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Leibniz on Providence, Foreknowledge and Freedom University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1994 Leibniz on providence, foreknowledge and freedom. Jack D. Davidson University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Davidson, Jack D., "Leibniz on providence, foreknowledge and freedom." (1994). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2221. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2221 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LEIBNIZ ON PROVIDENCE, FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM A Dissertation Presented by JACK D. DAVIDSON Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY September 1994 Department of Philosophy Copyright by Jack D. Davidson 1994 All Rights Reserved ^ LEIBNIZ ON PROVIDENCE, FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM A Dissertation Presented by JACK D. DAVIDSON Approved as to style and content by: \J J2SU2- Vere Chappell, Member Vincent Cleary, Membie r Member oe Jobln Robison, Department Head Department of Philosophy ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I want to thank Vere Chappell for encouraging my work in early modern philosophy. From him I have learned a great deal about the intricate business of exegetical history. His careful work is, and will remain, an inspiration. I also thank Gary Matthews for providing me with an example of a philosopher who integrates his work with his life. Much of my interest in ancient and medieval philosophy has been inspired by his work. My greatest debt with respect to this project is to Bob Sleigh. I could have asked for no better teacher. This dissertation is dedicated to Asli Gocer. With her, I got lucky. IV . ABSTRACT LEIBNIZ ON PROVIDENCE, FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM SEPTEMBER 1994 JACK D. DAVIDSON, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON M.A., UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Directed by: Professor Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. Commentators have long been fascinated by the problem of freedom in Leibniz's system. Many of the recent studies begin with Leibniz's views on modality, truth, and so-called superessentialism, and then investigate whether these doctrines are compatible with freedom and contingency. There is, however, another dimension to Leibniz's thinking about freedom that has been largely overlooked in the recent literature Leibniz inherited a medieval debate about God's foreknowledge of and providence over human free actions, and unlike the other great philosophers of the early modern period, set out to solve it. This means the problem of human freedom for Leibniz was nested in the larger problem of God's creation, preservation, and governance of the entire created order. In this dissertation I set out the late medieval debate and Leibniz's adjudication of it. I argue that Leibniz offers a strong notion of providence that is a via media between the two competing paradigms of the late seventeenth of these century, Molinism and Banezianism . In light v theological commitments, I offer a new assessment of Leibniz's views of divine and human freedom. VI TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . ABSTRACT LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS viii Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION ± The Project A Brief Summary 6 Miscellaneous Remarks 7 2 . THE LATE MEDIEVAL BACKGROUND 11 A Famous Proof Text 11 A Short History of a Big Controversy 13 The Philosophical Debate 16 Divine Causality 17 Secondary Causality 19 Divine Knowledge 21 Molinism 22 Banezianism 29 3. LEIBNIZ ON GOD'S PROVIDENCE AND FOREKNOWLEDGE ... 41 Leibniz's Motivation 41 Leibniz on Molinism 45 Leibniz on Banezianism 53 Leibniz's Account 55 Conclusion 66 4. LEIBNIZ ON HUMAN FREEDOM 74 The Problem 74 The Recalcitrant Passage of NCT 76 Physical Indifference and Compatibilism .... 79 Radix Libertatis 87 Divine Freedom 89 Imitative Freedom 97 Prediction 102 NCT Reconsidered 106 H 4 5 . CONCLUDING THOUGHTS Leibniz's Orthodoxy H 4 Concluding Remarks H 6 BIBLIOGRAPHY 118 vii . : . LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS A Gottned Wilhelm Leibniz: Samtli che Schrift-pn „nrt Briefe. Darmstadt and Berlin: Edition of the Berlin Academy, 1923 -present . Cited by series, volume page and AG P hilosophical—Essays . Trans., Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber. Indianapolis: Hacket, 1989. AT Oeuvres de Descartes . Eds, C. Adam and P. Tannery. Paris: 1897-1913. Reprint. Paris: Vrin, 1964-1975. Cited by volume and page. C Opuscules et fragments inedits de Leibniz . Ed., Louis Couturat. Paris, 1903. Reprint. Hildesheim: Olms 1966 . CD Causa Dei . Trans., Paul Schrecker in Leibniz Monadolocrv and other Philosophical Essays . Ed Schrecker and Schrecker. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1985, pp. 114-145. Cited by section number as given in G/6/437-460. CSM The Philosophical Writings of Descartes . Trans . , John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985-1991. Cited by volume and page. DM Discourse on Metaphysics . Trans., Mary Morris and G.H.R. Parkinson in MP . Cited by section number as given in G/4/427-63. FC Nouvelles lettres et opuscules inedits de Leibniz . Ed A. Foucher de Careil . Paris: Auguste Durand, 1857. G Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz . Ed., C.I. Gerhardt . Berlin, 1875-90. Reprint, Hildesheim: Olms, 1965. Cited by volume and page. Gr Textes inedits . Ed., Gasten Grua. Paris: Presse Universitaires de France, 1948. Reprint, New York and London: 1985. L Philosophical Papers and Letters . Ed., and trans. , Leroy E. Loemker, second edition. Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel, 1969. H. LA The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence . Ed., and trans., T. Mason. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967. Cited by page in G/2/11-138. viii . : LH Die Le ibniz-Handschrjf ten dpr—Koniglichen offentlichpn Bibliothek zu Hannovpr Ed . , Eduard Bodemann 1889. Reprint. Hannover Hildensheim: Georg 01ms, 1966 MP Philosophical Writings . Ed., and trans . , Mary Morris and G.H.R. Parkinson. London: Dent, 1973 . NCT "Necessary and Contingent Truths." Trans. Mary Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson in MP New Essays on Human Understanding . Trans., Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett . New Essays on Human Understanding . Cambridge: Cambridge University7 Presq 1981. Cited by page in A/6/6. PNG "Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason." Trans., Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber in AG. Cited by section number in G/6/598-606. SCG Summa Contra Gentiles . Trans., Anton C. Pegis. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975. Cited by book, chapter, and article. ST Summa Theologica . Trans., Blackfriars. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Col, 1964-66. Cited by part, question, and article. T Theodicy . Trans., E.M. Huggard. Theodicy . New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952. Reprint, LaSalle, 111.: Open Court, 1985. Cited by section number from G/6. VE Vorausedition zur Reihe VI - - Philosoohische Schriften-- in der Ausoabe der Akademie der Wissenschaf ten der DDR . Ed., Leibniz-Forschungsstelle of the Universitat Munster, 1982-1991. IX CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The Project In or around 1689 Leibniz wrote: How freedom and contingency can coexist with the series of causes and with providence is the worry oldest of the human race. And the difficulty of the problem has only increased through the investigations Christians have made concerning God's justice in providing for the salvation of men [FC178 (AG94)]. 1 Problems concerning providence, foreknowledge, and freedom occupy a central place in Leibniz's metaphysics. The Theodicy , the only book by Leibniz published in his lifetime, is devoted to solving two problems: The one kind springs from man's freedom, which appears incompatible with the divine nature; and nevertheless freedom is deemed necessary, in order that man may be deemed guilty and open to punishment. The other kind concerns the conduct of God, and seems to make him participate too much in the existence of evil.... To present these difficulties in brief, it must be observed that freedom is opposed, to all appearance, by determination or certainty of any kind whatsoever; and nevertheless the common dogma of our philosophers states that the truth of contingent futurities is determined, but his providence and his foreordinance whereupon foreknowledge itself appears grounded, do much more: for God is not as a man, able to look upon events with unconcern and to suspend his judgement, since nothing exists save as a result of the decrees of his will and through the action of his power. And even though one leave out of account the co-operation of God, all is perfectly connected in the order of things, since nothing can come to pass unless there be a cause so disposed as to produce the effect, this taking place no less in voluntary than in all other actions. According to which it appears that 1 . iS c m elled to do the good HnL 2 ? and evil that he does and m consequence that he neither deserves thereof recompense nor chastisement: thus morality of is the actions destroyed and all justice divine and human, shaken [T §§1-2] This dissertation is a study of Leibniz's solution to the interconnected set of problems concerning God's foreknowledge of and providence over human free actions. I should say up-front that my goal is exegetical history. 2 That is, my aim is to set out as clearly as possible Leibniz's views on these matters, and his reasons for holding them, rather than attempting to reach the truth about foreknowledge, etc., with Leibniz as my guide. As it happens, I believe Leibniz offers an important challenge to much of the contemporary work on foreknowledge, but it is not the primary purpose of this work to draw such lessons. 3 It is customary to begin projects such as this with some justificatory remarks.
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