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The Hudna: Hamas's Concept of a Long-Term Ceasefire

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The Hudna: Hamas's Concept of a Long-Term Ceasefire PRIO POLICY BRIEF 09 2010 Visiting Address: Hausmanns gate 7 7 gate Hausmanns Address: Visiting Norway Oslo, NO-0134 Grønland, 9229 PO Box Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) The Hudna: Hamas’s Concept of a Long-Term Ceasefire Visiting Address: Hausmanns gate 7 7 gate Hausmanns Address: Visiting Norway Oslo, NO-0134 Grønland, 9229 PO Box Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) (CSCW) War Civil of Study the for Centre The landslide victory of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Move- ment, Hamas, in the 2006 parliamentary elections in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the movement’s military takeover of the Gaza Strip in the following year revealed that Hamas cannot be ig- nored as a key player in Palestinian politics. Hamas is well-known for its anti-Israeli charter from 1988 and its violent attacks against Israel. Less known is that Hamas has its own recipe for solving the conflict with Israel peacefully. The core principle of this recipe is ISBN: 978-82-7288-372-9 978-82-7288-372-9 ISBN: www.studoisju.no 7 Studio Design: the Islamic concept of hudna, the extended ceasefire. To learn more about Hamas’s hudna proposals, PRIO research staff inter- viewed Hamas leaders in Gaza, Syria and Lebanon. This policy brief provides an analysis of those interviews, showing that where the Oslo process failed to achieve its intended aim – the resolution of all final-status issues – Hamas seeks to reach agreement on is- sues where agreement is possible and to postpone the obstacles to progress for the next generation to solve. Dag Tuastad Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) From PLO to Hamas? postpone the refugee issue. Thus, the whole Legitimacy ‘Today I have come bearing an olive branch point of the hudna is that it opens up for Given the above, it is possible that the reason and a freedom fighter’s gun. Do not let the reaching agreements on issues where agree- for Hamas’s public opposition to anything but olive branch fall from my hand,’ declared the ment is possible, while postponing difficult a return to the 1967 borders and negotiations late Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine issues such as the refugee issue, where over all final-status issues might then be more Liberation Organization (PLO), in his 1974 agreement seems unlikely, until a later date. about the involvement of the Fatah-dominated address to a plenary session of the UN Gen- PLO in negotiations with Israel than about the eral Assembly. Two decades later, Arafat Besides refugees another main issue in the issues themselves. Reference to the issue of established the Palestinian Authority on Pal- Israeli-Palestinian conflict relates to land and legitimacy is frequently made by Hamas estinian soil and was awarded the Nobel Peace the question of Israeli withdrawal from the members, and in their view Fatah thoroughly Prize, along with Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon West Bank and Gaza. Are the 1967 borders lacks the legitimacy to represent the Palestini- Peres of Israel, for entering into peace nego- absolute in Hamas’s thinking, or is it conceiv- ans. When Fatah is discussing questions tiations. able that Hamas might agree to a land-swap related to land swap, Jerusalem or refugees deal that would make it possible for Israel to with Israel, the very fact that it is Fatah dis- Where Arafat had an olive branch in one hand keep some of its settlements in the West cussing these issues with Israel increases and a gun in the other, Hamas has the hudna Bank? opposition to Israeli - Paslestinian talks inside and the Qassam rocket. Hudna is Hamas’s Hamas. Hence, the potential for compromise offer of a long-term ceasefire with Israel. On In Gaza, at least some of Hamas’s leaders are on final-status issues is not something that is close examination, the purpose and details of open to discussing this question, and there currently frontloaded by Hamas. Hamas’s hudna do not appear to differ sub- are individuals within Hamas who are willing stantially from the political positions of the to do cost–benefit calculations on land. Oth- How binding is the hudna? PLO during the Camp David talks in 2000. If ers, however, are determined to avoid what For Hamas, the hudna represents the transfer Hamas leaders are taken at their word, they they regard as the mistake the PLO made: of an Islamic means of conflict resolution may walk the same walk as Arafat did. minimizing Palestinian rights by discussing from intertribal conflicts to international details with Israeli negotiators. The main relations. The common denominator for Hamas’s conditions for a long-term cease- political body within Hamas, the shura, has Hamas is Islamic jurisprudence, not interna- fire with Israel discussed and approved the offer of a hudna, tional law. In Islamic jurisprudence, the In 1999, Hamas’s leadership set out the fol- but it has not discussed the details of what hudna is recognized as a binding and legiti- lowing conditions for a long-term ceasefire such an offer might involve. mate contract. The Quran requires Muslims with Israel in a memorandum sent to Euro- to observe the terms of such an agreement pean diplomats: During the spring of 2010, Hamas leaders in until the end of its specified period. Neverthe- 1. the withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces Gaza, Syria and Lebanon were interviewed by less, according to Islamic jurisprudence, the from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; PRIO research staff regarding the purpose of binding nature of a hudna is first of all a ques- 2. the evacuation of all Jewish settlements the hudna and the conditions for its estab- tion of moral binding, and no Islamic institu- illegally erected and populated by Jewish lishment. On refugees, interviewed Hamas tion exists to sanction a party violating the immigrants on Palestinian lands seized by leaders emphasized that the right of return treaty. force in both the West Bank and Gaza; would need to be accepted in principle. In 3. the release of all Palestinian prisoners in relation to this question, it is notable that the What is the purpose? Israeli detention; and positions of most of the Hamas people inter- The hudna is a means to a goal, rather than a 4. recognition of the right of the Palestinian viewed did not differ substantially from the goal in itself. Nevertheless, the hudna repre- people to self-determination. position of the PLO during negotiations with sents something more than simply a tactic. In Israel. In 2000 Palestinian delegation mem- Arab and Islamic tradition, a hudna consti- One might ask, though, what about the Pales- bers talked of the right of return, rather than tutes a phase within a larger process: first the tinian refugees? The seeming omission of return itself. The Israelis were asked to recog- ceasefire, hudna, then the sulh, reconciliation. recognition of the right of return as a condi- nize the right of return in principle; if they The most common outcome of the hudna tion for a ceasefire is mainly what distin- could agree to this, Arafat was reportedly phase is a final peace agreement. Ideally, the guishes the hudna from a possible final peace willing to be flexible on the actual implemen- purpose of a hudna is to resolve a conflict by deal. A hudna is a partial solution and a tem- tation of such a right. On the question of land forcing the parties to use the ascribed period porary agreement. It is not a final peace swap, there are also individuals within Hamas to seek a nonviolent resolution to their differ- agreement. As long as the refugee issue re- who are willing to enter into discussions. ences. mains unresolved, Hamas cannot recognize Thus, on this point too, the positions held by Israel, as Hamas leaders do not regard them- some Hamas leaders are consistent with those How long would it last? selves as having the legitimacy to decide on held by the PLO negotiators whose discus- The most important precedent a hudna in that issue on behalf of the refugees. The sions with Israel Hamas so markedly opposes. Islamic history, the treaty of Hudaybiya made hudna, which does not entail recognition of by the Prophet Muhammad and the Meccans Israel’s right to exist, means that Hamas can in 628, was to last for ten years. However, PRIO POLICY BRIEF 08 2010 www.prio.org Hamas places more emphasis on the princi- might be interpreted as a concession to Is- for discussing the truce. ple of the hudna rather than a specified period rael’s superior military power. This would of ten years. The ceasefire period is regarded undermine Hamas’s legitimacy, its leading Gaza’s salafi jihadist groups are estimated to as a trial period. It should be up to the next political position and its influence on the have around two hundred members, and they generation of the Palestinians to decide jihadist groups. The hudna is thus a liability are thus in no position to challenge the major whether the hudna should be extended, sus- for Hamas in Lebanon, as the organization Palestinian groups in terms of popular sup- pended or developed into a permanent risks losing its ideological control over jihadist port. Nevertheless, they do have strong moti- agreement. groups as a consequence of such an approach. vation to act as spoilers against possible nego- tiations on an extended ceasefire, which could Compatibility with Israeli requirements Syria have an impact on internal discipline within Can a hudna satisfy Israeli requirements for In Syria, as things currently stand, there exists Hamas. Thus, the main worry among security? Paradoxically, Hamas’s preference consensus between the Syrian regime, secular Hamas’s political leaders in Gaza in relation for a limited ceasefire rather than a full peace Palestinian resistance groups and Islamist to jihadists is not that they constitute a mili- agreement has important similarities with the Palestinian groups regarding political goals: tary threat or have large popular appeal; position of Israel’s Likud party.
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