Conceptualizing Path Dependence Through Discourse Analysis: the Case of Seasonal Farm Workers in Germany
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1 Conceptualizing Path Dependence through Discourse Analysis: The Case of Seasonal Farm workers in Germany Hess, Sebastian¹; Kleinschmit, Daniela²; Theuvsen, Ludwig¹; von Cramon-Taubadel, Stephan¹; Zschache, Ulrike¹ ¹Department for Agricultural Economics and Rural Development, Georg-August-University Goettingen ²Department of Forest Products, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala Abstract— This article introduces discourse analysis Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU has frequently as a theoretical concept and an empirical methodology been cited and analyzed as an almost ‘classical’ that may enable the endogenization of path creation and example in this regard (Ackrill and Kay 2006). path breaking changes in conventional models of Pierson (2000) notes that the political phenomena political path dependencies. Economic criteria such as surrounding path dependencies are associated with far rents created by a policy do not always provide a comprehensive explanation for path dependent political more complexity and, due to a lack of easily decisions. Discourse theory implies that specific measureable indicators, are far more difficult to interpretative schemata and narratives, such as story analyze than cases of purely economic path lines in the mass media, heavily influence the political dependencies. Therefore, in the literature related to discourse. Discourses themselves exercise a constitutive political science, Pierson (2000; 2004) constitutes a power that constrains decision-making processes and, rich body of analyses that identifies path dependencies thus, influence the ensuing policy creation path. Hence, and explains why these dependencies exist within discourses must be taken into account when political politics, yet without convincing and theoretically path creation is analysed. In this paper we trace over deeply rooted explanations of the reasons why certain time individual story lines that represent important – potentially inefficient – policies were introduced in elements of the discourse underlying the restriction of seasonal farm workers from central and eastern the first place. Therefore, in economics as well as in European countries in Germany. We illustrate how political science the process of path dependence to dominant speakers and their story lines have been and date largely constitutes a research field with a just currently are interacting to shape this policy. emerging and still incomplete theoretical framework (Garud and Karnøe 2001; Schreyögg, Sydow and Keywords— Agricultural Policy, Path Dependencies, Koch 2003). In addition, no empirical methods have Discourse Analysis so far been widely used that would allow general predictions of the causes and circumstances under which specific policies are introduced and the way they have been introduced in reality, implying that I INTRODUCTION especially the process of political path creation is not well understood yet. This paper proposes discourse analysis as a new This paper proposes discourse analysis as a new concept that should be integrated into the framework concept to be integrated into the framework of path of path dependence in order to reconstruct self- dependence in order to reconstruct self-reinforcing reinforcing feedback effects in politics. The processes feedback effects within politics. We argue that of path creation and path dependence is empirically discourse analysis presents a potentially fruitful explored through a media analysis on the topic of theoretical model that can be applied to empirical seasonal farm workers from central and eastern analysis. European countries (CEEC) in Germany as an Path dependencies within politics are marked by example of a comparatively small but highly regulated self-reinforcing feedback effects that alter the costs of factor market. We summarize what established switching from one policy regime to another (for theoretical and empirical evidence can say about this instance, Kay 2005). As a result of such re-affirmative policy, and why the concept of path dependency in dynamic processes, politics and institutions (North this context promises to fill certain gaps in 1990) may get locked into situations that become, conventional analysis (section 2). Section 3 introduces once in place, difficult to change. The Common the concept of discourse theory in connection with 12th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008 2 path dependencies and outlines a methodological their privileges again (Krueger 1974). However, a framework that describes how the explanatory power closer look at different definitions of path dependency of this concept is empirically tested. Section 4 presents on the one hand, and individual agricultural policy first empirical results that are discussed in section 5, measures on the other, does not always clearly suggest and section 6 concludes. that what is observed in reality necessarily fulfils anything more than the broadest criteria of ‘path dependency’ (e.g., not more than the general argument II. WHAT EXPLAINS THE EXISTENCE AND that ‘history matters’, Ackrill and Kay 2006). PERSISTENCE OF INEFFICIENT Therefore, a closer look at more specific policy fields AGRICULTURAL POLICIES? THE CASE OF provides better opportunities for analyzing processes SEASONAL FARM WORKERS of path creation and path dependence in the political sphere in more detail. In (agricultural) economics, rent-seeking behaviour An example of a very specific, highly protective (Krueger 1974) and the associated activities of lobby and very persistent agricultural policy is the regulation groups often provide convincing explanations for the of seasonal farm workers from central and eastern existence of protectionist policies, which in turn have, European countries (CEEC) who work each year in in many instances, especially distortive effects German agriculture (e.g. Gerdes 2000). Although it (Alston, Norton and Pardey 1995). Lobby groups aim can be traced back to the late 19th century, this policy at the redistribution of income in their own favour and does not seem to benefit farmers nor workers and is, at accordingly lobby actively within politics. Assuming the same time, a perennial source of tensions between utility maximizing behaviour, the cost of the lobbying lobbyists and politicians. In de facto, if not de jure, effort will be equal to or less than the volume of the violation of the EU’s common market, Germany and actual rent involved (Krueger 1974). In this context, Austria continue to restrict the employment of workers agricultural policies have been analyzed by from new EU member states in agriculture and economists as well as political scientists for a long neighbouring economic sectors. Under the current time and may be considered a classical example of regulation for seasonal farm workers from CEEC in redistributive policies that benefit the various farm Germany, farmers have to apply formally for a certain lobby groups involved (for instance, Tangermann number of workers several months ahead of the 1976; Alston and James 2002). harvest season. Farmers have to prove that they really From the rational choice perspective, politicians can need these workers on their farms and that they were be viewed as aiming to provide best policies given unable to fill vacant positions with German various political constraints (for instance, pressure unemployed persons. In general, farmers are currently arising from the activities of lobby groups, see Dixit granted only 80% of the workers they have requested. and Romer 2006). Alternatively, politicians and Hence, in theory they are obliged to hire at least 20% political institutions themselves can be seen as rent of their seasonal workforce on the German labour seekers (Olsen 1965: “stationary and roving bandits”) market. In practice, however, German workers are not with selfish preferences who are trying to maximize able or willing to do the work in question. Therefore, a their own benefits rather than being motivated by the 20% input restriction is imposed on labour-intensive best possible provision of public goods. The analysis agricultural products in Germany, or, in other words, of distortive market policies that are common in an input quota equal to 80% of total seasonal farm agriculture describes the incidence of policy (Alston labour demand is in place. German farmers are all and James 2002) typically as a failure to provide equally restricted by this 20% cut of their labour socially optimal outcomes due to some redistribution demand. If rent seeking were the key motivation for of income in favour of certain lobby groups (Alston, the existence of this policy, at least one of the interest Norton and Pardey 1995). groups involved should clearly benefit in monetary These redistributive policies typically create terms. The following analysis shows that this is in fact economic rents. Once an economic rent has been not the case. created and is assigned to a group of beneficiaries, it Input quotas typically limit the competitive market can be argued that policy makers may already have output of a farm product (Alston, Norten and Pardey induced political path dependency since this rent 1995). They also reduce the factor price equalisation creates a large potential for self-reinforcement due to that would otherwise take place as high wages for the fact that beneficiaries will be unwilling to give up 12th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008 3 farm labour in Germany attract low-priced workers that