Global Affairs

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What is the point about Sykes–Picot?

Pinar Bilgin

To cite this article: Pinar Bilgin (2016): What is the point about Sykes–Picot?, Global Affairs, DOI: 10.1080/23340460.2016.1236518

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2016.1236518

Published online: 11 Oct 2016.

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Download by: [Bilkent University], [Pinar Bilgin] Date: 19 October 2016, At: 23:28 Global Affairs, 2016 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2016.1236518

What is the point about Sykes–Picot? Pinar Bilgin*

Department of International Relations, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Bilkent University, Ankara, (Received 4 August 2016; accepted 12 September 2016)

The Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916) became (in)famous once again following a tweet announcing a propaganda video by the group that call themselves the Islamic State of and al Sham (ISIS) declaring “the end of Sykes–Picot”. In this essay I suggest that the point about Sykes–Picot is not about the “artificiality” of borders in the Middle East (for all borders are artificial in different ways) or the way in which they were drawn (for almost all borders were agreed on by a few men, and seldom women, behind closed doors) but (also) that it was shaped by a discursive economy that allowed for the International Society to decide the fate of those that were deemed as not-yet capable of governing themselves. ISIS preoccupation with the “end of Sykes–Picot” is conditioned by the same discursive economy that it apparently seeks to resist. Keywords: Sykes–Picot Agreement; Middle East; security; ISIS

Introduction “Middle East”. Since then, “Sykes–Picot” In 2014, the Sykes–Picot Agreement became has been Googled thousands of times and (in)famous following a tweet announcing a hundreds of opinion pieces have been propaganda video by the group that call them- written seeking to answer the question of “ – selves the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham whether it is indeed the end of Sykes Picot” as declared by ISIS (see Danforth (ISIS).1 The video showed the group destroy- 2013; Gause III 2014). In this essay, I ing the border barriers between and suggest that the point about Sykes–Picot is Iraq, signalling the end of a need to control not about the artificiality of borders (for all “ ” national frontiers; for they have now borders are artificial in different ways) or the “ ” become one people under ISIS rule (see way in which they were drawn (for almost Tinsley, 2015). In doing so, ISIS claimed to all borders have been agreed on by a few bring a physical end to the so-called men, and seldom women, behind closed “Sykes–Picot order” insofar as both sides of doors) but the ways in which Middle East the border had come under ISIS control. It politics were shaped in century that followed was also a metaphorical end in that ISIS was the First World War.2 It is not the borders per challenging both the borders and the nation- se, but life inside and across those borders that state order in the post-First World War have rendered Sykes–Picot a symbol of the

*Email: [email protected]

© 2016 European International Studies Association 2 P. Bilgin century-old regime of top-down, military- (Rogan, 2015). What is beyond dispute is focused, state-centric and statist security gov- that the Sykes–Picot Agreement was less ernance in the Middle East. about the future of the Middle East and more The essay is organized in two sections. In about the future of British–French rivalry in section 1 I offer a brief background on the this part of the world. As such, the agreement Sykes–Picot Agreement and consider the was concerned not with creating so-called claim that ISIS did not bring Sykes Picot to “viable states” (Ottaway, 2015; compare with an end because the agreement was never Pursley, 2015) but with furthering British and (fully) implemented. Second, I turn to those French colonial interests. who agree with the need to bring Sykes– The agreement concluded by Sykes and Picot to an end on the grounds that the Picot was never fully implemented. It was borders drawn by the European colonial revised numerous times. One such revision powers are “artificial”. Here, I underscore came after the Allied Powers lost the war in that where the critics of the so-called “Sykes– Asia Minor (the part of the world that the Picot order” wish to replace “artificial” agreement was originally named after), borders with (presumably) “natural” ones, thereby making the way for the formation of ISIS wishes to do away with borders for all a Republic of Turkey. The Lausanne Treaty Muslims, therefore challenging the very (1923) signed between the Allied Powers and notion of “nation-state”. Yet I emphasize that Turkey decided the newly established Repub- both ISIS and other critics of the Sykes–Picot lic’s borders. What is currently problematized order share similar assumptions regarding “sta- as the “Sykes–Picot order” was shaped at tehood” and artificiality. In the concluding San Remo Conference in 1920 but was section, I submit that while multiple actors further negotiated in the coming years. That have invoked the symbolism of Sykes–Picot, is to say, those who argue that ISIS did not none has thus far offered to do away with the bring “the end of Sykes–Picot” base their argu- century-old regime of top-down, military- ment on the historical fact that that particular focused, state-centric and statist security gov- agreement was never (fully) implemented. ernance that the notion of Sykes–Picot order If this “historical fact” comes across as too has come to symbolize. ISIS is no exception trivial to consider, it is nevertheless worth scru- in this regard – notwithstanding the group’s tinizing that some feel authorized to “fact- declarations to the contrary. check” ISIS. I will raise two issues. First, the fact that the Sykes–Picot Agreement was morphed into the San Remo consensus of the – This is not the end of Sykes Picot, Allied Powers (UK, France, Italy and Japan), because it was never implemented! and approved later by the League of Nations, “Sykes–Picot” is the better-known name of the does not render the order that followed any Asia Minor Agreement negotiated in May less of a concern regarding the colonial 1916 by Sir (Britain) and legacy in the Middle East. For, after San Georges Picot (France) to decide on the post- Remo, the agreement ceased to be a secret First World War fate of the Middle East. The deal between two colonizing powers and agreement was kept secret until 1917 when became a part of the security governance the Russian revolutionaries divulged the regime enforced by the international society. “secret deals made by the imperialist As such, the San Remo consensus and later powers”. The agreement had to be kept the League of Nations approved the colonizing secret, for it betrayed Britain’s promises to powers’ designs for the Middle East. Second, the Arab peoples who had agreed to join the the fact that the Sykes–Picot Agreement was fight against the Ottomans in return for prom- not implemented also had to do with the ises regarding the governance of Arab lands. ways in which some were more equipped The degree of British betrayal is disputed than others to participate in the drawing of Global Affairs 3 their boundaries. Following the war of national their proponents (also see Neep, 2015). independence, Turkey was able to participate in Accordingly, the critics fail to note that their the drawing of its own borders. Some others top-down outlook toward the Middle East is could not. For, at that time, some members of part of the problem highlighted by ISIS. the international society intervened in the As regards ISIS, the aforementioned video affairs of those who they portrayed as “back- explains their reasons in the following way: ward” by virtue of their “failure” in meeting the standard of civilization (Bilgin, 2012). Today we are happy to participate in destroy- The League of Nations considered it prudent ing the borders placed by the tawaghit to impose mandate regimes in some parts of [oppressors] to prevent the Muslims from tra- veling in their lands. The tawaghit broke up the Middle East because peoples of this part the Islamic Khilafah and made it into of the world were not deemed capable of self- countries like Syria and Iraq, ruled by man- rule. Those who insist that ISIS did not bring made laws … today we begin the final stage the end of Sykes–Picot overlook the ongoing after the Ummah was divided … Their plot yield of such a discursive economy that was to divide and conquer. That is what they had done with us. (Quoted in Tinsley, 2015) allows some to claim to “know” and/or “order” others (Neep, 2015). Their suggested solution is very different from the critics above in that they wish to do away Sykes–Picot imposed “artificial” borders with “nation-states”. Yet their way of doing – good riddance! this is to set up another state and impose an The critics who make the “artificiality” point order that is no less military-focused and do not contest the desire of ISIS to bring the statist than the existing regime of security gov- so-called Sykes–Picot order to an end. They ernance. As such, ISIS and the critics of the agree with ISIS that borders in the Middle Sykes Picot order share a commitment to the East were (largely but not wholly) decided by military-focused, state-centric and statist European powers under conditions of colonial regime of security governance that has charac- rule. They also agree that something needs to terized the Middle East in the past century. be done about them. However, a closer look Furthermore, both ISIS and the critics of at the solutions the critics of the Sykes–Picot the Sykes Picot order share the same Euro- “ order offer highlights how far removed they centric assumption that some borders are arti- fi ” “ ” are from the concerns raised by ISIS. Yet cial and others are natural . However, all fi another look suggests that they share some of borders are arti cial insofar as they are the same Eurocentric assumptions about the decided by a few men, and seldom women, “Middle East” and security governance. behind closed doors. For instance, To start with the critics of the Sykes Picot order, they underscore the fact that regional may have drawn the border between Iraq and with a pen, but he peoples themselves were not sitting at the was just as central in delineating the border table when the borders in the region were between France and Germany when he led drawn, and that is what has rendered the the allies to victory in World War II. Deter- border between Syria and Iraq (among others) mining whether Alsace and Lorraine would “artificial”. As a solution, some suggest that be French or German was never as simple as just sending a commission to find out where borders should be re-drawn to allow for some the French people stopped and the German kind of stability (Ashdown, 2014); others people started – rather, the territory was argue that it is impossible to seek to re-order awarded as a prize following each of the the region in the absence of superpower Europe’s bloody conflicts. (Danforth, 2013) resolve (Gause III, 2014). That both solutions are as top-down as the creators of the so- In the Middle East, , Turkey and Saudi called Sykes–Picot order seems to escape Arabia are considered to have “natural” 4 P. Bilgin borders insofar as their representatives partici- “proper” states in a way that is reminiscent of pated in the drawing of those borders either state “failure” debates of the 2000s. The differ- after a war or at the negotiation table. Further- ence between ISIS and its critics is that where more, Turkey’s border with Greece is shaped the former problematize a century of interven- by the river Meriç. What could be more tionism in the affairs of the region, the latter natural than that! Yet it took a League of only take responsibility for the Sykes–Picot Nations sanctioned population exchange moment of the early twentieth century. between Turkey and Greece to render the Neither of the two challenge century-old top- populations on either side more “homogenous” down, military-focused, state-centric and (Özsu, 2011). The point is that borders are statist regime of security governance. Argu- always “artificial” insofar as they are drawn ably, it is that very regime of security govern- in a top-down manner, without consulting the ance, which is shaped by the discursive people whose lives they run through. economy of the international society, that has Finally, claiming that borders in the Middle allowed for military interventionism in the East are “artificial” is a Eurocentric move that Middle East in present-day politics (Jabri, asserts the agency of European colonial 2013). The critics of the “Sykes–Picot order” powers in wreaking havoc in this part of the do not challenge the discursive economy that world while underestimating the amount of allowed for that order to be enforced by the agency exercised by regional peoples. This is international society. Nor do they challenge not to underestimate the destructive conse- the regime of security governance that was quences of divide and rule tactics employed instated as part of this order. by the colonial powers, which is considered as “ having postponed the rise of a new order Conclusion shaped from within the region” (Kamel, 2016, The point about Sykes–Picot is not (only) that p. 8). Rather, my point is that the critics of the it was a secret agreement concluded between “artificiality” of Sykes–Picot boundaries, even the colonizing powers, but (also) that it was as they seek to be self-critical (by virtue of shaped by a discursive economy that allowed owning up to the colonial legacy), betray their for the international society to decide the fate obliviousness to the history of the region and of those that were deemed as not-yet capable its peoples. As Lorenzo Kamel has maintained, of governing themselves. ISIS preoccupation “modern-day Syria and Iraq have both several with the “end of Sykes–Picot” is conditioned meaningful antecedents in the pre-Islamic by the same discursive economy that it appar- world” and that ently seeks to resist. That the current discus- sions about the end of Sykes–Picot are the claim that Iraq is an artificial creation con- cocted by the British after over- conducted in a similarly top-down manner looks the fact that … for much of the suggests that that the same discursive eighteenth and nineteenth centuries … economy prevails and continues to shape a , and Mōsul were governed top-down, military-focused, state-centric and as a single entity with Baghdad as their statist regime of security governance. ISIS center of gravity. Already at the time numer- ous local intellectuals indicated the area as does not seek to replace, but to inherit this “Iraq”. (pp. 8–9; also see Pursley, 2015) regime of security governance. The only difference being the replacement of “nation- This is not to claim access to “historical facts” states” with a state for the Ummah ruled by a 3 about the region and its peoples. Rather, the “particular understanding of Islamic law”. point is that self-styled anti-colonial subjectiv- ity of ISIS betrays a Eurocentric notion of “ fi ” “ ” Disclosure statement arti ciality and statehood that presumes fl “ ” No potential con ict of interest was reported by the states to have natural borders to make them author(s). Global Affairs 5

Notes https://www.google.com.tr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q= 1. An earlier shorter version of this article was &esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0ahUKEw published at http://www.sdu.dk/-/media/files/ i77uHa-ebOAhXCWhQKHfHKDu0QFggv MAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sdu.dk% om_sdu/centre/c_mellemoest/videncenter/ar fi tikler/2016/bilgin+article+(feb+16).pdf?la=en 2F-%2Fmedia%2F les%2Fom_sdu%2Fcen 2. I am sometimes reminded that Gertrude Bell’s tre%2Fc_mellemoest%2Fvidencenter% role as a woman taking part in “inventing” 2Fartikler%2F2016%2Fbilgin%2Barticle% the Middle East disproves my point. On the 2B(june%2B16pdf%3Fla%3Den&usg=AFQj contrary, those who point to Gertrude Bell’s CNEw7MBMGzhq-Smwovdm8qCWBTMTa role help reinforce my point about the persist- Q&sig2=mP5c6zSr8-dja2S4Me1Icw). Danforth, N. (2013). Stop blaming colonial borders ence of Eurocentrism in the study of the ’ Middle East. See Bilgin (2016). for the Middle East s problems. The Atlantic 3. I put emphasis on “particular”, because ortho- [Online]. Retrieved from http://www. dox interpretations of Islam impose strict regu- theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/09/ lations on the exercise of direct violence, stop-blaming-colonial-borders-for-the-middle- especially against believers of monotheistic easts-problems/279561/ religions and fellow Muslims. It is by obliterat- Gause III, F. G. (2014, May 20). Is this the end of ing this orthodox understanding of Islam, and Sykes-Picot? The Washington Post. by imposing its own interpretation that brands Jabri, V. (2013). The postcolonial subject: Claiming all non-Muslims as “unbelievers” and those politics/governing others in late modernity. Muslims who do not fit its own brand as “unI- London: Routledge. ” Kamel, L. (2016). Artificial nations? The Sykes- slamic , that ISIS seeks to warrant its exercise ’ of direct violence. This is a particular body of Picot and the Islamic State s narratives in a his- knowledge about Islam that ISIS wishes to torical perspective. Diacronie. Studi di Storia render prevalent, thereby replacing other com- Contemporanea 25. Online. Retrieved from peting interpretations of holy texts. As such, http://www.studistorici.com/wp-content/uploa ISIS could be viewed as unleashing its own ds/2016/03/03_KAMEL.pdf kind of “epistemic violence” to warrant its Neep, D. (2015, January 3). The Middle East, exercise of direct violence. hallucination, and the cartographic imagination. Discovery Society, 16. Retrieved, from http:// discoversociety.org/2015/01/03/focus-the- middle-east-hallucination-and-the-cartographic- Notes on contributor imagination/ Pinar Bilgin specialises in critical approaches to Ottaway, M. (2015). Learning from Sykes-Picot. International Relations and Security Studies. She WWIC Middle East Program Occasional is the author of Regional Security in The Middle Paper Series. Retrieved from https://www. East: A Critical Perspective (2005), and The Inter- wilsoncenter.org/publication/learning-sykes- national in Security, Security in the International picot. (2016). A full list of publications is available at Özsu, U. (2011). Fabricating fidelity: Nation-build- www.bilkent.edu.tr/∼pbilgin. ing, international law, and the Greek–Turkish population exchange. Leiden Journal of International Law, 24, 823–847. doi:10.1017/ S0922156511000392 References Pursley, S. (2015, June 2–3). “Lines drawn on an Ashdown, P. (2014, August 14). Western interven- empty map”: Iraq’s borders and the legend of tion over Isis won’t prevent the break-up of the artificial state (parts I and II) Jadaliyya. Iraq. . Retrieved from http://www.jadaliyya.com/ Bilgin, P. (2012). Globalization and in/security: pages/index/21759/ Middle Eastern encounters with international Rogan, E. (2015). A century after Sykes-Picot. The society and the case of Turkey. In S. Stetter Review of Global Affairs. Retrieved from (Ed.), The Middle East and globalization: http://www.thecairoreview.com/uncategorized/ Encounters and horizons (pp. 59–75). a-century-after-sykes-picot/ New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Tinsley, M. (2015). Whose colonialism? The con- Bilgin, P. (2016, June). Thinking postcolonially tested memory of the Sykes-Picot agreement. about the Middle East: Two moments of anti- POMEPS Blog. Retrieved from http://pomeps. Eurocentric critique. Center for Contemporary org/2015/03/06/whose-colonialism-the-conte Middle East Studies, SDU. Available from: sted-memory-of-the-sykes-picot-agreement/