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Afera Evropska Banka Za Razvoj 2000 - 2005. kratka istorija bes~a{}a OD REVOLUCIJE GRA\ANSKESVESTI DO 3 POLITI^KOG TERORA 5. oktobar ZA SLOBODU, PRAVDU I DEMOKRATIJU! 4 "RE^ JE RE^" ~ e DAO NAM JE RE^ r • DA ]E ZAUSTAVITI PROPADAWE NARODA I DR@AVE; • DA ]E SE IZBORITI ZA PRIMENU REZOLUCIJE 1244; • DA NE]E BITI POBEDNIKA NI PORA@ENIH; • DA NIJEDAN ^OVEK NE]E IMATI RAZLOGA ZA STRAH; e • DA ]E OBEZBEDITI VLADAVINU PRAVA; j • DA ]E SRBIJA DOBITI NOVI USTAV; • DA ]E DECENTRALIZOVATI DR@AVU. j DAO NAM JE RE^ • DA ]E GRA\ANI BITI SLOBODNI I RAVNOPRAVNI; m • DA ]E DR@AVA SLU@ITI, A NE VLADATI NARODOM. • DA ]E ZA[TITITI SOCIJALNO UGRO@ENE; a DAO NAM JE RE^ n • DA NE]E BITI TRGOVINE KOSOVOM I METOHIJOM. n • DA NE]E DOPUSTITI DA WEGA VLAST PROMENI. o ZA[TO NIJE a ODR@AO RE^? d 5 ZAKONOM U BEZAKOWE ZAKON O EKSTRAPROFITU Na samom po~etku kampawe protiv ekstraprofitera, guverner Dinki} izjavquje da je, tokom Milo{evi}eve vladavine, iz primarne emisije Narodne banke Jugoslavije povla{}enim poslovnim bankama dis- tribuirano 37 milijardi maraka, po kursu ni`em od realnog. Ta kursna razlika bila je osnov po kome se mogao ostvariti ekstrapfit. Pre- ra~unato, dr`avi je trebalo biti vra}eno oko 8,3 milijarde nema~kih maraka. Bila je to ve}a suma od svih sredstava koja je Srbija donacija- ma od inostranstva uspela dobiti. O~ekivane milijarde su se istopile u svega 30 miliona maraka, od kojih je 80% platila porodica Kari}. pss 6 Umesto da pomognu tim bankama da saniraju vi{e od 500 preduze}a, oni su omogu}ili njihov bankrot. Na ~elo Agencije doveli su Vesnu D`ini}, devojku iz neke male somborske banke, koja je ugasila ~etiri najve}e banke. Pri tom, na ~elu UO ove Agencije nalazio se Miroljub Labus, koji, odgovorno tvrdim, nema potrebno znanje iz oblasti poslovnih finansija i bankarstva. Labus je osmislio celu ovu akcije. Bez njega, Dinki} nije mogao da uradi ni{ta. Jovan Rankovi} biv{i savezni ministar finansija SLOM SRPSKOG BANKARSTVA pokrenut postupak Banke nad kojima je p ~aja od januara likvidacije ili ste 2001.godine 1. BC Bankredit a.d. Beograd 2. Kontrolbank a.d. Beograd 3. International Investment banka a.d. Beograd 4. Izvozna banka a.d. Beograd 5. Omega banka a.d. Beograd 6. Pe{ter banka a.d. Novi Pazar 7. Po`areva~ka banka a.d. Po`arevac 8. Privredna banka a.d. Novi Sad 9. [aba~ka banka a.d. [abac 10. SERB banka a.d. Beograd 11. Slavija banka a.d. Beograd jem 12. Srpska komercijalna banka a.d. Ni{ redumi{qa bistvo sa p 13. Stankom banka a.d. Beograd U 14. Vaqevska banka a.d. Vaqevo Dinki} uni{tava 4 najve}e 15. JUEKI banka a.d. Beograd 16. MB Union a.d. Beograd srpske banke da bi ra{~istio 17. Jugoslovensko-mediteranska banka a.d. Beograd teren za osnivawe novih "bura- 18. Mega-kom banka Internacional a.d. zerskih banaka" (Nacionalna Pri{tina {tedionica) i planira predaju celokupnog srpskog bankarskog tr`i{ta stranim bankama. - 12. 000 stru~nih bankarskih slu`benika ostalo je bez posla; - ova kadrovska se~a odnela je vi{e od 700 pss 7 12. 03. 2003. LIKVIDIRAN PREMIJER SRBIJE DR ZORAN \IN\I] SUDSKI PROCES JO[ NIJE OKON^AN 8 9 MO] U SRBIJI PREDSEDNIK VLADE Vojislav Ko{tunica MINISTAR UNUTRA[WIH PODPREDSEDNIK MINISTAR FINANSIJA POSLOVA VLADE Mla|an Dinki} Dragan Jo~i} Miroqub Labus MINISTAR MINISTAR PRAVDE VLADA POQOPRIVREDE... Zoran Stojkovi} Ivana Duli} - Markovi} PREDSEDNIK MINISTAR PRIVREDE SKUP[TINE MINISTAR ZDRAVQA Predrag Bubalo Dragan Markovi} Tomica Milosavqevi} MINISTAR ZA SKUP[TINA PREDSEDNIK EKONOMSKE ODNOSE SA USTAVNOG SUDA INOSTRANSTVOM Slobodan Vu~eti} Milan Parivodi} pritisak MINISTAR RUDARSTVA I EKSMINISTAR : ENERGETIKE LOBIJA ODBRANE SCG Radomir Naumov - uvozni~kog Prvoslav Davini} - energetskog GUVERNER NBS - farmaceutskog Radovan Jela{i} - javnih nabavki KUMOVI KO[TUNI^INE VLADE - Vuk Hamovi} i Vojin Lazarevi} vlasnici: EFT - a (trgovina i distribucija elektri~ne energije), MALOG KOLEKTIVA, SKVADRE i PIME, sa Nikolom @ivanovi}em doskora{wi suvlasnici NACIONALNE [TEDIONICE; @eqko Popovi} - NIS; Vladimir \or|evi} - EPS; Dra{ko Petrovi} - PTT; Mirko Petrovi} - DUNAV OSIGU- RAWE; Ivica Smoli} - KOMERCI- JALNA BANKA; Bojan Kri{to - LUTRIJA; Miroslav Mi{kovi} - DELTA M; FARMACEUTSKA INDUSTRIJA... 10 OM^A O VRATU SRBIJE KO KONTROLI[E FINANSIJE 1. I BANKARSTVO? - G17 PLUS! KO KONTROLI[E VOJSKU 2. I POLICIJU? - DSS! KO SE U SRBIJI BAVI 3. TRGOVINOM ENERGIJE? - KUMOVI! ONAJ KO KONTROLI[E PROIZVODWU I TRGOVINU STRUJE I NAFTE UPRAVQA KRVOTOKOM PRIVREDE! 11 ZA[TO JE TRA@ENA SMENA VLADE ZORANA @IVKOVI]A? ZA[TO OVA VLADA NE ZASLU@UJE POVEREWE? - ZATO [TO NIJE URADILA NI[TA OD ONOGA ZBOG ^EGA JE TRA@ILA SMENU VLADE ZORANA @IVKOVI]A. ZBOG TOGA PSS - BOGOQUB KARI] TRA@I DA VLADA VOJISLAVA KO[TUNICE PODNESE OSTAVKU. 12 Omladina Pokreta za evropsku Srbiju slede}i voqu mladih na osnovu prava na `ivot i rad u svojoj zemqi podnosi predlog gra|anima Srbije da donesu OODDLLUUKKUU Da svojim potpisom na Narodnu inicijativu pomognu poslanicima Skup{tine Srbije da izglasaju nepoverewe Vladi Srbije Obrazlo`ewe odluke Marta 2004. godine Vojislav Ko{tunica dao je re~ da }emo `iveti u ure|enoj dr`avi i da }e podneti ostavku posle prve afere u koju bude ume{ana wegova Vlada. Dve godine posle Srbija je oja|ena, a umesto date re~i Vojislav Ko{tunica vlada uz pomo} afera. Ko{tunice, pogledaj gra|ane Srbije u o~i i podnesi ra~un onima ~ijom voqom si izabran? • Ko je i za{to ubio gardiste u Top~ideru? • Koga }e {pijunirati Davini}ev satelit od 45 miliona evra? • Ko je iz Srbije izneo 37 milijardi dolara opqa~kanih od dr`ave i gra|ana Srbije i ko {titi qude na ~ijim ra~unima su te pare? • Osnovica za naplatu poreza ne ekstraprofit bila je 8,3 milijarde marka, napla}eno je 120 miliona maraka, od toga 80 odsto jednoj kompaniji i jednom ~oveku. U ~ijim xepovima i na ~ijim ra~unima je zavr{ila razlika? • Za{to u Srbiji nikada nije kontrolisano poslovawe onih koji su svoje imperije stekli na grobovima srpskih banaka i kompanija i milijarde evra zaradili trguju}i strujom, naftom i u miraz dobijenom Nacionalnom {tedionicom? • Ko se zasladio u {e}ernoj aferi a ko osve`io svoj ra~un u banci prodajom Kwaza Milo{a? • Da li je "stipendija" od Eriksona pre~ica do vlade koja osloba|a odgovornosti? • Ko su srpski {eici koji uvoze sirijsku naftu ispod cene, a prodaju nam lo{ benzin kao crno zlato? • Za{to se jedna banka u Rumuniji prodaje za preko tri milijarde evra dok su u Srbiji lik- vidirane 34 doma}e banke? • Otkrijte nam ekspertsku formulu guvernera Jela{i}a kako za trista hiqada kupiti ku}u koja vredi tri miliona evra? • Koliko kesa i kofera para treba dati pojedinim dr`avnim slu`bencima za pravo na rad u Srbiji? • Ko {titi one koji su za dve godine uzeli preko ~etiri milijarde evra potkradaju}i, dnevno, gra|ane Srbije za pet miliona evra? • Kolika je cena politi~ke za{tite la`nih patriota i nelegalno ste~enog kapitala prijate- qa, kumova i finansijera vlasti koji su enormno bogatstvo stekli {vercom nafte, oru`ja, narkotika, cigareta, alkohola i pqa~kom dr`avnih fondova prosvete, zdravstva, vojske, poli- cije, penzijskog i invalidskog osigurawa? • Doma}in kada prodaje auto ne skida motor i to~kove. Da li je sto miliona evra provizije za prodaju nezakonito oduzete Mobtelove licence, likvidacija te kompanije i rasprodaja opreme i pretplatnika, ispod cene, kao robe s gre{kom, va`nija od interesa dr`ave. Ko je odgovoran {to je spre~avaju}i prodaju Mobtela oduzeo dr`avi 500 miliona evra a medijskom hajkom i polici- jskom blokadaom rada potpuno uni{tio najuspe{niju srpsku kompaniju? • Koliko glava politi~kih protivnika jo{ treba da padne kako Premijer ne bi morao da odgov- ori kakva je budu}nost Srbije - sa Kosovom ili bez wega, u zajednici sa Crnom Gorom ili ne, u Evropskoj uniji, ili kao crna rupa Evrope? Vojislav Ko{tunica nije dobio mandat za veto na istinu. Ne}emo feudalnu ve} evropsku Srbiju! Tra`imo izbore! Odmah! Da gra|ani Srbije Ko{tunicu pogledaju u o~i! 13 AFERA TOP^IDER istra`na farsa 2004. ZA[TO A KO[TUNIC ]UTI? 14 AFERA "KWAZ" ROBIJA ZBOG KNJAZA Pritiskom na rad Komisije za har- tije od vrednosti Vlada Srbije prekr{ila zakone zbog ~ega mora da snosi i krivi~nu odgovornost. Pritisci Vlade, a pre svega pot- predsednika Miroljuba Labusa i ministra privrede Predraga Bubala, na rad Komisije za harti- je od vrednosti, predstavljaju kr{enje ustavnog poretka zbog ~ega neko iz vlasti mora da odgovara, sla`u se stru~njaci. Oni navode da je potpuno jasno da je Komisija promenila odluku o diskvalifikaciji "Apurne" posle pritiska Vlade i tu`ila{tva na njene ~lanove. Time je Vlada prekr{ila nekoliko zakona i pot- puno poni{tila osnovni princip demokratije o podeli vlasti. Potpredsednik Vlade Miroljub Labus je priznao da je u svojoj ku}i, usred procedure za preuzimanje akcija aran|elova~ke firme za proizvodnju sokova i mineralne vode, primio zamenika predsednika svetski poz- nate i priznate francuske kompanije Danon. Jednog od u~esnika u tom preuzimanju. Na intervenciju jedne strane ambasade. A da je to u redu, potvrdio mu je i jedan visoki zvani~nik Svetske banke. Sve ostalo je samo bolesna fantazija bolesne `ute {tampe. I svih bolesnih ~lanova Komisije za hartije od vred- nosti koji }e napuniti sve beogradske bolnice tako da za nas ostale bo- VAC lesnike ne}e biti mesta pod NI DI bolesni~kim suncem Srbije.
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