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Strategic Round-Table on Governance Transition

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Strategic Round-Table on Governance Transition Strategic Round-Table on Governance Transition in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Serbia & Montenegro Hyatt Hotel, Belgrade 19-20 July 2002 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia CONTENTS CONFERENCE REPORT ..……............................................................................................. 1 - The Significance of the Belgrade Agreement ………............................................................ 5 - Key Constitutional Issues ………........................................................................................... 7 - The Importance of Public Awareness, Information, and Debate ....………........................... 10 - Lessons from Other Transitions .………................................................................................ 11 - Institutional Challenges and Transitional Management ………............................................. 14 - Recommendations for Next Steps in the Transition to State Union ……….......................... 15 STATEMENTS MADE BY - Introductory Address on Round-Table Process by Francis M. O’Donnell, UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia……… ................... 19 - Observations on central/eastern European experience with transition and reform by Kalman Mizsei, UN Assistant Secretary-General and Director of the UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS……… .............................. 24 - Keynote Address: A Vision of Our Place in the World by Vojislav Kostunica, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ………...................... 29 - Five lessons on the Stages of Transition: from a “problem” to a “model” by Susan L. Woodward, Professor of Political Science at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York……… ............................................... 35 - Kaynote Address: A Joint Approach to European Integration by Miroljub Labus, Deputy Prime Minister of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia……….................................................................................. 38 - Five Constitutional and Institutional Lessons from the Experience of Poland by Danuta Huebner, State Secretary for EU Integration of the Republic of Poland……… ....... 44 - Kaynote Address: Serbia’s Place in the Joint Partnership by Zarko Korac, Deputy Prime Minister of Government of the Republic of Serbia……… ...... 50 - Five Key Constitutional and Institutional Foundations for Human Security by Ivan Krastev, Chairman and Research Director of the Center for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, Bulgaria……… ......................................................... 54 - Kaynote Address: Montenegro’s Place in the Joint Partnership by Milo Djukanovic, President of the Republic of Montenegro……… ..................................... 57 - Five Key Elements to Costa Rica’s Success with Ecology and Human Security by Rene Castro, Former Environment Minister in the Government of Costa Rica………......... 61 - Jan Willem Blankert, Delegation of the European Commission in Belgrade……… ............ 66 SPEECHES BY MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER COMMISSION ........................................................................................ 71 - Dragoljub Micunovic ………….................................................................................. 71 - Dragor Hiber ............................................................................................................... 76 - Slobodan Gavrilovic ................................................................................................... 78 - Dragan Kujovic .......................................................................................................... 81 ANNEXES Annex A – Programme Annex B – List of Participants Annex C – Press Releases Strategic Roundtable and Workshop on Governance Transition Belgrade, July 19-20, 2002 Executive Summary On July 19, 2002, in response to a This summary of the discussion at the request from national leaders, the United two meetings focuses on (1) the Nations Development Programme significance of the Belgrade Agreement hosted a Strategic Roundtable on for unblocking the process of European Governance Transition in the Federal integration and a new international Republic of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, identity for Serbia and Montenegro; (2) featuring most of the signatories of the the continuing disagreements about the Belgrade Agreement, invited concept of the state union being drafted international experts on transition, and a by the parliamentary commission and large representation of government the overwhelming consensus on the officials and the international need, whatever the details, for a community. The high-level meeting on functioning state; (3) the vital the transition from the Yugoslav importance of its democratic legitimacy federation to a new state union of Serbia and therefore the increased need for and Montenegro was followed the next public awareness, information, and day with an expert-level workshop of dialogue as the constitutional process members of the Constitutional Charter proceeds; and (4) six lessons to be Commission, senior officials from considered from other governance government ministries, and local and transitions (that a weak state can be as international experts aimed at making oppressive as a repressive one; the the charter’s implementation and the danger of rapid institutional decline if transition as smooth as possible. forward planning does not occur; that “people matter strongly,” reforms of Aimed to complement the diplomatic health, education, and social security are assistance of the EU with UNDP’s as important as economic reforms, and global experience on governance policy growing poverty in Serbia and and its international network of experts Montenegro cannot be ignored; to and officials experienced with beware of early winners who can block governance transition, particularly from the next stage of reforms, to avoid zero- countries of central and southeastern sum games in the constitution, and to Europe, the meetings generated define your own interests in negotiations phenomenal turn-out, intensive media with the EU). interest, and a host of practical suggestions for a successful transition. 1 Among the outcomes of the Roundtable • a recognition of an emerging and the subsequent Workshop were: network of active stakeholders in • the urgent need for forward the structural changes; planning and a strategic • a real concern that issues of framework to manage the growing poverty, residual institutional transition, personnel humanitarian needs, and social redeployment, and cohesion not be neglected in the interdependencies among process; constitutional, legal, institutional, • and a clear expectation that and transitional issues, including external assistance from the EU, interim arrangements and UN, and other members of the timetables; international community will be • a dramatic awareness of the gaps crucial in these tasks. in some institutional capacities, both currently and in the design of the state union; Governance • the need to harmonize decision- making procedures, Governance is the system of values, intergovernmental policies and institutions by which a communication, and citizenship society manages its economic, political rights, not just economic and social affairs through interactions relations; within and among the state, civil society • the widespread wish to bring the and private sector. constitutional uncertainty and • It is how a society organizes itself to legal vacuum to a rapid make and implement decisions, mediate conclusion, while recognizing differences and exercise legal rights and that the charter can be only the obligations first step toward the creation of a • It comprises the rules, institutions member state, as opposed to a and practices that set limits and provide nation state, as the constitution incentives process and European integration It operates at every level of human process go hand-in-hand; enterprise. • the broadly expressed desire to Source: Governance for Human Development foster more public awareness, (UNDP FRY, December 2000) information, and debate on key constitutional and transition issues, including media coverage and engagement of civil society organizations; 2 CONFERENCE REPORT* Born out of high-level consultations with national leaders by UNDP in FRY in the 3 On July 19, 2002, in response to a preceding months, this initiative aimed request from national leaders, the United to complement the diplomatic activities Nations Development Programme of the EU in facilitating the political hosted a Strategic Roundtable on agreement with UNDP’s global Governance Transition in the Federal experience on governance policy and its Republic of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, focus on human development as featuring most of the signatories of the captured in the Millennium Belgrade Agreement,1 invited Development Goals. The Roundtable international experts on transition, and a provided a forum for the signatories and large representation of government the members of the parliamentary officials and the international charter commission to present their community. The high-level meeting on visions for the new state union to a the transition from the Yugoslav public audience. They were joined by federation to a new state union of Serbia eminent international experts and and Montenegro was followed the next officials, primarily from countries of day with an expert-level workshop of central and south-eastern Europe which members of the parliamentary have been undergoing
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