Politics As a Sphere of Wealth Accumulation: Cases of Gilded Age New York, 1855-1888

City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 10-2014 Politics as a Sphere of Wealth Accumulation: Cases of Gilded Age New York, 1855-1888 Jeffrey D. Broxmeyer Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/407 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] POLITICS AS A SPHERE OF WEALTH ACCUMULATION: CASES OF GILDED AGE NEW YORK, 1855-1888 by Jeffrey D. Broxmeyer A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York. 2014 © 2014 JEFFREY D. BROXMEYER All Rights Reserved ii This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. PROFESSOR FRANCES FOX PIVEN ___________ ________________________________ Date Chair of Examining Committee PROFESSOR ALYSON COLE ___________ ________________________________ Date Executive Officer PROFESSOR JOE ROLLINS __________________________________ Supervisory Committee PROFESSOR JOSHUA FREEMAN __________________________________ Supervisory Committee THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii Abstract POLITICS AS A SHPERE OF WEALTH ACCUMULATION: CASES OF GILDED AGE NEW YORK, 1855-1888 by Jeffrey D. Broxmeyer Adviser: Professor Frances Fox Piven This dissertation examines political wealth accumulation in American political development. Scholars have long understood the political system selects for “progressive ambition” for higher office. My research shows that officeseekers have also engaged in “progressive greed” for greater wealth. I compare the career trajectories of four prominent New York political figures during the Gilded Age: William Tweed, Fernando Wood, Roscoe Conkling, and Chester Arthur. Using correspondence, census, tax and land records, government reports, investigations, and newspaper coverage, I explain why each political figure chose to either seize or pass up opportunities for political wealth accumulation. I also examine the principal sources of fortunes and the types of political practices that generated them. Profit-maximizing behavior during the late nineteenth century was central to the consolidation of politics as a vocation. Career-altering events such as an election loss, or alternatively, the opportunity to join a dominant party faction, often recalibrated a politician’s strategic calculation in the tradeoff between power and wealth. Furthermore, the dominant view of self-aggrandizement is that public officials either steal or extract rents, for example, in the form of bribes or loans. However, none of the large fortunes examined among my cases were built through conventional rent seeking, and peculation iv was only a minor source of income. Instead, the great fortunes were built through marketing-making activities. Tweed, Wood, Conkling, and Arthur accumulated political wealth by securing dominant market positions, or by creating new markets altogether. These figures accumulated productive personal property, or political capital, through control over political institutions, most notably by speculating in real estate, railroads, and finance, and by the establishment of politically dependent businesses, such as banks, lotteries, newspapers, and law firms. v Acknowledgements Portions of this dissertation first appeared as “The Boss’s Brains: Political Capital, Democratic Commerce, and the New York Tweed Ring, 1868-1871” in the Journal of Historical Sociology. I want to thank the journal editors and anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions. Earlier versions of some chapters were also presented at the Midwestern Political Science Association and the Western Political Science Association. I wish to express my appreciation to the Graduate Center for providing financial support in the form of two Doctoral Student Research Grants, an Advanced Research Collaborative Grant, a Travel and Research Grant, and a two-year Teaching Fellowship at Hunter College. Scholarly projects are truly social labors, and this dissertation is no exception. I want to thank Frances Piven, my adviser, for her tremendous support throughout the many iterations of this dissertation project. Her scholarly rigor and generosity have shaped not only this dissertation, but also the kind of academic I strive to be. My sincerest thanks are due to Joe Rollins. For years I have been the beneficiary of his support, insights, and sage advice. I also want to express my gratitude to Joshua Freeman for his willingness to serve on the dissertation committee and for graciously offering his time, comments, and critiques. I want to thank Alyson Cole for her support, and for her energy in building our program. Thanks are also due to Thomas Kessner for joining my proposal committee and providing several early suggestions about where to look in the archives. At the Graduate Center, Alex Zamalin has been a true friend, always willing to share stories and listen to my half-baked ideas. Jonathan Keller read and critiqued my original proposal, and his thoughtful suggestions helped me pass muster to Level III. Dan vi Skinner coached many of us through the program with his hardscrabble and frank wisdom. To everyone: thank you! My family deserve special acknowledgement for their unwavering support throughout this long ordeal. Their patience and guidance throughout this intellectual adventure has sustained me through many highs and lows. To Mom, Dad, Eric, and my grandfather, Bill; to the memory of my grandparents Fran, Ann, and Dave; and also to Pam, Allan, and Orlee: please know that acknowledgement pages do not run long enough to fully express my thanks for your love and support. Finally, and most important, I want to thank Shira, who has endured with matchless grace a partner in academic purgatory for so long. You are the best. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgments………………………………………………………………………..vi List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………..ix Chapter 1 – Introduction: Political Fortunes in American Political Development……….1 Chapter 2 – William Tweed’s Political Bubble………………………………………….24 Chapter 3 – The Politician’s Many Pockets: Fernando Wood’s Gilded Age……………49 Chapter 4 – Roscoe Conkling: Republican on Retainer…………………………………90 Chapter 5 – Subordinate Ambition: Chester Arthur’s Party Accumulation……………131 Chapter 6 – Conclusion: Political Capitalism in America……………………………...168 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………193 viii Tables Table 1. William Tweed: Rise and Fall……………………………………………….....29 Table 2. Fernando Wood: Recalibrated Ambition……………………………………….59 Table 3. Roscoe Conkling: Thwarted Ambition………………..………………………..94 Table 4. Chester Arthur: Subordinate Ambitions………………………………………136 Table 5. Political Ambition and Greed Tradeoffs Across Careers…………...………...177 Table 6. Political Behavior: Wealth Accumulating Practices…………………………..183 ix Chapter 1. Introduction: Political Fortunes in American Political Development Leaders of political parties during the nineteenth century became some of the earliest millionaires in the United States.1 From the American Revolution to the 1840s, property owners had followed the republican tradition of gentlemen-politicians who “retired” into public life as ratification of established status.2 By the 1850s, however, the political system itself emerged as a major source of fortunes. The conspicuous appearance of political wealth thrust questions into the public debate about democratic representation and the ambitions of officeseekers. Newspaper editors, political rivals, and civic reformers wondered how political entrepreneurs, many of whom hailed from modest backgrounds, became so wealthy throughout their careers. This controversy was initially muted because generating personal wealth from political property was informally acknowledged as part of coalition building and mass party competition. Drama over slavery and union also temporarily overshadowed these concerns about political wealth accumulation. Nevertheless, between the 1850s and 1880s, controversies large and small erupted in the nation’s capitol and across the country. Nowhere was this truer than New York, a center of trade, finance, and industry, where political fortunes were among the largest of the Gilded Age. The research objectives of this dissertation are twofold. First, I seek to enrich our understanding of the behavior of officeseeking politicians in the United States. Most political science models assume rational self-interest and individual ambition to be principal drivers of political behavior. Yet, these studies stop short of considering how 1 Fernando Wood and William Tweed, both examined in this dissertation, were among a wave of nouveau 2 Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 287-305. 1 the political system can be a place where elected officials amass considerable personal wealth by merit of their location at the crux of decision-making. Often, political goals and wealth go hand in hand. Under certain conditions, however, they may also diverge. During the course of a career, when do opportunities for higher office or more political power coexist with the desire for

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