with 66 votes for and 29 ag a i ns t .^^Tl^e I S r i 112

Lankan Tamils who believed that language represented

culture, race, history, individuality and finally a sub-

nation started determined protests even as the bill was

being Introduced. Sinhala leaders were able to delude the

Sinhala public that a_p_rogress i ve step forward had been

achieved but what happened was a quick descent 'into ethnic I violence, which erupted even as the bill was being voted

in the parliament. The 'Sinhala only' language policy . I passed into law as the official language Act. No. 33 of

1956 and reads as follows:

An Act to prescribe the Sinhala language as the one

official language of Ceylon and to enable certain

transitory provisions to be made (Date of assent: 7 July I 1956) I

1. The Act may be cited as the official language Act.

No. 33 of 1956.

2. The Sinhala language shall be the one official

language of Ceylon.

Provided that were the minister considers it impracticable to commence the use of only the Sinhala language, for any official purpose immediately on the coming into force of this act; the language or languages hitherto,used for that purpose may be continued to be so until the necessary change is effected as early as possible before the expiry of 31 December 1960 and, if such change canriol! be affected 113 by administrative order, regulations may be made under

this Act to effect such change.

3. (i) The Ministers may take such regulations in

respect of all matters for which regulations are

authorized by this Act to be made and generally

for the purpose of giving effect to the

principals and provisions of this Act.

(ii) No regulations made under sub-section (1) shall

have effect until it is approved by the senate

and the house of representatives and

notification of such approval is published in 61 the Gazette."

The agitation on the language issue led in 1956 to

the first outburstof serious ethnic violence. It began

when the Federal party members who had started a

Satyagraha on June 5th, when the Sinhala only bill was

introduced were assaulted by a crowd of Sinhalese, who had

gathered there to celebrate the passing of the Bill.

There were further violent incidents against Tamils in

Colombo and in the colonisation schemes of the Sa Oya

Valley, where Sinhalese were re-settled in clusters 62 surrounded by thickly populated areas. It was estimated

thatabout 150 people lost their lives during the

agitations immediately after the passing of 'Sinhala Only'

Act. Moreover, the society was effectively divided on 114

ethnic lines. The ethic problem was thereafter to

escalate and dominate the society, economy and politics of

Sri Lanka. In this period the Federal Party organized * active resistance to the government language policy. The

Tamils, hitherto unattracted by the Federal Party's demand

of Federal State, turned to the party now. With the : I Sinhala Only law on the statute book and the firm resolve

of the government not to accord equal status to Tamil and

the refusal of incorporating the clause for the

'reasonable use of Tamil', federalism became the only way

out for the integrity and future of the Tamils. For the

first time Tamils started talking about a separate Tamil 63 ' nation. The federal party which has become the spokesman

of the Tamils, called for a national convention onl 19

August and passed the following resolutions:

1. The replacement of the present pernicious

constitution by a rational and democratic

constitution based on the establishment of one or.

more Tamil linguistic states incorporating all

geographically contiguous areas in which the Tamil

^ I speaking people are numerically in a majority as

federating unit or units enjoying the widest

autonomous and residuary powers consistent with the

unit and external security of Ceylon.

2. The restoration of the Tamil language to its ri^hiful 115

place enjoying the absolute parity of status with

Sinhalese as an official language of the country.

3. The repeal of the present citizenship law and

enactment in their place of laws recognizing the

right to full ciLLzenship on the basis of a simple

te^t of residence for all persons who have made this ; ! country their home.

4. The immediate cessation of colonization of the . I traditional Tamil speaking areas with Sinhalese 64 , people."

Basing on these four points the Federal Party announced a Satyagraha campaign. Prime Minister

Bandaranaike who Was perhaps pressurised by the Bhikkus I and Succumbed to political compulsion and enacted the

'sinhala only act tried to avert a show down with the

Tamils. In April 1957, Bandaranaike announced a proposal in general terms as follows: I 1. The right of every Tamil to be educated in Tamil up

to the highest level of the educational system.

2. Tamils would be entitled to set for public service I ' ^ examinations in Tamil, with the provision that they

acquire; proficiency in Sinhalese in a stipulated period after recruitment as probationers.

3. Tamils would be entitled to correspond with the

government and receive replies in Tamil and 116

4. Local authorities in Tamil areas would be given the

power to transact business with the gc/ernment in

Tamil.

With this proposal Bandaranaike called for the

Federal Party leader CheJljv.anayagam for discussion and went on to declare that "the policy that the government intact to follow is while accepting Sinhalese as the official language, citizens who do not know Sinhalese should not suffer inconvenience, embarrassment or any trouble as a result of that. Some of my honorable friends opposite who held an extreme point of view will think differently.

There are extremists on both sides. We cannot decide these issues on grounds of extremism whether it be on this side of the house or on that side. If Sinhalese has been declared the official language of the country. The government now propose to take these steps and everybody 66 will have an opportunity to make suggestions."

This statement and the proposals brought the Federal

Party and government to negotiation table and after series of meetings an agreement popularly known as 'the B-C pact'. (Bandaranaike - Chelvanayagam Pact) was worked out and was tabled in the house on July 26, 1957. {See

Appendix). According to the B-C Pact, the northern province was to constitute one regional council and the eastern province was to be divided into tvo or more 117

councils. Regional counsellors were to be directly

elected and Parliament was to delegate powers to the

regional councils by act of parliament. The regional

councils were to have powers over specified subjects such

as education, land -and land development, health,

industries colonization etc. In regard to colonization

and resettlement schemes, regional councils were to have

the power to select those whom land was to be resettled.

Tamil was to be recognised as the language of national

minority and the language of government administration in

the northern and eastern provinces, with provision for

Sinhalese speaking people in those areas. This was to

take place without infringing on the position of the 67 official language Act. 1956. The Federal Party agreed to

call off the Satyagraha but trouble arose from Sinhalese

hard liners. Sections of the Sinhalese, led by militant

Bhikkus, declared the pact to be a betrayal of Sinhala

interests. The UNP leader J R Jayawardane organised a

march to Kandy on October 4, 1957 to invoke the blessings

of the 'devales' gods for his campaign against the B-C

Pact. Due to these pressures Bandaranaike did not take

any steps to translate the B-C Pact into law or

implementing the Pact. Instead in December 1957 a bill was tabled in-the parliament to put the Sinhalese letters

'SRI' (i.e. the prefix Sri in Sri Lanka) in place of 118 English letters that had hitherto been used on motor

vehicle number plates. Though this was a cosmic change

the Tamils refused to accept this and a campaign was

launched in Jaffna in March 1958 to tar out the Sinhalese

letter SRI in car number plates; which led to retaliation

by Sinhalese crowds who began to tar every Tamil sign in

Colombo and other areas. Thus the stage was set again for

a direct confrontation. In addition there was continuous

pressure on Bandaranaike by the Bhikkus who surrounded his

house, demanding the abrogation of the Bandaranaike-

Chel V an ayagam Pact and he finally acceded to these

pressures and announced that the Pact be abrogated with 68 immediate eff:ct.

This was the back ground to the rioting that broke

out in many parts of the country on May 23 1958 being

especially severe in Colombo, Batticaloa, Polonnaruwa,

Kurunegala, Galle and Matara where shops were looted and

set on fire. Tamils were attacked and killed, trains were

derailed and unparalleled violence took place for four days before a. state of emergency was declared. The army was called in the normally was restored but many lives 69 were lost, and many Tamils moved to Jaffna as refugees."

The mood in Colombo during the riots can be seen from the Government Agent's reports which described the situation: "Passing vehicles were stopped and their 119

occupants mercilessly assaulted. Moving trains were

halted at several places and the passengers ruthlessly

attacked. There were many instances of arson and such

brutal scenes as men being burnt alive. Looting was

rampant. The police were helpi ess against these marauding

rioters."■ ^ ' ..70

Even as order in the nation was restored, many Tamil

leaders and members of parliament were arrested and detained. Moderate people started wondering whether the

Sinhalese and Tamils reached the parting of the ways.

Howard Wyiggins wrote in his book, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a

New Nation: "In the event, the majority community

succeeded in obtaining the language reform legislation in

ardent spokesmen sought. The alarming riots of 1958, unparalleled in the Island's history, were the direct result of these reform's and the government's reluctance to insist that public order be maintained and individuals protected. The memory of those events will retard the creation of a unified modern nation-stste commanding the 71 allegiance of all communities."

The success of the 'Sinhala only' campaign and the events of the 1958 riots revealed the persistence and strength of that were forming the Sinhala Buddhist consciousness. The concept of the primacy of the Sinhala people and their mission to protect Buddhism were brought 120 into full play during this- period and were strong enough to invite people to go on the rampage against Sri Laakan

Tamils. To this group the language issue had been one of the critical importance, affecting their daily lives and giving them an illusory hope that 'Sinhala only' would mean more employment prospects and chances of getting into the prestigious posts held by the English-speaking elite.

In addition the Sinhala-Buddhist consciousness was strong enough to draw in the support of urban, poor, landless peasants for what was conceived as a common struggle of the Sinhalese against the Tamils. In addition the

Sinhalese political leadership supported the demand for 72 VSinhala only' in crder to succeed electorally."

In 1958 violence caused serious re-thinking in MEP - ' I circles. With the emergency in force and the Federal

Party M.Ps in detention, the Bandaranaike government, in a desperate attempt to compromise, enacted the Tamil

Language (special Provisions) Act of 28 of 1958. This contained substantially modified provisions for "the reasonable use of Tamil," in education, public service entrance examinations and administration in the northern 73 and eastern provinces. However, the Tamils saw this as a mere eye wash as the act did not contain any forcible right to use Tamil but merely authorized the Prime

Minister to make regulations to give effect to the use of 121

Tamil in areas specified in the act. In the mean time internal fissures within the MEP government has started exploding itself. The Marxist Parties proposed a non confidence motion on the government and resorted to spate of strikes which paralyzed industry, commerce and the port 74 which in turn destabalized thei government. i

In this deteriorating situation, ion'25th September

1959 a Bhikku named Somarama shot and killed Prime , I Minister Bandaranaike on the Veranda of his residence when he was paying obeisance to the visitingmonk. R. G.

Veeramantry writes: "It is pertinent to note that involved in the conspiracy to murder Bandaranaike were the most venerable Bhuddarakitc, the Kelaniya temple high priest and secretary of the Eksath Bhikkt| Peramuna. At the trial the former was convicted of murder and the 75 latter of conspiracy of murder." The assassination of

Bandaranaike was not perhaps a simple act carried by a murderous Bhikku at the instigation of Buddarakita.

During the trial two of his cabinet ministers and number 76 of others were mentioned as possible accomplices. It was believed that the murder was the culmination of the extremist feelings of Sinhala-Buddhists against the

t middle-of-the road policies of Bandaranaike. In ensuing interregnum the country slipped into a state of political confusion and chaos - which resulted in alnother election 122

to the parliament in March 1950.

In 1956 the SLFP won the election on the basis of

'Sinhala only' and Buddhist revival and in 1960 the same

issues were raised by all parties. Since January 1960 was

the first working day in the change over to the 'Sinhala

only' administration all the Sinhalese parties pledged to

the Sinhalese voters that, if, returned to power they

would rigorously enforce 'Sinhala only'. At the same time

the Federal Party called for a hartal (general strike) in

the north and the east on that day.^ The SLFP promised

the wholesale repatriation of Indian Tamils if it came to

power. The MEP promised to implemerit the Sanana

Commission report, which had recommended granting Buddhism

its rightful place in the affairs of the state and in the

government take-over of schools. However, none of these

parties won clear majority in the parliament which

resulted in calling for election again in July 1960.

The 1960 July election brought the fist woman Prime

Minister in the world Mrs. Bandaranaike with strong

Buddhist sentiments playing a major role in the election.

The federal party of the Tamils in February 1961 called on

Tamils government employees not to study Sinhala and not 77 to transact any business in Sinhala. It had also called

on the Tamils to correspond with the government only in

Tamil. Thousands of Federal Party volunteers surrounded 123 district administrative offices in the Tamil districts and 78 paralyzed the administration. The government in March declared emergency and dispatched military troops to occupy the northern and eastern provinces. Simultaneously the government went ahead with rigorous enforcement of

'Sinhala only' and passed the Language of the Courts Act making the courts conduct their business, in Sinhala rather than English. As a retaliatory measure and as a symbol of

'Tamil self government' Federal Party leader Chelvanayagam inaugurated the "Tamil Arasu (government) postal service" by issuing Federal Party's own postal stamps in post 79 offices of Jaffna district. This was quickly put down by ( the armed forces and all leaders were arrested. The I arrest and detention of all federal party MPS for six months, and two year state of emergency and the military occupation in the Tamil areas have widened the breach between the communities more. The government under Mrs

Bandaranaike was unwilling for any dialogue on the language issue. Attempts were made to appear that the

Tamil community at large did not think the language I problem as intractable but it uses the Federal Party 80 which was the cause of all problems. However, the

'Sinhala only' act would result in loss of educational and job opportunities for the Tamils and it was evident hat / they had to resist the act at all costs. It is under 124 these circumstances, for the first time an independent

Tamil member of parliament Mr Suntheralingam openly j rejected the Unitary State and called for a separate state of Ealam, comprising the ancient Tamil areas of the north and eas^ Sri Lanka. He was joined by another Federal

Party M P Navaratnam and declared that, if the leaders of the Sinhalese people persist in this attitude, I will say that when you will be advocating federalism. We will rather choose to have a division of the country even at 81 the cost of several lives. In this way one might say,

Tamil separatist nationalism was born. At the same time, though the Sinhala only act was well used by political leaders to meet their goals, the subsequent reality and the obvious benefits of Sinhala only unified the Sinhalese

- the low-country and Kandyan, Goyigama and Karava-

Buddhists and Catholics and other Christians. This development had effectively severed the Sinhala-Tamil

Vellala alliance.

In 1964 Dudley Senanaike entered into an agreement with Federal Party leader Chelvanayagam. Since the 1958

Tamil language (special provisions) Act remained a dead letter itnd no regulations had been framed under it

Senanayake agreed to frame new regulations making the

Tamil language the language of administration and record in the northern and eastern provinces. It was also agreed 125

that provision would be made in the regulations for Tamil­

speaking people to transact official and other business in

Tamil throughout the country. Senanayake also agreed tc

amend the 1961 language of the courts act, which had

substituted Sinhala for^English in court proceedings in the northern and eastern provinces. As to colonization

and resettlement, it was agreed that lands in the northern

and eastern provinces Would, in the first instance, be granted to landless residents in the two provinces and 82 finally to other citizens." (Senanayake-Chelvanayagam

Pact appears in the appendix). While the pact was becoming a public secret another development also was taking place. In early 1965 Mrs Bandar anaike's government I collected and published the writings of Dharmapala's writings under the auspices of Ministry of Education and cultural affairs. A highly evocative title "Return to

Righteousness" was given to this publication with passages such as "there is no place for the Tamils in Sri

Lanka...the Pagan Tami1s ...devastated the land, destroyed . 8 : ancient temples and nearly annihilated the historic race."

The Mahanayake of the Ramanya Sect of Buddhism wrote in

1967 "If the Tamils get hold of the country, the

Sinhalese will have to jump into the sea. It is essential therefore, tq safeguard our country, the race 84 and the religion, and to work with that object in mind." 126

In 1966 Dudley Senanaike's governgient formulated and

published the regulations under the Tamil Language

I (special provision) Act of 1958. The regulations provided for the use of Tamil in government business in the northern and eastern provinces and for the maintenance of ' i public records there. Official correspondence and the conduct of affairs of local bodies in these areas to be in

Tamil. Government would provide Tamil publications for all legislation, subordinate rules and orders. The Tamils were not happy about those regulations as all those who were outside north and east provinces would have to study

Sinhala. Many of the clauses from Senanayake-

Chelvanayaga^m Pact were not included in these promulgations. However, the Sinhalese took offensive of these regulations and demonstrated against this. In the ensuing violence arson one Bhikku was killed in police 85 firing. The regulations were condemned as a betrayal of the Sinhalese-Buddhist cause and a deliberate concession to the Tamils. Afraid of its long-term political consequences Qudley Senanayake did not implement the regulations .

In 1970' the government introduced a new constitution in the Parliament. The new constitution merely reiterated that Sinhalese would be the sole official language but

' i, specified that the regulations passed under the Tamil 127 language (special provisions) Act shall be regarded as subordinate legislation. Article 7 of the constitution of

Sri Lanka 1972 reaffirmed 'The official language of Sri

Lanka shall be Sinhala as provided by the Official 86 Language Act No. 33 of '1956.' The constitution further I said that the Tamil language regulations 'shall not in any manner be interpreted as being provision of the constitution but shall be deemed to be subordinate legislation.' Article 11 provided that the 'Language of the courts and trials shall be Sinhala throughout Sri

Lanka and accordingly their records, including pleadings, proceedings, judcments, orders and recordis of all, 87 judicial and material acts, 'shall be in Sinhala.' Then again the new constitution did not incorporate section

29(3) of the 1946/48 constitution which was regarded as an important instrument to protect minority rights. Moreover the judiciary was declared subordinate to the legislature which caused great concern to the minorities. Finally, the Sinhalese Buddhists succeeded in enacting a special clause in the constitution which declared that 'Buddhism 88 shall have the foremost place.' This clause was resented strongly by the Tamil 1eadership and ultimately the

Tamil's Federal Party had decided to boycott the constituent assembly and took up the position that the constitution of 1972 did not have the sanction of Tamil 128

People?®It was around this time that the university admission crisis arose (Discussed as separate chapter).

At this very period ithe Indian Tamil leadership was also alienated by the government policy of distributing estate lands only to the citizens of the country, thus leaving the Indian estate worli:ers without land or employment. All these led in 1974 for the first time since independence the Sri Lankan Tamil leadership coalesced with the Indian

Tamil leadership (the Ceylon workers congress led by Mr

Thondaman) to form the Tamil . IN 1975 this organization openly espoused the cause of a separate state and renamed itselfthe Tamil United Liberation Front

(TULF). The following resolution was adopted: The first

t national convention! of the Tamil Liberation Front, meeting at Pannadam, Vaddukodai, on the 14th day of May 1976, hereby declares that the Tamils of Ceylon, by virtue of their great language, their religions, their separate culture and heritage, their history of independent existence as a separate state over a distinct territory for several centuries till they were conquered by the I armed might of the European invaders and above all by their will to exist as a separate entity ruling themselves in their own territory, are a nation distinct and apart form the Sinhalese and their constitution announces to the iI world that the /Republ ican Constitution of 1972 has made 129 the Tamils slave nation ruled by the new colonial masters, the Sinhalese, who are using the power they have wrongly usurped and deprived the Tamil nation of its territory,

language, citizenship, economic life, opportunities of employment and education_and there by destroying all the attributes of nationhood of the Tamil people.

And therefore, while taking note of the reservations in relation to its commitment to the setting up of a separate state of Tamil Ealam exposed by the Ceylon worker's congress as a plantation workers, the majority of whom live and work outside the northern and eastern areas.

This ccnvention resolves that the restoration and reconstitution of the free, sovereign, secular state of

Tamil Ealam based on the right of self-determination inherent in every nation has become inevitable in order to safeguard the very existence of Tamil nation in the country."

Nevertheless, Mr. Thondaman was never really reconciled to the separatist solution for that would have involved a mass migration of his followers from the highlands to the north and east. The Tamils of north for I that matter would not accept them as equals. In the 1977 elections the UNP under JR Jayawardene won comfortably and began an effort to reconcile the two ethnic groups. But 130

the riots of August 1977 applied a serious setback for the

process. It was in the context of such tension and f conflict that a determined effort was made to effect

structural changes to ease ethnic tensions. The

provisions relating to language in the constitution of the ' I Democratic Socialistic Republic of Sri Uanka (1978) form a

key of the changes. As Mr C. R. de Si 1va outlines:

In the first place while Sinhala remains the official

language of Sri Lanka (Article 18), Sinhala and Tamil are

both recognized as national languages (Article 19) and

this represents an important modification of the ‘Sinhala

only' policy pursued by all governments. The article of

the new constitution relating to t h e u s e of Tamil in

courts of law are even more positive. ' Any judge, juror,

party applicant or legal representative who is not

conversant with the language used in any court in the

island is entitled to have all proceedings interpreted and all records translated to the appropriate national

language (Article 24). Unlike article 11 (1) of the 1972 constitution which merely gave pern)ission to the

legislature to provide for the use of any language other than Sinhala in courts of original jurisdiction in the north and eastern provinces, article 24(1) of the 1978 constitution while providing that Sinhala shall be the ■ /, I ' language of the courts of law, specifically provident that 131

the language of courts in the northern and eastern

provinces "shall also be Tamil and their records and

proceedings shall be in the Tamil language." Finally

article 25 specifically states that the state shall

provide adequate facilities for the use of languages as 91 provided in all the above-mentioned articles." The ,Sri

Lankan Government succeeded in convincing some section of the Tamils that great concessions were given to the minorities. Nevertheless, a substantial section of Sri

Lankan Tamils remains unreconciled. This is partly due to the fact that the constitution specifically states that it

is a unitary state thus standing firm against federalism further (article 9) the constitution states that "The

Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the state to 92 protect and foster the Buddha Sasana." The Buddha Sasana includes doctrines as taught by Buddha as well as the

Buddhist church. Some of the constitutional guarantees such as the requirement that all official publications shall be both in Sinhala and Tamil are not always complied with the enactment of the 1 978 constitution, Tamil \ attained the legal status of a national language along with Sinhala, but due to some inadequacies in its official status, it is far from becoming a national language in reality. So far as the citizens of Tamil districts are 132

concerned, the language problem does not bother them in

the same way as it creates practical difficulties for the

Tamils living in the Sinha 1a-majority areas. A Marga

Institute Publication says "...The Tamil community residents in the Sinhala speaking areas are often reduced to the condition of the illiterate when they receive ' 93 communication in t'he official language."

Despite the legal provisions, the Tamil minorities in the Sinhala Districts do not receive government communications in their own language. The government departments may not even have adequate bilingual personnel. It is said from the government side that except in a few non-Tamil districts the Tamils are spread thinly all over the country, and it becomes very difficult I to cater to their linguistic needs everywhere. But at the same time, the lack of motivation to implement the constitutional provision can not be denied. However, according to V P Vaidik, "The root of the problem lies with the new class of government personnel which has emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. These employees due to the 'Sinhala only' policy have picked up only Sinhala or

Tamil in their schools and English, which used to be a common language has been neglected. The decline of

English in modern Sir Lanka was natural but the new system failed to replac,e it with another indigenous link 133 language. Moreover, ethnic considerations discouraged 94 each group from learning the other's language."

It is pertinent to note the arguments put forth by the Sinhalese elite, against the special status of Tamil in Sri Lanka. ---

"Far from Tamils being humiliated for the use of their language, Tamil now enjoys a status in Sri Lanka which is unparalleled in other parts of the Tami1-speaking world. Tamil, a regional language in India, is a national language in Sri Lanka, and its free use in Sri Lanka

National Parliament, in the northern and eastern provinces, in all public records, on radio and television, on postage stamps, currency notes, in public correspondence initiated by Tamils in the Tamil language and as a medium of instruction at all levels of education 95 is an established fact."

The Taiails on the other hand, say that if they learn^

Sinhala, it will ultimately destroy their cultural identity. They contrast the Sri Lankan situation with that of India and argue that Hindi is not the language of majority in India. So learning Hindi does not imply the possibility of destruction of the regional languages and cultures, while learning Sinhala in Sri Lanka, with the steam-roller majority of the Sinhala people, will according to them spell disaster for the Tamils. 134

Moreover, the Sri Lankan Tamils feel that the Indian

Political system is more decentralised than the Sri

Lankan and the rights of regional languages are more secured.

Thus the 1anguage' question has remained an unsolved issue for the past three decades. Even though, it may look like a simple language question, it has such varied repressions-historical1y , culturally, religiously and politically - and any move on this is faced with tremendous echoes elsewhere. 135

MOTES AND REFERENCES

1. L. J. B. Turner, Collected Papers on the, History of the Maritime Provinces of Ceylon, 1795-1830, Colombo, 1923, 117.

2. Ibid., p. 118.

3. C. R. de Silva, Sinhala -Tamil Ethnic Rivalry and the New Constitution(1978), university of Paradeniya{unpublished paper) p. 4.

4. Samaraveera, "Land, Labor and Sectional Interests in the National Politics of Sri Lanka", Modern Asian Studies. XV (1), 1981, pp. 140-141.

5. Vennaisingham Somasundaram, Sri Lanka: The Conflict Within, New Delhi 1988, p. 5.

6. Ceylon National Review, 1958, p. 40.

7. S. Arasavatnam, "Nationalism in Sri Lanka and the Tamils", in Michael Roberts (ed). Collective Identities, p. 505.

8. Marshal R. Singer, The Emerging Elite. Study of Political Leadership in Ceylon, 1917, Mass, 1964, p. 37.

9. C.R.deSilva, op.cit.,p.7.

10. Marshal L Singer, op.cit., p. 30.

11. Satchi Ponnambalam, Sri Lanka: National Question, p. 95

12. Constitution of Sri Lanka (Independence) 1948, Section 29. (2).

13. C. R. de Silva, op.cit., p. 5.

14. Ibid., p. 5.

15. Lalit Kumar, Sirimavo - Shastri Pact, p. 15.

15. Ibid., p. 17. ,

17. P. R. Ramachandra Rao, India and Ceylon: A Study, Bombay 1954, p. 7. 135

18. Kumari Jayawardena, "Century of Ethnic Conf 1 icts(8) 'From Sinhala Only to Ethnic Violence' p. 8 . (unpublished paper)

19. Lalit Kumar, op.cit., p. 25.

20. Kumari Jayawardena, op.cit., p. 8

21. R. Kearney, Communalism & Language in the Politics of Sri Lanka, 1967, p. 17.

22. Kumari Jayawardena, op.cit., p.10.

23. Founding Manifesto of Sri Lanka Freedom Party, September 1951. p. 20.

24. Kumari Jayawardena, op.cit., p. 11.

25. Ibid., p. 11 .

26. The Buddhist Commission of Inquiry, The Betrayal of Buddhism, Balangoda, February, 1956 . p. 2.

27. Ibid., p. 10.

28. D. C. Wijayawardane, The Revolt in the Temple, Sinha Publication, Colombo 1955, p. 25-27.

29. Senator S. Nadesam Q. C., Ceylon's Language Problem, Collection of articles from Ceylon Daily News, 1955, p . 8.

30. Kumari Jayawardena, op.cit., p. 12.

31. Ibid., p. 12

32. Senator S Natesan, op.cit., p. 15.

33. Kumari Jayawardena, op.cit., p. 12.

34. Howard Wiggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation, Princeton, 1960, pp. 338-339.

35. Senator Natesan. op.cit., p. 17.

36. Pieter Kenneman, Hansard, June 14, 1956. (Records of Parliament debate^Ti

7. Kumari Jayawardena, op.cit., p. 14. 137

38. Betrayal of Buddhism, op.cit., p. 47.

39. Kumari Jayawardena, op.cit., p. ,24.

40. Michael Carreturs, The Forest Monks of Sri Lanka, Oxford University Press, Delhi 1983, p. 7l.

41. Ibid p. 85. ' i 42. Senator Natesan, op.cit., p. 3Q.

43. Satchi Ponnambalam, op.cit., p. 98.

44. "Background to Politics", Ceylon Observer, 17 July 1962.

45. Denzel Pieris, 1956 and After, Colombo 1958, p. 5.

46. Satchi Ponumbalam, op.cit., p. 99.

47. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Hansard,,6 June 1956.

48. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaice, Towards a New Era: Selected Speeches. Colombo 1961. p. 47.

49. Phi 1 ip ^iunavardana, Hansard, 1^ June, 1956.

50. Hansard, 14 June, 1956.

51. Satchi Ponnambalam, op.cit., p. 101.

52. I b i d . , p . 101.

53. Dr N. M. Perera; Hansard, 19 Oct. 1955.

54. Leslie Gunavardena, Hansard, 8 June, 1956.

55. Ibid. I 56. Calvin R De Silva, Hansard, 14 June, 1956.

57. House Debates, Official Reports, 1956, Vol. 24, p. 85.

58. Anil Moonesinghe, Hansard, 11 June, 1956.

59. "Language and ACUT", Daily Nevjs,' June 6, 1956.

60. Supplement to Ceylon Government Gazette 138

Extraordinary, part 11, July 7, 1956.

61. Colombo Archives, Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956, printed at the Government press, Colombo.

62. Kumari Jayawardena, op.cit., p. 10.

63. Satchi Ponnambalam. op.cit., p. 106.

64 . Ibid., p . 106.

65. Ibid., pp. 109-110.

66. Senator Natesan, op.cit., p. 26.

67. Satchi Ponnambalam, op.cit., p. 112.

68. Kumari Jayawardane, 100 years of Ethnic Conflict (9), 'Sinhala Chauvinism in the Fifties' p. TV.

69. Ibid., p. 12.

70. Report of the Government Agent, May 28, 1958.

71. Howard Wyiggins, op.cit., p 355.

72. Kumari Jayawardena, op.cit., p. 12.

73. Satchi Ponnambalam, op.cit., p. 114.

74. Kumari Jayawardena, op.cit., p. 12.

75. R. G. Weeramantry, Assassination of a Prime Minister: Geneva 1969, p. 85.

76. Ibid., p. 102.

77. Ceylon Daily News, 2 August, 1960.

78. Tamil Times, 6 August, 1960.

79. Tamil Times, 18 August, 1960. t 80. Tamil Times, August 29, 1960.

81. Ceylon Obs'erver, 13 December, 1964.

82. Satchi Ponnambalam, op.cit., pp. 135-136.

83. Ananda Guruge (ed) Return to Righteousness - Selected 139

Writings of Anagarika Dharmapala, Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs, Colombo 1965, p. 80.

84. Quoted in S H Kodikara "Communalist and Political Modernization in Ceylon", Modern Ceylon Studies, Vol. I, No. I, 1970, p. 103.

85. Ceylon Observer, 15, March 1966.

86. Ceylon' Daily News, 25,, May 1972.

87. Ibid. '

88. The Constitution of the Democratic Socialistic Republic of Sri Lanka, ( 1978), Dept. of Government Printing, Colombo, (Arti cle 2).

89. K. M. De Silva, The Constitution and Constitutional Reforms since 1948 in Sri Lanka a Survey, London C Harst 1977, pp. 17-327.

90. TULF National Convention, quoted by The Tamil Times, May 15, 1976. ,

91. Constitution of Sri Lanka (1978), op.cit.. Article 25

92. Ibid., Article 9. '

93. Inter-Racial Equity and National Unity in Sri Lanka: Marga Institute, Colombo, p. 16.

94. V. P. Vaidik, op.cit., p. 69.

95. S. N. Kodikara, "The Separatist Ealam Movement in Sri Lanka: An Overview", India Quarterly, Vol. 37. No. 2, April-June 1981, p. 208.