1. Course Aims and Objectives This course is an advanced survey of philosophy of science. Our guiding question throughout the course is, “Why trust a theory?” Accordingly, we concentrate on issues related to scientific epistemology. Our aim will be to develop a good acquaintance with the major texts from the 20th century on the subject. As such, we read excerpts (approx. 30pp. per week) from works by Duhem, Popper, Carnap, Hempel, Kuhn, Lakatos, Cartwright, and other major figures. Each week we take up a different topic: scientific theories, confirmation, discovery, explanation, etc.
There are two objectives which will be primarily assessed through a final essay on one of the topics of the course. By the end of the course, students should aim to possess a well-rounded understanding of central issues in Philosophy of Science, in particular epistemological issues, and how formal methods have been utilised in Philosophy of Science to help answer central philosophical questions. Students should also aim to improve their critical skills through in-depth textual analysis and written argumentation.
2. Seminar Content Week 1: Scientific Theories
Essential Readings:
1. Hempel (1970). “On the ‘Standard Conception’ of Scientific Theories,” in Hempel (2001). 2. Suppes (1967). “What Is a Scientific Theory,” in Morgenbesser (1967).
Useful References:
1. Winther (2015). “The Structure of Scientific Theories,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2. Halvorson (2015). “Scientific Theories,” In Humphries (2016).
Week 2: Deduction and Induction
Essential Readings:
1. Popper (2005 [1935]). The Logic of Scientific Discovery (excerpts). 2. Goodman (1983). “The New Riddle of Induction,” in Goodman (1983).
Useful References:
1. Vickers (2014). “The Problem of Induction,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2. Norton (2015). “A Little Survey of Induction,” in Achinstein (2005).
Week 3: Confirmation Theory
Essential Readings:
1. Hempel (1945). “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation,” Mind, 54: 1–26, 97–121 (excerpts). 2. Glymour (1980). Theory and Evidence (excerpts).
Useful References:
1. Crupi (2015). “Confirmation,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2. Fitelson (2006). “The Paradox of Confirmation,” Philosophy Compass, 1(1): 95–113.
Week 4: Logical Empiricism: Carnap and Quine
Essential Readings:
1. Carnap (1945). “The Two Concepts of Probability: The Problem of Probability,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 5: 513-532. 2. Quine, W.V.O. (1951). “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Philosophical Review, 60: 20-43.
Useful References:
1. Creath (2011). “Logical Empiricism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2. Tennant (1991). “Carnap and Quine,” in Salmon and Wolters (1991).
Week 5: Scientific Discovery and Justification
Essential Readings:
1. Reichenbach (1938). Experience and Prediction (excerpts). 2. Kuhn (2012 [1962]). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (excerpts).
Useful References:
1. Schickore (2014). “Scientific Discovery,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2. Nickles (1985). “Beyond Divorce: Current Status of the Discovery Debate”, Philosophy of Science, 52: 177–206.
Week 6: Scientific Progress and Problems
Essential Readings:
1. Lakatos, Imre (1970). “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” in Lakatos and Musgrave (excerpts). 2. Laudan (1978). Progress and Its Problems (excerpts).
Useful References:
1. Niiniluoto (2015). “Scientific Progress,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2. Bird (2015). “Scientific Progress,” in Humphreys (2016).
Week 7: Underdetermination of Theories
Essential Readings:
1. Duhem (1938 [1914]). The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (excerpts). 2. Quine (1975). “On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World,” Erkenntnis, 9: 313-328.
Useful References:
1. Stanford (2013). “Scientific Underdetermination,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2. Laudan (1990). “Demystifying Underdetermination,” in Savage (1990).
Week 8: Scientific Explanation
Essential Readings:
1. Hempel and Oppenheim (1948). “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” Philosophy of Science, 15(2):135-175 (excerpts) 2. van Fraassen (1980). “The Pragmatics of Explanation,” in van Fraassen (1980). Useful References:
1. Woodward (2014). “Scientific Explanation,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2. Salmon (1989). “Four Decades of Scientific Explanation,” in Kitcher and Salmon (1989).
Week 9: Laws of Nature and Causation
Essential Readings:
1. Lewis (1973). Counterfactuals (excerpts). 2. Cartwright (1979). “Causal Laws and Effective Strategies,” in Cartwright (1983).
Useful References:
1. Carroll (2016). “Laws of Nature,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2. Blanchard (2016). “Physics and Causation,” Philosophy Compass, 11(5):256-266.
Week 10: Abduction and Theoretical Virtues
Essential Readings:
1. Kuhn (1977). “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice,” in Kuhn (1977). 2. Lipton (2004). Inference to the Best Explanation (excerpts).
Useful References:
1. Douven (2011). “Abduction,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2. Douglas (2016). “Values in Science,” in Humphreys (2016).
3. Readings: Complete bibliographical references for primary readings. All readings will be made available online.
Carnap, Rudolf (1945). “The Two Concepts of Probability: The Problem of Probability”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 5: 513-532.
Cartwright, Nancy (1983). How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford University Press
Duhem, Pierre (1954 [1914]). The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Princeton University Press van Fraassen, Bas (1980). The Scientific Image. Oxford University Press.
Goodman, Nelson (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard University Press.
Glymour, Clark (1980). Theory and Evidence. Princeton University Press.
Hempel, Carl (1945). “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation,” Mind, 54: 1–26, 97–121.
Hempel, Carl (2001). The Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel. Oxford University Press.
Hempel, Carl, and Oppenheim, Paul (1948). “Studies in the Logic of Explanation”. Philosophy of Science 15(2):135-175 (excerpts)
Kuhn, Thomas (2012 [1962]). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, Thomas (1977). The Essential Tension. University of Chicago Press. Lakatos, Imre (1970). “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”. In I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press 91-195.
Laudan, Larry (1978). Progress and Its Problems. University of California Press.
Lewis, David (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell.
Lipton, Peter (2004). Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd Ed.). Routledge.
Popper, Karl (2005 [1935]). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Routledge.
Quine, W.V.O. (1951). “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Philosophical Review, 60: 20-43.
Quine, W.V.O. (1975). “On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World,” Erkenntnis, 9: 313-328.
Reichenbach, Hans (1938). Experience and Prediction. University of Chicago Press.
Suppes, Patrick (1967). “What Is a Scientific Theory?” in Morgenbesser (Ed.), Philosophy of Science Today. New York: Basic Books, 55-67.