PRIO POLICY BRIEF 09 2010 Visiting Address: Hausmanns gate 7 PO Box 9229 Grønland, NO-0134 Oslo, Norway Oslo (PRIO) Institute Research Peace The Hudna: ’s Concept of a Long-Term Ceasefire

Visiting Address: Hausmanns gate 7 PO Box 9229 Grønland, NO-0134 Oslo, Norway Oslo (PRIO) Institute Research Peace Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) The landslide victory of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Move- ment, Hamas, in the 2006 parliamentary elections in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the movement’s military takeover of the Gaza Strip in the following year revealed that Hamas cannot be ig- nored as a key player in Palestinian politics. Hamas is well-known for its anti-Israeli charter from 1988 and its violent attacks against Israel. Less known is that Hamas has its own recipe for solving the conflict with Israel peacefully. The core principle of this recipe is

ISBN: 978-82-7288-372-9 Design: Studio 7 www.studoisju.no the Islamic concept of hudna, the extended ceasefire. To learn more about Hamas’s hudna proposals, PRIO research staff inter- viewed Hamas leaders in Gaza, Syria and Lebanon. This policy brief provides an analysis of those interviews, showing that where the Oslo process failed to achieve its intended aim – the resolution of all final-status issues – Hamas seeks to reach agreement on is- sues where agreement is possible and to postpone the obstacles to progress for the next generation to solve.

Dag Tuastad Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)

From PLO to Hamas? postpone the refugee issue. Thus, the whole Legitimacy ‘Today I have come bearing an olive branch point of the hudna is that it opens up for Given the above, it is possible that the reason and a freedom fighter’s gun. Do not let the reaching agreements on issues where agree- for Hamas’s public opposition to anything but olive branch fall from my hand,’ declared the ment is possible, while postponing difficult a return to the 1967 borders and negotiations late , chairman of the Palestine issues such as the refugee issue, where over all final-status issues might then be more Liberation Organization (PLO), in his 1974 agreement seems unlikely, until a later date. about the involvement of the Fatah-dominated address to a plenary session of the UN Gen- PLO in negotiations with Israel than about the eral Assembly. Two decades later, Arafat Besides refugees another main issue in the issues themselves. Reference to the issue of established the Palestinian Authority on Pal- Israeli-Palestinian conflict relates to land and legitimacy is frequently made by Hamas estinian soil and was awarded the Nobel Peace the question of Israeli withdrawal from the members, and in their view Fatah thoroughly Prize, along with Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon West Bank and Gaza. Are the 1967 borders lacks the legitimacy to represent the Palestini- Peres of Israel, for entering into peace nego- absolute in Hamas’s thinking, or is it conceiv- ans. When Fatah is discussing questions tiations. able that Hamas might agree to a land-swap related to land swap, Jerusalem or refugees deal that would make it possible for Israel to with Israel, the very fact that it is Fatah dis- Where Arafat had an olive branch in one hand keep some of its settlements in the West cussing these issues with Israel increases and a gun in the other, Hamas has the hudna Bank? opposition to Israeli - Paslestinian talks inside and the Qassam rocket. Hudna is Hamas’s Hamas. Hence, the potential for compromise offer of a long-term ceasefire with Israel. On In Gaza, at least some of Hamas’s leaders are on final-status issues is not something that is close examination, the purpose and details of open to discussing this question, and there currently frontloaded by Hamas. Hamas’s hudna do not appear to differ sub- are individuals within Hamas who are willing stantially from the political positions of the to do cost–benefit calculations on land. Oth- How binding is the hudna? PLO during the Camp David talks in 2000. If ers, however, are determined to avoid what For Hamas, the hudna represents the transfer Hamas leaders are taken at their word, they they regard as the mistake the PLO made: of an Islamic means of conflict resolution may walk the same walk as Arafat did. minimizing Palestinian rights by discussing from intertribal conflicts to international details with Israeli negotiators. The main relations. The common denominator for Hamas’s conditions for a long-term cease- political body within Hamas, the shura, has Hamas is Islamic jurisprudence, not interna- fire with Israel discussed and approved the offer of a hudna, tional law. In Islamic jurisprudence, the In 1999, Hamas’s leadership set out the fol- but it has not discussed the details of what hudna is recognized as a binding and legiti- lowing conditions for a long-term ceasefire such an offer might involve. mate contract. The Quran requires Muslims with Israel in a memorandum sent to Euro- to observe the terms of such an agreement pean diplomats: During the spring of 2010, Hamas leaders in until the end of its specified period. Neverthe- 1. the withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces Gaza, Syria and Lebanon were interviewed by less, according to Islamic jurisprudence, the from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; PRIO research staff regarding the purpose of binding nature of a hudna is first of all a ques- 2. the evacuation of all Jewish settlements the hudna and the conditions for its estab- tion of moral binding, and no Islamic institu- illegally erected and populated by Jewish lishment. On refugees, interviewed Hamas tion exists to sanction a party violating the immigrants on Palestinian lands seized by leaders emphasized that the right of return treaty. force in both the West Bank and Gaza; would need to be accepted in principle. In 3. the release of all Palestinian prisoners in relation to this question, it is notable that the What is the purpose? Israeli detention; and positions of most of the Hamas people inter- The hudna is a means to a goal, rather than a 4. recognition of the right of the Palestinian viewed did not differ substantially from the goal in itself. Nevertheless, the hudna repre- people to self-determination. position of the PLO during negotiations with sents something more than simply a tactic. In Israel. In 2000 Palestinian delegation mem- Arab and Islamic tradition, a hudna consti- One might ask, though, what about the Pales- bers talked of the right of return, rather than tutes a phase within a larger process: first the tinian refugees? The seeming omission of return itself. The Israelis were asked to recog- ceasefire, hudna, then the sulh, reconciliation. recognition of the right of return as a condi- nize the right of return in principle; if they The most common outcome of the hudna tion for a ceasefire is mainly what distin- could agree to this, Arafat was reportedly phase is a final peace agreement. Ideally, the guishes the hudna from a possible final peace willing to be flexible on the actual implemen- purpose of a hudna is to resolve a conflict by deal. A hudna is a partial solution and a tem- tation of such a right. On the question of land forcing the parties to use the ascribed period porary agreement. It is not a final peace swap, there are also individuals within Hamas to seek a nonviolent resolution to their differ- agreement. As long as the refugee issue re- who are willing to enter into discussions. ences. mains unresolved, Hamas cannot recognize Thus, on this point too, the positions held by Israel, as Hamas leaders do not regard them- some Hamas leaders are consistent with those How long would it last? selves as having the legitimacy to decide on held by the PLO negotiators whose discus- The most important precedent a hudna in that issue on behalf of the refugees. The sions with Israel Hamas so markedly opposes. Islamic history, the treaty of Hudaybiya made hudna, which does not entail recognition of by the Prophet and the Meccans Israel’s right to exist, means that Hamas can in 628, was to last for ten years. However,

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Hamas places more emphasis on the princi- might be interpreted as a concession to Is- for discussing the truce. ple of the hudna rather than a specified period rael’s superior military power. This would of ten years. The ceasefire period is regarded undermine Hamas’s legitimacy, its leading Gaza’s salafi jihadist groups are estimated to as a trial period. It should be up to the next political position and its influence on the have around two hundred members, and they generation of the Palestinians to decide jihadist groups. The hudna is thus a liability are thus in no position to challenge the major whether the hudna should be extended, sus- for Hamas in Lebanon, as the organization Palestinian groups in terms of popular sup- pended or developed into a permanent risks losing its ideological control over jihadist port. Nevertheless, they do have strong moti- agreement. groups as a consequence of such an approach. vation to act as spoilers against possible nego- tiations on an extended ceasefire, which could Compatibility with Israeli requirements Syria have an impact on internal discipline within Can a hudna satisfy Israeli requirements for In Syria, as things currently stand, there exists Hamas. Thus, the main worry among security? Paradoxically, Hamas’s preference consensus between the Syrian regime, secular Hamas’s political leaders in Gaza in relation for a limited ceasefire rather than a full peace Palestinian resistance groups and Islamist to jihadists is not that they constitute a mili- agreement has important similarities with the Palestinian groups regarding political goals: tary threat or have large popular appeal; position of Israel’s Likud party. Likud politi- establishing a Palestinian state and ensuring rather, the fear is that they may exert an ideo- cians have discussed ending ‘endism’, which refugee return. No party has veto power over logical influence within the military branch of means abandoning the idea that the Israeli– Hamas’s political programme, but in order to Hamas. Palestinian conflict can be ended with a quick maintain good relations with both the so- fix, and instead focusing on issues on which called HISH Alliance of Hamas, Iran, Syria However, political and economic pressure on agreement is possible. This entails accepting and Hezbollah and the Damascus-based Pal- Hamas in Gaza does not necessarily mean that the terms of a final-status agreement estinian resistance groups, Hamas has been that the idea of the hudna has been weakened. cannot be agreed at the current time, without following a policy of strategic adaptability. The hudna offers a possible way out of the this necessarily implying a state of war be- Rejectionism resonates better than pragma- exhaustion of the Gaza population, without tween the parties. Where Israelis have re- tism in Syria, which makes tactical rejection- Hamas having to compromise on its basic ferred to an ‘economic peace’, Hamas’s con- ism less costly than tactical pragmatism for principles. An agreement on a ceasefire with cept of hudna also implies reaching Hamas in Syria. However, as a political rather Israel that does not include recognition of the agreement on some basic issues, while leav- than a military organization in exile, Hamas Jewish state and that implies an end to the ing the issues that are currently obstructing needs diplomatic tools. It must balance its attrition caused by the international boycott progress for future generations to decide. offer of a hudna with sustaining credibility on and the challenges from the salafi jihadists the two main rights insisted upon by the could benefit Hamas in terms of popular Challenges rejectionist groups: the right of return and the support. This would make it harder for the If political circumstances changed and the right of resistance. Qassam brigades and the hardliners within hudna was put on the formal agenda of Mid- the movement to ensure that Hamas main- dle East talks, would it be an absolutist or a Gaza tains absolute rejectionist positions. pragmatic position in relation to the details of In 2010, Hamas remains the target of an the conditions for such an agreement (such as international boycott, and the socioeconomic Recommendations the issue of postponing the refugee issue) that situation in Gaza is precarious. The ongoing would prevail? In order to answer this, one economic crisis in Gaza has nearly crippled z Discuss the hudna with Hamas. Hamas has would probably need to identify the positions Hamas’s rule. In March and April 2010, the suggested a long-term ceasefire. If no re- of various circles of power within Hamas, as Hamas government was unable to pay the sponse to this offer is forthcoming, this will well as their relative strengths. Below is an wages of civil servants. Its imposition of sev- signal to Hamas and its Palestinian support- evaluation of challenges to a possible hudna in eral new taxes, including a tax on cigarettes, ers that there is no international interest in three core areas of Palestinian resistance: was naturally highly unpopular among the their suggestion of a long-term ceasefire. Lebanon, Syria and Gaza. insolvent population. It has been reported that Discussing the hudna with Hamas will Lebanon the economic crisis could spark an uprising in strengthen the proponents of peaceful conflict In Lebanon Hamas has engaged in compre- Gaza. Opposition has grown from within resolution within the movement. Discussing hensive dialogue with salafi jihadist groups in Islamist ranks, from people who regard the hudna could also produce its own mo- Palestinian camps. Hamas apparently has Hamas as being ‘too light’ as an Islamist mentum. The signal sent by not pursuing the managed to de-radicalize the largest salafi movement. Allegedly, pressure from Al- hudna offer is that Hamas is viewed exclu- jihadist groups like Usbat al-Ansar. Taking Qaeda-inspired salafi jihadist groups has had sively as a resistance organization and ex- this role, of convincing the salafi jihadists to an ideological impact on the clandestine mili- pected to act like one. suspend armed activities as it harms the in- tary branch of Hamas. Already in the 1990s, it terests of the Palestinians, may prove costly was reported that prominent members of the z Encourage Hamas to emphasize governance for Hamas in its efforts to justify the pursuit military branch opposed the hudna, and that over resistance. Hamas is a mass movement of a possible hudna. The head of Hamas in Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Zahar – now and cannot be defeated without eliminating Lebanon feared that the focus on a hudna considered a hardliner – had been threatened its constituency, which comprises up to half

of the Palestinian people. There is a tension z Review the conditions for keeping Hamas on not act as spoilers to a new peace process. within the movement concerning priorities. If terror lists. Hamas wishes to be removed from Hamas has stated that it would accept the diplomatic conflict resolution is to gain mo- international lists of organizations involved in outcome of a possible Palestinian referendum mentum within the movement at the expense terrorism. There exist critical voices within on a peace deal. of armed resistance against Israel, Hamas’s Hamas regarding the use of terror both tacti- project of governing in Gaza should be en- cally and strategically. Through dialogue with couraged rather than obstructed. This would jihadist Islamist groups, Hamas has encour- entail a change to current economic and po- aged the latter to refrain from using terror. In litical ways of dealing with Hamas in Gaza, Lebanon this has led the largest jihadist whereby Hamas would be viewed as part of groups to distance themselves from Al-Qaeda. the solution, not just part of the problem. Concerning the conditions for keeping Hamas on terror lists, that Hamas do not use z Normalize the economic situation in Gaza by terror and renounce terror is a fair and realis- allowing for regular flow of goods in and out. tic condition. That Hamas recognizes Israel is Since Israel’s attack on the aid flotilla to Gaza not so. To not recognize Israel is not terror, in the spring of 2010, there has been a slight and it is not a balanced demand as only two easing of the blockade against Gaza, though Arab states – and – have for- improvements remain limited. The economic mally recognized the state of Israel. blockade should be totally lifted so that eco- nomic life in Gaza might be normalized. The z Encourage Palestinian unity. Without Pales- blockade regime has failed to achieve its aim – tinian unity, no peace deal with Israel will to topple Hamas. Hamas has never been have sufficient legitimacy among Palestinians stronger in Gaza, politically as well as militar- to be operational. A ‘carrot and stick’ approach ily, than after four years of economic block- should thus be adopted towards not only ade. The challenge to Hamas now comes from Hamas but also towards the Palestinian Au- radical groups both outside and inside Hamas thority on the West Bank, to encourage Pales- in Gaza. An improvement in the economic tinian unity. The international favouring of situation in Gaza would decrease tensions and the Palestinian Authority on the West Bank encourage Hamas to prioritize diplomacy over should not be unconditional as such Western violence. support demotivates those in power from sharing their power. Fatah and Hamas leaders z Engage politically with Hamas. The political should be told that a new Palestinian unity isolation of Hamas entails the isolation of government would be accepted and not boi- political ideas that are widely held among cotted. Palestinians. These ideas will not simply be made to disappear by refusing to engage in z Encourage political reforms in the PLO. A dialogue with Hamas. If political progress is prerequisite for a successful peace process is to be achieved, dialogue is essential. Experi- Palestinian popular support. For PLO to have ence shows that Hamas is capable of com- broad Palestinian popular support also from promise, and is able to cut deals with rivals large marginalized groups like the refugees, it both directly and indirectly. is necessary to have internal reforms in the PLO. Most important, Islamic factions among the Palestinians will need to be included in the PLO. This would also ensure that they do

THE AUTHOR THE PROJECT PRIO

Dag Tuastad holds a doctoral degree in anth- This policy brief is derived from a PRIO Paper The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) is a ropology and is an associate professor of entitled ‘Hamas’s Concept of a Long-Term non-profit peace research institute (estab- Middle Eastern studies at the University of Ceasefire: A Viable Alternative to Full Peace?’, lished in 1959) whose overarching purpose is Oslo and a senior researcher at PRIO. His published in November 2010. It forms part of to conduct research on the conditions for current research focuses on Palestinian poli- a PRIO project entitled ‘The Rule of Hamas in peaceful relations between states, groups and tics and the prospects for political reform Gaza: Rethinking the Prospects for Peace’, people. The institute is independent, interna- within the Palestine Liberation Organization. which has been funded by the Norwegian tional and interdisciplinary, and explores is- He can be reached at [email protected]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. sues related to all facets of peace and conflict.

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