WEEKLY REPORT ​ ​ ​ 25 – 31 March, 2020

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Northeast ● The Kurdish self-administration (KSA) announced additional mitigation measures for the spread of COVID-19 and implemented previously reported measures through its security apparatus across its territories, including IDP camps. The KSA and Government of Syria (GoS) also began preparing quarantine centers across Hospitals of Al-Hasakeh city. ● Screenings for symptoms of COVID-19 are not being comprehensively implemented at informal river crossings in KSA-held Deir-ez-Zor governorate as civilians are passing without being screened. Meanwhile, the Abu Kamal border crossing continued to allow Iranian militias to pass without screening them for symptoms of COVID-19. ● Islamic State (ISIS) prisoners attempted to escape from a covert prison in Al-Hasakeh city in Al-Hasakeh governorate and from Kisreh Prison in Kisreh town in Deir-ez-Zor governorate.

Northwest Syria

● Despite the SSG’s denial of the presence of COVID-19 in the northwest, the SSG has increased its mitigation measures. It is highly likely that the spread of COVID-19 in Idleb and western Aleppo governorates would lead to a new humanitarian crisis, particularly due to the estimated 1.1 million IDPs residing in overcrowded camps, and the northwest’s crippled healthcare system which is currently ill-equipped to deal with such a crises. ● Local sources in Azaz city maintain that the public have not taken the measures seriously and the majority continue to gather in public spaces. ● The SIG’s Support Coordination Unit received 600 COVID-19 examination kits from the WHO. This is reportedly the first batch from a total of 2,000 kits promised.

South and Central

● The GoS announced a partial curfew to take place all-over the country as an attempt to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. ● The GoS also implemented further mitigation measures and restrictions including halt of all transportation of citizens between governorates’ provincial centers. However, while mitigation measures are being implemented, the first official death from COVID-19 was recorded in Damascus city on March 29. ● In a series of events around Al-Qarayya, As-Sweida and Dar’a, ten civilians were killed (nine civilians from As-Sweida, one from Dar’a) and a number of others injured. While the situation seems to have been contained, the possibility of renewed tensions cannot be ruled out given the current lawlessness in southern Syria. ● Also, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported an increase in ISIS activity in the Homs desert. This has included the killing of at least 367 GoS-affiliated forces, 67 members of Iranian-backed militias, 4 civilian gas field workers and 2 shepherds.

Damascus/Rural Damascus

25 March; As an attempt to mitigate the spread of COVID-19, the Government of Syria announced a partial curfew to take place all-over the country. Curfew hours were set from 18:00 to 06:00 every day effective immediately. The curfew exempted workers of public services, foodstuffs truck drivers, health workers, SARC staff and all military and security personnel.

26 March; The Damascus Rural Health Director announced that 124 people were released from the quarantine center at the Damascus International Airport hotel after testing negative for COVID-19.

27 March; As further mitigation against the spread of COVID-19, the GoS announced the halt of all transportation of citizens between governorates’ provincial centers and all regions and rural areas at all times effective at 14:00 on Sunday 29 March and until further notice. The decision excluded transportation of goods and personnel of essential production sectors, as well as health workers, military and security personnel.

28 March; The Ministry of Education decided to further extend the closure of public and private schools and universities until 16 April.

29 March; the Ministry of Health announced the first death caused by COVID-19 within the country. A woman died on entry into the Al-Assad University Hospital in Damascus city, with the cause of death revealed on receipt of test results.

30 March; the Ministry of Health announced a second death attributed to COVID-19, with no further details released. On the same day, the Ministry of Justice announced an extension to the closure of courts and judicial institutions until 16 April.

31 March; the Ministry of Interior extended the closure of all offices of civil affairs services, the criminal record, immigration and traffic until 16 April.

Date Announced Announced Total Total Total Total Active Cases/Daily Deaths/Daily Cases Deaths Recovered Cases Mar 22 1 -- 1 -- -- 1 Mar 23 -- -- 1 -- -- 1 Mar 24 -- -- 1 -- -- 1 Mar 25 4 -- 5 -- -- 5 Mar 26 -- -- 5 -- -- 5 Mar 27 -- -- 5 -- -- 5 Mar 28 -- -- 5 -- -- 5 Mar 29 5 1 10 1 -- 9 Mar 30 -- 1 10 2 -- 8 Mar 31 -- -- 10 2 -- 8

Analysis/forecasting: Despite the extensive measures taken by GoS to mitigate the spread of COVID-19, further impact of the pandemic remains uncertain. As the WHO Syria representative stated on 31 March, the country has just reached the beginning of the pandemic’s upward curve meaning the coming two weeks might witness a skyrocketing increase of COVID-19 cases. Concerns regarding the accuracy of current official figures and the ability of the Syrian healthcare system to contain the virus have also been expressed by Mark Lowcock, UN humanitarian chief, in an address to the UN Security Council on 30 March. It was noted that only around half the country’s hospitals and primary healthcare facilities were fully functional at the end of 2019, meaning insufficient facilities to deal with a pandemic with the potential scale of COVID-19. Additionally, the SYP 100bn (approximately $75m) dedicated by the Ministry of Finance to fund the GoS’s measures to combat the spread of the virus is considered to be low in comparison with other neighbouring countries. Lebanon for example, has dedicated more than double the amount.

● 29 March; General Command of the Syrian armed forces issued two administrative orders ending the retention and the possibility of future summoning for reserve army officers who have completed three years or more of actual service, as well as for lower-ranked personnel who have completed their actual reserve service of seven years or more. The administrative order however conditioned the release of medical military personnel to the Medical Services Department’s approval, which might be due to possible need of their skills in the combat against the spread of COVID-19 among the army. ​ Homs

● 31 March; An Israeli air forces (IAF) missile attack targeted Al-Shoayrat Syrian army position east of Homs city. Syrian State TV said the warplanes fired the missiles while flying in Lebanese airspace adding that Syrian air defense systems successfully engaged and destroyed them. No casualties have been reported, and the IAF has not confirmed the attack. ● 31 March; Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported on an increase on ISIS activity in the Homs desert noting that since 24 March, SOHR documented the killing of at least 367 GoS-affiliated forces, 67 members of Iranian-backed militias, 4 civilian gas field workers and 2 shepherds, all attributed to ISIS attacks.

Dar‘a/As-Sweida/Quneitra

25–27 March; a criminal group in Al-Qarayya town, As-Sweida governorate, kidnapped two young men from Dar’a along with their cow-loaded truck. In an attempt to stabilize the situation, members of local armed factions in Al-Qarayya reportedly tried to arrest an individual thought to be responsible for the kidnapping of the two young men. However, the man killed himself using a hand grenade he was carrying.

27–28 March; in an apparent increase in tensions around Al-Qarayya, As-Sweida and Dar’a, three gunmen riding motorbikes from the direction of Busra Al-Sham entered Al-Qarayya, attempted the kidnapping of three civilians, failed, then shot at the victims’ vehicle. The attack reportedly resulted in the killing of one and the injury of the two others. Soon after the attack, local gunmen and local members of various armed factions from both As-Sweida and Dar’a headed to a location west of Al-Qarayya and engaged in five-hour armed clashes, reportedly resulting in the killing of nine civilians from As-Sweida, one from Dar’a, and the injury of many others. Additionally, six civilians from As-Sweida were taken hostage and two teenagers were reported missing, assumed kidnapped. A meeting was held in Al-Qarayya between local political, military and religious figures and GoS and Russian government officials in order to reduce tensions. The meeting ended with Russian officials promising to mediate the situation and secure the safe return of the hostages. However, shortly after the meeting, information of the killing of the six hostages reached Al-Qarayya, threatening further escalation of the situation. Later in the afternoon, the bodies of the six hostages were sent to Al-Qarayya, GoS forces established several checkpoints to create a buffer zone, the two missing teenagers were released from Busra Al-Sham and another mediation meeting was held.

Analysis/forecasting: While the situation seems to have been contained, the possibility of renewed tensions cannot be ruled out as long as no concrete actions are taken to end lawlessness, prevalence of guns among civilians, and the kidnappings in southern Syria. The dilemma remains that local communities are refusing to let GoS forces enter their towns and cities and restore their security. When considering the escalations in tensions in south Syria throughout the past few weeks, it is noteworthy that they have in fact allowed GoS forces to further expand its presence and reinforce its position. This might suggest the GoS is using (or inciting) such incidents in order to justify expansion.

● 27 March; four Qowat Sheikh al-Karama (QSK) members were killed at the GoS-installed Sed Al Ain checkpoint in Salkhad subdistrict, As-Sweida governorate. The reason behind the incident was reportedly due to personal disagreements which escalated into GoS shooting at the QSK members. ● 30 March; SARC dispatched a humanitarian aid convoy to Tafas city, in Dar’a. The convoy was reportedly loaded with 9500 food baskets and 9500 flour bags, originally provided by WFP. SARC also reported that throughout March 2020, the total number of aid convoys dispatched to Dar’a has reached 10 convoys reaching 59,310 families in 29 different communities.

Hama

● 25 March; local media reported the increase of about 40% in prices of basic goods in local markets in Hama city. The price increase is attributed to the outbreak of COVID-19 in the country:

Product Prices Pre-25 Prices as of 25 % change March (SYP) March (SYP)

Potatoes (kg) 500 850 70%

Green Beans (kg) 2,500 4,000 60%

Garlic (kg) 3,000 4,500 50%

Lemons (kg) 900 1,000 10%

Oranges (kg) 400 600 50%

Apples (kg) 550 700 27% Bananas (kg) 650 750 15%

Rice (kg) 800 1,200 50%

Sugar (kg) 600 900 50%

Flour (bag) 450 600 33%

Tea (kg) 7,500 9,000 20%

Al-Hasakeh/Ar-Raqqa Throughout the reporting period, the Kurdish self-administration (KSA) announced additional mitigation measures for the spread of COVID-19 and implemented previously reported measures through its security apparatus.

26 March; local sources report that the KSA has established quarantine centers in the National Hospital of Al-Hasakeh city. The Government of Syria (GoS) also prepared a room for quarantine in Lou’lou’ hospital in the same city.

26 March; the KSA began implementing its restrictions to movement in some IDP camps in northeast Syria including Al Hole camp, Hole subdistrict and Areesheh Camp, Areesheh subdistrict.

26 March; approximately 160 people were reportedly arrested by the KSA’s Internal Security Forces (Asayish) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Ar-Raqqa governorate for violating the KSA’s curfew and lockdown restrictions. Detainees were held in custody for 24 hours before being released.

29 March; the KSA announced that the bodies of people originating from KSA-held territories who were deceased outside KSA areas will be allowed to pass through KSA's border crossings to be buried in special designated cemeteries close to the crossings. Moreover, all arrivals from KSA territories passing through KSA's border crossings are forced to undergo a 14-day quarantine at the prepared quarantine facilities located at the crossings.

29 March; Ar-Raqqa city’s local council announced that all grocery shops are permitted to remain open indefinitely on the condition that shop owners wear gloves and masks. Local sources had added that this was in response to the fact that some local security authorities were mandating that shops close by 09:00. The announcement added that KSA-subsidized bakeries would be allowed to remain open between 06:00 and 08:00 as set by the council’s Committee of Supplies and Bakeries, while privately-owned bakeries remained open. The announcement also stated that exchange offices would only be permitted to open on Fridays.

29 March; KSA officials announced that all I/NGO staff now require Humanitarian Affairs Office-issued letters to be able to move between KSA-held governorates. The exception to these rules remains Ain Al Arab district.

Analysis/ Forecasting: The KSA continued its efforts to limit the potential spread of COVID-19 in its territories this week. However, restrictions appear to be challenged by the public as some mosques continued to hold Friday prayers across Ar-Raqqa city. It also appears that there are variations in implementing precautionary measures across Al-Hasakeh and Ar-Raqqa governorates; security authorities began shutting down shops selling nutritional supplies at 09:00 in Ar-Raqqa city, followed by a decision by the city’s local council to keep them open without restriction. This was assumed to be to reduce the civilian crowds in the morning. In contrast, similar shops were being closed by security authorities in Al-Hasakeh governorate by 16:00. Reports of robberies targeting shops and pharmacies across Ar-Raqqa and Al-Thawrah cities were recorded raising concerns regarding the potential security and economic implications of the movement restrictions, especially given the financial toll currently imposed on the population. The restrictions are likely to continue to negatively impact people’s livelihoods especially in light of the increasing commodity prices and exchange rate of the Syrian Pound. This reached 1,260 SYP per USD (previously 1,055 SYP/USD) on 26 March in Ar-Raqqa city. The curfew has also prevented many labor workers and other workers who dependent on their daily incomes from going to work which has put their livelihoods at risk.

● The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (NA) permitted GoS employees to re-enter and re-operate Alok water pumping station on 27 March only to evict them once again and block operations on 28 March. They then allowed them to re-enter on 30 March after which water supply resumed in Al-Hasakeh city (as of 31 March). The water station continues to be used as leverage by the NA to demand electricity supply from the KSA, impacting approximately 460,000 civilians’ access to water every time the water supply from Alok is cut.

● 29 March; local sources reported the attempted escape of Islamic State (ISIS) prisoners from a covert prison facility located at the outskirts of Ghweiran neighborhood in Al-Hasakeh city, near Ghweiran prison. Clashes erupted between prisoners and the SDF which led to casualties and injuries on both sides. It is likely that the attempted prison escapes are being triggered by the SDF’s attempts to transfer prisoners as part of their preventive measures to contain COVID-19. This incident follows the attempted escape of ISIS prisoners from Ghweiran prison on 15 March – the same week that the KSA began imposing comprehensive restrictions for preventing the spread of COVID-19.

Aleppo

26 March; the Minister of Health of the Syrian Interim Government, Dr. Maram al-Sheikh, stated that the SIG has drawn up a plan to deal with COVID-19. The plan reportedly includes preparing a laboratory to examine samples of suspected cases, three advanced isolation units, twenty-eight communal isolation units, as well as the launching of sterilization and awareness campaigns in markets, streets and public facilities. Al-Sheikh added that there were 65 hospitals in northern Syria, with around 3,000 beds in total (and 100 in Idleb governorate), 200 of which were in intensive care units.

27 March; Sheikh also announced via his Twitter account that the SIG’s Support Coordination Unit received 600 COVID-19 examination kits from the WHO. This is reportedly the first batch from a total of 2,000 kits promised, bringing the number of available kits estimated to be able to cater to almost 900 patients (number of tests do not directly correlate to number of patients as testing varies from patient to patient – some cases need multiple testing to confirm the virus and subsequently to confirm recovery).

Analysis/Forecasting: Although the SIG has taken a number of precautionary measures in the northwest, it remains unclear whether or not they will be able to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. It also remains unclear whether or not SIG’s health measures in hospitals are enough for a possible outbreak, particularly given the number of IDPs present in Turkish-administered areas. Local sources in Azaz city maintain that the public have not taken the measures seriously and the majority continue to gather in public spaces.

● 27 March; the local council in Azaz city announced an extension of the closure of public and private kindergartens, schools, and institutes until 30 April. The National Hospital in Azaz will continue operating its emergency department.

● 28 March; clashes took place between members of the Turkish-backed Ahrar ​ Al-Sharqiyah and the Turkish-backed Free Police inside the city of Al Bab as a result of the Free Police’s attempt to prevent gatherings at the city market. These clashes led to the death of one civilian and two members of Ahrar Al-Sharqiyah, and three other fighters were injured. Ahrar Al-Sharqiyah subsequently surrounded Al Bab Hospital and took control of the Free Police checkpoints, prompting the Free Police to withdraw from the area. Later, the Turkish-backed National Army temporarily took over the Free Police checkpoints in the city.

● 31 March; the Border Crossings Management announced the reopening of Jarablus border crossing with Turkey, however has restricted movement to traders who must be in possession of formal IDs. This crossing was previously open to all (dependent on the appropriate paperwork).

Lattakia/Tartous

Nothing significant to report.

Idleb

Throughout the reporting period, the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) issued a number of precautionary measures to prevent the spread of the COVID-19 in Idleb governorate and western Aleppo.

30 March; the Ministry of Higher Education issued a statement halting exams in all universities and institutes affiliated with the SSG from 4 April until further notice. The start of the second semester in public and private universities has been postponed from 29 February to the 15 April, and seminars and master thesis presentations cancelled.

30 March; the Ministry of Local Administration and Services also issued an order to close down commercial bazaars, poultry markets and motorbike parts shops from 30 March to 15 April.

Furthermore, the SSG affiliated Public Management for Crossings issued a decree on closing the Ghazwiyah and Deir Ballout crossings which link SSG controlled areas with Turkish-administered Olive Branch from 1 to 15 April. Only emergency cases and commercial and humanitarian trucks will be allowed to pass. The SSG’s Ministry of Health has also set up a team on the crossings to take the temperature of individuals crossing, with no actions confirmed if temperatures read as abnormal.

The reporting period also saw an estimated 30% increase in the price of basic goods in Idleb governorate, as follows:

Product Prices beginning of Prices as of 26 % change March (SYP) March (SYP)

Rice (kg) 450 550 22%

Borgol (kg) 350 425 21%

Sugar (kg) 625 750 20% Tea (bag) 7,000 10,000 33%

Vegetable Oil (liter) 800 1,000 25%

Orange (kg) 400 500 25%

Banana (kg) 600 800 33%

Apple (kg) 500 700 40%

Potato (kg) 300 450 50%

Sheep meat (kg) 7,000 9,000 28%

Analysis/Forecasting: As of 29 March, the SSG’s Minister of Health, Dr. Ayman Gibbs, has ​ continued to deny the presence of COVID-19 cases in the northwest, stating that tests of suspected cases have all been negative. Despite this, the SSG has upped its measures against COVID-19, given it had initially solely focused on closing educational facilities and publishing only one SSG infographic on COVID-19 on their official website. It is highly likely that the ​ ​ spread of COVID-19 in Idleb and western Aleppo governorates would lead to a new humanitarian crisis, particularly due to the estimated 1.1 million IDPs residing in overcrowded camps, and the northwest’s crippled healthcare system which is currently ill-equipped to deal with such a crises.

● 31 March; local media reported on further violations of 5 March Turkish-Russian ceasefire by GoS. Reportedly, GoS forces struck with artillery shelling the towns of Afs, Saraqab subdistrict; , , and , Kafr Nobol subdistrict; Nayrab, Idleb subdistrict, , Ehsem, Bara, and Deir Sunbul, Ehsem subdistrict; and , Ma'arrat An Nu'man subdistrict.

Deir-ez-Zor

25–26 March; local sources reported that screenings for symptoms of COVID-19 are not being comprehensively implemented as some civilians are still arriving through informal river crossings in KSA-held Deir-ez-Zor governorate without being screened.

26 March; the SDF closed down all shops apart from grocery stores and bakeries in Basira town, Basira subdistrict in line with the KSA’s efforts to stop the spread of COVID-1.

27 March; local sources reported cases of theft of electrical generators, motorcycles, electric circuit breakers, power cables and items outside residents’ homes following the implementation of the curfew from 18:00 to 06:00 in Government of Syria (GoS)-held Abu Kamal city and Deir-ez-Zor city in Deir-ez-Zor governorate.

27 March; mosques in Kishkiyeh, Hajin subdistrict held Friday mass prayers in violation of the KSA’s restrictions which was also the case across various other villages in Deir-ez-Zor governorate including in Kisreh, Kisreh subdistrict; Elhisan and Jneineh, Deir-ez-Zor subdistrict.

28–29 March; the SDF conducted an extensive raid operation targeting informal river crossings where fuel smuggling activities take place between Shiheil town, Basira subdistrict and Thiban town, Mayadin subdistrict. The operation led to clashes between SDF and civilians resulting in the death of at least one civilian and one SDF member and multiple injuries.

28 March; the Abu Kamal border crossing continued to allow the passage of Iranian militias who had not undergone inspection for symptoms of COVID-19.

Analysis/Forecasting: Despite the KSA lockdown and curfew and the SDF’s attempts to implement measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19, the inconsistent application of these restrictions raises concerns regarding the efficiency of the KSA’s efforts in containing virus in Deir-ez-Zor governorate. Specifically, while the KSA is regulating civilian movement through official river crossings in Deir-ez-Zor, many civilians and smugglers utilize informal river crossings across the Euphrates River which are more difficult to supervise as they are numerous and spread out. Those crossing are likely to pose the highest risk for COVID-19 transmission given that they come from GoS-held areas of Deir-ez-Zor governorate where local sources reported suspected coronavirus cases. The SDF operation targeting informal river crossings in Thiban and Shiheil may decrease these movements should they continue such efforts. The relationship between the SDF and some Arab tribes is likely to impact the SDF’s capacity to reinforce the KSA’s restrictions, as was highlighted in Kishkiyeh town where Friday mass prayers were still held. In this case, the SDF are wary of entering the village as residents from the Shei’tat tribe are well armed,hold anti-SDF sentiments, and are expected to strongly resist any implementation efforts by the SDF. Local sources indicated that the SDF appear to be able to reinforce COVID-19 precautionary measures more stringently in Al-Hasakeh governorate as compared to Deir-ez-Zor governorate, due to their increased security presence. The unregulated entry of Iranian militias and Iranian Shi’ite civilians traveling for pilgrimage – which decreased in number following the COVID-19 global outbreak – through the Abu Kamal border crossing is likely to be countering the efficacy of the GoS’s current efforts in mitigating the spread of COVID-19, particularly given the high number of confirmed cases in Iran (41,495) and Iraq (630) as of 31 March. Shi’ite pilgrims are also allowed by GoS to pass through the crossing after they are screened for COVID-19 symptoms, however this is unlikely to be sufficient to prevent the spread of the virus as they are not tested for it. Violations to restrictions and theft are likely to continue in the near future given the current harsh economic conditions facing civilians, made worse by the continued devaluation of the Syrian pound which reached 1,350 SYP per USD in Basira town on 25 March, (previously 1,040 SYP/USD on 27 February).

● 26 March; local sources reported that at least 10 Islamic State (ISIS)-affiliated prisoners attempted to escape Kisreh prison in Kisreh town, Kisreh subdistrict. The attempt reportedly took place during an electricity shutdown. The SDF later announced they had recaptured all prisoners.

CONTACT

Nicholas Bodanac HAT Director [email protected]

The Humanitarian Access Team (HAT) was established in Beirut in March 2015 in response to the collective challenges facing the remote humanitarian response in Syria. Successful humanitarian and development interventions require a nuanced and objective understanding of the human ecosystems in which these interventions occur. To this end, the HAT’s most important function is to collect, triangulate, synthesize, analyze and operationalize disparate data and information. Since 2015, HAT analysis has provided a forward-looking template for international interventions in Syria, and facilitated an increasingly nimble, adaptive, integrated, and ultimately impactful international response to the Syrian conflict.