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Beyond the Islamic State Beyond the Islamic state A new perspective on Hizballah’s policies Kai E. Kverme ARA4590 Master’s Thesis in Arabic Language Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages UNIVERSITETET I OSLO November 2010 II © Kai. E. Kverme År 2010 Beyond the Islamic state: A new perspective on Hizballah’s policies Author: Kai E. Kverme http://www.duo.uio.no/ Printing: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo III Abstract Islamist movements have traditionally been analyzed on the basis of their goal of establishing an Islamic State. But how should these movements be understood when this seemingly fundamental goal is abandoned? The following is a study of the Lebanese Hizballah, where I pursue a hypothesis that the aim of this party is to get a hegemony over Shiite Lebanon. By studying different components of the Shiite Lebanese society; a local community in South Lebanon, the religious leader Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Hizballah itself, and their Shiite critics, I argue that this party has managed to get a hegemony over the Shiite community. Through this hegemony Hizballah has managed to become the dominant political force in Lebanon, and is thus able to control the direction of national politics as well. IV V Acknowledgements I would like to start by thanking my supervisors, Associate Professor Kjetil Selvik and Professor Gunvor Mejdell. I am deeply grateful for all their kind advices and the encouragement they gave me through the work with this thesis. The feedback offered me by Selvik was invaluable, I am very grateful! Further I would like to thank Associate Professor Bjørn Olav Utvik, for whom I have worked as Research Assistant for the past three years. His insights and encouragement have been invaluable, and it has been an unprecedented pleasure and honor to work for him. In this respect I would also like to thank Dr. Tilde Rosmer and Truls Hallberg-Tønnessen for their comments and for three fantastic years on the Fault Lines of Islamism project. I would also like to take the opportunity to thank all my teachers and colleagues at IKOS, not least Mary Moubarak, whose advice and company both here and in Lebanon have been great! I would also like to thank my colleague Jon Nordenson for all his feedback and help; it has been an honor to work with him. And I would also like to thank Monica Lund Haugom for all the assistance through the years. Ingrid Baltzersen has always had valuable comments and advices, I am very grateful. I would also like to thank numerous friends and fellow students for listening to my endless talks on the subject through the years. I would like to thank all those in Mabarrat and in Khiam for receiving me and making my fieldwork possible, not least Shaykh Mahmoud Jalloul. I am very grateful for the unique opportunities he offered me, and not least for arranging my meetings with the late Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, may he rest in peace. I am also deeply grateful for all help, advice, and company offered me by friends in Beirut, not least bi l-bayt . I love you all! Finally, I am extremely grateful for all the encouragement and help offered me by my mother and father over the years. Without this, I would never have managed to complete this thesis! VI VII Notes on transliteration I have chosen to employ the transliteration used by the International Journal of Middle East Studies: ʾ ء b ب t ت th ث j ج ḥ ح kh خ d د dh ذ r ر z ز s س sh ش ṣ ص ḍ ض ṭ ط ẓ ظ ʿ ع gh غ f ف q ق VIII k ك l ل m م n ن h ه w و y ى a, in the construction -at ة -al ال The long vowels are transliterated as follows: ā ى ī ي ū و Doubled: Diphthongs: Short vowels: ay a,u,i َي iyy, with final form ī ّي aw َو uww, with final form ū وّ The Hamzat al-wa ṣl is not written. For names of persons I have given the name in full transliteration in square brackets the first time the name is mentioned, thereafter only the common English spelling is used. Names are always given with the capital letter first, for example Fadlallah [Fa ḍl All āh]. In cases where there is no common English spelling, such as al-Kh ūʿī, I have chosen to use the Arabic transliteration. The same is done for some specific terms for which it is difficult to give a simple English translation. Topographs are written as they appear on signs in Latin script in Lebanon. IX As for the transliteration of words in sequence, I have chosen to transliterate all words in pausal modus. All transliterations are italicized. The first letter in a sentence is written with a capital letter. Translations from Arabic or Norwegian are mine. X XI Contents 1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................1 1.1 The structure of the thesis .........................................................................................2 2 Theoretical framework ....................................................................................................4 2.1 Previous research on Hizballah .................................................................................4 2.2 A regular political party? ..........................................................................................4 2.3 A different view .......................................................................................................7 2.4 Other studies on the party in Arabic ..........................................................................9 2.5 The need for a new perspective ............................................................................... 11 2.6 Hegemony .............................................................................................................. 12 3 Methodology ................................................................................................................ 16 3.1 A case study ........................................................................................................... 16 3.1.1 Fieldwork ........................................................................................................ 17 3.1.2 Limitations and obstacles ................................................................................ 17 3.2 A redesigned thesis ................................................................................................. 19 3.2.1 From the local to the national .......................................................................... 19 3.3 The sources ............................................................................................................ 20 3.3.1 The fieldwork .................................................................................................. 20 3.3.2 Written sources ............................................................................................... 21 3.3.3 Interviews ....................................................................................................... 22 3.3.4 Other sources .................................................................................................. 23 3.4 Triangulation and Crystallization ............................................................................ 24 3.5 Objectivity ............................................................................................................. 24 4 The Lebanese state ........................................................................................................ 26 4.1 A contested entity ................................................................................................... 26 4.2 The civil war and its impact .................................................................................... 28 4.3 Sectarianism ........................................................................................................... 29 4.4 The parliamentary system ....................................................................................... 30 4.5 The Lebanese Shiites .............................................................................................. 32 4.6 The religious hierarchy and the position of the clerics. ............................................ 33 4.7 Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah ................................................................................ 35 5 A Shiite town in south Lebanon .................................................................................... 37 XII 5.1 A local community and the question of hegemony .................................................. 37 5.2 Khiam .................................................................................................................... 37 5.3 UNIFIL .................................................................................................................. 38 5.4 The July 2006 war .................................................................................................. 39 5.5 ‘We don’t have a state, we have parties’ ................................................................. 40 5.6 The neglected periphery ......................................................................................... 42 5.7 The view from ra ʾīs al-baladiyya ........................................................................... 43 5.8 Who is viewed to be the ‘ sul ṭa’? ............................................................................. 44 5.8.1 Politically ........................................................................................................ 44 5.8.2 Security and ‘ al-wa ḍʿ al-ʾamn ī’ ....................................................................... 45 5.8.3 Religious authority and Khiam as a
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