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Reducing Climate Risk: Climate Change Mitigation and Bioenergy

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Reducing Climate Risk: Climate Change Mitigation and Bioenergy RESEARCH SYNTHESIS BRIEF Reducing climate risk: Climate change mitigation and bioenergy Avoiding dangerous climate change requires ambitious ac- tions to sharply reduce greenhouse gas emissions. SEI works to inform, support and advise decision-makers and civil society on ways to achieve these reductions and build a low-carbon future – including the role of bioenergy. We have also built tools and analytical frameworks to explore the options, from the global to the local level. Key insights SEI’s research on climate mitigation is broad and diverse, with significant contributions to both the scientific community and policy discourses around the world, as well as capacity devel- opment. The insights discussed here provide a sampling of the range of our work. • Sub-national climate policy should focus on sectors where local actors can exert the most influence and the potential for abatement is greatest; in cities, that is likely to be trans- port and buildings. Sub-national governments can provide an important labora- tory for climate policy innovation, and with rapid urbanization around the world, city-scale mitigation efforts are ever more crucial. Building on SEI’s history of analysing GHG abate- ment opportunities for U.S. states (e.g. Massachusetts), SEI has worked with local governments to better gauge their emissions and find effective mitigation options. © Flickr / Washington State Department of Transportation © Flickr / Washington Seattle and Washington State have worked to reduce transport-related For example, SEI’s work with King County stands as one of the emissions by improving public transit options and encouraging cycling. most comprehensive analyses of local-scale emissions to date (Erickson et al. 2012). From that research, SEI built a detailed new fossil-fuel infrastructure is slated to come online by 2017 to framework for local governments to track emissions (Erickson lock in what remains of our carbon budget. and Lazarus 2012) and informed the local government network ICLEI’s primary reporting framework in its U.S. Community An SEI project launched in 2013 explores the implications of Protocol. SEI then worked with officials in Seattle to develop this disconnect between climate policy debates, and energy an in-depth, detailed scenario for how the city might achieve its development – especially in countries that are focusing on goal of carbon-neutrality, identifying ways to cut emissions by green growth. Our work is based on three premises: that climate up to 90% by 2050 (Lazarus et al. 2011). change mitigation can and must happen; that technologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) are unlikely to make a Most recently, SEI has worked with the C40 Cities Climate major near-term impact; and that policies to slow or limit fossil Leadership Group to develop estimates of the GHG abatement fuel extraction, not just fossil fuel use, are needed. potential of C40 cities in the years 2020 and 2030, as well as to identify criteria for a robust framework for assessing GHG In this context, we have examined different ways to assess reductions at the city scale, which is now under development. the GHG impact of new fossil-fuel infrastructure (Erickson and Lazarus 2013b), aiming to develop a more robust analyti- • Climate change mitigation policy urgently needs to confront cal framework that could be applied to fossil-fuel investments fossil-fuel development, as global warming can only be around the world. We also produced a case study of the proposed kept below 2°C if the vast majority of the world’s coal and Keystone XL pipeline that was cited in the U.S. Department of unconventional oil and gas resources stay in the ground. State’s Environmental Impact Statement of the project. The International Energy Agency has warned that if we are to A related analysis focused on different ways to account for fos- meet the 2°C target, about two-thirds of the world’s proven sil fuels in GHG emissions inventories (Erickson and Lazarus oil, gas and coal reserves must be left undeveloped, and many 2013a). Typically, emissions are measured and regulated at the financial institutions have begun to explore the implications point of fossil fuel combustion (e.g. power plants) or distribu- for markets of having “unburnable carbon”. Still, massive new tion (oil and gas supply); however, this demand-side focus investments continue to be made; according to the IEA, enough means countries could increase fossil-fuel supply and infra- o “The 2 C budget” Third, SEI research has shown that de- Produced under BAU scenario Produced within Produced beyond veloping modern bioenergy can not only the 2oC budget the 2oC budget expand energy access, but also help reduce Coal 8,700 traditional biomass use in poor countries that is associated with deforestation and black-carbon emissions. Thus, the net Oil, Unconventional 7,300 result is not necessarily more biomass use for energy, but rather more effective and efficient biomass use. As part of this Remaining resources Gas, Unconventional work, SEI co-hosted a national seminar on Additional production 2010-2100, bioenergy in Malawi (for a summary, see GEA Baseline scenario Oil, Conventional Johnson and Jumbe 2013). Production 2010-2100, GEA Mix scenario SEI’s approach has emphasized looking Gas, Conventional Historical production at energy security and climate mitigation (through 2010) through a “development lens”, to highlight Fossil fuels exploited1,000 vs.500 left in 0the ground, 500 1,000through 1,500 2100, 2,000 relative 2,500 to a 2°C 3,000 emissions 3,500 budget, 4,000 in terms of the complexity and multi-scale, multi- CO emissions resulting from fuel use. sector nature of bioenergy policy-making. 2 Carbon content (Gt CO2) of fossil fuel resources Drawing from data on historical fossil fuel use (IEA 2013a), fossil fuel reserves and resources (GEA 2012), and projected fossil It has also stressed the need to link biofuels fuel use under GEA’s Mix and Baseline scenarios, this figure shows the amounts of five categories of fossil fuel – conventional natural gas, conventional oil, unconventional gas, unconventional oil, and coal – that have been burned (pale pink bars) and policies to the creation of a “bio-based could still be exploited and combusted through 2100 (pale purple bars) under a scenario (GEA Mix) that represents at least a 50% economy”, which was also the subject of an chance of staying within 2°C. The dark pink bars illustrate the additional amounts of fossil fuels exploited and combusted through 2100 under a business-as-usual scenario (GEA Baseline). The dark purple bars represent the amount of additional recoverable in-depth report (Kemp-Benedict et al. 2012) resources. As shown, the vast majority of the resources left in the ground as the result of achieving a 2°C target would be coal and unconventional oil. produced as part of the business-focused 3C (Combat Climate Change) partnership. Pathways of investment in bioenergy have structure, potentially locking-in substantial future emissions, been explored in a dynamic setting in the National Bioenergy with relatively little effect on their own emissions accounts. Investment Model developed through an SEI collaboration with Complementary, extraction-based accounting frameworks are the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR). needed to fill this gap. Other major activities SEI’s work on this topic has also emphasized the need to con- • LEAP (the Long-range Energy Alternatives Planning system), sider fossil-fuel development in green growth planning efforts which is used by thousands of planners and researchers world- and LEDS studies. To date, neither guidance documents, nor wide, is a major contribution by SEI to mitigation and low-carbon country-specific studies have paid much attention to these issues, development planning at all levels. LEAP has been applied by yet failure to consider them creates substantial lock-in risks. many developing countries in creating their National Communica- Supply-side accounting frameworks and policy interventions can tions to the UNFCCC, at the U.S. state scale, and for city-level lead to more effective and comprehensive strategies to reducing planning in Seattle, Copenhagen and several cities in China and global GHG emissions (Lazarus and Tempest 2014). South Africa. In addition, it has been applied in several SEI-led projects, including Energy for a Shared Development Agenda • Modern bioenergy, including liquid biofuels, is not a pana- (Nilsson, Heaps, et al. 2012), a global energy study prepared for cea, but done well, it can greatly contribute to both mitiga- the Rio+20 conference. The project, a major international collabo- tion and energy access in developing countries. ration, included building a global energy and emissions model, scenario analysis and transitions analysis, and synthesized lessons Perceptions of bioenergy have changed dramatically in the last from 20 transformation cases around the world. decade. Once dismissed as dirty and undesirable in most devel- oping countries, and little-used elsewhere, it thrived as liquid • LEAP has also become a key tool for countries creating Low biofuels were embraced as low-carbon alternatives to petroleum Emissions Development Strategies (LEDS). SEI is supporting products. Then came the “food vs. fuel” backlash as well as several countries developing these strategies, including Mexico, an extended EU policy debate on the sustainability of biofuels the Philippines, Kazakhstan and Mongolia, and has also been a (Johnson 2011). key provider of technical support to international programmes such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) SEI’s research has focused on three aspects of this issue. The Low Emissions Capacity Building programme and the U.S. first, the subject of the bookFood versus Fuel (Rosillo-Calle government’s LEAD programme (Low Emission Asian Develop- and Johnson 2010), is the complex linkages, synergies and ment). SEI has also been working to develop improved method- conflicts in the use of land resources, which involves a series ologies, fill data gaps and enhance national capabilities.
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