Single-Crossing Differences on Distributions∗ Navin Kartiky SangMok Leez Daniel Rappoportx November 2, 2018 Abstract We study when choices among lotteries are monotonic (with respect to some or- der) in an expected-utility agent’s preference parameter or type. The requisite property turns out to be that the expected utility difference between any pair of lotteries is single- crossing in the agent’s type. We characterize the set of utility functions that have this property; we identify the orders over lotteries that generate choice monotonicity for any such utility function. We discuss applications to cheap-talk games, costly signal- ing games, and collective choice problems. Our analysis provides some new results on monotone comparative statics and aggregating single-crossing functions. Keywords: monotone comparative statics, choice under uncertainty, interval equilibria ∗We thank Nageeb Ali, Federico Echenique, Mira Frick, Ben Golub, Ryota Iijima, Ian Jewitt, Alexey Kush- nir, Shuo Liu, Daniele Pennesi, Jacopo Perego, Lones Smith, Bruno Strulovici, and various audiences for helpful comments. yDepartment of Economics, Columbia University. E-mail:
[email protected] zDepartment of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis. E-mail:
[email protected] xBooth School of Business, University of Chicago. E-mail:
[email protected] 1 Contents 1. Introduction3 1.1. Overview.......................................3 1.2. Related Literature..................................6 2. Main Results8 2.1. Single-Crossing Expectational Differences....................8 2.2. Strict Single-Crossing Expectational Differences................ 17 2.3. Monotone Comparative Statics.......................... 17 3. Applications 20 3.1. Cheap Talk with Uncertain Receiver Preferences................ 20 3.2. Collective Choice.................................. 23 3.3. Costly Signaling................................... 25 4. Extensions 28 4.1.