THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF

Case CCT23/2010

In the matter between:

THE CITIZEN 1978 (PTY) LIMITED First Applicant

KEVIN KEOGH Second Applicant

MARTIN WILLIAMS Third Applicant

ANDREW KENNY Fourth Applicant

and

ROBERT JOHN McBRIDE Respondent

APPLICANTS’ SUBMISSIONS ON THE MAIN APPEAL 2

CONTENTS

THIS APPEAL ...... 4

THE BACKGROUND ...... 6

THE CONTROVERSIAL STATEMENTS ...... 8

The controversy ...... 8

The “McBride tipped” article ...... 8

The “No comment” article and “Here comes McBride” editorial ...... 9

The first Williams article ...... 11

The “Bomber McBride” article ...... 12

The President’s letter ...... 14

The “Thabo Mbeki’s straw man” editorial ...... 15

The Kenny article ...... 16

The second Williams article ...... 18

The Ngonyama article ...... 19

The “McBride cops job” editorial ...... 20

THE MEANING OF THE CONTROVERSIAL STATEMENTS ...... 21 3

THE CITIZEN’S DEFENCE ...... 27

THE SCA’S FINDING ...... 29

The finding ...... 29

The implications ...... 30

THE LANGUAGE OF THE TRC ACT ...... 35

THE HISTORICAL PURPOSE OF THE TRC ACT ...... 40

THE SCHEME OF THE TRC ACT ...... 48

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRC ACT ...... 54

THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE TRC ACT ...... 60

PRAYER ...... 62

AUTHORITIES ...... 64 4

THIS APPEAL

1. This is an appeal against the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in The

Citizen v McBride [2010] ZASCA 5 (26 February 2010).1 Mr McBride made ten

claims for defamation and injuria against the owner, editor and two journalists of

The Citizen for repeatedly publishing two defamatory statements about him in

September and October 2003. The first was that he was a murderer who had

murdered three women by planting a car bomb outside Magoo’s Bar in Durban in

1986. The second was that he had been arrested and detained in Mozambique

in 1998 on suspicion of gun-running.

2. The High Court upheld all the claims. The SCA upheld the murder claims by a

majority. Streicher JA delivered the majority judgment and Ponnan JA delivered

a separate concurring judgment while Mthiyane JA delivered a dissenting

judgment. They unanimously dismissed the gun-running claims.

3. Both sides seek leave to appeal to this court against the SCA judgment insofar

as it went against them. In accordance with the directions of this court of 8 April

and 3 May 2010, we confine these submissions to the applicants’ appeal against

the SCA’s decision to uphold the murder claims.

1 SCA Judgment vol 9 p 774 5

4. The Citizen made the murder statements in the course of its campaign in

September and October 2003, against Mr McBride’s appointment as Chief of

Police of Ekurhuleni. It said that he was not suited for this position because he

was a murderer. The SCA held that the critical question was whether it was true

to say of Mr McBride that he was a murderer. It was common cause that he had

indeed committed murder by his participation in the Magoo’s Bar bombing but

had received amnesty for it in terms of s 20 of the Promotion of National Unity

and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. The SCA held that, in terms of the TRC Act,

perpetrators who received amnesty for the offences they had committed, “should

be considered not to have committed the offences”2 and that the statement that

Mr McBride was a murderer was therefore false.3

5. We shall submit that the SCA erred in its interpretation of the TRC Act. Sections

20(7) to (10) circumscribe the effect of amnesty. A perpetrator is relieved of

further civil and criminal liability for the crime he committed. If he has been

convicted of it, his conviction “shall for all purposes, including the application of

any Act of Parliament or any other law, be deemed not to have taken place”. It is

merely his previous conviction if he has one, which is deemed not to have taken

place. The underlying historical fact of his commission of the offence, remains

unaffected. If he committed murder, he remains a murderer because a murderer

is someone who committed murder, whether he was convicted of it or not.

2 SCA Judgment vol 9 p 704 para 30

3 SCA Judgment vol 9 p 706 para 33 6

THE BACKGROUND

6. The background facts are common cause. The High Court summarised them in

paragraphs 2 to 4 of its judgment4 and the SCA adopted its summary in

paragraph 22 of its judgment.5

“[2] At all material times during 1986 plaintiff was a member of Mkhonto we Sizwe (“MK”), a military wing of the African National Congress which was then involved in an armed struggle for political liberation against the security forces of the Republic of South Africa. On 14 June 1986 a unit of MK under the leadership of the plaintiff and acting within the context of the liberation struggle as aforesaid, carried out an attack by planting and exploding a car bomb outside the Magoo’s Bar / Why Not Restaurant, in Durban and as a result whereof three female patrons were killed and many other patrons were injured. Plaintiff was subsequently arrested, charged and convicted and sentenced to death in 1987 for the three counts of murder and 79 counts of attempted murder and other charges related to the operation.

[3] After some four years in death row, plaintiff was reprieved from the death sentence in 1991 and on 28 September 1992 he was released from prison. Plaintiff applied for amnesty to the TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) which was granted on 19 April 2001 in terms of section 20 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No 34 of 1995 (the TRC Act) for his conduct in the armed struggle including the attack on the Magoo’s Bar / Why Not Restaurant which was carried out on 14 June 1986 and for which he was convicted and sentenced to death and subsequently reprieved.

4 High Court Judgment p 642 paras 2 to 4

5 SCA Judgment vol 9 p 699 para 22 7

[4] During March 1998 plaintiff was arrested and detained for six months in Mozambique on allegations or suspicions of espionage, criminal conspiracy and gunrunning and was subsequently released without being charged after the allegations against him were quashed by the Supreme Court of Mozambique. At the time plaintiff was employed as a foreign affairs representative for the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICCO) Plaintiff had travelled to Mozambique in his private or personal capacity.’

7. Further particulars of this background appear from,

- the judgment of Corbett JA who upheld Mr McBride’s sentence on appeal to

the Appellate Division in S v McBride 1988 (4) SA 10 (A);

- Mr McBride’s application for amnesty of 10 April 1997 in volume 7 page 589

and particularly at pages 593 to 597;

- the Amnesty Committee’s decision of 19 April 2001 in volume 6 page 511 at

page 534 section M, and

- the Amnesty Committee’s letter of 19 April 2001 in volume 7 page 600 at

page 605 paragraph (xii). 8

THE CONTROVERSIAL STATEMENTS

The controversy

8. In September and October 2003 Mr McBride was a candidate for appointment as

Chief of Police of the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality. The Citizen

campaigned against his appointment.

The “McBride tipped” article

9. The Citizen started its campaign with a front page lead published on Wednesday

10 September 2003 under the headline “McBride tipped to head Metro cops”.6

10. The article opened by identifying Mr McBride as the person who had bombed

Magoo’s Bar and announced that he could be appointed as the Ekurhuleni Chief

of Police:

“Robert McBride – former operative in the ANC’s military wing, Umkhonto we

Sizwe, who bombed a Durban bar in 1986, killing several people including

three women – could be heading to the Ekurhuleni Metro as Chief of Police.”

11. After elaborating on the news that he was a candidate for appointment as Chief

of Police, the article described his participation in the Magoo’s Bar bombing and

the subsequent amnesty he received for it:

6 “McBride tipped” article 10 September 2003 vol 6 p 549 9

“McBride, as an MK operative, was attached to a Special Operations Unit.

He served four years on death row after being convicted for the car bomb

explosion at the Magoo’s and Why Not bars near the Durban beachfront in

1986.

He was widely condemned for the attack on what was widely perceived to be

a ‘soft’ civilian target though McBride insisted that the pub was frequented by

SADF military personnel from a nearby barracks. No soldiers were killed or

injured in the massive explosion.

Later McBride applied for and was granted amnesty for the attack by the

Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) due largely to the fact that the

ANC claimed it had ordered McBride to attack the pubs, contrary to its initial

denials that it was involved in the bombing.

But as McBride was deemed to be acting on the orders of a political

organisation he qualified for amnesty.”

The “No comment” article and “Here comes McBride” editorial

12. On Thursday 11 September 2003, the day after publication of the “McBride

tipped” article, The Citizen carried an article headed “No comment on McBride”7

and an editorial headed “Here comes McBride”.8

13. The “No comment” article reported that the Ekurhuleni Municipality had declined

to comment on Mr McBride’s candidacy for appointment as Police Chief. It again

7 “No comment” article 11 September 2003 vol 6 p 551

8 “Here comes McBride” editorial vol 1 p 17 10

described his role in the Magoo’s Bar bombing and the amnesty he had received

for it:

“McBride, current director at the Department of Foreign Affairs and head of

consular services, was sentenced to death during the apartheid era for his

role in the bombing of a Durban beachfront bar.

The sentence was later commuted. The Truth and Reconciliation

Commission also granted him amnesty.”

14. The “Here comes McBride” editorial commented on his candidacy as follows:

“Robert McBride’s candidacy for the Ekurhuleni Metro Police Chief is

indicative of the ANC’s attitude to crime.

They can’t be serious.

He is blatantly unsuited, unless his backers support the dubious philosophy:

Set a criminal to catch a criminal.

Make no mistake, that’s what he is. The cold-blooded multiple murders which

he committed in the Magoo’s Bar bombing put him firmly in the category.

Never mind his dubious flirtation with alleged gun dealers in Mozambique.

Those who recommended him should have their heads read.

McBride is not qualified for the job.

If he is appointed, it will be a slap in the face for all those crime-battered folk

on the East Rand who look to the government for protection.” 11

15. Mr McBride bases his claims A and B on this editorial.9

The first Williams article

16. A week later on Thursday 18 September 2003, The Citizen published an article

by the third applicant Mr Williams, headed “Beware ambush broadcasters

operating under false pretences”.10

17. Mr Williams said in the article that he had been invited to participate in a radio

debate “about forgiving people such as Alan Boesak, Winnie Madikizela-

Mandela, Robert McBride, etc.” which turned out to be a debate on The Citizen’s

“McBride tipped” article and “Here comes McBride” editorial. After commenting

on the debate, he continued as follows:

“If anyone wants my opinion about Robert McBride and forgiveness, here it

is.

Forgiveness is intensely personal. Each individual makes their own decision.

If you don’t forgive, you harm yourself. That’s why to forgive is divine.

I have no relationship with Robert McBride. It is not for me to forgive him.

But his track record as a multiple murderer and a suspect in gun dealing

make him unsuitable as a metro police chief in a country wracked by crime.

9 Particulars of Claim vol 1 p 5 paras 11 to 15

10 First Williams article 18 September 2003 vol 1 p 18 12

Forgiveness presupposes contrition. McBride still thinks he did a great thing

as a ‘soldier’, blowing up a civilian bar.

He’s not contrite. Neither are Winnie or Boesak. They are not asking for

forgiveness.

Boesak wants a pardon for something he says he didn’t do. That defies logic.

Those who want to forgive McBride don’t have to push for him to get this

sensitive job. The two issues are separate.

In fact our comment was not about forgiveness but rather about suitability.”

18. Mr McBride’s claims C and D are based on this article.11

The “Bomber McBride” article

19. The next day Friday 19 September 2003, Mr McBride’s attorneys sent a letter of

demand to The Citizen claiming compensation for the defamatory statements

made about him in the “Here comes McBride” editorial and the first Williams

article.12 The Citizen reported on the letter of demand in a front page lead

published the following Monday 22 September 2003.13

20. The article opened by saying that,

11 Particulars of Claim vol 1 p 8 paras 16 to 21

12 Letter 19 September 2003 vol 6 p 556

13 “Bomber McBride” article 22 September 2003 vol 1 p 20 13

“Magoo’s bomber Robert McBride is threatening to sue The Citizen for

R600 000 for alleged ‘defamatory and insulting remarks’ about his suitability

for the post of Ekurhuleni Metro Police Chief”.

21. It went on to describe the letter of demand and recounted what it had said in the

“Here comes McBride” editorial:

“In the original editorial, the Citizen said he was: ‘blatantly unsuited, unless

his backers support the dubious philosophy: set a criminal to catch a

criminal.

‘Make no mistake that’s what he is. The cold-blooded multiple murders which

he committed in the Magoo’s Bar bombing put him firmly in that category.

Never mind his dubious flirtation with alleged gun dealers in Mozambique.

‘Those who recommend him should have their heads read.

‘McBride is not qualified for the job.

‘If he is appointed it will be a slap in the face for all those crime-battered folk

on the East Rand who look to the government for protection.’”

22. It later added that,

“McBride was found guilty of the 1986 Durban bombings in which three

civilian women were killed. 14

He was released in September 1992, at the same time as multiple murderer

Barend Strydom.”

23. Mr McBride’s claims E and F are based on this article.14

The President’s letter

24. Almost a month later on Friday 17 October 2003 President Mbeki entered the

debate by criticising The Citizen in his weekly letter published on the internet, for

its publication of the “McBride tipped” article and “Here comes McBride”

editorial.15 The sting of his criticism was that “it would be fundamentally wrong

that (Mr McBride) is denied the possibility to be appointed to any position, simply

because of what he did during our struggle for liberation, for which he apologised

and for which he was granted amnesty.”16 He suggested that The Citizen had

undermined the work of the TRC.17

25. In response to his criticism, The Citizen published the following editorial and

three articles in the course of the following week.

14 Particulars of Claim vol 1 p 10 paras 22 to 26

15 President’s letter 17 October 2003 vol 7 p 581

16 President’s letter 17 October 2003 vol 7 p 581 at p 585 line 26 to p 586 line 2

17 President’s letter vol 7 p 581 at p 586 line 4 to p 588 line 22 15

The “Thabo Mbeki’s straw man” editorial

26. On Monday 20 October 2003 The Citizen responded to the President’s criticism

in an editorial under the heading “Thabo Mbeki’s straw man”.18

27. It opened as follows:

“You might think our globe-trotting leader, presiding over a party ridden by

conflict, would have more important things to do than endorse bomber Robert

McBride’s right to become Ekurhuleni Metro Police Chief.

Yet Thabo Mbeki devotes his weekly internet newsletter to that dubious

cause and to denigrating the Citizen.”

28. After criticising the President, the editorial continued as follows:

“In his usual circuitous, obfuscatory language, Mbeki hints darkly at ‘the grave

implications of what The Citizen is seeking to achieve’.

He then wanders off down a side road of his own making, about attitudes to

the TRC and ‘the path of national reconciliation’.

Rubbish.

Our coverage was aimed solely at making the irrefutable point that McBride is

unsuitable to head any decent police force.

We stand by that opinion.”

18 “Thabo Mbeki’s straw man” editorial 20 October 2003 vol 1 p 22 16

29. This is one of two editorials on which Mr McBride bases his claims G and H.19

The Kenny article

30. On Tuesday 21 October 2003 The Citizen published an article by the fourth

applicant, Mr Kenny.20 It was also written in response to the President’s letter.

31. Mr Kenny noted that the President devoted his weekly newsletter to an attack on

The Citizen for suggesting that Mr McBride was unsuitable for high office in the

police and continued as follows:

“The three most notorious non-governmental killers of the late apartheid

period were Clive Derby-Lewis, Barend Strydom and Robert McBride.

Each was a wicked coward who obstructed the road to democracy.

Derby-Lewis, who targeted a specific political enemy, Chris Hani, is the only

one not to be freed. The other two killed innocent people.

Strydom looked his helpless victims in the eyes before he murdered them.

McBride did not even do this. He planted a bomb in a bar and slunk off, not

caring whether it killed men, women or children.

It was the act of human scum”.

19 Particulars of Claim vol 1 p 10 paras 27 to 32

20 Kenny article 21 October 2003 vol 1 p 24 17

32. After a reference to Mr , the article continued as follows:

“McBride’s bomb was planted in 1986, at a time when apartheid was clearly

in retreat and when legal avenues of resistance were opening up.

His murder of the innocent women strengthened the hand of die-hard

apartheid supporters, and had the effect of prolonging the wretched regime.”

33. The next portion of the article was devoted to a refutation of the President’s

accusation that The Citizen undermined the TRC project. It returned to Mr

McBride and concluded as follows:

“If the ANC regards Robert McBride as a hero of the struggle, it should erect

a statue of him – perhaps standing majestically over the mangled remains of

the women he slaughtered.

If he wants to serve the community, he should work among aids orphans or

help to improve the provision of pensions to the poor.

He should most certainly not be made a policeman.”

34. Mr McBride’s claim I is based on this article.21

21 Particulars of Claim vol 1 p 12 paras 33 to 38 18

The second Williams article

35. Mr Williams added his comment on the President’s defence of Mr McBride in his

second article published on Wednesday 22 October 2003.22 The article was

devoted in the main to a refutation of the President’s criticism that The Citizen

undermined the work of the TRC.

36. It opened by drawing the connection between Mr McBride’s case and the work of

the TRC:

“Hands up if you believe Thabo Mbeki is a champion of reconciliation and a

defender of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

That’s the image put forward in his support for Robert McBride as Ekurhuleni

Metro Police Chief.”

37. The article continued to address this theme and later returned to Mr McBride:

“Mbeki’s support for bomber McBride is consistent with his long-held view

that any liberation force action was justified.

This unfeeling attitude doesn’t help genuine reconciliation. For example, in

his latest weekly internet newsletter he airbrushes over the horrible reality of

McBride’s deed in murdering civilians.”

22 Second Williams article 22 October 2003 vol 1 p 19 19

38. This is the second of the two Williams articles upon which Mr McBride bases his

claims C and D.23

The Ngonyama article

39. On Friday 24 October 2003 The Citizen published an article on the controversy

by the ANC spokesman Mr Smuts Ngonyama under the headline “Can country

afford this self-destruction?”24

40. Mr Ngyonyama said that,

“The pervasive question that begs an answer is whether Robert McBride

should ever be forgiven by the nation for his role in the liberation struggle that

resulted in the loss of life.”

41. He criticised The Citizen for suggesting that the amnesty granted to Mr McBride

was of no value:

“The articles carried by The Citizen suggesting the amnesty granted to

Robert McBride is of no value, and that he will continue to be judged by the

crimes for which he was pardoned, suggest the entire reconciliation process

was a one-way street.”

23 Particulars of Claim vol 1 p 8 paras 16 to 21

24 The Ngonyama article 24 October 2003 vol 6 p 564 20

The “McBride cops job” editorial

42. On 30 October 2003 The Citizen published an editorial headed “McBride cops

job” which concluded the debate because Mr McBride’s appointment as Police

Chief of Ekurhuleni had been made.25 It said the following:

“We believe we performed a civic duty on September 10 by alerting readers

to the possibility that Robert McBride could be named Ekurhuleni’s Metro

Police chief.

We said he was not the right person for the job. We maintain that view, as do

a great many readers.

But obviously a decision had already been taken.

President Mbeki even devoted one of his lengthy internet messages to

defending McBride and attacking The Citizen.

The bomber has support in high places, but that doesn’t detract from the evil

of his multiple murders, or make him a suitable policeman.

His appointment speaks volumes about the ANC’s attitude to crime.

God help Ekurhuleni.”

43. This is the second of the two editorials on which Mr Mc Bride bases his claims G

and H.26

25 “McBride cops job” editorial 30 October 2003 vol 1 p 23

26 Particulars of Claim vol 1 p 10 paras 27 to 32 21

THE MEANING OF THE CONTROVERSIAL STATEMENTS

44. Mr McBride’s case is that all the controversial statements were intended and

understood to bear one or more of the meanings ascribed to them in paragraph

13 of his particulars of claim.27

45. The following rules must be borne in mind in the determination of what the

controversial statements conveyed to the readers of The Citizen:

45.1. The test is objective. The court asks what meaning the words would

convey to the ordinary reader of the newspaper.28

45.2. It has regard to the qualities and knowledge of the ordinary reader of the

newspaper. The kind and quality of the readership “is as much part of

the context in which the alleged defamation occurs as the other words

contained in the article are”.29

27 Particulars of Claim vol 1 p 6 paras 13, 19, 24, 30 and 36; Defendant’s Request for Further Particulars vol 1 p 37 paras 3 to 6; Plaintiff’s Further Particulars vol 1 p 42 paras 8 to 10

28 Johnson v Beckett 1992 (1) SA 762 (A) 773B to D; Mthembi-Mahanyele v Mail & Guardian 2004 (6) SA 329 (SCA) paras 25, 26, 79 and 80; NEHAWU v Tsatsi 2006 (6) SA 327 (SCA) para 8

29 See the references in the previous footnote 22

45.3. The court takes account “not only of what the words expressly say, but

also what they imply”.30

45.4. Despite the fact that the same words may convey different things to

different people, the court attributes a single meaning to them. This

“single meaning rule” is well-established in English law.31 The SCA

recently adopted and applied an aspect of the rule in Tsedu.32 Its logic

is that one determines meaning through the eyes of a single notional

reader of the newspaper and not those of the actual readers who might

read it in different ways.

46. We submit that the ordinary reader of The Citizen would have understood the

controversial statements to mean that Mr McBride is not fit for appointment as

Ekurhuleni Chief of Police because he is a murderer despite the amnesty he

received for the murders he committed.

47. Mr McBride chose to sue on the articles and editorials which did not expressly

mention that he had received amnesty for the murders. The ordinary reader

30 Argus Printing and Publishing Co v Esselen’s Estate 1994 (2) SA 1 (A) 20E to G; Sindani v Van der Merwe 2002 (2) SA 32 (SCA) para 11; Mthembi-Mahanyele v Mail & Guardian 2004 (6) SA 329 (SCA) para 25

31 Charleston v Newsgroup Newspapers [1995] 2 AC 65 (HL) paras 71 to 72 and 73 to 74; Bonnick v Morris [2003] 1 AC 300 (PC) para 21

32 Tsedu v Lekota 2009 (4) SA 372 (SCA) paras 13 and 14 23

would however have known about it and understood it to be the premise of the

entire debate:

47.1. The Magoo’s Bar bombing, Mr McBride’s role in it and his amnesty for it,

are notorious facts of which most South Africans have knowledge. The

TRC said in the opening sentence of its report, that “All South Africans

know that our recent history is littered with some horrendous

occurrences” of which Magoo’s Bar was one.33 All South Africans or at

least those who read newspapers, know that civilians were killed in the

bombing of the bar and that Mr McBride was convicted and sentenced

to death but later received amnesty for his role in it. These events

received intense publicity at the time of the bombing in 1986, during Mr

McBride’s trial in 1987, when he was reprieved in 1992, when he was

appointed to the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1995, when he was

arrested, detained and later released on charges of gun-running in

Mozambique in 1998, when his amnesty application was heard in 1999

and when he was granted amnesty in 2001.

47.2. When it became known in September 2003 that he was a candidate for

appointment as Ekurhuleni Chief of Police, The Citizen reminded its

readers of these facts in its “McBride tipped” front page lead published

on 10 September 2003.34 It gave prominence to the Magoo’s Bar story,

33 TRC Report vol 1 chap 1 p 1 para 1

34 “McBride tipped” article 10 September 2003 vol 6 p 549 24

Mr McBride’s role in it and the amnesty he received for it. This report

set the scene for the public debate that followed.

47.3. The next day’s paper carried both the “No comment” article35 and the

“Here comes McBride” editorial.36 The “No comment” article reminded

readers of the fact that the TRC had granted Mr McBride amnesty for

the murders he had committed. The “Here comes McBride” editorial

commented on his fitness for office in the light of the murders he had

committed.

47.4. The first Williams article published a week later on 18 September 2003,

debated whether Mr McBride should be forgiven – a clear allusion to the

fact that he had received official “forgiveness” in the form of TRC

amnesty.37

47.5. The “Bomber McBride” article published on 22 September 2003 in

response to Mr McBride’s letter of demand, repeated the substance of

the “Here comes McBride” editorial.38

35 “No comment” article 11 September 2003 vol 6 p 551

36 “Here comes McBride” editorial 11 September 2003 vol 1 p 17

37 First Williams article 18 September 2003 vol 1 p 18

38 “Bomber McBride” article 22 September 2003 vol 1 p 20 25

47.6. That was where the matter rested for almost a month until the President

entered the debate by his letter published on the internet on Friday

17 October 2003.39 The basis on which he criticised The Citizen, was

that Mr McBride had received amnesty for his role in the Magoo’s Bar

bombing.40 He suggested that The Citizen had undermined the work of

the TRC.41

47.7. Following the President’s attack, The Citizen carried,

- the “Thabo Mbeki’s straw man” editorial on Monday 20 October

2003;42

- the Kenny article on Tuesday 21 October 2003;43

- the second Williams article on Wednesday 22 October 2003;44 and

- the Ngonyama article on Thursday 24 October 2003.45

39 President’s letter 17 October 2003 vol 7 p 581

40 President’s letter vol 7 p 581 at p 582 line 22 to p 583 line 2, p 584 lines 3 to 10 and p 585 line 26 to p 586 line 3

41 President’s letter vol 7 p 581 at p 586 line 4 to p 588 line 22

42 “Thabo Mbeki’s straw man” editorial 20 October 2003 vol 1 p 22

43 Kenny article 21 October 2003 vol 1 p 24

44 Second Williams article 22 October 2003 vol 1 p 19

45 Ngonyama article 24 October 2003 vol 6 p 564 26

47.8. This editorial and articles all engaged with the President’s criticism of

The Citizen that it had undermined the work of the TRC by its campaign

against Mr McBride’s appointment despite the amnesty he had received

for the murders he had committed. This entire debate was focussed on

the amnesty and its implications. The Ngonyama article made express

mention of it.

47.9. The “McBride cops job” editorial of 30 October 2003 concluded the

debate without adding anything to it.46

48. Mr McBride’s particulars of claim correctly identify the sting of the controversial

statements to be that he is not suited for the position of Ekurhuleni Chief of

Police because he is a murderer despite the amnesty he received for the

murders he had committed.47 Naturally, this formulation of the plaintiff’s claim

presupposes knowledge on the part of The Citizen’s readers of both the murder

and the amnesty, and also sets the basis for the comment as to his suitability for

that office.

46 “McBride cops job” editorial 30 October 2003 vol 1 p 23

47 Particulars of Claim vol 1 p 6 paras 13.1 to 13.8, 19, 24, 30 and 36; Defendant’s Request for Further Particulars vol 1 p 37 paras 3 to 6; Plaintiff’s Further Particulars vol 1 p 42 paras 8 to 10 27

THE CITIZEN’S DEFENCE

49. The Citizen raised a defence of fair comment.48 The requirements of such a

defence are that,

- the statement must constitute comment or opinion;

- it must be “fair”;

- the factual allegations on which the comment is made or opinion expressed,

must be true, and

- the comment or opinion must relate to a matter of public interest.49

50. The statement that Mr McBride was not fit to be the Chief of Police of Ekurhuleni,

was clearly comment on a matter of public interest.50

51. The comment was “fair” in that it was objectively “an honest, genuine (though

possibly exaggerated or prejudiced) expression of opinion relevant to the facts

on which it was based, and not disclosing malice”.51

48 Plea vol 1 p 26 paras 9.2, 14.2, 17.3, 22.2 and 26.2; Plaintiff’s Request for Further Particulars vol 1 p 32 paras 2 to 6; Defendant’s Further Particulars vol 1 p 34 paras 2 to 6

49 Hardaker v Phillips 2005 (4) SA 515 (SCA) para 26

50 SCA Judgment (Mthiyane JA) vol 9 p 721 paras 62 to 63, p 724 para 67 and p 735 paras 83 to 84

51 Johnson v Beckett 1992 (1) SA 762 (A) 783B; Hardaker v Phillips 2005 (4) SA 515 SCA paras 32 and 33; SCA Judgment (Mthiyane JA) vol 9 p 726 paras 69 to 70 28

52. The only question is whether the facts on which the comment was made, were

true. The SCA held that the statement that Mr McBride was a murderer despite

the amnesty he had received for the murders he had committed, was a

statement of fact. The question is accordingly whether it was true.

53. It is common cause that Mr McBride committed murder by his participation in the

Magoo’s Bar bombing. He confirmed it in his evidence:

“... at the date that you went there you put a car outside a bar with a bomb in

it. - Yes I did do that.

And you detonated the bomb. - Yes I did do that.

And it killed three women. - Yes I did do that.”52

54. The only remaining question is whether the amnesty granted to him rendered

this fact untrue. That is the question to which we now turn.

52 McBride vol 1 p 188 lines 11 to 14. See also McBride vol 2 p 115 lines 17 to 20 and p 187 lines 23 to 26 29

THE SCA’S FINDING

If the Party could thrust its hand into the past and say of this or that event,

it never happened --- that, surely, was more terrifying than mere torture and death? ...

And if all others accepted the lie which the Party imposed --- if all records told

the same tale --- then the lie passed into history and became truth.

George Orwell “1984” Part 1, Chapter 3

The finding

55. Streicher JA posed the question in paragraph 23 of his judgment, whether the

amnesty granted to Mr McBride “rendered the statement that he was a murderer

false”.53 He considered this question in paragraphs 23 to 33 and concluded,

- that people to whom amnesty had been granted for offences committed in the

course of the conflicts of the past “should be considered not to have

committed the offences”;54 and

- that The Citizen’s statement that Mr McBride is a murderer “is therefore

false”.55

53 SCA Judgment vol 9 p 700 para 23

54 SCA Judgment vol 9 p 704 para 30

55 SCA Judgment vol 9 p 706 para 33 30

56. Ponnan JA considered the same question in paragraphs 85 to 95 of his

concurring judgment.56 He also concluded in paragraphs 93 that The Citizen’s

statement that Mr McBride is a murderer, is false.57

57. Mthiyane JA considered the same question in paragraphs 73 to 82 of his

dissenting judgment.58 He concluded in paragraph 82 that The Citizen’s

statement that Mr McBride is a murderer, remains true as a matter of fact. The

effect of his amnesty was merely to relieve him of the civil and criminal legal

consequences of his crimes.59

58. We shall submit with respect that the dissenting opinion of Mthiyane JA is the

correct one. Before doing so, we consider some of the implications of the

majority’s finding.

The implications

59. The majority finding of the SCA that people who committed crimes are now

considered not to have committed them and that it is false to say that they did, is

far-reaching in its scope and implications. We submit it renders the TRC Act

unconstitutional.

56 SCA Judgment vol 9 p 737 paras 88 to 95

57 SCA Judgment vol 9 p 741 para 93

58 SCA Judgment vol 9 p 728 paras 73 to 82

59 SCA Judgment vol 9 p 734 para 82 31

60. The SCA’s finding embraces all crimes for which the TRC granted amnesty and

not only those committed in the struggle for liberation. It also includes the crimes

committed in defence of the apartheid state against the struggle for liberation.

61. The SCA’s finding is not limited to any particular context or any particular

purpose. The crimes for which amnesty was granted, are in all circumstances

and for all purposes deemed not to have been committed and it is always false to

say that they were committed whatever the circumstances or purpose for which it

is done.

62. It means that we must always and for all purposes pretend,

- that Dirk Coetzee, Almond Nofomela and David Tshikalanga did not murder

attorney Griffiths Mxenge;

- that Craig Williamson did not murder Ruth First and Jeanette Schoon by

having them assassinated;

- that Eugene de Kok did not participate in the murder of the Cradock Four;

- that Adrian Vlok never committed a crime by ordering the bombing of Khotzo

House and Cosatu House; and

- that Eugene de Kok, Craig Williamson and Johan Coetzee did not commit a

crime by bombing the London offices of the ANC. 32

63. The SCA would for instance brand as false, the account of the murder of

attorney Griffiths Mxenge given by Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke in the

inaugural Griffiths and Victoria Mxenge Memorial Lecture he delivered on 10

October 2009:

“On the night of 19 November 1981, Boet Griffs was assassinated and his

body was severely mutilated in an act of barbaric savagery. His murderers

used three okapi knives, a hunting knife and a wheel spanner because they

were ordered not to kill him with a gun. They inflicted 45 lacerations and stab

wounds that pierced his body, lungs, liver and heart. They slit his throat and

cut off his ears. They ripped open his stomach. The magistrate who sat at the

inquest into his death found that his death was caused by ‘the act of some

unknown person or persons.

His murderers are now known. They are self confessed. They are Dirk

Coetzee, Almond Nofomela, Joe Mamasela, Brian Ngqulunga and David

Tshikalanga. All were policemen and agents of the apartheid governments’

death squads. In 1996, 15 years later the Amnesty Committee of the Truth

and Reconciliation Commission granted them amnesty. The record of the

hearing on the death of Griffiths Mxenge before the Amnesty Committee

contains the confessions of his murderers. The confessions make harrowing

reading. They amount to a chilling account of a state that had lost its way;

that had forsaken the rule of law and justice in favour of brutality, terror and

murder against its political adversaries.”60

60

www.nmmu.ac.za/documents/lectures/Griffiths_and_Victoria_Mxenge_Inaugural_Lecture_330_Octob er_2009.pdf 33

64. If the law demands that we pretend that these crimes were never committed and

renders it false to say that they were, then it is an attempt to obliterate the past

and rewrite history despite the SCA’s protestations to the contrary.61 It means

that our history must be written without acknowledgment of the criminality of its

atrocities and without paying tribute to the targets of those atrocities as the

victims or survivors of crime. It is an attempt to scrub clean the annals of history.

65. The law of defamation also sometimes precludes us from raising infamies of the

past despite their truth. But it does not render them untrue. It merely precludes

us from raising old skeletons which are no longer germane to any matter of

public interest. It permits us to raise them whenever they are germane to any

matter of public interest.62 The SCA’s finding goes much further. It renders the

truth false and precludes us from speaking it under any circumstances or for any

purpose.

66. This court has often said that the right to freedom of expression entrenched in

s 16 of the Constitution, lies at the heart of democracy and is valuable inter alia

for “its facilitation of the search for truth by individuals and society generally”.63

61 SCA Judgment vol 9 p 705 para 33 and p 740 para 93

62 Graham v Ker (1892) 9 SC 185; Botha v Pretoria Printing Works 1906 TS 710 at 715; Coetzee v Central News Agency 1953 (1) SA 449 (W) 452H to 453B; Pienaar v Argus Printing and Publishing Co 1956 (4) SA 310 (W) 322A to E; Yusaf v Bailey 1964 (4) SA 117 (W) 126G to 127C; Mahomed v Kassim 1973 (2) SA 1 (RA) 9F to 10H; Buthelezi v Poorter 1975 (4) SA 608 (W) 617C to E; Iyman v Natal Witness Printing and Publishing Company 1991 (4) SA 677 (N) 686C; Kemp v Republican Press 1994 (4) SA 261 (E) 265I to 266C; Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) para 36 footnote 38 63 SANDU v Minister of Defence 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC) para 7; Case v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC) para 26; Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) para 21; Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority 2002 (4) SA 294 (CC) para 26; Phillips v DPP, WLD 2003 (3) SA 345 (CC) para 23; De Reuck v DPP, WLD 2004 (1) SA 406 (CC) para 59; Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC) para 138; SABC v NDPP 2007 (1) SA 523 (CC) paras 23 and 119 34

The SCA’s interpretation renders the TRC Act in fundamental breach of this right

in that it suppresses the truth by deeming it to be false and by rendering it

actionable to speak the truth under any circumstances or for any purpose

however compelling. Such a fundamental invasion of so important a right is not

justified in terms of s 36.

67. We submit with respect for the reasons that follow, that the SCA’s interpretation

is wrong. 35

THE LANGUAGE OF THE TRC ACT

68. The TRC Act spells out the consequences of amnesty in ss 20(7) to (10). This

court considered their meaning and implications in Du Toit.64 They do not bluntly

deem the crimes for which amnesty is granted, never to have been committed as

the SCA’s interpretation would have it. They provide for a range of specific and

carefully crafted consequences of amnesty.

69. Sections 20(7) and (9) govern the perpetrator’s civil liability for acts for which he

receives amnesty:

69.1. Section 20(9) preserves his outstanding liability under any civil judgment

based on those acts which was handed down before he received

amnesty.65

69.2. Section 20(7) immunises him against any future imposition of civil

liability for those acts.66

64 Du Toit v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 (6) SA 128 (CC) paras 31 to 56

65 Du Toit para 42

66 Du Toit para 40 36

70. Sections 20(7), (8) and (10) govern the perpetrator’s criminal liability for acts for

which he receives amnesty:

70.1. Section 20(7) immunises him against any future imposition of criminal

liability for those acts.67 It does not deem those acts not to have

occurred or not to have been criminal. On the contrary, s 20(7)(b)

makes it clear that amnesty does not protect the perpetrator’s

accomplices whose criminal liability is dependent on his.

70.2. Section 20(8) provides for perpetrators who are standing trial or who are

serving a custodial sentence, for acts for which they receive amnesty.

The pending proceedings are rendered void, the sentence if any lapses

and the perpetrator is released from custody. These consequences

only flow prospectively from the date of amnesty.68

70.3. Section 20(10) relates to the perpetrator’s previous conviction if any, for

acts for which he receives amnesty. It provides that,

- “any entry or record of the conviction shall be deemed to be expunged

from all official documents or records” and

- “the conviction shall for all purposes, including the application of any

act of parliament or any other law, be deemed not to have taken 67 Du Toit para 40

68 Du Toit para 41 37

place”.

71. We emphasize the following features of s 20(10):

71.1. It only benefits perpetrators who have been convicted of offences for

which they receive amnesty. It does not apply to those who committed

crimes of which they have never been convicted.

71.2. It only governs the status of the perpetrator’s previous conviction. It is

deemed to have been expunged from all official records and never to

have taken place.

71.3. It only operates prospectively. It does not undo the legal consequences

of the conviction already complete by the time amnesty is granted.69

72. None of the provisions of ss 20(7) to (10) says or implies that crimes for which

amnesty is granted, are deemed not to have been committed:

69 Du Toit para 52 38

72.1. They only relieve the perpetrator of some of the legal consequences of

his crime. They do not “restore the perpetrator, in every respect, to his

or her position prior to the commission of the offence”.70

72.2. They leave intact some of the significant legal consequences of the

perpetrator’s crime. They include all the completed legal consequences

visited upon the perpetrator, his outstanding liability under a civil

judgment already granted, and the characterisation of his past conduct

as criminal for purposes of the criminal liability of his accomplices.

72.3. They say nothing at all about the fact of the perpetrator’s past conduct

or its characterisation as criminal except that they expressly retain this

characterisation of his past conduct for purposes of the criminal liability

of his accomplices.

72.4. Section 20(10) in particular does not say that the perpetrator must be

deemed not to have committed the crime for which he received amnesty

It merely nullifies his previous conviction if any, and deems it never to

have taken place.

72.5. This understanding of s 20(10) is borne out by the fact that the section

only applies to perpetrators who have been convicted of the crimes for 70 Du Toit para 51 39

which they receive amnesty. It would be unbearably anomalous to interpret it to mean that their crimes must be deemed never to have been committed, without extending the same benefit to perpetrators who have never been convicted of the crimes for which they receive amnesty. 40

THE HISTORICAL PURPOSE OF THE TRC ACT

73. The SCA did not identify any particular provision of the TRC Act which says

expressly or by implication that crimes for which amnesty has been granted,

must be considered never to have been committed or that it is false to say that

they were. Its finding was based instead, on what it saw as the historical

purpose of the TRC Act. It found the purpose in the epilogue to the Interim

Constitution. It held that the purpose of the TRC Act was to grant amnesty to

perpetrators “to close the book on human rights transgressions of the past in

order to achieve reconciliation”. It inferred from this purpose, that the crimes of

the past for which amnesty is given, must be deemed never to have been

committed.71

74. We submit with respect that the SCA erred in its identification of the historical

purpose of the TRC Act. It was not merely to give effect to the amnesty promise

made in the epilogue to the Interim Constitution. Its ultimate objective was

indeed national reconciliation. But amnesty to perpetrators was not the only or

even the principal means by which it pursued that objective. It sought instead, to

find a balance between amnesty for perpetrators on the one hand and justice for

victims on the other. It found this balance in truth-telling. It sought to find, reveal

and preserve the truth about the past so that it might be remembered and never

be repeated.

71 SCA Judgment vol 9 p 702 paras 27 to 33 and p 737 paras 88 to 93 41

75. The Minister of Justice made this broader purpose clear when he introduced the

TRC Act in parliament. He recited the epilogue to the Interim Constitution and

continued as follows:

“I could have gone to Parliament and produced an amnesty law --- but this

would have been to ignore the victims of violence entirely. We recognised

that we could not forgive perpetrators unless we attempt also to restore the

honour and dignity of the victims and give effect to reparation. ...

The President believes --- and many of us support him in this belief --- that

the truth concerning human rights violations in our country cannot be

suppressed or simply forgotten. They ought to be investigated, recorded and

made known ....

There is a commitment to break from the past, to heal the wounds of the past,

to forgive but not to forget and to build a future on respect for human rights ...

I wish to stress that the objective of the exercise is not to conduct a witch

hunt or to drag violators of human rights before court to face charges.

However, it must be stressed that a commission is a necessary exercise to

enable South Africans to come to terms with their past on a morally accepted

basis and to advance the cause of reconciliation. I invited you to join in the

search for truth without which there can be no genuine reconciliation.”72

76. In response to the question why there should be a TRC, he referred to the

requirement of amnesty in the epilogue to the Interim Constitution and continued

72 Introduction by the Minister of Justice, Mr Dullah Omar http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/legal/justice.htm 42

as follows:

“But concern for perpetrators is not enough. There are many individuals,

families and communities who have suffered deeply as a result of human

rights violations. They deserve to know the truth as part of the healing

process. It is the search for truth which can create the moral climate in which

reconciliation and peace will flourish.” 73

77. The explanatory memorandum which accompanied the TRC Bill in parliament,

made the same point more than once:

77.1. It said that the purpose of the bill,

“is to bring about unity and reconciliation by providing for the

investigation and full disclosure of gross violations of human rights

committed in the past.

It is based on the principle that reconciliation depends on forgiveness

and that forgiveness can only take place if gross violations of human

rights are fully disclosed. What is, therefore, envisaged is

reconciliation through a process of national healing.”74

77.2. It described international experience on this score as follows:

73 Ibid

74 Explanatory Memorandum to the Parliamentary Bill www.justice.gov.za/trc/legal/bill.htm 43

“International experience shows that, if we are to achieve unity and

morally acceptable reconciliation, it is necessary that the truth about

gross violations of human rights must be:-

• established by an official investigation unit using fair

procedures;

• fully and unreservedly acknowledged by the

perpetrators;

• made known to the public, together with the identity of

the planners, perpetrators and victims.”75

78. Graeme Simpson explains how this evolution of the purpose of the TRC Act

came about:

“After the 1994 elections, the new Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar,

immediately signalled his intention to establish a TRC. Omar was aware that

the ‘postscript’ to the Constitution was binding, and accepted responsibility for

enacting legislation that would provide mechanisms and criteria for the

granting of amnesty. But, along with a strong, vocal and well-organised

human rights sector outside government, he was also concerned that

amnesty was a process geared essentially to the interests of perpetrators. If

South Africa was to come to terms with its past, build national reconciliation

and establish a society based on respect for human rights, the needs of

victims would have to be given equal weight.

75 Ibid 44

On this basis, it was argued that any amnesty process that was not accompanied by an attempt to disclose fully the nature of the crimes perpetrated, would have grave implications for the long-term prospects of sustainable democracy. In particular, amnesty would mean that the victims of abuse, on all sides of the political spectrum, would never have access to the information essential to their rehabilitation, let alone any prospect of redress under civil or criminal law. Without public acknowledgment or the possibility of restitution through the courts, there was a risk of widespread resentment and of private retribution --- despite the existence of a new democratic dispensation.

The TRC represented a creative response to these concerns. It was decided that the Commission would not only grant amnesty to perpetrators, but would also seek to establish the truth about past human rights violations, provide victims with some form of reparation, and make recommendations to the

President about measures the government should take to prevent any future recurrence of abuse. By foregrounding the interests of victims, the TRC would attempt to restore the moral balance to any amnesty agreement borne of political compromise. This fusion of amnesty with truth recovery and reparation was without precedent, and its objectives should be borne in mind during any evaluation of the TRC’s work. In a sense, truth recovery was viewed not so much as a trade for justice, but as an alternative restorative

(rather than punitive) approach to justice. In fact, conversations about the nature and quality of the historical truths recovered by the TRC go to the heart of the Commission’s restorative justice aspirations, both in respect of 45

the amnesty process for perpetrators and in respect of the testimonies by

survivors.”76

79. Alex Borraine,77 Colin Bundy,78 Deborah Posel and Graeme Simpson79 and the

TRC Report80 confirm this explanation. Colin Bundy summarises it as follows:

“Viewed within this reading of the negotiated settlement, the TRC emerged as

a crucial element of the historic compromise. More than that: Its own origins

involved an attempt to balance demands for disclosure and justice with an

existing commitment to a process of amnesty. The commitment to amnesty

was a ‘last minute compromise struck so late in the negotiation process that it

had to be included in a ‘Postamble’ tacked on to the end of the [Interim]

Constitution’; the commitment to parallel processes of an official

determination of the truth about past human rights abuses and some form of

reparation came after the 1994 elections.”81

Deborah Posel and Graeme Simpson note that the TRC was seen,

76 Graeme Simpson Tell no lies, claim no easy victories in Commissioning the Past: Understanding South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission ed Deborah Posel and Graeme Simpson, Wits University Press (2001) 222 to 223

77 Alex Borraine The Language of Potential in After the TRC: Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation in SA ed Wilmot James and Linda van de Vijver, David Philip Publishers (2000)

78 Colin Bundy The beast of the past: History and the TRC in After the TRC: Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation in SA ed Wilmot James and Linda van de Vijver, David Philip Publishers (2000) 12

79 Deborah Posel and Graeme Simpson The Power of Truth in Commissioning the Past ed Deborah Posel and Graeme Simpson, Witwatersrand University Press (2001) 1 to 13

80 TRC Report vol 1 chap 4 p 49 paras 6 to 28

81 Op Cit, Bundy 12 46

“as a means of putting a divided and conflictual past behind the nation

through acknowledgment, rather than amnesia.”82

80. As a result of this evolution, truth-telling became the primary focus of the TRC

Act. Justice O’Regan described it as follows:

“... the primary focus of the TRC legislation was to establish the truth about

the past. The scheme, simply stated, was to encourage those perpetrators of

gross human rights violations to come forward and tell their story in full. Full

and frank disclosure entitled a perpetrator to apply for amnesty within the

scheme of the Act. Amnesty, of course, meant that a perpetrator escaped

prosecution, conviction and punishment. The absence of punishment means

vengeance is not exacted. ... In affording amnesty to those who confessed to

gross human rights violations and described them in full detail, the Act

foresaw retribution in favour of truth.”83

81. This court also identified this expanded objective of the TRC Act in Du Toit:

“The objective was to facilitate the establishment of as complete a picture as

possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human

rights. In order to achieve this, the Reconciliation Act provides that amnesty

would be granted to perpetrators who make full disclosure of the facts relating

to acts committed with a political purpose during the period identified.

82 Op Cit, Posel et al 9

83 O’Regan History and Justice in Without Prejudice vol 9 no 4 (May 2009) 34 47

The grant of amnesty was to a certain extent a means to an end. Truth-

telling is central to the development of a collective memory and in order for

that truth to be told, amnesty was granted to those making disclosure about

offences that they had committed.”84

84 Du Toit v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (6) SA 128 (CC) paras 19 to 20 48

THE SCHEME OF THE TRC ACT

82. The scheme of the TRC Act gives effect to its historical purpose. It strikes a

balance between the promise of amnesty to perpetrators on the one hand and

the need to do justice to their victims on the other. It does so by focusing on the

discovery, exposure and preservation of the truth about the past. It provides for

amnesty but it is not its only or even principal concern. On the contrary, it

employs its promise of amnesty as a means to assist in the discovery of the

truth.

83. It must moreover be borne in mind when one interprets its amnesty provisions,

that they fundamentally intrude upon the basic rights of victims. This court

recognised in Azapo that amnesty to wrongdoers “effectively obliterates” their

victims’ fundamental rights to civil and criminal retribution.85 The TRC Act is

accordingly,

“a difficult, sensitive, perhaps even agonising, balancing act between the

need for justice to victims of past abuse and the need for reconciliation and

rapid transfer to a new future; between encouragement to wrongdoers to

help in the discovery of the truth and the need for reparations for the victims

of that truth; between a correction in the old and the creation of the new.”86

85 Azapo v President of the RSA 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) para 9

86 Azapo para 21 49

84. It was for this reason, “... important at the time that those coming forward to the

Truth and Reconciliation Commission and admitting to wrongs they had

committed did not receive the lion’s share of benefits from the process. The

Reconciliation Act carefully ensures this.”87

85. The provisions of the TRC Act make clear its shift of focus from mere amnesty to

perpetrators to a concern for justice to victims by seeking, revealing and

recording the truth.

86. The long title opens by saying that the purpose of the TRC Act is,

“To provide for the investigation and the establishment of as complete a

picture as possible of the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of

human rights committed during the period from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off

date contemplated in the Constitution, within or outside the Republic,

emanating from the conflicts of the past, and the fate or whereabouts of the

victims of such violations.”

It goes on to say that its purpose is also to grant amnesty but only to,

“Persons who make full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts

associated with a political objective committed in the course of the conflicts of

the past during the said period.”

87 Du Toit v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (6) SA 128 (CC) para 53 50

87. The preamble starts by referring to the constitutional injunction to build a bridge

between the past of a deeply divided society and a future founded on the

recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence. It goes on to

describe the means by which the TRC Act pursues that objective. The first is,

“To establish the truth in relation to past events as well as the motives for and

circumstances in which gross violations of human rights have occurred, and

to make the findings known in order to prevent a repetition of such acts in

future.”

Amnesty is also mentioned as one of its objectives but clearly not as its only or even principal focus.

88. Section 2(1) establishes the “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” as the

vehicle by which this must be achieved. Even its name reflects its focus on the

truth. It is not called the “Amnesty Commission”.

89. Section 3(1) identifies the four objectives of the TRC. All of them reflect or are

aligned with the overall objective of discovering, revealing and preserving the

truth about the past:

89.1. The first is to establish “as complete a picture as possible of the causes,

nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights” of the past. 51

89.2. The second is to grant amnesty to perpetrators but only those “who

make full disclosure of all the relevant facts”.

89.3. The third is to establish and make known the fate or whereabouts of

victims and to restore their human and civil dignity “by granting them an

opportunity to relate their own accounts of the violations of which they

are the victims”.

89.4. The fourth is to compile a report which provides “as comprehensive an

account as possible” of the facts discovered in pursuit of the first,

second and third objectives and with recommendations of measures to

prevent the future violations of human rights.

90. The TRC’s functions described in s 4, follow the same pattern and elaborate on

its pursuit of its four objectives.

91. Section 11 lays down the principles which govern the TRC’s treatment of victims.

They emphasize the focus of its concern to bring justice to victims.

92. The TRC’s work is done through,

- the Committee on Human Rights Violations in terms of chapter 3; 52

- the Committee on Amnesty in terms of chapter 4; and

- the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation in terms of chapter 5.

93. The Committee on Human Rights Violations is victim oriented. Its principal

function in terms of s 14(1) is to gather evidence of the gross violations of human

rights of the past and to report to the TRC on them in terms of s 14(2).

94. Amnesty is the concern of the Committee on Amnesty but even its mandate

prioritises truth-telling:

94.1. It must investigate all applications for amnesty in terms of s 19(2). It is

given wide-ranging resources and powers to do so in terms of ss 28 to

32.

94.2. It may only grant amnesty for gross violations of human rights after a

hearing in terms of s 19(4) read with s 19(3)(b)(iii). Such a hearing must

ordinarily be held in public in terms of s 33.

94.3. It may only grant amnesty if it is satisfied in terms of s 20(1)(c) that the

applicant has made full disclosure of all the relevant facts. 53

94.4. If it does so, it must by proclamation in the Government Gazette make

known the full names of the person to whom amnesty is granted

together with sufficient information to identify the act, omission or

offence in respect of which it is granted.

95. On completion of its work, the TRC must submit a report to the President in

terms of s 43. He is obliged in terms of s 44 to bring the report “to the notice of

the Nation”. 54

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRC ACT

96. The TRC’s Final Report makes it clear that it understood and implemented the

TRC Act to give effect to its purpose reflected in its history and the scheme of its

provisions. Its focus was on finding, revealing and preserving the truth about the

past so that it may be remembered and not repeated. It granted amnesty to

perpetrators but on a basis designed to serve the overriding objective of finding,

exposing and preserving the truth. It sought closure for victims, perpetrators and

society at large, not by amnesia, but by truth-telling.

97. The chair of the TRC Archbishop Desmond Tutu eloquently explained in his

foreword why the TRC pursued national reconciliation through truth and not

amnesia:

“There were others who urged that the past should be forgotten --- glibly

declaring that we should ‘let bygones be bygones’. This option was rightly

rejected because such amnesia would have resulted in further victimisation of

victims by denying their awful experiences....

The other reason amnesia simply will not do is that the past refuses to lie

down quietly. It has an uncanny habit of returning to haunt one. ‘Those who

forget the past are doomed to repeat it’ are the words emblazoned at the

entrance to the museum in the former concentration camp of Dachau. They

are words we would do well to keep ever in mind ...

In our case, dealing with the past means knowing what happened. Who

ordered that this person should be killed? Why did this gross violation of 55

human rights take place? We also need to know about the past so that we

can renew our resolve and commitment that never again will such violations

take place. We need to know about the past in order to establish a culture of

respect for human rights. It is only by accounting for the past that we can

become accountable for the future.

For all these reasons, our nation, through those who negotiated the transition

from apartheid to democracy, chose the option of individual and not blanket

amnesty. And we believe that this individual amnesty has demonstrated its

value. One of the criteria to be satisfied before amnesty could be granted

was full disclosure of the truth. Freedom was granted in exchange for

truth. ...”88

98. He later elaborated on the reasons why the TRC sought reconciliation through

truth and not amnesia89 and said the following:

“The trouble is that there are erroneous notions of what reconciliation is all

about. Reconciliation is not about being cosy; it is not about pretending that

things were other than they were. Reconciliation based on falsehood, on not

facing up to reality, is not true reconciliation and will not last.”90

88 TRC Report vol 1 chap 1 p 7 paras 26 to 29

89 TRC Report vol 1 chap 1 p 17 paras 68 to 73

90 para 69 56

99. The TRC noted that, not only its report but its entire record including all the

evidence it had gathered, “will form a part of the national memory for generations

yet to come”.91 It emphasized the role of “acknowledgment” in this context:

“Acknowledgment refers to placing information that is (or becomes) known on

public, national record. It is not merely the actual knowledge about past

human rights violations that counts; often the basic facts about what

happened are already known, at least by those who were affected. What is

critical is that these facts be fully and publicly acknowledged.

Acknowledgment is an affirmation that a person’s pain is real and worthy of

attention. It is thus central to the restoration of the dignity of victims.”92

100. In its discussion of the relationship between truth and reconciliation93 the TRC

again refuted suggestions that “to forgive is to forget” and that they should “let

bygones be bygones” and “forget about the past and focus on the future”.

101. In their discussion of the relationship between amnesty, truth and justice,94 the

TRC explained that they had followed a middle path “between a Nuremberg

option and total amnesia” of “amnesty with a considerable degree of

91 TRC Report vol 1 chap 5 p 113 para 38

92 TRC Report vol 1 chap 5 p 114 para 45

93 TRC Report vol 1 chap 5 p 115 paras 46 to 52

94 TRC Report vol 1 chap 5 p 117 paras 53 to 79 57

accountability built into it”.95 While successful amnesty applicants could not be

punished,

“The impact of public acknowledgment should not be underestimated.

Perpetrators were not able to take refuge in anonymity or hide behind

national amnesia.”96

102. The TRC made it clear that its truth-seeking was not directed at disclosure only

to close the book on the past, but was on the contrary directed at ensuring that

society never forgot the atrocities of the past:

“The nation must use these stories to sharpen its moral conscience and to

ensure that, never again, will it gradually atrophy to the point where personal

responsibility is abdicated. The challenge is to develop public awareness, to

keep the memories alive, not only of gross violations of human rights, but of

everyday life under apartheid. Only in this way can South Africans ensure

that they do not again become complicit in the banality that leads, step by

step, to the kinds of outrageous deeds that have left many ‘good’ South

Africans feeling that they can never be expected, even indirectly, to accept

responsibility for them ...

Thus, a key pillar of the bridge between a deeply divided past of ‘untold

suffering and injustice’ and a future ‘founded upon the recognition of human

rights, democracy, peaceful co-existence, and development opportunities for

95 TRC Report vol 1 chap 5 p 118 para 59

96 TRC Report vol 1 chap 5 p 120 para 62 58

all’ is a wide acceptance of direct and indirect, individual and shared

responsibility for past human rights violations.”97

103. In line with its emphasis on remembering the past, the Commission’s very first

recommendation directed at prevention of gross human rights violations in the

future, was that all its records and reports which “form a rich contribution to the

public memory” should be made available to the public “in the widest possible

way”.98

104. An interesting and pertinent footnote to the manner in which the TRC

implemented its mandate under the TRC Act, is that it considered recommending

the disqualification or removal from public office of people who had been

implicated in violations of human rights. It considered this question carefully but

finally decided not to recommend it. It suggested however that,

“when making appointments and recommendations, political parties and the

state should take into consideration the disclosures made in the course of the

Commission’s work.”99

97 TRC Report vol 1 chap 5 p 133 paras 109 to 110

98 TRC Report vol 5 chap 8 p 308 para 14

99 TRC Report vol 1 chap 1 p 3 para 11 read with vol 5 chap 8 p 310 paras 17 to 19 59

105. The TRC thus considered it permissible and appropriate for the disclosures

about a perpetrator’s past gross human rights violations, to be taken into account

when he is considered for appointment to public office. 60

THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE TRC ACT

106. We submit with respect that the SCA’s finding that the TRC Act by implication

deems crimes of the past never to have been committed and renders false any

statement that they did, is not to be found in the language of the TRC Act and is

profoundly inimical to its purpose as revealed by its history, scheme and

implementation.

107. Its principal focus is directed at finding, exposing and preserving the truth about

the past. Perpetrators are rewarded with amnesty but only in return for

disclosing the truth. Victims are rewarded with the truth in return for relinquishing

their moral and legal claim to retributive justice. National reconciliation is

pursued through and on the basis of the truth. The truth is recorded, published,

preserved and remembered to avoid a repetition of the past.

108. It is intolerable to suggest that the very same TRC Act which offers truth as the

panacea to victims in return for their moral and legal claim to retributive justice,

truth as the stepping stone towards national reconciliation and truth as the

safeguard against repetition of the atrocities of the past, should at the same time

and in the same breath suppress the truth by deeming it to be false and by

rendering its disclosure an actionable falsehood. 61

109. It does not mean that perpetrators who have received amnesty for their crimes,

may forever be branded criminal. The common law of defamation determines

when it may be done and when not. The disclosure of past infamies and old

scandals is not permissible if it is no longer germane to a matter of public

interest. Only if and when it remains germane to a matter of public interest, may

the disclosure be made.100 It is such an occasion when a murderer is a

candidate for appointment to the public officer of Chief of Police. Views may

differ on his fitness for office in the light of his criminal past. But it is germane to

the issue and may lawfully be raised.

100 Graham v Ker (1892) 9 SC 185; Botha v Pretoria Printing Works 1906 TS 710 at 715; Coetzee v Central News Agency 1953 (1) SA 449 (W) 452H to 453B; Pienaar v Argus Printing and Publishing Co 1956 (4) SA 310 (W) 322A to E; Yusaf v Bailey 1964 (4) SA 117 (W) 126G to 127C; Mahomed v Kassim 1973 (2) SA 1 (RA) 9F to 10H; Buthelezi v Poorter 1975 (4) SA 608 (W) 617C to E; Iyman v Natal Witness Printing and Publishing Company 1991 (4) SA 677 (N) 686C; Kemp v Republican Press 1994 (4) SA 261 (E) 265I to 266C; Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) para 36 footnote 38 62

PRAYER

110. The applicants ask for an order in the following terms:

110.1. The applicants are given leave to appeal and their appeal is upheld with

costs including the costs of three counsel.

110.2. The orders of the SCA are set aside and replaced with an order

upholding the appeal with costs including the costs of two counsel.

110.3. The orders of the High Court are set aside and replaced with the

following order: “The plaintiff’s claims are dismissed with costs.”

Wim Trengove SC

Shem Symon SC 63

Shanee Stein

Tosh Naidoo

Applicants’ counsel

Chambers

Sandton

7 May 2010 64

AUTHORITIES

Argus Printing and Publishing Co v Esselen’s Estate 1994 (2) SA 1 (A)

Azapo v President of the RSA 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) para 9

Bonnick v Morris [2003] 1 AC 300 (PC)

Botha v Pretoria Printing Works 1906 TS 710

Buthelezi v Poorter 1975 (4) SA 608 (W)

Case v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC)

Charleston v Newsgroup Newspapers [1995] 2 AC 65 (HL)

Coetzee v Central News Agency 1953 (1) SA 449 (W)

De Reuck v DPP, WLD 2004 (1) SA 406 (CC)

Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC)

Du Toit v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (6) SA 128 (CC)

Graham v Ker (1892) 9 SC 185

Hardaker v Phillips 2005 (4) SA 515 (SCA)

Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority 2002 (4) SA 294 (CC)

Iyman v Natal Witness Printing and Publishing Company 1991 (4) SA 677 (N)

Johnson v Beckett 1992 (1) SA 762 (A)

Kemp v Republican Press 1994 (4) SA 261 (E)

Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC)

Mahomed v Kassim 1973 (2) SA 1 (RA)

Mthembi-Mahanyele v Mail & Guardian 2004 (6) SA 329 (SCA)

NEHAWU v Tsatsi 2006 (6) SA 327 (SCA)

Phillips v DPP, WLD 2003 (3) SA 345 (CC)

Pienaar v Argus Printing and Publishing Co 1956 (4) SA 310 (W)

SABC v NDPP 2007 (1) SA 523 (CC)

SANDU v Minister of Defence 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC) 65

Sindani v Van der Merwe 2002 (2) SA 32 (SCA)

Tsedu v Lekota 2009 (4) SA 372 (SCA)

Yusaf v Bailey 1964 (4) SA 117 (W)

Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (29 October 1998) http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/index.htm

Graeme Simpson Tell no lies, claim no easy victories in Commissioning the Past: Understanding South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission ed Deborah Posel and Graeme Simpson, Wits University Press (2001) 222 to 223

Alex Borraine The Language of Potential in After the TRC: Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation in SA ed Wilmot James and Linda van de Vijver, David Philip Publishers (2000)

Colin Bundy The beast of the past: History and the TRC in After the TRC: Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation in SA ed Wilmot James and Linda van de Vijver, David Philip Publishers (2000) 12

Deborah Posel and Graeme Simpson The Power of Truth in Commissioning the Past ed Deborah Posel and Graeme Simpson, Witwatersrand University Press (2001) 1 to 13

O’Regan History and Justice in Without Prejudice vol 9 no 4 (May 2009) 34