EXTENSIONS of REMARKS June 20, 1989 EXTENSIONS of REMARKS WHAT DOES the FMLN REALLY the Endgame Is a Cutoff of U.S
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12594 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS June 20, 1989 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS WHAT DOES THE FMLN REALLY The endgame is a cutoff of U.S. aid, the taging the nation's economic infrastructure. WANT? only thing that will alter the balance of The objective was to further undermine the forces in favor of the FMLN. That is what government's ability to meet the needs of FMLN commander Joaquin Villalobos really the people. The total cost of FMLN sabo HON. ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO means when h e writes, "the problem to be tage to date is estimated at $1.8 billion. OF CALIFORNIA solved is the interference of the United Total U.S. economic aid to El Salvador this IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES States. Everything else is open to discus decade has been approximately $2.4 billion. sion" <Foreign Policy, Spring 1988) It should be noted that a sustained inter Tuesday, June 20, 1989 The FMLN's first miscalculation was evi national outcry forced the Contras to recon Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Speaker, in late dent in the failed "final offensive" of Janu sider the use of similar tactics in Nicaragua. April, the FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador an ary 1981. Regrouping in Havana a month However. there has been little international nounced they would step up their military later, FMLN strategists mapped out a plan criticism of the FMLN. In fact, many ob to ''improve our internal military situation" servers cite FMLN sabotage as evidence of campaign in order to thwart the war-monger by engaging in "negotiating maneuvers" de its strength. not its weakness, and therefore ing policies of the Government. Surely, that signed to win time <Freedom At Issue. Sep as a reason why the FMLN should be re must strike my colleagues as hypocritical. The tember-October. 1983>. The FMLN docu spected. Few point out that the primary vic FMLN continues to resort to terrorist attacks, ment produced at this meeting, entitled tims are the workers and peasants the political assassinations, and sabotage while "The Negotiations Maneuver," also included FMLN claims to represent. criticizing the Government for using its military a plan for a diplomatic offensive to establish By 1987. the FMLN took advantage of the forces to defend itself. the organization's international standing. openings created by the Esquipulas II Subsequent offensives in 1982 and 1983 Accord and mounting economic discontent In a recent commentary sponsored by the showed that the guerrillas had recovered a in El Salvador to penetrate democratic labor Independent Human Rights Organization Free significant degree of military capability. movements, and to rebuild front groups as a dom House, Douglas Payne analyzes the However, predicting victory by 1984 was cover for urban commando units. With re question: "What does the FMLN Really their next miscalculation. Their diplomatic newed terror and sabotage capability in the Want?" offensive and negotiating maneuvers had cities. FMLN strategists determined in early I urge my colleagues to read carefully this helped undermine support for the Salvador 1988 that the country was ripe for insurrec analysis. an government in Washington, but a bipar tion. But again they miscalculated. tisan Congressional majority remained in The new insurrectional strategy was A QuESTION OF EL SALVADOR: WHAT DoEs THE FMLN REALLy wANT? favor of continued U.S. aid. U.S. aid led to a mapped out in an internal document of the stronger, more professional army, and mili FMLN General Command, dated January <By Douglas Payne> tary reversals for the guerrillas. FMLN ef 1988 and entitled "Strategic Appraisal." The "Sudden turnaround'' and ··abrupt rever forts to disrupt the 1984 elections failed. document was captured by the military a sal'' are phrases most often used to describe Guerrilla ranks diminished as fighters left month later and subsequently published in the recent peace proposals by El Salvador's the war to try out the democratic system. the April issue of Analisis, the journal of Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front And the inauguration of President Jose Na the New University of San Salvador. It has <FMLN). Many observers emphasize that polean Duarte, a lifelong foe of military been acknowledged as authentic by the the FMLN guerrillas are no longer demand government, undermined their claim to le FMLN. ing a share of power. Many say that the gitimacy both at home and abroad. The document gives evidence that the offer to participate in elections means the The FMLN therefore quickly accepted FMLN once again drifted into its character FMLN has finally agreed to recognize the Duarte's invitation to negotiate in late 1984. istic overconfidence. Its leaders imagined democratic system it's been trying to over But after two meetings, they rejected his that the Salvadoran people had become so throw. offer to disarm and compete in the demo disillusioned with democracy that FMLN But a closer examination of internal cratic system, instead repeating their power "armed propaganda,.. by provoking in FMLN documents, and the group's actual sharing demand. But despite disappoint creased government repression, would "det behavior while proposing peace. reveals that ment over the failure of the talks, it was onate a social explosion" leading to insur the FMLN's objective has not changed; it clear that few democratic nations remained rection. But the scenario didn't pan out; the has merely made a strategic adjustment. willing to back the power-sharing demand. military and the Salvadoran people refused Secondly, a closer inspection of the organi Having lost the battle for popular support to assume their projected roles, even during zation itself reveals totalitarian methods of to the democratic system, the FMLN in 1985 a heated electoral campaign. internal control that make . the avowedly set out to destroy the system. Because of its The night before the March 1988 munici Marxist-Leninist FMLN a highly unlikely weakened military position, however, it was pal and legislative elections, the FMLN set participant in a democratic system. After a forced to resort to terror and sabotage. If it off six bombs in the capital. On election decade of war, there is a natural desire to had not, it would have ceased to exist as a day, they tried to enforce a nationwide traf pursue any avenue for peace, but there is political entity. fic shutdown. cut off power to 80 percent of strong evidence that the FMLN proposals The FMLN began with an attack on the the country by blowing up electoral towers, should be approached with extreme caution. presidency itself. The damage done to the and declared all polling stations military Since 1980, the FMLN has followed a clear Christian Democratic government, and to targets. But while the percentage of eligible pattern. It has consistently 1 > over-calculat Duarte personally, by the kidnapping of his voters declined in comparison to the 1985 ed its strength, both militarily and political daughter in 1985 cannot be overestimated. legislative elections, the total number of ly, then 2) bought time to recover from The FMLN declared it "our biggest victory voters in 1988 actually increased <Estudios defeat with peace proposals aimed at both so far." Such reveling in what many in the Centroamericanos. University of Central domestic and international audiences. The wider world saw as a grotesque act of terror America. San Salvador, March-April1988). FMLN's failure to foment insurrection in ism showed how marginalized the guerrillas During the remaining nine months of 1988, followed by peace proposals in 1989, had become. But. if they underestimated 1988, the FMLN declared a series of offen appears to fit the pattern. the political effects of this on themselves sives and called for the "masses" to join the But the timing of these proposals during they, were right about the impact it had on "popular rebellion." By the end of the year an electoral campaign, with a simultaneous the Duarte government. it was obvious there would be no insurrec increase in the use of violent tactics, signals The drawnout ordeal paralyzed the gov tion. A poll taken by the Jesuit-run Univer the offensive nature of the current initia ernment. In its wake, Duarte appeared to sity of Central America <UCA> showed that tive. The FMLN is not just buying time, it is abdicate leadership to party functionaries. nearly 9 out of 10 Salvadorans surveyed seeking to effectively coordinate, for the The government lost direction. and electoral were planning to vote in 1989 <Estudios Cen first time, armed action with political decep promises on social and economic issues were troamericanos. November-December 1988). tion. The immediate objective is to disrupt lost amid corruption and infighting. Seizing The UCA rector, Father Ignacio Ellacuria, a the democratic system, cause it to collapse. the opportunity, the FMLN turned to saba- man of the left and the former philosophy e This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor. Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor. June 20, 1989 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS 12595 professor of many of the FMLN command At the end of February, he candidly ac rently reports that killings are increasing ers, stated that insurrection was impossible, knowledged that the FMLN did not expect again, its Director, Maria Julia Hernandez, that Salvadorans would continue voting as their proposals to be accepted, that the ini says that most recent incidents are not sanc they had in five previous elections begin tiative was meant to "corner and isolate the tioned by the military leadership or the in ning in 1982. Army" <New York Times, 26 February stitution as a whole.