Transaction Costs, Market Failure and Economic Development
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Price Competition with Satisficing Consumers
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Aberdeen University Research Archive Price Competition with Satisficing Consumers∗ Mauro Papiy Abstract The ‘satisficing’ heuristic by Simon (1955) has recently attracted attention both theoretically and experimentally. In this paper I study a price-competition model in which the consumer is satisficing and firms can influence his aspiration price via marketing. Unlike existing models, whether a price comparison is made depends on both pricing and marketing strategies. I fully characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium by investigating the implications of satisficing on various aspects of market competition. The proposed model can help explain well-documented economic phenomena, such as the positive correla- tion between marketing and prices observed in some markets. JEL codes: C79, D03, D43. Keywords: Aspiration Price, Bounded Rationality, Price Competition, Satisficing, Search. ∗This version: August 2017. I would like to thank the Editor of this journal, two anonymous referees, Ed Hopkins, Hans Hvide, Kohei Kawamura, Ran Spiegler, the semi- nar audience at universities of Aberdeen, East Anglia, and Trento, and the participants to the 2015 OLIGO workshop (Madrid) and the 2015 Econometric Society World Congress (Montreal) for their comments. Financial support from the Aberdeen Principal's Excel- lence Fund and the Scottish Institute for Research in Economics is gratefully acknowledged. Any error is my own responsibility. yBusiness School, University of Aberdeen - Edward Wright Building, Dunbar Street, AB24 3QY, Old Aberdeen, Scotland, UK. E-mail address: [email protected]. 1 1 Introduction According to Herbert Simon (1955), in most global models of rational choice, all alternatives are eval- uated before a choice is made. -
Industrial Organization 06 Market Structure and Market Power
Industrial Organization 06 Market structure and market power Marc Bourreau Telecom ParisTech Marc Bourreau (TPT) Lecture 06: Market structure and market power 1 / 39 Outline 1 Introduction: definition of market power 2 Definition of relevant market An example: market definition in the telecommunications sector Approach based on cross price-elasticities Other approaches 3 The relationship between concentration and market power An example with the Cournot oligopoly model Issues in measuring concentration and market power Other concentration measures Other market power measures 4 The SCP paradigm 5 Some elements about the control of concentration Marc Bourreau (TPT) Lecture 06: Market structure and market power 2 / 39 Introduction Introduction Remember, from the lecture on Monopoly: Definition of "market power" The ability of a firm to raise its price over marginal cost. Importance of measuring "market power": In competition policy, some practices (for instance, bundling) are illegal if a firm has market power. In order to estimate the market power of a firm, we need to define first the relevant market. Marc Bourreau (TPT) Lecture 06: Market structure and market power 3 / 39 Market definition Definition of the relevant market Two questions: Product market Which products should we include in the "market"? Geographical market Which geographical zone do we have to consider? An economic definition of the market A market can be defined as a group of products presenting strong demand- substitutability and supply-substitutability. Marc Bourreau (TPT) Lecture 06: Market structure and market power 4 / 39 Market definition Definition of the relevant market Definition of the European Commission (1997) The relevant market includes all the products and/or services considered as interchangeable or substitutable on the account of product characteristics, price, and regular use. -
The United States Has a Market Concentration Problem Reviewing Concentration Estimates in Antitrust Markets, 2000-Present
THE UNITED STATES HAS A MARKET CONCENTRATION PROBLEM REVIEWING CONCENTRATION ESTIMATES IN ANTITRUST MARKETS, 2000-PRESENT ISSUE BRIEF BY ADIL ABDELA AND MARSHALL STEINBAUM1 | SEPTEMBER 2018 Since the 1970s, America’s antitrust policy regime has been weakening and market power has been on the rise. High market concentration—in which few firms compete in a given market—is one indicator of market power. From 1985 to 2017, the number of mergers completed annually rose from 2,308 to 15,361 (IMAA 2017). Recently, policymakers, academics, and journalists have questioned whether the ongoing merger wave, and lax antitrust enforcement more generally, is indeed contributing to rising concentration, and in turn, whether concentration really portends a market power crisis in the economy. In this issue brief, we review the estimates of market concentration that have been conducted in a number of industries since 2000 as part of merger retrospectives and other empirical investigations. The result of that survey is clear: market concentration in the U.S. economy is high, according to the thresholds adopted by the antitrust agencies themselves in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. By way of background, recent studies of industry concentration conclude that it is both high and rising over time. For example, Grullon, Larkin, and Michaely conclude that concentration increased in 75% of industries from 1997 to 2012. In response to these and similar studies, the antitrust enforcement agencies recently declared that their findings are not relevant to the question of whether market concentration has increased because they study industrial sectors, not antitrust markets. Specifically, they wrote, “The U.S. -
Harvard Law Review 132, No. 2, December 2018, Pp
SURESH NAIDU November 12, 2019 BUSINESS ADDRESS: 1405 IAB MC 3328 [email protected] 420 W. 118th St. www.santafe.edu/~snaidu New York, NY. 10027 APPOINTMENTS: Professor, Department of Economics/SIPA, Columbia University. September-December 2016 Visiting Researcher Princeton University Industrial Relations Section. July 2010-July 2016 - Assistant Professor, Department of Economics/SIPA, Columbia University. August 2013-May 2014 – Visiting Assistant Professor, MIT Department of Economics. 2008-2010 - Harvard Academy Junior Scholar Postdoctoral Fellow, Harvard University. OTHER AFFILIATIONS: Santa Fe Institute External Faculty Roosevelt Institute Fellow NBER Faculty Research Fellow (DEV, POL, and, DAE) BREAD faculty affiliate Microsoft Research New York: Visiting Researcher (2016-2017), Consulting Researcher (2017-2018). Faculty Affiliate with Columbia University Population Research Center and Data Sciences Institute. Social Science Research Council Working Group on Big Data in the Historical Social Sciences. EDUCATION: DEGREE DATE FIELD University of California, Berkeley Ph.D. December 2008 Economics University of Massachusetts, Amherst M.A. August 2004 Economics University of Waterloo B.Math.(With Distinction) May 2001 Pure Mathematics (minor in Peace and Conflict Studies) PUBLISHED PAPERS: “Text-based Ideal Points” (with David Blei and Keyon Vafa) -Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics 2020. “Do Americans Want to Tax Capital? Evidence from Online Surveys” (with Ray Fisman, Ilyana Kuziemko, and Keith Gladstone). -Forthcoming in Journal of Public Economics.. “Monopsony in Online Labor Markets” (with Arindrajit Dube, Jeff Jacobs, and Siddarth Suri) -American Economic Review- Insights, 2(1) March 2020. 33-46. “American Slavery and Labor Market Power” -Economic History of Developing Regions, 35(1), January 2020 3-22. -
The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications∗
The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications∗ Jan De Loeckery Jan Eeckhoutz Gabriel Ungerx KU Leuven UPF Barcelona (ICREA, GSE) Harvard University NBER and CEPR and UCL November 15, 2019 Abstract We document the evolution of market power based on firm-level data for the US econ- omy since 1955. We measure both markups and profitability. In 1980, average markups start to rise from 21% above marginal cost to 61% now. The increase is driven mainly by the upper tail of the markup distribution: the upper percentiles have increased sharply. Quite strikingly, the median is unchanged. In addition to the fattening upper tail of the markup distribution, there is reallocation of market share from low to high markup firms. This rise occurs mostly within industry. We also find an increase in the average profit rate from 1% to 8%. While there is also an increase in overhead costs, the markup increase is in excess of overhead. We then discuss the macroeconomic implications of an increase in average market power, which can account for a number of secular trends in the last four decades, most notably the declining labor and capital shares as well as the decrease in labor market dynamism. Keywords: Market Power; Markups; Profits; Secular Trends; Labor Market; Declining Labor Share. JEL: E2, D2, D4, J3, K2, L1 ∗We would like to thank Mark Aguiar, Pol Antras,` John Asker, Eric Bartelsman, Susanto Basu, Steve Berry, Tim Bresnahan, Emmanuel Farhi, Xavier Gabaix, Bob Hall, John Haltiwanger, Eric Hurst, Loukas Karabarbounis, Patrick Kehoe, Pete Klenow, Christian Michel, Ariel Pakes, Thomas Philippon, Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, Chad Syverson, James Traina, Jo Van Biesebroeck and Frank Verboven for insightful discussions and comments. -
1 Development Economics CEMFI Monica Martinez-Bravo Spring 2020
Development Economics CEMFI Monica Martinez-Bravo Spring 2020 Class meetings: Tuesday 11:30h – 13h Friday 9:30h – 13h 1 Office hours: Wednesday 15:30h – 17h Email: [email protected] Course Description: This course focuses on the understanding of the process of economic development. The central questions of the course are: 1) Why are some countries so much poorer than others? 2) What are the main barriers to the process of economic development? 3) What are the main barriers that prevent the poor to escape from poverty? 4) Why do these barriers exist and persist? The first part of the course (weeks 1 to 6) studies the decision making by individuals and market failures as potential barriers to the process of economic development. The second part (weeks 7 to 10) of the course examines the role of institutions and politics as determinants of underdevelopment. The purpose of the course is to give you a sense of the frontier research topics and a good command of the methodologies used in the field of Economic Development. The main emphasis will be in empirical and microeconomic studies, although some applied theory papers and macro analysis will also be discussed. Previous knowledge: Students are assumed to be familiar with the basic concepts of econometrics, microeconomics, and macroeconomics. Some of the problem sets will require the use of Stata. A Stata tutorial is available on Intranet. This tutorial covers a few basic commands frequently used in Stata. If you still find difficulty working with Stata you should talk to the Professor or Teaching Assistant. Teaching assistant: The teaching assistant for this course is Javier García-Brazales ([email protected]). -
Oliver E. Williamson [Ideological Profiles of the Economics Laureates] Daniel B
Oliver E. Williamson [Ideological Profiles of the Economics Laureates] Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead Econ Journal Watch 10(3), September 2013: 677-679 Abstract Oliver E. Williamson is among the 71 individuals who were awarded the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel between 1969 and 2012. This ideological profile is part of the project called “The Ideological Migration of the Economics Laureates,” which fills the September 2013 issue of Econ Journal Watch. Keywords Classical liberalism, economists, Nobel Prize in economics, ideology, ideological migration, intellectual biography. JEL classification A11, A13, B2, B3 Link to this document http://econjwatch.org/file_download/783/WilliamsonIPEL.pdf IDEOLOGICAL PROFILES OF THE ECONOMICS LAUREATES Oliver E. Williamson by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead76 Oliver Williamson (1932–) was born and raised in Superior, Wisconsin. His parents were both high school teachers in a small rural town. Williamson’s father and grandfather joined to start a small business in real estate. Williamson reflected on his father: My father was…outgoing and had an unusual gift with children. His own children were devoted to him. He was friends with and was regularly consulted by other youngsters. He was Superior’s Santa Claus—at the Kiwanis, the orphanage, for neighbourhood kids, his grandchildren, and on request—for about fifteen years. He was also active in civic affairs—the Chamber of Commerce, the hospital and was on the City Council for about twelve years, ten of them as its President. His generous spirit was combined with fiscal conservatism. His integrity was legendary. -
Behavioral Economics and Competition
Behavioral economics and competition PRESENTED TO Hong Kong Competition Commission PRESENTED BY Neil Lessem, Ph.D. 31 October 2016 Copyright © 2016 The Brattle Group, Inc. Agenda What is behavioral economics? Why does behavioral economics matter for competition? Examples of behavioral biases Case study: Drip pricing Conclusion 1 | brattle.com What is behavioral economics? Neoclassical economics assumes that: ▀ People hold rational preferences ▀ Individuals maximize utility, firms maximize profits ▀ People act independently on the basis of full and relevant information Behavioral economics, on the other hand: ▀ Uses insights from psychology and experimental economics to explain actual consumer behavior ▀ Explains why consumers in certain contexts act in a way that does not follow from the traditional economics framework 2 | brattle.com Homo Economicus or Homo Sapiens? 3 | brattle.com Obligatory Adam Smith slide Important behavioral theorists ▀ Adam Smith (1759) explored loss aversion, concerns about fairness and justice ▀ Vernon Smith (1976) introduced experimental economics ▀ Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed prospect theory ▀ Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) and David Laibson (1997) discussed hyperbolic discounting ▀ Colin Camerer (2003) researched the interface between cognitive psychology and economics ▀ John List (2004) took experiments out of the lab and into the field ▀ Dan Ariely (2008) framed biased decisions as being predictably irrational ▀ Thaler (2008) popularized behavioral economics with the publication of “Nudge” 4 | brattle.com -
Working Paper Series
Working Paper Series Maria Chiara Cavalleri, Alice Eliet, Concentration, market power and Peter McAdam, Filippos Petroulakis, Ana Soares, Isabel Vansteenkiste dynamism in the euro area Discussion Papers No 2253 / March 2019 Disclaimer: This paper should not be reported as representing the views of the European Central Bank (ECB). The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB. Discussion papers Discussion papers are research-based papers on policy relevant topics. They are singled out from standard Working Papers in that they offer a broader and more balanced perspective. While being partly based on original research, they place the analysis in the wider context of the literature on the topic. They also consider explicitly the policy perspective, with a view to develop a number of key policy messages. Their format offers the advantage that alternative analyses and perspectives can be combined, including theoretical and empirical work. Discussion papers are written in a style that is more broadly accessible compared to standard Working Papers. They are light on formulas and regression tables, at least in the main text. The selection and distribution of discussion papers are subject to the approval of the Director General of the Directorate General Research. ECB Working Paper Series No 2253 / March 2019 1 Abstract We examine the degree of market power in the big four countries of the euro area using macro and firm micro data. We focus on three main indicators of market power in and across countries: namely, the concentration ratios, the markup and the degree of economic dynamism. -
Globalization and Developing Country Welfare
The Advantages of Backwardness? Globalization and Developing Country Welfare Regime Transformation A thesis presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts Rahmi Çemen May 2013 © 2013 Rahmi Çemen. All Rights Reserved. 2 This thesis titled The Advantages of Backwardness? Globalization and Developing Country Welfare Regime Transformation by RAHMI ÇEMEN has been approved for the Department of Political Science and the College of Arts and Sciences by James Mosher Associate Professor of Political Science Robert Frank Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 Abstract ÇEMEN, RAHMI, M.A., May 2013, Political Science The Advantages of Backwardness? Globalization and Developing Country Welfare Regime Transformation Director of Thesis: James Mosher Those arguing for a “race to the bottom” in the globalization era assume that international factors have negatively impacted the welfare regimes of developing countries. In contrast, little attention has been given to how globalization can produce more opportunities than constraints for developing countries to reform inefficient and inegalitarian welfare regimes and create new ones that support long-run economically sustainable development. In order to investigate whether globalization has positive effects on welfare, three case studies are analyzed: South Korea, Turkey, and Mexico. My first hypothesis is that the relatively minimal institutional base of entrenched welfare entitlements in developing countries allows for the reform of expensive, inefficient, and inegalitarian welfare regimes in order to adapt to globalizations demands, while at the same time providing the innovative policy space to improve the area’s most beneficial to the well-being of the majority of the population, such as health care, education, and social assistance. -
E Pluribus Unum? Varieties and Commonalities of Capitalism
MPIfG Discussion Paper 10/ 12 E Pluribus Unum? Varieties and Commonalities of Capitalism Wolfgang Streeck Wolfgang Streeck E Pluribus Unum? Varieties and Commonalities of Capitalism MPIfG Discussion Paper 10 /12 Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Köln Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne October 2010 MPIfG Discussion Paper ISSN 0944-2073 (Print) ISSN 1864-4325 (Internet) © 2010 by the author(s) Wolfgang Streeck is Director at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne. [email protected] MPIfG Discussion Papers are refereed scholarly papers of the kind that are publishable in a peer-reviewed disciplinary journal. Their objective is to contribute to the cumulative improvement of theoretical knowl- edge. The papers can be ordered from the institute for a small fee (hard copies) or downloaded free of charge (PDF). Downloads www.mpifg.de Go to Publications / Discussion Papers Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies Paulstr. 3 | 50676 Cologne | Germany Tel. +49 221 2767-0 Fax +49 221 2767-555 www.mpifg.de [email protected] Abstract The paper reviews the origins of the comparative study of capitalism and of the di- verse approaches applied to it in contemporary political economy. It distinguishes four models accounting for differences in the institutional make-up of national capitalist economies, which it refers to as the social embeddedness, power resource, historical- institutionalist, and rationalist-functionalist model, respectively. Special attention is given to the rationalist-functionalist account of capitalist variety and its reception in the research literature. The paper concludes with remarks on the likely effect of the global financial crisis after 2007 on theories of political economy in general and of “varieties of capitalism” in particular. -
Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS ISSUE BRIEF APRIL 2016 BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICATORS OF MARKET POWER Introduction sanction anticompetitive behavior, and help define the contours of antitrust law through court decisions. These This issue brief describes the ways in which competition measures not only have immediate effects on the between firms can benefit consumers, workers, behavior that is challenged but also may help deter entrepreneurs, small businesses and the economy more anticompetitive abuses in the future. generally, and also describes how these benefits can be lost when competition is impaired by firms’ actions or Promoting competition extends beyond enforcement of government policies. Several indicators suggest that antitrust laws, it is also about a range of other pro- competition may be decreasing in many economic competitive policies. Several U.S. departments and sectors, including the decades-long decline in new agencies are actively using their authority to advance business formation and increases in industry-specific pro-competition and pro-consumer policies and measures of concentration. Recent data also show that regulations. For example, in several cases the Federal returns may have risen for the most profitable firms. To Aviation Administration (FAA) of the Department of the extent that profit rates exceed firms’ cost of capital— Transportation (DOT) has sought to provide competitive which may be suggested by the rising spread on the airline carriers with greater access to take-off and return to invested capital relative to Treasury bonds— landing slots at capacity constrained “slot-controlled” they may reflect economic rents, which are returns to airports. The Federal Communications Commission the factors of production in excess of what would be (FCC), in its most recent design of a spectrum auction, necessary to keep them in operation.