The Combination Problem for Panpsychism: a Constitutive Russellian Solution
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THE COMBINATION PROBLEM FOR PANPSYCHISM: A CONSTITUTIVE RUSSELLIAN SOLUTION AN INVESTIGATION INTO PHENOMENAL BONDING PANPSYCHISM AND COMPOSITE SUBJECTS OF EXPERIENCE Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Gregory Edward Miller University of Liverpool September 2018 i Abstract In this thesis I argue for the following theory: constitutive Russellian phenomenal bonding panpsychism. To do so I do three main things: 1) I argue for Russellian panpsychism. 2) I argue for phenomenal bonding panpsychism. 3) I defend the resultant phenomenal bonding panpsychist model. The importance of arguing for (and defending) such a theory is that if it can be made to be viable, then it is proposed to be the most promising theory of the place of consciousness within nature (Chalmers, 2016a; Strawson, 2006a). This is because constitutive Russellian panpsychism has all the theoretical virtues of physicalism and dualism but does not face the problems they do (Alter and Nagasawa, 2015a; Chalmers, 2016a). The combination problem, however, is the most significant problem for the Russellian panpsychist (Chalmers, 2016b; Goff, 2017a), and, hence, in order to show the viability of the theory I address this problem. Moreover, I present a novel ‘mereological argument’ for panpsychism which makes it necessary that the Russellian panpsychist addresses (and solves) the combination problem. The focus of this thesis is therefore addressing this problem. I argue that the combination problem can indeed be solved. To do so I argue for the phenomenal bonding solution proposed by Goff (Goff, 2016, 2009a). I argue that this solution works and that we can form a positive concept of the phenomenal bonding relation (Miller, 2017). This forces the panpsychist to make sense of how experiencing subjects can be proper parts of other experiencing subjects (Miller, 2018). I then argue that this can indeed be made sense of and show that we can indeed be composite subjects made of other subjects. To show that we can be subjects made up of other subjects I defend this proposal from various objections from throughout the literature. All these objections can be responded to by the constitutive Russellian phenomenal bonding panpsychist. Ultimately this leaves us with a novel and interesting account of what conscious subjects are, and what the material world is: they are both composite entities made wholly of conscious matter. i ii Acknowledgements First, I would like to thank Barry Dainton for his sustained help throughout the research and writing of this thesis. Barry is a sensible man who is willing to entertain apparently far-out ideas, this is an ideal trait for guiding wannabe philosophers (especially panpsychists). In the absence of his help, this work would not be the standard that it is, and the arguments contained within it would be much worse than they are. Without his encouragement I do not think I would have made it to the end of the process. I would also like to thank Stephen McLeod and Attila Tanyi for their role in my supervisory team. Your support throughout has been incredibly helpful. I would like to thank the following people for their invaluable philosophical discussions throughout my PhD, for their encouragement, or for reading portions of this thesis along the way. In no particular order I want to thank: Thomas Atkinson, Tom Winfield, Rachel Handley, Rob Booth, Becky Davnall, Philip Goff, Garrett Mindt, Grace Whistler, Dan Whistler, Sam Coleman, Tom Mcclelland, Sam Cloake, Hedda Hassel Mørch, Kevin Morris, Yujin Nagasawa, Itay Shani, Jack Symes, Daniel Hill, Matt Hart, Fabian Klinge, Siddharth Raghavan, Jakub Mihálik, and Laura Harris. You have all contributed something to this thesis, or the thinking behind it. I would especially like to thank Garrett Mindt, without whom I would have not finished this thesis on time and under the word count. I would also like to thank the editors and anonymous referees at the journals Dialectica and Ratio, their comments and feedback were incredibly helpful in formulating the arguments within chapters 5 & 6. I would also like to thank these journals for allowing me to reprint material. Chapter 5 is a near exact reprint of: ‘Forming a Positive Concept of the Phenomenal Bonding Relation for Constitutive Panpsychism’, Dialectica 71, no. 4 (December 2017): 541–62. Chapter 6 is a substantial reprint of: ‘Can Subjects Be Proper Parts of Subjects? The De-Combination Problem’, Ratio 31, no. 2 (June 2018): 137–54. I would like to thank the audiences at the following conferences too, their questions were very helpful in shaping the ideas within this thesis: Helsinki University ‘Towards a Science of Consciousness 21’; University of Milan ‘Me, the Self and I. Multiple approaches to the unity of the self’; Central European University ‘Mind, Matter, and Consciousness’ summer school; Durham University, ‘Early Career Mind Network Meeting’. ii iii I would like to thank the University of Liverpool Future Academic Bursary for their financial support, and I would like to encourage the university to continue to offer such support to students like myself. I would also like to thank the Royal Institute of Philosophy for their generous financial support. Along with the Central European University, Budapest. Without these sources of funding the research and writing of this thesis could not have been carried out. In a climate of academic precarity and underfunding, this is a privilege that I feel I do not deserve but am deeply grateful to have had. I would also like to thank my examiners Ludwig Jaskolla and Michael Hauskeller for taking the time to read this thesis, for their helpful and fruitful discussion about the content contained within it, and for their post-examination encouragement. Finally, I would like to thank my mum (Beverley), dad (Peter), brother (Alec), and my grandparents (Peggy, Harold, Annice, and Charlie) for their unconditional support. I cannot thank you enough for the help you have given me, especially when I did not ask for it. Without you all I could not have done this. Along with my family I would like finally to thank all my closest friends. At times it may not appear to be so, but there is much more to life than philosophy – you all (in your own ways) remind me of this fact. iii iv Table of Contents List of Figures ............................................................................................................................ viii Introduction ................................................................................................................................. ix PART 1: A WORLD OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE COMBINATION PROBLEM .................................................................................................................................... 1 1 Chapter 1: What is Panpsychism? ..................................................................................... 2 1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 2 1.1.1 The Completeness Question: ‘Everything’? .............................................................................. 3 1.1.2 The Condition Question: ‘Mental’? ............................................................................................ 6 1.1.2.1 Conscious Experience and its Subject .................................................................................. 7 1.1.2.1.1 What is the Phenomenal Character of the Fundamentalia? ...................................... 9 1.1.2.1.2 Are the Fundamentalia Subjects? ................................................................................. 10 1.1.2.1.3 What is the Internal Structure of Consciousness? .................................................... 12 1.1.3 The Relation Question: ‘is’? ....................................................................................................... 14 1.1.3.1 Introducing Russellian Monism ........................................................................................... 15 1.2 Types of Panpsychism and The Building Question ............................................................................ 19 1.2.1 Identity Panpsychism .................................................................................................................. 20 1.2.2 Constitutive Panpsychism .......................................................................................................... 21 1.2.3 Emergent Panpsychism .............................................................................................................. 27 1.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................. 28 2 Chapter 2: From Scarcity to Surplus: The Anti-Emergence Argument ................... 30 2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 30 2.2 The Mereological Argument for Panpsychism: the Essence of Anti-emergence ........................... 32 2.2.1 Supporting Mereological Confinement .................................................................................... 38 2.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................. 41 3 Chapter 3: From Surplus to